11/8/2016
The Federalism Project in the Philippines:
Cautionary Insights from the Institutional Design Literature
Gene Lacza Pilapil
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Mrs. Maria Isabel G. Ongpin and the
Ateneo de Manila University for having me as the speaker
for this year’s Jaime V Ongpin Annual Memorial Lecture,
which I consider as the most prestigious annual memorial
lecture in the country.
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Equally important, I am honored to be associated with the
legacy of Mr. Jaime V Ongpin who fought the Marcos
dictatorship when it was neither the popular nor the profitable
thing to do at that time.
His example should continue to inspire this generation of
public intellectuals as this country’s democracy is now once
again threatened by another authoritarian challenge and
another regime of untruth.
I would also like to thank everyone in the audience.
Although the topic is a worrying one, it should nevertheless
be a most happy day for me.
Among the audience are former professors, former students,
(some of whom are covering the lecture for the different
media outlets), current students (who braved Makati traffic
without being required nor enticed by any bonus grade),
colleagues, and old-time friends.
A million thanks to everyone for attending.
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Three Main Aims of the Lecture
1. Give a working knowledge of a federal political system
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2. Introduce the importance of the institutional design literature
to the Philippine charter change debate,
thereby helping elevate the level of the debate.
3. Give fair warning on the grave dangers of constitutional overhauls
based on the nature of institutions and institutional changes
as seen from the vantage point of the institutional design literature.
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Outline of the Lecture
Outline
I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
II. What is federalism?
III. Why and why not federalism?
IV. Three cautionary insights from the institutional
design literature for the federalism project in the
Philippines (and the overall charter change campaign)
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I. Short Introduction
to the Institutional Design Literature
I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
formal rules
institutions
rules that influence the strategies
of state and social actors
“written down somewhere
as laws, regulations,
constitutions, treaties, and
so forth” (John M. Carey)
“parchment institutions”
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I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
formal rules
institutions
rules that influence the strategies
of state and social actors
“written down somewhere
as laws, regulations,
constitutions, treaties, and
so forth” (John M. Carey)
“parchment institutions”
meta-institution: constitution
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I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
formal rules
institutions
rules that influence the strategies
of state and social actors
“written down somewhere
as laws, regulations,
constitutions, treaties, and
so forth” (John M. Carey)
“parchment institutions”
meta-institution: constitution
I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
differences in the arrangement of formal rules
one basic example: form of government
relation between the executive and legislative
horizontal
institutional design of a
country’s form of government
If separated = presidential
If fused = parliamentary
If hybrid = semi-presidential
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I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
such as the
form of government,
studies how the design
(or redesign) of a country’s
political institutions
I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
such as the
form of government,
system of government
studies how the design
(or redesign) of a country’s
political institutions
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I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
such as the
form of government,
system of government
electoral system,
studies how the design
(or redesign) of a country’s
political institutions
I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
such as the
form of government,
system of government
electoral system,
party system,
studies how the design
(or redesign) of a country’s
political institutions
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I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
such as the
form of government,
system of government
electoral system,
party system,
legislative structure,
studies how the design
(or redesign) of a country’s
political institutions
I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
such as the
form of government,
system of government
electoral system,
party system,
legislative structure,
judicial system,
studies how the design
(or redesign) of a country’s
political institutions
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I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
such as the
form of government,
system of government
electoral system,
party system,
legislative structure,
judicial system,
and
constitutional bodies
studies how the design
(or redesign) of a country’s
political institutions
I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
such as the
form of government,
system of government
electoral system,
party system,
legislative structure,
judicial system,
and
constitutional bodies
studies how the design
(or redesign) of a country’s
political institutions
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I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
such as the
form of government,
system of government
electoral system,
party system,
legislative structure,
judicial system,
and
constitutional bodies
studies how the design
(or redesign) of a country’s
political institutions
affects or will affect, among others,
I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
such as the
form of government,
system of government
electoral system,
party system,
legislative structure,
judicial system,
and
constitutional bodies
studies how the design
(or redesign) of a country’s
political institutions
affects or will affect, among others,
the accountability,
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I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
such as the
form of government,
system of government
electoral system,
party system,
legislative structure,
judicial system,
and
constitutional bodies
studies how the design
(or redesign) of a country’s
political institutions
affects or will affect, among others,
the accountability,
representation,
I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
such as the
form of government,
system of government
electoral system,
party system,
legislative structure,
judicial system,
and
constitutional bodies
studies how the design
(or redesign) of a country’s
political institutions
affects or will affect, among others,
the accountability,
representation,
popular empowerment,
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I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
such as the
form of government,
system of government
electoral system,
party system,
legislative structure,
judicial system,
and
constitutional bodies
studies how the design
(or redesign) of a country’s
political institutions
affects or will affect, among others,
the accountability,
representation,
popular empowerment,
elite capture,
I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
such as the
form of government,
system of government
electoral system,
party system,
legislative structure,
judicial system,
and
constitutional bodies
studies how the design
(or redesign) of a country’s
political institutions
affects or will affect, among others,
the accountability,
representation,
popular empowerment,
elite capture,
and coherent policymaking
of the state
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I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
other terms
“constitutional engineering literature”
“constitutional design literature”
“institutional approach”
“new institutionalism”
I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
counts some of the biggest names
in the political science discipline
Today’s lecture would recruit supporting arguments from, among others:
Matthew Shugart
John M. Carey
Scott Mainwaring
Robert Kaufman
Stephan Haggard
George Tsebelis
Giovanni Sartori
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I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
counts some of the biggest names
in the political science discipline
Today’s lecture would recruit supporting arguments from, among others:
including winners of the Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science
"to the scholar who in the view of the Foundation has
made the most valuable contribution to political science”
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I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
counts some of the biggest names
in the political science discipline
Today’s lecture would recruit supporting arguments from, among others:
including winners of the Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science
Arend Lijphart (1997)
Rein Taagepera (2008)
Adam Przeworski (2010)
Jon Elster (2016)
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I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
Juan Linz (1996)
counts some of the biggest names
in the political science discipline
Today’s lecture would recruit supporting arguments from, among others:
including winners of the Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science
Arend Lijphart (1997)
Rein Taagepera (2008)
Adam Przeworski (2010)
Jon Elster (2016)
II. What is Federalism?
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II.A. Definition of Terms
Most famous definition of federalism
is the shortest one
Daniel Elazar in his 1987 book, Exploring Federalism
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Most famous definition of federalism
is the shortest one
Daniel Elazar in his 1987 book, Exploring Federalism
“The simplest possible definition is self-rule plus shared rule.”
italicized part repeated
like a mantra in most
discussions of federalism
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Most famous definition of federalism
is the shortest one
Daniel Elazar in his 1987 book, Exploring Federalism
“The simplest possible definition is self-rule plus shared rule.”
divided powers
shared sovereignty
Another famous definition of federalism
William H. Riker in his 1975 article, “Federalism” in Handbook of
Political Science, Volume Five
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Another famous definition of federalism
William H. Riker in his 1975 article, “Federalism” in Handbook of
Political Science, Volume Five
"Federalism is a political organization in which the
activities of government are divided between
regional governments and a central government in
such a way that each kind of government has
some activities on which it makes final decisions.”
