PhD Pauli Heikkilä
ICCEES World Congress 2015
3 – 8 August, 2015
Makuhari, Japan
Global Allies or Racial Strangers – Perceptions of Finnish
Fascism on Japan during World War II
Abstract
Finland and Japan fought technically on the same side in World War II. However, Finland never
waged against the USA, which was the main opponent of Japan, and in a similar fashion the Soviet
Union declared war to Japan nearly a year after the end of Finno-Soviet Continuation War (1941–
1944). The bilateral relations between the distant allies were scarce and have not attracted historical
research.
My research deals with the Nazi German concept of New Europe, which was used to create a feeling
of solidarity of German allies. The call was far from sincere in the minds of Nazi leaders and had poor
response with desired allies as well. In Finland, only the marginal fascist groupings propagated for
New Europe. Previously I have analyzed their articles on Nordic community, Eastern European allies
(Slovakia, Croatia, Estonia), Russian enemy image, and on the relation of Nazi Germany and New
Europe. Their discourse is compared with the official Finnish diplomacy to gain a wider picture of
Finnish political elite.
The imagined role of Japan reveals the content of the global system within the Fascist ideology of the
small country. The Japanese won the admiration of the Finns with their achievements on the
battleground and therefore Japan was occasionally referred as a rising world power in Fascist
newspapers in Finland. After the war, the world would be divided into continents and Japan would
be the Asian leader. On the other hand, the distance between Finland and Japan prevailed as the
dominant factor and the image of Japan remained shallow and general. There was little interest to
learn about the new partners.
Short CV: Pauli Heikkilä (Finnish, born 1974) defended his doctoral thesis “Imagining Europe,
Imagining the Nation. Estonian Discussion on European Unification, 1923–1957” at the University of
Turku, Finland, in 2011. The extended version of the thesis Estonians for Europe. National Activism
for European Integration, 1922–1991 was published by Peter Lang in 2014. Since the defense, Dr.
Heikkilä has worked as Research Fellow in the Institute of History and Archaeology at the University
of Tartu, Estonia, where he has concentrated on international cooperation of Eastern European
emigrants during the Cold War. He has published widely also on contemporary Finnish history and he
is finishing a monograph on Finnish discussions on European unification.
PhD Pauli Heikkilä
ICCEES World Congress 2015
3 – 8 August, 2015
Makuhari, Japan
Global Allies or Racial Strangers –
Perceptions of Finnish Fascism on Japan during World War II
As unbelievable it may sound, my presentation has its roots in the history of European integration.
My doctoral thesis dealt with the Estonian discussion on unification plans 1923–1957 and my
forthcoming monograph will look at the same topics from the Finnish point of view. The middle point
of the timeframe, World War II, is rather problematic because unlike most of the European countries,
Finland was not occupied and thus didn’t have resistance movements, whose declarations could be
presented as embryos of unification. Instead, as an independent country, Finland had to adapt a
convenient attitude towards Nazi Germany and their slogan of New Europe.
In the long history of plans for European unification, the plans are presented after a calamitous war
to maintain peace. On the contrary, the New Europe was a call to arms and an attempt to create a
feeling of solidarity among German allies in the war against the USSR (and Great Britain). Despite
pretty words, the Nazi actions soon showed that the slogan was only a poor smokescreen for German
ambition of superiority in Europe and exploitation of continental resources.
The fascists in Finland were the obvious sympathizers of the New Europe, outside them and part of
conservative elite, the concept was rarely even discussed; usually disparaged and ridiculed. I have
previously analyzed their articles on Nordic community, Eastern European allies (Slovakia, Croatia,
Estonia), Russian enemy image, and on the relation of Nazi Germany and New Europe. Their
discourse has been compared with the official Finnish diplomacy to gain a wider picture of Finnish
political elite. During these researches, I’ve come across references to Japan, and then I decided to
add another case study to my research. The imagined role of Japan reveals the content of the global
system within the Fascist ideology of the small country.
My sources include mostly the newspapers by the Finnish fascists. There are no exact data about
their popularity, but a harsh estimation would be some thousands of supporters. Although there are
studies about their organizations and publications1, the ideological work is yet left to be done. The
main interest of these groups was in domestic and social politics rather than in foreign affairs. But
the fascist attitudes towards their respective groups and relations between them merit research
more than it has previously gained and the New Europe provides an excellent tool for that. It forced
them to consider issues, which were otherwise neglected.2
1
Erkki Teikari, Suomen oikeistoradikaalinen lehdistö vuosina 1930–1944 (Tampereen yliopiston
tiedotustutkimuksen laitos, Tampere 1973); Henrik Ekberg, Führerns trogna följeslagare: Den finländska
nazismen 1932–1944 (Schildts, Helsinki 1991).
