THE RUSI JOURNAL
Cheonan and Yeonpyeong
The Northeast Asian Response to North
Korea’s Provocations
Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Divergent responses to the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong
Island in 2010 have raised tensions in Northeast Asia. China’s enabling response appeared
to write North Korea a blank cheque for further provocations; but Beijing has in fact been
constrained by fear of destabilisation of the Kim regime. The incidents have prompted
a reappraisal of bilateral relations within the region – in particular, the South Korea-US
alliance – and revealed the continuing importance of the Sino-US relationship in Korean
peninsular security affairs.
T
he 26 March 2010 sinking of the
South Korean corvette Cheonan
in waters near the South Koreandeclared Northern Limit Line (a de
facto jurisdictional border with North
Korea) initially seemed to be another in
a series of tragic and periodic incidents
in which ongoing inter-Korean tensions
have flared up and then subsided. But as
events unfolded, the shockwaves from
the ship’s sinking and the subsequent
tensions generated by the 23 November
2010 North Korean artillery shelling
of Yeonpyeong Island have revealed a
different aspect of the current interKorean relationship. In the past, the rise
and fall of inter-Korean tensions rarely
had significant security ramifications
beyond the peninsula itself: provocative
incidents occurred in the context of
ongoing competition for legitimacy
between the two Koreas, with little
likelihood that isolated incidents would
escalate in ways that might decisively
shift the inter-Korean balance or result
in a tipping point that could eventually
lead to Korean reunification. But the
growing power imbalance between the
two Koreas, especially viewed against
the backdrop of an uncertain leadership
succession and increasing economic
difficulties in the North, has given the
Cheonan and Yeonpyeong provocations
a different quality – and has evoked a
different kind of response from regional
neighbours.
The Context
Following the end of the hostilities of the
Korea War in 1953, North Korea followed
an aggressive and hostile military strategy
into the 1970s that involved hundreds of
infiltrations into South Korean territory.
However, as South Korea’s power
increased in comparison to its northern
neighbour, Pyongyang’s aggressive use
of military provocations correspondingly
declined to the point that years went
by without land incursions across the
Demilitarized Zone that separates the
two countries; and there were only
intermittent challenges to South Korea’s
declared Northern Limit Line in the 1990s
and 2000s. By this standard, 2010 marked
a dramatic turning point in the scale of
North Korean provocations, involving the
highest level of South Korean casualties
since the 1960s.1 Moreover, despite a
series of maritime skirmishes involving
Korean fishing boats and naval vessels
from the late 1990s (including loss of
life in the West Sea/Yellow Sea), all
incidents had been managed in a strictly
inter-Korean context prior to 2010.
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Thus, the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong
provocations marked a dramatic
escalation of confrontation following
years of quiescence and a decade of
rapprochement under the progressive
governments of Kim Dae Jung and Roh
Moo-Hyun. They also established a direct
linkage between inter-Korean tensions
and the broader regional environment,
placing a spotlight on the quality of
Sino-US relations and regional crisis
management capabilities.
The interplay between interKorean tensions and the management
of regional security issues, especially the
management of Sino-US relations, helps
to explain why provocations that might
in the past have been treated as serious
but routine incidents in the context of the
longstanding inter-Korean confrontation
might now serve as sparks that have
broader ramifications for stability and
security in East Asia. Moreover, interKorean tensions have occurred in the
context of rising Chinese confidence and
a deepened recognition of economic
and political limitations on US global
leadership.
The Aftermath
The Cheonan sinking steadily evolved
from an inter-Korean incident to a focal
DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2011.576477
13/04/2011 10:18:24
Officers of the North Korean People’s Army ground force, navy and air force line up during a ceremony celebrating the re-election of North Korean leader Kim
Jong-il, Pyongyang, September 2010. Courtesy of AP Photo/Korean Central News Agency via Korea News Service.
point for regional tensions, both at
the UN Security Council and through
apparently competing Chinese and
US-ROK naval exercises. North Korea’s
artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island
reinforced the urgency of regional
co-ordination on provocations at a time
of declining confidence in the Chinesemediated Six Party Talks, a regional
security forum on Korean peninsular
denuclearisation and regional security
launched in 2003 involving the United
States, Japan, South Korea, North Korea,
China and Russia. The management
of these North Korean provocations
provides a litmus test for the future
nature of Sino-US interaction on
regional security issues and is an
early indicator of how US alliance
commitments in Northeast Asia
may come into conflict with China’s
aspirations for expanded regional political
and security influence as a result of its
rapid economic growth.
The series of actions and reactions
among the six parties following the
sinking of the Cheonan provides
insights into regional crisis management
capacities and sheds light on the bottomline positions, preferences and dilemmas
harboured by each party. A detailed
examination of regional responses to
the incident over the key phases of
confrontation highlights major differences
in strategic perceptions and interests
among the key players that present a
long-term challenge to the regional
management of Korean peninsula and
Northeast Asian security issues. This
article will explore these responses
through an evaluation of the impact of
the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents
on respective bilateral relationships
among the two Koreas, China and the
United States, and will also consider the
responses of Japan and Russia.