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A current definition of federalism
International IDEA in its 2015 primer, “Federalism”
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A current definition of federalism
International IDEA in its 2015 primer, “Federalism”
“Federalism is a system of government that establishes
a constitutionally specified division of powers between
different levels of government.”
A current definition of federalism
International IDEA in its 2015 primer, “Federalism”
“Federalism is a system of government that establishes
a constitutionally specified division of powers between
different levels of government.”
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system of government
single
central
source of
authority
Unitary system
of government
relationship between the
central government
vertical
subordinate
to the
central
local government
system of government
Federal system
of government
relationship between the
in certain
policy areas
where
central
government
has
exclusive
jurisdiction
central government
vertical
local government
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system of government
Federal system
of government
relationship between the
in certain
policy areas
where local
government
has
exclusive
jurisdiction
local government
vertical
central government
system of government
in certain
policy areas
where both
governments
have
jurisdiction
(concurrent/
shared)
Federal system
of government
relationship between the
local government
vertical
central government
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system of government
in certain
policy areas
where both
governments
have
jurisdiction
(concurrent/
shared)
Federal system
of government
relationship between the
central
government
local
government
vertical
II.B. List of Federal Countries
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Handbook of Federal Countries in 2005 listed 25 federal countries:
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Handbook of Federal Countries in 2005 listed 25 federal countries:
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Brazil
Canada
Comoros
Ethiopia
Germany
Switzerland
India
United Arab Emirates
Malaysia
United States
Mexico
Venezuela
F.S. Micronesia
Nigeria
Pakistan
Russia
Serbia and Montenegro
South Africa
Spain
Saint Kitts-Nevis
Forum of Federations in October 2016 lists 24 federal countries:
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Forum of Federations in October 2016 lists 24 federal countries:
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Brazil
Canada
Ethiopia
Germany
India
Iraq
Malaysia
Mexico
Nepal
Nigeria
Pakistan
Russia
South Africa
Spain
Sudan
Switzerland
United Arab Emirates
United States
Venezuela
Not in the list:
Comoros
F.S. Micronesia
Saint Kitts-Nevis
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My Provisional List: 27 Federal States
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Brazil
Canada
Comoros
Ethiopia
Germany
India
Iraq
Malaysia
Mexico
F.S. Micronesia
Nepal
Nigeria
Pakistan
Russia
South Africa
Spain
Sudan
Saint Kitts-Nevis
Switzerland
United Arab Emirates
United States
Venezuela
My Provisional List: 27 Federal States
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Brazil
Canada
Comoros
Ethiopia
Germany
India
Iraq
Malaysia
Mexico
F.S. Micronesia
Nepal
Nigeria
Pakistan
Russia
South Africa
Spain
Sudan
Saint Kitts-Nevis
Switzerland
United Arab Emirates
United States
Venezuela
Cover 40 percent of the world’s population
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My Provisional List: 27 Federal States
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Brazil
Canada
Comoros
Ethiopia
Germany
India
Iraq
Malaysia
Mexico
F.S. Micronesia
Nepal
Nigeria
Pakistan
Russia
South Africa
Spain
Sudan
Saint Kitts-Nevis
Switzerland
United Arab Emirates
United States
Venezuela
Cover 40 percent of the world’s population
but they constitute a minority of the total of 195 states (14%)
My Provisional List: 27 Federal States
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Brazil
Canada
Comoros
Ethiopia
Germany
India
Iraq
Malaysia
Mexico
F.S. Micronesia
Nepal
Nigeria
Pakistan
Russia
South Africa
Spain
Sudan
Saint Kitts-Nevis
Switzerland
United Arab Emirates
United States
Venezuela
Freedom House Freedom in the World 2016
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My Provisional List: 27 Federal States
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Brazil
Canada
Comoros
Ethiopia
Germany
India
Iraq
Malaysia
Mexico
F.S. Micronesia
Nepal
Nigeria
Pakistan
Russia
South Africa
Spain
Sudan
Saint Kitts-Nevis
Switzerland
United Arab Emirates
United States
Venezuela
Freedom House Freedom in the World 2016
18 out of 27 of federal states are electoral democracies = 67%
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My Provisional List: 27 Federal States
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Brazil
Canada
Comoros
Ethiopia
Germany
India
Iraq
Malaysia
Mexico
F.S. Micronesia
Nepal
Nigeria
Pakistan
Russia
South Africa
Spain
Sudan
Saint Kitts-Nevis
Switzerland
United Arab Emirates
United States
Venezuela
Freedom House Freedom in the World 2016
18 out of 27 of federal states are electoral democracies = 67%
107 out of 195 of non-federal states are electoral democracies = 64%
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Brazil
Canada
Comoros
Ethiopia
Germany
India
Iraq
Malaysia
Mexico
F.S. Micronesia
Nepal
Nigeria
Pakistan
Russia
South Africa
Spain
Sudan
Saint Kitts-Nevis
Switzerland
United Arab Emirates
United States
Venezuela
Freedom House Freedom in the World 2016
18 out of 27 of federal states are electoral democracies = 67%
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II.C. Institutional Features of Federal System
This section is mainly based
on Ronald Watts’s 1996
book, Comparing Federal
Systems in the 1990s
Many texts in the slides are
direct quotes from this book
Did not rewrite many of his
terms because of the
technical nature of his
arguments
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Professor
Department of Political Science
University of Melbourne
II.D. Six common institutional features
of federal systems according to Watts
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Different scholars list different numbers of common or essential
features of federalism
Duchacek =
Watts = lists 6 common features
Galligan = lists 4
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Different scholars list different number of common or essential
features of federalism
Duchacek = lists 8 (“yardsticks of federalism”)
Watts = lists 6 common features
Galligan = lists 4
Different scholars list different number of common or essential
features of federalism
Duchacek = lists 8 (“yardsticks of federalism”)
Watts = lists 6 common features
Galligan = lists 4
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1. Orders of Government
1. two orders of government each acting directly on their citizens
geographically or
territorially defined
constituent level
a.k.a.
“federal” (exs. US, Germany) “states” (exs. Australia, Malaysia, US)
“provinces” (exs. Argentina, Canada)
“central” (ex. South Africa)
“regions” (ex. Belgium) “communities”
“union government”
“cantons” (ex. Switzerland)
(ex. India)
“autonomous communities” (ex. Spain)
“national” (ex. Sudan)
“Länder” (exs. Austria, Germany)
federal level
a.k.a.
