THE PONEE? OF CONGRESS UNDER THA CONSTITUTION TO DEFINE, LIMIT,
OR CURTAIL THE APPELLkTE JURISDICTION OF TRE SUPREME COURT AND
THE JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL COURTS I N F f l I O R TO IT
(BY Sam J . Ervin, Jr., of Morganton, N . C., a Former J u s t i c e of
t h e North Carolina Supreme Court and a former United S t a t e s
Senator from North Carolina. )
J u d i c i a l Power
The J u d i c i a l Department of t h e United S t a t e s i s c r e a t e d by A r t i c l e I11
of t n e C o n s t i t u t i o n .
Courts a r e ordained t o e x e r c i s e j u d i c i a l pover alone.
Indeed, they a r e denied a l l o t h e r power.
The j u d i c i a l power i s t h e power wnich c o u r t s e x e r c i s e i n nearing and
determining cases o r c o n t r o v e r s i e s before them of which they have j u r i s d i c t i o n .
I n commenting on j u r i s d i c t i o n , t h e t e x t w r i t e r i n Corpus J u r i s
Secundum ( ~ o l .50, page 1090) says :
The word " j u r i s d i c t i o n i s derived from t h e L a t i n " j u r i s " and "dico",
and means " I speak by t h e law.
" The word " j u r i s d i c t i o n " implies a c o u r t
o r t r i b u n a l with j u d i c i a l power t o hear and determine a cause, and such t r i b u n a l
cannot e x i s t except by a u t h o r i t y of law. J u r i s d i c t i o n always emanates d i r e c t l y
and immediately from t h e law; it i s a power which nobody on whom t h e law has not
conferred it can e x e r c i s e .
..
J u r i s d i c t i o n may be e i t h e r o r i g i n a l o r a p p e l l a t e .
Original jurisdiction
i s t h e power of a c o u r t t o t r y and decide a case o r controversy i n t h e f i r s t
instance; and a p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n i s t h e power of a s u p e r i o r c o u r t t o review
the r u l i n g of an i n f e r i o r c o u r t on t h e record made i n t h e i n f e r i o r court, and
t o affirm, reverse, o r modify such r u l i n g .
A p a r t i c u l a r c o u r t may have o r i g i n a l
J u r i s d i c t i o n i n some cases o r controversies, and a p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n i n
others.
20 American Jurisprudence, 2d, Courts, s e c t i o n 98, page 459.
The Supreme Court made these sound observations on t h i s s u b j e c t i n
Osborn v. U . S. Bank,
The J u d i c i a l power, a s contradistinguished from t h e power of t h e l a w ,
has no existence. Courts a r e mere instruments of t h e law, and can w i l l nothing.
Vhen they a r e s a i d t o exercise d i s c r e t i o n , it i s a mere l e g a l d i s c r e t i o n , a d i s c r e t i o n t o be exercised i n determining t h e course prescribed by law; and when t h a t
i s discerned, t h e duty of t h e court i s t o follow it. J u d i c i a l power i s never
exercised f o r t h e purpose of giving e f f e c t t o t h e w i l l of t h e judge; always f o r
t h e purpose of giving e f f e c t t o t h e w i l l of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e ; or, i n other words,
t h e w i l l of t h e law.
The Constitution Means What It Says
Although some p o l i t i c i a n s , j u d i c i a l a c t i v i s t s , and other biased
individuals seek t o t w i s t awry words d i s p l e a s i n g t o them, t h e Constitution means
what it says.
I n expounding t h i s t r u t h , Chief J u s t i c e John Marshall, America's
w i s e s t J u r i s t of a l l times, s a i d i n h i s famous opinion i n Gibbons v. Odgen,g 'fieat.
