R e G o v e r n m e n t

Propag;.:..m da An.: .t.lysis:
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G o v e r n m e n t
Nov e mb8r 20 , 1 963
COMJ.'1UN I ST REACTION TO THE OVERTHROW OF THE DI EM GOVERNMEN T.
INTRODUCT I ON~
Beginning l ast Jul y , when the p©ssibil i t y of a c ouE_ d ' etat
in Vietnam be c ame
~oth
rea l
and like ly, the commun ist propaganda
organs i n Peking , Hanoi , the Nationa l Front cl andes t ine station··
as we l l as the NLF i t se lf,
in its social movement
and mass
media p ro paganda i n South Vietn a m, l a un ched wha t might be called
a preemptive at t a ck on t he idea th a t
a change o f government
woul d have a ny meaning or va l i dity .
This effort by its very nature was contradictory and se lfdefea t ing . Since the basi c t ene t of the communi s t s in Vie tn am
has be en tha t
there must be a change in the South Vie tn amese
g overnmen t -- indeed, t hat is wha t
repor t
t he wa r is a l l abou t
-- to
th a t a chan ge of s ome t::rJm own character is in the
making and per
~
thi s is bad ,
is to under c ut the long standing
and major commun i st propaganda t he me th a t a ll of Vietnam ' s
troub l e s are due to the Diem g overnme n t and if only it is c a n
be removed the road to utopia lies straigh t ahead .
The atta c k on a new g ov e rnment whic h did not ye t exis t
presented t he commur..i sts with seve ral difficu l ties , chief of
which was the fact th ey dJC.n' t lmow whom they we re attacking .
However , with a n audacit y th .s. t was monumen t a l,
t he communis t
propagand ists pur sued the theme through the months of August,
i3 eptembe r
and : Octo be r, hamme rin g away at the idea that Die m,
who is bad ,
is g oing to be removed and th at is not good ,
howev e r remem be r t ha t Diem is bad .
In Octob e r t he radi o output -- especially by Pe king
(apparen tly more sensi t ive than either Hanoi or the NLF to the
... 2
impli c a tions of a ch a n ge of
~ overnme nt)
-- b e c ame incr eas ingly
strident and e v e n hyst e ric a l. This hyst e r ia is we ll un derst o od .
A ch ange o.f g ov e rnment; as the Chinese
c~mmun i sts
we ll
rec o gnized , presents communist propaganda makers ( a n d perhaps
c ommuni st p olic y makers) wi th t he grav es t crisis they bave
faced s inc e the Vie tn amese insurge nc y moveme nt r es umed in mi d -
1 960 .
This pap e r i s a n eff ort to asse ss the commun i st re ac tion
to th e overthrow of th e Diem g ov e rnme nt, Nov ember 1- 2 , 1 963 ,
a nd is based on
~pr op aga nda
output by the National Li be r a tion
F ront , its c l a n dss tine r a d io stati on broadc asting in S outh
Viet n am , a n d t o some extent the pr opag a nda eut p ut by th e DRV
a nd Communi s t Ch i na .
The c orT1J.11un i s t propag·mdists 1 h a n d ling of ev e nts in Viet
Nam since Nov embe r f ir s t c a n be d ivi de d int o t wo c ategories .
Firs t, there has bee n a n effort to mani pul a t e and dist ort n ews
re por ts on actual ha ppenings in Saigon in such a way as t o
discredit the new g ov e r nma nt and everyone , espe c iall y Ameri c a ns,
ass oc i a t ed with it . Se c ondl y ,
thero has bee n an effort to adap t
the t hemes and appea l s whic h have serv ed so we ll in the pa s t
to the new s i tua ti on.
Co:nununist Int e r pre t a tion of Coup
.·~ve nts .
A.s is ge nerally th e case i·J ith c o!Tlmunlst pro paganda out pu t
follo wing s ome de ci sive event ,
initial
Sa igon was o b j e ct ive and factu a l,
if
treatment of e ve nts in
so~ ewha t
confusing .
