2017
BACKGROUND GUIDE
Political Committee
Determining methods by which the Building Integrity program and the Building
Integrity Policy can be further integrated into NATO missions and operations
Providing parameters to the NAC for negotiating with the Russian Federation on
restarting the NATO-Russia Council
Crafting NATO’s role in the ongoing refugee crisis in Europe
Anticipating and addressing Russian and Serbian responses to Montenegro's
accession and the likely future accession of Kosovo
Written by Katarina Boehm
Chairperson of the Political Committee at NOR-NATO 2017
Letter from the chair
Honorable Delegates,
Welcome! My name is Katarina Boehm and I will be chairing the Political Committee at this
year’s NOR-NATO conference. I am a fourth-year student at Northeastern University double
majoring in Political Science and Environmental Science. I have been competing in model
simulations since my second year, and have fallen in love with the process and experience. I
competed at the 2015 and 2016 International Model NATO Conferences, and will be
competing at the same conference in February of this year. I have chaired numerous high
school and middle school conferences through the UN Association of Greater Boston, and at
the collegiate level, I chaired the Council of Arab Environmental Affairs Ministers at the
Northeast Regional Model Arab League Conference in November 2016. I encourage all of
you to consider one of the committee officer positions at the conference!
This background guide will provide you with an overview and explanation of the four
topics of the Political Committee, but it alone isn’t enough to prepare you for the
conference. Use this guide as a launching point for your own research, and do your best to
fully understand your country’s policy on each topic. I would suggest using news sources,
official government releases, and scholarly articles, as well as NATO documents and the
commentary thereon. Comprehending and upholding your country’s policy is vital to the
success of the model simulation.
As your chair, my job is to help prepare you for the conference (I hope this guide will
achieve that goal!) and to guide debate during the simulation. Knowing parliamentary
procedure is a stepping stone to your success, so I would suggest familiarizing yourself
with the NOR-NATO Handbook, found on the conference’s website. New delegates, don't be
afraid to speak up and reach out to other delegates on every topic of debate. As a member
of the Alliance, your country's views are welcome and valued. Experienced delegates, try to
hone your debate and communication skills, and remember to help out the newer delegates
in the room - we all start somewhere! It is important for everyone to remember that model
simulations are educational experiences, and there is more to achieve at the end of the day
than an award; great relationships, professional and personal, can begin in the debate
room.
If you have any questions during the conference, please feel free to ask me or any of the
other members of Conference Secretariat. I hope the experienced delegates in the room will
also offer their assistance! I look forward to meeting you all this March!
Best,
Katarina
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Topic I: Determining methods by which the Building Integrity program and the
Building Integrity Policy can be further integrated into NATO missions and
operations
General Background
The Building Integrity program is an Alliance capacity-building program aimed at the
defense institutions of member and partner governments. It seeks to create practices of
good governance in the defense and related security sectors of participating governments
in order to protect against corruption.1 As stated in the Warsaw Summit (2016), the
Alliance recognizes that “corruption and poor governance are security challenges which
undermine democracy, the rule of law and economic development.”2
The Building Integrity (BI) program is complimented by the Building Integrity Policy,
which was endorsed by the Heads of State and Government of the Alliance during the
Warsaw Summit. The BI Policy lays out why the program is important, with whom it shall
be undertaken, and what it aims to do. In summary, the Policy explains that the program is
meant to build integrity through good governance and anti-corruption measures in defense
and related security sectors of Allies, Partners, and select other nations The program aims
to promote collective defense and cooperative security, noting that corruption erodes
public trust in government as well as economic development, both of which in turn affect
NATO’s core missions of collective defense and cooperative security.3 The BI Policy also
calls for the development of an Action Plan, as well as for annual updates to the North
Atlantic Council (NAC) on the implementation of the BI program.