1, 188, 6 L . E ~ . 23:
As men whose i n t e n t i o n s r e q u i r e no concealment generally employ the
words which most d i r e c t l y and a p t l y express t h e i d e a s they i n t e n d t o convey, the
enlightened p a t r i o t s who framed our Constitution, and t h e people wno adopted it,
must be understood t o have employed words i n t h e i r natllral sense, and t o have
intended what they have s a i d .
What Chief J u s t i c e Marshall s a i d i s beyond r a t i o n a l dispute.
I f they
~ e
John
d i d not intend f o r t h e Constitution t o mean what it says, ~ e o r iqashington,
Dickinson, BenJamin Franklin, Nathaniel Gorilam, Alexander Hamilton, Rufus King,
James Madison, Gouverneur Morris, Robert Morris, William Patterson, Charles
Cotesworth Pinckney, Roger Sherman, James Wilson, and t h e i r compatriots i n
the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Convention of 1787 indulged i n unprecedented hypocrisy or
idiocy when they d r a f t e d the Constitution and submitted it t o t h e S t a t e s f o r
ratification or rejection.
Trle Power of Congress Unler the Constitution
Provisions
01'
A r t i c l e s I and I11 of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n c l e a r l y r e v e a l
t h a t Congress has t h e l e g i s l a t i v e power t o dei'ine, l i m i t , o r c u r t a i l tile appellate
j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e Supreme Court and t h e J u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e f e d e r a l courts
in:erior
t o it.
They a r e a s follows :
1. A r t i c l e I, S e c t i o n I, d e c l a r e s " a l l l e g i s l a t i v e powers h e r e i n
granted s h a l l be v e s t e d i n a Congress of t h e United S t a t e s , which s h a l l c o n s i s t
of a Senate and House of Representatives."
2.
A r t i c l e I, S e c t i o n V I I I , c l a u s e s 1 and 18, p r e s c r i b e " t h e Congress
s h a l l have the power
.... t o make a l l laws which
s h a l l be necessary and proper
f o r carrying i n t o execution t h e foregoing powers, and a l l o t h e r powers v e s t e d by
t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n i n t h e government of t h e United S t a t e s , o r i n any department
or of r i c e r t h e r e o f . "
3. A r t i c l e 111, S e c t i o n I, provides, i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t , " t h e j u d i c i a l
power of t h e United S t a t e s s h a l l be v e s t e d i n one Supreme Court, and i n such
i n f e r i o r courts a s t h e Congress may from time t o time o r d a i n and e s t a b l i s h . "
4.
A r t i c l e 111, Section 11, c l a u s e 1, s t i p u l a t e s "the j u d i c i a l power
s h a l l extend t o a l l cases, i n Law and Equity, a r i s i n g under t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n ,
and t h e laws of t h e United S t a t e s , and t r e a t i e s made, o r which s h a l l be made,
under t h e i r a u t h o r i t y ;
Ministers and Consuls;
. . . t o all cases a f f e c t i n g Ambassadors, o t h e r public
. . . t o a l l cases of admiralty and maritime j u r i s d i c t i o n ;
. . . t o c o n t r o v e r s i e s t o which t h e United S t a t e s
controversies between two o r more S t a t e s ;
another S t a t e ;
. . . between c i t i z e n s of
s h a l l be a P a r t y ;
. . . to
. . . between a S t a t e and c i t i z e n s of
different States;
. . . between
citizens
of t h e same S t a t e claiming l a n d s under g r a n t s of d i f f e r e n t S t a t e s , and between
a S t a t e , o r t h e c i t i z e n s t h e r e o f , and f o r e i g n S t a t e s , c i t i z e n s , o r subjects.'!
5. A r t i c l e 111, Section
11, Clause 2, s t a t e s " i n a 1 1 cases a f f e c t i n g
Ambassadors, o t h e r p u b l i c m i n i s t e r s and consuls, and t h o s e i n wnich a S t a t e s h a l l
be a party, t h e Supreme Court s h a l l have o r i g i n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n .
