Climate-Induced Migration from
Northern Africa to Europe:
Security Challenges and Opportunities
Leo Goff, Hilary Zarin, and Sherri Goodman
CNA’s Center for Naval Analyses
Mass migration from Africa into Europe is identified as one of the many
security threats associated with climate change. The scale of the issue is reflected
in numerous intelligence assessments and policy documents, and remains the
subject of scores of conferences, workshops, and papers. European Union security
experts warn that climate-induced migration may increase conflict in transit and
destination areas and that Europe must expect substantially increased migratory
pressure.1 Some Europeans cite these and other migration security warnings as
a reason to move migration control to areas outside Europe or pass more restrictive immigration policies. On the other hand, some speculate that fears of
international migration are “unfounded’” and “based on many misconceptions
about the duration, destination, and composition of migrant flows.”2 Still others
have claimed that African migration into Europe is merely a “securitization” of
climate change, in which migration is exaggerated for use as a political tool to
motivate action to address the issue.3 At the same time, global organizations such
as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
and the Foresight project on Migration and Global Environmental Change are
advancing migration as a meaningful adaptation to climate change.4 These differing views on the impact of future African migration into Europe merit careful
attention and resolution, particularly among policy makers and practitioners.
We approach this subject pragmatically by examining what needs to be
Leo Goff is Program Manager of the CNA Military Advisory Board. Hilary Zarin is Research
Analyst in the International Affairs Group of CNA. Sherri Goodman is Senior Vice President
and General Counsel at CNA, as well as Executive Director of the CNA Military Advisory Board.
Copyright © 2012 by the Brown Journal of World Affairs
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Leo Goff, Hilary Zarin, and Sherri Goodman
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done to advance migration as an adaptation strategy to climate change. This
article presents an overview of current and projected African migration trends
and the associated security threats. Through this approach, we find that migration is primarily driven by sociocultural factors that not only include economics
and the environment, but also social networks, cultural norms, and demography.
These factors directly affect migration and, therefore, need to become a central
tenet of policies that address migration, climate change, and security.
We further find that not all migration is the same, and different types of
migration carry different security risks. Careful examination of current and potential migration from Africa to Europe enables us to categorize migration into
three broad categories: regular (legal) migration, irregular or illegal migration,
and involuntary migration. The security threats associated with these categories
of migration are also dependent upon the magnitude of migration. Combining differing migration types and migration magnitudes generates a variety of
scenarios. This article examines migration by type and magnitude and provides
a model in the form of a “security framework,” which will allow policy makers
and practitioners to compare, address, and reduce the most significant security
challenges associated with climate change–induced migration.
To advance the discussion, we disaggregate into elemental parts the future scenarios in which African migration into Europe is regarded as a threat
to security. We examine the validity of predicted migration scenarios and their
associated potential security threats in light of a growing body of empirical
research that discusses migration and security. We then provide a framework
to examine the inferred security implications of migration. Finally, we discuss
policies, programs, and trends that may facilitate a practical shift in discussions
of future African migration into Europe from discourses that are predominately
“threat based” to those of opportunity and adaptation.
To further the discussion on climate change–induced migration from Africa to Europe, this article provides a framework that examines security threats
and gives policy recommendations informed by African adaptive capacity. We
adopt the term adaptive capacity in this article to refer to “the ability of a human
or natural system to adapt, i.e., to adjust to variability and extremes; prevent
or moderate potential damages; take advantage of opportunities; or cope with
the consequences.”5
WHY NORTHERN AFRICA AND EUROPE, AND WHY NOW?
In 2011, the Arab Spring brought the threats and security challenges associ-
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Climate-Induced Migration from Northern Africa to Europe
ated with mass migration from northern Africa into Europe to the forefront of
the EU political debate. As the Libyan uprising began, Italian foreign minister
Franco Frattini warned that the crisis in Libya could set off an “unimaginable”
movement of Africans into Europe. “Those who spoke of hundreds of thousands
[of people crossing into Europe] are not exaggerating,” Frattini said. “We have
already seen what happened in Tunisia.”6 At that point, more than 3,000 Tunisians had landed on the Italian island of Lampedusa, and the Italian government
had declared a humanitarian emergency.7
By May of 2011, the estimated number of migrants from North Africa
who had made their way to Italy rose to 30,000. Some of these migrants were
fleeing the conflict in Libya, but the majority of migrants were from Tunisia.8
With little assistance from the EU to cope with this mass migration, Italy sent
thousands of largely French-speaking Tunisians across the border to France. In
response, France stopped all trains from Italy carrying immigrants, citing “risks
to public order and security.”9
The actions of both Italy and France brought into question the very foundation of EU unity and migration policies. Highlighting the divide within the EU
caused by this sudden, large migration of North Africans, in April 2011, Italian
prime minister Silvio Berlusconi said, “Either Europe [the European Union] is
197
something that’s real and concrete or it isn’t. And in that case, it’s better to go
back to each going our own way and letting everyone follow his own policies
[…].”10 Subsequently, the European Commission found that, “[the 2011 migration] crisis confirms the need for increased solidarity at the European level
and better sharing of responsibility, it must be recognised that the EU is not
fully equipped to help those member states most exposed to massive migratory
movements.”11
European policy makers are increasingly being warned from both sides of
the Atlantic that EU member states may face increased exposure to massive migratory movement because of climate change. A paper from the High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council, EU member states may face increased
entitled “Climate Change and exposure to massive migratory moveInternational Security,” warned
ment because of climate change.