The BI program is structured as a multi-step process known as the “Building Integrity
toolkit.”4 The toolkit includes four pieces: first, the BI Self-Assessment and Peer Review
Process, second, tailored programs, third, education and training activities, and fourth,
publications. The BI Self-Assessment and Peer Review Process is comprised of a voluntary
self-assessment questionnaire focused on a state’s “existing procedures and practices,”
followed by a Peer Review Report prepared by the International Staff at the NATO HQ,
which provides feedback on the assessment, noting good practices as well as areas for
improvement.5
The tailored programs are demand-driven and created to meet the specific needs and
situations of participating countries.6 There are currently two tailored programs: the
NATO. “Building Integrity Factsheet.” NATO. 2016. Accessed 15 Jan 2017. <link>.
NATO. “Warsaw Summit Communique.” NATO. Sect. 130. 3 Aug 2016. Accessed 15 Jan 2017. <link>.
3 NATO. “NATO Building Integrity Policy.” NATO. 5 Oct 2016. Accessed 15 Jan 2017. <link>.
4 NATO. “Building Integrity.” NATO. 5 Oct 2016. Accessed 15 Jan 2017. <link>.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
1
2
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Tailored BI Program on South Eastern Europe (SEE), and the Tailored BI Program for
Building Integrity and Reducing the Risk of Corruption in the Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF).7
The third and fourth steps, education and training activities, and publications, are meant to
provide participating countries with educational support (including a flagship course in
Oberammergau, Germany) and both general and targeted publications to support their
implementation and observed results. Current publications include a collection of best
practices, as well as reports based on observations for specific nations, such as Montenegro
and Serbia.8
The BI program is developed and managed by NATO and several of its various subdivisions,
but implementation of the program is largely undertaken by NGOs, IGOs, and state
government organizations, including Norway’s Ministry of Defense, The USA’s Naval
Postgraduate School, and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime in Vienna, Austria.9 These
partner organizations host events, conduct research and training, and participate in
analysis.10
History
The BI program was first established in 2007 through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership
Council. From the start, the program has largely been “focused on developing practical
tools to help nations build integrity, transparency and accountability and reduce the risk of
corruption in the defence and security sector.”11 Since 2007, the program has been slowly
refined, focusing more on education and training as well as civil-military relations and
efforts to combat corruption.12 As mentioned above, the program has also led to the
development of two tailored programs - one for South Eastern Europe, and one for the
Afghan National Security Forces - in 2012.13
The program is supported through a NATO Trust Fund led by six nations - the UK, Norway,
Poland, Switzerland, Bulgaria, and Belgium.14 Norway, after participating in the BI
program, established the Center for Integrity in Defense Sector (CIDS). 15 The Center
Ibid.
Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 NATO. “Building Integrity Programme.” NATO. 7 Dec 2012. Accessed 15 Jan 2017. <link>.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 NATO. “Building Integrity.” NATO. 5 Oct 2016. Accessed 15 Jan 2017. <link>.
15 NATO. “Download: Building Integrity Factsheet, Self-Assessment Questionnaire and Peer Review Process.”
NATO. 1 Jan 2014. Accessed 15 Jan 2017. <download link>.
7
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became the Department Head for Building Integrity in 2013, and has since hosted multiple
conferences to further the program.
A number of nations - partners and Allies alike - have participated in BI programming. As of
2015, “more than 30” nations have taken advantage of BI resources. 16 The program is open
to all Allies, members of the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperative Initiative,
and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Partners all over the world, and Colombia.17 Of
those “more than 30,” 11 have completed the Self-Assessment and Peer Review Process,
and at least sixteen more have begun that same process. Others may have taken part in
trainings or conferences, or otherwise used available educational material.18
The completion of the Self-Assessment and Peer Review Process, as well as the use of other
BI material, has led to some significant improvements within nations. For example, states
have established structures or positions with the purpose of promoting good practices
and/or anti-corruption and public access, developed improved relations with civil society
and the media, and revised or developed entirely new codes of ethic and conduct for
personnel.19
Finding a Solution
While the Building Integrity program has been successful in several of its efforts and
implementations, there is still work to be done in terms of fully integrating it into NATO’s
core mission and into NATO’s operations. This sentiment can be seen in the Building
Integrity Policy, in which Allies recognized that one of NATO’s overarching aims regarding
BI was to “integrate Building Integrity within the context of NATO’s wider policy objectives
and the implementation of the Alliance’s core tasks.”20
This topic asks you to consider ways in which BI might be better integrated. How have
other NATO initiatives been introduced and integrated, and where do they stand today?
