Using a regional or country case-study, make an
assessment of the levels of instability within that
region or country, and the likely impact to UK
interests (out to 2015).
Country Case Study: Syria
For the Foreign Secretary and associated advisors
By Asim Rizvanovic
Asim Rizvanovic 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Since the commencement of hostilities within Syria the conflict has killed 33599
people,1 displaced internally 1.2 million, and caused 335,000 to become
refugees.2 Regional and international powers have vital interests in Syria and
this has been highlighted by Iranian and Russian support of the current regime.
This brief will highlight how UK interests are affected and how they can be
furthered and protected in Syria with a list of policy recommendations which are
in line with other UK policies. The prescriptions analyse the second and third
moves of other parties as well as considering the overall longer-term
implications. Recommendations: Creation of humanitarian corridors, supply of
medical and communications equipment, supply of personal armour, monitoring
of British Muslims engaging in the conflict, and dialogue with opposition leaders.
SITUATION BRIEF
The conflict in Syria is largely a result of forty-nine years of dominance by the
minority Alawite sect. Dissent has most been most visible amongst the lower
socioeconomic groups.3 The conflict began on the 15th. March, 2011 as part of
1
Centre for Documentation of Violations in Syria, Statistics for the Number of Martyrs, http://vdc-­‐sy.org/index.php/en/ (Nov. 9, 2012). 2
Raissa Kasolowsky, "Up to 335,000 people have fled Syria violence: UNHCR", Reuters, Oct. 9, 2012 (http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/09/us-­‐syria-­‐crisis-­‐refugees-­‐idUSBRE8980ZP20121009). 3
Suzanne Saleeby, “Sowing the Seeds of Dissent: Economic Grievances and the Syrian Social Contract’s Unraveling”, Jadaliyya, Feb. 16, 2012 (http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/4383/sowing-­‐the-­‐seeds-­‐of-­‐dissent_economic-­‐grievances-­‐
an). Asim Rizvanovic 2 the regional ‘Arab Spring’ uprising. The betrayal of the government’s
responsibility to protect as a result of the crackdown on demonstrators by
government forces and the refusal of Assad to step down has led to the
escalation of violence into a civil war, with outside actors influencing hostilities.
Whilst the US, GCC, Arab League and the EU have condemned Assad and his
regime, Russia, China and particularly Iran continue to issue support. Human
rights violations have allegedly been committed by both government forces4 and
by opposition groups.5
Key Stakeholders
Bashar Al-Assad/Ba’ath Party: Assad, the leader of the Ba’ath party, and the
party itself are seeking to retake the whole of the country by violent
means. Assad’s family has been in power for thirty-three years. Has made
concessions in the past, such as lifting the state of emergency, but such moves
have had little effect.
Free Syria Army: Main opposition group. Led by Colonel Riad Al-Asaad,
formerly of the Syrian Air Force. Goal is the overthrow of the government. The
FSA claims that it has no political or religious prerogative, except removing
Assad. If successful the likelihood of a smooth transition to democracy is very
low. The US has established contact between Gulf States and the FSA to ensure
its funding. The ‘Syrian Support Group’ based in Washington has the ability to
4 United Nations, Humanitarian Situation in Syria Deteriorating, with 2.5 Million Urgently Needing Relief, Says Secretary-­‐
General, Accusing Both Sides of Atrocities, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/ga11268.doc.htm (Sept. 4, 2012). 5
Human Rights Watch, Syria: Armed Opposition Groups Committing Abuses, http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/20/syria-­‐
armed-­‐opposition-­‐groups-­‐committing-­‐abuses (March. 20, 2012). Asim Rizvanovic 3 legally raise funds for the FSA. Saudi Arabia’s strong support of the FSA is an
indication of its long held desire to change Syria’s secular stance, and to gain a
regional ally.
Russia: From 2005 to 2011, Syria was Russia’s seventh largest arms customer,
with sales worth $831 million.6 The navy base at Tartus is the only
Mediterranean base the Russians have. Any military intervention is viewed by
them as a violation of sovereignty; this view is compounded by their own current
internal issues. They will only agree to moves that further their own distinct
policies.
