Centre for Eastern Studies
NUMBER 150 | 27.10.2014
www.osw.waw.pl
Russia in Serbia – soft power and hard interests
Marta Szpala
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Serbia on 16 October has demonstrated Moscow’s
willingness to secure its interests in the Balkans and use Belgrade in its confrontation with
the West. It seems, however, that Russia does not have much to offer to Serbia’s authorities,
which are reluctant to make more concessions towards Russia. However, Moscow has already gained a strong position in Serbia, which is due to the country’s dependence on Russian
natural resources and, in particular, strong support for Russian policy on the part of Serbian
elites and society. The traditional pro-Russian attitudes have been strengthened as a result
of a series of Russia-inspired, wide-ranging soft power initiatives which have proved so successful that a large part of society has begun to believe that Russia’s interests are consistent
with Serbia’s.
Russia’s increasingly active policy towards Serbia and the Serbian minorities in the neighbouring countries – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo – has been part of a larger
plan aimed at hampering the integration of the Balkan states with the Euro-Atlantic structures and maintaining an area of instability and frozen conflicts in the EU’s near neighbourhood. Russia’s policy is also becoming increasingly effective due to the EU states’ diminishing
support for Balkan countries’ European integration.
The Western Balkans have not been a priority
region for Moscow, especially compared with
the area of the former Soviet Union. However,
the Western Balkans remain significant for Russia
for two reasons. Firstly, this is a territory of ongoing rivalry between Russia and other global and
regional actors (e.g. the USA and the EU), and
secondly, a key region from the point of view of
control over the energy supply routes leading to
Europe and of the intention to strengthen Russia’s
dominant position in the European energy sector1.
In its policy towards the Balkans, Russia has
been focusing mainly on relations with Serbia
Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation
of February 2013: http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-osndoc.nsf/1e5f0de28fe77fdcc32575d900298676/869c9d2b87ad8014c32575d9002b1c38!OpenDocument
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and the Serbian minorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo2. Russia’s
underlying assumption is that the politics of
Serbia, the region’s largest country surrounded by states which have large Serbian minority
groups, is a guaranty of stability in the Western
Balkans. Moscow utilises a series of instruments
for exerting pressure on Belgrade – from the
growing dependence on energy supplies to the
support for Serbia’s position on Kosovo in the
In the remaining states Russian influence has been much
weaker because their dependence on Russian fuel and
the volume of trade exchange with Russia are insignificant. Croatia is the only country to import large amounts
of fuel from Russia, though this is done on the basis of
spot contracts rather than long-term contracts. Excluding Croatia, the volume of trade between the Balkan
states and Russia amounts to 1%– 1.5% of their total
trade exchange.
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UN forum and Serbs in Serbia and in the neighbouring countries which are the most vulnerable to Russian influence. Therefore, Serbia has
held a special place in Russian policy and, by influencing Belgrade, Moscow intends to secure
itself the means of controlling the situation in
the region. Simultaneously, Moscow has been
developing contacts with Serbian minorities in
order to directly influence the developments
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and
Kosovo, mainly by fuelling separatist ambitions.
The intensification of Russia’s actions towards the
region dates back to 2008. This was when Pristina declared independence and Russia, which
supported Serbia and failed to recognize Kosovo’s secession, gained control over the Serbian
fuel company, NIS. Moreover, the consolidation
of Vladimir Putin’s regime and the strengthening
of the Russian economy at that time enabled Russia to pursue an active policy in the area reaching
beyond its immediate neighbourhood. Moscow
was becoming more and more determined to regain its influence in the region, which had eroded following the fall of the USSR due to Russia’s
weakness. However, the geographical distance,
weak commercial relations and years of neglect
in developing this direction of foreign policy have
resulted in a situation where Russia’s choice of instruments to expand its influence in the region is
much more limited than that of the EU. Russia’s
actions are becoming ever more effective, however, and an important portion of them involves
applying a vast array of soft power measures to
win or Serbian popular support.
The energy sector
and the economic promises
The economic instruments of pressure applied
by Moscow towards Serbia include Russian
domination in the fuel and gas sector. In 2008
the Russian Gazprom acquired the Serbian
company NIS3, thereby gaining full control over
In 2008 Russia acquired 51% of shares in NIS and increased its ownership to 56% in the following years.