2
Literature on fascism has exploded since Ernst Nolte and especially after Roger Griffin’s theory of fascism as
palingenetic ultranationalism. Research on international (or inter-fascist) ideas took place in early 1970s (For
There are four newspapers in my material: Kustaa Vaasa (Gustav Vasa) and Uusi Eurooppa (New
Europe) were published by the organization Siniristi (Blue Cross). As a political party they underlined
the bilingual character of the Finnish nation but on the other hand it included also people from the
kindred societies; one of their leaders, Erkki Räikkönen, was of Ingrian descent.3
The two others, Vapaa Suomi (Free Finland) of Suomen Kansallissosialistinen Työjärjestö (Finland’s
National Socialist Working Organization) edited by Teo Snellman and Kansallissosialisti (National
Socialist) of Suomen Kansallissosialistit (Finland’s National Socialists) edited by Yrjö Raikas, were
more clearly the organs of their parties. The dividing line between them was whether the fascist idea
had domestic or German origins. Raikas won the battle in late 1943, when Snellman sold his paper
and started to work in Raikas’s organization. Kansallissosialisti was by far the most popular of these
papers and the only one, which survived until the Finnish truce with the USSR in September 1944.4
The fascist style seems poetic but it hides the void behind the words. Although translating their long
and complex sentences is difficult, it serves the purpose to gasp the fundamental idea in them. For
example, they preferred to use term “kansanvaltio” (nation’s state) to “kansallisvaltio” (nation state).
What’s the difference, what’s the point?
The Finnish press was relatively free during the war.5 The censorship did not pay huge attention to
fascist papers, as they were so unimportant. They were under surveillance for their domestic
aspirations but also because of relations to Western powers. Although the press in Finland may have
been free to write about Japan, there is no doubt the information sent from Japan – or Germany –
was highly regulated. It was ‘an imagined community’ in the true sense of the concept.
The fascist publicity is the first level of this research. To gain some more general image I will also use
presentations on the parliamentary press based on research literature6 and my own cursive reading.
The second level of the research material is the reports of the Finnish foreign ministry from Tokio,
which were the most objective Finnish accounts from Japan. Finnish Envoy Gustaf Idman was a
career diplomat but he had arrived in Tokyo only in October 1939. His reports arrived in Finland with
great delay even before the Barbarossa attack in June 1941; for example the report on August 20,
1941 was received in the foreign ministry on December 17. Idman continued to write them although
sending them became impossible after Japan attacked the US in December. The reports arrived in
example Michael Ledeen, Universal Fascism. The Theory and Practice of the Fascist International, 1928-1936
(Fertig, New York 1972) and has since then re-emerged sporadically with very recent publications: Anti-Liberal
Europe. A Neglected Story of Europeanization. Ed. Dieter Gosewinkel. Beghahn Books, Oxford 2014; Robert
Grunert: Der Europagedanke westeuropäischer faschistischer Bewegungen 1940–1945. Ferdinand Schöningh,
Paderborn 2012; Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History 2012:3.
3
Teikari 1973, 87-89, 93-94; Ekberg 1991, 107-109, 211-219.
4
Teikari 1973, 62-63, 70-71; Ekberg 1991, 168-191, 250-253.
5
Alpo Rusi, Lehdistösensuuri jatkosodassa: Sanan valvonta sodankäynnin välineenä 1941–1944. Suomen
historiallinen seura, Helsinki 1982.
6
Touko Perko, Aseveljen kuva: Suhtautuminen Saksaan jatkosodan Suomessa 1941-1944. WSOY, Helsinki 1971;
Heikki Luostarinen, Perivihollinen: Suomen oikeistolehdistön Neuvostoliittoa koskeva viholliskuva sodassa 194144. Vastapaino, Tampere 1986.
Helsinki only in 1952, when the new envoy took the office. Finnish legation included also military
attaches Colonel Kaila and Major Laine.
There isn’t a surplus of research literature on the three nexuses of this paper: German-Japanese
relations, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and Finnish-Japanese relations at least in
English – or in Finnish. This paper is based mainly on four publications and some of them admit that
there still remain gaps in research, which probably have not been filled in other languages either.7
Besides monographs, a glimpse of relevant journals (Japan Forum, Journal of Japanese Studies) gives
only a handful of articles on the history of actual Japanese foreign policy (particularly in this topic) or
their foreign relations in general, (perceptions etc.)8 There might be political reasons for staying quiet
but also a practical one, like the lack of sources, or the mere fact that there actually is nothing to
study.