Inter-Korean Relations
The initial impulse of the Blue House
on the night the Cheonan sank was to
delink the sinking from possible interKorean tensions despite the temptation
to ascribe blame to North Korea before
an investigation into its cause. The Lee
Myung-bak administration’s decision to
launch a multilateral investigation of the
Cheonan sinking led by the Joint CivilianMilitary Investigation Group (JIG) drew
praise from outside observers and earned
credibility and support for the South
Korean president from the United States.2
However, once the ship was physically
recovered from the seabed in mid-April
2010, under extraordinarily difficult
physical conditions, the investigation
turned towards the consideration of
an ‘external explosion’ as the most
likely cause for the sinking, leading to
speculation that North Korean special
operations forces might have been
responsible for launching a torpedo from
a mini-submarine.
North Korea did not publicly
mention the Cheonan incident until 17
April, when a military commentator
called it a ‘regretful accident’ and denied
DPRK involvement, arguing that the Lee
administration’s accusations were aimed
at avoiding ‘heavy defeat’ at the 2 June
local elections, justifying its conservative
policy, strengthening US-led international
sanctions and undermining North Korean
efforts toward building a ‘strong and
prosperous state’.3
The release of interim results on
20 May 2010, less than two weeks prior
to South Korean local elections, left the
impression among many South Koreans
that the investigation was compromised
by ruling party attempts to use North
Korean issues as a domestic political lever
on public opinion. This perception served
to feed the polarisation of South Korean
public opinion over the legitimacy of
the investigation results, a development
that played into North Korean hands.
South Korean academic experts
pointed to ‘serious inconsistencies’ in
the interim report, arguing that ‘the
“critical evidence” presented by the JIG
does not support its conclusion that the
Cheonan’s sinking was caused by the
alleged DPRK’s torpedo’. 4 Another factor
that influenced international perceptions
of the credibility of the report was an
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Cheonan and Yeonpyeong
independent Russian review of the
international investigation team’s findings
that concluded that the evidence did not
conclusively prove that the sinking was
caused by a North Korean torpedo. Other
factors influencing the credibility of the
report in the eyes of the South Korean
public were perceived inconsistencies in
statements from senior officials in the Lee
administration in the early stages after
the incident, and an initial unwillingness
to release the full JIG report.
North Korean statements initially
targeted the Lee administration, and
it was not until the release of the JIG
interim report that the DPRK Foreign
Ministry directly accused the United
States of using the Cheonan incident
to realise its broader strategic interests
in the region, claiming that ‘the
investigation was steered by the US
from its very outset’.5 During a 28 May
press conference criticising the findings
of the JIG investigation, the North
Korean National Defense Commission
suggested that the Cheonan case
provided a pretext for the US-ROK delay
of wartime operational control transfer,
and Pyongyang released a statement
on 22 June denouncing South Korean
participation in the US-led Proliferation
Security Initiative, calling the decision
‘little short of declaring they would not
rule out military conflicts’.6
In the aftermath of the Yeonpyeong
incident, both US and Chinese diplomatic
efforts sought to mediate the situation:
joint calls for inter-Korean dialogue
were made during consultations led
by Deputy Secretary of State James
Steinberg in mid-December; and these
were reaffirmed in the joint communiqué
released on the occasion of the ObamaHu summit in Washington in January
2011. These efforts promoted the
reduction of tensions between the two
Koreas and created an environment
in which South Korea accepted North
Korea’s offer of preliminary talks
between defence ministers immediately
after the conclusion of the Washington
summit. But the subsequent breakdown
in preliminary high-level inter-Korean
military talks on 9 February 2011
revealed that differences in opinion
over responsibility for the Cheonan
and Yeonpyeong incidents are a
fundamental stumbling block to interKorean reconciliation. At those talks,
South Korea sought a North Korean
admission of responsibility for the
two incidents as a precondition for
the resumption of regional dialogue,
while the North attempted to justify
its actions. Following the failed talks,
North Korea’s state newspaper Rodong
Sinmun accused the South of pursuing
a ‘policy of confrontation’, and stated
that ‘it is impossible to improve the
north-south relations … unless the
South Korean authorities give up their
attitude of denying dialogue and seeking
confrontation’.7
The
inter-Korean
stalemate is an obstacle to regional
efforts toward the resumption of the Six
Party Talks through which North Korea’s
nuclear programme and other issues
must be addressed.
China-ROK Relations
China initially saw the Cheonan sinking
as an inter-Korean incident and appeared
frustrated by South Korean efforts to
both internationalise the issue by taking
it to the UN Security Council and to use
the incident as a pressure point against
North Korea. Beijing repeatedly called
for ‘calm and restraint’8 in dealing
with the crisis and Chinese leaders
consistently reaffirmed their commitment
to address the case ‘in an objective
and fair manner’.9 China’s handling of
the Cheonan incident, and especially
its blocking of international efforts to
censure North Korea for the Yeonpyeong
Island artillery shelling, have severely
damaged the Sino-South Korean political
relationship and have created doubts
about China’s credibility as a broker
of the Six Party Talks. There are also
concerns that in the process of defending
North Korea, China has given Pyongyang
licence to undertake even more serious
provocations in the future.