Appa rent l y the first report by Radio Ha noi on th e c oup c ame a t
1C:i07
~1'I'
Nov embe r 1, a n an n ounc e mEmt quoting as its source the
Vo ice of Ameri c a . The maj or e v ent s of t h e next 3 6 hours were
-
3 ;...
r epor t e d mo re o r l ess accurat e l y: t he c a pt u r e of Gi a Long
pa l a c e , t he various ac counts o f
t he d8a th of Ng o Dinh Di e m a n d
Ng o Dinh Nh u, t he U. S . Na t i o na l Security Coun c i l mee t i ng in
'J: ashing ton ,
tb s f l igh t
r ep orts on t he mov 0Cllen t of t he U. S . Seventh Pl ee t,
of Ng o Dinh Can and Ng o Tron g Hi e u .
The e nd of
th e no b j ec tive " pe rio d c ame wi th t he popul a r,
p ro- a rmy de mon s.t ra t i on s by the pe op l e of Sa i gon a n d e ls ewh e r e
which we r e c ha r a ct e r ized by the c ommun ists a s bein g vi "le n t l y
anti - Ame r i c a n in n atu r e . Th is bega n Sa t u r day af t e rnoon,
Nov embe r 2 , and with tha t , i t was c l ear ,
t he communis t p r opa-
gan da p ol i c ie s h ad b e e n f ixed .
F rom th e s tar t c e rt a i n th e me s we r e emph a sized , and
appeare d ove r and ov e r in th e c ommuni st out p ut . F iv e appea r ed
to be stre s sed mo r e th a n othe rs .
1 . Ame ric an
of c orrrrnun is t
invo l v_ern~ t .
The o v e rr iding cha r a ct e r is tic
output add r esse d d irec tl y to th e f ac t o f the
change of g ov e rnme nt w.s.s a virul en t
and the
11
p uts c h that i t ha s cre a. t ed .
at t3..ck on th e Un i t ed St a t e s
11
In u r ep or t
MA C- V military briefin g Pekin g r epo rt e d :
o pen ly ann ounc ed t h a t
11
on a Saigon
A s p oke s man ••
o
t he Gni t ad S t a t e s wo u ld t igh t en i t s
d ir e c t c ontro l ove r th 0 s c,uth Vi e tnam p u ;ipe t a r my . He a ls o
said tha t Ameri c 3. n advisors n ow ho oe fo r a 'nore dire ct a n d
exc l u s iv e rli lit ary chain o f co,nniand wi th out in t e rfere n c e r rom
po l i t i c ian s . Peki n g in anothe r b r oad c as t de cl a red : "The pl a in
fact ab o ut t he Saigon c oup which rep l ace d Ngo Dinh Diem's
fami l y r u l e wit h a mi li tary di c ta to r ship is t hat
it was s t a ge -
managed by t h e United Stat e s , not wi thst andin g th e fl a t
b y th e U .s . St a t e De p a rtme n t .
ii
de ni a l
-
4 -
Radio Li 0e ration , th0 NLF clandestine station, November
2 J began a serie s of
n-,vh a t
is the Mo s t
co~·mne nt a ries
devoted to tbe sub ject
Corre ct Path of Nationa l Sal vati on .
11
(See
Annex ) The chief theme in the se ties was the assertion that
the change of government means increasGd American invo l vement
in the war .
11
Th e coup shows that it is th e U . S . impe ri a l is ts
wh o have organized it , with the aim ••• of ti ghtening up their
ag~; r ess ive
war which is me e ting with serious defeats •••••
Evary onG sees that th e most correct way to so l v e t he prob l em
in S outh Vietn am is to o ppose th J U . S . imp e ria li sts and v.1 hat e v er clique of lackeys they may hav e . 11 The st a tion went on ,
11
It is n o t enough to put d own th e dicta torial r eg ime of th e
Ng o Dinh Diem family with out cutting th e ro o t
of that regime ,
which is the U . S . i mp ·o:; rL:;_ li st po l i cy 01" a g gression , as every one knows . The U • .5 . impJll::?. ll st s are the
s~vorn
enemy of the
Vi:otnamese pe ople . J'h ey h o.v a b0e n sending into Vietnam troops ••.
and othe r war me a ns
incl ud i~ g
che mic a l
poison , p l otting to set
their colonial ist yoke on our pe ople . n Leaflets and social
moveme nt propaganda. ac ti vi ty in the
high l a nds strsssed this them0
~ l so ,
~VJ:8 kong
de lt a area and
a s is not e d b 9 low.
