Austausch, Vol. 1, Issue. 2, October 2011
The Breaking of a Taboo? The Musealisation of Adolf Hitler and
the Changing Relationship Between the Former Führer and
Germany
Mark Barnard, Ph.D.
([email protected])
Introduction
Since 1945, marked by phases of silence and avoidance, sceptical debate
and critical confrontation, „normalisation‟ and painful recollections of
German suffering, as well as more recent „personalising‟ or „trivialisation‟ of
the past, Germans have been struggling to come to terms with the historical
burden of Hitler and the Holocaust.1 Although most Germans continue to
accept collective responsibility for the past, as the „Erlebnisgeneration‟
(those who experienced the Third Reich) pass into history, there has been
a perceptible impatience with individual accountability by many of the third
post-war generation who seek „normality‟ unburdened by Hitler. 2 With
reunification, for example, the propensity for transferring responsibility for
the past to the „other‟ Germany diminished, presenting the opportunity for
atonement and the addressing of ostensible former silences and evasions
which provoked embittered debates concerning the extent and acceptance
of collective culpability.3
Though remaining highly contentious, there is ample evidence of official
insistence on a continued adherence to the post-war Kollektivschuldthese
(collective guilt thesis) which may well have been counter-productive,
prompting Germans to grow impatient with an inherited and excessive guilt
1
Lübbe, Hermann. „Der Nationalsozialismus im deutschen Nachkriegsbewußtsein.‟
Historische Zeitschrift 236 (1983), 579-599; Schelsky, Helmut. Die skeptische Generation:
eine Soziologie der deutschen Jugend. Düsseldorf: Eugen Diederichs Verlag, 1963;
Fulbrook, Mary. German National Identity after the Holocaust. Cambridge: Polity Press,
1999, 103-231, 234-235.
2
Staab, Andreas. „Xenophobia, Ethnicity and National Identity in Eastern Germany.‟
German Politics 7:2 (1998), 42-43; Fulbrook, German National Identity, 125, 234-235;
Engel, Esteban. „Hitler und die Deutschen in Berlin.‟ Münstersche Zeitung, 14 October
2010. Accessed 20 March 2011. http://www.muensterschezeitung.de/nachrichten/
kultur/kulturwelt/art617,1063634.
3
Augstein, Rudolf. „Anschlag auf die “Ehre” des deutschen Soldaten?‟ Der Spiegel, 10
March 1997, no 11, 92-99; Kansteiner, Wulf. „Mandarins in the Public Sphere:
Vergangenheitsbewältigung and the Paradigm of Social History in the Federal Republic of
Germany.‟ German Politics and Society 17:52:3 (1999), 84-120; Niven, Bill., ed. Germans
as Victims: Remembering the Past in Contemporary Germany. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2006, 1-2.
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Austausch, Vol. 1, Issue. 2, October 2011
complex.4 As a key component of a Western Verfassungspatriotismus
(constitutional patriotism) and an official Erinnerungsarbeit (labour of
remembrance),
enjoying
varying
levels
of
compliance,
the
Kollektivschuldthese and a concomitant „institutionalisation of collective
guilt‟ have always had their detractors.5 Attempting to establish the cultural
and historical conditions that facilitated National Socialism, culminating in
the Kollektivschuldthese, American social scientists, for example,
concluded during the 1940s that since Germans as a whole had uncritically
accepted Hitler, they were collectively and individually responsible for past
transgressions.6
Concerned about a renewed „Schlussstrich‟, or attempts to consign
collective responsibility for Hitler and the Third Reich to history, since then
numerous academics and members of the Bundestag have claimed young
Germans in particular no longer wanted to hear about National Socialist
crimes.7 The Berlin-based German Historical Museum‟s (DHM) 2010
exhibition: „Hitler and the Germans. Volksgemeinschaft and Crimes‟ reacted
to a continued configuration of a competing Erinnerungskultur of contrition
and a „Katharsis‟ (catharsis) of „normalisation‟, and tried to redress a reemergent post-war intentionalist personalisation of the past that sought to
offload collective responsibility onto the former Führer.8
While Hitler and National Socialism are perhaps by-words for German
history, films and museums in Germany have, or so the DHM claimed,
avoided representations about the legacy of the man behind the Third
Reich. Neither have they attempted to explain afresh how the Führer factor,
or Hitler‟s persona and charisma, permeated the lives of millions.9 Breaking
4
Mohr, Reinhard. „Total normal?‟ Der Spiegel, 30 November 1998, no 49, 42;
Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/48. Stenographischer Bericht 48 Sitzung. Bonn,
25 June 1999, 4097-4099, 4100-4112, 4146; Jennerich, Christian. „Discomfort, Violence
and Guilt.‟ Debatte, 2000 8:1 (2000), 61-69.
5
Fulbrook, German National Identity, 10-11, 36-47, 125-127, 228, 234-235. See also:
Wilds, Karl. „Identity Creation and the Culture of Contrition: Recasting “Normality” in the
Berlin Republic.‟German Politics 9:1 (2000), 83-102; Plenarprotokoll, 4086-4108.
6
Agar, Herbert. Unsere Zeit fordert Grösse. Stuttgart: Der Standpunkt, 1946; Jaspers, Karl.
Die Schuldfrage. Heidelberg: Schneider, 1946.
7
Plenarprotokoll, 4086-4108; Betz, Hans-Georg. „Perplexed Normalcy: German Identity
after Unification.‟ In Rewriting the German Past: History and Identity in the New Germany.
Reinhard Alter and Peter Monteath, eds. New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1997, 44-45, 60;
Fulbrook, German National Identity, 10-11, 36, 45, 125-127, 228, 234-235.
8
Kellerhoff, Sven Felix. „Die deutschen Historiker sahen “Der Untergang.”‟ Die Welt, 17
September 2004. Accessed 3 July 2006. http://www.welt.de/data/2004/09/17/
333307.html?prx=1; Engel, „Hitler und die Deutschen‟; Ottomeyer, Hans. „Vorwort.‟ In Hitler
und die Deutschen. Volksgemeinschaft und Verbrechen. Hans-Ulrich Thamer and Simone
Erpel, eds. Dresden: Sandstein Verlag/Berlin: Deutsches Historisches Museum, 2010, 1314.
9
„Faszination Führer. Ausstellung: Hitler und die Deutschen.‟ Stern, 17 October 2010.
Accessed 25 March 11. http://www.stern.de/panorama/ausstellung-hitler-und-diedeutschen-faszination-fuehrer-1613851.html; Riedel, Alexander. „Der Diktator der
Deutschen.‟ Nordwest-Zeitung, 12 October 2010, 12.
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former taboos, it was only in 2004 that „visualisations‟ of Hitler became
adequately addressed, at least cinematically, through Oliver Hirschbiegel‟s
Berlin-based Der Untergang (Downfall).10 Shown in over 400 German
cinemas, provoking considerable hostility and acclaim, Downfall was part of
an Erinnerungskultur (remembrance culture) in which it is becoming
acceptable among many in Germany to humanise Hitler and German
suffering, simultaneously addressing and rejecting the immense legacy of
the past.11 For years, German museums have focussed on the terrors of
the Nazi regime, ranging from the camps, to the crimes of the Wehrmacht,
to enforced labour and the Holocaust but not on Hitler per se in Berlin,
where presenting him has always been problematic and even prohibited.12
Symptomatic of this phenomenon, the former director of the museum
Hans Ottomeyer, has explained how in 2004 an externally proposed
exhibition, Hitler and the National Socialist Regime, was unanimously
rejected by the DHM‟s academic board for fear of fostering a Führerkult,
attracting neo-Nazis who could exploit it as a place of pilgrimage. 13 Given
the prevalence of photographs and posters in the 2010 exhibition that were
previously exploited for political purposes and the fact it is unconstitutional
to disseminate Nazi propaganda or glorify Hitler, the curators were faced
with a difficult balancing act between unavoidable depictions of Hitler and
historical illucidation.14
Displaying 600 objects and 400 photographs, the DHM‟s 2010 Hitler
exhibition was alleged to have been the first definitive portrayal of the Volk’s
relationship with the former Führer, analysing why Hitler enjoyed
widespread support until the very end by way of the socio-political
conditions, or „structures‟, and populist Zeitgeist.15 Beginning with
10
Hall, Allan. „Is Germany Finally Forgiving Hitler?‟ Daily Mail, 25 August 2004, 30;
Kellerhoff, „Die deutschen‟; Riedel, „Der Diktator‟, 12.