Regional Players:
•
Allegedly Iran has sent 15,000 troops from its ‘Quds Force’.7 Likely that
Iran will continue to support its ally, even if international intervention occurs,
but the likelihood of openly supporting it with its maximum military strength is
low at this time.
•
Hezbollah has been supporting the Syrian government, but its
involvement will not be sufficient to keep Assad in power.
Equipped, trained
and prepared for guerrilla warfare, whilst the requirement on the ground for the
Syrian government is for a mechanised solution. Its usefulness is low and
unlikely to cause much disruption amongst opposition groups.
•
Saudi Arabia’s role as chief financier is a manifestation of its will to
dissolve the alliance between Iran and Syria. By installing a predominantly
6
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPIRI Arms Transfers Database http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_values.php (Nov. 7, 2012). 7
Russia Today, “15,000 elite Iranian special-­‐ops 'head' to Syria”, The Guardian, Oct. 4 2012 (http://rt.com/news/syria-­‐iran-­‐
cooperation-­‐protests-­‐969/). Asim Rizvanovic 4 Sunni regime in Syria, the power of balance within the middle-east will shift
towards the Sunni sect of Islam, and further isolate Iran.
•
Israel has little influence over the conflict; chief concern will be the
potential transfer of non-conventional weapons to Hezbollah. Israel does not
have a clear stance and is not openly supporting either side of the conflict.
Either option for the Israelis is not a positive one from their point of view.
•
Turkey has received an influx of refugees into its territory. Tensions
between Syria and Turkey have escalated over mortar attacks, cross-border
skirmishes and the downing of a Turkish Air-Force reconnaissance plane. As a
result, the Turkish parliament has approved cross-border operations8 and openly
expressed its desire for regime change.9
UK Interests in Syria
The UK trades little with Syria; its main interest is security. Violence needs to
be contained before spreading to other countries. The threat by British Muslims
who have taken part in the conflict is very high to the UK. The UK has an
excellent opportunity to rebalance power against Iran.
8
Matthew Weaver and Brian Whitaker, “Turkey-­‐Syria Border Tension”, The Guardian, Oct. 4 2012 (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/04/turkey-­‐syria-­‐threat-­‐security-­‐live). 9
The Nation, “Turkey Dubs Syria A Clear Threat – Vows To Retaliate”, The Nation, June. 26 2012 (http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-­‐news-­‐newspaper-­‐daily-­‐english-­‐online/international/26-­‐Jun-­‐2012/turkey-­‐dubs-­‐syria-­‐
a-­‐clear-­‐threat-­‐vows-­‐to-­‐retaliate). Asim Rizvanovic 5 POLICY PROPOSALS
1.
Support creation of humanitarian corridor.
Pros:
I)
Endorsed by the Syrian National Council10 (although to what extent
they represent opposition groups is very contestable. Recent
developments indicate greater cohesion11, though such actions are
very likely attempts at drawing Western assistance)
II)
Appears humanitarian conscious
III)
Useful to win ‘hearts and minds’ of opposition and civilians.
Cons:
I)
Will not be seen as enough by opposition groups
II)
Will strain Turkish-Syrian relations further.
2.
Supply communications equipment. Groups are spread out between
locations, without defined fronts; such equipment is vital for groups to step-up
operations. The supply of medical equipment and personal armour is necessary
to rebalance the theatre of war towards the opposition groups.
Pros:
I)
Greater coordination between groups
10
The Wall Street Journal, Syrian Opposition Leader Transcript, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203833104577071960384240668.html , (Dec. 2, 2011). 11 Neil Macfarquhar and Hala Droubi, “With Eye on Aid, Syria Opposition Signs Unity Deal”, The New York Times, Nov. 11 2012 (http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/12/world/middleeast/syrian-­‐opposition-­‐groups-­‐sign-­‐unity-­‐
deal.html?pagewanted=all). Asim Rizvanovic 6 II)
Ability to mount cooperative operations across different spaces
III)
Medical equipment will keep more rebels battle-effective
IV)
Morale boost
V)
UK will be seen as a partner.
