THE
ECONOMIC
Studies
in
Voting
WEEKLY
August 4, 1962
Behaviour
I I I Religion and Caste in the Punjab:
Sidhwan Bet Constituency
Baldev Raj Nayar
One approach by Congress candidates in their election campaigning in the Punjab was based on
what may be called the "theory of factions". According in this theory every village, more particularly the Jat
section of every village, is divided into two factions and these factions govern the entire life oj the village.
During the election it was expected that these factions would align themselves with different political parties
-in the typical case, one supporting the Congress and the other the Akati Dal.
But, if the result of the election in the Sidhwan Bet constituency is any guide, the! theory of factions
did not hold during the general elections.
It was also expected that scheduled castes and Hindus Would invariably vote for the Congress when
the choice was between an Akali Dal Sikh and a Congress Sikh. Here again, the result of the election failed
to show any correlation between the per cent of scheduled castes in the population of a polling station and the
votes secured by the Congress candidate.
A corollary of the proposition that scheduled castes lend to vote for the Congress is that Jat Sikhs
are unitedly behind the A kali Dal. In the Sidhwan Bet constituency, however, the Congress candidate did cut
into the Jat Sikh vote. Affinal and agnatic ties, the traditional political, affiliations of particular villages,
the presence of bitter factions — all influenced the Jat Sikh vote.
THE
reserved Assembly constituency of Sidhwan Bet lies in the
L u d h i a n a District of the P u n j a b ;
the major part of it is in Raikot
thana
of
Jagraon
tehsil.
The
Ludhiana-Ferozepore
road divides
the constituency into two parts —
one known as Sidhwan
Bet side
and the other as Dakha side. The
constituency derives its name f r o m
the village Sidhwan Bet w h i c h was
founded by
the caste of Sidhus,
the Bet r e f e r r i n g to the fact that
it is in the river area of the Sutlej.
There are no towns in the
constituency though a large market
centre called M u l l a n p u r serves the
area.
The m a i n crops are wheat,
sugarcane, maize
and groundnuts.
A l l the villages in the constituency
are now covered by the c o m m u n i t y
development p r o g r a m .
There are
some
historic
Sikh
gurudwaras
(temples) in the constituency—places
w h i c h had been visited by the S i k h
Gurus — a fact of considerable
importance in the political loyalties
of the area.
The Candidates and Their
Background
There were five candidates
Ajit Kumar
(Akali
D a l ) , Gopal
Singh Khalsa (Congress), Bachan
Singh
( I n d e p e n d e n t ) , B i r Singh
( S w a t a n t r a ) , and Lal Singh
(Independent) —- r u n n i n g in the 1962
general elections f r o m this constituency for the 154-member Legis-
lative
Assembly of the
Punjab.
However, for all intents and purposes, the main contest was between A j i t K u m a r ( A k a l i Dal) and
Gopal
Singh Khalsa
(Congress).
A j i t K u m a r was the general secretary of the Punjab State Republican P a r t y and, though not a Sikh
himself, was r u n n i n g on the A k a l i
Dal ticket, and under the symbol
of the H a n d allotted to that party,
through an electoral alliance between the two parties.
He was
b o r n in 1928 in a scheduled caste
home in L u d h i a n a C i t y , though his
ancestral village is Dhat w h i c h is a
part of the
constituency. Because
of prejudice in - H i n d u and
Sikh
schools at the time, he received his
p r i m a r y education in a M u s l i m
school in Ludhiana. However, when
Muslims started
converting scheduled castes to Islam. Hindus —
especially those belonging to the
A r y a Samaj — began t a k i n g i n terest in the education of the scheduled castes, and A j i t K u m a r j o i n ed an A r y a Samaj school. The
treatment he received at the hands
of H i n d u teachers and students was
not exactly a happy one. and eventually he passed his
h i g h school
examination in 1945 as a private
student
after
leaving the school.
A m b e d k a r and his A l l - I n d i a Scheduled Castes Federation (SCF) had
by this time stimulated in h i m an
interest in politics, but due to the
economic
circumstances
of
the
1267
f a m i l y he j o i n e d government service
as a clerk. He left the job in 1952
to support the S C F candidates
d u r i n g the first general elections.
Later he j o i n e d the Central T r a c t o r
Organization in Bhopal as an accounts clerk.
W h i l e in service he
passed his intermediate examination
in 1948 and afterwards j o i n e d the
railways as a ticket collector first
in
Jodhpur and then in
Hissar.
D u r i n g his service in the railways
he took active interest in the w e l fare of the scheduled castes and in
railway labour unions. F i n a l l y , i n
1957 he q u i t r a i l w a y service and
contested the
reserved
seat f r o m
Raikot double member constituency,
and secured 30,011 votes as against
the
Congress
candidate
with
39,466 votes, w h o was then supported by the Akalis. Since then A j i t
K u m a r has been in active politics.
In
1959 he went on an eight
days hunger strike in the food
agitation.