The same applies to German New Europe. Despite hints of identifying it with the current European
Union, the two ideas are despite superficial similarities fundamentally opposite. These studies rarely
refer to relations with Japan. The basic works on Nazi Germany by Ian Kershaw and Michael Burleigh
make very few references to Japan and none of them to their bilateral relations9. Gerhard Weinberg
in his book of more than 700 pages on pre-war Nazi foreign policy gives roughly twenty pages to the
preparations of the Anti-Comintern treaty.10 The dissertation by Olavi Fält still remains the solid
presentation of Finnish-Japanese relations until 1939 and a similar research could finally continue
from his work. 11
7
W.G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism 1894-1945. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1987, esp. 12; Iriye, Akira, Japan and
the wider world. From the mid-nineteenth century to the present. Longman, London 1997; Jonathan R.
Adelman, ’German–Japanese relations, 1941–1945’, Jonathan R. Adelman (ed.) Hitler and his allies in World
War II. Routledge, Abingdon 2007, esp 43. The article by Adelman is dominantly based on two sources: Bernd
Martin, Japan and Germany in the Modern World. Berghahn, Oxford 1995 and Hans-Joachim Krug, Yoichi
Hirama, Berghold Sander-Nagashima, Reluctant Allies. German Japanese Naval Relations in World War II. Naval
Institute Press, Annapolis 2001.
8
Ken McNeil, ’New Zealand through a Japanese glass 1869-1944’, Japan Forum 2006:1 23-43; Rustin B. Gates,
’Pan-Asianism in Prewar Japanese Foreign Affairs. The Curious Case of Uchida Yasuya’, Journal of Japanese
Studies 2011:1; Roman Rosenbaum, ’What kind of place in the new nation of Machuria? Roundtable talks in
Nyonin geijutsu’, Japan Forum 2013:3, 379-394; Andrea Germer, ’Visible Cultures, invisible politics. Propaganda
in the magasine Nippon Fujin, 1942-1945’, Japan Forum 2013:4, 505-539.
9
Michael Burleigh, The Third Reich. A New History. Macmillan, London 2000; Ian Kershaw, The Nazi
Dictatorship. Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation. Fourth Edition. Arnold, London 2000.
10
Gerhard Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany. Starting World War II, 1937–1939. University of
Chicago Press, Chicago 1980.
11
Olavi Fält, Eksotismista realismiin. Perinteinen Japanin-kuva Suomessa 1930-luvun murroksessa [From
Exoticism to Realism. The Traditional Image of Japan in Finland in the Transition Years of the 1930’s]. PohjoisSuomen Historiallinen Yhdistys, Rovaniemi 1982.
An Axis too wide
Japan primarily entered the horizon of Finnish fascists, when she signed international treaties with
the Nazi Germany. Kansallissosialisti cherished the tripartite treaty of September 1940. It built
relations between the states on a natural basis, whilst in comparison the League of Nations had been
an unnatural union and distorted genuine solidarity among nations. Instead the treaty took the
national obligation into consideration and with Japan it was now a global system.12
Vapaa Suomi considered in a similar fashion the international meaning of the Anti-Comintern treaty,
when it was revised in November 1941 and Finland among others joined it. First of all it was the
alliance of free nationstates and brotherhood-in-arms between Europeans and Japanese. Secondly
the treaty determined “the concentration of leadership in Europe for the Axis powers and in Asia for
Japan”.13
There were actual some signs and opportunities for cooperation. During and after the Barbarossa
invasion, Japan and Germany were close for cooperation, as Japanese Army moved troops to the
Soviet border in many occasions between July 1941 and June 1942 but the final decision was not
eventually made. In October 1941 Japan made the decision to continue advancing to the south (and
attacking the US) and favored a diplomatic solutions between Germany and the USSR. After
Stalingrad common military plans became mere fantasy.14
They had been far from reality even before. From the German point of view Japan, which had taken
the German colonies in World War I, was a minor partner to China until 1939 even despite the AntiComintern treaty.15 The treaties Germany and Japan signed included clauses for exceptions. As
Jonathan Edelman formulates, “both sides wanted the other to help save it rather than to work
together”. The treaties rather keep them apart than brought them together.16 A famous, although
personal, example of contradiction between Japan and Germany is Chiune Sugihara, consul to
Lithuania, who issued transit visas to thousands of Jews to travel to Japan through the USSR.