I n a l l the other
cases before mentioned, t h e Supreme Court s h a l l have a p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n ,
both a s t o law and f a c t , with such exceptions, and under such r e g u l a t i o n s , a s
t h e Congress s h a l l make."
A s a r e s u l t of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n engendered by t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e
Supreme Court i n Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 1 L.Ed. 440, A r t i c l e 111,
Section 11, Clause 1, was a l t e r e d i n p a r t by t h e Eleventh Amendment.
This
Amendment s p e c i f i e s "the J u d i c i a l Power of t h e United S t a t e s s h a l l n o t be
construed t o extend t o any s u i t i n law o r equity, commenced o r prosecuted
a g a i n s t any one of t h e United S t a t e s by c i t i z e n s of another S t a t e , o r c i t i z e n s
o r s u b j e c t s of any f o r e i g n s t a t e . "
Another Amendment, t h e Seventh, a p p l i e s t o t h e a p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n
of t h e Supreme Court i n r e s p e c t t o f a c t s determined by j u r i e s i n c i v i l cases.
It must be noted t h a t A r t i c l e 111, Section 11, Clause 1, does n o t
a c t u a l l y confer j u r i s d i c t i o n on any c o u r t of t h e United S t a t e s .
On t h e contrary,
it merely enumerates t h e cases o r c o n t r o v e r s i e s i n whicn Congress has t h e
l e g i s l a t i v e power t o confer j u r i s d i c t i o n upon them i f it s e e s f i t t o do so.
I n f e r i o r F e d e r a l Courts E s t a b l i s h e d By Congress under A r t i c l e I11
Acting under A r t i c l e 111, S e c t i o n I, Congress h a s e s t a b l i s h e d United
S t a t e s D i s t r i c t Courts a s c o u r t s of g e n e r a l j u r i s d i c t i o n t o t r y and decide
f e d e r a l c i v i l and c r i m i n a l cases i n t h e f i r s t instance, and United S t a t e s Courts
of Appeal t o review on appeal most r u l i n g s of t h e D i s t r i c t Courts.
To a i d i n t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of f e d e r a l c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e generally,
Congress has c r e a t e d United S t a t e s m a e i s t r a t e s t o t r y and determine p e t t y f e d e r a l
criminal cases, and t o conduct preliminary hearings i n f e d e r a l c r i m i n a l cases of
which t h e D i s t r i c t Courts have o r i g i n a l j u r i s d i c t i n n ,
These m a g i s t r a t e s do not
enjc; l f f e tenure.
Acting under p r o v i s i o n s of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n o t h e r t h a n A r t i c l e 111,
Congress has e s t a b l i s h e d c e r t a i n s p e c i a l c o u r t s of l i m i t e d j u r i s d i c t i o n and c o u r t s
for territories.
These c o u r t s a r e n o t s u b j e c t t o t h e requirements of A r t i c l e 111.
For the sake of c l a r i t y , I employ t h e term f e d e r a l c o u r t s i n f e r i o r t o t h e Supreme
Court i n t h i s statement t o s i w i f y only those i n f e r i o r c o u r t s c r e a t e d by Congress
under A r t i c l e 111, such as t h e D i s t r i c t Courts, t h e Courts of Appeals, and the
Court of Claims.
Original J u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e Supreme Court
A r t i c l e 111, Section 11, clause 2, defines i n s p e c i f i c terms t h e
o r i g i n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e Supreme Court, and Congress i s without power t o
increase o r decrease it. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 24 L.Ed. 60;
Gordon v. United S t a t e s , l l 7 U.S.
697, Appx. 76 L.Ed. 347.
Tne Supreme Court has adjuQed,
however, t h a t Congress may confer on
i n f e r i o r f e d e r a l c o u r t s concurrent j u r i s d i c t i o n with the Supreme Court over
cases or controversies within t h e o r i g i n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e Supreme Court,
s u b j e c t t o t h e review of t h e i r r u l i n g s by t h e Supreme Court.