that “there will be millions of
‘environmental’ migrants by 2020 with climate change as one of the major
drivers of this phenomenon […] Europe must expect substantially increased
migratory pressure.”12
In 2011, the U.S. Defense Science Board warned that low-lying ports and
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Leo Goff, Hilary Zarin, and Sherri Goodman
198
delta areas in North Africa would become inundated with seawater, resulting
in deadly storm surges and the loss of agricultural land. It cautioned that these
factors could displace populations, placing pressure on Europe.13 In 2010, the
U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) predicted that over the next 15 years,
migration into Europe would grow substantially by way of North Africa, the
Middle East, and the post-Communist states of Eastern Europe and Eurasia.
The NIC further cautioned, “[Nation] states will face increasing difficulty in
managing migration pressures and flows, which will number several million
people annually […] and will increase social and political tension and perhaps
alter national identities.”14 In 2007, national security experts on CNA’s Military
Advisory Board identified migration from Africa and the Middle East as the
largest climate-induced threat to Europe, specifically linking climate-induced
migration to increased social and economic stress on European nations.15
Migration policies are some of the most challenging on the EU agenda.
Because of historic ties and NATO security treaties, Europe shares security issues
with the United States, Canada, and other trans-Atlantic partners. Nonetheless, the migration challenges that the European community currently faces are
somewhat unique. Both Africa’s geographic proximity to Europe and its position as a growing source of energy and human resources make it strategically
significant for European policy makers and planners. Migration policies must be
formulated carefully in the context of Africa’s strategic significance to Europe.
For example, since northern Africa is geographically close to Europe, policies
aimed at reducing the number of legal migrants from Africa to Europe could
contrarily result in increased illegal migration. Additionally, European countries
find it challenging to establish repatriation agreements because African countries
are reluctant to take back migrants who are working and sending money home
to their families, thereby improving those countries’ economies.16 Furthermore,
African leaders are reluctant to be seen by their electorates as cutting deportation deals with former colonial powers.17 When these African leaders control
large quantities of oil, phosphorous, or other natural resources, the choices have
strategic implications.
CLIMATE CHANGE–INDUCED MIGRATION IN NORTHERN AFRICA
In spite of the volume of warnings that migration from Africa to Europe represents a great security threat, the magnitude, type, and specific nature of the
threat remain largely undefined. To understand the threat, it is imperative to
examine current models and historical patterns of migration against the backdrop
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Climate-Induced Migration from Northern Africa to Europe
of demographic and environmental changes in Africa.
Africa is a vast continent comprised of diverse ecosystems, economies, and
cultures. Any attempt to characterize it as a single body or even as a common
population does a disservice to the unique cultural, national, religious, and
governance systems that compose Africa. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this
essay, we focus our work on an area we define as “northern Africa”—the African
countries along the Mediterranean Sea (North Africa); the sub-Saharan countries
of Mauritania, Mali, and Niger; the Sudan; and the Horn of Africa. This area
was selected because of its proximity and historical ties to Europe, the recent
political turmoil in many of the countries, and the predicted effects of climate
change on the entire region.
Patterns of Migration
For millennia, populations have migrated in response to environmental stresses
and degraded living conditions as well as for better opportunities. Although the
factors driving migration are complex and varied, migration is as old as civilization. In a receiving country, migration can provide an influx of human resources,
intellectual capital, and cultural diversity. It can also stress social systems and
increase job competition, leading to social tensions in communities and—in
the extreme—conflict.
Decisions to migrate are influenced by a combination of drivers and constraints that may be political, economic, sociocultural, or demographic.18 As a
result, migration is fundamentally a social process that is difficult to attribute
to any one factor. Studies of migration-based social networks, however, may
give better insight into which factors drive migration and to which destinations.
Social networks are sets of people linked by acquaintance, kinship, and work
experience. A migrant network (a kind of social network) is formed through
migrants’ interpersonal ties, material resources, employment opportunities, and
remittances. A greater perspective on current migration and migration networks
may provide a better understanding of future climate-induced migration.