2 . Lack
of vL1bilit'' of n -:: --~------w a: ov e rnmcmt . The s ec ond most
·--------~·- - pre valent t h e me in
th ~:
con1rnun i s t
int e rpret a t ion of events was
th :; ass e rtion that the nne w D . 5 . sch ·Jme is doomed to defeat
b e c ciuse of inhere nt contr.::Ldictions in it . 11 Said t ba c l a nd e stine
st J. tion:
nconc.:n ·nin ::; th •3 new con t radic t ions in South Vi e tnam
the main and antago nistic contra di ction i s between
th ~
S o ut h
Vi e tn amese peop l e inc l u d ing th 3 working c l ass , the p e tty
bourge o isi8 , national bourgeo i s i e , p a triotic st1·a t a and
personal itie s on th 8 one s :Lde dnd tb s U. S . imp 2ri s.l i st s and
th ei r h e nchma n, inc lu d ing th e mos t pro- Amsr ic 3.n r Gacti onaries
amonf t h0 lan dl ords .•• t be recent coup wil l l ead to another
cou 9 . So l pn g ::t s th 3 American imperial ists are not wi pe d out
1
of South Vi e tn am th e main a nt ag onistic cont radictions c annot
1 '
be sat t l 0d ! These c a n be set tl ed on l y by the pe ople 1-Jor,{ing
within the Na tional Lib e r a tion Front .
3 . Vill if ic a t ion of
~th"'. .
Eilemb e r s of tbe n_et:'.__govsrnment .
This be g'.:tn 0v,3 n oef or- e Nov r:i mosr 1 an d incre a s e d in int e n s i t y
O.uring the first wes k after t he ov 8 rth row. An e xampl e :
11
In a
prsss int e: rvi 0w Duon g Van Minh , chi eft a in of th e n ew puppe t
regime r e v eaL :; d his t r uo col ors as a U . E . l ackey . Be s a id th at
t be new mi l i t ary r 3qi8J
South Vi e tn a mes e
und
1
w3nts c l os e r coo pe r a tion be t waen
~n ~ rican
o f ficers i n th e future .' He
dis clos ed t hat the n_;w r.;;::i...rL0 5 under the puidance of 1U. S .
ad v is ors ' wou l d i n tensify its activi tie s in po l itic a l decep tion t o coord ina te its military o pp r 0 s s ion of the pe opl e . 11
Att a cks c ame by n ame as wG ll. Gen a r a l Tran Van Don was
ch.J.ractcrized as
11
t hs. t .fo1•me r pu pps t a cting chi e f of staf f
un de; r Die m. 11 Gene ral Ton
-~hat
Dinh wa s describ od as
11
Diem
minister of security , known fo r his bl oody r ep r e ssion of th e
people in e nforcing th e ma rt i al l aw of Au gust
~l
••• re spons ibl e
fo r t b o mas sacr e of h un dr e ds of 0u ddhist monks and nuns ,
students and int e lle ctu al s . n Hguye n Ngo c Tho
11
wa s vice
preside nt of t he Di em administration ••• appo int ed to n eg oti at e
with the Buddhi s t associ ation .<m d as such wa s op posed to tlv:;
.Bu dChi sts."
4. Gen e ral ho s t i l i ty to tbe new r cq:ime . The n e w gov e rnma nt
- 6 -
is characterized as
~
military d ict a torship a n d high ly un -
popular . For exampl e , th e se qu otations: ''M a ny Saigon p e ople
voic e indignation at Ton That Dinh fo r b annin g de monstrations
a n d mae tin g s and in ma n y pl ac e s peopl e h ave sat up se lfda fanse armed groups and many s oldi e r s deserted and joined the
peop l e ' s rahk s t r in e; in g with t he m th e ir Hea pons . " Or , from
Pekin g ,
11
The Saigon peop l e are d iscont e nt e d with th e r e c e nt
pr o - US mi l itary c oup a nd h ave begun to cp p os e tho n ow mi lit a r y
di e ta tor ia l
r 'Y~,'
ime ..• Sa i g on univ e rsity students p l an to st <J.ge
a demons tra ti•:n again st Nguye n Ng oc Tho 1 s appointment as
prumi e r. 11 The c l a nd e stine station r ep ort ed "Young offic e rs
who took par t in t he coup are d is gruntl ed bec a us e the y hav e
not bea n promot ed by th e Unit e d St a t e s . " Division and contra dic tion amon g off ic a rs nat iv e to south Vi e tnam prop e r , such
a s Du on g Van Minh
,J.ncl
'J'r·an Vs.n Don , and thos e native of central
Viet n am, l i ke Ton That Dinh and Do Ca o Tri , a r e incre asing .