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2. Distribution of Powers
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2. a formal constitutional distribution of powers and allocation of
revenue resources between the two orders of government
2. a formal constitutional distribution of powers and allocation of
revenue resources between the two orders of government
a.k.a. “legislative competences”
a.k.a. “jurisdiction”
involves the distribution of legislative powers and executive powers
between the federal and the constituent governments
vary in terms of form and scope
Exclusive
Legislative Powers
Concurrent
Legislative Powers
Residual
Legislative Powers
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2. a formal constitutional distribution of powers and allocation of
revenue resources between the two orders of government
a.k.a. “legislative competences”
a.k.a. “jurisdiction”
involves the distribution of legislative powers and executive powers
between the federal and the constituent governments
vary in terms of form and scope
maintenance
of law and
security
economic
taxing powers
immigration
defense
and
social affairs
monetary interregional
transportation international relations
union
2. a formal constitutional distribution of powers and allocation of
revenue resources between the two orders of government
a.k.a. “legislative competences”
a.k.a. “jurisdiction”
involves the distribution of legislative powers and executive powers
between the federal and the constituent governments
vary in terms of form and scope
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Exclusive Legislative Powers
the federal government
exs. Canada, Spain,
India, Australia, US,
Argentina and Pakistan
assigned only to either
or
the constituent government
exs. Canada, Spain,
and India
Canada’s Constitution
Federal Jurisdiction
Sections 91 and 92 (10)
Exs. Public Debt and
Property
Regulation of
Trade/Commerce
Unemployment
Insurance
Direct/Indirect Taxation
Postal Service
Census/Statistics
Provincial Jurisdiction
Sections 92, 92A, and 93
Exs. Direct Taxation within
Province
Management/Sale of
Public Lands
belonging to Province
Prisons
Hospitals
Municipalities
Formalization of Marriage
Available from http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/aia/index.asp?lang=eng&page=federal&doc=legis-eng.htm
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Concurrent Legislative Powers
a.k.a. Shared legislative powers
shared between the federal and the constituent governments
may be legislated by both the federal
and the constituent governments
in case of conflicts
between them
in most instances,
federal legislation prevails
over constituent legislation
Concurrent Legislative Powers
Distribution of
Concurrent Legislative Power
extensive areas of
concurrent jurisdiction
limited areas of concurrent
jurisdiction
Sample Country Cases
Australia, Germany, India, US
Canada
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Residual Legislative Powers
Identify which order of government has jurisdiction over matters
not specified in the constitution as exclusive or concurrent
federal government
constituent governments
usually in federations created
by the process of devolution
from a formerly unitary state
(“holding-together federalism”)
usually in federations created
by the process of aggregating
previously separate units
(“coming-together federalism”)
Australia, Austria, Germany,
Switzerland, and the US
India and Canada
Distribution of Powers in a Sample of Federal Countries (from IDEA)
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2. a formal constitutional distribution of powers and allocation of
revenue resources between the two orders of government
symmetrical
asymmetrical
one form: constitutional asymmetry
all constituent
governments have equal
juridical status and
powers
differences in the status of
legislative and executive powers
assigned by the constitution to
the constituent governments
2. a formal constitutional distribution of powers and allocation of
revenue resources between the two orders of government
one type of constitutional asymmetry
 increase the jurisdiction
(autonomy) of particular
constituent states
concessions made to the Borneo
states (Sabah and Sarawak)
when they joined the Malaysian
federation in 1963
asymmetrical
one form: constitutional asymmetry
differences in the status of
legislative and executive powers
assigned by the constitution to
the constituent governments
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2. a formal constitutional distribution of powers and allocation of
revenue resources between the two orders of government
one type of constitutional asymmetry
 increase the jurisdiction
(autonomy) of particular
constituent states
asymmetrical
one form: constitutional asymmetry
concessions made to some of
the “autonomous communities”
in Spain (esp. Basque Country,
Catalonia, and Galicia)
differences in the status of
legislative and executive powers
assigned by the constitution to
the constituent governments
2. a formal constitutional distribution of powers and allocation of
revenue resources between the two orders of government
1. tax collection and revenue raising powers
2. intergovernmental financial transfers
fiscal
federalism
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2. a formal constitutional distribution of powers and allocation of
revenue resources between the two orders of government
1. tax collection and revenue raising powers
fiscal
federalism
Distribution of Taxing Powers
Taxing Powers
Federal
Customs
Canada, US,
Switzerland, Australia,
Germany, Austria,
India, Malaysia, Spain,
Pakistan
Excise
Canada, Switzerland,
Australia, Germany,
Austria, Malaysia,
Spain, Pakistan
Concurrent
Federal paramountcy
Concurrent
Belgium
US, Belgium
India
Based on Watts, Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s, Appendix A, p. 118.
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Distribution of Taxing Powers
Taxing Powers
Concurrent
Federal
Federal paramountcy
Customs
Canada, US,
Switzerland, Australia,
Germany, Austria,
India, Malaysia, Spain,
Pakistan
Excise
Canada, Switzerland,
Australia, Germany,
Austria, Malaysia,
Spain, Pakistan
Concurrent
Belgium
US, Belgium
India
Based on Watts, Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s, Appendix A, p. 118.
Distribution of Taxing Powers
Taxing Powers
Federal
Concurrent
Federal paramountcy
Switzerland, Austria,
US, Australia,
India, Malaysia,
Corporate Income
Germany*, Belgium
Spain, Pakistan
Personal Income
Austria, Malaysia
US, Australia,
Germany*, Belgium
Sales
Switzerland,
Austria, Malaysia,
Spain, Pakistan
US, Australia,
Germany*, Belgium
Concurrent
Canada
Canada, India,
Switzerland,
Spain, Pakistan
Canada, India
Based on Watts, Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s, Appendix A, p. 118.
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Distribution of Taxing Powers
Taxing Powers
Federal
Concurrent
Federal paramountcy
Switzerland, Austria,
US, Australia,
India, Malaysia,
Corporate Income
Germany*, Belgium
Spain, Pakistan
Personal Income
Austria, Malaysia
US, Australia,
Germany*, Belgium
Sales
Switzerland,
Austria, Malaysia,
Spain, Pakistan
US, Australia,
Germany*, Belgium
Concurrent
Canada
Canada, India,
Switzerland,
Spain, Pakistan
Canada, India
Based on Watts, Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s, Appendix A, p. 118.
Distribution of Debt / Borrowing Powers
Debt/Borrowing
Powers
Foreign
Borrowing
Domestic
Borrowing
Federal
Austria, India,
Malaysia
Concurrent
Federal paramountcy
Concurrent
Australia
Canada, US,
Switzerland,
Germany, Spain,
Pakistan
Australia
Canada, US,
Switzerland, Germany,
India, Malaysia, Spain,
Pakistan
Based on Watts, Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s, Appendix A, p. 118.