Later, d u r i n g the antibetterment
levy
agitation
an
agitation
against the increase in
land taxes imposed on the plea that
government projects had increased
a g r i c u l t u r a l yields, a sort of prosp e r i t y tax — he was arrested in
1959 and sent to A m r i t s a r j a i l for
40 days. D u r i n g the Punjabi Suba
agitation
he was arrested for his
part in the agitation for the protection of c i v i l liberties, going on at
the same time, and served 37 days
THE
August 4, 1962
in j a i l . T h o u g h he himself went
to j a i l on the issue of c i v i l liberties
and though
the Republican P a r t y
itself is neutral on the issue of the
f o r m a t i o n of the P u n j a b i
Suba,
A j i t K u m a r could satisfy the A k u l i oriented voters in (he constituency
that he had made sacrifices by goi n g to j a i l d u r i n g the Punjabi Suba
agitation in 1961,
Gopal Singh Khalsa. the Congress
candidate, was b o r n in a scheduled
caste Ramdasia
Sikh family
in
1903, in a village w h i c h is outside
the Sidhwan Bet
constituency but
not too far from it. After s t u d y i n g
at the M a l w a Khalsa H i g h School
in L u d h i a n a ,
Khalsa went to the
U n i t e d States in 1923 and spent
three
years at
the U n i v e r s i t y o'
Idaho in Moscow, Idaho, and later
in a college at Stockton, C a l i f o r n i a .
However, he d i d not graduate b u t
joined
the
Hindustan
National
Party and f i n a l l y returned to I n d i a
i n 1 9 3 1 . A f t e r his r e t u r n t o I n d i a ,
he took keen interest in the welfare
of the scheduled castes and j o i n e d
the A l l
India
Scheduled
Castes
Federation of Dr B R Ambedkar.
He was a member of the S C F
Working
Committee
and a close
associate o f D r
Ambedkar
from
1937 to 1946.
I n 1937 he ran as
an independent for
the
Punjab
Legislative Assembly and was elected. He was then appointed Parliamentary Secretary to
the Punjab
Premier Sir Sikander H y a t K h a n .
F r o m 1937 to 1946 he was also a
nominated member of the D i s t r i c t
Board of L u d h i a n a , A f t e r the w a r ,
in 1946, he was appointed as an
officer in
the L a b o u r
Department
o f the g o v e r n m e n t o f I n d i a .
In
1952 he joined the A k a l i D a l , ran
on its ticket for the P u n j a b Legislative Assembly, was
elected w i t h
28,179 votes as against the Congress
candidate's 15,067 and the S C F
candidate's
8,993 votes.
He then
became the Leader of the Opposit i o n in the Punjab Assembly. He
had
d u r i n g his political career
edited a couple
of magazines and
papers, and f r o m 1952 to 1954 was
Chief E d i t o r of the D a i l y Prabhat,
the U r d u spokesman of the A k a l i
Dal.
In 1956 as a result of the
merger of the Akali Dal w i t h the
Congress p a r t y , he joined the latter
organization but was unable to get
the Congress ticket for the assembly in 1957. He played a p r o m i n e n t
o a r t in
the
organization of the
M a l w a A k a l i D a l to oppose Master
T a r a Singh and his A k a l i D a l i n
the 1959 elections to the S G P C
( " S h r o m a n i G u r u d w a r a Parbandhak
Committee") — the central organization responsible for the management of gurudwaras in the P u n j a b — though the
Malwa Akali
Dal as well as other organisations
r u n n i n g against Master T a r a Singh
met w i t h disastrous defeat in these
gurudwara
elections.
Campaigning and Canvassing
The Akali Dal Candidate
A j i t K u m a r proved an able organizer of his election campaign. He
started his campaigning in the second week of January 1962 w i t h
a definite programme to visit the
170 or so villages at least once and
twice if possible. He established
offices at strategic places manned by
workers w i t h the members of his
f a m i l y playing an active role. His
main strategy was based
on the
caste
composition of the constituency.
For the
scheduled
caste
votes, he approached the scheduled
caste panchayats.
On his behalf,
about five
to ten members
from
some 30 such panchayats went to
various villages on foot canvassing
for votes. In a d d i t i o n there were
four groups of workers on bicycles.
T w o station wagons were also used
to c a r r y workers to villages.
As far as the Jat Sikh vote was
concerned, the
campaigning
was
left to A k a l i
workers, and the
gurudwaras were the m a i n centres
of
campaigning. A l l
the gurudwaras
in
the constituency were
under the control of the A k a l i D a l .
The
managers
of
these gurudwaras were active sympathisers and
canvassers for the A k a l i candidate.
The A k a l i candidate and workers,
when they entered a village, i n v a r i ably headed for the gurudwara f o r
canvassing,
speech m a k i n g and for
refreshments.
On the other hand,
the Congress candidate d i d not, or
rather could not. go to the gurudwaras for electioneering. This was
an avenue closed to the Congress
candidate
- though
one
active
Congress w o r k e r remarked, as his
station wagon slopped in front of
the Public Relations Office of the
Punjab Government i n L u d h i a n a ,
" Y o u see. we use the Public Relations
Department as much as the A k a l i s use
the gurudwaras. T h i s is our eauivalent of the A k a l i gurudumras" Use
of the P u b l i c Relations D e p a r t m e n t
by the Congress took the f o r m of
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ECONOMIC
WEEKLY
b o r r o w i n g entertainers and workers
f r o m this department,
Gurudwara-Based Campaign
In the
gwrudwaras, w h e n
the
people assembled f o r d a i l y prayers
or on special occasions, the priest
or the manager of the gurudwara
or a p r o m i n e n t personality of the
area, appealed to them in the name
of the S i k h religion to vote f o r the
A k a l i candidate A j i t K u m a r .