Current Trends in African Migration
Though much of the African population lives in areas with high water scarcity
and the highest percentage of hunger in the world, the percentage of Africans
migrating abroad is modest. Africans make up less than 15 percent of total
international migrants compared to the 22 percent from North America or the
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Leo Goff, Hilary Zarin, and Sherri Goodman
34 percent from Europe.19 According to the World Bank, of the 214 million
international migrants around the world, only 30 million are African. This is
less than 3 percent of the total African population.20 According to the European
Commission’s Eurostat, in 2010 there were 20 million non-European immigrants
living in Europe, and of those
International migrants tend to be about 5 million—less than 0.7
young adult males who are able to percent of the total European
of African
work and send part of their paychecks population—were
21
origin. Although there is a
home to their extended families. great deal of population movement in Africa, most African migration is intracontinental and not to Europe.22
Recent data indicates that intra-African migration is motivated by a combination of existing social capital, economic need, and employment opportunities in neighboring countries that share cultural and linguistic similarities with
the country of origin.23 In 2010, 64 percent of the sub-Saharan migration was
intraregional and employment related—with primary destinations including
Burkina Faso, Kenya, and South Africa.24 Other examples from East Africa
are similarly striking. The singular exception to this intra-Africa trend is in the
countries that border the Mediterranean. In these North African countries,
200
about 90 percent of the migrants travel outside of their region, primarily going
to the Middle East and Europe.25
An economic desire to send remittances to family members is one of the
critical factors motivating both intraregional and external African migration.26
As a result, international migrants tend to be young adult males who are able to
work and send part of their paychecks home to their extended families.27 Those
migrants who do leave Africa tend to have greater social capital, including wealth,
than those who migrate within the region. As a result, middle-income migrants
with job skills are the most likely demographic to emigrate from Africa.28
In Africa, poorer migrants and those forced to migrate by sudden onset
disasters—whether related to political conflict, natural disaster, environmental
change, economic drivers, or some combination thereof—tend to migrate within
the region. For example, in 2011 over 360,000 migrants fled Libya during the
violent overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi. Of these migrants, 95 percent moved
to other countries in Africa or South Asia, while less than 1 percent (2,800)
sought refuge in Europe.29 Of the 31 million worldwide emigrants from Africa in
2010, about only 2.3 million (7 percent) are characterized as refugees displaced
by war, drought, or other causes.30
One reason that Africans make up such a small percentage of the world’s
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Climate-Induced Migration from Northern Africa to Europe
migration population is their profound adaptive capacity. The adaptive capacity
inherent in a social system represents the set of resources available for adaptation—information, technology, economic resources, and institutions—as well as
the ability or capacity of that system to use the resources effectively in pursuit of
adaptation.31 Several recent examples from Africa illustrate this adaptive capacity.
Northern African indigenous populations repeatedly suffer the effects of
changes in land productivity and food scarcity. Nonetheless, there are numerous
examples of northern African populations—particularly pastoralist, nomadic,
and semi-nomadic peoples—who have maintained the traditional bases of their
economic and household production systems in the face of extreme conditions.32 The adaptive capacity of these populations involves cyclic migration of
herders and livestock, flexible rules, common property, and close observation
of small environmental changes over time—such as changes in plants, animals,
and water—and adaptation to environmental change.33 For example, African
indigenous populations have historically made incremental changes to their
migration routes in response to decreased rainfall by incorporating new routes
into their seasonal movements.34 Often, these rural mechanisms exist in the
absence of state presence or authorities.
The ability of Africans to migrate is a function of their social capital and
financial ability to migrate. Migration is contingent upon an ability to coordinate
and finance the trip, use existing networks to adapt and survive in a new setting,
and continue to attend to responsibilities in their place of origin, if applicable.
In both intra-African migration and overseas migration scenarios, family and
social networks are influential in providing necessary economic support and in
helping to determine the choice of destination. In this manner, social networks
are vehicles through which emigration may increase and become patterned.35
Those who cannot migrate because of inadequate economic resources must
adopt other strategies that strengthen their adaptive capacity and ensure their
survival.36 In many instances, this involves sending one family member afar to
earn money and send some of the earned money back to the extended family in the form of remittances that supplement or even provide the household
economy. Remittances may provide the most visible and tangible manifestation
of migration networks in Africa.37
To summarize, while it is tempting to reduce African migration patterns
to economic factors, such as “Africans who cannot afford to go far, don’t,” these
types of overgeneralizations fail to adequately address the complexity and the
resilience of African social systems: their adaptive capacity. Security discussions
of future African migration should not ignore African resilience, adaptive capac-
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ity, and migrant networks. Today, most Westerners would expect to see high
international migration rates in sub-Saharan Africa because of the challenging
living conditions, but it actually has among the lowest permanent migration rates
in the world.38 While current African migrants predominantly move within the
African continent rather than overseas, population growth and climate change
may stress these existing patterns.
Predicted Population and Climate Change
202
Any discussion of changes in migration patterns in Africa—and both the present and future dangers they may pose—must begin with an exploration of two
highly contentious and uncertain trends: population growth and climate change.
Security experts cite both of these factors as likely drivers for increased migration.