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Distribution of Debt / Borrowing Powers
Debt/Borrowing
Powers
Foreign
Borrowing
Domestic
Borrowing
Federal
Austria, India,
Malaysia
Concurrent
Federal paramountcy
Concurrent
Australia
Canada, US,
Switzerland,
Germany, Spain,
Pakistan
Australia
Canada, US,
Switzerland, Germany,
India, Malaysia, Spain,
Pakistan
Based on Watts, Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s, Appendix A, p. 118.
2. a formal constitutional distribution of powers and allocation of
revenue resources between the two orders of government
1. tax collection and revenue raising powers
fiscal
2. intergovernmental financial transfers
federalism
a.k.a. “equalization transfers”
“solidarity transfers”
composed of conditional and unconditional grants
roughly similar to the Philippines’ Internal Revenue Allotment
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Fiscal imbalances that every federalism has to correct
1. vertical imbalances
constitutionally assigned
revenues for the federal
and constituent governments
≠
constitutionally assigned
expenditure responsibilities
for the federal and
constituent governments
Main reason for the vertical imbalance
allocation of major taxing
powers to the federal
governments
vs.
assignment of expensive
expenditures to the
constituent governments
Fiscal imbalances that every federalism has to correct
2. horizontal imbalances
revenue capacities
of different
constituent
governments vary
inability of constituent
governments to provide
their citizens with
services at the same level
(regional imbalances)
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Correcting the horizontal and vertical imbalances
financial transfers from one level of government to another
constituent governments
federal governments
exception
Germany: interstate
financial transfers
conditional transfers
(federal transfers to constituent
governments that have
conditions attached to them)
unconditional transfers
(federal transfers to constituent
governments that have no conditions
attached to them)
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3. Bicameralism
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3. provision for the designated representation of distinct regional
views within the federal policy-making institutions, usually provided
by the particular form of the federal second chamber
principle of bicameralism in federalism
authoritarian regime
microstate
except the
United Arab Emirates
and
Saint Kitts and Nevis,
all federations are bicameral
3. provision for the designated representation of distinct regional
views within the federal policy-making institutions, usually provided
by the particular form of the federal second chamber
Unlike the first
chamber, the second
chamber is the
legislative institution
which operates on
the basis of
representation as
states
principle of bicameralism in federalism
except the
United Arab Emirates
and
Saint Kitts and Nevis,
all federations are bicameral
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Manner of Selection
Implications
Sample Country Case/s
Manner of Selection
Implications
Sample Country Case/s
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Manner of Selection
Implications
Sample Country Case/s
4. Constitutional Entrenchment
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4. a supreme written constitution not unilaterally amendable and
requiring the consent of a significant proportion of the constituent units
this is the principle of
constitutional entrenchment of federalism
plain English: very difficult to
amend its federal character
require the involvement of
both orders of government
US, Canada, India,
and Malaysia
most federations require:
amendments of the constitution
that affect its federal character
(ex. distribution of power)
approval in both houses
of the federal legislature
+
approval either by a special majority
of the constituent unit legislatures
or by a referendum requiring
a “double majority”
“federally
weighted”
absolute
majority
(Australia)
(Switzerland
special majority
and Canada)
(US, India,
and Malaysia)
simple
majority
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require the involvement of
both orders of government
US, Canada, India,
and Malaysia
most federations require:
amendments of the constitution
that affect its federal character
(ex. distribution of power)
+
approval either by a special majority
of the constituent unit legislatures
or by a referendum requiring
a “double majority”
absolute
“federally
simple
majority
weighted”
majority
1. overall majority and
(Australia)
(Switzerland
2. majorities in a majority
special majority
and Canada)
of constituent units
(US, India,
(Switzerland and Australia)
and Malaysia)
approval in both houses
of the federal legislature
4. a supreme written constitution not unilaterally amendable and
requiring the consent of a significant proportion of the constituent units
clauses that cannot be
changed by amendment
Qualify Watts: some
federal constitutions
have “eternity clauses”
for their federal
character
exs.
Brazil and Germany
this is the principle of
constitutional entrenchment of federalism
certain cases:
not possible
to revoke
plain English: very difficult to
amend its federal character
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5. Adjudication
5. an umpire (in the form of courts or provision for referendums)
to rule on disputes between governments
even more necessary
in federations
need for processes to adjudicate
disputes and resolve conflicts
unavoidability of
overlaps of jurisdiction
between governments
and the consequent likelihood
of intergovernmental
competition and conflict
referendum
(Switzerland)
judicial
“judicialization of politics”
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5. an umpire (in the form of courts or provision for referendums)
to rule on disputes between governments
two types of courts
supreme court
constitutional court
final adjudicator in relation to
all laws including the constitution
US, Canada, Australia, India,
Malaysia, and Austria
specializes in constitutional
interpretation
Germany, Belgium, and Spain
Methods of Appointment to the Supreme Courts
Methods of Appointment
Sample Country Case/s
appointed solely by the president but
ratified by the Senate where the state
electorates are equally represented
US
Bundesrat representing the Lӓnder
appoints half the members of the
Constitutional Court and the Bundestag
the other half
appointment by federal cabinet but
required by the constitution to consult
certain bodies before making the
appointments
Germany
India and Malaysia
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Methods of Appointment to the Supreme Courts
Methods of Appointment
Sample Country Case/s
appointed solely by the president but
ratified by the Senate where the state
electorates are equally represented
US
Bundesrat representing the Lӓnder
appoints half the members of the
Constitutional Court and the Bundestag
the other half
appointment by federal cabinet but
required by the constitution to consult
certain bodies before making the
appointments
Germany
India and Malaysia
Methods of Appointment to the Supreme Courts
Methods of Appointment
Sample Country Case/s
appointed solely by the president but
ratified by the Senate where the state
electorates are equally represented
US
Bundesrat representing the Lӓnder
appoints half the members of the
Constitutional Court and the Bundestag
the other half
appointment by federal cabinet but
required by the constitution to consult
certain bodies before making the
appointments
Germany
India and Malaysia
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6. Intergovernmental Collaboration
6. processes and institutions to facilitate intergovernmental collaboration
for those areas where governmental responsibilities are shared or
inevitably overlap
two important dimensions
relations between the federal
and unit governments
inter-unit relations
exs. standing and ad hoc meetings involving ministers,
legislators, officials and agencies of different governments
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Institutions of Intergovernmental Collaboration within Federations
Institutions
formal
Forms of Institutions
standing and ad hoc meetings involving ministers,
legislators, officials and agencies of different governments
“executive federalism” (parliamentarism) = predominant role
of governmental executives (ministers and their officials)
federal legislature (presidentialism) and a variety of channels
e.g. extensive lobbying of federal legislator by various state
and cantonal representatives
interlocked federalism = there is a constitutional requirement that a
considerable portion of federal legislation must be administered by
the governments of the regional units (Germany)
II.E. Primary and Secondary Characteristics
of Federalism
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Neat Institutional Design Technique to Make Sense of the Institutional
Features of Federalism
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Neat Institutional Design Technique to Make Sense of the Institutional
Features of Federalism
1. Orders of Government
2. Distribution of Powers
3. Bicameralism
4. Constitutional Entrenchment
5. Adjudication
6. Intergovernmental Collaboration
7. ______________
8. ______________
Primary
characteristics
Secondary
characteristics
(that make possible the
primary characteristics)