The two parties had minimal communication with each other. The exchange of intelligence was
minimal and occasional naval cooperation went poorly. Germany did not inform Japan in advance on
either the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact (which practically nullified the Anti-Comintern treaty) or the
12
Berliini-Rooma-Tokio luo perustan uudelle henkiselle ja taloudelliselle elämälle. Kansallissosialisti 1941:11,
1+4; Berliinin kongressi 1941. Kansallissosialisti 1942:4, 4.
13
Saksan, Italian ja Japanin kolmiliitolla on suuri yleismaailmallinen merkitys. Vapaa Suomi 1940:17,1;
Antikomintern. Vapaa Suomi 1941:39/40, 5-6.
14
Adelman 2007, 44, 48-49, 74.
15
Adelman 2007, 57, 63-66.
16
Adelman 2007, 45, 47, 69; For disagreement between German and Japanese diplomacy on local level, see
Nada Kisic Kolanovic, ’The NDH’s Relations with Southeast European Countries, Turkey and Japan, 1941-45’,
Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 2006:4, 473-492.
Barbarossa invasion. On the other hand, Hitler notoriously heard on the attack on Pearl Harbor from
BBC Radio.17
For the Finnish fascists it was clear, which side was dominant in the treaties. When reporting on
consequences of Pearl Harbor, the front page of Kansallissosialisti declared “Germany in War against
America”, whereas the Japanese declaration of war was left to the next page.18
Nazis even founded the journal Berlin-Rom-Tokio to celebrate their union and Finnish fascists
repeated some of its articles. Unfortunately one of the articles dealt with the German independence
on raw materials outside Europe. Also the other articles imply to very similar publication as other
“European” journals by the Nazis.19
India, where speculative Axis cooperation might have been fatal for Allied warfare, is the best
illustration of collision of different policies towards collaborators and other nationalities. Japan tried
to find a suitable leader to support against the British rulers, but Germany despised the actual
Aryans.20 In this case, Finnish fascists were closer to the Japanese. For example, Uusi Eurooppa had
few articles on India and her struggle against the British oppression. In overall, Finnish fascists had
very little information outside Europe.21
Despite the glooming facts, there were few references also by the Finnish fascists about the common
nature of warfare in Europe and Asia, which even without a common enemy had at least similar
ideological background. Even if the theatres weren’t common, they were corresponding in other
ways.22
Instead of mutual plans, both Japan and Germany envisioned a final showdown with their partner
after the Allies were beaten.23 Such fear of “yellow peril”, coined by Wilhelm II, hardly existed in
Finnish imagination. But when Swedish scholar Rütger Essén visited Finland in early 1943 to give a
lecture, he got a question from the audience on “the yellow peril”. Essén assured the question wasn’t
topical and China or Japan aimed merely having “Asia for Asians and Europe for Europeans.”24
17
Adelman 2007, 47-48, 66-68, 75.
18
Saksa sotatilassa Amerikan kanssa. Kansallissosialisti 1941:48, 1; Japani julistanut sodan Yhdysvalloille ja
Englannille. Kansallissosialisti 1941:48, 2.
19
Berliinin kongressi 1941. Kansallissosialisti 1942:4, 4; Länsimaiden voitto – Euroopan pelastus.
Kansallissosialisti 1943:18, 3; Saksan uusi kauppapolitiikka. Kansallissosialisti 1943:25, 3; Bolshevismin voitto
merkitsee länsimaiden perikatoa. Vapaa Suomi 1943:6.
20
Adelman 2007, 47-48.
21
For example, Gandhi ja Nehru. Uusi Eurooppa 1942:6, 1+6.
22
Sotilassopimus ilmaus akselivaltojen kohtalonyhteydestä. Kansallissosialisti 1942:15, 3.
23
Adelman 2007, 45-46.
24
Bolshevismin pyrkimykset. Uusi Eurooppa 1943:4, 3.
There were obvious similarities between the two countries, Germany and Japan. Both were odd
mixtures of revisionist and conservative ideologies, which aimed at taking advantage of the
international system in the flux. Furthermore culture of obedience was dominant in both cultures.25
Idman regularly complained about the obedience or stubbornness of his staff. First it did not allow
any changes or modifications after the plan was once made. Secondly, in the strong faith on
authorities, the staff let the police to enter the legation to ask questions on state matters. 26
Nevertheless, despite these superficialities, the differences prevail. Although both were new-comers
internationally, Japan had in fact an old, established state structure. In comparison, Germany had
been unified only a generation earlier. Political system and structure were completely different. Nazi
Germany was an exceptionally hierarchical dictatorship, whereas Japan witnessed several changes in
political leadership, and additionally military gained more and more power during the war.27
Furthermore it was these similarities, which helped to keep them apart. Both were racist and
prejudiced as such and suspicious also for each other. The tradition of yellow peril was inherited from
Imperial Germany and Japanese did not make much difference between Europeans when it came to
criticize former colonial powers. Both were interested on their short-term gains and lacked a global
vision. Authoritarian political system didn’t cherish international cooperation either.28
Another concurring theme in Idman’s reports was the prejudices and xenophobia. Foreigners were
by default suspected as spies. The concept of race was rather suspicious by the Finns, but Idman used
it fluently to explain the differences; perhaps the experience of living in faraway country influenced.