Ames v. Kansas,
111 U. S. 449, 28 L.Ed. 482, 4 S.Ct. 437; Bors v. Preston, 111 U.S. 252, 28 L.
Ed. 419, 4 S e c t . 407-
The Appellate J u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e Supreme Court and
t h e J u r i ~ d i c t i o nof t h e Federal Courts I n f e r i o r t o it.
It i s otherwise with r e s p e c t t o t h e a p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e
Supreme Court and the j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e f e d e r a l courts i n f e r i o r t o it.
One
of' America's most profound c o n s t i t u t i o n a l scholars, Edwin S. Corwin, had t h i s
t o say on t h i s s u b j e c t i n the 1974 e d i t i o n of h i s famous book The Constitution
And What It Means Today (pages 167-158):
The "cases" and "controversies" here enumerated f a l l i n t o two categories;
f i r s t , those over which j u r i s d i c t i o n "depends on t h e c h a r a c t e r of the cause",
t h a t i s t o say, t h e l a w t o be enforced; second, those over which j u r i s d i c t i o n
"depends e n t i r e l y on t h e character of t h e p a r t i e s . " m ohe ens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat
.
264, 376, 5 L.Ed. 25'1) I n both instances, however, t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n described
i s only p o t e n t i a l , except a s t o t h e o r i g i n a l J u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e Supreme Court.
Thus t h e lower f e d e r a l courts derive all t h e i r j u r i s d i c t i o n immediately from
Acts of Congress, and the same i s t r u e of t h e Supreme Court a s t o i t s a p p e l l a t e
Jurisdiction.
As has been noted, A r t i c l e 111, Section 11, Clause 2 declares i n p l a i n
words t h a t t h e Supreme Court has "appellate j u r i s d i c t i o n , both a s t o Law and
Fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations, a s t h e Congress s h a l l
make. "
The Supreme Court has r i g h t l y adjudged i n multitudes of sound
decisions t h a t under t h i s provision it can exercise no a p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n
except i n t h e cases o r controversies prescribed by Acts of Congress.
Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 D a l l . 321, 1 L.~d.619; Clarke v. Bzzadone,
1 Cranch 212, 2 L.Ed.
Ex Parte Bollman,
85; United S t a t e s v. More, 3 Cranch 159, 2 L.Ed. 397;
4 Cranch 75, 2 L.Ed. 554; Durrousseau v. United S t a t e s ,
6 Cranch 307, 3 L.Ed. 232; United S t a t e s v. Goodwin, 7 Cranch 108, 3 L . E ~ .
284; United S t a t e s v. Gordon, 7 Cranch 287, 3 L.Ed.
Nourse,
347; United S t a t e s
V.
6 Pet. 470., 8 L.Ed. 467; Barry v. Mercein, 5 How. 103, 12 L.Ed. 70;
Forsythe v. United S t a t e s ,
9 How. 571, 13 L.Ed. 362; Re Kaine, 14 How. 103,
14 L.Ed. 345; Ex Parte Vallandigham, 1Wall. 243, 17 L.Ed. 589; Daniels v.
Chicago & R . I. R . Co.,
3 Wall. 250, 18 L.Ed. 224; Walker v. United S t z t e s ,
4 Wall. 163, 18 L.Ed. 319; Edmonson v . Bloomphire, '7 Wall. 306, 19 L.Ed. 91;
Ex Parte McCardle,
7 W a l l . 506, 19 L.Ed. 264; Re Yerger, 8 Wall. 85, 19 L.Ed.
332; French v. Shoemaker, 12 Wall.
13 Wall.
128, 20 L.Ed.
590, 22 L.Ed. 429; B u t t e r f i e l d v. Usher,
91
U.S.