Cons:
I)
Temporary satisfaction; groups will want arms
II)
Russians and Iranians will see it as meddling in internal affairs; likely
to increase aid to government regime.
3.
Establish close contact with opposition leaders.
Pros:
I)
Establish partnerships to ensure UK influence post-Assad
II)
Gain former ally of Iran; increased pressure on Iran
III)
Tactical advantage (intelligence-wise) if future Syria chooses not to
remain an ally.
Cons:
I)
Critics will say the UK is supporting terrorism
II)
Potential for another Afghanistan; aiding groups now does not secure
their loyalty.
4.
British Muslims who have engaged in combat in Syria must be monitored.
Pros:
I)
Surveillance will control threat; to some extent
Asim Rizvanovic 7 II)
Gain Intelligence on terrorist networks in UK.
Cons:
I)
Agencies already stretched; impossible to monitor every suspect
II)
Difficult to secure evidence that will lead to convictions.
5.
Military intervention or a no-fly zone.
Pros:
I)
Will accelerate regime-change
II)
Secure a regional ally
III)
Military presence close to Iran.
Cons:
I)
Expensive
II)
Public appetite for war is lacking
III)
Very likely that presence of NATO troops close to Iran’s borders will
encourage it to accelerate its militarisation
IV)
Strong chance of proxy war against Russia and Iran, and to lesser
extent China.
V)
Question of precedent. Critics will argue to invade far more repressive
regimes
VI)
Sectarian violence will be blamed again on NATO forces
VII)
Critics will overlook lives saved and focus on failures.
Asim Rizvanovic 8 How Other Players Will React To the Policies (To 2015)
British Muslims returning from Syria will possess skills that could threaten
national security.12 Surveillance and arrests (where appropriate) must be
ensured. The presence in Syria of Al-Qaeda linked cells makes this threat more
dangerous.
The Syrian government will continue to accuse any opposition groups of being
terrorists. Meanwhile, it is likely that the government will increase violence as
the opposition grows in strength. The Ba’ath party and the wider Alawite sect
will hold onto power as long as possible, with or without foreign intervention, as
it is highly unlikely that Iran will back down in its support of its closest ally.
Policy three is vital to ensure that the UK can guide regional affairs, and attain
power in the post-Assad military. This is imperative as it takes power away from
Iran; it will be losing its greatest ally.
Policy five is not recommended as the likelihood of Russia and/or China vetoing
the motion is very high. Even if they would abstain from vetoing, they will not
get involved with regime-change. The Russians are aware that Assad cannot
hold onto power forever, hence to accelerate Assad’s removal the Russians need
to be given concessions. First and foremost military intervention cannot occur
as the Russians will increase the supply of arms to Syria, in what it argues is the
defence of sovereignty against foreign actors.
It is unlikely that all opposition groups would welcome foreign troops. The UK
needs to support the opposition from a distance. Sectarian violence is a high
12
Robert Verkaik, “MI5 stops British extremists joining Syria was after concerns they will return home with deadly skills”, The Daily Mail, Sept. 1 2012 (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-­‐2196933/MI5-­‐stops-­‐British-­‐extremists-­‐joining-­‐Syria-­‐
concerns-­‐return-­‐home-­‐deadly-­‐skills.html). Asim Rizvanovic 9 probability, and such allegations have already been made.13 Even if the
government was to step down immediately, violence would not cease and will
continue to be an issue for many years to come.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS:
I)
CREATION OF HUMANITARIAN CORRIDOORS
II) SUPPLY OF MEDICAL AND COMMUNICATIONS
EQUIPTMENT, AS WELL AS PERSONAL ARMOUR
III) ESTABLISHING CLOSE CONTACT WITH
OPPOSITION LEADERS
IV) MONITORING OF BRITISH MUSLIMS WHO TAKE
PART.
13
Ruth Sherlock, “Syria: Sectarian Violence Hits Damascus”, The Telegraph, Sept. 13 2012 (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9542033/Syria-­‐sectarian-­‐violence-­‐hits-­‐Damascus.html). Asim Rizvanovic 10 BIBLIOGRAPHY
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