11
„“Der Untergang.” Hitler soll Deutschland einen Oscar bescheren.‟ Stern, 6 January 2005.
Accessed
3
July
2006.
http://www.stern.de/kultur/film/der-untergang-hitler-solldeutschland-einen-oscar-bescheren-530242.html; Kellerhoff, „Die deutschen‟; Hall,
„Germany‟, 30; Overesch, Manfred. Der Augenblick und die Geschichte. Hildesheim am
22. März 1945. Hildesheim/Zürich/New York: Olms Verlag, 2005, 9-13.
12
Hornig, Frank, and Sontheimer, Michael. „“Führer” im Kleinformat.‟ Spiegel, 18 October
2010. Accessed 23 March 2011. http://einestages.spiegel.de/static/
topicalbumbackground/16101/1/_fuehrer_im_kleinformat.html; Ottomeyer, „Vorwort‟, 13-14.
13
Ottomeyer, „Vorwort‟, 13-14; Hornig and Sontheimer, „“Führer” im Kleinformat‟; Lepping,
Claudia. „Kinder, was wisst ihr vom Führer?‟. Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 21 October 2010.
Accessed 20 March 2011. http://www.stuttgarter-nachrichten.de/inhalt.ausstellung-inberlin-kinder-was-wisst-ihr-vom-fuehrer.33e709cb-56f6-4538-a665-9085bf7e422e.html.
14
Schneider, Barbara. „Vom Wechselverhältnis zwischen Führer und Volk.‟ Magdeburger
Volksstimme, 15 October 2010. Accessed 23 March 2011. http://www.volksstimme.de/
vsm/magazin/kultur/; Abteilung Verfassungsschutz – Publikationen. Symbole und
Kennzeichen des Rechtsextremismus. Info 1. Berlin: Berlin Senatsverwaltung für Inneres,
July 2001, 11-12.
15
„Hitler-Ausstellung wird womöglich verlängert.‟ Der Westen, 3 December 2010. Accessed
4 March 2011. http://www.derwesten.de/kultur/ausstellungen/Hitler-Ausstellung-
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Austausch, Vol. 1, Issue. 2, October 2011
photographs of Hitler as party agitator, commander and a montage of his
skull - each of which were superimposed on images of the unemployed,
jubilant masses and soldiers - visitors were also provided with eight
displays covering the Führer myth, the Party‟s origins, its acquisition of
power, war of annihilation and racial mania. Endeavouring to elucidate the
extent of the Führerkult and validity of the ephemeral but pervasive and
quantifiable Volksgemeinschaft (a socially unified and ethnically
homogenous people‟s community), epitomising an Alltagsgeschichte
(everyday history), the DHM exhibited a whole range of Nazi memorabilia.
Personifying the alleged all-pervading Führer factor, objects displayed
included Party playing cards, letters of adoration to Hitler, a photographic
fan book and even a large tapestry, all ostensibly demonstrating how
fervently the nation embraced and was bewitched by a man described by
the curators as a „former mediocrity‟.16
Despite the DHM‟s alleged academic breakthroughs and assertions from
some quarters that „taboos‟ have been broken, this paper contends that
Hitler was presented by the museum with greater, not less, historical
reservation by conforming to the Kollektivschuldthese.17 Although
displaying many previously unseen artifacts, by adhering to a negative and
incriminatory structuralist Sonderweg thesis, which predicated that
Germany‟s economic development and political apathy predisposed the
populace to Nazism, the DHM failed to foster a more impartial and
balanced insight into the Führer factor.18
Underlining disparities between a popular and official „landscape of
memory‟, this paper contends there was hostility to the DHM‟s structuralist
„millions of little monsters‟, or the U.S. historian Daniel Goldhagen‟s 1996
„bad Germans‟ collective guilt thesis by accounting for the Führer factor
based on the mindset of the masses. 19 Addressing a key stage in
wird-womoeglich-verlaengert-id4015400.html; Riedel, „Der Diktator‟, 12; Hitler und die
Deutschen. Volksgemeinschaft und Verbrechen. Deutsches Historisches Museum.
Accessed
4
November
2010.
http://www.dhm.de/ausstellungen/hitler-und-diedeutschen/index.html.
16
Thamer,
Hans-Ulrich.
„Hitler
und
die
Deutschen
–
eine
vieldeutige
Beziehungsgeschichte.‟ In Hitler und die Deutschen. Thamer and Erpel, eds., 162-170;
Ibid., 171-180, 181-192, 193-211, 243-260, 261-278.
17
Riedel, „Der Diktator‟, 12; Boyes, Roger. „Organisers of a Berlin Exhibition Hope to Break
the Hitler Taboo.‟ The Times, 13 October 2010, 24; Crossland, David. „An Opportunity
Missed. The Failure of Berlin‟s Hitler Exhibition to Break New Ground.‟ Spiegel, 18 October
2010. Accessed 19 October 2010. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/
0,1518,druck-723784,00.html.
18
Ottomeyer, „Vorwort‟, 13-14; Eatwell, Roger. Fascism. A History. London: Pimlico, 2003,
xxi; Alter, Reinhard, and Monteath, Peter, eds. Rewriting the German Past: History and
Identity in the New Germany. New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1997, 13-16.
19
Koshar, Rudy. From Monuments to Traces: Artefacts of German Memory, 1870-1990.
Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 2000, 9-13; Ewert, Burkhard.
„Millionen Monster: Schau über Adolf Hitler in Berlin.‟ Neue Osnabrücker Zeitung, 18
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Austausch, Vol. 1, Issue. 2, October 2011
Germany‟s cathartic Vergangenheitsbewältigung (coping with the past)
where memory is being played out between an officially endorsed
„Schuldkultur‟ of atonement and a self-exonerating Schuldabwehr (evasion
of guilt), this paper questions the extent to which prohibitions concerning
how Hitler is presented have been broken.20
In order to validate these claims, and in seeking to de-mythologise a
propaganda–inspired all-powerful Führerfigur and subsequent selfabsolving Schuldabwehr phenomenon, the exhibition‟s essence is outlined
as defined by chief curator Hans-Ulrich Thamer, followed by a resume of
intentionalist and structuralist accounts for Hitler and the Holocaust.
Responding to an alleged historical immaturity concerning the
musealisation of Hitler, „content analysis‟ is used to evaluate a corpus of
supra-regional
newspapers
to
demonstrate
how
an
official
Kollektivschuldthese was accepted or rejected by the opinion-following or
forming media and, by extension, their reading public.21 Reviewing the
DHM‟s claims that the exhibition broke new historical ground, the final
section on „taboos‟ considers whether prohibitions of presenting Hitler have
been dispensed with by considering the prevalence of his personalised
artifacts and reactions to the museum‟s alleged reluctance to transgress the
ethical frontiers of acceptability.22
The DHM‟s Presentation of Hitler‟s Power and De-Demonisation
With its photographs, images and constructed Führerkult, or mystical
bond between Hitler and his followers, for chief curator Thamer a lasting
legacy of Nazi propaganda was its successful dissemination of the
phenomenon that Hitler‟s power ultimately derived from his genius as gifted
statesman, popular leader and redeemer. 23 Despite the fact that Nazi
propaganda did not depict reality in the sense that it was always
constructed for a specific political message and audience, for Thamer it is
March 2011, 28; Goldhagen, Daniel. J. Hitler’s Willing Executioners. Ordinary Germans
and the Holocaust. New York: Knopf, 1996.
20
Kellerhoff, „Die deutschen‟; Kundrus, Birthe. „Der Holocaust. Die “Volksgemeinschaft” als
Verbrechensgemeinschaft?‟ In Hitler und die Deutschen. Thamer and Erpel, eds., 134-135.
21
„Whenever somebody reads, or listens to, the content of a body of communication and
then summarises and interprets what is there, then content analysis can be said to have
taken place‟, noted Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones. Burnham, Peter. et al. Research
Methods in Politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, 236-237.
22
Hornig and Sontheimer, „“Führer” im Kleinformat‟; Kalitschke, Martin. „Der Münsteraner
Historiker Hans-Ulrich Thamer hat die Berliner Hitler-Ausstellung entworfen.‟
Münsterländische Volkszeitung, 2 November 2010. Accessed 23 March 2011.
http://www.bbv-net.de/lokales/regionales/1435796_Der_Muensteraner_Historiker_Hans_
Ulrich_Thamer_hat_die_Berliner_Hitler_Ausstellung_entworfen.html.
