The Leadership of Harold Wilson Assessed Using
the Greenstein Model
Introduction
Recently, there has been some very interesting work done on the creation of a hierarchy of
success for British Prime Ministers, similar to that employed by Schlesinger and Schlesinger
Jnr. when ranking Presidential performance in the USA. Theakston and Gill designed a
questionnaire which was sent to academics that identified themselves as either British
Politics or modern British History specialists (Theakston and Gill, 2006, 193). They asked
for a score of success of all twentieth century Prime Ministers to formulate a hierarchy, with
the most successful at number one and the least successful at number twenty. They also
asked what specific personality traits or leadership abilities were the most useful or essential
for successful Prime Ministers. This created a ranking of Prime Ministers, but it also
attempted to elicit what particular traits were of key importance when labelling an individual
a ‘success’ or a ‘failure’. Was their personal strength or willpower a key facet or more of a
liability? Was their ability (or lack of it) to communicate effectively with the media an
important factor? Was charisma king or simply one of numerous personality traits beneficial
to becoming a ‘successful’ Prime Minister? Attlee was named the most successful British
Prime Minister of the twentieth century, which might give some indication of the
importance attributed to key skills such as the ability to people manage and the deliverance
of manifesto promises. That Churchill and Lloyd George were two and three respectively in
the same survey might lead to assumptions that there was not one set template of personality
2
traits which informed people’s voting or opinions on individual Prime Ministers. How can
you grade certain individuals facing different circumstances and opposition against each
other, and against a certain measurement of success or failure?
As this ranking of leaders has primarily been established in the US where the ranking of
Presidents is now a fairly established practice the question needs to be asked; why do the
American academics rank their leaders as they do? Generally included in the top three
Presidents are Abraham Lincoln and George Washington. Interestingly for the British work,
certain Presidents are not included in the poll, due to the short length of their tenure, as in
the case of Garfield who was assassinated after only a very short period as President (four
months). This is something which perhaps might have been particularly relevant in the
ranking of Bonar Law at number 16 and Douglas-Home at 19 (out of a total of 20 with only
Anthony Eden ranking lower). While the Schlesinger polls did not explicitly ask the
respondents to identify why certain characteristics and personality traits were important,
some work has been done on this to fill the academic gap. One of the leaders in this field is
Fred Greenstein.
Greenstein identified six personality traits which related to ‘presidential job performance’
(2000, 5). However, he argued that his model could only be used for analyzing the reasons
for the success or failure of American Presidents and not British governments. The reason
for this was that he believed that British governments were far too collective in nature to
analyze the personal traits or abilities of an individual Prime Minister. However, Theakston
argued that Greenstein’s model could be applied to all British Prime Ministers regardless of
their style or personal attributes as long as the individuals were analyzed within the British
3
system of government and with an understanding of the context of their time in office. ‘The
argument here is that Greenstein’s analytical framework can be applied comparatively and
can help in trying to assess Prime-Ministerial performance … detailed historical analysis of
different government would arguably yield a more nuanced verdict of the impact of Prime
Ministers like Baldwin, Wilson or Major than Greenstein claims’ (Theakston, 2007, 41) While
Theakston is almost certainly correct, that the use of the Greenstein model can allow greater
analysis of the attributes or failings of British Prime Ministers regardless of their governing
style, it seems clear that the Greenstein model will be most illuminating when used to
consider the abilities and flaws of those Prime Ministers who exercised a considerable degree
of personal influence, something which would be evident within the leadership of their
government or administration, as witnessed in the American Presidential system. This article
will argue that the Greenstein model is relevant when considering British Prime Ministers,
particularly those who adopt a Prime Ministerial or Presidential governing style. It will then
utilize the Greenstein model to focus on the governing style of Harold Wilson. This model
may also help to explain why he became a much maligned figure, despite some important
victories for his government’s and his abilities as a Labour leader and Prime Minister.
This article will focus primarily on Wilson’s first period in government, between 1964 and
1970, for a number of reasons. It is clear that Wilson adopted a very different approach to
leadership of the cabinet and government in his second period in office from 1974 to 1976,
as he himself recognised (Donoughue, 1987, 15). When Wilson and his ministers entered
government in 1964, very few of them had any governmental experience due to the Labour
Party’s lack of electoral success in the 1950’s. Wilson was one of the minority as he had been
a member of Attlee’s cabinet, serving as President of the Board of Trade from 1947 until his
4
resignation in 1951, along with Bevan and John Freeman.1 Due to this lack of experience,
Wilson was able to take a very active and interventionist role in the running of many of his
key departments, demonstrating both his personal views on specific policy issues and his
individual leadership style. This was a situation which did not occur in his 1974-6
government to the same extent. Many ministers then had been cabinet members in his
previous government and their experience and abilities, coupled with Wilson’s increasing
fatigue, led to him taking a far more ‘hands off’ approach to government in his last two years
in office (Donoughue, 1987, 15). Firstly, however, it is essential to outline how the
Greenstein model, which was created for the study of American Presidents, can be utilized
in the study of British Prime Ministers.
Prime Ministerial and Cabinet Government
Generally the style which a Prime Minister adopts is influenced by his or her preferred style
of conducting cabinet and any previous experience they may have as a cabinet minister. In
his 1962 book The British Cabinet, Mackintosh used examples of various Prime Ministers,
Conservative, Labour and Liberal, to show how different individuals had influenced the
styles their cabinets had adopted. The style which has been labelled ‘Prime Ministerial
government’ appears to have been adopted by the vast majority of post-war Prime Ministers.
However, Greenstein implied that this was incorrect and that cabinet government was the
standard in modern British politics, noting that this included the tenures of Baldwin, Wilson
and Major among others (2000, 2-3).