318; United S t a t e s v. Young, 94 U.S. 258, 24 L.Ed. 153; United
S t a t e s v. Sanges,
Bank v. Peters,
144 U.S. 310, 36 L.Ed. 445, 12 S . C t . 609; National Exch.
144 U.S. 570, 36 L.Ed. 545, 12 S . C t . '(6'7; American Const. Co.
v. Jacksonville, T. b K-W. R . Co.,
1-48 U.S. 373, 37 L.Ed. 486, 13 S . C t . 158;
Colorado Cent. Consol. Min. Co. v. Turck, 150 U.S. 138,
37 L.Ed. 1030, 14 S.Ct.
35; Maynard v. Hecht, 1 5 1 U .S . 324, 38 L.Ed. 179, 1 4 S . C t
UniJ;ed S t a t e s , 164 U.S. 436, 41 L.Ed. 504,
. 353;
Chapman v.
17 S.Ct. '76; Montgomery Bldg.
Const. Trades Council v. Ledbetter Erection Co.,
73 s.ct. 196.
v. KLein,
519; M e r r i l l v. Petty, 16 Wall. 338, 21 L . E ~ . 499;
Murdock v. Memphis, 20 W a l l .
246, 23 L.Ed.
86, 20 L.Ed. 270; United S t a t e s
&
344 U.S. 178, 9'1 L.Ed. 204,
I n commenting on what he c a l l s t h e power of Congress over t h e
a p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Supreme Court and t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e
f e d e r a l c o u r t s i n f e r i o r t o it, Edwin S. Comin made t h e s e observations i n
t h e 1947 e d i t i o n of The C o n s t i t u t i o n And What It Means Today
age
127):
Moreover, through i t s unlimited c o n t r o l over t h e Supreme C o u r t ' s
a p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n , as w e l l a s of t'ne t o t a l j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e lower f e d e r a l
courts, Congress i s i n p o s i t i o n t o ' r e s t r i c t t h e a c t u a l e x e r c i s e of j u d i c i a l
review a t times, and even t o f r u s t r a t e it a l t o g e t h e r .
Thus i n 1869 it prevented t h e Court from p a s s i n g on t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y
of t h e Reconstruction Acts by r e p e a l i n g t h e l a t t e r ' s j u r i s d i c t i o n over a case
which had a l r e a d y been argued and was ready f o r d e c i s i o n (EX P a r t e McCardle,
7 Wall. 506, 19 L.Ed. 264); and i n t h e war j u s t closed ( i .e
t h e Second ;Jorld
W-) it confined t h e r i g h t t o challenge t h e v a l i d i t y of p r o v i s i o n s of t h e
Emergency P r i c e Control Act and o r d e r s of t h e OPA under it t o a s i n z l e Emergency
Court of Appeals and t o t h e Supreme Court upon review of t h a t c o u r t ' s judgments
and o r d e r s . (u.s. Code, tit. 50, app. Sec. 924(a); Lockerty v . P n i l l i p s , 319
U.S. 182, 87 L.Ed. 1339, 63 S . C t . 1019; Yakus v . U. S., 321 U.S. 414, 88 L.Ed.
834, 64 S.Ct. 660; Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 88 L,Ed. 892, 64 S.Ct. 641)
.,
Wrien it e x e r c i s e s i t s power t o e s t a b l i s h an i n f e r i o r c o u r t under
A r t i c l e 111, S e c t i o n I, Congress i s empowered t o s p e c i f y what. i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n
s h a l l be.
Tie Supreme Court has r i g h t l y r u l e d i n multitudes of sound d e c i s i o n s
t h a t i n f e r i o r f e d e r a l courts, such a s D i s t r i c t Courts and Courts of Appeal, can
e x e r c i s e only such j u r i s d i c t i o n , c i v i l o r criminal, as may be conferred on them
by an Act of Congress.
Rhode I s l a n d v. Massachusetts, 1 2 P e t . 1233,
Fitzpatrick,
9 L.Ed,
1233; Levy v.