23
Thamer, „Hitler und die Deutschen – eine vieldeutige Beziehungsgeschichte‟, 162-163;
Thamer, Hans-Ulrich. „Die Inszenierung von Macht. Hitlers Herrschaft und ihre
Präsentation im Museum.‟ In Hitler und die Deutschen. Thamer and Erpel, eds., 17-22.
74
Austausch, Vol. 1, Issue. 2, October 2011
still historically viable since its reception reveals a wealth of information
about the socio-political context or structures from which it originated. 24
Tracing key stages in the construction of Nazi imagery, Thamer and others
were concerned that Hitler‟s personalisation has trivialised historical
conscience, which was why the DHM sought to de-mythologise Hitler as an
all-powerful dictator and the subsequent exculpatory Selbstbild (selfimage). Instead of the much-cited Nazi assertion of one German identity,
reflected in the phrase Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer, for example, the
exhibition concentrated on the historical conditions or structures of the
European inter-war years of crisis.25 This was because according to
Thamer, what Nazi images and subsequent interpretations of the Führer
factor hardly ever show is that Hitler‟s charismatic control had to be
constantly sustained and renewed by propaganda along with „Tat und
Beispiel‟ (action and example) rather than enforced structures of
bureaucratic legality.26
While Hitler‟s charisma was certainly a key component of his control, the
DHM primarily attributed his appeal, qualities and successes to the
consent, focus of adulation, sense of purpose and other desires of the
masses.27 Although recognising Hitler‟s extraordinary willpower and
opportunism, with a mixture of ideological consent and short-sighted
material interests, Thamer maintained the Führer fully exploited the
prevailing aura of „unprincipled blindness‟ in an unchallenged spiralling path
to power and penetration of society.28 Nazi power structures certainly
ensured Hitler‟s authority, contended Thamer and fellow curator Simone
Erpel, but these dynamics of control were not the result of a deliberate or
„intentionalist‟ strategy, rather the consequence of Hitler‟s amateurish style
of rule whose resultant Führer state, symbolised by overlapping areas of
responsibility, concealed chaos.29
Except for a few unrepentant Nazis, for two decades it was generally
assumed and accepted by both Germans and occupying powers alike that
Hitler was an all-powerful dictator whose will was invariably translated into
action and, therefore, almost solely responsible for everything. Leading to
24
Thamer, „Die Inszenierung‟, 18.
Ibid., 17-19, 22; Erpel, Simone. „Hitler entdämonisiert. Die mediale Präsenz des Diktators
nach 1945 in Presse und Internet.‟ In Hitler und die Deutschen. Thamer and Erpel, eds.,
154; Frei, Norbert. „Führerbilderwechsel. Hitler und die Deutschen nach 1945.‟ In Hitler und
die Deutschen. Thamer and Erpel, eds., 143-144.
26
Weber, Max. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriß der verstehenden Soziologie.
Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2002, 122-128; Thamer, „Die Inszenierung‟, 19-20.
27
Weber, Wirtschaft, 122-128; Thamer, „Hitler und die Deutschen – eine vieldeutige
Beziehungsgeschichte‟, 162-163.
28
Thamer, Hans-Ulrich. „Machtübertragung und nationale Revolution.‟ In Hitler und die
Deutschen. Thamer and Erpel, eds., 194.
29
Thamer, „Die Inszenierung‟, 17-22; Erpel, Simone. „Der “Führerstaat”.‟ In Hitler und die
Deutschen. Thamer and Erpel, eds., 231.
25
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the gates of Auschwitz, for intentionalist historians, Hitler conceived the
idea of the total physical extermination of the Jews during the 1920s and
relentlessly pursued this intention on acquiring power; in short, Hitler‟s bitter
hatred of all Jews was held as a sufficient explanation for the Holocaust,
which happened because Hitler willed it. Summarising the intentionalist
approach, since Hitler made most of the decisions and controlled what went
on in Germany, his personality and ideology effectively rendered Hitlerism
as Nazism.30 The DHM‟s assessment of the post-war intentionalist
atmosphere was that with Hitler dead and guilty, appeasing all concerned,
the blame could thus be loaded onto his uncomplaining shoulders and
every ordinary German could claim innocence after an easing of deNazification following Eisenhower‟s „crusade against Communism‟. 31 As a
consequence of reconstruction and Allied political education initiatives
which promoted both a distance to and disavowal of National Socialism, for
example, the pervasive slogan „Hitler was to blame‟ offered Germans a
collective amnesty.32
Dismissing Hitler‟s dominant role in the Holocaust or any long-term plan
for genocide, structuralist historians suggest there was no direct path to
Auschwitz owing to a lack of clear objectives, coherent policies and
conflicting interpretations of Hitler‟s will.33 So while Hitler in theory was an
all-powerful dictator, as various intentionalists have suggested, in practice
he was not always free to act as he wished or the prime mover, since even
when a decision had been taken it had to be implemented by others. 34
Underlining continuities with the past, according to DHM catalogue
contributor Norbert Frei and curator Simone Erpel, substituting the post-war
Kollektivschuldthese was an intentionalist Selbstbild which seduced the
Germans more strongly than Hitler ever did, namely, that they were his first
and last victims. 35 Led astray by Goebbels‟ propaganda, holding Hitler
solely responsible for the war, and collectively punished through that lost
war, this Selbstbild served to redirect responsibility and absolve guilt,
thereby demonising the dictator and prohibiting his former positive image,
claimed Erpel.36 With former favourable conceptions of his leadership
30
Taylor, Alan J. P. The Origins of the Second World War. London: Penguin Books, 1961,
nd
26-27, 34-36; Farmer, Alan. Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust. 2 ed. London: Hodder
Education, 2009, 6; Layton, Geoff. Germany: The Third Reich. 1933-45. 3rd ed. London:
Hodder Murray, 2005, 100, 107-108, 192, 194.
31
Eisenhower, Dwight David. Crusade in Europe. New York: Doubleday, 1948; Taylor, The
Origins, 26-27, 34-36; Kundrus, „Der Holocaust‟, 132-134.
32
Frei, „Führerbilderwechsel‟, 143-144.
33
Layton, Germany, 100, 108; Schleunes, Karl A. The Twisted Road to Auschwitz: Nazi
Policy Toward German Jews, 1933–1939. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970;
Farmer, Anti-Semitism, 7-8.
34
Farmer, Anti-Semitism, 7-8; Layton, Germany, 100-101, 108-109, 138, 191-195;
nd
Schleunes, The Twisted Road; Fulbrook, Mary. A Concise History of Germany. 2 ed.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, 200.
35
Kundrus, „Der Holocaust‟, 132-134; Frei, „Führerbilderwechsel‟, 144.
36
Erpel, „Hitler entdämonisiert‟, 154; Frei, „Führerbilderwechsel‟, 143-144.
76
Austausch, Vol. 1, Issue. 2, October 2011
having been reversed, blaming Hitler and his regime re-directed attention to
his particular seductive form of leadership, allowing Germans a certain
distance from him and permission to see themselves as victims of his
personal charm and magnetism. 37
Paradoxically, this attitude also fostered the Hitler Myth, or positive
recollections of National Socialism, such as the Autobahns and the
recreational benefits of the Strength Through Joy (KdF) organisation for
millions of workers, the success of which was attributed to Hitler, who
simultaneously became an irretrievable demon in the process.38
Acknowledging Der Spiegel’s 1996 front cover depiction of Hitler with
Germans for the first time, which reflected a marked empathy to a revived
Kollektivschuldthese, the DHM also sought to highlight that the media are
both addressing and avoiding the past by an unedifying entertainment,
parodying Hitler.39 It was this intentionalist circumvention of Daniel
Goldhagen‟s recurring structuralist genocidal spirit thesis for which Erpel
and Frei reproached the media, contending that downplaying the dictator
changed Hitler‟s image from a tabooed demon into a satirical figure, which
adversely conditions historical conscience through trivialisation.40 In his
1996 publication Hitler’s Willing Executioners, Goldhagen claimed that
between 100,000-500,000 Germans were directly implicated in the
„machinery of destruction‟, thus putting collective responsibility of the past
back on the public agenda by dismissing a general post-war denial of
knowledge concerning the Holocaust,.41 Presenting what was effectively a
damning indictment of the whole German people, Goldhagen identified a
hatred of Jews so ancient and profound that genocide barely required
explanation, at the same time alleging that a widespread and particularly
violent variant of anti-Semitism was the catalyst for the Holocaust.42
For structuralists, who place less emphasis on the role of the individual
and more on social and economic structures, since many Germans voted
for Hitler, the moral responsibility for the „Final Solution‟ extends beyond the
Führer‟s intentions to the regime‟s apparatus and ultimately, therefore, to
an alleged mindset of the people.43 According to Jewish historian Raul
37
Erpel, Simone. „Hitler und kein Ende.‟ In Hitler und die Deutschen. Thamer and Erpel,
eds., 280; Thamer, Hans-Ulrich. „Führermythos und Führerbewegung.‟ In Hitler und die
Deutschen. Thamer and Erpel, eds., 172.
