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Fisheries management and institutional reform:
a European perspective
David Symes
Symes, D. 2007. Fisheries management and institutional reform: a European perspective. – ICES Journal of Marine Science, 64: 779– 785.
Changes to the institutional frameworks that help shape fisheries policy-making are typically incremental and piecemeal, with governments content to tinker at the edges, but rarely willing to embrace fundamental reform. The present study outlines the nature of
institutional frameworks and explores the need to ensure coherence across different scales of governance. Co-management and participative governance are commonly regarded as important recent developments. Although they may well satisfy notions of “good governance”, their ability to deliver better policy, more effective management, and sustainable fisheries is open to question. In the search
to improve the efficacy of fisheries management, three key issues are identified: restructuring of co-management organizations, clarification of property rights, and development of an ecosystem-based approach. Finally, attention is drawn to the challenge to fisheries
governance posed by moves towards integrated management.
Keywords: co-management, ecosystem-based approach, European Union, institutional frameworks, integrated management,
participative governance, property rights.
Received 13 July 2006; accepted 9 January 2007; advance access publication 28 February 2007.
D. Symes: Department of Geography, University of Hull, Hull HU6 7RX, UK. tel: þ1 482 865403; fax: þ1 482 466340; e-mail: [email protected].
Institutional change: the issue of coherence
Whenever management strategies for the sustainable use of fishery
resources come under scrutiny, discussion sooner or later turns to
issues of governance and the institutional frameworks that guide
the process of decision-making. Any new management practice,
whether it be the adoption of a precautionary approach, adaptive
management, or harvest control rules, or a radical shift in the
overall management regime from a state-led “command and
control” system, to a devolved decentralized form, or to one
based on assigning individual or community property rights,
will inevitably leave its imprint on the institutional framework.
To a greater or lesser extent, therefore, it will influence subsequent
management decisions.
The social sciences have a long-standing general interest in the
structures and processes of decision-making on different scales—
local, national, and international—and in different cultural, social,
and economic contexts. Their interest in fisheries management is
somewhat more recent. Originally concerned with traditional
forms of work organization and local governance (Barth, 1966;
Andersen and Wadel, 1972; Berkes, 1986), fisheries management
developed towards the end of the 20th century with a strong
focus on co-management systems (Jentoft, 1989; Sen and
Raakjaer Nielsen, 1996; Wilson et al., 2003), before broadening
out into an overarching concept of fisheries governance
(Kooiman et al., 2005). Linked to the notion of “hollowing out
the state”, which involves a partial transfer of responsibility and
authority for policy decisions from the central agencies of government to networks of public and private bodies at national,
regional, and local levels (Rhodes, 1996), the term governance
describes a shift towards more decentralized and inclusive
decision-making structures.
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The governance system is an engine that drives policy-making
and the development of management strategies. It comprises a
complex range of components, each of which must function efficiently and in harmony with other components to allow effective
decision-making. In other words, the overall performance of the
management system will depend on the level of coherence in the
design of the institutional framework as a whole. It would be
unreasonable, however, to expect fisheries governance to function
with the precision of a Rolls Royce engine. Hardly ever would it be
possible to replace an existing form of governance with an entirely
new model in which all the working components and the overall
institutional framework are purpose-built. At best, we are
dealing with a patched-up model, one, it is to be hoped, that is
still in reasonable working order, but with some of the components worn out and a few possibly close to breaking point.
Despite renewal of some of the parts, the overall performance is
bound to be constrained by inefficiencies remaining elsewhere in
the system.
Achieving a satisfactory level of institutional coherence is problematic in fisheries, and especially so in Europe. Part of the explanation is to be found in the high levels of uncertainty relating to
the resource itself and its environmental context, and part lies in
the complexities of a common-pool resource, where systems of
property rights are often imprecisely defined and incomplete. A
major factor, however, particularly relevant to European fisheries,
is that national boundaries are of limited significance. The intricate configuration of the European coastline, combined with the
fragmentation of authority among a large number of coastal
states, frequently implies the curtailment of national Exclusive
Economic Zones (EEZ). More than anywhere else in the
world, fisheries management in Europe becomes an issue of
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international collaboration. Unfortunately, the superimposition of
the European Union (EU), and the brave but flawed experiment in
harmonizing management through its Common Fisheries Policy
(CFP), has failed so far to achieve the desired coherence. Indeed,
it may be argued that the tensions between European and national
institutional frameworks continue to hamper the development of
effective management strategies for Europe’s fisheries.
