Rising From and To the Sea:
China, Technology and the Future of Maritime Power
KerryLynnNankivell
Maritime historian Felipe Fernandez-Armesto notes that “[o]nly miracles of simplicity or
complexity”canmakeitpossibletobuildasocietycentrallyorganizedaroundthesea.1 Thesheer
hostilityofthemaritimeenvironment,lackoffreshwaterorreliablefoodsupplyandconstantthreat
ofexposure,canonlybeareithermodest,primitivesea-basedcivilizations,liketheOrangLautof
theMalayanpeninsulaortheUrosofLakeTiticacaintheAndesmountains,orintricatelycomplex
ones,liketheEuropeanempiresoftheenlightenmentortheUnitedStatesoftoday.Studyofeither
civilizationalphenomenontemptsustoconclude,asFernandez-Armestoclaimswetoooftendo,
that“manisnotmadeforthesea,northeseaforman.”2 Indeed,evenfromwithingreatsea-faring
cultures,thepredominantculturalnarrativeoftheseaisoneofdisorientation,longing,madness
andultimatelydeath.ThesethemesprovideathreadfromHomertoShakespeare,throughthe
timelessnessofMelvilletothecontemporarynarrativesofYannMartel.
Butthetruthisthatthelandisnotonlymarginaltotheseageographically,butalsosocially.
Successfulandsustainedexploitationofthesea,whetherfortrade,migrationorwar,hasbeena
consistenthallmarkofhighcivilization.ThiswassofortherichcivilizationsoftheIndianOcean
morethan6,000yearsago,theirfollowersintheMediterranean,andcertainlytheEuropeanempires
whoserise,forbetterorworse,markedtheopeningofmodernage.
Today,U.S.-ledglobalization,underchallengebyaquicklyrisingAsialedbyChina,isalso
underpinnedbyasophisticatedsea-basedtradingsystem.Thissystem–enabledbyglobalmegaports,standardizedcontainersandstories-highgantrycranes,aworldwidebreak-neckpacein
shipbuilding,satellitecommunicationandmodern,globalfinance–hasallowedustoexperience
thesinglelargestaccumulationofwealththatmankindhasyetachieved.3 Andaswasthecasewith
IndianOceancultureswitnesstoboomingmonsoon-poweredtradeinthefifthcenturyB.C.E.,so
today,thosenationswhohavesuccessfullyleveragedtheseaforeconomicadvantagehavebecome
wealthythefastest,interactedwiththeworldthemostfrequently,projectedpowerthefarthest,and
thereby given their cultures, languages, religions, and political systems a large advantage in
survivability.
WhathaschangedinrelativecivilizationalsuccessesfromtheIndianOceanthousandsofyears
agototoday?Onlytechnologicalinnovationinseapower,andthenumberofplayerspursuingit.
Today’swidelyperceivedshiftinthebalanceofpowerisunderpinnedbyjustthat.EastAsia’srise
isbestunderstoodasashiftinseapower,primarilycommercialand(tosomeextent)military.Led
byJapan,SouthKorea,SingaporeandTaiwan,newplayerslikeMalaysia,China,Vietnamand,
increasingly,Indiaarelookingtoseapoweraspre-requisitesforoverallnationalsuccess.These
majorsuccessesinincreasingseapowerhavecomehand-inhandwithmajornewgeo-political
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burdens,someofthemurgentandintense.The21st century,assomanybefore,willbeshapedby
nationalsuccessesandfailuresinmeetingthesechallengesandcontinuingthesafeandreliableuse
ofthesea.
AnexhaustiveanalysisoftheregionalcausesandconsequencesoftheriseofmaritimeAsiais
beyondthescopeofthiswork.Suchaninvestigationwouldbenothinglessthanamaritime
interpretationofavastanddeepcivilizationalshiftthatischangingtheglobalcenterofgravity
fromtheAtlantictothePacificOcean.However,thisworkcananddoestakeonare-description
oftheriseofChinainparticularfromamaritimeperspective.ThecaseofChinaistakenasa
specialoneforthreeprimaryreasons.First,itistheriseofChinathatwillhaveandisalready
havingthemostwidely-feltregionalimpact.Second,theriseofChina,unliketheriseofsome
otherplayers,isthemostaccessibleandclearexampleofasuccessful,maritime-basedbroad
nationalstrategy.Andthird,thesuccessofthismaritime-basednationalstrategyinChinais
promptingare-evaluation,evenamongestablishedmaritimeplayers,abouttheveryfundamentals
ofthemaritimedomainandmodernseapower.Forthesethreereasons,theimpactofmaritime
poweronoverallnationaldevelopment,andtheroleoftechnologyinenablingthatrisewillbe
examinedhereintermsofChinaprimarily.ApplyingtheseinsightstoSingapore,SouthKorea,
Vietnam,Malaysia,andotherpowerswillremainoutsidethescopeofthispaper.
Beginningfromthatpremise,thisoverviewwillfollowthislogictoexaminetheriseofChina
andthestrategicfutureoftheAsia-Pacificthroughamaritimelens,withaviewtotheroleof
technologyanddevelopmentintheachievementofseapower.Analysiswillbeundertakeninthree
broadparts:itwillbeginwithaconsiderationofChina’stwokindsofseapower,bothcommercial
andmilitary.ItwillbearguedthatthefirstisthefoundationofmodernChina,andthatthesecond
onlyanaturalout-growthofamaritime-basedeconomy.Discussionwillgoontoexplorethe
impressivegrowthinmaritimecapabilities,particularlysub-surface,inthewiderIndo-Pacific
context,consideringtheimpactontheregionalstrategicoutlook.Finally,itwillconcludewitha
discussionofthepolicyburdensofAsia’smaritimesuccess.
TWOKINDSOFSEAPOWER
China as a Commercial Sea Power
ThemaritimesecurityfieldintheAsia-Pacificisdominatedbydiscussionsabouttheriseof
AsianseapowertranslatedastheriseofAsiannavies.Toooften,scholarsandsecuritypractitioners
alikeassumethatseapowerisasingle-dimensionalcharacteristic,measuredin‘grayhulls’and
navaltonnage.WhileitisundoubtedlytruethatAsianpowerisincreasinglyemployednotjuston
thecontinentitself,butontheworld’soceans,focusingonthisdevelopmentaloneputsthecart
beforethehorse.Asia’snavalexpansion,whileitselfastrategicgame-changerintheregion’s
security outlook, needs to be understood as a necessary result of a dramatic rise in Asia’s
commercialseapower.Itisthiscommercialseapowerthatisthefoundationsupporting,ifnot
necessitating,Asia’sturntotheseainnavalterms.