He nevertheless understood the differences due to distance: “Europe is far away and Asians have
little interest in her many nationalities; they barely know their names.” Idman saw a lot of work in
cultural education: “European and Japanese thinking differ greatly from each other. The manners of
a foreigner are certainly considered inappropriate by the Japanese.”29
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere vs. New Europe
As an international newcomer Japan gradually broke out of the perceived colonial rule and since
1931 aimed at autonomy in her foreign relations, and making the decision without consulting any
Western power.30 In the process of expanding, new kind of thinking of foreign policy developed. In
August 1936, in relation to the intense situation with China, the idea of New Order for East Asia was
introduced in the foreign ministry and was discussed in civic society as well. It was presented as an
alternative to bilateral relations with China; instead Japan would take the leading role in reorganizing
25
Adelman 2007, 52-55.
26
UM 5 C 15, Report no 22, Suomen itsenäisyyspäivän vietto Japanissa v.1942, 21.12.1942.
27
Adelman 2007, 55-56, 58-60.
28
Adelman 2007, 44-46, 56; Hugo Dobson, ’The failure of the Tripartite pact. Familarity breeding contempt
between Japan and Germany, 1940-45’, Japan Forum 1999:2, 179-190.
29
UM 5 C 15. Report no 16. Köyhtyvä Euroopa 2, 1.9.1942; Report no 28. Japanin suhtautumisesta Saksan ja
Venäjän väliseen sotaan, 22.7.1941; Report no 8. Japanilaisten suhtautuminen ulkomaalaisiin, 26.6.1943.
30
Adelman 2007, 62.
East Asia and China would be divided into provinces. These principles were materialized in the treaty
signed in November 1940.31
The wording of the new ideology was still fluid. Slogans like “new order in East Asia” (Tōa
shinchitsujo), “East Asian Gemeinschaft” (Tōa kyōdōtai) “East Asia Economic Sphere” (Tōa Keizai-ken)
were candidates before finishing with Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” (Daitōa kyōeiken).
According to Beasley ken echoes to sphere of influence, and kyōei was used a quarter century earlier
to describe unequal economic relationship with Japan and China. Thus it rejected European direct
colonial rule but maintained Japanese supremacy.32
After Netherlands and France were conquered by Germany, their colonies were easy prey for Japan.
It also changed the ideology of foreign policy turning it to construct an economic self-sufficiency.
Whereas Japan had supported industrialism in continental China, Southern area was exploited for
raw materials.33 Finland recognized the puppet state of Manchukuo in July 1941 and Idman
considered it necessary to give basic information on the territory to the foreign ministry. His report
underlined the industrialization under the Japanese orders.34
Administrating the acquired territories required new administration. Greater East Asia Ministry (Dai
Tōa-shō) was established by replacing Ministry of Colonial Affairs and Asian Development Board. It
had strong and growing military presence. Like the German Eastern ministry, it had suspicious
agenda of dividing the territory of the state. Within the ministry, territories were not treated
universally but inherited different local methods according to their status.35 Idman paid attention to
the large number of former diplomats in the ministry and concluded it merely a scheme to keep
them on governmental payroll, as the legations were abandoned.36
Only Kansallissosialisti took notice on the Eastern Asian ministry and later it published news on the
concept of Greater East Asia. However, it did not explicitly compare it to the New Europe, but the
emphasis was nevertheless on similar liberation of suppressed nations, who are now able to improve
their natural advantages within the fixed framework and Japanese leadership. The result would be
unpresented growth and prosperity.37
31
Beasley 1987, 201-202, 204-208; Iriye 1997, 76-77.
32
Beasley 1987, 226-227, 233; Ikuhiko Hata, ’Continental expansion, 1905-1941’. Translated Alvin D. Cox. The
Cambridge History of Japan. Volume 6. The Twentieth Century. Ed. Peter Duus. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge 1988, 301; Iriye 1997, 77.
33
Beasley 1987, 222-226, 245-249; Iriye 1997, 79
34
UM 5 C 15. Report no 29. Mansukuo, 4.8.1941.