Institutional reform is typically incremental, piecemeal, and by
definition slow. Governments may tinker at the edges of the institutional framework in an attempt to improve specific architectural
features to facilitate decision-making, or to fine-tune delivery
mechanisms. Changes in government may result in shifts of
emphasis in the guiding values and principles of policy. From
time to time, central government agencies alter their departmental
structures with the intention of better accommodating underlying
shifts in the policy approach. Only occasionally, however, will they
effect a significant change in the overall system. Generally, fisheries
have been spared the problems sometimes associated with reforming administrations. National governments seldom exhibit enthusiasm for major reforms of fisheries policy; the political return is
scarcely worth the investment of resources and the use of legislative time. At the European level, there is a risk of institutional
paralysis as the Commission of the European Community
(CEC) is unwilling to relax its guiding principles of nondiscrimination and relative stability, or to yield its exclusive
competence for the framing of fisheries policy, while national
self-interests remain deeply suspicious of any attempts by the
CEC to bring forward fundamental policy change.
Institutional reforms: co-management and
participative governance
If we were to judge progress in fisheries management in Europe
simply by referring to a list of innovations over the past decade
or so, it might appear that we have travelled quite a long way in
a relatively short period of time. Not only have we seen changes
to the formulation of scientific advice through the adoption of
the precautionary approach, and to the form of regulation with
the introduction of effort controls alongside output restrictions,
but we have also witnessed changes to the process and scope of
decision-making and to systems of state support for the industry.
The changing political geography of Europe’s fisheries in response
to the continuing expansion of the EU presages further change
(Symes, 2005).
In relation to decision-making procedures, we can discern three
interrelated trends:
(i) the shift from a centralized, top-down, “command and
control” mode in which the industry is largely excluded
from the policy process to systems of co-management
where responsibilities are shared between the state and
industry-based organizations, and ultimately to more open
forms of participative governance;
(ii) the creation of increasingly ambitious management agendas
from the relatively straightforward scientific and technical
issues, and the provision of access arrangements to concerns
for environmental protection, the development of an
ecosystem-based approach, and marine spatial planning
(MSP);
(iii) a consequent broadening of representation within the policy
community to include not only commercial and recreational
D. Symes
fishing interests, but also conservation organizations and
other social groupings (community organizations, consumer
groups).
Together, these three trends describe an increasingly complex
situation, creating problems for the management of an oftendiscordant policy discourse and for ensuring that the basic
elements of good governance (transparency, proportionality,
representation, equity, efficiency, and effectiveness) are properly
maintained. Although they may bring increased recognition,
involvement, and a degree of influence for the fishing industry,
they do not necessarily transfer much real power from central
government to stakeholders.
Although co-management is used to describe a broad spectrum
of collaboration between government and non-governmental
organizations (Sen and Raakjaer Nielsen, 1996), an important
distinction is emerging between the simpler, pragmatic forms of
co-management and the more comprehensive notion of participative governance. Simpler forms of co-management, implying the
devolution of specified management responsibilities from the
state to industry, are concerned primarily with technical issues
for the conservation of fish stocks, access to fisheries, and the
resolution of gear conflicts at a local level. Co-management is
therefore consonant with the principle of subsidiarity, nominally
espoused by the EU, by which decision-making is devolved to
the most appropriate level of competence. Alternatively, as
Loucks et al. (2003) observe in writing about co-management in
North America, it accords with Jeffersonian democracy where
“each might do for itself what concerns itself directly, and what
it can do much better than a distant authority” (McHugh, 1972,
quoted in Loucks et al., 2003). By contrast, participative governance will tend to operate on national and regional levels and
range over a much wider agenda, including the formulation and
implementation of broad principles of fisheries policy, the
relationships between fisheries and the marine environment, and
competition for marine space. It will also be essentially advisory
in function.
Both sets of institutional arrangements confer a number of
advantages over the “command and control” mode of decisionmaking, which relies heavily on the force of legislation. Among
the benefits commonly claimed for co-management are: greater
openness and transparency; a broader basis of information and
knowledge, including both fisheries science and local ecological
knowledge; increased rationality and legitimacy for the regulatory
system; enhanced levels of confidence, commitment, and compliance; and, arguably, lower transaction costs (Symes and Phillipson,
1999). However, there are also potential disadvantages to the
greater involvement of stakeholders in decision-making.