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In1998,seniorChinesemilitaryofficials,evaluatingChina’smilitarypositioninAsia,argued
thatChinaneededto“fosteramaritimeconsciousnessamongitscitizens,developamaritime
economy,anddevelopitsnavalsecurityforces.”4 Whilethefirstandthirdrecommendationswere
well-taken at that time, arguably, by 1998 China had already begun to cement formidable
commercialseapower.Intheaggregate,theeconomicrevolutionthathasliftedbillionsoutof
povertyinChinaandtransformedChina’sglobalpositionhasbeenprofoundlymaritimeinnature.
WhenChinaembarkedoneconomicreformsintheearly1980s,itsmanufacturingexportsasa
percentageofglobalexportswaslessthan1percent.5 Twodecadeslater,spurredbymassive
investmentinthenation’smanufacturingsectorandcoastalinfrastructure,Chinaaccountedfor
morethan8percentofallglobalexportsinthemanufacturingsectorbythefirsthalf-decadeof
thiscentury,6 andafterabriefperiodofnegativegrowthfollowingtheglobalfinancialcrisisin
2008,wasagainincreasingitsmanufacturedexports,bothinabsoluteandrelativeterms,byearly
2011.7 Whilethisimpressivegrowthhasoftenbeenregisteredasasuccessofnationalinvestment
inmanufacturingalone,ithasbeenimportantlypredicatedontheabilityofChinesemanufacturers
togetproductstofar-offmarketsviaseabornetrade.ThishasmeantthatBeijing’sdevelopment
strategiesneededtobelaidoutwithreferencetothesea:earlyinvestments,frominfrastructureto
capitalsupportofidentifiedindustries,werealmostexclusivelyfocusedonthosecoastalareasof
Chinawitheasiestandcheapestaccesstosea-lanes.Inspiredbytheexampleofneighboring
Singapore,8China’sleadershipintheearly1980sdeliberatelysetouttoridethesteadytideofoceangoing trade sailing past China’s coast. Rather than pursue indigenous ‘balanced growth’ or
domestically-focused industrialization, Beijing instead chose to throw its weight behind the
developmentofamanufacturingsectorpluggedintotheglobalmaritimeeconomyasaneasyand
accessiblefulcrumfornationaleconomicdevelopment.
In1995,threeyearsbeforeGeneralMiexhortedChinatodevelopamaritimeeconomy,with
China’smanufacturingsectoralreadydemonstratingimpressivegrowth,stepswereundertakento
ensureincreasedreliablemaritimeaccessforChinesemanufacturerstotheircustomersoverseas.
Inthatyear,theShanghaiMunicipalGovernmentwasauthorizedbyBeijingtodevelopitsmaritime
economywithaviewtoleveragingtheinternationaltradingsystem;Shanghaitookthisdirection
withadegreeofenergyandenthusiasmthatnoonecouldhaveforeseen.In1990,Shanghaiport
handledlessthanhalf-a-million20-footequivalentunits(TEUs)ofcontainerizedtrade,despiteits
favorablegeographicpositionatthemouthoftheYangtzeRiveronthePacificbasin.By1998,
Shanghai’sthroughputhadrisento3millionTEUs,averagingalmost27percentgrowthyear-onyear.9By2010,ShanghaihadnarrowlyedgedoutSingaporetobecometheworld’slargestcontainer
port,asingularlymagnificentandunforeseenachievement.10 Itwaspremisednotonlyonthe
exploitationofnaturalandstructuraleconomicadvantages,includingShanghai’sdeep-waterharbor
andChina’scompetitivelabormarket,butalsoonplanning,foresightandfeatsofengineering
undertakenbytheChineseleadership.Massiveinfrastructureprojectsbecamethehallmarkof
Chinesenationaldevelopment,includingthedredgingofShanghaiharbortomakewayforeverbiggercontainervessels,theconstructionofsubsidiaryportstoprovideexcesscapacity,andthe
buildingofthelarge-scalesupportinginfrastructuretoconnectitsmoothlytogether,suchasthe
impressive32.5kmDonghaiBridge,thesecond-largestoceanbridgeintheworld.Asasingle
nationalasset,theportatShanghaiisimpressiveenough.Consideration,however,thatShanghai
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isonlythelargestofChina’smega-ports,eightofwhichrankasamongtheworld’s20largest
containerthoroughfares,11 andonebeginstoappreciatethemagnitudeandglobalrelevanceof
China’smaritimeeconomicrevolution.
ButevenbeforetheemergenceofShanghaiasthefocalpointofChina’smaritimeeconomic
strategy,by1998,Chinahadalreadyscorednotablesuccessesinthedevelopmentofcrediblesea
powerasaleadingplayerintheglobalshipbuildingindustry.Thoughinthe1980s,Chinawas
describedasa“technologicallybackward,poor-qualitymanufacturerofbasicships,”12 asearlyas
1992,Chinarankedasthethirdlargestshipbuilderintheworld,standingastridelong-established
EuropeanindustryplayerslikeGermanyandtheNetherlands,andalreadyeclipsingtraditional
maritimepowersliketheUnitedKingdom.13 Today,Chinaistheworld’ssecondlargestcommercial
shipbuilder,secondonlytoindustrypowerhouse,SouthKoreaandsecondtononeintermsofraw
aggregateneworders(Chinesefirmsgrabbed61.6percentofallnewvesselordersin2010).14
WhileChinesefirmsarepreferredforlow-techbulkcarriers(incontrasttoSouthKorea’shighendships),Chinahasdevelopedasophisticatedmanufacturingcapabilitythatwidensitsmaritime
base,raisesitsindigenoustechnologicalandengineeringcapacity,andmoredeeplyentrenchesits
economyandoverallnationalinterestsintheglobalmaritimemarket-place.