1
Wilson had been appointed as Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Works in 1945, then in 1947 was
moved to be Secretary of Overseas Trade before becoming President of the Board of Trade.
5
Cabinet government is a collective style of government, where the cabinet as a whole,
generally guided or advised by the Prime Minister and the more senior members, make
policy decisions and discuss the general policy aims of the government. In a cabinet
government the Prime Minister is first amongst equals, with many decisions being made in
cabinet with a guiding hand from the Prime Minister. However, Mackintosh concluded that
this collective style of decision making in cabinet had not been predominant since the latter
half of the nineteenth century (1962, 451). His accounts of different governing styles meant
that traditional views of how the government worked were called into question. Richard
Crossman concluded in his review of Mackintosh’s book in The Guardian that the cabinet
style of government (which Bagehot had noted was typical in his 1867 book The English
Constitution) no longer existed, although this might have been rather an over-simplification of
Mackintosh’s work (Crossman, 1962, 24; Bagehot, 1867).
Mackintosh argued that in Britain, the Prime Ministerial system had become predominant in
the latter half of the twentieth century, with his examples from pre-1940 showing that many
Prime Ministers in this earlier period had preferred the cabinet style of government, with a
few notable exceptions. He argued that the role of the modern cabinet in a Prime Ministerial
government was to co-ordinate administration, ensure that legislative proposals were
acceptable and to keep senior ministers in touch with the activities of the government, not as
a forum to thrash out policy. This was very different from the traditionalists’ view of the role
of cabinet (Mackintosh, 1962, 385). Ministers in a Prime Ministerial government generally
spend their time dealing with decisions within their departments using the policy frameworks
which have been worked out previously. These policies and the general aims of the
6
government are often decided upon while in opposition by the wider party, although of
course some policies have to be worked out while the party is in government. Decisions can
be made at a variety of levels within government depending on what the issue is. These can
be decided by civil servants, departmental committees, the departmental minister or even, in
a limited number of cases, the cabinet itself. Decisions are often taken with very little
discussion and many may never have come to the attention of the cabinet, or even the
departmental minister. When issues are referred to the cabinet, it is often due to conflict at
the committee stage. In these instances, the cabinet acts as an appeal court, not deciding
policy but instead deciding what specific measures should be adopted to institute a policy
which had already been decided upon. Alternatively, decisions can be made based on the
specific circumstances, with issues of practicality taking precedence. However, in the battle
between departments, and with the input of the Treasury, ever eager to cut costs, the
support of the Prime Minister is vital for these policy decisions to pass through cabinet
without rejection or considerable rewriting. As chairman of the cabinet, the Prime Minister
can often help shape the debate at cabinet, by highlighting (or ignoring) specific comments
or summing up the debate in a specific way. In addition, the Prime Minister gains further
influence and power by being at the middle of the political system and knowing the majority
of the policy decisions being made, while other cabinet members, even very senior ones, are
not privy to this range of information.2
2
Where power lies in government and the roles of Cabinet Ministers and the Prime Minister are still issues
which generate heated debate. For a more modern discussion of these issues, please see: Marsh, David,
Richard, David and Smith, Martin, “Re-assessing the Role of Departmental Cabinet Ministers”, Public
Administration, Vol. 78, No. 2, 2000, pp. 305-326. Bevir, Mark and Rhodes, R.A.W., “Prime Ministers,
Presidentialism and Westminster Smokescreens”, Political Studies, Vol. 54, No. 4, 2006, pp. 671-690. Marsh,
7
When Mackintosh’s book was published in 1962, Crossman outlined the three main themes
of the book as being that ‘(1) Cabinet government had been replaced by Prime Ministerial
government, that (2) the Commons had become only one of many interests which a Prime
Minister had to consider when making decisions, and that (3) Prime Ministerial government
was a retreat from democracy’ (Crossman, 1962, 24). He believed that Mackintosh’s book
was extremely good, describing it as ‘a monumental new book’ which contained ‘the first
serious academic analysis of where power lies and how decisions are made in our present
system of government’ (1962, 24). His review was fairly short and so his critique of
Mackintosh’s book is brief but there are some striking observations which he made, which it
is important to note. Firstly, he supported Mackintosh’s assertion that the Prime Minister
can make all the big decisions of government. Indeed, he went further, stating that ‘it is
entirely at his discretion whether he consults members of the cabinet, civil servants, outside
advisers, or representatives of big interests’ (1962, 24). He continued with Mackintosh’s
conclusions, stating that this hand-over of power from cabinet to the Prime Minister meant
that the Commons was now little more than one interest among many, with the Prime
Minister more able to rely on other communication methods to reach out to the public at
election time (1962, 24). He indicated that the Prime Minister did not have any reason to
communicate with the public other than during elections. This meant that democracy in its
traditional sense, no longer existed, as discussion no longer influenced decision making. ‘The
only kind of discussions a modern Premier need hold before a decision are secret
consultations with civil servants, or outside interests, and secret meetings with a party
David, Richard, David and Smith, Martin, “Unequal Plurality: Towards an Asymmetric Power Model of British
Politics”, Government and Opposition, 2003, pp. 306-332.
8
caucus’ (1962, 24). The picture which Crossman painted of governmentwas one which he reevaluated while he was a cabinet minister between 1964 and 1970, when he gained the
knowledge and experience which allowed him to make more credible conclusions. While
Prime Ministerial Government became more prevalent in Britain after 1945, we need to
consider whether Wilson adopted this style or opted for more of a cabinet style of
Government.