38
Erpel, „Hitler entdämonisiert‟, 154-155; Erpel, „Hitler und kein Ende‟, 280; Lynch, Michael.
Nazi Germany. London: Hodder Headline, 2004, 104-105.
39
Erpel, „Hitler entdämonisiert‟, 154-160; Erpel, Simone. „Hitler im “Spiegel”.‟ In Hitler und
die Deutschen. Thamer and Erpel, eds., 291.
40
Erpel, „Hitler entdämonisiert‟, 154-160; Frei, „Führerbilderwechsel‟, 144-147; Goldhagen,
Hitler’s.
41
Farmer, Anti-Semitism, 10-11; Niven, Germans, 1-2; Goldhagen, Hitler’s.
42
Goldhagen, Hitler’s; Farmer, Anti-Semitism, 10-11; Layton, Germany, 100; Koonz,
Claudia. The Nazi Conscience. Cambridge, USA: Harvard University Press, 2003, 11;
Fulbrook, German National Identity, 4.
43
Layton, Germany, 4-5, 100; Farmer, Anti-Semitism, 7, 11; Kohn, Hans. The Mind of
Germany: the Education of a Nation. London: Macmillan, 1965, 3-21.
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Hilberg, for example, the Final Solution did not depend on Hitler‟s
extremism, but on the expansion of an inherent, latent and genocidal spirit
that was not so much demanded as consensual.44 Reflecting less of a „you
must‟ and more of „you can or may‟, Nazi methods of control and initiatives
of violence were by no means based exclusively on coercion, contended
DHM catalogue contributor Birthe Kundrus. 45 The Party‟s gradual
monopolisation of power was only possible with the co-operation of what
the DHM termed the Parteirevolution von unten (grass-roots political
revolution), suggesting Hitler was controlled by events and the political
system, while Nazi power structures ensured his overall authority. 46
Summarising the exhibition‟s essence, not only was there co-ordination
from above, but also an enthusiastic co-operation from below, whereby
Hitler‟s charisma and populist aspirations, along with his image of legality
as voice of the Volk, all sustained the mobilisation of the masses and their
compliance with violence.47 In short, moving away from a self-exonerating
intentionalist stance and more towards a self-accusatory structuralist one,
for chief curator Hans-Ulrich Thamer, Hitler‟s hold over the nation owed
less to German sociologist Max Weber‟s „charismatic control‟ thesis and
more to the structuralist social-political conditions of the day, along with the
motivations and mindset of many.48
Media Reactions
Along with political scientists and historians, participants in past debates
surrounding identity and memory also included journalists and writers, selfconsciously setting the terms of popular discourse both in popular dailies
and weeklies such as the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Die Zeit, Der
Spiegel and Stern.49 Playing a significant role within past and contemporary
controversial issues, these so-called „Meinungsführer‟ (formulators of
opinion) personify a German tradition of intellectual journalism where public
44
Hilberg, Raul. The Destruction of the European Jews. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985,
63; Koonz, The Nazi Conscience, 10, 279.
45
Kundrus, „Der Holocaust‟, 134.
46
Thamer, „Machtübertragung‟, 194; Thamer, „Die Inszenierung‟, 17-22; Erpel, „Der
“Führerstaat”‟, 231.
47
Thamer, „Die Inszenierung‟, 21-22; Kalitschke, „Der Münsteraner‟; Thamer,
„Machtübertragung‟, 194; Thamer, Hans-Ulrich. „Hitler und die NSDAP.‟ In Hitler und die
Deutschen. Thamer and Erpel, eds., 181.
48
Weber, Wirtschaft, 122-128; Thamer, „Hitler und die Deutschen – eine vieldeutige
Beziehungsgeschichte‟, 162-163.
49
Kansteiner, „Mandarins‟, 98; „Ernst Nolte: “Die Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will”.
Eine Rede, die geschrieben, aber nicht gehalten werden konnte. Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung.‟ Deutsches Historisches Museum, 6 June 1986. Accessed 11 June 2004.
http://www.dhm.de/lemo/html/dokumente/NeueHausforderungen_redeNolte1986/;
Fulbrook, German National Identity, 125-127, 175, 222.
78
Austausch, Vol. 1, Issue. 2, October 2011
opinion often equals published opinion, but is not necessarily official.
Further to the findings of my PhD, for instance, which demonstrated key
dissonances between official and popular conceptions of memory and
identity since 1990, evidence suggested a continuing resentment from
some
quarters
towards
the
DHM‟s
endorsement
of
a
„bundesrepublikanische Schuldkultur’ (official culture of shame).50 This was
manifest in changes to ethnic conceptions of citizenship, the Green Cards
immigration debate, claims xenophobia was mainly confined to the former
GDR, the 1996 anti-Wehrmacht exhibition, official defamation of Second
World War fighter ace Werner Mölders and German suffering as depicted in
Jörg Friedrich‟s 2002 book The Fire.51
Developments since reunification not only suggested there was
widespread anxiety and resentment towards immigration and asylum, but
also attempts to dispense with an inherited guilt complex - a result of
excessive official demands for ongoing atonement and an institutionalised
identity based around Auschwitz.52 Contesting concerns that Auschwitz
should remain an inescapable and unique symbol of German guilt and
identity, and insisting on continued public contrition, the former SPD Mayor
of Hamburg, Klaus von Dohnanyi, declared „nothing defines German
identity both at home and abroad so profoundly as the Holocaust‟.53 During
a 1999 Bundestag debate concerning a memorial to the Holocaust in Berlin,
for example, politicians from across the political spectrum were unanimous
in their assertions that Hitler and the Holocaust should remain an
indispensable part of collective guilt, remembrance and national
consciousness.54
While official sites of memory, such as the government-sponsored DHM,
may reflect a political system and private experience, reminiscent of the
debates during the 1990s concerning the extent to which guilt should
continue to inform German identity, recent reactions to the exhibition
evoked a „Zerknirschungsmentalität‟ (mentality of remorseful rumination). 55
Depicting hitherto undisplayed items, such as the Führer‟s fan mail and the
Heilbronner rote Album documenting Nazi victory parades, all tracing the
50
Assheuer, Thomas. „Ein normaler Staat?‟ Die Zeit, 12 November 1998. Accessed 20
December 2005. http://zeus.zeit.de/text/archiv/1998/47/199847.normalitaet_.xml. See also:
Barnard, Mark. The Past Becomes the Present. German National Identity and Memory
since Reunification. University of Salford, 2008, Ph.D. Thesis.
51
Barnard, The Past.
52
Müller, Jan-Werner. Another Country: German Intellectuals, Unification and National
Identity. New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 2000, 244-252. Mohr, „Total normal?‟,
42; Jennerich, „Discomfort‟, 61-69.
53
„Klaus von Dohnanyi. Eine Friedensrede.‟ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10 November
1998, 33; Mohr, „Total normal?‟, 42; Staab, „Xenophobia‟, 40; Jennerich, „Discomfort‟, 61,
67, 69; Müller, Another Country, 246, 248, 252.
54
Plenarprotokoll, 4097-4099, 4100-4112, 4146.
55
Berger, Stefan. The Search for Normality: National Identity and Historical Consciousness
in Germany since 1800. Providence/Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1997, 179, 192; Mohr, „Total
normal?‟, 42-46; Plenarprotokoll, 4086, 4091-4116.