However, the Sino-South Korean
relationship had begun to sour even
prior to the release of the JIG’s interim
report on 20 May 2010. An initial sign
of China’s insensitivity to South Korean
concerns was the fact that the Chinese
government took weeks to acknowledge
and offer condolences for the deaths
of the Cheonan’s crew. Although Lee
Myung-bak met with President Hu Jintao
on the occasion of the opening of the
Shanghai Expo on 30 April, China did not
inform South Korean officials in advance
of plans to host North Korean President
Kim Jong-il days later for a summit with
President Hu Jintao on 6 May. Officials in
Seoul had expected the Hu-Lee summit
to lead to intensified consultations with
China on laying out an international
response to the Cheonan incident, but
the Shanghai summit failed to produce
a joint understanding on how to address
the tensions.10 At the onset of Kim
Jong-il’s five-day trip to China, ROK
Unification Minister Hyun In-taek urged
China to play a ‘responsible role’,11 while
South Korean editorials argued that ‘the
warm welcome to the Kim entourage is
particularly offensive … since it comes on
the heels of South Koreans’ mourning the
sailors killed on the Cheonan’.12
China’s prioritisation of regional
stability and relations with the North at the
expense of China-ROK relations revealed
a surprising South Korean miscalculation
regarding Chinese strategic priorities and
its likely response to South Korean efforts
to secure a strong UN condemnation
of North Korea. In view of the relative
weight of China’s significant trade with
South Korea versus trade with the North,
this was a logical projection, but it failed
to take into account China’s historical
and ideological ties with North Korea or
deep Chinese concerns about prospects
for North Korean instability in the context
of succession. This misreading may have
occurred in part as a result of Premier
Wen Jiabao’s statement in Seoul that
China would ‘value the outcome of the
international probe and the international
community’s reaction to it’, and that
‘following that decision, we will shield no
one’.13 A week later, South Korea pressed
for a direct condemnation of North Korea
when it formally requested that the matter
be considered by the Security Council on
4 June,14 but this effort misjudged China’s
response at the Security Council as well
as US capacity to elicit Chinese support.
While the Obama administration voiced
strong support of President Lee’s handling
of the incident, Chinese reluctance to join
international condemnation of Pyongyang
undermined ROK efforts to secure a
timely international response. The 9 July
Security Council Presidential Statement
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Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
was perceived as a ‘diplomatic setback’ for
South Korea.15
The impact of the Cheonan incident
has intensified debates inside South
Korea regarding how to deal with a rising
China and Seoul’s policy orientation
toward the United States and China
respectively. An earlier phase of this
debate occurred in 2008 when South
Korean president Roh Moo-Hyun put
forward a ‘balancing’ concept that
would involve less dependence on the
alliance with the United States and
the strengthening of South Korea’s
relationship with China. But Lee Myungbak’s emphasis on the importance of the
US-ROK alliance since his inauguration
has appeared to come at the expense
of effective Sino-ROK relations, even
while the two countries announced the
establishment of a ‘strategic partnership’
in May 2008. In the summer following the
Cheonan sinking, a South Korean editorial
noted that ‘Seoul and Washington have
come to a new chapter in their strategic
alliance and partnership’, to which ‘no
doubt the North’s torpedo attack on the
South’s warship Cheonan in the West
Sea in March has contributed’. But it
also argued that: ‘the two countries
should be careful not to bring about
unnecessary conflicts with neighbouring
countries, especially China … It would
be better for the South to avoid being
caught in the rivalry between Beijing and
Washington.’16 This is an expression of
the conventional wisdom among South
Korean foreign policy specialists on
how to manage respective relationships
between China and the United States.17
South Korean analysts appear wary of
the long-term risks of Sino-US tensions
as raised by the Cheonan incident
versus the need to maintain a favorable
China-ROK partnership. These analysts
privately express grave concerns about
the weakening of the relationship with
China.18 A May editorial argued that ‘the
“strategic partnership” signed between
the two countries last year must not be
burned in fiery emotion and rhetoric’.19
A major challenge for South Korean
policy is how to build sufficient trust
in Sino-South Korean relations to win
more active co-operation with China
on political issues, especially as it
relates to the future of the Korean
peninsula in the event of North Korean
instability.20
China-DPRK Relations
Beijing’s cautious approach to dealing
with the Cheonan incident is probably
best explained by ongoing concerns
about North Korea’s internal stability
at a time of leadership succession in
Pyongyang. While the United States and
South Korea viewed the incident as an
unprovoked attack by North Korea and
attempted to hold the North accountable
for its actions, China saw the subsequent
US-ROK naval exercises in response to
the attack as underestimating the serious
risks of further provoking Pyongyang and
escalating regional military tensions. In
response to President Obama’s remarks
at the G20 summit in Toronto criticising
China’s ‘willful blindness’ on the issue,21
a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman
on 29 June reaffirmed China’s ‘fair and
irreproachable’ position, stating that
‘China borders on the Korean Peninsula,
and we have our own feeling on the
issue … we have more direct and intense
concerns’.22 In addition, China’s response
to the Cheonan sinking and its aftermath
appeared to widen the internal divisions
between Chinese civilian party and
military leaders regarding North Korea
policy which had surfaced after North
Korea’s May 2009 nuclear test. According
to US officials, Chinese party leaders have
reportedly expressed increasing anxieties
about Pyongyang’s provocations while
military leaders have tended to defend
North Korea’s position.23
North Korea’s dependency on
China has increased amidst heightened
tensions between China and US allies in
the aftermath of the Cheonan incident.