Wilson’s Style of Government
Greenstein, writing in 2000, indicated that his leadership model could not be used effectively
in Britain, particularly in conjunction with the ranking of Prime Ministers because ‘in Great
Britain, with its tradition of collective leadership … the rare Winston Churchill, Margaret
Thatcher or Tony Blair is far outnumbered by the many Stanley Baldwin’s, Harold Wilson’s
and John Major’s, whose personal impact on governmental actions is, at best, limited’
(Greenstein, 2000, 2-3). Greenstein categorised Wilson as a collective leader, a ‘first amongst
equals’ leading a cabinet Government. However, a debate now exists over the degree of
personal influence Wilson had, and certainly his (and his governments’) mistakes tend to be
laid firmly at his feet, suggesting personal power and influence. There is absolutely no doubt
that Wilson gave some of his Ministers a degree of independence within their departments.
However, general policy direction and key governmental areas, such as the economy and
foreign policy still had Wilson’s fingerprints all over them. Wilson certainly did not portray
himself as an iron fist in a velvet glove, nor was he, but his various public images as a man at
home with his pipe and slippers and tinned salmon sandwiches, or as a young, Oxbridge
educated technocrat, were not entirely accurate either. The categorisations which Greenstein
9
makes seem to be based more on style than substance and a rather crude comparison
between the American and British governmental systems by an expert in American politics.
This leads Greenstein to incorrectly label Wilson more of a collectivist than an individualist,
certainly in his first period as Prime Minister. In his opinion, this would mean that Wilson
was particularly unsuited to be analyzed using his model. However his assumptions about
Wilson are on the whole inaccurate and it has been suggested that the differentiations that
Greenstein made between American and British leadership do not necessarily preclude the
use of his model as an important and useful analytical framework for all British Prime
Ministers (Theakston, 2007, 41).
Wilson was aware that his first period as Prime Minister between 1964 and 1970 had been
Prime Ministerial (or Presidential) in style.3 Bernard Donoughue noted that ‘Mr Wilson was
apparently more assertive a decade earlier [between 1964 and 1970]. By 1974 his colleagues
were more difficult to dominate … Probably Mr Wilson could have dominated his
colleagues a little more in 1974-6 had he so chosen, but he was anxious not to repeat the
“presidential” experience of 1964’ (Donoughue, 1987, 15). This is interesting as Donoughue
is highlighting the abilities and independence of the cabinet members as having an impact on
the style of government adopted, something which Mackintosh and Crossman barely
considered. Donoughue noted that the Wilson cabinet between 1974 and 1976 were ‘a
remarkably impressive team. They had such experience, intellectual calibre, seniority and
weight in various sections of the party that it was not easy for any Prime Minister to
3
You will note that the Presidential style of government was not mentioned either by Crossman or
Mackintosh. The term ‘Presidential Government’ in Britain appears to be used interchangeably with the term
‘Prime Ministerial’ government and that will be the case throughout this article.
10
dominate them’ (1987, 15). Wilson himself noted that ‘it was not an exaggeration when I
called the 1974 cabinet the most experienced and talented cabinet this century…’ (Wilson,
1976, 24) This highlights the fact that his 1964-70 cabinet were not as capable or
experienced as his later one, unsurprising considering the Labour Party had been out of
power for 13 years before their 1964 election victory. Because of the lack of experience in
his first administration, it seems very likely that Wilson’s personal style was able to find more
expression in his first period in office, hence why it is being focused on here.
Richard Crossman wrote extensively in his cabinet diaries about Wilson’s governmental style,
obviously in light of his existing interest in the debate. His diaries are one of the most
extensive and important sources from the period. Initially, he concluded that while there was
more scope for decision making in cabinet than he had initially thought, there was also more
scope for interference by the Prime Minister in decision making. He was surprised by the
level of discussion which was available in cabinet, and appears to have been surprised at the
freedom which both the cabinet and the Prime Minister had (Crossman, 1975, 29, diary
entry for 22nd October 1964). One month after recording his initial views in his diaries, he
returned to this theory and considered the cabinet and Wilson’s role within it again, coming
to very similar conclusions. While noting the power of other senior ministers within the
cabinet, particularly George Brown, Crossman indicated that Wilson was allowing his
departmental ministers to get on with their work ‘without running to him for assistance’
(1975, 68, diary entry for 22nd November 1964). The main criticism which he had of the
cabinet was that it was too departmental and that almost no-one has an overall impression of
all the activities of the government except Wilson, with Brown being well-versed on
domestic issues but lacking in foreign affairs knowledge at this point. Crossman failed to
11
consider whether this knowledge helped Wilson fulfil a Prime Ministerial role, placing him in
a far more powerful position than his closest senior ministers, but it should be assumed that
it increased his relative position with the cabinet.
By December 1964, Crossman had more clearly identified a theme which was to recur within
his diaries for much of his ministerial career. He argued that individual ministers did not
have wide-ranging discussions within cabinet on policy. Instead, ‘the twenty-three of us
come, each with his particular pressures and problems, trying to get what we want. And we
do avoid any collective discussion of general policy except perhaps on defence and foreign
affairs’ (1975, 80, diary entry for 3rd December 1964). This departmentalism was an issue
which he continued to be aware of, repeatedly urging Wilson to create a small inner cabinet
which could help him to co-ordinate policy and consider the wider political picture. Wilson
did not act upon this advice despite Crossman’s belief that he would.