One
of the
points w h i c h the Congress
P a r t y t r i e d t o e x p l o i t was t h a t A j i t
K u m a r was not a S i k h . But in the
gurudwaras
and
outside,
Akali
workers explained that what they
wanted was to elect a member to
the Assembly, and not a priest to
the gurudwara.
It was also p o i n t e d
out that since the Sikhs were accused
of being
communal, they
should elect A j i t K u m a r to v i n d i cate their position and prove that
they
were not communal-minded.
B u t as f a r as the Jat Sikhs were
concerned the
appeal
was made
frankly and openly in the name of
r e l i g i o n . W i t h war
cries of Sat
Sri Akal, A k a l i workers asked the
voters to vote for the S i k h Panth.
In the speeches,
given
in the
gurudwarars,
the sacrifices of the
Sikhs were recounted, especially of
G u r u G o b i n d Singh and his sons,
and the latter-day sacrifices in the
cause of the P u n j a b i Suba; it was
emphasized that now it was merely
a question of
casting the
ballot
whereas in the past the Sikhs had
to fane bullets. If the Sikhs wanted
to achieve the P u n j a b i Suba, they
should vote for A j i t K u m a r , because if A k a l i candidates were returned in large enough numbers
they could just, vote for the P u n j a b i Suba in the Assembly. In this
connection A j i t
K u m a r ' s j a i l sentences d u r i n g the
agitation
days
were recalled.
Professional singers
of m a r t i a l music created an emotionally receptive atmosphere f o r the
pronouncements
of
the
Akali
workers.
T w o i m p o r t a n t personalities i n
Akali
politics
also
campaigned
briefly for A j i t K u m a r in his constituency —- Sant Fateh S i n g h and
the A k a l i D a l Propaganda Secretary Kehar
S i n g h V a i r a g i . I n his
c a m p a i g n i n g , A j i t K u m a r received
full
cooperation f r o m the
Akali
workers who sincerely w o r k e d for
h i m . W h i l e i n the
i n i t i a l stage
there was some g r u m b l i n g because
the A k a l i D a l
had not p u | up a
THE
ECONOMIC
WEEKLY
party
member
as a
candidate,
there was no question of anybody
trying
to sabotage
his
election
when, as it was explained,
"once
the Panth has made the decision."
One must note here the identification of the
A k a l i Dal
w i t h the
S i k h Panth. T h e A k a l i p a r t y w o r k ers were no
financial burden on
A j i t K u m a r as
they came either
f r o m gurudwaras or were p a i d by
the
p a r t y : their food and transportal ion was taken care of by the
A k a l i Dal either on its own or
through the gurudumrus.
The A k a l i
Dal
campaign was
reinforced by
posters
from
the
A k a l i Dal office in A m r i l s a r . These
included : (1) an
appeal
from
Master T a r a Singh and Sant Patch
Singh to vote for A j i t K u m a r ; ( 2 )
several pictures of maimed or dead
persons in an attempt to depict the
atrocities
committed by the party
in power; (3) a picture of the opponent of Punjab
Chief M i n i s t e r
Pratap Singh
K a i r o n in Sarhali
constituency, shown
contesting; his
election f r o m
b e h i n d prison bars;
(4) a poster
c r i t i c i s i n g the Congress
government's
cultural
programmes,
showing
half-dressed
dancing girls and drunken m e n ;
(4) a poster showing the Congress
government
as
a demon-goddess,
crushing people and c i v i l l i b e r t i e s :
( 5 ) finally, a poster entitled " o l d
souls, new lives"
showing N e h r u
w i t h Aurangzeb in the background,
and
Pratap
Singh
K a i r o n with
Nawab
of S i r h i n d
in
the background
Aurangzeb and Nawab
of S i r h i n d are the two most hated
characters in Sikh history. In addit i o n there was an appeal from the
son of Dr B K A m b e d k a r to vote
for
A j i t Kumar.
emphasizing
for the
benefit of the scheduled
caste vote
that Ajit K u m a r was
a
candidate of the
Republican
Party.
The Congress Candidate
The Congress
candidate's campaign was, in contrast, highly disorganized.
Khalsa
himself
is a
w i t t y speaker, and could pour scorn
and ridicule on the A k a l i D a l . its
leader Master T a r a Singh and the
opposing
candidate.
But, in contrast
to
earlier elections, voters
now
- wanted
the candidate to
visit them
i n d i v i d u a l l y at
their
houses. Large
meetings no longer
interested
them.
Besides,
public
meetings needed Organisation.
This
August 4, 1962
proved a handicap because Khalsa
had in 1952 r u n in a double-member
constituency where the member r u n n i n g for the general seat
had done most of the organizational
work, and the candidate
running
for the reserved scat merely tagged
along.
Congress workers
themselves were very critical of Khalsa
for his lack of organization.
For
(me t h i n g he started late in the
election campaign, almost a month
after A j i t K u m a r .
Some of
the
Congress workers were critical of
his practice of r e t u r n i n g to L u d h i ana City in the evening which was
precisely
the time to meet the
voters
who
were in
the fit-Ids
d u r i n g the daytime. They also
criticised h i m for choosing K h u shkismet Singh.
vice-president
of
the District Congress Committee of
L u d h i a n a , as his
election aide
since Khushkismet Singh was not
liked by certain sections of Congress
voters in the villages.