MovingupthevaluechainofcommercialshipbuildingisnottheonlychallengefacingChinese
commercialseapowerinthecomingdecades.Themostpressingchallenge,alreadyidentifiedby
Chineseplanners,willbetoensurethatChineseportscontinuetothrivewithoutbecomingtheir
ownworstcompetition.Chineseplannersareacutelyawarethat,givenChina’sunquestioned
dominanceofcontainertradeintheEastAsianregionandglobally,futurecompetitivethreatis
likelytocomefromwithin,ratherthanfromabroad.Thatis,theprimarychallengetoChina’s
continuedsuccessistheveryrealprospectthatthesuccessesofShenzenandGuangzhoumaycome
at the expense of Shanghai or Hong Kong, creating an effective ceiling to China’s national
commercialseapower.Already,analystsofportdevelopmentstrategiesinthisregionhavenoted
theproblemof“mutuallydestructivecompetition”15 amongagroupofall-Chineseportsandport
operators.
However,adaptivebehaviorspremisedon“co-opetition”ratherthandirectcompetitionalready
characterizedevelopmentsinbusinessstrategyinsouthernChinaandHongKong.Portoperators,
facingincreasingcompetition,haveformed“strategicalliances”withtheircompetitorsasameans
ofmaintainingmarketshare,increasingbargainingpowerwithglobalshippinglines,andensuring
long-termmarketrelevancethroughthedevelopmentofcomplementarybusinessstrategies,as
opposedtodirectlycompetitiveones.16 Thoughthisdevelopmentwasprimarilyobservableatthe
firmlevelinsouthernChina(thatis,betweencompanies,eitherprivateorstate-owned),thereis
evidencethatthisstrategyhasbeenadoptedatthelevelofgovernmentalportauthorities.InJune
2011,Chinesemediasourcesconfirmedthata“strategicalliance”betweenfourChineseports–
Qingdao,Yantai,RizhaoandWeihai–signedacooperativeframeworkagreementwithSouth
Korea’sPortofBusantoestablishanintegrated“shippingandlogisticscenterinNortheastAsia.”17
This“portcluster”approach,inwhichcloselysitedportsmayconsolidatemarketsharebytaking
onspecializedroleswithintheclustertoformanintegratedlogisticsregion,isclearlyaimedat
takingChinesecompetitivenessinthemaritimelogisticssectortoanewlevelforthenextcentury.
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Whetherornotsuch“co-opetition”isfeasible,whatthebalanceofshort-termcostsandlong-term
gainswillbe,andhowitwillaffectoverallportoperationsworldwideremaintobedetermined.
However, China has already proven its weight in commercial sea power, suggesting that any
significantorganizationaldevelopmentthereshouldbetakenasapotentialleadingtrendinthe
overallglobalindustry.
Andso,China’sfast-developingstrengthatseahasbeenseveraldecadesinthemaking,though
itsmilitarymodernizationhasonlygainedwide-spreadglobalattentionsincetheturnofthecentury.
When General Mi advocated in 1998 for a Chinese “maritime consciousness” and “maritime
economy”asaprecursortoestablishingChina’sglobalpower,hewasalreadywell-behindthe
times.Bydesign,DengXiaoping’sopeningofChinatotheworldin1978firmlyorientedthe
countrytoitscoasts.Value-addedexportsinthemanufacturingsectorwasasingleplankofnational
development strategy, further enabled by the design and construction of major world-class
infrastructureprojectsatChineseports,andbyagovernment-ledexplosioninChineseshipbuilding.
Today, China’s economic miracle continues to be profoundly maritime. Chinese people are
emerging from a century of poverty by making rudimentary (but increasingly modern)
manufacturedproducts,funnelingthemthroughnewChinesemega-portsatever-increasingspeed
andvolume,tobecirculatedaroundtheglobebyChinese-builtships.
Asaresult,China,moresothanmostoftheworld’slittoralstates,hasentangleditscontinued
prosperityandwell-beingwithsafeandreliableaccesstotheworld’soceans.Onthatbasis,inthe
widelyreadZhongguo Junshi Kexue,aseniorofficerofthePeople’sLiberationArmyusesU.S.
navaltheoristAlfredThayerMahantounderscoreChina’sneedtocontrolAsiansealanesof
communication(SLOCs),especiallythe“strategicpassages”throughwhichChinese-tradedgoods
and materials traverse: “In modern times, efforts aimed at securing the absolute control of
[maritime]communicationsareturningwitheachpassingdayintoanindispensableessentialfactor
inensuringtherealizationofnationalinterests.”18Itsmaritime-basedeconomyimpelsBeijingto
directnationalsecuritypolicytowardsafeguardingitsfundamentallydomesticeconomicinterests.
China as a Military Sea Power
Thus,evenbeforethedawnofthenewmillennium,Chinahadfosteredthedevelopmentof
credible,indigenousseapowerwithcommercial,ratherthanmilitaryroots.Ofcourse,these
commercialsuccesses,particularlywithrespecttoChina’sever-busiershipyards,hadimportant
repercussionsintherealmofmilitarypolicy.IfscholarsinChinaareincreasinglyturningtoU.S.
navaltheoriststounderstandandassessChina’sstrategicpositionintheAsia-Pacific,itisbecause
China’snewandintensevulnerabilitytonavalblockadeiscausingadeepre-assessmentinBeijing
ofthePacificOceanandthepostureofChina’sneighbors.Thisre-assessmenthasemphasizedtwo
primaryconstraintsonChina’sgeo-strategicposition.
ThefirstisChina’s“Malaccadilemma.”In2003,ChinesePresidentHuJintaoassertedthat
“certain major powers” are interested in controlling the Straits of Malacca to China’s great
disadvantage.19 AstheprimaryconduitforChina’sincreasinglylargeforeignenergysupplies,as
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wellasaconduitforChineseexports,thestrategicchokepointsthroughmaritimeSoutheastAsia
(includingtheMalacca,LombokandMakassarstraits)areamajorsourceofanxietyamongChina’s
militaryplanners.WhilestepstomitigateChina’sdependenceonseaborneenergyhavebeen
undertaken(primarilyviatheconstructionofpipelines),theeconomicrealityremainsthatChina
willcontinuetobedependentonsea-borneenergycargosforthelongterm.Moreover,Chinese
exportsofmanufacturedgoodstomarketsintheMiddleEast,EasternAfricaandtheMediterranean
necessarilyrequiretransportthroughthenarrowstraitsofmaritimeSoutheastAsia.Asaresult,
muchstrategicweightisplacedonBeijing’sabilityto,ifnotcontrol,thenguaranteefreeaccessto
thesewaterways.