From 1965 until 1970, Crossman’s views on the style of the Wilson government remained
relatively static, only fluctuating when he felt Wilson had acted in a distinctly different style
on specific issues. From the middle of 1965 he began to indicate in his diaries that while
Wilson was very careful to create the impression of cabinet government, he was instead
acting in a more Prime Ministerial way, fixing decisions with individual ministers, making
more decisions and being at the very centre of his government (1975, 201, diary entry for 1st
April 1965).4 While being critical of this style of government, Crossman utilized it, relying on
4
Crossman stated that ‘this PM very much likes fixing things up privately with Ministers by bilateral
discussions if he possibly can. On the other hand, he is extremely conventional in his desire to make the
cabinet system work in the traditional way’ (Crossman, 1975, 201, diary entry for 1st April 1965).
12
Wilson at certain key points to ensure decisions were made and agreed by cabinet. In 1966
he began to note a change in Wilson’s style. ‘The PM has run the govt completely Prime
Ministerially, he has decided to allow decisions to be taken by George Brown and Callaghan
sparring with each other, and in every other way he has retained decision taking in his
personal domain’ (Crossman, R. 13th June 1966 to 23rd September 1966. Entry for 24th July
1966. Photocopied typescripts of the first and second volumes of the Diaries of a Cabinet
Minister. Crossman Papers. MSS.154/8/92. Modern Records Office, University of Warwick).
In June 1967 he again commented on Wilson’s handling of cabinet regarding the issue of DNotices, indicating that Wilson dominated the handling of the affair by carefully preparing
the timing of the cabinet meeting, ensuring that the discussion took no longer than half an
hour, limiting criticism and ensuring that the white paper on the issue was published after
the cabinet meeting. Crossman described this as the ‘first occasion when I can remember
him taking the strictly presidential line’ (1976, 380, diary entry for 13th June 1967). He
maintained in his diaries that from this occasion on, Wilson became more Prime Ministerial
in his style with cabinet. He concluded that the 1967 cabinet reshuffle allowed Wilson to
take more control of his government, ‘now that phase is over and he is taking the lead
himself, laying down the policy in SEP (steering committee on economic policy) and then
telling the full cabinet of the decisions’ (1975, 466, diary entry for 7th September 1967). It
seems likely that this gradually changing style was due to Wilson’s increasing confidence in
his role as Prime Minister and his reshuffle of cabinet. Following this incident, Crossman did
not comment upon the style of government again, instead becoming more involved in his
reform programme and later his departmental business. It can be assumed that he did not
fundamentally alter his view that Wilson acted increasingly in a Prime Ministerial way, with
his cabinet relegated to the role of rubber-stamp on legislation, a situation which had
13
developed since 1964, when his presentation style had been very different. Wilson appears,
during his 1964-70 government, to have adopted a Prime Ministerial style of government, a
view which is not only confirmed by Crossman, but also by Donoughue, recording Wilson’s
own views. In light of this, we will now consider Greenstein’s model and how it can be
applied to Wilson’s leadership.
Greenstein’s Model for Measuring Successful Leaders
As mentioned briefly earlier, Greenstein identified six characteristics or abilities which were
necessary to be a successful leader. These were:
1. Proficiency as a Public Communicator – This relates to the ability of an
individual to effectively communicate their views, policies and strategy to the public.
In addition, it is concerned with how the individual relates to the public and interacts
with them to gain trust and ultimately electoral success.
2. Organisational Capacity – This element is concerned with the ability of an
individual to organize and create ‘effective institutional arrangements.’ It also deals
with the ability to create good working relations and ‘forge a team and get the most
of it, minimize the tendency of subordinates to tell their boss what they sense he
wants to hear.’
3. Political Skill – The ability of an individual to be politically skilful, both within their
own party and externally. This is usually done by utilizing the ‘powers of office
assertively, build[ing] and maintaining public support and establish[ing] a reputation
among fellow policy makers as a skilled, determined political operator.’
14
4. Public Policy Vision – This relates to the way in which an individual leader
possesses (or fails to possess) an ideology or a set of long-term policy aims and can
‘assess their feasibility’. Greenstein also argues that this includes a ‘capacity to
inspire’.
5. Cognitive Style – Greenstein defines this as the way in which an individual
‘processes the Niagara of advice and information that comes his way.’ While some
individuals focus on the key elements and brush the details aside, other focus on the
smaller issues as a way of dealing with large issues more gradually. Neither is a
guarantee of success, but the large amounts of information which leaders receive,
often on an hour-by-hour basis needs to be absorbed and dealt with rapidly.
6. Emotional Intelligence – This focuses on the ability of an individual to ‘managed
his emotions and turn them to constructive purposes, rather than being dominated
by them and allowing them to diminish his leadership’. Greenstein points out that it
is not a good thing for leaders to be devoid of emotion, nor should they be ruled by
it. Instead a middle ground has to be achieved. ‘Great political ability does sometime
derive from troubled emotions, but the former does not justify the latter in the
custodian of the most destructive military arsenal in human experience.’ (Greenstein,
2004, 5-6 and 218-223).
Wilson Assessed using the Greenstein Model
Proficiency as a Public Communicator
15
One area where Wilson is seen as being a master craftsman is in the field of public
communication. His image, as well as his presentational style, were both carefully
manufactured. As Theakston noted ‘it has been said that Wilson deliberately acquired a sense
of humour in the 1950’s and he certainly transformed himself from a dull and boring speaker
into one who, at his best, was devastatingly sharp, lucid and witty and a brilliant
parliamentary debater’ (Theakston, 2007, 44). His proficiency as a public communicator was
further enhanced by his opposition – Douglas-Home was a poor public speaker with little
rapport with the electorate. Edward Heath was not much better, appearing to be rather
distant – ‘a dry technocratic manager’ (Theakston, 2007, 42). In comparison to the
opposition, Wilson’s presentation appeared better than it would have done were he facing a
Macmillan or a Thatcher in their prime.