According to Gray (2005), the system can become unwieldy, timeconsuming, and costly; it can add considerably to the time taken to
reach decisions, so limiting a government’s ability to act swiftly
and decisively. It will tend to shift the focus from long-term
societal goals to local, short-term self-interest, and it may
obscure and weaken the democratic accountability of the state.
Despite such possible disadvantages, co-management and participative governance in general have been received enthusiastically
by academic commentators as the appropriate way forward,
though somewhat more sceptically by industry itself. In practice,
however, the benefits may be more apparent than real. Central
government continues to exercise a good deal of control. It still
directs overall policy as a result of its basic obligation to manage
Fisheries management and institutional reform
the nation’s share of the living resources of the sea on behalf of
its citizens and for the common good. The state also retains
legal competence for negotiating with third countries. For EU
member states, these obligations have been transferred to the
CEC and the Council of Ministers. In respect of their inshore
waters, national governments still retain much management
responsibility. They may grant conditional licences to other organizations to undertake those responsibilities on their behalf, but
they will nearly always retain legal powers to approve, amend, or
reject proposals for new regulations.
Governments are often nervous about granting too much
autonomy to local authorities or non-governmental agencies for
fear of losing control of a situation for which ultimately they
will be judged accountable. It is not uncommon in fisheries and
other policy areas for governments to talk up the advantages of
decentralization while actually strengthening control from the
centre. In inshore fisheries, there is also a proper concern to
avoid creating a confused and potentially dysfunctional mosaic
of local regulations, which could hamper their strategic management. For their part, it is arguable whether stakeholder organizations would welcome the transfer of more responsibility,
without adequate powers of enforcement and substantial financial
support. Nor in some cases will they have the resources and
capabilities to cope with the added burden (Phillipson, 2002).
The need, therefore, is not necessarily for “less” state, but “for a
more effective, accountable, and responsive state” (Anon., 2005).
In the eyes of the more sceptical observers within industry,
participative governance has rather less to do with improving
management than with the appeasement of fishing interests.
There may be more than a grain of truth in this assertion. In its
own analysis of the shortcomings of the CFP, the CEC (2001)
drew attention to the failure to engage the industry directly in
the policy process. The establishment of Regional Advisory
Councils (RACs) was in part a response to complaints over the
remoteness of decision-making and a lack of responsiveness to
stakeholder concerns. Therefore, RACs were intended to facilitate
the process of governing. However, they were much more than
an exercise in public relations: RACs were expected to harness
the considerable knowledge, experience, and wisdom within the
industry in the formulation of more relevant management strategies. There were also concerns that RACs would create another
tier of “stakeholder bureaucrats” as much out of touch with
reality as the mandarins of European and national administrations. Moreover, extending the range of stakeholders involved
to include conservation interests and other social groupings was
seen by many in the industry as at best a distraction and at
worst a conspiracy, although in reality, it was simply an appropriate interpretation of the changing circumstances of fisheries
management. Early indications suggest that this scepticism may
well be misplaced. The North Sea RAC, established in December
2004, has already begun to project a strong, independent voice
on a range of both immediate (closed areas, stock recovery
plans) and longer term (maximum sustainable yield strategies,
MSP) issues (Deas, 2006), although its ability to influence key
policy decisions has yet to be tested.
Participative governance touches the surface rather than penetrating to the core of the issues confronting fisheries management.
It may well be important in its own right in helping to create a
sense of shared ownership of the management strategy from
which could flow greater commitment to, and compliance with,
the necessary regulations. However, there is no reason to assume
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that participative governance will of itself radicalize management.
Indeed, it is just as likely to prove a force for conservatism, reinforcing tried and tested forms of regulation, rather than risking the
uncertainties associated with new approaches.
Institutional frameworks and fisheries governance
Governance systems, such as participative governance, are among
the most visible manifestations of institutional frameworks.
Although they may reflect key elements of a framework, only
rarely will they be counted among the principal factors that
define policy. These lie elsewhere within the institutional
framework.