The BI Policy makes mention of applying BI procedures internally - ensuring that NATO’s
internal governance is efficient and without corruption. Would that course of action help
the Alliance better integrate the program?
Further, the program as it stands has been built to apply to the defense and related security
sectors of participating governments. For many nations, that means their Ministry of
Defense - but could (and should!) the program be expanded to other sectors? For example,
NATO. “Oslo hosts 2015 annual Building Integrity conference.” NATO. 23 Jun 2015. Accessed 15 Jan 2017.
<link>.
17 NATO. “NATO Building Integrity Policy.” NATO. 5 Oct 2016. Accessed 15 Jan 2017. <link>.
18 NATO. “Download: Building Integrity Factsheet, Self-Assessment Questionnaire and Peer Review Process.”
NATO. 1 Jan 2014. Accessed 15 Jan 2017. <download link>.
19 Ibid.
20 NATO. “NATO Building Integrity Policy.” NATO. 5 Oct 2016. Accessed 15 Jan 2017. <link>.
16
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in Ukraine, the program was fully applied to nine ministries that answer to that nation’s
National Security Council.21
Questions to Consider in Your Research
● Has my state participated in the Building Integrity program?
● Does my state fund the Building Integrity program?
● What does my state have to gain or lose from the program’s further expansion
and/or integration?
● What does the Alliance have to gain or lose from the program’s further expansion
and/or integration?
Questions a Resolution Might Answer
● Can Allies be compelled to participate in the BI program?
● By what means or methods will the Alliance further integrate the program into its
missions and operations, and how will these means or methods be paid for?
● Does the NATO Trust Fund currently supporting the BI program need to be
expanded or replaced as a funding mechanism?
● Should the BI program be expanded beyond defense and related security sectors?
● How should NATO internally prevent corruption and ensure good governance?
● Are there other nations or partners who are not presently involved in the BI
program who should be? How should the Alliance proceed to include them?
Additional Resources
● Download: BI Factsheet
● Defense One: How Corruption Undermines NATO Operations
● Defense One: After NATO Summit, Transparency Must Accompany Tanks
● NATO and the Evolution of the Building Integrity Initiative
● NATO Building Integrity Website: Resources Database
NATO. “Download: Building Integrity Factsheet, Self-Assessment Questionnaire and Peer Review Process.”
NATO. 1 Jan 2014. Accessed 15 Jan 2017. <download link>.
21
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Topic II: Providing parameters to the NAC for negotiating with the Russian
Federation on restarting the NATO-Russia Council
General Background
In 1997, NATO and Russia agreed to the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation,
and Security. The Act established a means of communication between NATO and Russia,
and set guidelines for what the two entities should work together on. The overall purpose
of the 1997 Founding Act was to ensure the achievement of the “shared objective of
strengthening security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area for the benefit of all
countries.”22
The Act delineated seven principles, to which NATO and Russia agreed to work jointly on:
the development of a stable and enduring partnership; the acknowledgment of the role that
democracy, the rule of law, political pluralism, and other values play in development and
security; refraining from the threat or use of force against each other, as well as against any
other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence; respect for
sovereignty, self-determination, political independence, and borders; mutual transparency
in the development and implementation of security and military defense doctrines;
prevention of conflict and peaceful settlement of disputes; and support on a case-by-case
basis of UN Peacekeeping operations.23
In order to achieve the seven aims set forward, and to ensure mutual relations, the Act
established the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC), which served as a mechanism
and forum for consultation and cooperation.24 In 2002, the PJC was replaced by the NATORussia Council (NRC), but the 1997 Founding Act remains the basis and guidelines for
cooperation between NATO and Russia.25 One difference between the PJC and NRC is that
the NRC is a forum where Russia speaks with the member states of the Alliance on an equal
basis; 29 states meeting as equals. The PJC was set up to be a bilateral NATO +1 format.26
As with the PJC, the NRC mainly serves as a mechanism for NATO and Russia to further
their relationship. It works to promote mutual dialogue between Allies and Russia, to
create and identify areas of joint cooperation and action, and to develop common
approaches to security issues.27 The NRC has worked on all areas identified in the 1997