Contr ad ictions wit h i n th e rrnlit :i r y c ou p
5 . Eve nts will l ead to n ew
mis~ ry
continue~
11
f or a ll. The r e sul t
of t he change of gov e rnli1en t , tho c ommuni sts assert , will be an
in tens ifica ti on of tlrn ·w : :·.I' and th i_s rr:e a ns ir:.cr o ase d misery for
a ll. Th e clande stine st,J:.;ion i::: '.Tlost emph at ic on this point.
The general s ar e quo t._,d 1:1_s say i ns th e wJ. r against the communists will bs purs ue d and t h e se st a t eme nts ar e t wi sted te
i mp l y th a t n ew increased priv a tions and h ardshi p s are in
st ore f i.n' the Vi a tnames 0 . Said the cla nde stine station : "Thus
tho c oup doe s no t cre a t e; c ondi tions for assuagin g t h e sufft; ri ng s
our pe ople h ave e ndLlr e d for nine ye 8rs , ao e s not l oad to a
stabl e sit ua tion i n South Via tnam, doe s not r o spon d to th e
- 7
sacred
aspir ~t ion
~
for ind3pendence , democracy and oeace , but
on the contr9..rJY'opens the -vrn-y for mor e serious troub l es
c
'.rhere
is now tha danger t hat th 0 war wi ll dav3 lo p more fi 3rce l y ,
causing l arge - s c s l e des truction and ki lling in our country v11
Adaptat ion of Oµ ... ,Goini;r Communis t Themes and Appeal s .
Tha r e an:- five major nb read and butter" themes which t he
L:ommuni st pro paganda apparatus h a s used a l most continua ll y
since t he start of t he insurgen t movement in VicJtnam . Wherav a r
possibl a an effor t is made to adapt thes e five to curre nt
even ts and dev e lo pments .
1. Enthusi asm for th o r ovolution: The ov e rri d i ng e ffort
of communis t propagandists is to genor8te and ma in t ain the
spirit of r e volt among ttw Eouth
v1 -~ tn umr::ise ,
usin g t he bes t of
whatever themas are at h.:.ncJ . 'I'ho mai n reason for the n e c essi t y
of revo lt h a s been th:; " corrupt , tyranni c a l n a ture of th e Diem
gove rnm;Cm t • 11 Wi th t h e overthrow of th &t gov e r nment t ho communist pr opagan dist s now atte mpt to switch horses and asser t
th a t the struggl e goes on j
undimini ~t ed
cland8s tine station r0ports for cxdmp l e ,
in popul ari ty o Tho
11
'11he S o uth Vie tnam
patrioti c a r med un its ;:ud poop l e h ·w o won many v ic t orie s in
attacking enamy tro ops d:iring and :i.fter the Saigo n pro - US
milit ar y coup. 11 Then f ollo-w s a d._; sc ript ion of v a rious vie tories.
Repo rts Radio Hanoi : nI'ho r><:trioti c forces in South Vi0t nam
havG i n crea sed th3 ir actions to de stroy milit a r y posts and
stre_tegi c h aml e t s sinc o th o coup d 1 e t at to ov er thro w the Diem
r 0g ime broko out .H And tb2rs fol lows a list of strat eg ic
hamlJts destroyed . Reports Ra_dio Peking : "Peop l e in Saigon and
Cha lan have h e l d many demonstratio ns agai nst th e pro - US co up
- 8 -
u,s.
g roup. The demonstrators carri e d placards saying 'Oppos e
I mp8 rialist Ag gression Aga inst South Vi e tnami •••• Patriotid
popul a r orga niz a tions are spr0a ding handbi lls de nouncing U.S.