As with so many concepts in social science usage, the terms
“institution” and “institutional framework” are difficult to
define with any precision. Specialist and common usage have conferred a variety of meanings on the word “institution”, ranging
from abstract notions to quite concrete forms. Something of this
dualism is exposed in the standard dictionary definition, which
embraces both “an established custom, law, or relationship in a
society” and “an organization or establishment founded for a
specific purpose” (Collins, 1986).
The term “institutional framework” therefore denotes the range
of institutions that together form the decision-making environment, so helping to shape broad policies and specific instruments
for governing fisheries. It will include particular organizations and
the systems of beliefs, law, science, and social organization that
legitimize, inform, and uphold it, as well as the outputs in the
form of rights, responsibilities, and regulations. However,
because it also embodies the relationships and interactions
between the different parts, the institutional framework will tend
to imply more than the sum of its parts. Much of what is actually
included in the institutional frameworks for fisheries governance
will have little to do with fisheries per se, but will be common to
all areas of policy-making (e.g. the basic legal and juridical
systems, democratic institutions, and the like). Other aspects,
such as the principle of sustainable development and the precautionary approach, may be common to several areas of policy,
but interpreted and applied differently in the context of fisheries.
Where the institutional frameworks for fisheries may take on
unique characteristics will be in relation to the common-pool
nature of the resource and the need for collective bargaining in
the management of shared stocks.
For the present purpose, definition is important only in so far
as it conveys an appropriate sense of the role performed by institutional frameworks in the governance of fisheries. Shorthand
descriptions of their functions, such as “establishing the rules of
the game”, “providing the coordinates for social action”, or even
more simply “describing the way that we do things”, are often
more helpful in indicating function than a list of contents such
as agreements, rules, rights, laws, norms, beliefs, roles, procedures,
and organizations. However, as Jentoft (2005) warns us, we must
guard against adopting too narrow a description for fear that
it would focus attention on only a limited selection of the framework’s attributes. We should recognize that institutional frameworks are, in effect, social constructs that give structure, order,
and predictability to human relations and interactions (Jentoft,
2005) and help to determine what is reasonable, appropriate,
and acceptable in terms of policy decisions. Our descriptions of
the functions of institutional frameworks, however, should
emphasize their active, dynamic roles in creating opportunities
for fisheries governance rather than acting as rigid frameworks
782
imposing constraints on the choice of alternative courses of action.
If institutional frameworks do serve to establish boundaries for
problem solving, then those boundaries must retain a degree of
elasticity.
What then are the essential properties of the frameworks that
will serve the needs of fisheries governance well? The answer
may appear somewhat paradoxical for, on the one hand, they
need to be robust, stable, and resilient, conveying a sense of durability in the face of external pressures (globalization, environmental change, resource depletion, and food security). On the
other hand, they must be able to accommodate a range of strongly
contrasting world views and sectoral interests. They must also be
flexible and adaptive in coping with the demands placed on the
governance system by those same external pressures. As a result,
the institutional frameworks must constantly evolve to reflect
both the internal dynamics of fisheries policy and changes in the
outside world. Part of that evolution will be determined by
ongoing dialogue between competing interest groups and institutions within management, partly as a result of the repositioning
of the state within the governance system, and partly as a reflection
of changing global priorities. There is, however, always a danger of
certain organizations within management using their prestige and
influence solely to further their own interests, so diverting vital
energy from the creative tasks of governance into acts of selfpromotion or self-preservation. Institutions unwilling or unable
to adapt to the changing demands of governance will tend to
obstruct the course of change and, sooner or later, lose the very
influence that they so cherish.
Scales of governance
One of the challenges for fisheries governance is to ensure that the
different scales of governance assume appropriate sets of responsibilities that will guarantee a strong measure of coherence between
policy decisions formulated at each scale. To some extent, this
challenge arises as a result of the weakening of the once dominant
role of the nation state—no longer in a position to set its own protocols for fisheries management through consultations with its
scientific services—and the competing claims for regional and
community management.
Today, one can recognize four distinct scales of governance
with perceptible, though not always clear-cut, divisions of responsibility. On a global scale, the international institutions of the
United Nations are responsible for establishing the Law of the
Sea, protocols for the management of high-seas fisheries and straddling stocks, and for developing universal principles of fisheries
management (vide FAO’s Code of Conduct for Responsible
Fisheries of 1994; FAO, 1995) and of environmental conservation
(the Convention on Biodiversity of 1992), inter alia. These are
expected to provide a sufficiently clear sense of direction for
fisheries management policies, but permit reasonable latitude of
interpretation when integrating the principles into regional and
national institutional frameworks.
