Tehran: Paradox City

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Over two hundred years, decreasing mortality rates and an influx of migrants transformed
Tehran from a 7.5 square kilometre city of 15,000 inhabitants into a mega-city of ten million
sprawling over 600 square kilometres. Having subsumed flatlands to the east and west and
seventy villages on its adjacent mountain slopes, today’s Tehran varies 800 metres in
elevation from south to north. The city’s topographical variation is paralleled by the marked
differences in class and life-style of its inhabitants. All of Iran’s urban and pastoral nomadic
areas are represented in Tehran’s population, as are the country’s religious minorities:
Zoroastrians, Jews, Armenians, and Assyrian Christians.
By Soheila Shahshahani
T
o the differences in culture and
geographical origin of Tehran’s
inhabitants, we can add political tensions: modernization, nationalism,
monarchy and religion collided in the
modern city. Tehranis have witnessed
two revolutions, the toppling of two
monarchies, and a number of assassinations. Urban life has thus come to
be associated with hope for progress,
but also with fear of tension and
chaos.
The same can be said about
Tehran’s history of urban development. While early changes included
the destruction of the old city’s gates
and fortifications, these were replaced
with the new symbols of modern governance, massive ministerial and military buildings. Universities, banks,
boulevards and huge statued squares
were built, the squares and the universities containing elements of opposition to religious authority. Architects
were either brought in from Europe
and the United States, or they were
Iranians who had studied abroad or
had graduated from Dar al-Fonun
(Polytechnic of Iran, established 1851).
Tehran was built to different architectural tastes without a cohesive
urban plan. As the city outgrew its previous limits, land ownership emerged
as a serious problem. In 1918 the first
legal act regarding land registration
was passed. The transition from traditional ownership following Shari’a
or royal decree to modern legal ownership became the source of widespread corruption. The monarchy, military, various ministries, banks, the
religious foundation of owqaf, and
influential people registered millions
of square meters of land under their
names.1
In 1951 oil was nationalized. Following the defeat of the nationalist
Prime Minister Dr Mohammad
Mossadeq, the royal tendency was to
channel oil wealth to the urban areas,
particularly Tehran, at the expense of
infrastructure for agriculture and
industry. In 1968 Tehran’s first
urbanization plan, the Tehran Comprehensive Plan (TCP), was officially
approved in parliament. A twenty-five
year project proposed by Iranian and
American firms, the TCP identified
problems of density in the city centre, pollution, commercial activities,
transportation, unemployment, and
migration into the city. The solutions
were ambitious: the TCP extended
the city limits to reduce concentration in built-up spaces, and established ten districts of 500,000 people, each with its commercial,
industrial and high-rise buildings. It
further sub-divided areas into neighbourhoods of 15-30,000 people with
their own schools and facilities.
Land speculation and construction,
however, remained among the most
profitable activities in the country. The
legal system related to land continued
to allow for its appropriation while its
ambiguities encouraged corruption.
The increase in the price of oil in the
1970s induced Mohammad Reza Shah
to dream of a grand civilization for
Iran’s future. The project of Shahestan Pahlavi, with ministries,
embassies, cultural and recreational
centres, built on 554 hectares of land
and employing 189,000 people, was
to symbolize the future modern city in
the heart of Tehran.2
Eleven years after the Tehran Comprehensive Plan, in 1979, the Islamic
Revolution shook the city. Two measures were of prime importance in
forming the face of the city in the years
to come. One was an oral decree by
Imam Khomeini that all Tehrani had
the right to possess a house. This
ignored the city limits set by the TCP
and, overnight, small houses were built
on the outskirts of the city. The second
was the government’s decree, in 1989,
after the war with Iraq, that different
sectors of the government had to
become economically self-sufficient.
This encouraged the municipality to
allow, and then fine, illegal buildings.
Fines thus became permits and buildings were constructed in ways that
were not permitted by law.
Old gardens and mansions were
destroyed to clear space for massive
new apartment blocks. Fines for cutting trees or building high-rises
brought colossal amounts of money to
the municipality. In modernizing the
city, the municipality was in the paradoxical situation of planting trees and
flowers to make small parks while
benefiting from the destruction of the
lights and colourful flags for festivities
added to the transformation of the city,
but not necessarily in welcome ways.
Hardly any street-names from before
the revolution remained, making people recall previous names or ponder
before giving directions. When transformation arrives with paradox, it
becomes more incomprehensible:
When new mosques lose their domes,
and new high-rise buildings gain
domes, one loses the bearings of identity. When Tehran University remains
the site of Friday prayer 24 years after
the Revolution, one wonders about the
symbolic meaning of such displacement.
Perhaps these are matters of little
importance when compared to what
may happen with the next earthquake,
which records show strike Tehran every
150 years. Should the epicentre of a
major earthquake fall on the city, we
can expect immediate casualties in the
hundreds of thousands. In a matter of
days, millions could die as a result of
fire and lack of facilities. Who would
bear responsibility for neglecting the
necessary precautions for such an eventuality?
Every year, during the many holidays, particularly during the long New
Year holiday which marks the beginning of spring, the Tehrani, like the
inhabitants of all mega-cities, leave
Tehran. The city breathes, its arteries
cleared of congestion, and under the
blue sky and at the foot of the magnificent Alborz mountains the city has
time to reflect upon the two hundred
years which have transformed it to
hold what was then the entire population of Iran. <
Bibliography
- Adle, C. and B. Hourcade (eds.), Teheran
capitale bicentenaire, Paris/Teheran: Institut Francais de Recherche en Iran (1992).
- Madanipour, Ali, Tehran, The Making of a
Metropolis, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons
Both photos by Soheila Shahshahani
Tehran: Paradox City
A modern mosque without the traditional
dome.
(1998).
Dr Soheila Shahshahani is an anthropologist teaching at Shahid Beheshti University,
Tehran. Her research interests include pastoral nomadic societies, urban areas, and
material culture.
[email protected]
Notes >
1 Owqaf: is money or property that wealthy citizens allocated to the poor and
to religious students and dignitaries.
2 Shahestan Pahlavi was one of the most important urbanization projects of
the Pahlavi period, using the investment funds for urbanism of the whole
country for ten years. A British firm designed the project, which was to cover
over 550 hectares of land on the hills of central Tehran.
A non-religious
building featuring
a dome.
‘lungs of Tehran’, the gardened northern section of the city. Previously the
gardens had brought cool weather
down from the mountains, sweeping
pollution into the lowlands beyond the
city.
Pollution, traffic congestion and accidents thus became facts of daily life.
Painting pedestrian crossings white,
allowing advertisements to appear on
buses and walls, placing billboards
along highways and lining streets with
IIAS Newsletter | #31 | July 2003
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