Founding Act, and has added areas of concern to the agenda with “the mutual consent of its
NATO. “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security between NATO and the Russian
Federation signed in Paris, France.” NATO. 12 Oct 2009. Accessed 15 Jan 2017. <link>.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 NATO. “NATO-Russia Council.” NATO. 15 April 2016. Accessed 15 Jan 2017. <link>.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
22
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members.”28 The NRC established a number of cooperative programs, focusing on the
“exchanging information and training for fighting against piracy, drug trafficking, and
terrorism, and carrying out search-and-rescue efforts at sea.”29
History
Following what NATO has called “disproportionate military action” in Georgia by Russia,
the NRC was suspended in August, 2008 for several months.30 Though meetings were not
held, some areas of cooperation continued despite the suspension, including cooperation
on counter-narcotics operations and the fight against terrorism.31 In December of the same
year, Allied foreign ministers agreed to pursue a phased re-engagement with Russia, and by
March 2009, the NRC was formally resumed. There was not another meeting of the NRC at
the level of foreign ministers until December 2009.32
In 2014, NATO condemned Russia’s role in the escalation of military action in Ukraine, and
also declared that it did not recognize the independence referendum in Crimea, which
Russia does support, on the basis that it violated both the Ukrainian Constitution and
international law.33 As a result of Russian involvement in the conflict, NATO decided to
suspend all practical areas of cooperation with Russia, including the NRC. Officially,
channels of political dialogue were kept open through the NRC and the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council, though the NRC did not meet for in any official capacity for two years;
the first meeting since the suspension of cooperation was in April, 2016.34
The April 2016 meeting, though useful, did not mark a return to “business as usual,”
according to NATO’s Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg.35 A second meeting in July 2016
was also well received, as was a third meeting in December 2016. The agendas at these
three meetings all included the discussion of the crisis and conflict in Ukraine, as well as the
situation in Afghanistan, including regional terrorist threats. Notably, at the December
2016 meeting, Ambassadors welcomed “a Finnish proposal to host a technical meeting with
Russian experts in early 2017 to improve air safety in the Baltic Sea region,” which has
Ibid.
Charles Recknagel. “NATO-Russia Council: From High Hopes to Broken Dreams.” Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty. RFE/RL. 12 July 2016. Accessed 15 Jan 2017. <link>.
30 NATO. “Russia’s accusations - setting the record straight.” NATO. 12 May 2014. Accessed 15 Jan 2017.
<link>.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 NATO. “NATO-Russia Council.” NATO. 15 April 2016. Accessed 15 Jan 2017. <link>.
35 NATO. “Relations with Russia.” NATO. 20 Dec 2016. Accessed 15 Jan 2017. <link>.
28
29
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been a concern for a number of Baltic states.36 These meetings have all taken place at the
ambassadorial level.37
Finding a Solution
This topic asks for the development of parameters with which the NAC can negotiate with
Russia on the official resumption of the NRC. It is important to remember that while there
have been three meetings since the formal suspension of cooperation, the NRC has not be
restored to its official capacity as forum for discussion on joint cooperation. Your aim
should be to determine what terms or conditions need to be met, or must not be met, in
order for NATO and Russia to resume joint cooperation and common action.
Each member of the Alliance has a different relationship with Russia and a different place
within NATO. Considering what each member has to gain and to lose from potential
concessions to Russia, try to determine what mutual goals must be met between NATO and
Russia to reconvene the NRC. Begin by identifying issues - what is preventing NATO and
Russia from full cooperation? Once those issues are identified, consider what action(s)
must be taken by both parties to remedy them. For example, if an issue is military action,
what must Russia do to make military action no longer a point of contention between it and
the Alliance? What must the Alliance do?
Members of the Alliance may have very different opinions on this topic, depending on their
unique relationship with Russia and with other states in the Alliance. Compromise will
likely be necessary, so it is important to develop “red lines,” or points, ideas, or actions
which might cause a “no” vote from your member state.
Questions to Consider in Your Research
● What kind of relationship does my country have with Russia? In what ways do we
work together, and in what ways are we in contention?