i mp·J ri a li sts and th o ir l aq k ey s '
11
2 . Cert a inty of victOI.]l • This usually take s the form of
propagand a piec e s listing ARVN c a sualties; destribing th e
dast:ruc tion of wa r ma t e ri al
8specially h e l icopters and, most
importan t, a rme d forc e s de s e rtions. Reports the cl a nde stine
s t a tion: tr The South Vie tna m Pe ople's s e lf defense forc e s hav e
int crn sifi8d their attacks on th a puppe t army after the pro-US
mil itary c o up .•• In fiv e days the p Gopl e 1 s self defense units
increased a ttacks by fifty pe rc e ntD ki ll ed 114 p u ppe t troops
s.n d wounded 1 59 ••• c aptu r ed S05 weapons and 29 r ad ios. n On Nov.
9 , tbe Lib eration Pross :?..nnounc2d that "More t han 32,000 troops
of the U.S.
co ntr oll ~d
;:; av.th Vis tnam army ros e up against their
co cr111anders or we nt o v :J r to the peop l e in th e first nine months
of 1963 •••. n ea rly h a l f
t akin~
p l a c3 in July, Au gust and Sep .
when the Di e m cliquo was c ar r ying out unpr e c ede nt ed r e pr e ssions
against tho Bud dhi s ts
.::::.nd otbtffS •... "Si!1ce th e U. S . - e ngineered
military coup more and
~ore
troo9s nav e l ef t
t hei r r a nks to join
the pa triotic for c e s or r,::;t1.;_r ncod ham:; • 11
3 . Nego ti a t ed S·3 tt l eme nt. This app eal, s eek ing to
ize 11 S outh Vi e tn a m
11
neutral-
and unify Vi a tnarn a nd take it out of tho
cold wa r context , h a s b ee n dr op ped a lmo st e ntire ly by tb e communi st propagandists , apparent l y a t a ctical mov e a nd not r ep r e sentin g a ch a n ge of basic po lic y . Whereve r possible communis t
output skirts the idea e ntire ly. Wh0re it is forc e d to generalize on ov e rall obj0ctiv es i t
confines i ts e lf to stat ame nts of
-
this sort:
9 -
"A s t h e NLF h a s oft e n r-epea t e d ,
t b3 Sout h Vie tna-
mese pro b l e m mus t bs so l v ,3 d through n ,:;g otia t ions Ei.rr. o n g the
v ::_ e tname s e t h 0:ms o l v ·a s . Onl y und e r this cond i. tion wi l l b l ood
stop be ing shed and c a n our country d e v e l o p norma l ly . n
4 . At tro c iti ss
~y__t_h3
GVN and ARVN . This bas f ocuss e d
du rin g th o past few months on g3 rm warfar a typ 3 ch a r ge s with
par'ticul ar ompha s is on th t'l GVN de f o l i a tio n pro g ram . This th e me
continues ;
de scrib i n g th e " Spr0ad of ch e mical
Tro • ••• the spre ading of ins e c t
l arv ~e
poisons in .2,en
on sw as t po t ato fie l ds ••
tb e use o f noxious ch 0mic a l s e ls c3wher o •••• ii Al so str .;; ss o d is
ch 8 idea th at nothing has a ctu a l l y be :m c han ge d ,
im_;· r de r , torture , a r res t s and detention ,
"Sc 0 n e s of
c '.3.sGs of sep a ration
of pare nts from chil dre n and husbands f rom wiv es ,
de struction of ho:110s Hno vl l l s g :;s a l l wi l l
sc e n e s of
o ccur a g ai n ••• S ou th
Vi e tnam r e m':li ns •••• 3. h<.511 e n c;101. rth . "
5 . Ext 1.:0 rnal iz a t ion . Tlns e ffort ,
t i ona l
to e n ge nd e r int e rna -
sup port c ontinua s . The t e chnique us a d a t
th o mome n t is
quoting of c ommunist and a nti - Am..; ric -:t n n ;;w sp ape rs on th e
m0an ing of th e c oup .
Po l i c y S t ateme nts
Sl£1. ~_._.::__ j:._~2.e
The c l a ndest ine
Coup;
st ~ t i c n h q ~
b ro ad c as t
on l y two basic
policy s t atemen t s sinc e Nov omba r 1 (s oo Anne x for excerp t s
f r om ma jor stateme nt . ) On No v e.m.rn r o a t
b ro a dc a st i n
1.