3
the oil processing sector (the Panchevo and
Novi Sad refineries) and a strong position in
the distribution network (in 2012 the company
had an 82% share in the fuel market and 38%
in retail market4). The company has also taken
over the only gas depot (Banatski Dvor) and has
been granted a monopoly, on favourable terms,
for the extraction of gas and oil in the territory of Serbia. An agreement on the construction of the South Stream gas pipeline has also
been signed. Serbia has been dependent on
the supply of fuel from Russia (98.81% of gas
consumed by Serbia comes from Russia)5, carried out by intermediary companies associated
with Gazprom (e.g. the Yugorosgaz company).
Apart from the energy sector and the import of fuels, Russia’s role in the Serbian
economy has been insignificant.
Apart from the energy sector and oil and gas imports, Russia’s role in the Serbian economy has
been insignificant. In 2005–2013 Russia invested 598.4 million euros in Serbia6, which is 4.5%
of all foreign investments carried out over that
period. Apart from the acquisition of NIS, there
has been no significant inflow of large Russian
investments to Serbia. The financial promises
concerning e.g. the Beopetrol company acquired
by LUKoil in 2000, have not been kept7, and the
investments in NIS have been financed from
M. Bijanić, Petroleum Industry in Serbia. The best year in
company’s history, http://www.sinteza.net/files.php?file=analiza/2012-NIS.pdf
5
With gas accounting for 11.6% of the consumption of
fuel in Serbia. http://www.energy-community.org/portal/page/portal/ENC_HOME/MEMBERS/PARTIES/SERBIA
6
Foreign Direct Investments in Cash - Net, by Country,
2005–2013 (BPM5), http://www.nbs.rs/internet/english/80/platni_bilans.html
7
Z. Mihajlović Milanović, Energy-Economic Relations Between Russia, the Neighbouring Countries and the European Union: Energy Dependency and/or Interdependence, [in:] Russia Serbia Relations at the beginning of
XXI Century, ed. Žarko N. Petrović, p. 158,
http://www.isac-fund.org/download/Russia-Serbia-Relations-at-the-beginning-of-XXI-Century.pdf
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the loan granted by Gazpromneft or from the
company’s own funds. Similarly, the pronouncements made during President Dmitri Medvedev’s
visit to Serbia in 2009, concerning budgetary aid
and infrastructural investments amounting to
1 billion euros8 have not been realised either,
despite having been repeated by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin during his 2011 visit (this time
the estimated amount was 1 billion US dollars)9.
47% of Serbs believe Russia to be the
largest supplier of development aid to
Serbia. In fact, 89.49% of funds comes
from the USA and the EU, and the Russian
contribution has not even been included
in statistical reports.
In 2000 Serbia signed a free trade agreement
with Russia involving the introduction of a preferential 1% tax rate on specific product groups.
Although the agreement has not been ratified by
the Russian side, it is being upheld by Russia10.
In 2013 Serbian imports from Russia amounted
to 1.4 billion euros, making up 9.2% of the total
import volume. On the other hand, the value of
Serbian exports to Russia stood at 0.79 billion euros. Although the volume of Serbian exports to
Russia have been growing, in the context of the
increase in Serbia’s export figures the importance
of the country’s trade with Russia has diminished
(from 7.7% in 2012 to 7.3% in 2013)11. The EU
and CEFTA remain Serbia’s main trade partners.
The economic crisis has boosted the efficien-
Russian President Deepens Balkan Ties On Belgrade
Visit, http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian_President_
Seeks_To_Deepen_Ties_In_Belgrade/1856602.html
9
Putin: Russia remains Serbia’s ally, 23.03.2011, http://www.
b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2011&mm=03&dd=23&nav_id=73400. The officially stated reason for failing
to complete the investment plans has been the lack of the
necessary documentation on the Serbian side.
10
Russia deliberately choose not to ratify the agreement to
keep laverege on Serbia.
11
Statistical Release ST16-6, no. 198, 16.07.2014.
http://webrzs.stat.gov.rs/ WebSite/repository/documents/00/01/45/00/st16g072014e.pdf
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cy of the energy- and economy-related instruments of or coercion used by Russia towards
Serbia. In 2013 the problems with maintaining budgetary liquidity convinced the Serbian
government to seek a loan from Russia for the
amount of 344 million euros, which would not
be conditional on the introduction of economic reforms or savings plans. The loan has been
granted, but on less favourable terms than the
financial support offered e.g. by China12. Serbia
has also a problem with paying debts for the
gas (around 200 mln euro) and want to keep
the price for gas on the lowest possible level.