1 5 P e t . 167, 1 0 L.Ed. 699; Cary v . C u r t i s , 3 How. 236, 11 L.Ed.
'il8; Bath County v.
Amy,
13 Wall. 244, 20 L.Ed. 539; Grover
Co. v . Florence Sewing Mach Co., 18 W a l l .
E B. Sewing Mach.
553, 21 L.Ed. 914; Gaines v. Fuentes,
92 U.S. 10, 2 3 L.Ed. 524; Re Pennsylvania, 109 U.S. 174, 27 L.Ed. 834, 3
S .ct.
84; E l l i s v. Davis, 109 U.S. 485, 27 L.Ed. 1006, 3 S . C t . 327; Ex P a r t e Royall,
117 U.S. 241, 29 L.Ed. 868, 6 S.Ct. 734; Holmes v. Goldsmitn
& Co.,
147 U.S. 150,
37 L.Ed. 118, 13 S.Ct. 288; Gregord v. Van Ee, 160 U.S. 643, 40 L.Ed. 566, 16
v
S. C t . 431; Plaquemines Tropical F r u i t Co./
. Henderson,
S. 511,
L(U,U.
42 L.Ed. 1126, 18
S.Ct. 685; Lockerty v. P h i l l i p s , 319 U.S. 182, 67 L.Ed. 1339, 63 S.Ct. 1019;
Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 88 L.Ed. 892, 64 S.Ct. 641; Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Mackay, 351 U.S. 427, 100 L.Ed.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 1.5 L.Ed. 2d
1297, 76 S.Ct.
895; South Carolina v.
769, 86 S . C t . 803; Palmore v. United
States, 411 U.S. 389, 36 L.Ed. 2d 342, 93 S.Ct. 1670; Hagans v. Lavine,
U. S. 528, 39 L.Ed.2d
415
577, 94 S . C t . 1372.
Even i n cases where it has conferred j u r i s d i c t i o n on f e d e r a l courts
i n specified cases, Congress has t h e power t o take away such j u r i s d i c t i o n a t
any time it sees f i t .
Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U . S. 226, 67 L.Ed. 226,
43 S.Ct. 79, 24 A.L.R.
1077.
pending cases.
It may oust f e d e r a l c d u r t s of j u r i s d i c t i o n i n
Re Yerger, 8 Wall.
239 U.S. 506, 60 L . E ~ . 409, 36
85, 19 L.Ed. 332; Hallowell v. Commons,
s .ct.
202.
What has been s a i d makes these things indisputable:
f i r s t , t h e Supreme
Court's a p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n and t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e f e d e r a l courts i n f e r i o r
t o it a r e conferred upon them by Acts of Congress; and, second, Congress cannot
confer upon them j u r i s d i c t i o n of any cause o r controversy other than those
enumerated i n A r t i c l e 111, Section 11, Clause 1. Nashville v . Cooper, 6 Wall.
247, 18 L.Ed. 851; Palmore v. United S t a t e s , 411U.S. 389, 36 L.Ed.2d 342, 93
s. c t .
1670.
When it confers a p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n on t h e Supreme Court o r j u r i s -
d i c t i o n on a f e d e r a l court i n f e r i o r t o it, Consress must give t h e court freedom
t o decide the case o r controversy j u d i c i a l l y one way o r another.
The power t o
- 9 regulate the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the court does not empower Congress t o i n s t r u c t
it as t o how it should decide the case or controversy.
Congress undertook t o do t h a t by a proviso it adopted on June 30,
18'70.
By the proviso, Congress i n s t r u c t e d the Court of Claims t o ignore the
constitutional e f f e c t of p r e s i d e n t i a l pardons i n deciding the claims of persons
who haa allegedly supported the Confederacy f o r cotton confiscated by the federal
government i n Confederate S t a t e s during the C i v i l War.
The Supreme Court
r i g h t l y struck down the proviso i n United S t a t e s v. Klein, 1 3 Wall. 128, 20 L.Ed.