The population of the world is growing by about one billion people every 13
to 15 years and the African population is growing faster than that of anywhere else
in the world.39 Although highly variable, the population of Africa is predicted to
more than double—growing to more than 1.7 billion people—between 2000 and
2050.40 This rate of accelerated population growth, particularly in sub-Saharan
Africa, has been observed for the past few decades. Adding to the challenges of
population growth, rates of urbanization in Africa are the highest in the world.
By 2025, more than half of the African population will be urban, and during
the next quarter century the urban population will be growing almost twice as
fast as the general population.41 Security experts warn that urban areas will have
a higher population density that could be subject to extreme weather events
such as flooding, which could result in the forced displacement of millions.42
While the projected doubling of the African population will already place
migration pressures on millions of Africans, security experts predict that these
strains will be exacerbated by environmental changes brought on by climate
change. With presently available science, however, the exact magnitude and
specific nature of climate change are hard to predict.
Currently, there is no coherent integrated information system capable of
generating reliable, sustained climate projections, because climate models are
primarily loose federations of programs from academia, government institutions,
nongovernmental organizations, and industry.43 In 2011, the U.S. Defense
Science Board (DSB) conducted a thorough investigation of a wide variety of
credible sources and climate information systems and found that “the existing
models do not offer the space and time resolution, completeness, or accuracy
to support needed improvements in or validation of regional climate models,
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Climate-Induced Migration from Northern Africa to Europe
particularly in developing areas.”44 However, after comparing various models,
the DSB predicted that the global temperatures could rise from a minimum
of two degrees Celsius to as much as seven degrees Celsius by the end of the
twenty-first century.
Even with immediate changes to reduce greenhouse gases, the long duration of existing gases in the atmosphere will likely result in an increase in the
average temperature of the earth by a minimum of one to two degrees Celsius
over the next 50 years.45 This temperature increase will result in changes to
the hydrologic system (precipitation). According to the International Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), the changes associated with precipitation patterns
over Africa will result in more hot days (meaning higher absolute maximum
temperatures, more warm days, and fewer cold nights) and more droughts over
much of Africa.46 Moreover, more powerful cyclones and torrential rains are
expected over parts of Africa, increasing the frequency and severity of flooding
in low-lying areas. Increases in the earth’s temperature and climate change will
raise ocean temperatures and accelerate glacial melting. The resulting rise in sea
level will cause a sizeable loss of land along the coasts of Africa and saltwater
intrusion into low-lying coastal areas and deltas.47
Changes to Migration Patterns in the Context of Climate and Population Changes
The relationship between the environment and migration is complex. It is far too
simplistic to assume that climate change will automatically result in the increased
movement of people. For example, the number of persons affected by natural
disasters has more than doubled in recent years, but there has been no major
increase in international migration in many of the disaster-affected regions.48
Although research that can prove a direct, causal link between climate
change and migration is scant, it is clear that both climate change and sea-level
rise—predicted to result from the earth’s warming—will negatively affect human support systems in Africa. The ability to broadly link migration with the
degradation of African social systems is even more complex than the link between
climate change and migration.
In a robust, two-year research project conducted for the European Commission, the Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios project
found that, without mitigation or other significant forms of adaptation, the
combination of a significantly increased population and changed precipitation
patterns will result in critical shortages of resources, particularly of water and
food.49 These resource shortages will prevail over much of northern Africa. Not-
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204
withstanding adaptive capacity and resilience, resource scarcity will motivate the
desire for long-distance migration, though it is expected that increasing poverty
levels will suppress much of this movement.50
Sea-level rise will force the displacement of millions of Africans because of
the submergence of land or loss of arable land due to saltwater intrusion.51 This
trend will be exacerbated by urbanization. Rapid growth in urban populations
is often concentrated in poorly regulated low-lying areas. As the U.S. Defense
Science Board warned in 2011, other increased extreme weather events, such as
cyclones or torrential rains, will increase flooding in low-lying areas. Increased
flooding will result in the annual displacement of millions of Africans because
their homes are underwater.52 Some will not have the financial means to migrate
and will be forced to move back into the floodplain. Others will migrate to areas
less vulnerable to flooding. If history is any indication, most will return when
the water recedes.53
In summary, migration in Africa is likely to increase because of population
growth and the rising sea level. However, resilience, social variability, abject
poverty, and the lack of adequate predictive models make future migration
difficult to quantify and, thus, assess in a global context. Notwithstanding the
proven resilience of Africans, models also cannot be used to disprove warnings,
such as those from the European Commission, that there will be “millions of
‘environmental’ migrants” by 2020.54 Without the ability to prove or disprove
the claims of mass migration, security experts must prudently explore a range
of plausible scenarios and their associated security threats. However, discussing
migration in broad terms is insufficient for both the security community and
policy planners. A model, in the form of a security framework, can provide
clarity and a mechanism to compare varying security threats. Such a framework
will help advance the security dialogue and policy planning for climate-induced
African migration into Europe.