● What does my country think about the situations in Ukraine and in Georgia?
● What does my country stand to lose or gain with the resumption of formal
cooperation with Russia?
● What are my country’s “red lines” in terms of negotiating with Russia?
Questions a Resolution Might Answer
● What does the Alliance stand to gain or lose from the resumption of formal
cooperation with Russia?
36
37
Ibid.
Ibid.
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● What are the most important issues for the Alliance to reconcile with Russia?
● On what issues must the Alliance hold their ground, and not negotiate with Russia?
● What kind of precedent does the suspension and potential resumption of formal
cooperation with Russia set?
Additional Resources
● NATO: Relations with Russia
● NATO: NATO-Russia Council
● NATO: Russia’s accusations - setting the record straight
● Russia Ready To Re-establish Military Ties with NATO If NATO De-Escalates
● Sputnik News: NATO, Russia should relaunch dialogue to avoid military incidents
● Reuters: NATO Russia Council to meet on Monday amid east-west standoff
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Topic III: Crafting NATO’s role in the ongoing refugee crisis in Europe
General Background
To begin at the very basics: generally speaking, a refugee is a person who is fleeing
persecution or conflict in their home country. To be legally considered a refugee (and to
receive the legal rights and any benefits that accompany that status), a person must first
apply for asylum. The only difference between an “asylum seeker” and a “refugee” is that a
refugee has successfully sought asylum, whereas an asylum seeker may not have received
asylum (yet or at all) and is continuing to seek it.38
There is an ongoing refugee crisis in Europe, propelled by a continuing flow of refugees
from nations in the Middle East and other geographical areas. FRONTEX, the EU border
agency, estimates that over 1,800,000 refugees and migrants made their way to Europe in
2015.39 Syria was the number one place of origin, followed by Afghanistan at half the
amount of Syria, and Iraq.40
Most of the incoming refugees travel across the Mediterranean to the southern states of
Europe, notably Greece, Turkey.41 Although legally, under the Dublin Regulation, asylum
seekers in European Union countries must first apply for asylum in the country they enter
first, many seek to continue on to other EU countries, such as Germany, before placing an
asylum application.42 This rule has caused Mediterranean nations to bear the brunt of the
weight of the refugees, as most reach Europe by sea over the Mediterranean, as opposed to
over land or by air.43 The EU saw more than 1.3 million asylum applications in 2015.44
The influx of refugees from Syria in particular is, in large part, the result of civilians caught
in a civil war sparked by the Arab Spring, compounded with the threat of the the terrorist
group ISIS (or ISIL, or Daesh).45 Many migrants from other Middle Eastern countries,
notably Iraq and Afghanistan, are fleeing similarly extended conflicts, among other threats.
Other migrants from nations where conflict isn’t the primary push, such as Eritrea,
“What is a refugee?” USA for UNHCR. 2017. Accessed 15 Jan 2017. <link>.
“Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts.” BBC News. 4 March 2016. Accessed 15 Jan
2017. <link>.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 “The Dublin Regulation.” UNHCR. No date. Accessed 15 Jan 2017. <link>.
43 “Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts.” BBC News. 4 March 2016. Accessed 15 Jan
2017. <link>.
44 Ibid.
45 Kurzgesagt - In a Nutshell. “The European Refugee Crisis and Syria Explained.” Youtube video. 17 Sep 2015.
Accessed 15 Jan 2017. <link>.