11
Eng l ~sh
0548 GMT Ra d io Han oi
th o NLF 1 s e ight de mands . They are :
De st r oy a l l tb e stra t eg ic haml ets and quart e rs , and
oth a r d is g uis ed conc 0 ntrat ion camps ;
2.
11
Re l ease a l l p ol i t ic a l
(po l i t ica l) t e nd en ci 3s;
detainees , wha t e v e r t h.)ir
- 10 11
3.
Promulg ;:.tts wi th ou t Cc8 lety demo cr:.l.tic fr e8d om
freedom of assemb ly, expre ,s s i on , the p ress, wo rsb ip, 2nd. tr2 de
J.n.d so on;
4.
i
1
Root out 211 v es tig e s of the facist and militarist
d ict ator ial r egime;
r cd. d i~"lg
5.
nstop all psrss cuti on anc repression; CL!."ld
6.
nDi ss olv e all nepotist organizati ons, all forms of
co:r..trol,
1
R8publican Youth 1 or p; aniza t:!.ons and o thsr paro.-mili-
t 2ry organizations of yo uth, wo men , stu d ents 2nd pupils,
public employ8s anc! peopl8s;
7. nrmmediately stop the for cibl e conscription :.u1d militarization of youth , wome n, and pub lic servants}
Propae;anda Ac ti v i t y
~-n
tbs Tl8kong Del ta .
No rmally there is a two to fo ur week time lag between o.n
event and th e a pp ear:..mc e of' -crin.ted iiLF' propagcmda on the
subj ec t . The NLF'
cut t h is t:Lm8 lag
:!.~"l
the <ekong Ds l Lt :l.n tbs c:.1 se of the coup
~m o
were c'Hstribut i ng l8af lets b ': November
3 . All l e aflets obtained by t he
~ o r k i ng
a ddresse d to ARVN soldiers . A_
le ~'- f' le
assert ? d that th e
u s
·_n_ot-.v
t-o
u
bA
J
o "- o
'-u .·_-tkAn
·i·t'
l by "J
~---1 T-Om
_ I ·i"'F-'"'
1-;
_;
..._,
Op
.L
Group t o date we r e
t f rom Lam. Dong province
(' --,·n op·i "(''".\r>~rn
_ ._,, __ .._._. __
'-l.i 1·1
'· ·1"'
_ .._..
11
~,
.._,
li
und ur ged people
CO trn+-arfA
l·ibAY'~t-io·n
~ -- u _. _
_, ·it-- u
-' - l...l.
-- •
A leaflet f rom An Xuye n, a ft er asserting that the chang e
of gove rri.:.'Tien t
full scale wo.r
WO.S
planned by u,e Americans '
~n Vietn~1m
0 eclared:
ii
The
w:!.11 be cotltinued by tbe A.mer ic .J i!s ,
b ring ing death to y ou . You are s t ill in dungsr . Don't be
tricked. Eve n if a coup h:.1.s been st:.1.f2: ed war still exists .
.... ...
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then g oes on to urgs s ol d i e rs to desert.
We hav e only
o•~8
re p or t to do.t e on socJal mov eme n t prop:.1-
g .'.lno.a :J.pp8::tls in t ee ;''feko n g De lta • .A report f r om L on('; Xuyen
says t h a t the arme d p r opag anda teams , in thei r nocturnal
pr opag anda s e ssions in i solated village rs ar e stressing th e
th s m8 that "No w,
the Un1te d State s 1s taking ov e r c omp l ete ly
and th iDg s will be j ttst li ke they wer e whe n the F r ench were
l10 r 3 .
tt
Anti ex I : C 0 1iJ111en t
Alt h ough i t would be d i ff icult to d ocume nt, f rom th e
mat e rial descr i bed above ,
t he con te n ti on th et t cmnmLlD.is t prop a-
gan d ists are in se ri ou s tro u b l e , this is the conclusion re a ched
by t be Working Gr oup. I t is a dmi t t ed l y a sub je ctiv e judg ment ,
but on e based
o~
t he
study of the ebb and f l ow of
t l1r 8e
o:C
cormnttn is t
th8 maj or th eme s during the past
:re-~tr s .