ThesecondprimaryconstraintonmodernChina’sgeo-strategicposition,givenitsmaritimefocusedeconomy,hasbeenidentifiedbyChinesemilitaryleadersastheproblemofthe‘firstisland
chain.’Writingin2003,ChinesescholarsHouSonglingandChiDiantangexplain:
[A]lthoughChina’sgeographicpositioncausesChinatofacethesea,itdoesnotborderthe
ocean.Betweenthenearbyseasandthegreateroceanisanislandchaincomposedofthe
Japanese archipelago, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, and numerous Southeast Asian
archipelagos.Thisisthe“firstislandchain.”Topassthroughthenearbyseasandenter
thelargerocean,Chinamustpassthroughthisislandchain.Thenorthernpartofthisisland
chain is currently controlled by the U.S.-Japan alliance. These areas can easily be
blockadedduringtimesofwarsincetheyareisolatedfrontallybyTaiwan,whichhasstill
notbeenreunifiedwiththemotherland.20
Thus, the vulnerability of China’s coastal economic centers to blockade, disruption or
destructionbytheUnitedStatesanditsallieshasputanewimperativeoncontrollingallofthe
waterswithinthe‘firstislandchain.’Beijingseemstobelievethatcontrollingthesecoastalseas
istheonlymeansofguaranteeingfreeandreliableaccesstotheopenoceanintheeventofregional
hostilities.Thiscontroloftheseaincludes,ofcourse,regainingcontrolofTaiwan,thelargest
singleislandinthechain,strategicallylocatedatitscenter.Seeninthislight,China’snaval
modernizationandstrategicfocustoregaincontrolofTaiwancanbeunderstoodasaninevitable
structuralcorollarytoitseconomicmiracle.21
Justasitscommercialsuccessinthemaritimerealmhashadimportanteffectsonmilitary
policy,italsohashadimportantbenefitsforthemilitarymodernizationthatitnecessitates.That
istosay,thatnotonlydoesChina’smaritimeeconomycreateanewstrategicimperativeatsea,it
alsomakesiteasiertomeetthatimperative.Incontrasttomanyinthedevelopingworld,Chinais
increasinglyemployingadefense-sectorinnovationmodelperfectedintheUnitedStatesthat
leveragestheglobalmarketplacethroughthecommercialsectorasameanstospursustainable,
indigenous technological growth directed at long-term defense priorities. This has paid big
dividendsinChina’sshipbuildingsector,inwhichcommercialandnavalshipbuildingprojectsare
undertakenliterallyalongsideoneanother,sometimesinthesameshipyardbythesamestate-owned
enterprise.22 Whiletechnologyisnotuniformlyapplicabletomilitaryandcommercialshipbuilding,
thereareenoughareasofoverlapthatthesectorshavemutuallybenefitedoneanother.23 Both
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commercialandnavalshipbuildinginChinahaveseenaveritableexplosion:justasChinamoved
surelyuptheladderofcommercialshipbuildingnations,sothePeople’sLiberationArmy(Navy)
hasratchetedupthepaceofitsshipbuildingprograms.China’sPLA(N)unveiledtwoclassesof
nuclear-poweredsubmarinesoverthelastdecadeandlooksontracktolaunchanotherby2015,an
unanticipatedachievementinaremarkablyshortperiodoftime.TheaggregateresultisthatChina
ispositioningitselftobeamaritimesuperpowerwithnotonlyfar-reachingstrategicinterests,but
strategicadvantagesthataredeeplyintertwinedwithitscommercialsuccess.
Ofcourse,Chinaisnotaloneindiscoveringthehigh-valuereturnoninvestmentinlinking
commercialindustrialcapabilitytomilitaryseapower.Othercountrieshaverecognizedand,to
varyingdegrees,employedthislogicaswell.SouthKorea,forexample,spentmuchofthelast
decadesofthe20th centurynurturingthedevelopmentofindustrygiants–Daewoo,Hyundaiand
Samsung–andeventuallysucceededinallbutcorneringtheglobalmarketonshipconstruction.
LikeChinatoday,SouthKoreaquicklyleveragedthisindustrialhigh-technologycapacitytofasttrackthedevelopmentofmodernnavalshipbuildingofhigh-qualityplatformsenabledbyforeignproduced accompaniments. Most recently, the much-envied KDX programme, in which the
RepublicofKoreaNavywilltakedeliveryofthreeclassesofvesselsinlessthanadecade,brought
thesecondofthreeplannedAegis-capabledestroyersonlineinJune2011.24 TheROKNavy
describesthenewplatformasa“theworld’stopclassanti-ship,anti-aircraftandanti-submarine”
asset,notingthatitcarriesawidearrayofAmerican,EuropeanandKoreanweapons,including
theAegisCombatSystemproducedbyLockheedMartin.25
ItisthiskindofnaturalstrategicsynergythatthethenChiefofNavalOperationsAdmiralGary
RougheadwaseyeingwhenhetoldtheSenateArmedServicesCommitteethattheUnitedStates
Navyrequiresa“stableshipbuildingprogram”notonlytomaintaintheFleet’scapabilityandaccess
intheworld’soceans,buttosafeguardtheAmericancommercialindustrialbaseintheshipbuilding
sectorasaneasily-eroded,butnoteasilyrebuiltnationalstrategicasset.26 Perhapsunderpressure
ofshrinkingbudgets,someunderperformingshipbuildingcontractsorempoweredorganizedlabor,
thereispalpableconsternationamongU.S.NavyprofessionalsaboutthestateofU.S.shipbuilding
anditseventualimpactonbothcommercialandmilitaryseapower.