38
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Morocco, and Iran, may be attempting to escape “poverty, human rights abuses, and
deteriorating security.”46
History
NATO has long stood apart from issues and crises deemed “humanitarian,” given that some
Allies have preferred to leave those types of issues to national governments and foreign
ministries, or to other intergovernmental organizations in whose purview non-militaryand non-security-oriented issues lie.47 In effect, the European Union and its border control
agency, FRONTEX, have been at the forefront of any concerted effort in regards to the most
recent refugee crisis in Europe, which became a crisis in earnest in 2015. 48 However, the
ongoing refugee and migrant crisis in Europe has shown itself as “a major security threat to
the Alliance.”49
In February 2016, at the request of Germany, Greece, and Turkey, NATO officially decided
that it would insert itself into the crisis management scheme by moving all of its standing
naval forces in the Mediterranean to the Aegean50, with the mission of conducting
surveillance and reconnaissance which would in turn assist FRONTEX and the national
governments of Greece and Turkey.51 NATO’s purpose in the Aegean isn’t to return those
making the often dangerous journey across the sea to their origin, but instead to assist
other organizations in the effort to break up human trafficking rings and other criminal
networks. However, NATO’s mission is fully compliant with the Law of the Sea, which
requires vessels to make effort to assist other vessels in distress.52
NATO has, on occasion, assisted with humanitarian crises before. During the Yugoslav
Wars, one of NATO’s objectives in Kosovo was to ensure the safe return of refugees and
displaced persons. To that effect, the Alliance built refugee camps, reception centers, and
feeding stations, and moved hundreds of tons of humanitarian aid to those affected. NATO
assisted the UNHCR with coordination of humanitarian aid flights, and contributed aircraft
to undertake said flights. In 1998, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council established the
Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC), which further assisted
“Why is EU struggling with migrants and asylum?” BBC News. 3 March 2016. Accessed 15 Jan 2017. <link>.
Judy Dempsey. “From Suez to Syria: Why NATO must Strengthen its Political Role.” Carnegie Europe.
Carnegie Europe. 8 Dec 2016. Accessed 15 Jan 2017. <link>.
48 Nina Graeger. “NATO’s Role in the Refugee Crisis: Building Bridges with the EU.” European Futures. The
University of Edinburgh. 25 April 2016. Accessed 15 Jan 2017. <link>.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 NATO. “Assistance for the refugee and migrant crisis in the Aegean Sea.” NATO. 27 June 2016. Accessed 15
Jan 2017. <link>.
52 Ibid.
46
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UNHCR in this crisis, and has since mostly assisted with natural disasters in partner
nations.53
Finding a Solution
While many NATO members have already been entrenched in the ongoing refugee crisis,
NATO as an Alliance has only begun to develop its role. The use of standing naval forces in
the Aegean to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance, and the intelligence sharing
between Greece, Turkey, NATO, and FRONTEX that has come as a result are first steps, but
NATO has been hesitant and careful to not militarize the crisis.54
Clearly, cooperation with individual government agencies and with other
intergovernmental organizations has been the cornerstone of NATO’s role in the ongoing
crisis so far. Nations and the Alliance as a whole must now ask themselves in what ways
can they continue to partner with other entities, and for what purpose? Is there a need to
exert military prowess on the crisis?
NATO has thus far stuck to the water and air between the refugees’ point of origin and their
intended destination. Is there a need to move onto land, either in Europe or in the Middle
East?
Questions to Consider in Your Research
● How has my country responded to the ongoing refugee crisis in Europe?
● Does my country support current EU rhetoric on the ongoing refugee crisis?
● Does my country support NATO’s continued and increased cooperation with the EU?
● What does my country have to offer to NATO’s approach to the refugee crisis?
● What does my country have to gain or lose regarding NATO’s involvement with the
ongoing refugee crisis in Europe?
Questions a Resolution Might Answer
● Should NATO continue to limit its involvement to surveillance and reconnaissance?
● Should NATO continue to focus on augmenting current EU missions regarding the
crisis, or should NATO seek to create its own missions regarding the crisis?
NATO. “NATO’s role in relation to the conflict in Kosovo.” NATO. 15 July 1999.Accessed 15 Jan 2017. <link>.
Jens Stoltenberg. “NATO and Europe’s refugee and migrant crisis.” NATO. 26 Feb 2016. Accessed 15 Jan
2017. <link>.
53
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● What does NATO have to offer the greater European community in regards to the
refugee crisis?
● If NATO’s role increases and/or if new missions are authorized, what kind of
funding mechanism should be employed?