CLIMATE-INDUCED MIGRATION AND THE SECURITY FRAMEWORK
Future security threats are rarely certain. Most often, they are shaped by continually changing strategic, political, and environmental landscapes. Future
scenarios are often based on experience or a collective “best guess” rather than
on an explicit theory of human behavior. When referring to how security planners and military leaders think about preparing for uncertain future events,
General Paul Sullivan, former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army said, “We never
have 100% certainty. If you wait until you have 100% certainty; something bad
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Climate-Induced Migration from Northern Africa to Europe
is going to happen on the battlefield. That’s something we know.”55
Because of the variability in the scope and type of climate-induced future
African migration into Europe, there is not 100 percent certainty of the security
threats presented. Yet, even cursory analyses or evaluation of threats are missing
in the vast majority of security warnings associated with climate-induced African migration into Europe. A security framework can be developed as a simple
model to evaluate risks associated with alternative future migration scenarios
and the security issues related to each alternative.
Developing a Security Framework
When facing uncertain futures, security leaders often prepare for a range of
scenarios. They build strategic and operational plans and size forces for the most
likely and affordable alternatives, while planning for less demanding scenarios
as “lesser-included cases.” Military planners also evaluate the risks associated
with various future scenarios. National security leaders then make judgments
about the levels of risk that are appropriate to accept as part of national security
planning. As part of a broader national security process, security leaders provide
input to policy makers on how to avoid the most devastating and costly scenarios
while prioritizing limited resources.
African adaptive capacity, social networks, economic uncertainty, and unpredictable population growth create an inability to accurately predict the type
and magnitude of climate-induced African migration into Europe. Accordingly,
since migration cannot be accurately predicted, looking more closely at a range of
migration scenarios may identify a range of security risks. Knowing the security
risks associated with alternative scenarios can allow policy makers to prioritize
limited resources to avoid the high risks while shaping events to encourage the
lower risk scenarios. A framework that allows for comparison of security risks
for varying migration scenarios could advance the discourse.
The first problem with trying to build a migration scenario framework
is definitional. Migration can involve temporary, short, cyclic, or permanent
movements of people. It may be voluntary in response to changes and pressures in surroundings over time, or involuntary as a result of displacement.56
Migration may be legal or illegal, occurring within or outside existing laws and
frameworks. It may be irregular, whereby a migrant changes status from illegal
to legal, or vice versa. The broadest definition is one articulated by the International Organization of Migration (IOM):
Migration is the movement of a person or a group of persons, either
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across an international border, or within a State [country]. It is a
population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people,
whatever its length, composition and causes.57
Other organizations add complexity by distinguishing “migrants” from
“migration.” As of January 2012, the United Nations Educational, Scientific,
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) defined a migrant as a person who lives
temporarily or permanently in a country “where he or she was not born, and
has acquired some significant social ties to this country.” According to these
two examples—and there are many more—someone who has migrated may
not necessarily fall into the category of “migrant.”
Building a matrix that looks at each variant of migration would be cumbersome and serve little purpose. From a planning perspective, grouping some
of the variation is useful. Considering the varied definitions of migration and
migrants, for the purpose of examining the security threats associated with migration into Europe, we will categorize migration into three broad categories:
t
206
t
t
Regular (legal) migration: migration that adheres to existing immigration laws.
Irregular or illegal migration: migration that does not adhere to immigration laws.
Involuntary migration: mass displacement, which can be caused by
extreme weather events or conflict.
To examine the potential security risks associated with these three distinct kinds
of migration into Europe, we will look at scenarios surrounding two potential
magnitudes of migration:
t
t
Those consistent with today’s trends, as a function of total African
population.
Those that are an order of magnitude (10x) higher.
Although models that can predict future migration patterns into Europe do not
exist, evaluating a range in the levels of migration allows for the exploration of
security concerns. We chose a factor of 10 to explore a higher level of migration,
but any attempt to specify the level of future migration is pure speculation.58
In completing this type of framework, those in the security community
should conduct a thorough examination of scenarios that pose a challenge to
state relations and governance, and then evaluate the risks associated with those
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Climate-Induced Migration from Northern Africa to Europe
scenarios, even though some may seem implausible. In this context, the “security
threats” that tend to be associated with migration can be broken down into four
broad categories:
t
t
t
t
Danger to international order.
Danger to the government or institutions of the country that hosts
the immigrants.
Cross-cultural tension that could lead to ethnic conflict.
Human threats to migrants or citizens of the host country.
Having considered the range of security threats, we provide a security
framework that describes how these threats align in the six scenarios. The completed framework, provided in Table 1, is illustrative only. Moreover, for the
purposes of this illustration, the motivations of migration are not distinguished
by environmental, economic, political, or some combination of causal relationships. Additionally, economic and environmental conditions in Europe are held
constant.