These Congressmen
said
that
Khushkismet
Singh was openly
working for
his close relative,
Shamsher Singh
D h a n d a r i , who was r u n n i n g on the
A k a l i Dal ticket from the adjoining
L u d h i a n a South constituency. Congress leaders and workers in the
area were generally
disappointed
at Khalsa's selection of people to
accompany h i m d u r i n g his campaign in the villages.
He had chosen people who were anathema to
many Congress-men.
Moreover he
had w i t h him workers from the
Chamar caste most of the
time,
w i t h the result that he was unable
to gain an effective entry into the
Jat sections.
At times he was
even stoned
and prevented
from
entering villages.
One of the reasons for Khalsa s
lack of
attention to organization,
was his over-confidence at the beg i n n i n g , stemming from the feeling
that A j i t K u m a r was "only a lad"
in politics, a non-Sikh r u n n i n g in
a predominantly Sikh constituency
against a
Sikh
candidate of the
Congress
party.
Moreover.
the
Republican Party was not influential among the scheduled castes in
the Ludhiana District, and Khalsa
was well-known in the t e r r i t o r y because of his long history of p a r t i eipation in politics.
Another of the factors responsible
for
the
mismanagement; of
Khaisa's
campaign was a rift in
the Congress ranks. An i m p o r t a n t
269
faction in the Congress party in
the area left the party and helped
the A k a l i s . The leader of this faction. Joginder Singh, had been an
honorary magistrate and an i m p o r t ant government official, and commanded
considerable
respect and
influence among the Jats.
H i s going over to the Akalis was a great
blow to the Congress candidate. In
the Block Samiti elections, his son
had been opposed by the other
major faction in the Congress in
the area and because he feared
that attempts were being made to
undermine his influence in the Congress he went over to the Akalis.
T h i s defection to the A k a l i D a l was
influential in s w i n g i n g the Jat S i k h
votes to A j i t K u m a r in 14 of the
70 p o l l i n g stations. In addition to
this major
breakaway f r o m the
Congress party, there was much factionalism w i t h i n the party.
Approach through Panchayats
Khalsa's
m a i n strategy, as of
most Congress candidates, was to
approach panches, sarpanches and
landlords, and take them along for
c a m p a i g n i n g among other voters. It
must be said that other political
parties also approach panches and
sarpanches depending on whether
they have their p a r t y men on the
panchayats. A little more than 50
per cent of the panchayats in the
constituency are controlled by the
Congress party, about 3() per cent
by the Akalis and the rest by the
Communist party and the Hepublican party. These are rough figures,
because, for one thing, the p a w h a vat elections are supposed to be
fought on a non-party basis and no
records are kept as to w h i c h party
controls a particular panchayat. and.
secondly, at the time panchayat
elections took place the Akalis had
not completely separated themselves
f r o m the Congress party. The A k a l i
panchayats today have broken away
from the Congress Party after the
panchayat elections. S i m i l a r l y , the
Block Samiti was under the control
of the Congress party, but its chairman went over to the A k a l i Dal on
the eve of the general elections and
won a seat to the l e g i s l a t e assembly on the A k a l i ticket from an adj o i n i n g constituency. Initiallly dominated by the Congress, about 50 per
cent of its members are Akali now.
some. 12 per cent are Republicans
and Communists and the rest are
Congressmen. The
Zila
Parishad
THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY
August 4, 1962
1270
THE
ECONOMIC
has a Congressman for its c h a i r m a n ,
hut some 40 per cent of the memhers are Akalis. Except for a very
small number of cases
such as
Pamali ( p o l l i n g station number 1)
and Pamal ( 2 ) and some v i l l a ges in the Sidhwan Bel area — the
panchayats, as far as the Congress
was concerned, were unable to exert
any special influence on the voters.
Khalsa's m a i n point of attack
was that A j i t K u m a r was not a S i k h
and that he was a chain-smoker,
which he indeed is ( i n Sikh r e l i gion smoking is t a b o o ) . To the Jat
Sikhs, A j i t K u m a r was presented by
the Congress workers as an advocate
of nationalization of land and of
industries, as belonging to a party
whose founder. B R Ambedkar, was
responsible for the H i n d u Succession Act ( w h i c h the jats opposed)
and as an anti-Jal. To the scheduled
casles, A jit K u m a r was presented
as having crossed over to the A k a lis and having favoured the f o r m a t i o n o f t h e Punjabi Suba i n w h i c h
scheduled cash's w o u l d find it hard
to live in the villages. The Congress
party, on the other hand, was presell led as the protector of the scheduled castes. It is an i r o n y of p o l i tics how roles can be reversed from
election to election. In the 1952
elections, A j i t K u m a r then camp a i g n i n g f o r the S C F candidate
against Khalsa, warned the scheduled
castes that the A k a l i s w i l l "finish
t h e m " if they came into power.
Now, in 1962, Khalsa r u n n i n g on
the Congress p a r t y ticket was using
exactly the same argument. W o r k e r s
c a m p a i g n i n g for Khalsa also dropped hints that Khalsa. because of
his close connections w i t h Chief
M i n i s t e r K a i r o n , w o u l d become a
minister after the elections and that
people should vote for h i m if they
wanted to get their w o r k done later.