Additional Resources
● NATO and Kosovo: A Historical Overview
● NATO: Assistance for the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in the Aegean Sea
● European Futures: NATO’s Role in the Refugee Crisis
●
From Suez to Syria: Why NATO Must Strengthen its Political Role
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Topic IV: Anticipating and addressing Russian and Serbian responses to
Montenegro's accession and the likely future accession of Kosovo
General Background
In May 2016, Allied foreign ministers signed Montenegro’s Accession Protocol, officially
granting the state “invitee” status. Montenegro is now able to attend all meetings of the
Alliance as an observer. Once all 28 member states have ratified Montenegro’s Protocol, the
state can accede to the Washington Treaty and become a full member.55
Montenegro’s road to membership began in 2009, when the Alliance invited Montenegro to
participate in the Membership Action Plan (MAP) program. Between 2010 and 2015,
Montenegro undertook a number of reforms under its MAP, mostly regarding enforcement
of the rule of law and meeting NATO standards for security and defense. In late 2015, the
state was invited to begin joint talks with Allies about accession.56
In 2008, Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia after a referendum. While many
nations, including the United States and most other members of the Alliance, have
recognized Kosovo as an independent state, Serbia, Russia, and four NATO members Greece, Romania, Spain, and Slovakia (and other members of the international community),
have refused to recognize Kosovo. This divide over recognition has put a halt on Kosovo’s
membership to some intergovernmental organizations, including the UN, the EU, and
NATO. Kosovo’s government has expressed intent to join the Partnership for Peace
program, with the support of states such as the United States, but has yet to become a
member.57
Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia have a long and intertwining history. Serbia and
Montenegro, together as one republic (with Kosovo still considered part if Serbia) was the
last remaining Yugoslav Republic. In 2006, Montenegro declared its independence on the
basis of a referendum.58 In 2008, Kosovo attempted to similarly declare independence, to
much larger backlash.
Russia has consistently supported Serbia’s position on Kosovo, due in part to concerns over
its own internal separatist factions. In the face of a Europe that is turning ever Westward,
NATO. “Relations with Montenegro.” NATO. 26 May 2016. Accessed 15 Jan 2017. <link>.
Ibid.
57 Mentor Vrajolli and Pellumb Kallaba. “Kosovo’s Path Towards the NATO Partnership for Peace (PFP)
Program.” Kosovar Center for Security Studies. 2012. Accessed 15 Jan 2017. <link>.
58 “Timeline: Break-up of Yugoslavia.” BBC News. 22 May 2006. Accessed 15 Jan 2017. <link>.
55
56
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Serbia has found an ally in Russia - one who has agreed to bolster its economy and military
capacity without restrictions often imposed by the West.59
History
NATO has made good on its open door policy, despite the discomfort caused to some
member states and the considerable disapproval of Russia. Since the end of the Cold War,
twelve states have acceded to NATO; Montenegro will be the thirteenth. NATO maintains
that its open door policy does not pose a threat to any state, rather that it works to promote
cooperative security, stability, and peace in Europe.60
Russia’s reaction to the accession of Albania and Croatia in 2009 was mild, marked more by
silence than by outright support.61 Albania and Croatia were given invitations to ascend at
the 2008 Bucharest Summit. At the same summit, the Alliance voted to deny MAPs for both
Ukraine and Georgia, in part due to the fear of “a sharp deterioration in relations with
Moscow and...military conflict with Russia.” However, some members of the Alliance
believed extending a MAP to Ukraine “would have sent a strong warning signal to Russia to
not repeat the use of such aggressive tactics.”62
Russia has vocally opposed NATO enlargement via the accession of Montenegro, going so
far as to warn against the beginning of “a new Cold War,” and positing that Montenegrin
integration into NATO “threatens to rend Montenegrin society and ratchet up social and
political tensions.”63 Serbia has not loudly opposed Montenegro’s accession to NATO,
though it has not supported it, either - Serbia itself is a member of NATO’s Partnership for
Peace.
In October, a “coup” attempt was foiled by Serbian and Montenegrin authorities. The
purported goal of the “coup” was to overthrow the Montenegrin parliament and coopt the
elections, in order to sway the result away from the Montenegrin pro-NATO Prime
Minister, Milo Dukanovic. Dukanovic, who was re-elected the day of the attempted “coup,”
made a number of allegations about the attempt, including pinning Russia as the
mastermind behind the attempt. Dukanovic abruptly resigned in October hours after he
announced that the Montenegrin government was investigating Russia’s role in the plot. 64
Samuel Ramani. “Why Serbia is Strengthening its Alliance with Russia.” The World Post.