79
Austausch, Vol. 1, Issue. 2, October 2011
essence of Hitler‟s power back to the people rather than Party structures,
curator Simone Erpel claimed the DHM was the first to examine the basis of
the Führer factor.56 Although the Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung (HAZ)
acknowledged that the exhibition addressed how Hitler maintained his hold
over the people, it criticised the curators‟ alleged timidity. For HAZ and
others, the DHM failed to explain why so many Germans continued to be
fascinated with the Führer.57 Irrespective of the many commendable facets
of the exhibition, Burkhard Ewert of the Neue Osnabrücker Zeitung, along
with Claudia Lepping of the Stuttgarter Nachrichten, went further, alleging
that this was not an exhibition about Hitler since the museum did not
engage with the actual relationship between the Führer and the masses.58
Despite attracting high praise for the interesting, varied and meticulously
compiled catalogue, with its excessive preoccupation on circumstantial and
commercialised objects of evidence, for Ewert and others, the DHM lost
something of the „esprit’ of good historical exhibitions by conforming to
structuralist academic trends.59 Omitting Hitler‟s personalised objects and
shunning intentionalist accounts, the museum‟s alleged objective structural
reflexions, which aimed to de-personalise the past and the ostensible selfconciliatory and obsessive Popfigur phenomenon, produced a very different
musealisation of memory to that promoted by the Bundestag.60 For Simon
Benne, Lepping and Der Spiegel, who contended that Hitler has become
more of a political, moral and aesthetic obstacle to be carefully negotiated,
the exhibition approached Hitler‟s musealisation with far too much historical
reserve.61 Der Spiegel complained that since the general public could not
be trusted on the grounds of their latent predisposition to Nazi propaganda,
everything was avoided that could possibly be construed as a heroisation of
Hitler, or a justification of the post-war trend that an ignorant and largely
innocent people were led astray, complained Der Spiegel.62
In line with the DHM‟s mistrust of the masses, curator Hans-Ulrich
Thamer noted the reduction of Hitler‟s memorabilia to objects of virtually
secondary significance by obliquely presenting items, such as a chest of
drawers and a glorified oil painting of the Volksgemeinschaft, in order to
56
Thamer, „Machtübertragung‟, 198-199; Thamer, „Hitler und die NSDAP‟, 189-191;
„Faszination Führer‟.
57
Benne, Simon. „Berliner Ausstellung thematisiert “Hitler und die Deutschen”.‟
Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 October 2010, 7; Benne, Simon. „Nerv der Zeit.‟
Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung, 17 October 2010. Accessed 25 March 2011.
http://www.haz.de/Nachrichten/Meinung/Uebersicht/Nerv-der-Zeit.
58
Benne, „Berliner Ausstellung‟, 7; Benne, „Nerv der Zeit‟; Lepping, „Kinder‟.
59
Ewert, „Millionen‟, 28.
60
Frei, „Führerbilderwechsel‟, 144-147; Erpel, „Hitler entdämonisiert‟, 154, 156-158;
„Sendung am 30. Januar 2011 Zeitgenosse Hitler Er ist nicht tot zu kriegen.‟ Zweites
Deutsches
Fernsehen,
31
January
2011.
Accessed
25
March
2011.
http://www.zdf.de/ZDFde/inhalt/80,1872,8201512,00.html.
61
Benne, „Berliner Ausstellung‟, 7; Lepping, „Kinder‟.
62
Hornig and Sontheimer, „“Führer” im Kleinformat‟.
80
Austausch, Vol. 1, Issue. 2, October 2011
diminish Hitler‟s ostensible potentiality of power and attraction. 63 Alluding to
the Kollektivschuldthese, curator Simone Erpel contended that the people‟s
adulation was all pervading, accounting for the people‟s fascination with the
former Führer by means of structural conditions, such as resentment in
defeat, hostility to the Weimar Republic and post-war Germany‟s
Krisengesellschaft (society in crisis).64
Reminiscent of this German post-war structuralist Western
historiography, which claimed a traditional but now reformed elite was ruling
on behalf of the masses that could not as yet be trusted, Thamer claimed:
„Recent research has revealed that the Third Reich‟s war-time society was
significantly more sinister than previously thought.‟65 Though historians are
divided between those who claim it was a „pseudo-ideology‟ or constitutive
of reality, essential to understanding society during the Third Reich, Thamer
argued that Hitler‟s charisma, control and destructive ethos cannot be
explained without reference to the relationship between the Führer, Volk
and the Volksgemeinschaft.66 Moreover, alluding to the complicity of the
Kriegsgeneration (war generation) and negating their claims of ignorance,
Thamer also noted that while the world of the Volksgemeinschaft was
separate from that of the camps, the latter‟s fences were clearly visible,
thereby ensuring that Nazi terror against racial enemies and minorities was
witnessed by the public.67 Upholding this stance of indifference rather than
claims of ignorance, DHM catalogue contributor Birthe Kundrus claimed
that in contrast to past discussions, current debates no longer revolve
around whether the Germans were aware of the Holocaust, but rather how
they dealt with it.68
Indicative of the school of thought that perceives the Volksgemeinschaft
as a reflection of reality as opposed to mere ideology, and alluding to
collective guilt, Kundrus contended that the Third Reich was not simply a
society, but a tangible, specific, well-supported, albeit Nazi-induced social
order and community.69 The DHM contended that not only did Hitler present
himself as a man of the people, fulfilling the nation‟s yearning for a hero, but
also as the living incarnation of the Volksgemeinschaft – the widespread
active or passive participation in which facilitated his rise to power and
control, the destruction of democracy, along with war and genocide. 70
63
Ibid.
„Faszination Führer‟.
65
Hornig and Sontheimer, „“Führer” im Kleinformat‟; Fulbrook, German National Identity,
117-118; Alter, „Cultural Modernity‟, 153, 171.
66
Layton, Germany, 50-52; Thamer, „Die Inszenierung‟, 19.
67
Thamer, Hans-Ulrich. „Die deutsche Gesellschaft im Krieg.‟ In Hitler und die Deutschen.
Thamer and Erpel, eds., 261.
68
Farmer, Anti-Semitism, 10; Kundrus, „Der Holocaust‟, 131-134.
69
Kundrus, „Der Holocaust‟, 130-133; Layton, Germany, 51-52, 83.
70
Thamer, „Die Inszenierung‟, 19-22; Thamer, Hans-Ulrich. „Führerherrschaft und
Vernichtungskrieg.‟ In Hitler und die Deutschen. Thamer and Erpel, eds., 243; Thamer,
64
81
Austausch, Vol. 1, Issue. 2, October 2011
Consequently, for the DHM the rise of Hitler becomes less determined by
the mobilisation and totalitarian techniques of the Party and more due to the
widespread willing co-operation and consent to National Socialist
ideology.71
So, was Hitler a monster who seduced adoring millions, or was it more
the case that millions of little monsters willingly did his bidding, reflected
Burkhard Ewert of the Neue Osnabrücker Zeitung? 72 Inherent within the
exhibition‟s title: „Hitler and the Germans. Volksgemeinschaft and Crimes‟,
for Ewert and others, it was clear the DHM upheld the latter theory, „blindly‟
following the alleged historical consensus since 1945.73 In some ways, such
intentionalist reactions to the DHM‟s structuralist stance accounting for the
Führer factor reflected the much-debated question of whether German
history has determined the German character or whether character has
determined history.74 Though hotly contested, some structuralist academics
responding to the question, was the Third Reich inevitable?, believe Hitler
was the natural product of Germany‟s political evolution, cultural and
intellectual heritage along with its national character.75 In other words, did
the people succumb to Hitler because anti-democratic social and
intellectual foundations had been retained, as the DHM implied, or because
they had become part of modern western society?
Resurrecting the Kollektivschuldthese, as the DHM implied, Goldhagen
suggested that the Holocaust was facilitated by the active complicity of
many in the population, since within German culture there had developed a
particularly violent variant of an eliminatory anti-Semitism.76 Accusing the
DHM of deliberately avoiding dealing with Hitler on the grounds his
personalisation could lead to a repetition of the past, the Stuttgarter
Nachrichten asked: „Was the DHM really expecting another Hitler?‟, thereby
alluding to its allegedly unwarranted reservations and a Schuldkultur from
certain visitors. This echoed TAZ‟s 2004 critique of those who feared the
return of the Führer factor.77 After 1945, for example, for many Germans
„Die deutsche Gesellschaft im Krieg‟, 261; Thamer, „Hitler und die Deutschen – eine
vieldeutige Beziehungsgeschichte‟, 170.
71
Thamer, „Die Inszenierung‟, 19, 22.
72
Ewert, „Millionen‟, 28.
73
Ibid., 28.
74
Kohn, The Mind of Germany, 7-9; Calleo, David. The German Problem Reconsidered.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978, 5-6; Alter and Monteath, eds., Rewriting
the German Past, 13-16.
75
Layton, Germany, 190-192; Taylor, Alan J. P. The Course of German History. London:
Hamish Hamilton, 1945; Shirer, William L. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1959.