T h e Election Results
The election for the S i d h w a n
constituency, as f o r the rest of
Punjab, was held on February
1962. The results of the election
Bet
the
24,
are
Table 1 : E l e c t i o n Results f o r Sidhw a n Bet Constituency in 1962
Candidate
Ajit Kumar
Gopal S i n g h
Khalsa
B a c h a n Singh
B i r Singh
Lal S i n g h
August 4, 1962
WEEKLY
Party
Akali Dal
Votes
Polled
23,567
Congress
Independent
Swatantra
Independent
11,763
473
481
783
given in Table 1. The A k a l i - D a l supported
candidate won
easily.
T h i s seat had been won by an A k a l i
candidate in 1952 ( b y Khalsa, who
was now r u n n i n g on the Congress
t i c k e t ) , a Congress-Akali candidate
i n 1957, and now in 1962 i t had
gone to an Akali-supported but nonS i k h candidate. T h i s testifies to the
ability of the A k a l i Dal to swing
the vote to any candidate of its
choice in this Sikh m a j o r i t y constituency.
II
Analysis of V o t i n g Behaviour
A b o u t 30 per cent of the populat i o n of the Sidhwan Bet constituency belong to the scheduled castes,
the non-scheduled caste population
consisting p r i m a r i l y of Jat Sikhs,
w i t h a s p r i n k l i n g of caste H i n d u s
and some other backward classes.
The Hindus are mostly shopkeepers
and small-scale businessmen. Data
on the population of H i n d u s and
b a c k w a r d classes in the villages is
not available, but on the basis of
interview's some estimate of these
w i l l be given where possible and
necessary. The Jat Sikhs are the
cultivator-farmers who o w n their
l a n d . The scheduled castes are land,
less
a g r i c u l t u r a l labourers. They
also engage in leather and scavengi n g w o r k . W h i l e no figures are
available, in the Dakha part of the
constituency, about 50 per cent of
the scheduled caste population is
etigaged in shoemaking, the other
50 per cent in agriculture, h a l f of
them being tenants and the otherhalf agricultural labour. I n the S i d h wan Bet area, 75 per cent of them
work as a g r i c u l t u r a l labourers, and
about 20 per cent w o r k as labourers engaged in d i g g i n g wells, const r u c t i n g roads or m a k i n g mats and
baskets. About 5 per cent: or so are
small l a n d o w n i n g cultivators ,. Except
for this last category, in both D a k ha and Sidhwan Bet sections, the
landowners arc i n v a r i a b l y Jat Sikhs.
Data on the population of scheduled castes in the various villages
was obtained f r o m the Office of the
Superintendent of Census Operations
( P u n j a b ) i n Chandigarh. However,
i t was difficult to locate all the v i l lages w h i c h f o r m part of the p o l l i n g stations in the constituency, but
data is available for a total of 58
p o l l i n g stations — either by i n d i v i d u a l p o l l i n g stations or a combination of p o l l i n g stations ( i n case a
1271
village or group of villages are
split i n t o two or more p o l l i n g stat i o n s ) . The analysis here will be
based on the v o t i n g statistics for
p o l l i n g stations; one p o l l i n g station
covers approximately a thousand
voters.
Theory of Factions
One approach by Congress candidates in their election campaigning
is based on what may he called
' T h e Theory o f Factions." A c c o r d i n g to this theory, every village,
more p a r t i c u l a r l y the Jat section of
every village, is divided into two
factions, resulting f r o m a variety of
factors in village life. These factions,
it is said, govern the whole life of
the village. At the time of the general elections, these factions align
themselves w i t h different political
parties, characteristically one a l i g n i n g itself to the Congress p a r t y and
the other to the A k a l i D a l . In other
words, the voter's loyalty is not to
any political party, or to a p o l i t i cal appeal, or to a p a r t i c u l a r candidate, but to the local faction whose
leaders can s w i n g the vote to any
p a r t y . These factions may switch
their loyalties at the last m i n u t e ;
if one changes one way, its opponent w i l l go the other way. In other
words, the main determinant of the
voter's choice is loyalty to the local
faction rather than to a p o l i t i c a l
p a r t y or candidate. To be sure,
most villages are faction r i d d e n .
Even where panchayat elections have
taken place unanimously, factions
are present, because u n a n i m i t y in
most cases emerged as a result of
candidates w i t h d r a w i n g after h a v i n g
been convinced of certain defeat —
not f r o m an absence of contest.
However, if the election results of
S i d h w a n Bet constituency are any
guide, the theory does not seem to
hold. It is significant that the Congress candidate could get more than
51 per cent of the vote at only two
of the 70 p o l l i n g stations in the
constituency. At 25 p o l l i n g stations
he got less than 25 per cent of the
vote. Except for 12 p o l l i n g stations.
his vote at every other p o l l i n g stat i o n was less than 41 per cent. On
the other hand, except for I I p o l l i n g stations, the A k a l i - D a l - R e p u b l i can candidate got more than 51
per cent of the vote at every one
of the 70 p o l l i n g stations. Table 2
sets out in detail the vote percentages of the candidate by p o l l i n g
stations.
August 4, 1962
THE
ECONOMIC
WEEKLY
THE
ECONOMIC
WEEKLY
It is true that a p a l l i n g station
may include more than one village
and the results w o u l d thus be distorted, but the election figures for
those single villages for w h i c h data
are available, indicate the same
trend, as w i l l be seen f r o m Table 3.