A second, macro-regional scale of governance includes regional
organizations such as the North East Atlantic Fisheries
Commission (NEAFC), which is responsible for brokering
regional agreements for the conduct of fisheries and the allocation
of resources among member states within their regions. In the
context of European fisheries, the role of the regional organization
has been largely superseded by the EU, with its extensive “common
pond” and “universal rules” for the conduct of fisheries, including
conservation, the regulation of fleet structures, and the
D. Symes
management of the market in fish and fish products. With the
setting up of RACs in 2003, there is the merest hint that the EU
may be willing to entertain further regionalization of the CFP at
some future date.
The third scale is the nation state which, although suffering a
significant loss of authority over many aspects of fisheries management, remains a key player, with control over the allocation of
fishing rights and an important role in managing the competing
forces of the market and civil society. The role of the state
remains contested both in relation to the EU and in the division
of responsibilities with co-governing institutions. The successful
promotion of RACs as an influential voice in EU fisheries management is likely to further reduce the role of the nation state. Not
only will RACs provide a direct channel of communication
between the industry and the CEC, so circumventing the need
for representation by the member state, but in cases where the
CEC’s proposals are seen to embody the RAC’s advice, the need
for ministerial intervention at Council meetings will be curtailed.
The final scale is represented by local institutions, which reflect
the interests of coastal communities and the diversity of inshore
fisheries and are commonly responsible for the mediation of
social relations between different gear groups, etc. Local institutions will tend to express different values (community survival,
job security, protection of community use rights) from those
reflected in national institutions (sustainability of the national
resource base, maximizing the benefit of fishery resources for the
nation, economic efficiency).
Within any hierarchy of institutions, especially where the division of responsibility involves a separation between the formulation and implementation of policy, tensions are likely to arise.
In the sequence just described, tensions may occur at two particular points: first, between the residual independence of the nation
state and the centralizing tendency of regional institutions such
as the EU, and second, between the nation state and local institutions. However, given an appropriate and sufficient degree of
local autonomy over the management of access rights in inshore
waters, there is no reason that devolved systems of management
should not complement strategies for sustainable fisheries developed at national and regional scales in a coherent way.
Key issues and future actions
Kooiman et al. (2005), in their stimulating analysis of fisheries
governance, argue that the shortcomings of current practice have
a good deal to do with the fact that too much attention is
focused on the means of delivery, and too little on the underlying
principles that should guide sound policy formulation. The
reasons for this state of affairs are obvious. It lies comfortably
within the compass of the governing institutions to modify the
design of the governance system and to fine-tune the instruments
of regulation. That can be done quickly, and the results are usually
fairly conspicuous, at least to those in industry. By contrast, to
bring forward new principles for the guidance of fisheries management, or even to update and operationalize existing principles of
environmental and social justice in the context of fisheries, will
be seen as a Herculean, if not Sisyphean, task. That lies beyond
the competences of bureaucrats and scientists and requires the
mobilization of considerable social forces; it will also take time.
If this analysis is valid, it does provide fairly clear indications as
to where we should invest some of our limited social and scientific
capital in the short to medium term.
Fisheries management and institutional reform
In such a brief introductory paper, it is not possible to create a
comprehensive, or even representative, list of all the issues
concerning the relationships between institutional frameworks,
good governance, and sound management strategies for fisheries.
The list would certainly need to range from questions about the
detailed architecture of co-management institutions, through problems of integrating development strategies across different scales
of policy-making, to more fundamental concerns over articulating
underlying values and principles consistently within fisheries management strategies. Prioritization of the list would vary according
to the individual’s particular interests. Here, three issues have been
chosen in the hope of illustrating the nature of the tasks ahead and
the need for a multidisciplinary approach on an academic level,
and for collaboration across a broad range of actors.
Co-management organizations
Although the basic principles of participative governance and
co-management are firmly established, questions still remain
over how to obtain best value from organizations dedicated to
this purpose. First, we may need to rethink their function and constitution and perhaps redraw soft boundaries around their terms
of reference to allow flexibility in the face of changing circumstances. Second, attention should be paid to capacity building in
terms of human resources, the generation and transfer of knowledge, and adequate funding to ensure that the organizations are
truly fit for the purpose. Third, there are issues of representation.