35
Mark Peattie, ’The Japanese colonial empire, 1895-1945’. The Cambridge History of Japan. Volume 6. The
Twentieth Century. Ed. Peter Duus. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1988, 244-252; Beasley 1987, 236241.
36
37
UM 5 C 15, Report no 4. Itä-Aasian ministeriö, 23.2.1942.
Suur-Itäaasian ministeriön perustamista. Kansallissosialisti 1942:94, 3; Suur-Itäaasian maatalous järjestetään.
Kansallissosialisti 1942:97,4; Itä-Aasian kansat saavat niille kuuluvan elintilan. Kansallissosialisti 1942:98, 4;
Kansallissosialisti published also an article “Japan as an ally to Europe” but it found only the old
feudal culture similar to Europe. The emphasis of the article was to point Japan’s differences against
the US, Great Britain and the USSR.38
A comparison of ruling the occupied territories was made in May 1943 by the Japanese Envoy Hiroshi
Ōshima in Berlin. He gave a frank advice: “I think you should lose no time in giving guarantees of
independence to the Ukraine and the three Baltic nations.” Ōshima provided the puppet government
in Manchukuo as the model to follow but Ribbentrop condemned the scheme as impossible. Hitler
was even more reluctant for such ideas.39
Vapaa Suomi pondered on the Japanese task in Far East Asia. The region had been a playground for
Western imperialist but now “the sharp sword of Japan cuts the spider web on the Asian shores
across the Pacific and the Indian Ocean.” They had played Japan and China against each other, who
were natural partners. “The purpose is to overthrow the government in Chongqing, which has sold
herself to western capital, and then expel the English and American forces from China. After Japan
has completed this task, the poor and suffered Chinese nation can live in peace and freedom and
keep the fruits of her work. The hour of Asian liberation has arrived.”40
But in real life Japan had become both liquidator and successor of Western imperialism. Japanese
started also to proclaim Yellow man’s burden that it was their duty to assist and guide less advanced
brothers and sisters, who on the contrary saw only as replacement of the foreign rulers. From their
perspective, Asian interests seemed oddly to equal with Japanese benefits. Frustration exploded as
armed resistance.41
After defeats Japan started to make concessions to conquered nations. New agreements were signed
and advisory councils created, which still left Japanese in control. The vague system reassembled
British agglomeration. The Greater Asia Conference organized in Tokyo in November 1943 did not
propose any kind of administration but declared on common spirit. The conference appealed for
improved international relations, end for racism, and increase of cultural exchange. How much it was
lip service to Western Allies and conquered nations is debatable, but at least the latter weren’t
totally convinced.42
Suur-Itä-Aasian synty ja lujitus. Kansallissosialisti 1943:72, 1; Maataloudellinen jälleenrakennus Suuritäaasiassa. Kansallissosialisti 1944:10, 6.
38
H.P., Japani Euroopan liittolaisena. Kansallissosialisti 1942:107, 3.
39
Carl Boyd, Hitler’s Japanese confidant. General Oshima Hiroshi and MAGIC intelligence, 1941–1945.
University Press of Kansas, Kansas 1993, 83. Mark Mazover (Hitler’s Empire. Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe.
Penguin Books, London 2008) uses this incident to illustrate differences between German and Japanese policies
to conquered nations.
40
”Kun kansainväliset hämähäkinverkot revitään rikki”. Vapaa Suomi 1942:16, 2; Japani suojelee uskontoja.
Vapaa Suomi 1942:22, 2; Kumpi on syyllinen sodan alkamiseen. Vapaa Suomi 1942:40, 2.
41
Beasley 1987, 228, 243-245, 252; Peattie 1988, 244.
42
Beasley 1987, 241-243; Iriye 1997, 90-92.