9. onwards ______________
III. Why and Why not Federalism?
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Potential Advantages of Federalism (International IDEA, 2015)
1. Federalism is offered as an institutional solution to the problems
associated with scale and diversity
2. Federal government is rooted in constitutionalism and pluralism
3. Broaden the base of power-sharing
4. Encourage innovative and pragmatic approaches to policy
development
5. Reduce the burden on the central authorities
6. Share resources across geographical space
7. Develop capacity and democratic responsibility
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Potential Disadvantages of Federalism (International IDEA, 2015)
1. Duplication of work and lack of coherence
2. Additional operating costs
3. Increasing regional discrepancies of wealth, resources and
outcomes
4. Harmful economic competition between sub-national units
5. Judicialization of politics
Nine Potential Disadvantages of Federalism (International IDEA, 2015)
6. Potential exclusion of minorities
7. The strengthening of local elites who misuse power
8. Ineffective governance because of a lack of capacity
9. Instability and threats to democracy
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IV. Three Cautionary Insights
from the Institutional Design Literature
IV.1. First cautionary insight:
No consensus on the superiority of one form/system to another
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 there is no consensus on the superiority of the
parliamentary /semi-presidential
federal
to the
to the
or
presidential
unitary
form of government
system of government
or vice versa
Critics of the superiority argument give two intertwined reasons:
1. Institutional bundle
system of government
a package of institutional features
federal
just a few examples:
distribution of
legislative/executive powers
type of constitutional
entrenchment
design of upper house
mechanisms for intergovernmental coordination
unitary
devil
is
in
the
details
just a few examples:
manner of recruitment
in the national/local
bureaucracy
appointment powers of the
president to bureaucracy
level and type of decentralization
level and type of devolution
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At the level of institutional bundle, helps explain performance
1. Institutional bundle
system of government
a package of institutional features
federal
just a few examples:
distribution of
legislative/executive powers
type of constitutional
entrenchment
design of upper house
mechanisms for intergovernmental coordination
unitary
devil
is
in
the
details
just a few examples:
manner of recruitment
in the national/local
bureaucracy
appointment powers of the
president to bureaucracy
level and type of decentralization
level and type of devolution
At the level of institutional bundle, helps explain performance
1. Institutional bundle
form of government
a package of institutional features
parliamentary
just a few examples:
type of confidence vote
dissolution power of the
prime minister
design of legislature
(unicameral/bicameral)
power of legislative committees
cabinet powers
presidential
devil
is
in
the
details
just a few examples:
veto power of the president
legislative proactive
powers of the president
impeachment rules
impoundment and other
budgetary powers
reelection rule
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Critics of the superiority argument give two intertwined reasons:
how different types of
institutions affect each other
(e.g. how party system is
affected by the electoral
system)
2. Institutional configuration
this means that institutions must
not be analyzed independently
from other institutions that may
affect their functioning
Critics of the superiority argument give two intertwined reasons:
2. Institutional configuration
form of government
performance affected by other institutions
parliamentary form of government
just one
pair of
examples: party system
Westminster
(SMD)
electoral system
PR MM
presidential form of government
devil
is
in
the
details
party system
timing of
elections
SMD
electoral system
run-off
PR
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At the level of institutional design, helps explain performance
2. Institutional configuration
form of government
performance affected by other institutions
parliamentary form of government
just one
pair of
examples: party system
Westminster
(SMD)
electoral system
PR MM
presidential form of government
devil
is
in
the
details
party system
timing of
elections
SMD
electoral system
run-off
PR
At the level of institutional design, helps explain performance
2. Institutional configuration
system of government
performance affected by other institutions
federal system of government
just one
pair of
examples: party system
electoral system
devil
is
in
the
details
unitary system of government
party system
electoral system
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Note that non-institutional factors are not yet factored here:
exs. level of economic development, colonial heritage, political culture,
political elite composition, length of democracy, geographical location
2. Institutional configuration
system of government
performance affected by other institutions
federal system of government
just one
pair of
examples: party system
electoral system
devil
is
in
the
details
unitary system of government
party system
electoral system
IV.2. Second cautionary insight: Reform not Overhaul
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the recommendation of
top scholars for
democratic countries with
already functioning
systems or forms of
government
is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
revival of institutional design questions
the recommendation of
top scholars for
democratic countries with
already functioning
systems or forms of
government
revival of institutional design questions
= linked with the most recent wave
of democratization
where from 1974-1994:
75 countries transited to democracies
including the Philippines in 1986
is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
fundamental
institutional choices for
new democracies:
most important is the
form of government
role of Juan Linz’s 1990 article
“The Perils of Presidentialism”
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the recommendation of
top scholars for
democratic countries with
already functioning
systems or forms of
government
picked up by Filipino parliamentary
advocates by mid-1990s,
when we have already made our
choice of form of government in
the 1987 Constitution
is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
fundamental
institutional choices for
new democracies:
most important is the
form of government
role of Juan Linz’s 1990 article
“The Perils of Presidentialism”
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the recommendation of
top scholars for
democratic countries with
already functioning
systems or forms of
government
these regimes in transition
have no option but to make
these constitutional choices
is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
fundamental
institutional choices for
new democracies:
most important is the
form of government
the difficulty and danger of these
choices are captured by the subtitle of
role of Juan Linz’s 1990 article
Jon Elster et al.’s book on postcommunist transitions in Eastern Europe “The Perils of Presidentialism”
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the recommendation of
top scholars for
democratic countries with
already functioning
systems or forms of
government
even for most scholars arguing
the superiority of parliamentary
and/or federal, there is no
recommendation to dump
existing presidential/unitary
systems
the recommendation of
top scholars for
democratic countries with
already functioning
systems or forms of
government
even for most scholars arguing
the superiority of parliamentary
and/or federal, there is no
recommendation to dump
existing presidential/unitary
systems
analogy: Sagada vs. Manila
is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
fundamental
institutional choices for
new democracies:
most important is the
form of government
role of Juan Linz’s 1990 article
“The Perils of Presidentialism”
is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
fundamental
institutional choices for
new democracies:
most important is the
form of government
role of Juan Linz’s 1990 article
“The Perils of Presidentialism”
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the recommendation of
top scholars for
democratic countries with
already functioning
systems or forms of
government
is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
among the reasons why strongly
discouraged:
1. unnecessary: if there is no superiority,
then there is no need for overhaul
the recommendation of
top scholars for
democratic countries with
already functioning
systems or forms of
government
especially for
federalism
where state
governments,
constitutions, courts,
and bureaucracy,
etc. would have to
be created
is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
and
among the reasons why strongly
discouraged:
2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally
and intellectually complex for lofty goals
Philippine time
frame is 10 years!