519, as all unconstitutional attempt by Congress t o usurp t h e j u d i c i a l power the
Constitution reposes i n the courts.
Exercise By Congress Of I t s Pbde'r I n Times P a s t
Congress has never authorized federal courts t o exercise a l l of the
jurisdiction it has the power t o give them under A r t i c l e 111, Section 2,
Clause 1.
On the contrary, it has denied them j u r i s d i c t i o n i n multitudes of
instances ever since it enacted the Judicfary Act of 1'789.
A s a r u l e , Congress
has done t h i s t o f o r e s t a l l a flood of t r i v i a l l i t i g a t i o n , or t o minimize the
clogging of the dockets of the federal courts.
As has been observed, however, the McCardle Case demonstrates it
c u r t a i l e d the a p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Supreme Court i n 1869 t o prevent
it from making a decision it feared the court might render.
The Wisdom Of The Founding Fathers
Tne Constitution i s the most precious instrument of government ever
devised by the experience and wisdom of man.
The Founding Fathers d r a f t e d
and r a t i f i e d i t t o secure t o Americans the power of s e l f r u l e and freedom from
governmental tyranny, whether l e g i s l a t i v e , executive, or j u d i c i a l .
I
1
They r e a l i z e d , however, t h a t men a r e f a l l i b l e beings, and t h a t none of
them can be s a f e l y t r u s t e d with unlimited power.
To t h i s end, they vested i n
the Supreme Court t h e power t o i n t e r p r e t the Constitution, and thereby gave
it t h e power t o confine Congress, the President and the S t a t e s t o t h e i r
a l l o t t e d constitutional. spheres.
They undertook t o make Supreme Court J u s t i c e s T a i t h f u l t o the Constitut i o n by making it t h e supreme l a w of t h e land, and by r e q u i r i n g them as well a s
all other f e d e r a l and s t a t e o f f i c e r s t o be "bound by oath o r a f f i r m a t i o n t o
support it
."
( ~ r t i c l eV, Clause 3)
They a l s o undertook t o make Supreme Court J u s t i c e s independent of
a l l things on e a r t h except t h e Constitution i t s e l f by decreeing i n A r t i c l e 111,
Section 1, t h a t "the judges, both of t h e Supreme and i n f e r i o r courts, s h a l l
hold t h e i r o f f i c e s during good behaviour, and s h a l l , a t s t a t e d times, receive
f o r t h e i r services a compensation which s h a l l n o t be diminished during t h e i r
continuance i n o f f i c e . "
Notwithstanding these provisions, two members of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l
Convention of 1787, Elbridge
Gerry, of Massachusetts, and George Mason, of
Virginia, opposed r a t i f i c a t i o n of t h e Constitution by t h e S t a t e s because it
contained no provision s u f f i c i e n t t o compel a c t i v i s t Supreme Court J u s t i c e s t o
obey t h e i r oaths o r affirmations t o support the Constitution o r t o prevent
them from s u b s t i t u t i n g t h e i r personal notions f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l precepts while
pretending t o i n t e r p r e t it.
I do not favor Congress l i m i t i n g the j u r i s d i c t i o n - of f e d e r a l courts
t o adjudicate cases i n which they have manifested t h e i r devotion t o t h e Constitution.
- u I nevertheless reJoice because the Founding Fat'ners have reposed
i n Congress the power t o define, l i m i t , o r c u r t a i l t h e a p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n
of t h e Supreme Court and the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the f e d e r a l courts i n f e r i o r t o
it.
The reason f o r my r e j o i c i n g i s simple.
I abhor j u d i c i a l usurpation
and deem tyranny on t h e bench a s reprehensible a s tyranny on the throne.