Wilson tended to have two different public personas which he managed to combine to great
effect despite their slightly contradictory nature. One the one hand, he presented himself as a
sharp, well educated economist, a man of the future, interested in science and the ‘white heat
of technology’. On the other, Wilson presented himself as a down-to-earth working class
hero from Yorkshire who preferred tin salmon sandwiches to five course banquets. Both
were true to some degree, but neither was a true representation of the man or his
background. Wilson was able to communicate very effectively and created a certain amount
of empathy with the electorate, partially by using his image to his advantage. During the
1964 election campaign ‘reporters found him [Wilson] chatty and intimate … his wit
sparkled like a firecracker’ (Peter Jenkins as recorded in Pimlott, 1992, 312). Obviously, the
message of any government, even in the modern media age, is not solely delivered by the
leader. While Wilson’s style was carefully planned, other members of his cabinet were not so
16
careful. However, he was able to deliver a consistent message to the electorate in a believable
and down-to-earth style, speaking almost as one of them rather than the leader of the
Labour Party.
In terms of his proficiency as a public communicator, Wilson was among one of the best
Britain has ever had. He was able to resonate with the electorate (particularly in the 1964 and
1966 elections, although the situation after this date was obviously affected by the
performance of the Labour government in power over the longer term). He was able to
perform well both in the House of Commons and on television, while his ability for quick
retorts made him a hit with the general public. Pimlott recorded his general ease in public
meetings. He ‘was happiest in the hurly-burly of big meetings. Here he had perfected a
personal art form; the exploitation of hecklers’ (1992, 312). He was also able to compare
himself well with the opposition, which he did skilfully. Some of Wilson’s media abilities
undoubtedly came from his recognition that the media had to be managed rather than simply
handled, while many other leaders of both main parties, although not all, had failed to realise.
Organisational Capacity
Greenstein means by this the ability of the President (or Prime Minister in our case) to adapt
the machinery of Whitehall to his or her own ideas and those of other members of the
government, where appropriate. In this regard, Wilson was something of an innovator. This
might well have been inspired (or at least educated) by his time as a civil servant during the
Second World War, perhaps coupled with his work on the constituency organisation of the
Labour Party. One of the clearest examples of this innovative spirit was the creation of the
17
DEA in 1964, to offer an alternative power source to the Treasury (although Wilson argued
that his primary motivation was to provide a mechanism for long-term economic planning,
something which he argued the Treasury was not able to do due to time constraints)
(Pimlott, 1992, 279). Another example of his innovation was in his remodelling of the
ministries dealing with overseas issues. Firstly, the Ministry of Overseas Development was
created in 1964 with Barbara Castle at its helm while, in the light of events in Rhodesia and
the dismantling of the former British Empire, the Commonwealth Relations Office was
renamed the Department of Colonial Affairs in 1966 when it was merged with the Colonial
Office before both were subsumed into the Foreign Office in 1968 (Vickers, 2006, 146).
Wilson was certainly not unique within Westminster in terms of his reforming spirit, but his
desire to reorganise and reform departments in order to give them more cohesion and
political purpose was certainly not a routine activity among Prime Ministers in Britain. In this
regard, Wilson was certainly successful as he was willing to reform the machinery of
government. He was willing to accept advice from others but was also willing to follow his
own instinct, particularly when dealing with overtly political concerns or personnel issues.
The creation of the huge Department of Health and Social Security in 1968 was not popular
with many within the merged departments as well as Sir Laurence Helsby [Head of the Civil
Service between 1963 and 1968] but was willed into existence by Wilson to give Richard
Crossman a suitable job. On other occasions the Civil Service view won out, as happened in
1969 when Wilson was dissuaded from merging the Ministries of Transport and Power when
William Armstrong [Head of the Civil Service from 1968 to 1974] argued that other
departments might sit rather better together (Theakston, 2006, 153-4).
18
However, it has to be said that some of Wilson’s reforms were not so successful, as
witnessed by the rather quick demise of the DEA. The question has to be asked, using
Greenstein’s work, is an individual a success if they simply institute reform, or can they only
be considered such if those ideas flourish in the medium to long term? Greenstein does not
really consider this, but it is fair to say that Wilson was generally successful in terms of
organisation capacity, although his planning may leave a little to be desired.
Political Skill
This facet of the Greenstein model relates to the political ability of an individual and their
persuasiveness when selling their policies to the public as well as their own party. Wilson was
a master at this kind of political manoeuvring as he didn’t really have a wide ranging,
cohesive public policy vision (see below). Instead, Wilson was ever opportunistic, playing
something of a short-term game, rather than attempting to implement a specific overarching
policy or ideology. Indeed, he was willing to sacrifice a great deal in order to make immediate
political gains, as witnessed both in his negotiations with Ian Smith over UDI in South
Rhodesia and also within his cabinet negotiations over Britain’s 1967 application to join the
EC. In both of these sets of negotiations, even cast-iron assurances from Wilson could be
questioned in the pursuit of a deal.
In the case of Rhodesia, the policy of NIBMAR (No independence Before Majority African
Rule) was described as non-negotiable by Wilson, something which became increasingly less
true during his negotiations with Smith on possible terms of legal independence for the
region. Pimlott quoted Judith Hart who said that ‘if the [HMS] Tiger settlement had gone
19
through, I would have resigned.’ He also argued that ‘the package was so generous to the
Rhodesians that it would have caused a storm among Labour Ministers, and might have
precipitated a Commonwealth collapse – precisely what it was intended to avoid’ (Pimlott,
1992, 451). In terms of the 1967 application to join the EC, despite considerable apathy and
some hostility around the cabinet table (as well as, it has to be said, some enthusiasm from
certain powerful cabinet members) Wilson was able to finesse his way to an acceptance of
the EC as Britain’s most effective tool for economic progression. As Oliver Daddow noted
‘the issue that subtly came to dominate cabinet discussion was not whether but how to apply’
(Daddow, 2003, 14). Wilson also appears to have believed that he could utilize his
considerable political skill to persuade the leaders of the six EC countries (particularly West
German and France) that Britain wanted to be a fully functioning member of the
Community and that it would be in their economic interests to encourage this.