76
Goldhagen, Hitler’s; Erpel, Simone. „Die deutsche Gesellschaft und Hitler.‟ In Hitler und
die Deutschen. Thamer and Erpel, eds., 211; Thamer, „Die deutsche Gesellschaft im
Krieg‟, 261. Agar, Unsere Zeit fordert; Jaspers, Die Schuldfrage.
77
Lepping, „Kinder‟; Wagner, Franz Josef. „Vergesst Hitler!‟ Die Tageszeitung, 14
September 2004. Accessed 12 July 2011. http://www.taz.de/1/archiv/archiv/?dig=2004/09/
14/a0164.
82
Austausch, Vol. 1, Issue. 2, October 2011
Hitler became the ideal scapegoat for their past transgressions in the form
of an „Alleinschuldige‟ (sole responsibility) which fostered the impression
that they were the manipulated victims of the Führer factor. Challenging this
trend and demanding a direct confrontation with the Third Reich in order to
ascertain the Kriegsgeneration’s complicity, their children (the 1968
generation), sought to identify the socio-economic and political factors or
structures that had faciliated National Socialism, thus avoiding the mistakes
of the past.78
Not everyone in Germany was happy with the media‟s move away from a
Kollektivschuldthese via a demonising or personalising of Hitler, insisting
that since fewer people are left alive who were misled by him, Germans
ought to be perpetually reminded of past mistakes. While recognising the
exhibition could become a place of pilgrimage for neo-Nazis, the Stuttgarter
Nachrichten’s Claudia Lepping and the Neue Osnabrücker Zeitung
resented the DHM‟s adherence to a Kollektivschuldthese, dismissing the
possibility of another Hitler on the basis of a well-established culture of
contrition and inconducive conditions.79 Disputing the DHM‟s allusions that
the Germans have not learned from their past and its unjustified fears that
elucidating the real reasons for the Führer factor would breathe new life into
Hitler, Lepping also claimed that these hackneyed and irritating structuralist
accounts for Hitler‟s success have plagued the Germans for long enough.80
Conversely, the Magdeburger Volkstimme seemed more in accord with
the DHM‟s structuralist presentation of the past. It uncritically highlighted
that one of the key myths exploded by historian and exhibition catalogue
contributor, Othmar Plöckinger, was that Mein Kampf was little read by
Germans during Hitler‟s tenure.81 Summarising the book‟s historical impact
and academic validity within heated post-war discussions, Plöckinger
concluded that while it is debatable whether Mein Kampf was „the book of
the Germans‟, more recent resumes testify to its incontrovertible and
unremitting status as „the book of German history‟.82 For the Magdeburger
Volkstimme, it was the conditions and consequences of Hitler‟s rise and
rule, his promises to the people, along with their blind faith in and adoration
of him, which led to their general involvement in atrocities. 83 According to
curator Hans-Ulrich Thamer, instead of any significant resistance, there
78
Benne, „Nerv der Zeit‟; Gassert, Philipp and Steinweis, Alan E. eds. Coping with the Nazi
Past: West German Debates on Nazism and Generational Conflict: 1955-1975. New York:
Berghahn, 2006.
79
Ewert, „Millionen‟, 28.
80
Lepping, „Kinder‟.
81
Schneider, „Vom Wechselverhältnis‟.
82
Exceeding all the publishers‟ expectations, Mein Kampf sold 900,000 copies in 1933.
Plöckinger, Othmar. „Hitlers “Mein Kampf”. Von der “Abrechnung” zum “Buch der
Deutschen”.‟ In Hitler und die Deutschen. Thamer and Erpel, eds., 50, 55-56; Schneider,
„Vom Wechselverhältnis‟.
83
Schneider, „Vom Wechselverhältnis‟.
83
Austausch, Vol. 1, Issue. 2, October 2011
was growing public support or at least acceptance, and this sympathy and
compliance enabled the Nazi double strategy of seduction and violence.84
Further indicative of the DHM‟s self-accusatory structuralist stance, which
insisted that the Volksgemeinschaft was integral to Hitlerism, the curators
sought to contextualise genocide and a general nationalisation of violence
by showing how, not if, the Volksgemeinschaft radicalised society.85
Thamer and catalogue contributor Michael Wildt claimed the
Volksgemeinschaft’s promotion and its integrative function conveyed the
fears, hopes and denunciations of the day, though it was not constitutive of
social reality since it excluded certain societal strata. Just as it sought to
overcome divisions of class, politics and religion by encouraging greater
social co-operation, its adherents also sought social scapegoats, sustaining
the violence and extremism against undesirables.86 Promising a socially
unified and ethnically homogenous people‟s community which would create
a new national identity based around race and struggle, the
Volksgemeinschaft also envisaged making Germany great again by
destroying the hated Versailles Treaty and ridding the country of its internal
enemies.87
DHM contributor, Birthe Kundrus, contended there was at least a partial
knowledge amongst the population of the Holocaust, implying collective
culpability, even though active public participation in systematic genocide
was limited to a few individuals.88 For Kundrus and Wildt, ensuring the
Volk’s ethnic future, together with the prospect of individual enrichment and
Selbstermächtigung (self-empowerment), lay behind the general
acceptance of the expulsion and exploitation of Poles and Ukrainians, along
with violence against the Jews up to and beyond 1939.89 Addressing Die
Zeit’s question of the extent to which Germany had been radicalised into a
Volksgemeinschaft, Wildt claimed that despite not constituting reality since
it excluded formerly accepted and integrated strata of German society, it
certainly encouraged widespread and accepted barbaric behaviour. In order
to emphasise the generational criminality within the Volksgemeinschaft,
particularly striking photographs were displayed depicting local reactions to
the anti-Semitic street processions in which women, children and
84
Thamer, „Machtübertragung‟, 194.
Rank, Martin. „Anstehen für den Führer. Hitler-Ausstellung in Berlin.‟ Die Tageszeitung,
18 October 2010. Accessed 23 March 2011. http://www. taz.de/1/berlin/artikel/1/
anstehen-fuer-den-fuehrer-1.
86
Thamer, „Die Inszenierung‟, 19, 21; Bajohr, Frank and Wildt, Michael. Volksgemeinschaft.
Neue Forschungen zur Gesellschaft des Nationalsozialismus. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer,
2009 and: Ullrich, Volker. „Deutschland, ein Land aus Nazis? Hitler-Ausstellung.‟ Die Zeit,
15 October 2010. Accessed 20 March 2011. http://www.zeit.de/2010/42/Interv-M-Wildt.
87
Kalitschke, „Der Münsteraner‟; Fulbrook, A Concise History, 178, 182.
88
Kundrus, „Der Holocaust‟, 131.
89
Ibid., 131; Wildt, Michael. Volksgemeinschaft als Selbstermächtigung. Gewalt gegen
Juden in den deutschen Provinz 1919 bis 1939. Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2007.
85
84
Austausch, Vol. 1, Issue. 2, October 2011
adolescents abused „guilty‟ Jews paraded before them by the Party faithful
before the 1935 Nuremberg Laws.90
Resenting this alleged general complicity alluded to by Kundrus, Wildt
and Thamer, protests also came from HAZ and Der Spiegel at the DHM‟s
failure to sufficiently highlight resistance to the regime. Nowhere was any
mention made, for example, of Rudolf-Christoph von Gersdorff‟s 1943
assassination attempt on Hitler in Berlin, complained Der Spiegel.91
Although accepting Hans Mommsen‟s theory that the Holocaust was a
radicalised process of cumulative violence, indicative of the ongoing
allocation of responsibility, Kundrus claimed a schoolteacher who
witnessed Jewish persecution personified the Volksgemeinschaft’s
ephemeral reality and attitudes of the day.92 Unhappy that her distressed
pupils had to witness the arrival of a train-load of emaciated Jews near
Auschwitz, the teacher recorded in her diary: „Was it really necessary that
those little children had to see such an awful process of public exclusion?‟ 93
Shortly afterwards, however, she expressed her irritation that the Jews had
not saved themselves by using their obvious wealth.94
Conversely, symbolic of a manifestation of the „good German‟, a former
Wehrmacht officer Wilm Hosenfeld resolved to rescue Jews whenever
possible. Despite being a former admirer of Hitler, he was disillusioned with
the NSDAP on the basis of war-crimes. Was this an exception to the socalled „bad German‟ phenomenon? 95 Almost certainly, contended Kundrus,
because while figures are always difficult to establish, the number of
„Retter‟, or „good Germans‟, were clearly a minority.96 Moreover, while the
teacher‟s troubled statement revealed an irritation with a huge breach of
moral norms, for Kundrus it conveyed an acceptance of legitimised murder
as a means of a reversed accountability which claimed that the Jews
themselves were also to blame for their fate. In short, irrespective of the
fact that many did not deal directly in mass murder, it was undoubtedly
tolerated by the majority.97
Not only traditional elites, but also the majority of the population joyfully
welcomed the regime or came to terms with it, succumbing relatively
quickly to its promises of a united egalitarian society, national revival and
90
Wildt, Michael. „“Volksgemeinschaft” als Selbstermächtigung. Soziale Praxis und Gewalt.‟
In Hitler und die Deutschen. Thamer and Erpel, eds., 90-93; Ullrich, „Deutschland‟.