TABLE 1. FUTURE AFRICAN MIGRATION TO EUROPE SECURITY FRAMEWORK
Magnitude of African Migration
Same percentage of total
10x current percentage of total
African population
African population
Controlled migration, Overall LOW Security Risk
Type of African Migration
within immigration laws
Prolonged period
t Ethnic tension/conflict
t Stress on social programs
t Over stress on social programs
t Growing nationalism
Illegal or Irregular Overall LOW Security Risk
migration
Prolonged period
Overall LOW/MED Security Risk
t Ethnic tension
t High nationalism
Overall MED/HIGH Security Risk
t Ethnic tension
t Ethnic tension
t Human trafficking/exploi-
t High criminality
tation
t Alternative governance
t Criminality/smuggling
t High trafficking/exploitation
t Low confidence in government
Mass Displacement Overall MEDIUM Local Risk
Short period
Overall HIGH Security Risk
t Ethnic tension
t Environmental crisis
t Overrun social programs
t Overrun social programs
t Human rights/environment
t Temporary shelter/encampment
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Although the security risks identified in this illustrative framework are
informed by research on migration, conflict, and impacts to social systems, the
actual security risks should be identified by a broader group of government, intelligence, and security planners well versed in European policy, programs, and
politics. Most significantly, the completed framework illustrates that the security
risks are inconsistent across the six possible combinations. It shows that none of
the proposed types of migration pose a threat to international governance, and
only a few pose a marginal threat to the internal governance. The threats identified in this framework are primarily to internal populations of Europe and to
the migrants. The majority of threats are manifested in cross-cultural conflicts,
criminal activity, and population vulnerabilities; they are not existential threats.
As an example, the framework shows that if migration levels remain constant as a function of African population growth and migration is primarily
legal, the associated risk is low. Based on current data, if the African population doubles and the migration rate stays at the same percentage of the overall
population, the expectation is that the number of migrants would also double.
If the population of Europe remains flat, as it has been for the last several years,
then the absolute percentage of Africans in Europe would grow to about four
percent. Security risks should be manageable at this level of migration. A similar
analysis would ensue for each of the six scenarios.
As represented by the illustrative framework, even if migration were to
occur at 10 times the current level, the security risk remains internal and at
low-to-medium levels. On the other hand, if illegal migration rises to 10 times
the current level, then the threat rises considerably, mostly because of increased
levels of human trafficking, exploitation, and other forms of criminal activity.
The highest security risks are associated with mass displacement over a
short period of time. With that anticipated level of mass displacement, social
programs would likely not be able to meet acute demand. Without the proper
planning and resources needed to accommodate this level of displacement, a
humanitarian crisis could ensue.
Using this framework, security planners can program resources to prepare
and, if necessary, respond to identified potential threats and manage migration.
Most importantly, the security framework identifies areas where policies can be
targeted to reduce threats associated with each scenario. Other policies can be
targeted to completely avoid scenarios that pose the highest security threats.
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Climate-Induced Migration from Northern Africa to Europe
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
In developing policy recommendations, rather than group “migrants” into one
broad category, we have found that distinguishing between the types of migration
and the magnitude at which migration occurs is a useful exercise for security
planning purposes. Using this construct, we propose three policy recommendations intended to lower overall security threats.
Lower the Risks Associated with Mass Displacement
As a first priority, all nations should commit to lowering the risks of climate
change to vulnerable ecosystems. These initiatives are currently the source of considerable discussion among those in the environmental community. Implementation should occur through international aid and agreements that target initiatives
in vulnerable areas, including environmental planning, housing standards, and
floodplain regulations. These initiatives should also include investments in the
infrastructure and equipment needed to respond to a disaster should it occur.
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), the militaries of the EU, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) should expand the planning and preparation of
forces and operational plans, including acquisition of contingency equipment,
to respond to forced migration that will result from extreme weather events.
Reduce Illegal and Irregular Migration
The security framework identifies illegal and irregular migration as presenting
a higher security threat, while legal migration, even at 10 times the current
percentage, presents a low risk. Reducing illegal and irregular migration, even
if it means increasing the levels of legal migration, will reduce security risks.
As a first step in reducing illegal migration, current migration policies should
be examined carefully to eliminate barriers to legal migration. Reducing these
barriers should lower the pressure to migrate illegally. At the same time, other
policies should continue to evolve to better manage illegal and irregular migration. Policies directed at curbing illegal migration could include more sustainable
development in countries with higher migration trends. They could incorporate
the financing considerations of future migration into aid and development planning, and expand programs to better manage and curb illegal migration from
transient countries.
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Leo Goff, Hilary Zarin, and Sherri Goodman
Target Additional Research to Explore the Disaggregated Nature of African Migration into Europe
Additional research will improve current understandings of migration and enable a more refined and targeted security assessment. As a priority, the research
should study both formal and informal migrant networks. In particular, more
research and development should be dedicated to work on remittances as a tangible measure of migration. As previously indicated, remittances are the most
concrete evidence of migrant networks that currently exist. However, because
of the ways remittances are sent and received, most are impossible to trace. The
amount of money sent as remittances is likely much higher than is currently
projected. Remittances may be used as the primary indicator of both legal and
illegal networks, while providing important information on the migrant networks through which they operate. Remittances research should be conducted
at both a macrolevel—in which national, financial, and geographic trends are
better traced, and at a local level—in which ethnographies, household surveys,
and case studies help researchers understand informal migrant networks.