Jentoft et al. (2003) pose a series of specific questions concerning
representation: (i) who can legitimately claim recognition as
a user or stakeholder qualifying for representation on the
co-management or co-governance body? (ii) in what capacity
should they be recognized (as delegates accountable to their
particular interest groups or as free agents)? (iii) how should the
process of selection be conducted? and (iv) how far should they
be involved in decision-making? These are questions that relate
not only to the general principles of co-management and participative governance, but also to the design of specific organizations
and their capacity to function effectively. Some co-management
organizations, RACs included, could face a crisis of identity
arising from the pressure to maintain a broad basis of representation, while ensuring that they retain competence in handling
complex technical issues.
Property rights
Systems of rights occupy a crucial position within the nexus of
institutions that make up an institutional framework. They have
significant implications for other components of the network,
notably legal systems and the nature of regulation and enforcement. They are closely connected to the prevailing value systems
and will strongly influence responses to development proposals.
The issue of property rights in fisheries is a controversial one,
dividing the social sciences and the fishing industry alike.
Property rights are concerned with rules of access to fisheries,
economic efficiency, and social equity, and hence their significance
in influencing the choice of management options and in shaping
the industry’s response. Three different types of property rights
in fisheries—state owned, community, or individual—determine
under what conditions the individual has a right of entry to a
fishery. In relation to participative decision-making, they will
(i) influence the procedures and processes of the governance
system, (ii) shape the user groups’ views on a range of
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management issues, and (iii) possibly redefine stakeholders’ perceptions of basic values such as sustainability and social justice.
The issue facing the choice of property rights is how to resolve
the dilemmas posed by common-pool resources. However, the
debate is all too often caricatured as a simple choice of whether
or not to substitute a system of state-controlled common property
rights with private property rights in the form of individual transferable quota (ITQ). In fact, the real question is one of “horses for
courses”, deciding which form of property right best suits a particular circumstance. There is no reason to assume that all of a
nation’s fisheries need to be encompassed within one and the
same system, nor that any single form of governance will necessarily require a particular type of property right. There may be a
greater affinity between state ownership of fishing rights and
centralized systems of governance, or between community fishing
rights and local co-management. However, as the example of the
Biesheuvel system in the Netherlands indicates, co-management
and ITQs are compatible (Langstraat, 1999). Certain national juridical systems, however, may limit the range of choice. Prat (1998)
argues that, in France, the law of property applied to marine
resources precludes the development of individual rights and
ensures that the state retains responsibility for determining
access to and allocation of resources. The problem in the UK is
rather that de facto ITQs, which have been allowed to develop
over the past decade or so, may not be confirmed in law, although
the latest government proposals to formalize the quota system
(Fishing News of 2 June 2006) could help to remove this uncertainty. Meanwhile, some of the detailed arrangements for financing a highly successful community-quota scheme in the
Shetlands have fallen foul of European competition rules. These
examples demonstrate the need to clarify the relationships
between common practice, the law, and institutions of governance.
An ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management
The final example, and one which comes closer to Kooiman et al.’s
(2005) plea that more attention be paid to the guiding principles
and their consistent application in fisheries policy, is the question
of how to translate the concept of sustainable development into
operational management procedures. A few years ago, the development of the ecosystem approach held out the hope of a new
paradigm for fisheries management, embodying notions of precaution, environmental protection, and responsible fishing, as a
means of steering a safe course for the exploitation of marine
living resources. The importance attached to the ecosystem
approach reflected a changing emphasis in the core values of
western society and a reappraisal of man –environment relationships. Although it remains prominent in the action plans of
environmental NGOs and conservation agencies, specifically in
the form of marine protected areas (MPAs), and has been
adopted as an integral part of national and international agendas
for marine environmental management, it has failed to make a
comparable impact on fisheries policy.
An ecosystem-based approach should be an integral part of any
strategy for sustainable fishing. However, this statement implies
more than negotiating suitable sites and management plans for
MPAs, persuading fishers to adopt ecosystem-friendly fishing
practices, or introducing eco-labelling schemes. Rather, it should
become the principal driver of integrated management, with a realignment of the science from one preoccupied with the detailed
population characteristics of individual commercial species to
one more firmly embedded in an understanding of the functioning
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of the marine ecosystem. It also implies a fundamental but progressive shift in management, gradually loosening the stranglehold
that output limitations (catch quota) impose on management
options, and deploying instead more ecologically sensitive forms
of “parametric management” (Wilson and Dickie, 1995) in the
shape of technical conservation measures (gear restrictions, spatial
and temporal closure of fishing areas, etc.).