91
Hornig and Sontheimer, „“Führer” im Kleinformat‟; Benne, „Berliner Ausstellung‟, 7;
Kundrus, „Der Holocaust‟, 134; Thamer, „Machtübertragung‟, 194.
92
Kundrus, „Der Holocaust‟, 130-135; Mommsen, Hans. „Zerstörung der Politik und
Amoklauf des NS-Regimes. Politikverständnis und kumulative Radikalisierung.‟ In Hitler
und die Deutschen. Thamer and Erpel, eds., 68-73.
93
Kundrus, „Der Holocaust‟, 130.
94
Ibid.
95
Agar, Unsere Zeit fordert; Jaspers, Die Schuldfrage; Kundrus, „Der Holocaust‟, 130.
96
Kanon, Joseph. The Good German: A Novel. London: Little, Brown, 2001; The Good
German. Warner Home Video, 2007. DVD; Kundrus, „Der Holocaust‟, 130.
97
Kundrus, „Der Holocaust‟, 130.
85
Austausch, Vol. 1, Issue. 2, October 2011
prosperity. DHM curator Simone Erpel noted that trust in the Führer’s
promises ensured that Hitler could count on mass support, even amongst
those initially mistrustful of the regime – particularly the workforce whose
integration within the German Labour Front (DAF) and KdF, following the
Führer-allegiance principle, testified to a thorough Gleichschaltung (coordination).98 Under the DHM‟s sub-section Verheißungen (promises), for
instance, offering consumer welfare, leisure and ultimately a more affluent
society, mass-consumerism was one of Hitler‟s key inducements,
epitomised by a whole series of modern, affordable and well-received
Volksprodukte (people‟s products).99 A double-edged sword, on the one
hand, the DAF and KdF ensured social conformity and control and on the
other organised welfare and leisure - the widespread acceptance of which
suggested a general tolerance of exclusion, terror and persecution. 100
Through nationalist emotionalisation and economic enticements, but also
with coercion and control, Hitler mobilised a huge desire for re-birth and
achievement, along with unprecedented energies of destruction which
culminated in the extermination of all democratic institutions and values. 101
Taking issue with this self-excusatory structuralist stance, Benne,
Lepping and Esteban Engel dismissed Erpel‟s critique of this all-pervading
yet trivialised Hitler „obsession‟ on the grounds that such debates were no
fixation, but rather the prerequisites ensuring the continuation of Hitler‟s
(and not the people’s) demonisation and guilt.102 Symptomatic of this
adherence to an intentionalist self-absolving Schuldabwehr, there were
times, noted Simon Benne of HAZ and Lepping of the Stuttgarter
Nachrichten, when the DHM preferred to analyse anonymous structures
rather than deal with Hitler himself, along with an explicit avoidance of the
maxim that individuals shape history.103 Evidently in accordance with this
Schuldabwehr, Bonn museum curator Jürgen Reiche ruminated that
historical phases often experience a sudden renaissance which one
consciously or passively encourages.104 Moreover, down-playing
intentionalist stances by over-emphasising objective and antiquated
structural phrases, such as No mandate, No Hitler, along with dismissing
the Führer as a demonic figure or even a figure of fun, runs the risk of
98
Erpel, „Die deutsche Gesellschaft und Hitler‟, 211; Thamer, „Hitler und die Deutschen –
eine vieldeutige Beziehungsgeschichte‟, 162-163; Thamer, „Führerherrschaft‟, 243.
99
Erpel, „Die deutsche Gesellschaft und Hitler‟, 211-212.
100
Ibid., 211; Erpel, „Hitler entdämonisiert‟, 156.
101
Thamer, „Führerherrschaft‟, 243.
102
Erpel, „Hitler entdämonisiert‟, 156; Benne, „Nerv der Zeit‟.
Engel, „Hitler und die Deutschen‟; Lepping, „Kinder‟.
103
Benne, „Berliner Ausstellung‟, 7.
104
Kilb, Andreas. „Die merkwürdige Lust aufs Geschichtsgefühl.‟ Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, 2 March 2011. Accessed 23 March 2011. http://www.faz.net/artikel/C31509/diemerkwuerdige-lust-aufs-geschichtsgefuehl-30329543.html.
86
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losing the very essence of Hitler‟s subjective appeal and fascination,
claimed Lepping.105
Taboos?
While discussing the legacy of the Führer has never been prohibited,
exemplified by museums in Nuremberg and The Berghof dedicated to his
life and times, suggestions for a DHM exhibition on Hitler had to be
abandoned in the light of strong academic opposition during 2004. 106
Apparently, personalising or depicting Hitler in isolation has always been
contentious - or rather avoided - in the capital. There were widespread
academic fears that such an exhibition could be misconceived as promoting
or condoning a „fascination with evil‟ amongst the public, encouraging neoNazis to come and pay tribute to Hitler. Following protests in Berlin
transcending the boundaries of political correctness by an ostensible
exaggeration of the effects of Nazi propaganda, Zugzwang‟s group of
modern artists‟ media history exhibition of the Führer’s photographer,
Heinrich Hoffmann, scheduled for the DHM in 1995, also had to be
cancelled.107
First impressions of the DHM‟s 2010 Hitler exhibition indicated past
prohibitions have been dispensed with, by way of the inclusion of at least
one of Hitler‟s personal artifacts in the form of his desk.108 Avoiding charges
of glorifying Hitler which can lead to criminal prosecution in Germany, cocurator Klaus-Jürgen Sembach evaded the problem by depicting busts of
the Führer in miniature, thereby rendering adulating poses from right-wing
extremists difficult.109 „Showing such artifacts in such a way would
transgress the frontiers of acceptability,‟ explained chief curator Hans-Ulrich
Thamer.110
However, a closer examination of the DHM‟s ostensible academic and
artistic breakthroughs concerning Hitler revealed an inadequate and highly
contested musealisation of memory and, for some, nothing new. Indicative
of the „misleading‟ perception that the DHM was the first to dispel former
prohibitions concerning Hitler‟s widespread appeal was the Nürnberger
105
Lepping, „Kinder‟; Benne, „Nerv der Zeit‟.
Hornig and Sontheimer, „“Führer” im Kleinformat‟; Crossland, „An Opportunity‟.
107
Hornig and Sontheimer, „“Führer” im Kleinformat‟; Riedel, „Der Diktator‟, 12; Lepping,
„Kinder‟; Ottomeyer, „Vorwort‟, 13-14; Herz, Rudolf. „Zugzwang - Forced Movement.‟ Rudolf
Herz. Accessed 15 July 2011. http://www.rudolfherz.de/ZUGZWANG.HTML.
108
Crossland, „An Opportunity‟; Riedel, „Der Diktator‟, 12; „Sendung am 30. Januar 2011‟;
Baumer, Harald. „Bloß nicht mehr Adolf Hitler als unbedingt nötig.‟ Nürnberger
Nachrichten, 15 October 2010. Accessed 20 March 2011. http://www.nordbayern.de/
nuernberger-nachrichten/politik/bloss-nicht-mehr-adolf-hitler-als-unbedingt-notig-1.242457.
109
Boyes, „Organisers‟, 24; Baumer, „Bloß nicht mehr‟.
110
Hornig and Sontheimer, „“Führer” im Kleinformat‟.