South Korea’s trade cut-off following the
Cheonan sinking and continued efforts to
enforce international sanctions under UN
resolutions have left North Korea with
no recourse but to rely more heavily on
China for economic assistance. A symbolic
result of the impact of this shift was North
Korea’s rebuff of former US President
Jimmy Carter’s visit to Pyongyang in
August 2010, when Kim Jong-il chose to
meet President Hu in Changchun instead,
with the apparent mission of securing
Chinese economic aid and support of its
unfolding leadership succession.24
Despite pledges of strengthened
co-operation between Beijing and
Pyongyang’s new leadership since
the historic Workers’ Party of Korea
conference in September 2010, several
potential conflict points in the relationship
have appeared to test China’s patience
with DPRK provocations. First, China’s
diplomatic and economic support of
Pyongyang, and China’s willingness to
prevent international efforts to punish
North Korean bad behaviour, has
undermined perceptions of China’s role
in the regional and global community.
Second, North Korea’s renewed nuclear
ambitions as represented by revelations
to a private American delegation of
a new uranium enrichment facility in
mid-November 2010, shortly before the
Yeonpyeong attack, have challenged
Chinese efforts to lead regional efforts
on DPRK denuclearisation. Third, North
Korea’s continued emphasis on selfreliance as its national development
strategy has contradicted Chinese efforts
to promote reform and opening in North
Korea. Fourth, North Korean provocations
have heightened frictions in China’s
bilateral relationships with major regional
partners, including South Korea and the
United States.
The Chinese greeted with alarm
joint US-ROK military exercises involving
the USS George Washington following
the Yeonpyeong incident. But China’s
response appeared to focus more on
the need to calm down Seoul and to
prevent South Korean military exercises
in the aftermath of the shelling rather
than to identify or punish North Korea as
the perpetrator of the incident. China’s
refusal to go along with the Security
Council’s condemnation of North Korea
for launching the unprovoked shelling (or
for revelations regarding North Korea’s
enriched uranium programme) and
criticisms of South Korea for undertaking
military exercises designed to show South
Korea’s will to respond to future North
Korean attacks, illustrated a widening
gap between China and the US and South
Korea in the aftermath of North Korea’s
Yeonpyeong artillery shelling.
US-ROK Relations
US responses to North Korea’s
provocations have been treated primarily
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Cheonan and Yeonpyeong
as an opportunity to show solidarity
with its alliance partners in Northeast
Asia. President Obama affirmed that
the United States ‘fully support[ed]’
Lee’s approach in the run-up to the 20
May release of the JIG interim report.25
After the publication of the Security
Council Presidential Statement on 9 July,
Secretary Clinton stated that ‘we applaud
the Republic of Korea’s careful handling
of this situation’.26 Immediately following
Seoul’s release of the JIG interim results
confirming North Korean responsibility
for the sinking, Washington ‘condemned’
the attack while emphasising its security
commitment to South Korea:27 this was
arguably the most important of the
American responses. The summit with
Lee Myung-bak on the sidelines of the
Toronto G20 gathering in June marked
the sixtieth anniversary of the Korean
War and the first meeting between
the two presidents since the Cheonan
incident. There, President Obama
called the alliance a ‘lynchpin’ of Asian
security, and pledged to ‘deter any acts
of North Korean aggression’.28 The joint
communiqué of the US-ROK Security
Consultative Meeting on 8 October
2010 ‘reaffirmed the continued US
commitment to provide and strengthen
extended deterrence for the ROK’,
and produced ‘Strategic Alliance 2015’
through which ‘the Republic of Korea
and the United States are more united
than ever before to deter North Korean
provocations and aggression’.29
However, the Cheonan and
Yeonpyeong attacks have raised questions
about the long-term role of the US-ROK
alliance in preventing recurring North
Korean military provocations and the
challenge of managing Chinese reactions
to efforts to enhance the US-ROK security
alliance. In immediate response to the
Yeonpyeong shelling, the United States
joined South Korea in four-day joint
naval exercises in the Yellow Sea on
28 November–1 December 2010. This
response was effective and reassuring
to South Korea, especially following the
decision to exercise the USS George
Washington in the East Sea/Sea of Japan
rather than the West Sea/Yellow Sea
following the Cheonan incident. Only
days after the Yeonpyeong artillery
shelling, Secretary Clinton hosted a
trilateral foreign ministers’ meeting with
Japanese and South Korean counterparts
in Washington where the three leaders
‘strongly condemned the attack’.30 This
meeting served both to underscore
solidarity among allies in response to
North Korea’s provocation and to send
a message to Beijing that North Korea’s
continued provocations were driving US
allies together in ways that are not in
China’s national security interests. The
meeting was also a rejection of Chinese
calls for ‘emergency consultations’ among
the six parties following the attack and
drew a sharp response from the Chinese
Foreign Ministry spokesperson, who
stated that ‘military alliances and displays
of force cannot solve the issue’.31
South Korea enjoys particular
status as an internationally responsible
player and close ally of the Obama
administration, which has pledged
its support for the idea of Korean
unification. For instance, the June 2009
US-ROK Joint Vision Statement declares
both parties’ commitment, stating
that: ‘Through our Alliance we aim to
build a better future for all people on
the Korean Peninsula, establishing a
durable peace on the Peninsula and
leading to peaceful reunification on
the principles of free democracy and a
market economy’.32 But even despite
such expressions of solidarity, the United
States has harboured concerns that
North Korea’s provocations continue
to drive South Korea into a situation in
which an increasingly frustrated South
Korean public expect a stronger response
from the ROK government, including
the adoption of more aggressive rules
of engagement by border forces. This
includes proposals by a South Korean
defence review commission that South
Korea should adopt a policy of ‘proactive
deterrence’ that might involve striking
North Korea first in self-defence rather
than suffering further provocations.