The adoption of an ecosystem-based approach to fisheries
management may also provide the opportunity for creating
closer links between fisheries science and local ecological knowledge generated through the practical experience of fishers.
Considerable progress is being made in narrowing the gaps in
understanding between science and industry through initiatives
such as the non-governmental North Sea partnership (Hawkins,
2005) and state-funded schemes involving the scientific services
and commercial fishing enterprises in joint research projects.
However, integration of the two forms of knowledge produced
by epistemologically different research methods remains elusive.
While scientific advice is primarily required to inform the
setting of numerical targets for resource extraction, the stimulus
for further integration will remain weak. However, with the
development of an ecosystem-based approach and the use of
more ecologically sensitive instruments, the argument for
incorporating local environmental knowledge becomes much
more compelling.
Integrated management of marine space: a
challenge for governance
The examples cited in the previous section reflect different levels of
action to ensure the coherence of the institutional framework and
the efficacy of governance. They relate to modifications to the
design of organizations, clarification of relationships between
key components of the framework, and a reorientation of policy
through the development of a new paradigm. Institutional frameworks are in constant need of reappraisal, modification, and
occasional reform to avoid the perils of path dependency in
which prior sets of actions may constrain future decisions. The
emphasis has been on deliberative action to improve the coherence
and relevance of institutional frameworks for fisheries governance,
conducted mainly from within the policy community. This
emphasis must not, however, divert attention from changes
taking place beyond the immediate sphere of fisheries management, but in cognate areas of decision-making.
One such development with potentially profound implications
for fisheries governance concerns the integrated management of
marine space, a reflection of the pressing need for environmental
protection and the increasing competition for space in certain
regional seas. Europe lags behind certain other regions (e.g.
North America and Australia) in developing a framework for integrated management. Recently, the EU has taken two potentially
important steps towards a comprehensive strategy for managing
its marine territories with the publication of a Thematic Strategy
for the Marine Environment (CEC, 2005) and a Green Paper on a
future maritime policy for the Union (CEC, 2006). Together they
map out the basic architecture of integrated management. The
former sets out proposals for the protection and conservation of
the marine environment in the form of a draft Directive requiring
relevant member states to develop strategies for achieving good
environmental status by 2021 in each of three designated regions
(Baltic, Northeast Atlantic Ocean, and Mediterranean) and eight
D. Symes
subregions. The latter presents a broader vision for the integrated
management of all maritime activities according to the economic,
social, and environmental dimensions of sustainable development,
and envisages a system of MSP as a means of achieving such
integration.
Development of a comprehensive strategy raises important
issues for European governance. Not only will it involve a judicious meshing of hitherto separate policies and a balancing of
sectoral interests, but it will also require a meaningful division
of responsibility between the EU and its member states, together
with effective collaboration between groups of member states in
respect of particular regions or subregions. Moreover, there is
the potentially difficult task of developing protocols for MSP to
be applied across the EEZs of different member states. Particular
problems will occur in those areas where the EU does not have a
monopoly of political authority, as for example in the Baltic and
the Mediterranean.
The repercussions for fisheries management could be quite
profound. In relation to its use of marine space, the fishing industry, until recently, has enjoyed a surprising level of “favoured
status”, though largely by default. From the 1990s on, however,
the primacy of fishing activity has been progressively challenged
and curtailed by international actions. Its position could change
even more decisively in the future. With the advent of MSP and
the possible zoning of sea uses, key elements of the strategic management of fisheries could be taken out of the hands of fisheries
governance per se. Fisheries management could thus be relegated
to decision-making on mainly technical matters within a framework of MSP.
From the perspective of the institutional framework for fisheries governance, the introduction of integrated management
will at best imply (i) a greatly expanded but possibly less influential
community of stakeholders, (ii) a new set of decision-making processes and procedures, (iii) the development of new management
instruments, (iv) the dilution of property rights, and (v) the codification of relationships between different users of the sea. In all, it
presages probably the most significant change to the institutional
framework for fisheries governance since the 1970s.
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