If the theory of factions had been
true, it is odd that the Congress
candidate gets the smaller faction
i n the o v e r w h e l m i n g m a j o r i t y o f
the cases. Data f r o m the S i d h w a n
Bet constituency shows a m a j o r i t y
for the A k a l i D a l candidate in most
villages. However, the theory is not
to be dismissed entirely for it does
contain some t r u t h in regard to
those villages where factionalism is
bitter, or the prestige of the leaders
of the factions is at stake in the
election. In these villages, each fact i o n , whether large or small, does
align itself w i t h opposing political
parties. On the basis of i n f o r m a t i o n
available f r o m interviews, factionalism in the village was influential in
the f o l l o w i n g p o l l i n g stations or
villages mentioned in Table 4 (these
examples are i l l u s t r a t i v e and not
exclusive).
August 4, 1962
ency is an exception, b u t a look at
the p o l l i n g station figures does not
show any consistent correlation between the percentage of scheduled
caste persons in the total p o p u l a t i o n
of a p o l l i n g station and the v o t i n g
percentage of the Congress candidate (See Table 5 ) ,
To be sure, in this constituency
the sharpness of the contest between
the Congress p a r t y and the A k a l i
D a l , as f a r as the scheduled castes
were concerned, was blunted by the
fact that t w o scheduled caste candidates opposed each other w i t h a
resultant d i v i s i o n of the scheduled
caste vote. It may be that the scheduled caste p o p u l a t i o n does vote for
a
Congress candidate b u t
only
where the choice is between a -fat
S i k h of the A k a l i D a l and a Jat
S i k h of the Congress p a r t y ( i n such
constituencies, the A k a l i D a l candidates do not even approach the
Scheduled Caste Vote
An essential supplement to the
so-called "theory of factions' 1 is
that scheduled castes — at least in
the M a l w a area of w h i c h L u d h i a n a
D i s t r i c t is a p a r t - and the H i n d u s
i n v a r i a b l y vote for the Congress,
when the choice is between an A k a l i
S i k h and a Congress S i k h . The
H i n d u s vote for the Congress because the A k a l i Dal is professedly
a single c o m m u n i t y p a r t y standing
for S i k h interests exclusively.
The
scheduled castes are sympathetic to
the Congress, it is said, because the
Congress Government has abolished
untouehability, has p r o v i d e d for the
reservation of seats in legislatures
and posts in Government offices for
scheduled castes, and enacted v a r i ous measures f o r their welfare and
advancement. A n o t h e r reason is that
the scheduled castes f o r m the under,
p r i v i l e g e d sections of the village,
and come i n t o conflict w i t h Jal
S i k h landlords. The Jat Sikhs are
behind the A k a l i Dal and its dem a n d for the P u n j a b i Suba. whereat* the scheduled castes are against
P u n j a b i Suba because of the p o l i t i cal power it w i l l vest in the Jat
Sikhs. Consequently, it is said, the
scheduled
castes
overwhelmingly
vote for the Congress p a r t y . It m a y
w e l l be that S i d h w a n Bet constitu-
1273
scheduled castes, convinced as they
are that they w o u l d i n e v i t a b l y vote
for the Congress candidate).
More
T a b l e d : V o t e Percentages o f Congress a n d A k a l i Candidates i n Sidhw a n Bet Constituency
Percentage o f
Votes Polled
10-20
21-25
26-30
81-35
36-40
41-45
46-50
51-55
56-60
61-65
66-70
71-75
76-80
81-85
86-90
Number of Polling
Stations
Ajit Kumar Khalsa
13
1
12
10
7
2
16
2
6
6
4
5
12
2
9
8
18
5
1
—
1
—
THE
August 4, 1962
ECONOMIC
WEEKLY
THE BIG HURRY IN THE WORLD OF SURGERY
1274
THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY
i m p o r t a n t , i n t h i s case, the n o n Congress scheduled caste candidate
t h o u g h r u n n i n g o n the A k a l i D a l
ticket in f a c t belonged to a distinct
p o l i t i c a l p a r t y w h i c h , i n spite o f its
name — the R e p u b l i c a n P a r t y — represents exclusively the interests of
the scheduled castes. M o r e o v e r , he
h a d w o r k e d i n the constituency over
a p e r i o d of f o u r or five years and
h a d been able to b u i l d an i m a g e of
h i m s e l f as a sincere a n d dedicated
w o r k e r f o r the cause of the sched u l e d castes. I t m a y b e noted t h a t
e v e n i n 1957, w h e n r u n n i n g o n his
o w n party's ticket in the Raikot
double
member
constituency,
of
w h i c h the present constituency was
t h e n a p a r t , he was able to secure
43.2 per cent of the vote as against
the Congress candidate's 56.8 per
cent, at a t i m e w h e n t h e A k a l i s
were m e r g e d o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l y w i t h
the Congress p a r t y .
I n f a c t , the vote o f the scheduled
caste sections is f u l l of subtleties,
compounded of gratitude, fear, and
r e v o l t . T h e r e i s genuine g r a t i t u d e
o n t h e p a r t o f m a n y scheduled
caste persons f o r w h a t t h e Cong-
August 4, 1962
ress has done f o r t h e m . As one
Ramdasia S i k h v i l l a g e r b e l o n g i n g t o
the
scheduled
castes
remarked,
" G u r u G o b i n d S i n g h made a c o n d i t i o n of these s y m b o l s " — p o i n t i n g t o w a r d his beard — " b e f o r e m a k i n g
us an equal of the other Sikhs. T h e
Congress, however, granted us equality unconditionally".