The sphere was doomed to fail from the beginning. The isolated sphere, however large, could not
feed the Japanese population. Damages from the warfare took time to repair and Japan lacked
capital for that and other improvements. Traditionally South Asia wasn’t important for Japanese
trade and the new territory gave a lot of surprises. The vast distances required efficient transport,
but the trade inside the sphere was too similar and depended on export. The impossible quotation
gave room for post-war policy of global trading.43
The term hakkō ichiu, literally “Eight corners of the world under one roof”, has been translated as
“Universal harmony” or ”Universal brotherhood”, and was used for both global organization and
territorial imperialism, emphasizing either the corner or the roof.44
Considerations for new global order (that reflected Japan’s position towards the whole world and not
just immediate territory) emerged in Japan apparently only in 1940 after the German victory in
Western Europe. The World was supposed to be divided into four blocs. Foreign Minister Matsuoka
Yōsuke envisioned in a memorandum in early 1941 Great East Asian, European, American, and Soviet
(including Persia and India) Zones with a leader in each bloc. Paradoxically this justification of
Japanese supremacy was dominantly a Western idea, from German geopolitical school of thought. 45
Global thinking like this was rare in Finland in generally, and particularly by the fascists. In late 1941
Vapaa Suomi touched briefly the question of colonies and reorganizing them under common
European rule. For whomever the other continents belonged, Africa was still for Europeans. Also the
Finns had a role to play or at least the newspaper asked “shouldn’t our voice be heard when solving
paneuropean colonial questions?”46
Finland and Japan: distant friends
Envoy Idman reported routinely on Finnish image in Japan and his work to improve it by sending
articles to English-speaking newspapers, especially to Japan Times and Advertiser. His work also
included sending corrections (revisions) to this journal. In August 1941 he was happy to report “I
merely want to emphasize that Japanese newspapers have a very sympathetic attitude to our
country. The bravery and achievements of Finns are often on the headlines of the newspapers.”47
The relationship with the USSR was main question of Finnish foreign policy but sadly the Japanese
attitude and policy against the USSR totally differed from Germany, and Finland. There were actual
battles with thousands of casualties, without declaration of war, first in Changkufeng near
Vladivostok in summer 1938 and a year later at Nomonhan between Outer Mongolia and Manchuria.
43
Beasley 1987, 249-250; Iriye 1997, 93-138.
44
Beasley 1987, 226-227, 244; Hata 1988, 302; Iriye 1997, 79.
45
Iriye 1997, 80-82; Adelman 2007, 54.
46
Afrikka Euroopan siirtomaaksi. Vapaa Suomi 1941:36, 2.
47
UM 5 C 15, Report no 22. Suomi Japanissa, 13.6.1941; Report no 17. Suomea koskevia huhuja Japanin
sanomalehdistössä, 5.5.1941; Report no 31. Suomi japanilaisessa sanomalehdistössä, 20.8.1941.
To secure the northern flank, Japanese concluded the non-aggression pact with the Soviets in April
1941.48
Idman paid extra attention to the possible changes in Japanese policy towards the USSR but couldn’t
find any signs of it. Japanese guarded the relations and in Idman’s mind with the expense of Finland.
He presumed that due to foreign policy reasons the local newspapers weren’t allowed write about
Russian losses (on the first page), and consequently on Finnish successes.49 However, Idman was
happy to report on personal conversations, where prominent figures, such as General Araki and
former ambassador (to Finland) Sugushita praised “remarkable action of Finland.”50
Finnish fascists waited these signs far more passionately. “At the moment the whole world
intensively anticipates the Japanese response to the gigantic battle between Germany and the Soviet
Union, which will have a decisive outcome for Japan as well.” These expectations changed into veiled
demands towards the end of the war: “Unless Japan joins the efforts to demolish the red Russia,
which is the enemy of both Europe and Asia, she signs her own death sentence. […] Without
European assistance she will never survive the war against England and America.”51
Since the Japanese weren’t fighting the USSR, Finnish fascists saw their battle against the other
common enemy, Great Britain (which had declared war on Finland in December 1941, although they
never engaged in actual fighting against the Finnish troops). The war on Pacific was presented as the
battle of the empires and in this comparison, Japan was considered the more rightful and proper
ruler for the East Asia. It had proven to be more efficient in educating people and increasing
production.52 The US was hardly mentioned at all!
Since 1905, when the defeat in Tsushima strait set the wheels in motion and eventually forced
Russian Czar to make concessions to the Finnish Grand Duchy, the Finns have had a generally positive
impression on Japan. Very little was known from them, but the Japanese were perceived with
admiration and gratitude for a long time. Only in the late 1930s, in the pressure of international
tension and official neutrality, this image faded and Japan became for most of the Finns another
great power among great powers. More right the newspaper was, more likely it considered Japan as
potential ally against the USSR.53
48
Beasley 1987, 221; Adelman 2007, 48-49, 70-73, 78.
49
UM 5 C 15, Report no 22, Suomen itsenäisyyspäivän vietto Japanissa v.1942, 21.12.1942; Report no 28.
Japanin suhtautumisesta Saksan ja Venäjän väliseen sotaan, 22.7.1941.
50
UM 5 C 15, Report 24, Saksan hyökkäys Venäjää vastan, 27.6.1941.
51
Japanin laajentuminen. Kustaa Vaasa 1941:7/8, 25. This was actually based on the article by Rütger Essén in
the same paper. Japanin satavuotissuunnitelma. Kustaa Vaasa 1941:7/8, 17-19. See also, Japani ja Eurooppa.