TheHuffingtonPost.com, Inc. 16 Feb 2016. Accessed 15 Jan 2017. <link>.
60 NATO.”Enlargement.” NATO. 3 Dec 2015. Accessed 15 Jan 2017. <link>.
61 Vincent Morelli, et. al. “NATO Enlargement: Albania, Croatia, and Possible Future Candidates.” Congressional
Research Service. 14 April 2009. Accessed 15 Jan 2017. <link>.
62 Ibid.
63 Gordana Knezevic. “Russian Anxiety Over Montenegro’s Accession.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
RFE/RL. 26 June 2016. Accessed 15 Jan 2017. <link>.
64 Julian Borger. “Montenegro’s PM quits after suggesting Russia had role in election plot.” The Guardian.
Guardian News and Media Limited. 25 Oct 2016. Accessed 15 Jan 2017.<link>.
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Serbian Prime Minister Vucic, whose government made several arrests in relation to the
plot, said that he did not suspect the involvement of the Serbian state.
In the face of Kosovo’s independence declaration, Russia stood by its ally Serbia, and
actively chose to not recognize Kosovo. It upheld this decision in 2014, when Crimea issued
a declaration of independence, citing Kosovo’s independence as a precedent,65 though cited
ICJ decision clearly states that it was not be seen as a precedent.66 Also at play is the tension
between Kosovo and its ethnic Serb minority, a group for whom Serbia and Russia feel they
have a responsibility to look out for.67
Finding a Solution
It is clear that Russia opposes Montenegrin accession, and would follow that it will oppose
any bid for membership by Kosovo. Serbia, though remaining quieter on the Montenegrin
issue, may follow its ally Russia in opposition. What, if anything, can and should the
Alliance do to prepare for these reactions?
When Montenegro ascends, and should it turn its face from Russia, Russia will lose
“strategic access” to the Adriatic Sea, and Serbia will remain its only serious ally in the
Balkans.68 Is this of concern for NATO members, and how should the Alliance address it?
Despite being a military alliance, focused on cooperative security and collective defense,
NATO and its individual members have other tools at their disposal to address any
concerns or threats that might arise. Your country might consider the strategic placement
of troops, economic sanctions, and the provision (or lack thereof) of assistance or
humanitarian aid.
Questions to Consider in Your Research
● How does my country feel about the open door policy?
● Does my country recognize Kosovo as an independent state?
● Does my country feel particularly threatened by Russia?
● How has my country responded to threats from Russia and other states, individually
and through the Alliance?
“Russia Stance on Kosovo Unchanged Despite Crimea.” BalkanInsight. BIRN. 12 March 2014. Accessed 15
Jan 2017. <link>.
66 NATO. “Russia’s accusations - setting the record straight.” NATO. 12 May 2014. Accessed 15 Jan 2017.
<link>.
67 “Kosovo - Serbs.” World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. Minority Rights Group. No date.
Accessed 15 Jan 2017. <link>.
68 Risto Bozovic. “NATO: Montenegro membership certain despite Russia objection.” Salon. Salon Media
Group, Inc. 3 Nov 2016. Accessed 15 Jan 2017. <link>.
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● Why might Russia and Serbia have a negative, neutral, or positive reaction to the
accession of Montenegro and possible accession of Kosovo?
Questions a Resolution Might Answer
● What does the Alliance anticipate Russia’s reaction will be? Is the Alliance
anticipating any type of tangible reaction?
● What does the Alliance anticipate Serbia’s reaction will be? Is the Alliance
anticipating any type of tangible reaction?
● What is the best way to deter any type of threat or adverse reaction from either
Russia or Serbia?
● What individual actions can Allies take to deter any type of threat or adverse
reaction from Russia or Serbia?
Additional Resources
● NATO Enlargement?: The Case of Montenegro
● The Foreign Policy of State Recognition: Kosovo’s Diplomatic Strategy to Join
International Society
● NATO’s Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo
● NATO: NATO’s Role in Kosovo
● Kosovo’s Path Towards the Partnership for Peace Program
● NATO: Enlargement
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