In terms of his political skill, Wilson was a master, with very few Prime Ministers exhibiting
quite the abilities which he had. That said, in order to be the consummate political animal
that Wilson was, he had to have a fairly flexible idea of what it was to be a Labour Prime
Minister and a rather pragmatic or short-term view of what was in the best interests of his
party and the country more widely. As Theakston noted ‘to him [Wilson] any amount of
fudging, trimming or deviousness was justified if it served the overriding end of keeping the
party together, bridging political differences and avoiding splits or resignations’ (Theakston,
2007, 49). This seems rather a problematic stance for a Prime Minister to take, although
more ideologically driven individuals appear to have run into their own problems in this
regard. The measurement of success in this case seems to be very closely linked with
whether the aims and objectives of the government were met and in this regard the picture
20
for Wilson is rather mixed. Political savvy in its own right, while undoubtedly useful, and
perhaps imperative for the successful politician, whether they be a President or a Prime
Minister, seems to be lacking purpose or direction without a coherent public policy vision.
Public Policy Vision
Greenstein means by this the possession of a clear set of long-term goals, a blueprint for
future progress which is possessed by ‘successful’ politicians and leaders. This can be an
ideology, but can simply be a set of guiding principles, a sense of direction rather than a
detailed road map. This would include the very ideologically driven Prime Ministers, such as
Thatcher, and also individuals such as Attlee, who did not appear to have a strict ideological
vision but was guided by his own set of principles and party ethos. Wilson was not in
possession either of an ideological basis for his actions, or even necessarily with a set of
principles and party ethos. For Wilson, a week was a long time in politics. As considered
above (under ‘political skill’) Wilson was a pragmatic leader, with a desire for short-term
gain, rather than pain in pursuit of a longer term goal. His views on specific policies could be
changed relatively quickly in some circumstances, or influenced by the strong views of a
powerful cabinet colleague, or in the case of EC membership, the influence of cabinet
colleagues and a desire to undermine the opposition leader’s key policy aim. Oliver Daddow
highlighted four reasons for Wilson’s rather changeable stance on Europe between 1964 and
1976; the EEC as an economic boost for Britain; the failure of EFTA to deliver large-scale
economic growth; to divert attention away from internal party problems within the Labour
Party; and his desire to outdo Heath’s flagship policy (2003, 11-14).
21
Another area where there was little evidence of long-term goals beyond immediate survival
was the economy. When Wilson entered Downing Street following his 1964 election victory
he was informed of a massive trade deficit meaning that he, along with Jim Callaghan [the
new Chancellor] and George Brown [newly appointed head of the Department of Economic
Affairs] had to decide immediately whether to devalue the pound or deflate the whole
economy in the hope of riding out the financial storm. The three decided on deflation and
followed this policy, with rather varied levels of success, until the economic pressures could
no longer be controlled and the pound was devalued in 1967. The reasons behind this
decision are unclear, but it seems likely that the interests of the newly formed Wilson
government, who were operating with a wafer-thin majority, were high in the mind of
Wilson and his colleagues. Vickers has suggested that devaluation would ‘mean playing into
the hand’s of Labour’s opponents who argued that Labour governments were disastrous for
the British economy, and that a devaluation took place whenever a Labour government was
elected’ (Vickers, 2006, 134) It should be noted that Wilson was put in a rather difficult
position regarding the economy in 1964 and his desire to create financial stability would
surely have outweighed any particular economic plan which he already had. However, while
it is possible that Wilson did have an economic battle plan when he entered Downing Street
in 1964, his actions, at least partially prompted by the difficult circumstances in which he
found himself, provide few hints of what that might have been.
In terms of public policy vision, Wilson is rather deficient and could easily be labelled a
failure. However, the possession of an ideology or a binding set of principles is not
necessarily a guarantee of success for either Presidents or Prime Ministers. A degree of
flexibility is required of all politicians to be successful, and Wilson certainly possessed it. His
22
lack of long-term policy vision does, however, seem to have been rather detrimental, giving
the impression of unprincipled short-term planning. Wilson was certainly a political animal,
but he wasn’t a long-term strategic thinker.
Cognitive Style
Greenstein includes within cognitive style the ability of an individual to process advice and
information. This is very often linked to their intellectual abilities, although not necessarily
their educational achievements. In his work on Presidents, while making reference to the
schooling of individuals, it is not utilized as the measurement of success. Greenstein instead
focuses on the individual styles of specific Presidents and how they make use of their skills
to respond to advice and news.
In terms of Wilson, we have rather a fragmented picture. While undoubtedly very
academically successful (he was a grammar school boy and an Oxford graduate), he cannot
easily be labelled as an intellectual in politics. In her work on intellectuals in politics, Radhika
Desai failed to list Wilson, while including others such as Gaitskell and Jay (1994, 6 and 67).