China’s Collapsing Domains
Asnotedabove,Chinaisinnovatingtosendafleettosea,boastinggreatersizeandexhibiting
greatertechnologicalsophistication.Thistrendwasmostprominentlyinevidencetoeveryonein
thestrategiccommunity,andnotlimitedtomaritimeprofessionalsonly,withthelong-overdue
confirmationinJune2011byChina’sPLAChiefofGeneralStaffGeneralChenBingdethatChina
wasindeedpreparingtosailitsfirstaircraftcarrier.27 Theconfirmationwasquicklyactedupon:
the refurbished ex-Soviet carrier, Varyag completed its maiden voyage onAugust 17, 2011,
uncomfortablycoincidentwithavisitfromU.S.VicePresidentBiden.28 Follow-oncommentary
offeredtothe Hong Kong Commercial Daily byLt.Gen.QiJianguo,AssistantChiefoftheGeneral
Staff,notedthataircraftcarriersare“symbolsofagreatnation”thataredeployedbyallofthe
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world’sgreatnations.29 WhilestrategiccommentatorsoutsideChinaaregenerallycautiousintheir
overallassessmentoftheimmediatestrategicimpactofthisnewdevelopmentvis-à-vistheUnited
States,30 thereisnodoubtthatChina’semergenceasamaritimepowerofsignificantsizeandscope
isirreversibleandofgreatportentinthelongterm.
Inadditiontoitsimpressivefeatsofrelativelyshort-fuseshipbuilding,China’seffortstomeet
newstrategicimperativesatseahavecomeinunconventionalformsaswell.Itislikelywiththese
unconventional,asymmetriccapabilities,andnotthroughthedevelopmentoftraditionalcapabilities
likeaircraftcarriers,thatChinawillseektogainadvantageoverestablishednavalpowers.Facing
overwhelmingU.S.regionalsuperiority,combinedwiththecleartechnologicalsuperiorityofU.S.
alliesJapanandSouthKorea’smaritimeforces,Chinahassoughttoleapfrogandinnovateitsway
toanasymmetricbalancingofthosemaritimepowersofwhichitismostsuspicious.Through
technologicalinnovation,China’smilitarytodayaimstonotonlyaddassetstothemaritimedomain,
butfundamentallychangeitscharacterbycollapsingitwithlandandspace.Themostobvious
exampleofthisisthedevelopmentoftheAnti-ShipBallisticMissile(ABSM),Dong-Feng21D
(DF-21D)bytheChinesePeople’sLiberationArmy,whichmightonedaybeabletoaccurately
targetanaircraftcarrierstrikegroupsailingasfaras2,700kilometersawayfromtheChinese
coastline.Asleadinganalystsnote,theDF-21Dcouldbestationedonthecoasttofullyexploitthe
rangeofthetechnology,oritcouldbeembeddedsodeeplywithinChineseterritorysoastomake
anyretaliationorpre-emptivemeasureagainstitanattackontheheartofChina,andtherefore
“extremelyescalatory.”31 Forthisreason,manyanalystsagreethattheDF-21Disnotjustanother
inastringoftechnologicalmilestonesmarkedbythePLA,butisapotentiallyparadigm-shifting
developmentthatwilluncomfortablyblurlong-helddistinctionsbetweenthemaritimerealmand
theterritorialone.Historically,theformerhasbeenexploitedasarealmofferingalotofpolitical
andstrategicmaneuverability:nationscouldputpressureonrivalsatseathattheycouldnot
realisticallygetawaywithonland,engagingineverythingfromgunboatdiplomacytominor
provocationswithlittleescalatoryeffect.Blurringthelinebetweenthelandandtheseawillmean
thatthisvaluablemaneuverabilitywillbeimportantlyandsignificantlyreduced.
NotonlyisChina’smoderntechnologicalenvironmentfusingseapowerwithconventionallandbasedpower,itisalsoblurringthedistinctionbetweenseapoweranddominanceofbothouter
space and cyberspace. Modern navies, led by the U.S., increasingly found power projection
capabilityoninformationtechnologiesandenablingassetsinthesky,ratherthanatsea.Such
informationandcommunicationstechnologiesallowforcestoemployglobalpositioningsystems,
precision-guided munitions, and other networked & digitized information-based capabilities
necessaryformodernfightingforcesoperatingfarfromhomeports.Inimportantways,seapower
inthe21st centurywillalsorequiredeeprelianceandcontrolofspaceandspace-basedassets.32
Furtherdownthechain,ensuringtheintegrityofinformationandthereliabilityofcommunications
channelsincyberspaceisvitaltoensuringtheoperationalviabilityofafar-flungfleetsailingin
thevastoceanicregionofthePacific.Thoughnotspecificallyorovertlydirectedatoneanother,
boththeUnitedStatesandChinaareclearlyawareofthedeepeningmulti-dimensionalityofmodern
seapowerintermsofexpandingspatialdomains.Asaresult,bothorganizationscontinueto
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innovatetofurtherprojecttheirpoweralongalldimensionalaxes,andhedgeagainstvulnerability
throughinnovateddefensivetechnologiesandpostures.
Certainly,thisisthemessagethatseniorU.S.militaryofficialsaredeliveringtoWashington.
ChallengedbypoliticalleaderstodemonstratethattheformidableU.S.NavyandU.S.Pacific
Command(PACOM)wouldhavearesponsetomissiledevelopmentsachievedinChina,comments
madebyseniorofficialsincludingAdmiralGaryRougheadandAdmiralPatrickWalsh(Pacific
FleetCommander)suggestthattheappropriateresponsetoChina’sDF-21Dannouncementwill
bemulti-tiered.Asearlyas2009,AdmiralRougheadtoldU.S.SenatorJohnMcCainatahearing
oftheU.S.ArmedServicesCommitteethatthebestinnovationtomaintainthecredibilityand
influenceofU.S.seapowerisnottechnologicalper se, butorganizational.Hearguedthat,asthe
U.S.alreadydeploysatechnologicallyunmatchedfleet,theU.S.Navyshouldadapttochanging
strategicconditionsbythinkingaboutnewparadigmsforthemaritimedomain.Thiswillinclude,
amongotheradaptations,thinkinginnewwaysabouthowtoarrangeandstructuretheuseofits
already-established assets. A new paradigm might privilege, for example a “Blue Water
AntisubmarineWarfare”premisedon“integratedairandmissiledefense.”Thenewparadigm
mightalsorequirefocusingshipbuildingeffortsnotonlarge,targetableplatformslikeaircraft
carriers,butonmoreagile,dispersiblelittoral-capablevesselsinstead.33 In2011,respondingto
CongressionalconcernsabouttheDF-21Dinnovationinparticular,AdmiralWalshimpliedinan
interviewwithJapanesemediathatChinesemissiledevelopmentputanewpremiumonthemissile
defenseprogram,includingthecooperationofU.S.alliesinAsiainthatprogram,as“essentialto
[U.S.]abilitytooperatefreely”inthePacific.34
NoneoftheseanswersrepresentafullysatisfyingAmericananswertothechallengeofChinese
missileinnovation.Asmoreandmoreunclassifiedsourcesbecomeavailable,itislikelywewill
seethattheoverallU.S.responsetotheDongFeng21Dwillinvolveamyriadofactions,including
theonesdiscussedabovealongsidemanyothers.TheUnitedStates,withaconsiderableindigenous
andsustainabletechnologicalcapabilityofitsown,willnonethelessbeunlikelytodirectlyoutinnovateChinaonthismeasurewithasinglecounter-platform,butwilladaptinamulti-dimensional
fashiontonewstrategicrealities.35
THEPROLIFERATIONOFSEAPOWER:MODERNMULTI-POLARITYATSEA
ThoughthePeople’sRepublicofChina’semergenceasafirmlyfoundedseapowerispreeminenttounderstandingthemodernAsia-Pacific,itiscontextuallyimportanttonotetheoverall
proliferation of new maritime players throughout the region. In 2011, there is no doubt that
technologicalinnovationischangingtheseascapeoftheIndo-Pacificregioninmilitaryterms.