These measures carry with them risks of
potential escalation that require careful
management; the results may also be
harder to control than many South
Koreans realise.33
US-China Relations
China’s strong reaction to the US-ROK
military drills in the East Sea in July
merged concerns about a more
‘assertive’ Chinese approach toward
maritime security and regional political
issues with efforts to manage tensions
on the Korean peninsula, where China’s
preferred objective has been to maintain
rather than challenge the status quo. The
response to the provocations highlighted
the importance of Sino-US co-operation
as a potentially effective mechanism
for limiting inter-Korean escalation and
keeping a lid on confrontation. It was
also a litmus test on whether China and
the United States would compete or
co-operate in support of Asia’s regional
stability. But it also illustrated a gap in
Chinese and US approaches, especially
as they relate to the preferred strategies,
tools and outcomes that each side seeks
on the Korean peninsula.
One characteristic of the Chinese
response has been the tendency to look
at the Korean peninsula through the lens
of Sino-US strategic relations. This view
is reflected in growing concerns about
the intentions of the US-ROK alliance, as
shown in China’s expression of concern
about US-ROK military exercises in
response to North Korea’s provocations.
An editorial in China’s party paper
Global Times argued that ‘Whatever the
explanations the US and South Korea
offered, the military drills surrounding
China’s offshore sea obviously have the
intention of targeting China’; and warned
that ‘Seoul may not have fully realized
the consequences of upsetting China-US
ties … a stronger South Korea-US alliance
might jeopardize the trust of Seoul with
its neighbours’.34
At the same time, China’s
enabling response to North Korean
provocations has become a growing
source of irritation in Washington as
China has seemingly turned a blind
eye to North Korean actions and given
North Korea a ‘blank cheque’ to pursue
provocations with apparent impunity.
Washington’s growing frustration with
China’s insistence on ‘calm and restraint’
when dealing with North Korea was
clearly reflected in President Obama’s
remarks at the G20 Summit in Toronto,
where he noted: ‘there’s a difference
between restraint and willful blindness
to consistent problems’.35 On the other
hand, Washington appears to recognise
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Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
both the critical importance of Chinese
co-operation on North Korea and
related Chinese sensitivities that limit
such co-operation. At a speech at the
MacArthur Foundation on 9 July 2010, US
Forces Korea Commander General Walter
Sharp stated that: ‘The Republic of KoreaUS alliance needs more from the entire
international community and all countries
in the region, in particular China. We
believe all countries in the region and
China need to work in co-operation in
addressing North Korean aggressive
behaviour. In particular we will welcome
Chinese action even behind the scenes.’36
When Admiral Michael Mullen visited
South Korea in December to strengthen
co-ordination of future responses to
North Korean attacks, he stated that
‘China has unique influence. Therefore,
they bear unique responsibility.’37
The US dismissal of Chinese
proposals to convene an emergency
meeting among delegation heads of the
Six Party Talks immediately after the
Yeonpyeong incident, and its hosting of
trilateral foreign ministerial talks with
Japan and South Korea in December
2010 provided a complex backdrop for
joint Sino-US calls for direct inter-Korean
dialogue in mid-December in the run
up to the Hu-Obama summit in January
2011. The summit’s joint statement made
the right noises but failed to explicitly
address several differences in Chinese
and American approaches toward North
Korea, including the implementation of
Security Council Resolutions 1718 and
1874 condemning North Korea’s two
nuclear tests (for which Chinese support
has been critical); differences in view
on ‘recent developments’ that led to
heightened tensions on the peninsula;
and the naming of specific ‘necessary
steps’ towards the resumption of Six
Party Talks.38
Japanese and Russian Responses
While Japanese observers saw the
Cheonan sinking as ‘a warning signal’
for the Japanese government about the
North Korean military threat,39 Japanese
concerns have been driven by the
regional repercussions from the incident
and implications for the US-Japan
alliance, perceived to have suffered under
Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama. During
his joint press conference with Secretary
Clinton in Tokyo on 21 May, Foreign
Minister Katsuya Okada stated that ‘the
importance of the Japan-US alliance is
increasing amid the unstable and insecure
situation in East Asia, with incidents like
the sinking of the South Korea warship’.40
The Cheonan incident and its aftermath
have also provided a context that justified
an improvement in ROK-Japan security
co-operation. South Korea and Japan are
reported to be negotiating agreements
on intelligence sharing, and acquisitions
and cross-servicing as technical measures
that would dramatically reinforce the
potential for security co-operation
on military issues between the two
countries.