210
CONCLUSION
Many proclamations about climate change–induced migration from Africa
into Europe inadequately consider African adaptive capacity. As a result, current security warnings most likely overstate the magnitude of future migration.
Moreover, the lack of specificity about the nature of the migration threat creates the impression that the issue has been “securitized,” which does little to
help policy makers and security planners mitigate or respond to unidentified
threats. Furthermore, most security warnings inadequately indicate the level
of uncertainty in the magnitude or type of the migration, as well as the varied
nature of the associated security threats.
Disaggregating the threat warnings shows that a rapidly expanding population and climate change in northern Africa will likely cause deterioration in the
living condition of many North Africans, which will stress existing migration
patterns. Increased flooding from rain and rising sea levels will force millions
of northern Africans to migrate. In response to these types of environmental
challenges, Africans have demonstrated tremendous adaptive capacity and have
some of the lowest international migration levels in the world. When Africans
do migrate, they tend to remain within Africa, relying heavily on existing social
and migrant networks. While some of the northern Africans subjected to the
the brown journal of world affairs
Climate-Induced Migration from Northern Africa to Europe
primary or secondary effects of climate change will migrate to Europe, current
models cannot effectively predict the magnitude or the type of this future migration. Moreover, the security risks associated with African migration into Europe
depend on the specific scenario. Scenario analyses and a security framework
provide a useful way to examine the range of security threats associated with
different types and levels of future African migration into Europe.
Using a security framework, it becomes evident that many of the scenarios
associated with plausible future African migration into Europe carry low risk,
while some have higher security risks. Security planners and policy makers can
use this type of framework to help shape policies that lower the probability of
high-risk scenarios while preparing for the more likely low- to moderate-risk
scenarios. Because several migration scenarios have low security risks, migration
should be advanced as an effective adaptation strategy for population growth
and environmental changes that will likely result from a changing climate. WA
NOTES
1. European Commission, “Climate Change and International Security: Paper from the High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council,” S113/08, 2008,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/99387.pdf, 4.
2. Cecilia Tacoli, “Climate Migration Fears ‘Misplaced,’” BBC Viewpoint, September 29, 2009, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8278515.stm.
3. Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration,” Journal of Common Market Studies 38 (June 2000): 751–77; Georgios Karyotis, “European Migration Policy in the Aftermath of
September 11: The Security-Migration Nexus,” Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research
20 (2007): 1–17.
4. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Cancun Agreements, https://unfccc.int/
meetings/cancun_nov_2010/meeting/6266.php; The Government Office for Science, London, “Foresight
Migration and Global Environmental Change” (Final Project Report, 2011).
5. “Adaptation Guidance Notes and Definitions,” The World Bank, http://climatechange.worldbank.
org/climatechange/content/adaptation-guidance-notes-key-words-and-definitions.
6. Stephen Castle, “Europe Focuses on Flow of Migrants,” New York Times, February 21, 2011.
7. Ibid.
8. Gervais Appave and Frank Laczko, eds., World Migration Report 2011: Communicating Effectively
about Migration, (Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2011), http://publications.iom.int/
bookstore/free/WMR2011_English.pdf.
9. Peter Allen,“France Stops all Italian Trains Carrying North African Immigrants,” Telegraph, April
17, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/8457138/France-stops-all-Italiantrains-carrying-north-African-immigrants.html.
10. Rachel Donadio, “Fears about Immigrants Deepen Divisions in Europe,” New York Times, April
12, 2011.
11. European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Communication on
Migration,” COM2011 248 final (2011), http://www.statewatch.org/news/2011/may/eu-com-migrationcom-248-11.pdf, 6.
12. European Commission, “Climate Change and International Security,” 4.
13. The Board further finds that this change can affect U.S. national security. See: “Trends and Implica-
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Leo Goff, Hilary Zarin, and Sherri Goodman
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tions of Climate Change for National and International Security,” October 2011, http://www.acq.osd.
mil/dsb/reports/2011-11-Climate_Change.pdf.
14. National Intelligence Council, “Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the Future with Nongovernment Experts,” 2010, http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_globaltrend2015.html#link7b.
15. CNA Corporation, “National Security and the Threat of Climate Change,” 2007, http://www.cna.
org/reports/climate.
16. Katrin Bennhold, “France Uses Money, Not Manacles, For Deportation,” Europe—International
Herald Tribune, December 21, 2006.
17. Ibid.
18. Douglas S. Massey et al., Worlds in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the
Millennium (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
19. Gervais Appave and Frank Laczko, eds., World Migration Report 2011: Communicating Effectively
about Migration, (Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2011), http://publications.iom.int/
bookstore/free/WMR2011_English.pdf.