(institutional bundle)
+ (institutional
configuration)
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the recommendation of
top scholars for
democratic countries with
already functioning
systems or forms of
government
no democratic
country has been
crazy enough to
make these
overhauls at the
same time!
very tricky
executive
veto gates
dual executive
no democratic
country has been
crazy enough to
make these
overhauls at the
same time!
is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
and
among the reasons why strongly
discouraged:
2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally
and intellectually complex for lofty goals
(institutional bundle)
+ (institutional
configuration)
Just when you think it
could not get crazier,
semi-presidentialism
fast becoming a
grocery list of
institutions!
is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
and
among the reasons why strongly
discouraged:
2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally
and intellectually complex for lofty goals
(institutional bundle)
+ (institutional
configuration)
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the recommendation of
top scholars for
democratic countries with
already functioning
systems or forms of
government
institutional design
literature has
sobered from the
enthusiasm of the
early 1990s on the
power to get
institutional design
right
is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
and
among the reasons why strongly
discouraged:
2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally
and intellectually complex for lofty goals
And this is just about one aspect of the
institutional configuration: electoral system
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Philippines’ constitutional
overhaul project in 2016:
height of intellectual irony
institutional design
literature has clearly
sobered from the
enthusiasm of the
1990s on the power
to get institutional
design right
hubris?
and/or
sheer
ignorance of
the literature?
is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
and
among the reasons why strongly
discouraged:
2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally
and intellectually complex for lofty goals
is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
and
among the reasons why strongly
discouraged:
2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally
and intellectually complex for lofty goals
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is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
and
among the reasons why strongly
discouraged:
2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally
and intellectually complex for lofty goals
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90
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is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
and
among the reasons why strongly
discouraged:
2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally
and intellectually complex for lofty goals
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“hyperrationality” (Croissant and Merkel)
hyperinstitutionalism
is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
and
Taagepera:
among the reasons why strongly
discouraged:
2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally
and intellectually complex for lofty goals
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hyperrationality (Merkel and Croissant)
hyperinstitutionalism
is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
and
Taagepera:
“excessive optimism”
in institutional design
easily leads to
“excessive
disillusionment”
afterwards
among the reasons why strongly
discouraged:
2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally
and intellectually complex for lofty goals
undermining rather than deepening democracy
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is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
and
among the reasons why strongly
discouraged:
3. Unsafe (highly risky): will be discussed
in cautionary insight 3
the recommendation of
top scholars for
democratic countries with
already functioning
systems or forms of
government
1. More justifiable
two reform principles
from Larry Diamond
is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
reforms
 do not need constitutional revisions
 only legislation
 or constitutional amendments
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the recommendation of
top scholars for
democratic countries with
already functioning
systems or forms of
government
1. More justifiable
two reform principles
from Larry Diamond
is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
reforms
 do not need constitutional revisions
 only legislation
 or constitutional amendments
A. reform only in the face of manifest flaws
B. reform should correct those flaws as specifically as possible
the recommendation of
top scholars for
democratic countries with
already functioning
systems or forms of
government
is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
reforms
 do not need constitutional revisions
 only legislation
 or constitutional amendments
If there are errors in the reforms,
easier to return to the old setup
or to push it further to the new setup
through new legislation/amendment
2. Less risky: Messed-up
reforms are more reformable
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the recommendation of
top scholars for
democratic countries with
already functioning
systems or forms of
government
2. Less risky: Messed-up
reforms are more reformable
If there are errors in the reforms,
easier to return to the old setup
or to push it further to the new setup
through new legislation/amendment
For scholars, may yet be the
most crucial prerequisite
before any talk of a
constitutional shift to
parliamentary form
is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
piecemeal reforms that move to a
more parliamentary-like direction
(example: party system reforms
against turncoatism)
or a more federal-like direction
(exs.: increased regional autonomy
or a more robust local govt. code)
involve only legislation
is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
piecemeal reforms that move to a
more parliamentary-like direction
(example: party system reforms
against turncoatism)
or a more federal-like direction
(exs.: increased regional autonomy
or a more robust local govt. code)
involve only legislation
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For scholars, may yet be the
most crucial prerequisite
before any talk of a
constitutional shift to
parliamentary form
Sartori:
is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
piecemeal reforms that move to a
more parliamentary-like direction
(example: party system reforms
against turncoatism)
or a more federal-like direction
(exs.: increased regional autonomy
or a more robust local govt. code)
involve only legislation
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For scholars, may yet be the
most crucial prerequisite
before any talk of a
constitutional shift to
parliamentary form
Sartori:
undisciplined political
parties in a presidential
democracy
becoming disciplined in a
parliamentary shift is
“against all odds”
For scholars, may yet be the
most crucial prerequisite
before any talk of a
constitutional shift to
parliamentary form
Mainwaring and Shugart:
is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
piecemeal reforms that move to a
more parliamentary-like direction
(example: party system reforms
against turncoatism)
or a more federal-like direction
(exs.: increased regional autonomy
or a more robust local govt. code)
involve only legislation
is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
piecemeal reforms that move to a
more parliamentary-like direction
(example: party system reforms
against turncoatism)
or a more federal-like direction
(exs.: increased regional autonomy
or a more robust local govt. code)
involve only legislation
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For scholars, may yet be the
most crucial prerequisite
before any talk of a
constitutional shift to
parliamentary form
Mainwaring and Shugart:
undisciplined political
parties in a parliamentary
shift “could exacerbate
problems of governability
and instability” more than
in a presidential democracy
is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
piecemeal reforms that move to a
more parliamentary-like direction
(example: party system reforms
against turncoatism)
or a more federal-like direction
(exs.: increased regional autonomy
or a more robust local govt. code)
involve only legislation
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For scholars, may yet be the
most crucial prerequisite
before any talk of a
constitutional shift to
parliamentary form
Croissant and Merkel:
For scholars, may yet be the
most crucial prerequisite
before any talk of a
constitutional shift to
parliamentary form
is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
piecemeal reforms that move to a
more parliamentary-like direction
(example: party system reforms
against turncoatism)
or a more federal-like direction