The Cheonan incident also prompted
Japanese calls for closer trilateral
co-operation with the United States
and South Korea on both deterring the
North Korean threat and addressing
potential North Korean instability. Japan’s
greater willingness to co-operate with
the United States and South Korea on
security matters was perceived as an
important signal of resolve in response
to North Korean provocations. Noting
that the Cheonan sinking occurred
at a time of North Korea’s uncertain
domestic transition, a Japanese editorial
argued that ‘given North Korea’s nuclear
weapons and missiles, we must never
omit precautions for unexpected
contingencies. Now is the time for Japan,
South Korea and the United States to first
start discussions on contingency planning
[to respond to potential instability in
North Korea].’41 The strengthening
of trilateral co-ordination following
the Yeonpyeong shelling catalysed
further discussion of enhanced JapanROK defence co-operation, including
strengthened logistical and intelligence
co-operation between the two militaries.
While Russia has tended to play
a relatively marginal role in Northeast
Asian security relations in recent years,
its active response to the Cheonan
sinking has served as a key influence
on both international condemnation of
Pyongyang and South Korean domestic
perceptions. Russia’s early co-ordination
with China demonstrated its diplomatic
support of Pyongyang and Beijing as
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met senior
Chinese officials including President Hu
Jintao in Beijing days before Russia’s
expert team began their investigation
in South Korea. The immediate Russian
response to Seoul’s conclusions fell in
line with Chinese fears about provoking a
military conflict on the peninsula; during
his meeting with the foreign minister,
Yang Jiechi, in June in Beijing, Lavrov
reportedly affirmed that both China and
Russia were ‘deeply concerned’ about the
inter-Korean situation.42
Russia’s decision to send its own
investigation team to South Korea and
related South Korean media debates
served to widen the domestic debate
in South Korea over North Korea’s
responsibility for the sinking.43 Despite
Moscow’s decision not to disclose the
conclusions of its navy-led independent
investigation, progressive South Korean
media reports on its alleged findings in
July refuted various aspects of Seoul’s
multilateral report.44 The Russian report
is significant for the fact that it was the
only national review independent of
the South Korean-led investigation and
also made Russia the first nation to
deny North Korean responsibility. But,
described by some Russian analysts as
being ‘as equally unconvincing as the
South Korean-led report’,45 the Russian
report seems more important as an
indicator of Russian strategic efforts
rather than a basis of contradictory
evidence. According to Leonid Petrov
of the University of Sydney, ‘the whole
purpose of Russia’s move was to restore
the balance of power in Northeast Asia.
There was no balance of power when
South Korea with its allies, including
the US, Japan, the UK, and Australia,
produced a document, unilaterally
accusing North Korea over the incident.’46
In the aftermath of the Yeonpyeong
shelling, Russia appeared to break
with China by urgently pressing for a
Security Council discussion of peninsular
tensions in mid-December, motivated
by concerns that South Korean military
exercises might stimulate an escalatory
North Korean counter-response. Russia
did not try to shield North Korea from
international criticism, in contrast to
China’s position at the Security Council
discussion. Moscow has held to the
position that denuclearisation of the
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Cheonan and Yeonpyeong
peninsula should be pursued through
the resumption of Six Party Talks. Indeed,
Foreign Minister Lavrov has stated that
‘there is no other mechanism to settle
the problem’.47
Regional Security Dynamics in
the Post-Cheonan Environment
The 26 March 2010 Cheonan sinking and
20 November 2010 Yeonpyeong attack
have deepened mistrust among regional
actors while exposing the negative
consequences of heightened tensions.
China’s unwillingness to condemn North
Korea following the Yeonpyeong artillery
shelling widened the gap in both SinoSouth Korean and Sino-US relations.
Although China has been preoccupied
with promoting stability on the Korean
peninsula and inside North Korea at all
costs, this approach appears to have
unleashed rather than restrained North
Korean leaders to pursue provocations
with apparent impunity. As a result,
divergent responses to North Korean
provocations have introduced tensions
at a regional level, even as Sino-US
co-operation proved to be an essential
element in limiting inter-Korean tensionescalation following the Yeonpyeong
artillery shelling.