Whilethedevelopmentofcommercialseapowerisinarguablymoreimportantintermsofthe
impactithasonthedaytodaylivesoftheregion’sinhabitantsanditsbroadsecurityoutlook,
advancesinmilitarypowerareimportantcorollariestounderstandingthestrategicfutureofthe
Asia-Pacific.WhetherinJapan,SouthKoreaorSingapore,orVietnam,MalaysiaorIndia,the
economicstructureoftheAsia-Pacificisgeneratinganeworreinforcedinterestintheoceansin
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virtuallyeverymajorcapitalonthecontinent.Inthesecountries–justasinChina–ascommercial
interestsinseabornetradebecomemoresophisticatedandprofitable,sotheimperativetosecure
thenation’sintereststhroughmilitarycredibilitywillsharpen.InthemodernIndo-Pacific,this
logichasbeenborneout:today,theflagfollowstrade,thatistosaythatthenaturalresultof
increasinglytrade-dependenteconomiesistheconcurrentdevelopmentofsophisticatedseapower
toprotectthoseinterestswherevertheymaybethreatened.
Therearemanyplacestofindevidenceofthistrendacrosstheregion,butthesinglemost
instructiveareaforinvestigationistheexplosioninnavalcapabilityacrossthetheater.Though
theU.S.Navyremainsthepreponderantpoweratseaandwillforsometime,36 thereisincreasing
erosionoftheNavy’sstrategicadvantagebyanarrayofincreasinglycredibleplayersontheocean.
NotonlyChina’sPeople’sLiberationArmy(Navy)andtheIndianNavy,butalsotheJapanese
MaritimeSelfDefenseForces(JMSDF),theRepublicofKoreaNavy(ROKN),theRepublicof
SingaporeNavy(RSN),andtheRoyalAustralianNavy(RAN)aresendingincreasinglycapable
platformstoseawithincreasingfrequency,inserviceofanever-wideningsphereofstrategic
missionsforthegovernmentsthattheyserve.Whetherfisheriespatrol,customsenforcement,antipiracy operations, disaster management and humanitarian assistance, or old-fashioned naval
exercise,patrolandportvisits,theIndo-Pacificoceanscomplexisnowmorethaneverahightrafficareaforregionalnavies.
Innosingleindicatoristhisexplosionincapabilitymorestarkthanintheproliferationof
submarines.Atleastoneprivatemarketconsultancy,ForecastInternational,predictsthat111
submarineswillbebuiltgloballybetween2011and2020,nurturingamarketworth$106billion.37
Thoughtheestimateis,especiallyintheout-years,highlyspeculative,wecansayforsurethat
morethan50submarineshavebeenacquiredorannouncedbyIndo-Pacificnationsinthelastfive
yearsalone.38 Astraight-lineextrapolationofthisregionaltrendwouldsuggestthataglobal
projectionof111submarinesbuiltisperhapsanunder-estimationofthetruerateofproliferation
ofsubmarinesinthenewIndo-Pacific.
Whilethereareanumberofwaystomeasurenavalstrengthandambition,aggregatenumber
ofsubmarinesisaninterestingbarometerfortworeasons.First,submarinesareoftentimesthe
firstacquisitionofanewlyambitiousnavalpowerbecausetheyareanasymmetricweaponof
maritimewarfare.Asingle,relativelypedestriansubmarinecaninflicttremendousdamageonan
unsuspectingadversary,andeventhepossibilitythatasubmarineisnearbycankeepawell-trained,
well-resourced surface fleet on the defensive and reluctant to maneuver. In confrontational
circumstances,asubmarineisauniquelycost-effectiveplatformforamodestpowerfacingamore
capableadversary.ThetragicsinkingofROKSCheonan inMarch2010isevidenceofthattruth:
inthatinstance,anunsophisticatedNorthKoreancoastalsubmarinebrokeastate-of-the-artSouth
Koreancorvetteintwoandkilled46sailors.Forthatreason,submarineacquisitioncanbe
understoodasthefirstsignofanemergingnavalpowergainingafootholdinstrategiccontext.In
theIndo-Pacifictoday,weareseeinganumberoffirst-timesubmarineacquisitions,suggestinga
numberofstrategictransformationsunderwayatthesametimeacrosstheregion.