A t the same
t i m e there is a feeling that the
scheduled castes have got all they
could get f r o m the Congress, a n d
that they have now to adopt other
means and organizations to f u r t h e r
t h e i r ends. T h e element of f e a r
springs f r o m the fact that the scheduled castes can be subjected to
reprisals — social,
economic
and
p o l i t i c a l — if
they go against the
wishes of the local village leaders
who
come f r o m a m o n g the
Jat
Sikhs. I n the S i d h w a n Bet section
of the constituency, m a n y scheduled
caste voters voted against the A k a l i
candidate because, due to their o w n
weak and dependent economic p o s i t i o n , they accepted the leadership of
the Jat S i k h leaders, some of w h o m
were against the A k a l i candidate
f o r his p a r t i n f i g h t i n g f o r the
r i g h t s of the landless a g r i c u l t u r a l
labour i n the past i n t h i s area. One
S i k h v i l l a g e r was asked as to the
v o t i n g i n t e n t i o n of his v i l l a g e : " W e
are g o i n g t o vote f o r the m a n w h o
i s i n j a i l . " " B u t that i s i n A m r i t s a r
District, far from here." " W e l l , we
are g o i n g to vote f o r the P a n t h . "
" H o w about the scheduled castes
p e o p l e ? " " T h e y too w i l l vote w i t h
u s . " " W h y , w o n ' t they vote f o r the
C o n g r e s s ? " " N o , w e w o u l d stop t h e i r
fodder,"
W h e n the relations between the
Jats and the scheduled castes are
b a d , then the scheduled castes vote
against the side w i t h w h o m the Jat
Sikhs are a l i g n e d — and since in
this area the Jat sections are, gener a l l y t h o u g h not t o t a l l y , i n c l i n e d
t o w a r d the A k a l i D a l — a n d since
the contest is between the A k a l i D a l
a n d the
Congress,
the scheduled
castes w o u l d tend to vote f o r the
Congress. I n S i d h w a n Bet constituency, however, in 1962 relations between the Jals and the scheduled
caste sections were by and l a r g e
good, p a r t l y perhaps because of the
realization on the p a r t of Jat S i k h
voters that since this was a reserved
constituency
they
had to
work
t h r o u g h a scheduled caste m e m b e r
i n the legislature, a n d p a r t l y p e r haps because of the electoral a l l i -
1275
ance between the A k a l i
Dal and
the R e p u b l i c a n P a r t y w h i c h i n t u r n
helped the j o i n t A k a l i - R e p u b l i c a n
candidate.
S o m e t h i n g m a y also be
said f o r the loyalty of
scheduled
caste voters to the leadership of
the late B K A m b e d k a r , his p a r t y
— the SCF — and its
successor,
the R e p u b l i c a n p a r t y .
Khalsa who
h a d been elected in 1952 f r o m this
area h a d been a close associate of
A m b e d k a r , and A j i t
K u m a r who
won in 1962 is the general secretary
of the
P u n j a b State
Republican
Party.
Hindus, Christians and Backward
Classes
Hindus
form
an
insignificant
p a r t o f the p o p u l a t i o n i n this constituency.
B u t where there is a
concentration o f H i n d u s , this comm u n i t y votes f o r the Congress in
the P u n j a b when the choice is between the Congress and the
Akali
Dal.
T h i s i s obvious
f r o m two
p o l l i n g stations: ( 1 ) S i d h w a n Bet,
p o l l i n g station
n u m b e r 2 1 , where
the Congress
candidate
received
50.3 per cent of the vote p o l l e d , and
( 2 ) A k a l g a r h , p o l l i n g station n u m ber 6 1 , ( w h e r e H i n d u s constitute
about 50 p e r cent of the p o p u l a t i o n
a n d C h r i s t i a n s another 20 per cent)
where the Congress candidate received
60.2 per cent of the vote
polled.
Data
o n the
backward
classes
is not
available.
These
classes consist largely of carpenters,
i r o n s m i t h s a n d barbers, a n d
are
present in every v i l l a g e . W h i l e they
were converted to S i k h i s m long ago,
they are not completely
accepted
into the S i k h f o l d by the Jat Sikhs
w h o consider them i n f e r i o r Sikhs.
On the other h a n d , they insistently
w a n t to p r o v e
that they are as
good Sikhs as
any other, and the
act of v o t i n g becomes a f o r m of
self-assurance and a p u b l i c demons t r a t i o n of b e i n g a complete S i k h .
T h e y v i g o r o u s l y and demonstratively
s u p p o r t e d A j i t K u m a r because he
was a candidate of the A k a l i D a l
and all staunch Sikhs were supposed
to be w i t h that p a r t y .
Jat Sikh Vote
A c c o r d i n g to some, a corollary
of the p r o p o s i t i o n that
scheduled
castes tend to vote f o r the Congress
p a r t y is that the Jat Sikhs
are
u n i t e d l y b e h i n d the A k a l i D a l .
A
look at the v o t i n g returns f o r the
Congress candidate shown in Table
5 w o u l d indicate that at
several
August 4, 1962
places he secured a h i g h e r percent,
age of voles
than the
scheduled
caste .percentage of the p o p u l a t i o n .
W h i l e part
of this may he f r o m
other categories of b a c k w a r d classes,
the evidence ' suggests that the Congress candidate d i d
cut i n t o the
Jat S i k h vole, and that the Jal Sikhs
d i d vole for the
Congress p a r t y .