Uusi Eurooppa 1944:1, 2+4.
52
”Kauko-idän imperiumin” loppu. Vapaa Suomi 1942:11, 1+4; Todellinen Japani. Uusi Eurooppa 1942:18, 4;
Englanti ja Amerikka polvilleen. Uusi Eurooppa 1943:45, 4; Englannin imperiumin hajjaantumisoireet.
Kansallissosialisti 1942: 13, 3.
53
Fält 1982.
The fascist newspapers continued this tradition. Some of the articles were short introductions to
Japan. The article by Gustaf Ramstedt, the first Finnish Envoy in Tokyo (1919–1929), in Uusi Eurooppa
dealt more with the Japanese culture and family life but the editor was more enthusiastic about “the
unconditional faith for victory by the Japanese people.” Kustaa Vaasa translated a similar review
from Swedish scholar Rütger Essén.54
Finding similarities between Japan and Finland was rather desperate. The common trick was to
blame previous (mostly Anglo-American) literature, which was then presented to distort their image
to Western purposes. Instead Japan and Finland were told to have lots in common starting from
linguistics, which even in contemporary terms was far-fetched. Racial similarities were on the other
hand literally fantastic. The European-looking Ainu were the original Japanese race, and their traits
were still dominant in the elite. “It pays the effort to get acquainted with the Japanese as the best
friends for Europeans, our allies and decent patriotic people.”55
When the news from the Pacific started to appear less favorite to the Axis, the newspapers had the
usual excuses of strategic withdrawal and gathering of forces before the next – final – attack. For
example, in early 1943 Vapaa Suomi described how “Japan has an intention to stabilize the
conquests of last year by increasing her military position in East Asia and systematically improving
the conditions for the local peoples.”56
54
Japanin satavuotissuunnitelma. Kustaa Vaasa 1941:7/8, 17-19; Pyhä Tsushima. Uusi Eurooppa 1944:2, 1+4.
55
Todellinen Japani. Uusi Eurooppa 1942:18, 4.
56
Japanin aseet vapautuvat uusiin iskuihin. Uusi Eurooppa 1943:12, 2; Tojon äskeinen puhe. Vapaa Suomi
1943:5, 2.
New Europe: little European, very European
The amount of texts on Japan in four Finnish fascist newspapers has been surprisingly – and
disappointingly – small. It’s nowhere close to attention paid to for example Slovakia or Croatia, which
undeniably had smaller importance in any standards for world history and even for Finnish efforts.
Achievements of Japanese military were regularly reported only during the first half of 1942, when
Kansallissosialisti managed to be published five times a week (usually these newspapers were
weeklies at the best) and had more space to be filled. Secondly this was the time of rapid Japanese
advance towards South, when the European theater was relatively quiet, in the anticipation of
second German assault on the USSR. One cannot avoid the impression that the articles on Japan
were published also on other occasion in the lack of European news or to turn the attention away
from other international problems. Japan as herself wasn’t interesting.
On the other hand, this presentation cannot provide the Finnish context outside the fascist
publications. Allegedly a conservative newspaper cheered the Japanese success in spring 1942 on
front page: “Singapore is ours!” The matriarch of conservative cultural elite, Maila Talvio, organized
particular Japanese evenings, where foreign literature and music was introduced57. Furthermore
Itsenäinen Suomi (Independent Finland) by the Union of Independence, which is best considered as
patriotic and not fascist, had their issue 1942:2 dedicated entirely to Japan (also Hungary, Ingria and
Estonia had theme numbers) and articles on Japan appeared until 1944, presumably ending because
the Japanese legation in Helsinki started publishing a newsletter. These examples of very cursive
reading imply that Japan was discussed much more widely than previously presumed; hopefully I can
continue to this direction. It also implies that Japan was just behind the publication threshold: the
small fascist newspapers did not have room to publish the news on Far East even if they wanted to.
Even if this were true, they made the decision to publish something else.
On the fascist newspapers, the conclusion is paradoxical: the New Europe comprehended by the
Finnish fascists was very little European. It accepted the dominate role of Nazi Germany in the
expense of other European nations, including herself. At the same time, it was very much, almost
exclusively, European. They paid barely any attention to world outside dominated by European
powers; the colonial rule in Africa was perceived to continue and the battles in East India were more
about British losses than Japanese victories. Their sympathy for the Japanese “Yellow man’s burden”
and lack of visions of final global showdown is either due to traditional good image of Japan Finnish
discourse, or their consideration hadn’t yet reached that level.
57
Tuulio 1965, 451–452.