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Thesecondreasonthatitisaninterestingmetricisthatsubmarines,thoughcost-effective,are
incrediblytechnologicallydaunting.Saveforouterspace,thereisnomorehostileoperating
environment for human beings than under the ocean’s surface. As a result, the operation of
submarinesrequirealotofprofessionaltrainingforpersonnel,atime-intensiveandlaboriouseffort
to operate and maintain, and even greater effort and skill to safely design, build or modify
submarinesindigenously.Whethernewlyemergingnaviesarebuildingtheirownsubmarines(like
ChinaandIndia)orwhethertheyareacquiringthemfromabroad(likeVietnamandMalaysia),the
inclusionofsubmarinesinsubstantialnumbersintheregionisevidencethatnaviesareincreasingly
capable,oratleast,increasinglyambitiousintechnologicalterms.ThefactthattheAsiancontinent
istodaynotjustanactivebuyerofsubmarines,butalsoadesignerandmerchant,39 speakstothe
trulyremarkabletechnologicalrevolutionthatthecontinenthasundergoneinrecentdecades.The
upfrontinvestmentintechnology,trainingandprofessionalizationcanandwillpaydividendsto
investingnationsintermsofthestrategicadvantagethatsubmarinescanprovide.Moreover,this
strategicadvantagewillhaveimmediateimpact,creatinganewmulti-polarAsiainwhichmultiple
credibleplayerswillbeoperatingintheoceanatanygiventime.
THEBURDENOFASIA’SMARITIMESUCCESS
Ofcourse,theproliferationofsubmarinesinparticular,andofnavalassetsmoregenerallyin
aheterogeneousstrategicenvironmentgreatlyincreasesgeo-strategicuncertainty.Couplethiswith
thegrowingrelianceonmaritime-basedtradebyvirtuallyallofthecountriesoftheregion,andit
iseasytoseethatthestakesofmaritimesecurityarerising.Theincreaseininterestsandacquisition
ofcapabilitiesdoesnotforeordainmilitaryconflict,butdoesmakesuchconflicteasiertostumble
intooverrelativelyminorpoliticalflashpoints.Inthiscontext,thecontinuedproliferationof
maritimeboundarydisputesinbothEastandSouthAsialendsparticularcauseforconcern.As
militarycredibilityandtechnologicalcapabilitiescontinuetoriseinAsia,thecrisiseventsatsea
of2010,includingthesinkingofROKSCheonan inMarchandtheconfrontationofJapaneseCoast
GuardvesselsandaChinesefishingtrawlerinSeptember,willlikelybecomemorenumerousand
perhapsmoredeadlythanintimespast.Inthissense,theburdenofeconomicandmilitarysuccesses
inChinaandinthewiderAsia-Pacificwillbetheneedtosharpenbothconflictresolutionandcrisis
managementskillsthroughoutthecivilianbureaucraciesoftheregion.Withoutanevolutionin
policyanddiplomaticinnovationinskillcommensuratewithinnovationclearlyondisplayinthe
realmofmaritimepower,theburdenofAsia’ssuccessmayalsobeitsAchillesheel.
______________________________________________________________________________
Notes
1.FelipeFernandez-Armesto,“MaritimeHistoryandWorldHistory,”inMaritime History as World History,ed.DanielFinamore
(Gainsville,Fl:UniversityPressofFlorida,2004),8.
2.Ibid.
3.Foragreathistoricaloverviewofcontainerizedtradeandthe“worldtheboxmade”seeMarcLevinson,The Box: How the
Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger (Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2006).
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4.LtGenMiZhenyu,“AReflectiononGeographicStrategy,”quotedinJamesR.HolmesandToshiYoshihara,“TheInfluenceof
MahanonChina’sMaritimeStrategy,”Comparative Strategy 24,no.1(2005):30.
5.RenfengZhao,“ChinaandIndia:Acomparisonoftrade,investmentandexpansionstrategies,”ChathamHouseShortReport,
June1,2007,http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/International%20Economics/010607workshop.pdf.
6.Ibid.
7. “China Manufacturing Growth is Accelerating on Export Orders, Survey Shows,” Bloomberg News, March 23, 2011,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-24/china-manufacturing-growth-is-accelerating-on-export-orders-survey-shows.html.
8.DengXiaoping’striptovisitSingaporeanPrimeMinisterLeeKwanYewtolearnaboutcapitalistdevelopmenthasenteredEast
Asia’spopularmythologyasanexplanationofChina’seconomicmiracle.
9.JasmineLamandKevinCullinane,“ShanghaiasanInternationalMaritimeCentre:ImplicationsfortheEastAsianRegional
Economy,”Proceedings of the Eastern Asia Society for Transportation Studies 4(October2,2003):290.
10.“ShanghaiporttoovertakeSingaporeasbusiestcontainer-handlingportbyendof2010,”Marco Trade News,September23,
2010,http://www.marcotradenews.com/transporte/17374/Shanghai-port-to-overtake-Singapore-as-busiest-container-handling-portby-end-of-2010.
11.Nine,ifonecountsTaiwan’sKaohsiungportaspartofChina.AmericanAssociationofPortAuthorities,WorldPortRankings,
2009,http://aapa.files.cms-plus.com/PDFs/WORLD%20PORT%20RANKINGS%202009.pdf.
12.ThomasG.Moore,China in the World Market (Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2001),163.
13.Ibid.
14.SomeanalystssaythatChinahasalreadysurpassedSouthKorea,basedon2010figures.SeeStuartBurns,“ChinaApplying
thePressureonSouthKoreaandJapaninShipbuilding,”MetalMiner,October18,2010,http://agmetalminer.com/2010/10/18/chinaapplying-the-pressure-on-south-korea-and-japan-in-shipbuilding-2/.
15.Dong-WookSong,”Portco-opetitioninconceptandpractice,”Maritime Policy & Management 30,no.1(2003):32.
16.Ibid.,29-44.
17.“EChina’s4portsallywithROK’slargestport,”China Daily,June9,2011,http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/ business/201106/09/content_12664708.htm.
18.QuotedinHolmesandYoshihara,27.
19.IanStorey,“China’sMalaccaDilemma,” Jamestown China Brief,May17,2006,
http://www.asianresearch.org/ articles/2873.html.
20.HouSonglingandChiDiantang,“SoutheastAsiaandCentralAsia:China’sGeostrategicOptionsintheNewCentury,”Dangdai
Yatai 4(April15,2003):9-15,quotedinHolmesandToshihara,31.
21.Ofcourse,BeijinghasalwaysemphasizedtheneedtoregainTaiwan.Theeconomicimperativehasonlyunderlinedthisneed
andgivenfurtherimpetustoresourcethestrategywithmilitarycapabilitytargetedatthatobjective.