Precisely
what the bases of this
loyalty are it is h a r d to say. O p p o sition workers
a t t r i b u t e it to the
g r a n t of quotas, allocation of depots
and other favours shown
by the
r u l i n g p a r t y . However, there is a
variety of factors involved, w o r k i n g
not only in the case of the Congress
candidate hut also the other candidates.
One of the most
striking
features of election c a m p a i g n i n g by
all candidates in L u d h i a n a D i s t r i c t
is the extent to
which affinal and
agnatic ties are used by candidates
and their workers to put pressure
on voters to vote f o r a p a r t i c u l a r
candidate.
These
relatives
help
irrespective of their own
political
inclinations.
The whole system of
relationships
is reactivated d u r i n g
elections.
Daughters-in-law,
for
instance, visit their ancestral villages
to w i n support f o r a certain candidate.
Candidates depute
special
workers for a p p r o a c h i n g relatives.
Past p o l i t i c a l affiliations do not make
any difference, and helping relatives
cuts across party-lines.
A
person
may be h e l p i n g two opposing parties
i n a d j o i n i n g constituencies.
While
in this case the Congress candidate
was a
member
of the
scheduled
castes, there were always a considerable
number of people who were
interested in his v i c t o r y and had
a stake in i t . Thus Jat S i k h leaders
having lies with the Congress p a r t y
b r i n g along
other relatives
and
friends into the p a r t y fold for voting f o r the Congress candidate.
Another factor is the past p o l i t i c a l
history of the village. Villages w h i c h
were strongholds of the Congress
movement in the pre-independence
p e r i o d find it difficult to break away
f r o m their old loyalty.
Sometimes
old Congressmen, t o r n between their
loyalty to the o l d
Congress and
N e h r u , on the one h a n d , and their
dissatisfaction
with
the
present
Congress regime in the P u n j a b , on
the other, just sit it out at home.
On the other h a n d , the experiences
w i t h the Congress Government may
induce the voters of a
particular
village to vote against the Congress
THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY
candidate,
An example of this is
the village of A i t i a n a
where the
A k a l i Dal candidate received 75.6
per cent of the votes.
T h i s village
was a p r o m i n e n t centre of the a n t i betterment
levy a g i t a t i o n in 1959
and witnessed a
police f i r i n g in
which a
couple of people were
k i l l e d , i n c l u d i n g a scheduled caste
woman,
and several were i n j u r e d .
The Congress candidate, .because of
the resentment against the G o v e r n ,
ment among the villagers of A i t i a n a .
was able to secure only 1.1,2 per
cent of the vote.
A g a i n , another factor is the presence in certain villages of extremely hostile
and bitter
factions
which d i v i d e the village in its voting;
The voting here is an expression of
hostility against
the
opposing
faction rather than
of
political
preference.
Many
Jat
S i k h votes go to (he Congress Party
in this manner.
T h e n , some vote
f o r the Congress p a r t y
because it
embodies governmental power.
As
one villager said,
" W e voted f o r
the B r i t i s h Government when there
was a B r i t i s h G o v e r n m e n t ; we vote
for the Congress Government when
there is a Congress G o v e r n m e n t ; if
the A k a l i s ever f o r m a Government
we w i l l
vote for them too.
We
vote for the Government, whosoever
it is not the political party.' 1 On
the other hand, it should be noted
that
the
electorate
voted
overwhelmingly against the Government
in the S i d h w a n Bet constituency. As
a matter of fact, one could point
to the existence of an anti-government
sentiment.
T h i s is obvious
f r o m the fact that in 1957. when
even the Akalis
were in alliance
w i t h the Congress p a r t y . A j i t K u m a r
could secure 30,011 voles as against
39.166 votes f o r the Congress c a n d i date.
Perhaps it may well be that
part of the reason for the success
of the A k a l i Dal lies in its a b i l i t y
to attract to itself this anti-government sentiment.
Still another
factor
influencing
the voter's choice,
though not in
the case of the Congress candidate
here
whose ancestral village
lay
outside the constituency, is geographical l o y a l t y .
A j i t K u m a r polled
85,4 per cent of the polled voles at
p o l l i n g station number 48,
which
included his village D h a t . S i m i l a r l y ,
while the election returns f o r the
other
candidates were
extremely
1276
low, at B h u n d r i p o l l i n g s t a t i o n (18)
they w e n t up to 37.9 per cent because that p o l l i n g station includes,
the village of L a i S i n g h , one of the
other candidates.
It was a c o m b i nation of
such factors that
cut
across ethnic and religious loyalties
that enabled the Congress candidate
to cut into the Jat S i k h vote.
Conclusion
W h a t can we say in conclusion
about the factors that made possible,
the o v e r w h e l m i n g
v i c t o r y of the
Akali-supported-Republican
candidale?
It can be said that, consideri n g the composition of the constituency
since there is no large
t o w n h a v i n g a large H i n d u p o p u l a tion and the scheduled caste population is o n l y 30 per cent — .the
candidate p u t up by the A k a l i Dal
w o u l d have w o n , not only because
of the religious appeal the
Akali
Dal makes to the Sikhs but also in
its a b i l i t y to marshall on its side
anti-government
sentiment.
What
made possible
the
overwhelming
victory of A j i t K u m a r was h i s o w n
work among the scheduled
caste
population and his s u p e r i o r - o r g a n i sation.