(exs.: increased regional autonomy
or a more robust local govt. code)
involve only legislation
is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
Croissant and Merkel:
different time horizon
the consolidation of the new party system
takes much longer than changing the constitution
“old, fragmented, clientelistic, and irresponsible parties”
“would not be able to create strong and stable governments”
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the recommendation of
top scholars for
democratic countries with
already functioning
systems or forms of
government
2. Less risky: Messed-up
reforms are more reformable
If there are errors in the reforms,
easier to return to the old setup
or to push it further to the new setup
through new legislation/amendment
because of constitutional
entrenchment protecting
its status, no federal
country negotiated under
democratic conditions has
ever returned to unitary
2. Less risky: Messed-up
reforms are more reformable
If there are errors in the reforms,
easier to return to the old setup
or to push it further to the new setup
through new legislation/amendment
is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
very different from messed-up
constitutional revisions involving
system or form of government
especially for shift to federalism
is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
very different from messed-up
constitutional revisions involving
system or form of government
especially for shift to federalism
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because of constitutional
entrenchment protecting
its status, no federal
country negotiated under
democratic conditions has
ever returned to unitary
2. Less risky: Messed-up
reforms are more reformable
If there are errors in the reforms,
easier to return to the old setup
or to push it further to the new setup
through new legislation/amendment
is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
very different from messed-up
constitutional revisions involving
system or form of government
especially for shift to federalism
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because of constitutional
entrenchment protecting
its status, no federal
country negotiated under
democratic conditions has
ever returned to unitary
“forcedtogether
federalism”
2. Less risky: Messed-up
reforms are more reformable
If there are errors in the reforms,
easier to return to the old setup
or to push it further to the new setup
through new legislation/amendment
is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
very different from messed-up
constitutional revisions involving
system or form of government
especially for shift to federalism
IV.3. Third cautionary insight:
Institutional design is political design
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According to Adam Przeworski:
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According to Adam Przeworski:
There are no optimal democratic institutions
B
and even if
there were,
According to Adam Przeworski:
There are no optimal democratic institutions
the distributive impact of institutional design
means opposing political forces will most likely not choose them
B
and even if
there were,
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According to Adam Przeworski:
There are no optimal democratic institutions
the distributive impact of institutional design
means opposing political forces will most likely not choose them
A
B
and even if
there were,
B1
According to Adam Przeworski:
There are no optimal democratic institutions
the distributive impact of institutional design
means opposing political forces will most likely not choose them
political
economy of
institutional
design/
constitutional
engineering
(most
important
actors are
those who
will write the
constitution)
A
opposing
political forces
B
and even if
there were,
B1
B2
B3
each
institutional
design outcome
reflects the
balance of power
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political
economy of
the
federalism
project in
the
Philippines
under
Duterte
different from the
federalism project
before Duterte
(1986-early 2016)
only president to
support was Arroyo
(in her campaign
platform in 2004)
but haphazard support
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political
economy of
the
federalism
project in
the
Philippines
under
Duterte
very strong
support of the
president
(prominent in his
campaign platform)
different from the
federalism project
before Duterte
(1986-early 2016)
only president to
support was Arroyo
(in her campaign
platform in 2004)
but haphazard support
only played second
fiddle to the
parliamentary project
113
11/8/2016
political
economy of
the
federalism
project in
the
Philippines
under
Duterte
very strong
support of the
president
(prominent in his
campaign platform)
different from the
federalism project
before Duterte
(1986-early 2016)
U
political
economy of
the
federalism
project in
the
Philippines
under
Duterte
clear primacy over the
parliamentary/semipresidency project
only president to
support was Arroyo
(in her campaign
platform in 2004)
but haphazard support
only played second
fiddle to the
parliamentary project
F
Constituent
Assembly
(P/SP)
How do we
reach here?
Current preferred
mode:
- Philippine President
- House Speaker
- Senate President
- House Committee
on Constitutional
Amendment
114
11/8/2016
U
political
economy of
the
federalism
project in
the
Philippines
under
Duterte
F
Constituent
Assembly
(P/SP)
How do we
reach here?
Current preferred
mode:
- Philippine President
- House Speaker
- Senate President
- House Committee
on Constitutional
Amendment
115
11/8/2016
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all
its Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
“Constituent assembly” mode
(Note: term never appears in the Constitution)
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all
its Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
?
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117
11/8/2016
October 10, 1986
118
11/8/2016
U
political
economy of
the
federalism
project in
the
Philippines
under
Duterte
Constituent
Assembly
U
political
economy of
the
federalism
project in
the
Philippines
under
Duterte
Constituent
Assembly
F
How do we
reach here?
F
How do we
reach here?
(P/SP)
(P/SP)
assuming that the Duterte administration could get
the 3/4ths vote (18/24) in the Senate = big question mark
and (223/297) in the Lower House = sure ball, as of now
119
11/8/2016
Philippine Congress
(especially its HoR)
U
F
How do we
reach here?
Constituent (P/SP)
Just two comments
Assembly
1. very low level of
one of the most crucial indicators:
institutionalization of political parties
party switching
current 17th Congress (the one that will become the ConAss):
election result for HoR = PDP-Laban only had 3 out of 297 representatives
LP had 116 members
= PDP-Laban membership and allies swelled
post-election
party-switching to a supermajority of 260-plus
and re-alignment = official minority: 20-plus but also the majority's minority
= real minority; down to 7 members
Philippine Congress
(especially its HoR)
U
F
How do we
reach here?
Constituent (P/SP)
Just two comments
Assembly
1. very low level of
one of the most crucial indicators:
institutionalization of political parties
party switching
 higher level of payoffs to  More incoherent
 More unstable
move legislative agenda lawmaking as more
political support
of the executive
policy side payments
for the president,
pork barrel by any
are made with more
especially when
other name
players representing
(CDF, PDAF, DAP,
particularistic interests his popularity
goes down
Duterte’s pork)
120
11/8/2016
Philippine Congress
(especially its HoR)
U
Just two comments
2. High level of barrier to entry
F
How do we
reach here?
Constituent (P/SP)
Assembly
one of the most crucial indicators:
political dynasty
Not aware of any scholarly study yet on the 16th Congress (2013-2016)
and the current 17th Congress (2016-2019)
But there are at least two on the House of Representatives of the 15th
Congress (2010-2013) by Mendoza et al., 2012
121
11/8/2016
Philippine Congress
(especially its HoR)
U
F
How do we
reach here?
Constituent (P/SP)
Just two comments
Assembly
2. High level of barrier to entry
one of the most crucial indicators:
political dynasty
th
HoR of the 15 Congress (2010-2013)
70 percent of members belong to a political dynasty
“with kinship links to at least one legislator in the 12th, 13th,
14th, or 15th Congress, or at least one local government
official elected in 2001, 2004, 2007, or 2010” (Dynasty3 Type)
Philippine Congress
(especially its HoR)
U
Just two comments
2. High level of barrier to entry
F
How do we
reach here?
Constituent (P/SP)
Assembly
one of the most crucial indicators:
political dynasty
Not aware of any scholarly study yet on the 16th Congress (2013-2016)
and the current 17th Congress (2016-2019)
But there are at least two on the House of Representatives of the 15th
Congress (2010-2013) by Mendoza et al., 2012
by Rivera, 2011
122
11/8/2016
Philippine Congress
(especially its HoR)
U
F
How do we
reach here?