106
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Nachrichten‟s revelation that no-one had previously dared to deal with
questions of may, can or should one show Hitler artifacts.111
While the DHM‟s exhibition was instrumental in broaching new
approaches to the theme by depicting hitherto unforeseen images,
nevertheless, there were widespread allegations of continuing taboos
concerning the presentation of Hitler‟s personal artifacts and a lack of
consensus regarding their historical and moral viability. Symptomatic of
such discrepancies were various reactions to the DHM‟s avoidance of his
personalised objects: „Whenever there are suggestions about exhibiting
Hitler‟s artifacts, they are always accompanied by academic reservations
and petulance,‟ complained Ewert.112 Such resentment was also evident in
Der Spiegel’s lamentations over the very naming of the exhibition,
declaring: „As if there were not enough taboos already about the past,
during 2004 the DHM even had to relinquish its proposed singular naming
of the exhibition “Hitler” in the face of fierce academic opposition from both
left and right.‟113
By dismissing the intentionalist historical relevance of personal artifacts
on the grounds that Hitler‟s appeal can only be understood within the
criminal context and quantifiable reality of the Volksgemeinschaft, collective
guilt was clearly apparent for DHM tour guide Anyangbe-Portele and her
collegues.114 In contrast, reflecting intentionalist perceptions of the past,
some visitors objected that too much about the Führer had been omitted:
„Too little about Hitler was addressed and none of his personal possessions
were shown‟, explained Lepping.115 Amongst the 600 objects still off limits,
for example, were Hitler‟s alleged skull fragments, his dinner jacket or
anything that could have been touched by the former Führer - even the
sound of his voice was conspicuously missing.116 Subscribing to an
ostensible selective and prescribed historical discourse of the past, the
Münsterländische Volkszeitung reported that while there were objects
which the DHM wanted but could not have, there were also those which
they could have had but declined.117 Further indicative of this selfexonerating intentionalism were claims that even if such items had been
shown, they would have revealed little about Hitler and even less
concerning the alleged attitudes of his millions of lesser monsters.118
111
Riedel, „Der Diktator‟, 12; „Faszination Führer‟; Baumer, „Bloß nicht mehr‟; Hornig and
Sontheimer, „“Führer” im Kleinformat‟; Ewert, „Millionen‟, 28; Ottomeyer, „Vorwort‟, 13-14;
112
Ewert, „Millionen‟, 28.
113
Hornig and Sontheimer, „“Führer” im Kleinformat‟; Ottomeyer, „Vorwort‟, 13.
114
Rank, „Anstehen‟.
115
Lepping, „Kinder‟; Rank, „Anstehen‟.
116
„Faszination Führer‟; Crossland, „An Opportunity‟; Riedel, „Der Diktator‟, 12.
117
Hornig and Sontheimer, „“Führer” im Kleinformat‟; Kalitschke, „Der Münsteraner‟; Kilb,
„Die merkwürdige‟; Ewert, „Millionen‟, 28.
118
Ewert, „Millionen‟, 28.
88
Austausch, Vol. 1, Issue. 2, October 2011
Conclusion
In conclusion, revealed in reactions to the DHM‟s apparent „structuralist‟
Sonderweg, or, more accurately, what intentionalist political scientist Karl
Dietrich Bracher derided as a „Sonderbewußtsein‟ (special consciousness),
the impact of a failed Austrian artist on one of the world‟s most culturally
gifted countries shows no sign of abating.119
Aside from allusions to the rather incriminatory Sonderweg, the former
director of the DHM, Hans Ottomeyer, insisted that the question of why so
many Germans were ready to relinquish democracy and condone legalised
violence really belongs to the future, since currently there are no clear
explanations.120 Defending the exhibition‟s essence, since the Third Reich‟s
history remains open to question, Erpel argued that it is evident that
Germany still finds coming to terms with its past very difficult, which was
why the exhibition allowed visitors to draw their own conclusions
concerning how Hitler and past crimes were possible.121
However, evidence from comparing former Volksgemeinschaft
publications with more recent ones suggested that contributors within the
DHM‟s catalogue continued to highlight structural over intentionalist factors,
such as Hitler‟s ideology emphasising the generational cohort and, by
extension, collective responsibility.122 By implying the Volksgemeinschaft
was a tangible, albeit transitory, manifestation of reality reflected in National
Socialism‟s mass support, as opposed to a „pseudo ideology‟ based merely
on image, the DHM appeared to endorse structuralist claims that
intellectual populist foundations facilitating totalitarianism had been
retained.123 As the exhibition made clear, the Führer factor primarily relied
on the support or consent of millions and in spite of doubts concerning
active public participation in the Volksgemeinschaft, by adhering to the
Sonderweg thesis, it was evident the DHM still subscribed to the
Kollektivschuldthese. Underlining disparities between an official and popular
Erinnerungskultur, reactions indicated a reluctance to accept the DHM‟s
millions of little monsters or „bad Germans‟ theory, the omission of Hitler‟s
artifacts on the grounds of a revived Führerkult and negation of an
ostensible self-exonerating, „good German‟ phenomenon.
So were fears of another Führerkult justified or should more of his
artifacts have been incorporated? On the one hand, since fewer people are
119
Alter, „Cultural Modernity‟, 153; Ottomeyer, „Vorwort‟, 13-14.
Ottomeyer, „Vorwort‟, 13-14; Eatwell, Fascism, xxi; Riedel, „Der Diktator‟, 12.
121
Riedel, „Der Diktator‟, 12; Erpel, „Hitler und kein Ende‟, 280.
122
Wildt, Volksgemeinschaft als Selbstermächtigung. Gewalt gegen Juden; Wildt,
„“Volksgemeinschaft” als Selbstermächtigung. Soziale Praxis‟, 90-91; Frei, Norbert. 1945
und wir. Das Dritte Reich im Bewußtsein der Deutschen. München: Beck, 2009, 178; Frei,
„Führerbilderwechsel‟, 144-145.
123
Ritter, Gerhard. Das deutsche Problem. Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1962, 23; Layton,
Germany, 52, 83, 190-191; Thamer, „Die Inszenierung‟, 19, 21-22.
120
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Austausch, Vol. 1, Issue. 2, October 2011
alive who welcomed and were led astray by Hitler, perhaps Germans
should be eternally reminded of their past transgressions, thereby justifying
their concerns to negate a fascination with evil amongst the public. On the
other, given that the expected wave of neo-Nazis failed to materialise,
along with various allusions that Germany has been plagued by past
inhibitions for long enough, perhaps a deeper investigation is needed into
the origins of Hitler‟s charisma. 124 Indicative of this Selbstbildsspannung
(conflicting self-image) and disputed historical discourse was a
musealisation of memory being played out between a Schuldkultur of
atonement and self-exonerating Schuldabwehr.
Yet perhaps this very lack of consensus justifies the inclusion of Hitler
memorabilia since the establishment of points of similarity and difference
affords a more comprehensive and greater understanding of Germany‟s
current Erinnerungskultur. If one accepts some of the media‟s claims that
Germans are now able to cope with their past, it is unreasonable to exclude
Hitler‟s artifacts – particularly since the passing of the Kriegsgeneration
offers a more impartial and balanced opportunity to discover the basis of
the Führer factor.125
Moreover, stepping outside the furore that this theme invariably invokes,
historians are supposed to be objective analysts, not subjective moralists,
and in this respect they should perhaps regard Hitler with the same
historical detachment as they would Caesar or Napoleon. As some have
inferred, it is not historians‟ role to say what ought to have happened but
what was done and why, since no panel of experts should dictate the
difficult choice between an objective and emotive historical model, and
therefore, the elusive truth, as they attempted to do when they dismissed
the DHM‟s 2004 proposed exhibition.126
Admittedly, striking a balance between the DHM‟s objective historical
elucidation and a subjective Geschichtsgefühl (sense of history) is also
problematic, particularly as the inclusion of artifacts may be exploited for
propaganda or mere effect. On the other hand, approaches which move
away from interpretations tailored to fit the preconceptions of Germany‟s
victors offer a more realistic musealisation of memory since subjective
artifacts expound complex events by turning them into text, whose
reception provides a useful insight into past and current Zeitgeists.
So have any taboos been broken? While the DHM failed to break new
historical ground by adhering to a structuralist historical consensus, its
depiction of some of its unparalleled collection of artifacts heralded a
change in the musealisation of Hitler‟s memory. However, although a
124
Lepping, „Kinder‟; Ewert, „Millionen‟, 28.
Fuhr, Eckhard. „Hitler und Chips. Das Dritte Reich, Hitler und die Deutschen.‟ Die Welt,
16 October 2010. Accessed 20 March 2011. http://www.welt.de/print/die_welt/debatte/
article10329030/Hitler-und-Chips.html.
126
Kilb, „Die merkwürdige‟; Ewert, „Millionen‟, 28; Hornig and Sontheimer, „“Führer” im
Kleinformat‟.
125
90
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societal history of the Third Reich has become more elucidated, given the
ongoing need for Germans to experience their past with less historical
reservation and the unwarranted but perhaps understandable fears of a
resurgent Führerkult, in some ways, the Führer factor is still taboo.
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