The weakn es s of tbe appeal s i s most apparent in the output
of th 8 cl .2ndestine st :..t t ion wh icb keep s harking back to the July
d ir e ct ed a g ainst the Diem governme nt and now large l y out of date.
'I'h8 e::.!t lr8 s truc t ur .3 ')f tb s
eonmu:n ~Lst propag~1nda
edifJ_ce
was built on the s ins of the Di em r sg ime . Thi s 1-.ras its strength .
'l' h i s etls o wets its wectkness . The e :ntire pol:;.ticetl c lim.'.1
. te ho.s
chang ed in Vietn8111 and t he comm:unists for the moment ar e l ef t
n l mo st with out p ro petgetn da Clll1lffilllni ti on (other than U o S . ;Lmp r: .: ria li sm ). Wit hin s i x months p erh aps it will be etble to assemble some
materietl dealing with g ri 8van c es , r eal
meantime we betve a ho neymoon perio d .
SAIGON, VI ETN AM
or imagined . But in the
.:. ;, 1 2 TT·
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1he Libero.tion Stat i on (cl andest ine) at 0500 GMT Novembe r
5, 1 96 3 , broadcast in Vietnamese a statement whi c h in all
probabi li ty was int en d:::-:d :Cor r ol icy u se by lHJi c '.J.dr e s throu 9; h 1
aur, Vi etnei.m . As is often t he case wit h m.'..1jo r deve lopmen t s, th e
and
co ~jed
hc:, .
1
':
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re~ ro du c ed
cd-·1
t p·~1pn
t
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J .L1 .•. ~ --V
i..,..
throughout the rura l
b pr;·;:n. "O·n Nov·embA T' 1
• ' t.-~~'--- C
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,
1 963 a mill t ary coup
took p lace in Sai gc n , initi ated by a numb e r of leade rs of t he
so u t hern army to overthrow the re g ime of the Ngo Di.·:ih Di em
f
~:im:Lly .
Whtle firing between c oup troops O.!."!d Di emi st t roops wa s
11
still going on , the coup ' s lsud ing or r anizat ion, th e Coun cil of
GeD.e rctl, procl:J. i med :Lts
f\ff1. 6 :un<=~:::.t:1l
poll.cies , t he
m.'..1 :~. n
content
of whi c h is thnt it Hill pur sue the :..1,"!t:I. -c o·'rmun:L st strugg l e ,
wi ll co:·: itinue s·l. d :Lnp: w1tb the Am:::: r:l.cans , mid will pursue th e
war -- that is, ru r sue the enti re treacherous bus iness that Ngo
Dinh Di em followed f or nine years . The mil:Ltary orde rs issued
by the coup l eade rs i n the past few day s obviously a im at
maintaining i n t he most thorough wa y the p ol ic i e s and orguniz aticns of the Ngo r inh Diem recime , rereut ing what that t r a it or
bud done ,
an d ov er tl y s how i ng their Jntent ion to r e sist the
p8ople .
"T hus , the co up !.!.ot Ot!.ly r°o"'·s not creL1te cot:i_,j ·]_t:l. ons for
assuo.gin.g ti:ie
spffer i t~.p: s
our peop le b3ve endured for t:.:i.!."l e y ea.rs,
d oes not l ead to u stable situat i on :Ln Sout h Vietnam nor do 2s
it respond t o the sacred 3spiration for i ndepen denc e , democrac y ,
and peace of our nation . On t he contrary , it opens the wny fo r
- 13 -
more serious
troubl e ~
The re is the dange r th at t he war wi ll
deve lop mors fiercely, caus i ng lar ge - sc al e d e struction and
kill ing i n our
11
co untry~
It :!s obv ious tbat th e Novembe r one coup does not
co~:.tri-
bute to r e s t ricting and en6 ing the ag g r ess ive war of t he U. S .
i :nps r:Lalists :Ln South Vi et n J.m, the major dl saster of our nutio:r_ .