22.AndrewS.EricksonandKathleenA.Walsh,“NationalSecurityChallengesandCompetition:DefenseandSpaceR&Dinthe
Chinesestrategiccontext,”Technology in Society 30(2008):353.
23.Foramoredetailedexplorationofcommercial-militaryoverlapandrelativecomplexityinbuildingvariouskindsofships,see
GabeCollinsandAndrewErickson,“LNGCarrierstoAircraftCarriers?AssessingthePotentialforCrossoverBetweenCivilian
andMilitaryShipbuildinginChina,”China SignPost™ (洞察中国)12(December18,2010).
24.“SeouldeployssecondAegisdestroyer”,Space War, June10,2011,
www.spacewar.com/reports/Seoul_deploys_second_Aegis_destroyer_999.html.
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25.Ibid.
26.AdmiralGaryRoughead,“HearingtoReceiveTestimonyontheDepartmentoftheNavyinReviewoftheDefenseAuthorization
RequestforFiscalYear2010andtheFutureYearsDefenseProgram”(June4,2009):6.Fulltextavailableatwww.armedservices.senate.gov/Transcripts/2009/06%20June/09-40%20-%206-4-09.pdf.
27.“ChinaAircraftCarrierConfirmedbyGeneral”,BBC News,June8,2011,http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific13692558. InitialtestswereexpectedonJuly1,2011butwerereportedlydelayed.
28. Jonathan Manthorpe, “Beijing Greets Biden by Testing First Aircraft Carrier,” Vancouver Sun, August 19, 2011,
http://globalbalita.com/2011/beijing-greets-biden-by-testing-first-aircraft-carrier/.
29.QuotedbyBBCNews,“ChinaAircraftCarrier.”
30. Mostcommentatorsagreethatasingleaircraftcarrierisoflimitedglobalstrategicvalue;keyadvantagecanonlybeachieved
withmultiplecarrierplatforms.Animportantcaveatisthatevenasingleaircraftcarriermayhaveanimportant,ifnotdecisive
impactonthestrategicbalanceinthemorelimitedTaiwanandSouthChinaSearegionaldisputes.Indeed,thecarrier’sname,Shi
Lang, suggeststhatthecarrierisatributetotheChineseAdmiralwhoconqueredTaiwanin1861.See,inter alia,Holmes,James.
“BlueWaterDreams.”Foreign Policy, TheSlateGroup,June27,2011.Moreover,followingthefirstseatrialofthecarrier,
commentatorsacrosstheglobeseemtoagreewithU.S.PACOMCommander,AdmiralRobertWillard,thatthisstepwasonlya
verysmallbeginningtodevelopingacarriercapability.SeeViolaGiengerandTonyCapaccio,“China’sCarrierPosesMostly
SymbolicThreat,U.S.AdmiralSays,”Bloomberg News,April12,2011,http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-12/china-ssoviet-era-carrier-poses-mostly-symbolic-threat-u-s-admiral-says.html.SeealsoAbrahamM.Denmark,AndrewS.Erickson,and
Gabriel Collins, “Should We Be Afraid of China’s Aircraft Carrier? Not Yet”, Foreign Policy, June 27, 2011,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/27/should_we_be_afraid_of_chinas_new_aircraft_carrier?page=full.
31. AndrewS.Erickson,“BallisticTrajectory:ChinaDevelopsNewAnti-shipmissile,”Jane’s Intelligence Review,(February2010).
32. AndrewS.EricksonandKathleenA.Walsh,“NationalSecurityChallengesandCompetition:DefenseandSpaceR&Dinthe
ChineseStrategicContext,”Technology in Society 30(2008):349-361.
33. AdmiralRoughead,“HearingtoReceiveTestimony,”6.
34. Yoichi Kato, “U.S. commander blasts Chinese Navy’s Behavior”, Asahi
www.asahi.com/english/TKY201006140534.html.
Shimbun, June 15, 2010,
35.NotethattheUnitedStatesisnottheonlymaritimeplayerthinkingaboutthisdilemma:JapanandIndia,forexample,are
exploringthesameproblem.See“China’sASBMProgrammeMatterofConcern:NavyChief,”Indian Defence,December5,
2010,www.indiandefence.com/forums/f8/chinas-asbm-programme-matter-concern-navy-chief-2966/.
36. This judgment remains the mainstream verdict, despite some reporting suggesting the contrary following the
publicationofareportbytheIISSthattheChineseNavycommandsmoreshipsinthePacificthantheUSNavy.Overly
simplisticanalysisresultedfromthisreport.Foragoodcritiqueofover-simplificationseeJamesR.HolmesandToshi
Yoshihara, “When Comparing Navies, Measure Strength, Not Size,” Global Asia, December 10, 2010,
http://www.globalasia.org/V5N4_Winter_2010/James_R_Holmes_&_Toshi_Yoshihara.html.
37.“FIProjectsa$106+BillionSubmarineMarket,”PressRelease,January10,2011,
http://www.forecastinternational.com/press/release.cfm?article=219.
38.ThistrendisledbytheUnitedStatesNavy,whichplanstobring30Virginia-classnuclearattacksubsonline;sevenarealready
active,sixhavebeencommissionedinthelastfiveyears,andaneighthwaschristenedinNovember2010.See“NewestVirginiaClassSubmarineChristened,”PressRelease,November6,2010,http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=57044.Other
bigacquisitionsareprojectedforChina(20+),RepublicofKorea(15),Australia(12),India(12),Indonesia(12),Russia(8),Taiwan
(8),andJapan(6).
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39.Atthetimeofwriting,mediasourcesinIndiasuggestthatPakistanhasconfirmedadealwithChinatoprocuresixnew
conventionallypoweredsubmarines.Ifconfirmed,thiswouldbethefirstexportofChinesesubmarinestoPakistan.RajatPandit,
“PakaddingsubmarinemuscleasIndiadithers,”Times of India,April11,2011,http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/201104-11/india/29405993_1_submarines-pns-hamza-navantia.SouthKoreahasalsoenteredthesubmarinemarketasmerchants,
enteringintofiercecompetitionwithmoreestablishedFrenchandGermanfirmstosupplyIndonesiawiththreediesel-electric
submarines. “S. Korea close to clinching Indonesia submarine deal,” The Korea Herald, August 26, 2011,
http://www.koreaherald.com/national/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=2-11-826000596.
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