Constituent (P/SP)
Just two comments
Assembly
2. High level of barrier to entry
one of the most crucial indicators:
political dynasty
th
HoR of the 15 Congress (2010-2013)
“34 out of 77 provinces or 44 percent had the
same political family winning the governorship
and at least one congressional district”
123
11/8/2016
Philippine Congress
(especially its HoR)
U
Just two comments
2. High level of barrier to entry
F
How do we
reach here?
Constituent (P/SP)
Assembly
one of the most crucial indicators:
political dynasty
 Self-perpetuating
in politics by
nature of clan
replication
124
11/8/2016
125
11/8/2016
U
Philippine Congress
(especially its HoR)
Just two comments
2. High level of barrier to entry
 Self-perpetuating
in politics by nature
of clan replication
How do we
reach here?
Constituent (P/SP)
Assembly
one of the most crucial indicators:
political dynasty
 Highly clientelistic
(patronage-based)
because familial/clan
interests take
precedence over any
national interests
U
ConAss
members
who are
winners of
the old
unitary/
presidential
setup
F
 Prevents party
institutionalization
as dynasties act
as surrogates of
political parties
F
How do we
reach here?
(P/SP)
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11/8/2016
U
F
How do we
reach here?
(P/SP)
ConAss
members
who are
winners of
the old
compromises “with
unitary/
groups that have
presidential
benefited from existing
setup
institutional
arrangements”
overwhelmingly for
non-institutionalized
and dynastic interests
F1
(P/SP1)
each
institutional
design outcome
reflects the
balance of power
127
11/8/2016
U
ConAss
members
who are
winners of
the old
unitary/
presidential
setup
overwhelmingly for
non-institutionalized
and dynastic interests
overwhelmingly for
non-institutionalized
and dynastic interests
(P/SP)
F1
(P/SP1)
distributive
swing could be
more dramatic
because of
the sheer
multiplicity
of features
involved
(think
institutional
bundle and
configuration)
F
How do we
reach here?
U
each
institutional
2 design outcome
(P/SP2) reflects the
balance of power
F
F
How do we
reach here?
(P/SP)
F1
(P/SP1)
each
institutional
2 design outcome
(P/SP2) reflects the
balance of power
F
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because of
the sheer
multiplicity
of features
involved
(think
institutional
bundle and
configuration)
overwhelmingly for
non-institutionalized
and dynastic interests
“hybrid
outcomes
that leave
lines of
accountability
unclear and
combine the
worst
of both
worlds”
F
(P/SP)
F1
(P/SP1)
F3
(P/SP3)
because of
the sheer
multiplicity
of features
involved
(think
institutional
bundle and
configuration)
institutional
Frankenstein outcomes
U
How do we
reach here?
U
each
institutional
2 design outcome
(P/SP2) reflects the
balance of power
F
F
How do we
reach here?
(P/SP)
F1
(P/SP1)
F3
(P/SP3)
each
institutional
2 design outcome
(P/SP2) reflects the
balance of power
F
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among the most important factors:
(existing vested interests)
U
institutional
endogeneity
what explains
institutional
choices?
and performance?
ConAss
members
who are
winners of
the old
unitary/
presidential
setup
(P/SP1)
F3
among the most important factors:
(existing vested interests)
U
ConAss
members
who are
winners of
the old
unitary/
presidential
setup
premium on
democratic regime
transitions
(P/SP)
F1
(P/SP3)
assumption of
some kind of
displacement
of the vested
interests of
the old order
F
How do we
reach here?
each
institutional
2 design outcome
(P/SP2) reflects the
balance of power
F
F
How do we
reach here?
(P/SP)
F1
(P/SP1)
F3
(P/SP3)
each
institutional
2 design outcome
(P/SP2) reflects the
balance of power
F
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among the most important factors:
(existing vested interests)
U
Worst-case
scenario of
constitutionmaking for
Przeworski
ConAss
members
who are
winners of
the old
unitary/
presidential
setup
F
How do we
reach here?
(P/SP)
F1
(P/SP1)
F3
(P/SP3)
each
institutional
2 design outcome
(P/SP2) reflects the
balance of power
F
131
11/8/2016
among the most important factors:
(existing vested interests)
Worst-case
scenario of
ConAss
constitutionmembers
making for
who are
Przeworski
winners of
the old
“When the
unitary/
relation of
forces is known presidential
setup
and uneven,
U
the institutions are
custom-made for a particular
person, party or alliance”
F3
(P/SP3)
among the most important factors:
(existing vested interests)
Elster:
ConAss
members
who are
winners of
the old
unitary/
presidential
setup
U
F3
(P/SP3)
F
How do we
reach here?
(P/SP)
F1
(P/SP1)
each
institutional
2 design outcome
(P/SP2) reflects the
balance of power
F
F
How do we
reach here?
(P/SP)
F1
(P/SP1)
each
institutional
2 design outcome
(P/SP2) reflects the
balance of power
F
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11/8/2016
among the most important factors:
(existing vested interests)
Elster:
Constitutions
ConAss
“ought to
members
be written by
who are
specially
winners of
convened
the old
assemblies”
unitary/
 “not by
presidential
bodies
setup
that also
serve as
3
ordinary
legislatures”
(P/SP3)
U
F
F
How do we
reach here?
(P/SP)
F1
(P/SP1)
each
institutional
2 design outcome
(P/SP2) reflects the
balance of power
F
133
11/8/2016
among the most important factors:
(existing vested interests)
Elster:
Constitutions
ConAss
“ought to
members
be written by
who are
specially
winners of
convened
the old
assemblies”
unitary/
 “not by
presidential
bodies
setup
that also
serve as
“to reduce the scope for
ordinary
institutional interest”
legislatures”
U
among the most important factors:
(existing vested interests)
U
political
economy of
the
federalism
project in
the
Philippines
under
Duterte
ConAss
members
who are
winners of
the old
unitary/
presidential
setup
analogy: same inept driver
with brand new vehicle
from Manila to Sagada
F
How do we
reach here?
(P/SP)
F1
(P/SP1)
each
institutional
2 design outcome
(P/SP2) reflects the
balance of power
F
F
How do we
reach here?
(P/SP)
F1
(P/SP1)
F3
(P/SP3)
each
institutional
2 design outcome
(P/SP2) reflects the
balance of power
F
134
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IV.4. Other cautionary insights
4. Institutional design as “mis-design”
(strategic miscalculations of actors)
a.k.a. “law of unintended consequences”
135
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5. Institutional design as “design-less”
(upstream and downstream quality of new constitutional choices)
Thank you very much
136
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The Federalism Project in the Philippines:
Cautionary Insights from the Institutional Design Literature
Gene Lacza Pilapil
137