An intellectual in politics is distinguished from an intellectual politician by their desire to
theorise party policy, something which Wilson rarely did. Both Ben Pimlott and Philip
Ziegler noted in their biographies of Wilson that he was not particularly interested or
concerned with theorising or ideologies, instead focusing on practical policy issues (as
discussed above in the sub-sections on ‘political skill’ and ‘public policy vision’). Ziegler
described Wilson as the ‘Gritty Yorkshireman’, an observation which Crossman had also
made, noting that these kind of men ‘are also expected to be pragmatic and to distrust, if not
23
invariably avoid, flights of fancy or reflective theorising. Henry Kissinger marvelled at
Wilson’s indifference to abstract ideas’ (Ziegler, 1993, 42). Pimlott noted that The Observer
‘counted it an advantage, as far as the approval of rank-and-file trade-unionist MPs were
concerned, that – though brainy – he [Wilson] was not an intellectual in the normal sense…’
(Pimlott, 1992, 106). Wilson’s more practical approach seems to have been popular with the
electorate, but his lack of theorising while an MP excludes him from the category of
intellectuals in politics.
However, it is not essential to a Prime Minister to be an intellectual. Some of Britain’s best
Prime Ministers, while undoubtedly intellectually able, were not intellectuals within politics,
using Desai’s template. However, in the case of Wilson, this ties into his lack of long-term
vision, making him rather short-sighted in policy terms. Instead of considering the ideas
behind policies or the driving force, Wilson instead focused on the shorter-term benefits and
the salesmanship required to sell the idea to his party and the country more widely. Wilson’s
ability to process information was certainly good, and his intelligence is not in question here.
However, it seems that this was not perhaps utilized as effectively as it might have been due
to his lack of ideology or a set of principles within which he was able to work. That is not to
say that Wilson the man did not have principles or was unprincipled in his daily life, simply
that his policies did not reflect any underlying long-term aims. In this regard, Wilson can be
labelled both a success and a failure. He was a success in that he was very capable of working
as a Prime Minister (both in terms of his work rate and his ability to understand and digest
complex information, especially economic data) but he was something of a failure in that he
was not able to utilize that information into what is now termed ‘joined-up government’ or
to fend off some of the external difficulties which he faced as Prime Minister, which should
24
perhaps have been more obvious to a man of his ability with key information at his
fingertips.
Emotional Intelligence
The emotional intelligence of an individual is perhaps one of the most important facets
required of a President or a Prime Minister. Without the ability to control your emotions,
effective leadership, particularly political leadership, is almost impossible. As Greenstein
notes, ‘beware the presidential contender who lacks emotional intelligence. In its absence, all
else may turn to ashes’ (2000, 200). This category relates not simply to self-belief (which is in
itself an important facet of leadership) but to the ability to ignore negative news stories, deal
with colleagues and face confrontation when it is required.
Again, in this regard, we have rather a mixed picture of Wilson. He had many admirable
personal qualities which he was able to utilize effectively when leader of the Labour Party
and later Prime Minister. He was cordial, nurtured personal relationships and did not hold
himself at a distance from others. Donoughue noted
Harold also liked verbal advice and a lot of gossip. He loved chatting. He
would emerge from the heavy dramas of the cabinet room and grab me,
saying ‘Get Joe [Haines], get Albert [Murray], come upstairs to the study.’
Once there, one moment we would be discussing international monetary
policy and the next the football disasters of Millwall FC … or the alleged
25
affairs of various Ministers, especially at Defence, where the security
aspect added a delicious piquancy (1987, 12).
Hardly the attitude of a difficult or isolated figure in Number ten.
However, he was also thin-skinned and took criticism, particularly press criticism, to heart
and brooded on it. He avoided confrontation wherever possible, which could be very
problematic and allowed certain individuals to overstep the mark on occasion. Additionally
he was often accused of a sense of paranoia, believing that his cabinet colleagues were
scheming against him leading Benn to note in his diary ‘Harold is very paranoid … he is
afraid and isn’t quite up to the job’ (Benn, 1988, 63, diary entry for 30th April 1968). In his
later period in government between 1974 and 1976, Wilson believed that MI5 were plotting
to remove him from power. As we know, there is now debate over the reality of these fears,
but Wilson was undoubtedly an individual with a very keen suspicion of those who
surrounded him.
When Wilson was able to keep his emotions in check, he could be a successful Prime
Minister. His man-management skills were very good and he was a man who, due to his
personality and position within the party, was neither vehemently hated nor desperately
loved. He certainly did not suffer from some of the same emotional problems which have
stunted or even destroyed other Prime Ministers and Presidents (Greenstein identifies
Nixon, unsurprisingly, as the most emotionally flawed of the Presidents he studied, while
Theakston identifies Eden as someone ‘not emotionally well-equipped for the highest
office.’) (Greenstein, 2004, 222; Theakston, 2007, 59). However, he did have some emotional
26
demons to fight in terms of his paranoia and suspicion and his overt optimism could verge
on delusion, such as his belief that he and George Brown could convince De Gaulle in 1967
to allow Britain to join the EC (Pimlott, 1992, 439).5 However, Anthony Adamthwaite noted
‘much more than a Wilson charm offensive would have been required to neutralise the Quai
d’Orsay’s [the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs] outlook’ (2003, 162). In the main, Wilson
was generally a good manager of his emotional intelligence, and was successful in this regard.
Conclusion
Greenstein’s model for analysing the success or failure of American Presidents can be
successfully utilized for British Prime Ministers. Despite the differences in the American and
British political systems, the abilities (or lack of) in the leader are crucial to the success of the
administration or government. While in Britain the governmental system is built to
encourage collectivism, the reality of the situation in Post-War Britain is very different.
Prime Ministerial government has become the norm, but individuals such as Greenstein (an
American Politics specialist not a British Politics specialist) rely on impressions of
government rather than the realities of the situation. While collective government in Britain
is not necessarily dead, it is not a rule of thumb.