It is possible to draw several lessons
from the impact of the Cheonan and
Yeonpyeong incidents on Northeast
Asian security relations. First, they
demonstrated the importance of
strengthening regional co-ordination
mechanisms on North Korea and broader
security issues through overlapping
US-ROK-China
and
US-Japan-ROK
trilateral efforts. Such efforts appear to
require a greater Chinese willingness to
consult with regional partners, a more
honest Chinese assessment and response
regarding who is to blame for recent
provocations, and a reconciliation of US
alliance commitments and the increasing
role of Sino-US relations on key regional
issues.
Second,
the
Cheonan
and
Yeonpyeong incidents highlighted the
contradictions China faces in its desire to
promote engagement with North Korea as
a means by which to manage crisis, and
its unwillingness to acknowledge North
Korea as the instigator of crisis. One result
has been declining confidence among
American and South Korean officials in
Chinese efforts to play a responsible role
in the region as mediator of the stalled
Six Party Talks on DPRK denuclearisation.
Third, the Cheonan sinking has
increased the spotlight on North Korea’s
domestic transition, which many US and
South Korean observers have linked
to the incident.48 While Pyongyang
will likely remain preoccupied with
securing a smooth leadership transition
following its historic September 2010
party conference, the Cheonan incident
has challenged North Korean efforts to
balance its domestic goals with foreign
policy priorities.
Finally, the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong
incidents have highlighted the linkage
between inter-Korean tensions and
regional stability in ways that underscore
the need for a unified regional approach
to the management and resolution of
inter-Korean tensions that might presage
or result from North Korean instability.
At the same time, a regional unified
approach is also a necessary prerequisite
for managing inter-Korean tensions and
providing a suitable path for addressing
these issues through negotiation. But the
likelihood of progress on that path will
only come in the context of greater unity
of purpose, priority and focus among
major powers, especially the United
States and China. Otherwise, North
Korea may continue to exploit differences
and collective action problems among
neighbours of the two Koreas in ways that
both highlight the instability of the current
balance of power on the Korean peninsula
and which potentially jeopardise the
collective interest in regional stability that
is shared by all parties. ■
4Seunghun Lee and J J Suh, ‘Rush to
Judgment: Inconsistencies in South
Korea’s Cheonan Report’, Asia-Pacific
Journal (Vol. 28, No. 1, July 2010).
6Korean Central News Agency, ‘Lee
Myung Bak Groups’ Confrontation with
DPRK Blasted’, 26 June 2010.
Scott Snyder is Director of the Center for
US-Korea Policy at the Asia Foundation,
Adjunct Senior Fellow for Korean Studies
at the Council on Foreign Relations, and
Senior Associate of Pacific Forum CSIS.
He received a BA from Rice University
and an MA from Harvard University. His
latest book is China’s Rise and the Two
Koreas (Lynne Rienner, 2009).
See-Won Byun is the Research Associate
of the Asia Foundation’s Center for
US-Korea Policy in Washington. She is
also the non-resident Kelly Fellow of
Pacific Forum CSIS. She received a BA
from Brown University and MA degrees
from Yonsei University and George
Washington University.
NOTES
1Narushige Michishita, North Korea’s
Military-Diplomatic Campaigns,
1966−2008, Abingdon: Routledge, 2009).
See especially appendices A-C, pp.
199–203.
2Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group
(JIG), ‘Joint Investigation Group Report
on the Attack against ROKS Cheonan’,
Interim Report, May 2010, available at
<http://www.Cheonan46.go.kr/100>,
last accessed 25 March 2011.
3Korean Central News Agency, ‘Military
Commentator Denies Involvement in
Ship Sinking’, 17 April 2010.
5Korean Central News Agency, ‘Who
Wire-pulled Shocking Case Behind
Scene’, 28 May 2010. Also see Haksoon
Paik, ‘An Analysis of the North Korean
Perspective on Post-Cheonan Regional
Security’, Paper presented at an Asan
Institute Symposium on Post-Cheonan
Regional Security, Center for US-Korea
Policy and Asan Institute for Policy
Studies, Seoul, 13 August 2010.
7Korean Central News Agency, ‘S. Korea
Denounced for Sticking to Their Policy of
Confrontation’, 12 February 2011.
8Xinhua, ‘China Again Calls for Restraint,
Calm over ROK Warship Sinking’, 10 June
2010.
9Xinhua, ‘China to Make Objective, Fair
Judgment on S. Korean Warship Sinking:
Wen’, 28 May 2010.
© RUSI JOURNAL APRIL/MAY 2011
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Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
10 N
a Jeong-ju, ‘President Lee’s China Trip
Half Success’, Korea Times, 2 May 2010.
11Sam Kim, ‘S. Korea Calls For “Responsible
Role” by China in Dealing with N. Korea’,
Yonhap, 4 May 2010.
12JoongAng Daily, ‘Let’s Cool Off Over
China’, 8 May 2010.
13JoongAng Daily, ‘China Won’t Shield
Cheonan Culprit,’ 29 May 2010, <http://
joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.
asp?aid=2921121>.
14Park In-koo, ‘Letter dated 4 June 2010
from the Permanent Representative
of the Republic of Korea to the United
Nations addressed to the President of
the Security Council’, S/2010/28, <http://
www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/
cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/DPRK%20S%20
2010%20281%20SKorea%20Letter%20
and%20Cheonan%20Report.pdf>, last
accessed 25 March 2011.