20. “Latest Findings from Joint World Bank, African Development Bank Research,” World Bank,
March 30, 2011.
21. European Commission –Eurostat Database, “Migration and Migrant Population Statistics,” October
2011, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics.
22. Appave and Laczko, eds., World Migration Report 2011.
23. Abede Shimeles, “Migration Patterns, Trends and Policy Issues in Africa” (African Development
Bank, Working Papers Series N° 119, 2010), http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/
Project-related-Procurement/WORKING%20119%20word%20document%20AA.pdf.
24. Ibid.
25. European Commission–Eurostat Database, “Migration and Migrant Population Statistics.”
26. Dilip Ratha, “Workers’ Remittances: An Important and Stable Source of External Development
Finance,” in Global Development Finance 2003: Striving for Stability in Development Finance (Washington,
DC: World Bank, 2003), 157–70.
27. Ibid.
28. Dilip Ratha et al., Leveraging Migration for Africa: Remittances, Skills, and Investments (Washington,
DC: The World Bank, 2011): 1–3.
29. Appave and Laczko, eds., World Migration Report 2011.
30. United Nations Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population
Prospects: 2010 Revision, http://www.un.org/esa/population/unpop.htm.
31. Dilip Ratha et al., Leveraging Migration for Africa: Remittances, Skills, and Investments.
32. Maryam Niamir-Fuller, “The Resilience of Pastoral Herding in Sahelian Africa,” in Linking Social
and Ecological Systems: Management Practices and Social Mechanisms for Building Resilience, ed. Fikret Berkes
and Carl Folke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998): 250–84.
33. Ibid.
34. P.J. O’Farrell et al., “Human Response and Adaptation to Drought in the Arid Zone: Lessons from
Southern Africa,” South African Journal of Science 105 (2009): 34–39.
35. For example, see: Aderanti Adepoju, “Rural-Urban Socioeconomic Links: The Example of Migrants
in Southwest Nigeria,” in Modern Migrations in Western Africa, ed. Samir Amin (London: Oxford University
Press, 1974): 127–37; Harvey M. Choldin, “Kinship Networks in the Migration Process,” International
Migration Review 7 (1973): 163–75; John C. Caldwell, African Rural-Urban Migration (Canberra: Australian
National University Press, 1969); Bruce H. Herrick, Urban Migration and Economic Development in Chile
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965); Charles T. Illy and Harold C. Brown, “On Uprooting, Kinship, and the
Auspices of Migration,” International Journal of Comparative Sociology 8 (1967): 139–64.
36. Abede Shimeles, “Migration Patterns, Trends and Policy Issues in Africa.”
37. Dilip Ratha, “Workers’ Remittances,” 157–70; Albert Bollard, David McKenzie, and Melanie
Morten, “The Remitting Patterns of African Migrants in the OECD,” Policy Research Working Paper
Series 5260, The World Bank, 2010.
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Climate-Induced Migration from Northern Africa to Europe
38. Inter-American Development Bank, “Regional Overviews: Africa,” World Migration 2008, http://
www.iadb.org/ ntal/intalcdi/PE/2008/02382a17.pdf.
39. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, “World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision, Highlights and Advance Tables,” Working Paper No. ESA/P/WP.220,
2011.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Defense Science Board, “Trends and Implications of Climate Change for National and International
Security,” October 2011, http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2011-11-Climate_Change.pdf.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid, 9.
45. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), “Climate Change: Meeting
the Challenge to 2050,”Policy Brief, 2008.
46. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Projected Climate Change and its Impacts,” in IPCC
Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change, 2007.
47. Defense Science Board, “Trends and Implications of Climate Change.”
48. Appave and Laczko, eds., World Migration Report 2011.
49. Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios (EACH-FOR), “Preliminary Findings
from the EACH-FOR Project on Environmentally Induced Migration,” 2008.
50. Richard Black, et al., “Demographics and Climate Change: Future Trends and their Policy Implications for Migration,” Department for International Development (DFID) by the Development Research
Centre on Migration, Globalization and Poverty, University of Sussex, 2008, http://www.migrationdrc.
org/publications/working_papers/WP-T27.pdf. 51. Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios (EACH-FOR), “Preliminary Findings
from the EACH-FOR Project on Environmentally Induced Migration,” 2008.
52. Black et al., 2008.
53. Ibid.
54. European Council, “Climate Change and International Security,” Paper from the High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council, March 14, 2008.
55. CNA Corporation, “National Security and the Threat of Climate Change.”
56. Jon Barnett and Michael Webber, “Migration as Adaptation: Opportunities and Limits,” in Climate
Change and Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Jane McAdam (Oxford: Hart Publishing,
2010), 41.
57. International Organization for Migration, “Key Migration Terms,” http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/
about-migration/key-migration-terms/lang/en.
58. Black et al., 2008.
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