The
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l power of Congress t o define, l i m i t , or c u r t a i l t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n
of these courts i s i n r e a l i t y t h e only means embodied i n the Constitution
whereby a c t i v i s t Supreme Court J u s t i c e s can be denied t h e a u t o c r a t i c polqer t o
make themselves America's supreme d i c t a t o r s .
J u d i c i a l a c t i v i s t s a r e judges who i n t e r p r e t t h e Constitution t o mean
what it would have s a i d i f they i n s t e a d of t h e Founding Fathers had w r i t t e n it.
The moral i n h i b i t i o n of t h e i r oaths or affirmations t o support the
Constitution has not sufficed t o r e s t r a i n j u d i c i a l a c t i v i s t s ;
Moreover, l i f e
tenure and undiminishable compensation do not render them immune t o the
temptation t o make themselves independent of the Constitution.
Alexander Hamilton a s s e r t s i n %he F e d e r a l i s t No. 79 t h a t Supreme
Court J u s t i c e s "are l i a b l e t o be impeached f o r mal-conduct" by Congress under
t h e A r t i c l e of t h e Constitution "respecting impeachments", and declares i n t h e
F e d e r a l i s t No. 81 t h a t M t h i s i s d o n e a complete security" a g a i n s t j u d i c i a l
activism.
I express no opinion respecting t h e v a l i d i t y of Hamilton's view t h a t
j u d i c i a l activism c o n s t i t u t e s an impeachable offense under A r t i c l e 111, Section
4 of t h e Constitution.
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It i s t o be noted, however, t h a t t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y , i f it e x i s t s , has
had no d e t e r r e n t e f f e c t on j u d i c i a l activism.
Moreover, impeachment i s a
cum>ersal,process, and cannot be made e f f e c t i v e without t h e concurrence of two
a
t h i r d s of the members of t h e Senate.
A r t i c l e I, S e c t i o n 3, Clause 6.
The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l power of Congress t o define, l i m i t , o r c u r t a i l
t h e a p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e Supreme Court and t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e
f e d e r a l c o u r t s i n f e r i o r t o it i s e x e r c i s a b l e , however, by a b a r e m a j o r i t y of
t h e Houses of Congress.
Members of Congress who r e v e r e t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a r e
l i k e l y t o demand t h a t t h i s power be e x e r c i s e d with frequency i n t h e f u t u r e i f
a c t i v i s t Supreme Court J u s t i c e s do n o t s t o p s u b s t i t u t i n g t h e i r personal notions
f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r e c e p t s while pretending t o i n t e r p r e t t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n .
I n closing, I r e f u s e t o heed Mark Twain's reputed admonition:
i s precious.
Truth
Use it s p a r i n g l y .
The t r a g i c t r u t h i s t h a t j u d i c i a l activism has run r i o t among Supreme
Court J u s t i c e s during r e c e n t y e a r s .
They have b e l i t t l e d t h e r o l e of t h e S t a t e s i n t h e f e d e r a l system of
government ordained by t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n ; they have ignored t h e f a c t t h a t s o c i e t y
and t h e victims of crime a r e as much e n t i t l e d t o j u s t i c e a s t h e accused, and i n
consequence have impaired t h e c a p a c i t y of f e d e r a l and s t a t e c o u r t s t o p r o t e c t
t h e people from criminals; they have n u l l i f i e d b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s of t h e Constit u t i o n and s u b s t i t u t e d t h e i r personal notions f o r them i n cases having r a c i a l
overtones; and they have a r r o g a t e d t o themselves t h e . a u t o c r a t i c power t o p r e s c r i b e
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s f o r v o t i n g i n e l e c t i o n s and t o supervise such e l e c t i o n s i n
defiance of provisions of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n which e x p r e s s l y deny them and t h e
f e d e r a l government such power.
It is high time for activist Supreme Court Justices to realize that
the Constitution of the United States belongs to the people of America and not
to them, and that their supreme obligation to our country is to obey their
oaths or affirmations to support the most precious instrument of government
ever devised by human experience and wisdom.