As Theakston argues, it is possible that in the case of Prime Ministers who adopt a cabinet
style of government, the use of Greenstein’s model might provide us with more insight into
one of the personalities around the cabinet table, although the conclusions would have to be
5
‘At Cabinet, after the return if Wilson and Brown from the first leg of their journey, it appeared that “George
and Harold both thought that they had begun the major job of charming the General.”’ (Pimlott, 1992, 439)
27
treated with a certain amount of caution and assessed in the context of the British political
system (Theakston, 2007, 41). However, it seems likely that Greenstein’s model is
particularly revealing when it is applied to the leadership of Prime Ministers who have
adopted a Prime Ministerial or Presidential style of government, such as Harold Wilson.
Using Greenstein’s model to assess the success of Wilson, it is easy to see that he possessed
many qualities which made him a successful leader. He was an effective organiser, able to
reorganise and reform the mechanisms of Government, was a supreme political animal in
terms of his political skill and was generally able to keep his emotions steady and utilize his
personality traits. However, the use of this model has also highlighted some of the reasons
why Wilson was not so successful, and these tend to be political factors rather than
personality ones. He lacked a coherent political vision and because of this, he was rather
pragmatic, searching for the short-term popular vote-winning position, rather than dealing
with some of the underlying problems which Britain faced in the late 1960’s. It is perhaps
due to this rather mixed impression of Wilson that he was ranked a rather middling 9 out of
20 in the Theakston-Gill poll (Theakston and Gill, 2006, 196).
However, Greenstein’s model, while useful, does not provide us with a complete picture as it
fails to take account of external factors, instead dealing with the reactions to these. In the
case of Wilson, while he may not have dealt with, for example, the underlying economic
problems which Britain faced in 1964, choosing to deflate the economy rather than devalue
the pound, this was almost certainly driven to a degree by the political realities which Wilson
and the Labour Government faced. Ideology and a long-term strategic plan are all well and
good, but if you only stay in power for 2 years (between 1964 and the 1966 General
28
Election) they are going to be rather limited in their usefulness. Wilson was not a perfect
Prime Minister, but then no-one is. Greenstein himself notes that perfect Presidents are
simply unrealistic, and it might be the flaws which make an individual a success as well as a
failure. ‘In the real world, human imperfections are inevitable, but some imperfections are
more disabling than others’ (2000, 200). Using the Greenstein system is an interesting
academic exercise and sheds light on some underdeveloped areas of British Political history,
but it raises as many questions as it answers.
Bibliography
Adamthwaite, Anthony, “John Bull Vs. Marianne Round Two: Anglo-French Relations and
Britain’s Second EEC Membership Bid” in Daddow, Oliver (Ed.) Harold Wilson and European
Integration; Britain’s Second Application to join the EEC, Frank Cass, 2003.
Bagehot, Walter, The English Constitution, Glasgow, Fontana/Collins, 1963 reprint with an
introduction by Richard Crossman.
Benn, Tony, Office Without Power; diaries 1968-72, Hutchinson, 1988.
Bevir, Mark and Rhodes, R.A.W., “Prime Ministers, Presidentialism and Westminster
Smokescreens”, Political Studies, Vol. 54, No. 4, 2006, pp. 671-690.
Crossman, Richard, “Retreat from Democracy”, The Guardian, 6th June 1962.
Crossman, Richard, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister: Minister of Housing 1964-66, Vol. I,
Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape, 1975.
Crossman, Richard, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister: Lord President of the Council and Leader of the
House of Commons 1966-68, Vol. II, Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape, 1976.
29
Crossman Papers, MSS.154/8/92. Photocopied typescripts of the first and second volume
of the Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, 13th June 1966 to 23rd September 1966.
Daddow, Oliver “Introduction” in Daddow, Oliver (Ed.) Harold Wilson and European
Integration; Britain’s Second Application to join the EEC, Frank Cass, 2003.
Donoughue, Bernard, Prime Minister; The Conduct of Policy under Harold Wilson and James
Callaghan, Jonathan Cape, 1987.
Greenstein, Fred, The Presidential Difference; Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton, New York,
Free Press, 2000.
Greenstein, Fred, The Presidential Difference; Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton, Second
Edition, Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2004.
Mackintosh, John, The British Cabinet, Stevens, 1962.
Marsh, David, Richard, David and Smith, Martin, “Re-assessing the Role of Departmental
Cabinet Ministers”, Public Administration, Vol. 78, No. 2, 2000, pp. 305-326.
Marsh, David, Richard, David and Smith, Martin, “Unequal Plurality: Towards an
Asymmetric Power Model of British Politics”, Government and Opposition, 2003, pp. 306-332.
Morgan, Janet, The House of Lords and the Labour Government 1964-70, Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1975.
Pimlott, Ben, Harold Wilson, Harpercollins, 1992.
Theakston, Kevin and Gill, Mark, “Rating 20th - Century British Prime Ministers”, British
Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 8, No.2, 2006, pp. 193-213.
Theakston, Kevin, “Whitehall Reform” in Dorey, Peter (Ed.) The Labour Governments 196470, Routledge, 2006.
Theakston, Kevin, “What Makes for an Effective Prime Minister?”, Quaderni Di Scienza
Politica, 2007, pp.39-61.
30
Vickers, Rhiannon, “Foreign Policy Beyond Europe” in Dorey, Peter (Ed.) The Labour
Governments 1964-70, Routledge, 2006.
Wilson, Harold, The Governance of Britain, 1976, Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael
Joseph.
Ziegler, Philip, Wilson, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1993.