On t he contrary , it is a
sign of an int e nsif l c ati on
~ r e monitory
of th:Ls war . More ov er , the Sout h Vi e tnamese face th e t hr e at of
u new military d ictatorial reg i mB . Fac ed with this situation,
The n f oll ows u standar d historical account of the pas t
c.ot1ct 1_tiot1s t!~18 lT. S .
i :c1rp.:-~r :l ~1 li st~s
cli que , whi ch was no
orde r t o
~e c e i ve
lon ~~ r
pu bl~ c
etct~:Lvs l y m:.1 t1e 1J.ver8d
us ~i u l ,
to
s1.vD.p
by another lackey cli que in
op1nlon , to crsate condition s -- they
pur su e the i r upcressive po l lctes .
~b e
November 1 963 c oup had
attrJb'\..1ted to t be:l. r ;::lc. t:l. on::: c a_:.no t d ec e i v e public opinion. The
l atts r correct l y real ize th at while
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is embe llished by
Ynyo ne who exsrclses power
the people if be d oes
~ot
~Uien1
~ew
~.:.'.').
N~ o
Dinh Diem was forc ed
r•s,,._',· ia18 Js
-~ru1 .L r~.t:1 ined
L1tld. ,
adj e ctives .
Sou th
vi e tnmn
sa t isfy the
is '."'_Ot support ed by
~un ~amental
aspirations
- 14 of the sou th e rn peop l e . He m 1st abolish
1.vurd s wbic h are c :::trn.oufl .'. L /?'.::'d concs!.!trat i
po l-l.tic .~11
hamlets un0
c :.:rm.ps. He must
0:::1
po l lti ~ a l
re l ease al l re rsons jnil ed ?o r
to wha t
st~ate p ic
r eas ons, no mutter
tsn.d0 nc:1. 0 s tbsy bs l o!.:p- . He must immedL1 t e ly
.''·rant 0 emocru tic free d oms, sue. h as :C;".'e ed om of o.s s smb l y , fr eed om
of
2 rfo.nizat:i.ot"~ ,
l abo r uEion :frsec om, freed om of speech an d the
press , f r eed om o f be li ef , ctnC: f r eed om of' tr :..1de . He must e limi n ate to the root al l vest i ge s of the dicta t oria l,
f u ~is t ,
milit ari st r s1:t:1.me . He must put a!.! end to t e rror, oppr ess ion,
ac'la l"Qj_d s. Ee must c51.s solv e the L! te r- f umily org'..1nizci.tions ,
all oppress i v s forces , the re p ubli c an you th orgL.t:nizct t i on ,
a ll p.:.ir u - rn.il:l.tar y
or p;cti!~tz ci.tio~r. s
mnong tbe youth , worn.en,
.~n1 d
students ,
public serv .m ts , un6 <: l1e r -sop l e . Ee mus t r ut cm e nd to ci.11
unreas onabl e arr ee t s ...• ~ e ars of the op inion that the Nov.
on e c oup will hav e a pcsltiu2
reso l ute l y try t o
esc~:J.pe
tln
ma~mi ng
·c . s .
if the coup leade rs
imp sr i a l :Ls ts gr ip cmd a re
suf f icient l y indepe n de n t to abGndon t he pa th of
not d r .:J.w useful l essotis f rom ·cb::;
c ont i nue
fo ll ow i n~
~fO
resisted by the peorle
:1..~!rn.s d 1:..tte
str~gg lin g
r ea.11. ties a.nc!
f 1nh Dlem's f o otsteps , they will be
~nt
the ir own so l die rs and will be
unab l e t o avoid defeat .
nThe conclus :1.on drawn f rom ths c oup by ctll st r a ta cf
sotither n pf;ople 2.s th.:1t th ey must co ntinu e thf· ·1.r resi stunc e
mere re so l ute ly t h an eve r and that the revo l ut ionary road
which tbey have fo llowed on their own is t he unique ro aC l ea6 inp: to tb e 1:1.be rcttion of thei r own f cuni l:1.es .::mo t he father l a nd.
On the p os sibi li ties cf a ne p otiu ted en d to the war ,
the
;i
- 15 -
the Vietnamasa themselves . Only under this condition will blood
stop be :L:cic ab ao and c an our c our.try dev-::)l op
norm~llly .
11
henchman wil l fu ll more deep ly both politically an6 physically.
Greater i nt e rn a l d issension will preva il in their ranks, and i t
will be utV-: rly :1.mpossibl e for t h e:m to svoid compl e te failures.
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