15Korea Times, ‘Closer Alliance’, 21 July
2010.
16Ibid.
17Chung Jaeho, Between Ally and
Partner: Korea-China Relations and the
United States (New York, NY: Columbia
University Press, 2008).
18Author conversations in Seoul,
December 2010.
19JoongAng Daily, op. cit.
20Bonnie Glaser and Scott Snyder, with
David Szerlip and See-Won Byun,
Responding to Change on the Korean
Peninsula: Impediments to US-South
Korea-China Coordination (Washington,
DC: Center for Strategic and International
Studies, May 2010).
21The White House, ‘Remarks by President
Obama at G20 press conference in
Toronto’, Canada, 27 June 2010, <http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
remarks-president-obama-g-20-pressconference-toronto-canada>, last
accessed 25 March 2011.
22Xinhua, ‘China Rebuffs Criticism over
Stance on Korean Peninsular Situation’,
29 June 2010.
23Mark Landler, ‘US Stands with an Ally
Eager for China to Join the Line’, New York
Times, 26 May 2010.
34Global Times, ‘Military Drills Leave S.
Korea Insecure’, 20 August 2010.
35The White House, op. cit. in note 21.
24Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun, ‘ChinaKorea Relations: Consolidating Ties with
New DPRK Leadership’ in Carl Baker and
Brad Glosserman (eds.) Comparative
Connection (Vol. 12, No. 3, October 2010).
25Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Statement
by the Press Secretary on the Republic of
Korea Navy ship the Cheonan’, 19 May
2010, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/statement-press-secretaryrepublic-korea-navy-ship-Cheonan>, last
accessed 25 March 2011.
26Hillary Rodham Clinton, ‘UN Security
Council Statement on the Cheonan
attack’, Washington DC, 9 July 2010,
<http://www.state.gov/secretary/
rm/2010/07/144407.htm>, last accessed
25 March 2011.
27Office of the Press Secretary, op. cit.
28The White House, ‘Remarks by President
Obama and President Lee Myung-bak
of the Republic of Korea After Bilateral
Meeting’, Toronto, 26 June 2010, <http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
remarks-president-obama-and-presidentlee-myung-bak-republic-korea-afterbilateral->, last accessed 25 March 2011.
29Joint Communiqué, ‘The 42nd USROK Security Consultative Meeting’,
Washington DC, 8 October 2010,
<http://www.defense.gov/news/
d20101008usrok.pdf>.
30‘Trilateral Statement: Japan, Republic of
Korea, and the United States’, Washington
DC, 6 December 2010, <http://www.state.
gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/12/152431.htm>.
31Xinhua, ‘China Refutes Criticisms
on Efforts for Emergency Six-party
Consultations’, 2 December 2010.
32Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Joint Vision
for the Alliance of the United States of
America and the Republic of Korea’, 16
June 2009, <http://www.globalsecurity.
org/wmd/library/news/usa/2009/
usa-090616-whitehouse01.htm>, last
accessed 25 March 2011.
33Author conversations with ROK
government and US Forces Korea
personnel, December 2010.
36Song Sang-ho, ‘US Expects More N.K.
Provocations’, Korea Herald, 10 July 2010.
37Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the
US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Speech at the
Ministry of National Defense, Seoul,
South Korea, 8 December 2010, <http://
www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?id=1502>,
accessed 25 March 2011.
38The White House, ‘US-China Joint
Statement’, 19 January 2011, <http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/01/19/us-china-jointstatement>, last accessed 25 March 2011.
39Nikkei Weekly, ‘Sinking of S. Korean Ship
Demands Strong Response’, 24 May 2010.
40Masamiito, ‘Clinton: Sinking Also Threat
to Japan’, Japan Times, 22 May 2010.
41Daily Yomiuri, ‘Maintain Vigilance Against
North Korea’, 12 July 2010.
42RIA Novosti, ‘Russia, China to Try to
Prevent Conflict on Korean Peninsula—
Lavrov’, 4 June 2010.
43Yu Yong-won, ‘Russia’s Cheonan
“Investigation” Is a Political Minefield’,
ChosunIlbo, 10 September 2010; Ha Uhyeong, ‘Lee Administration Responds to
Russian Investigation Report’, Hankyoreh,
28 July 2010.
44Hankyoreh, ‘Russian Navy Expert Team’s
Analysis on the Cheonan Incident’, 27
July 2010; Hankyoreh, ‘Russia’s Cheonan
Investigation Suspects that the Sinking
Cheonan Ship Was Caused by a Mine in
Water’, 28 July 2010.
45See Leonid Petrov’s remarks in Sunny Lee,
‘Why Russia doesn’t share its Cheonan
results with Seoul’, Korea Times, 12
October 2010.
46Ibid.
47RIA Novosti, op. cit.
48Ruediger Frank, ‘An Act of Open
Insubordination? Implications of the
Cheonan Incident for Domestic Politics
in North Korea,’ 38 North, SAIS US-Korea
Institute, 9 May 2010.
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