Moreover the Russian promises of investment
and the question of access to the large Russian
market started to play an important role in
the government-promoted strategy of speeding up economic development. In this context,
the greatest degree of attention has been paid
to the project for construction of the South
Stream gas pipeline. It is intended to generate
new jobs, provide inexpensive access to fuels
and bring income from transit fees.
Although the declared involvement of Russian
capital in Serbia has so far not materialised in
any large scale, pro-Russian commentators see
Moscow as an attractive and essential partner
of Belgrade, and the Serbian media frequently
and willingly present Russian investment plans
and development aid as a great opportunity for
the country’s economy. Consequently, 47% of
Serbs believe Russia to be the largest supplier
of development aid to Serbia13.
Instruments of public diplomacy
The most important means of influence used
by Russia to strengthen its position in Serbian
society is Russia’s proximity, as well as the pos Russia has granted two loans to Serbia. In the case of the
first one, the interest rate is 6M Libor + 2.95%, the other
one – 3.5%. The interest rate of loans granted by the Chinese Export–Import Bank is 3% and 6M Libor + 1.30%.
13
European Orientation of the Citizen of the Republik of
Serbia. Trends. http://www.seio.gov.rs/upload/documents/nacionalna_dokumenta/istrazivanja_javnog_mnjenja/opinion_poll_14.pdf
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itive image of Russia and its policy14. The task
of fostering the feeling of proximity and promoting the Russian vision of the international
situation and Serbian-Russian relations lies with
a network of dedicated Russian institutions. The
network has been expanded in recent years to
provide support (including financial aid) to organizations and groups which favour Russian interests. Branch offices of the organization Russkiy Mir (the Russian World) and a representative
office of the International Fund for the Unity of
Orthodox Nations have been opened in Novi
Sad and Belgrade (2005). In 2013 a representative office of the Russian Institute of Strategic
Research (RISI) and a branch of the Russian Foreign Cooperation Agency (the Cultural Centre
Russian House) were established in Belgrade.
Several Russian foundations operate in Serbia,
including the Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund,
the Strategic Culture Foundation, the Centre of
National Glory, the Foundation of St. Andrew
and the Fund for the Russian Necropolis in Belgrade, created especially for Serbia15. Serb language versions of Russian news portals have
been created, often with a comprehensive section devoted to local political affairs. They are
prepared mainly by Russian state institutions
such as the news channel RT (www.vostok.rs),
the Voice of Russia broadcasting network
(www.glasrusije.rs), various Russian foundations
In the entire area of the Balkans, Russia is perceived
through the prism of its support for the independence of
Slavic nations, and because of the geographical distance
and the familiarity of the Communist regime Russia is not
seen as a threat or a state which forces certain measures
on its smaller neighbours. The positive image of Russia
has been confirmed in opinion polls. In Serbia 55% of the
respondents approve of Russia’s actions, in Bosnia and
Herzegovina’s Republika Srpska inhabited by Serbs the
level of support is 59%, and 57% in Montenegro. Balkan
views of a multipolar world; http://balkanfund.org/
15
In recent year there has been an increase in the number of
events sponsored by Russian organizations and funds. The
events included the Young Leaders Forum in Novi Sad, the
exhibition devoted to 48 victims killed in Odessa clashes,
the world premiere of a film directed by Nikita Mikhalkov,
the Russian Culture Days, the Russian Film Days. The Russian authorities have sent at least three humanitarian aid
convoys to victims of May 2014 floodings. These events
have received extensive coverage in the mainstream media.
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such as the Strategic Culture Foundation (www.
strategic-culture.org) and groups associated
with the Russian Orthodox Church (www.pravoslavie.ru). The major Serbian daily newspaper
Politika and the monthly Geopolitika contain
supplements Ruska Reč and Rusija i Srbija, published by Rossiyskaya Gazeta as part of the Russia Beyond the Headlines project. Russian organizations and funds also support the actions of
domestic far right and Eurosceptic organizations
(Dveri, Naši), political parties (Treća Srbija) and
non-governmental organizations with an ideological profile favoured by Moscow (e.g. Srbski
Kod, Beogradski Forum za Svet Ravnopravnih).
Russia is principally determined to challenge Serbia’s EU integration plans and
the process of reconciliation in the region,
carried out under the auspices of the EU.
The actions of Russian organizations and the
media, as well as the Serbian counterparts associated with them, focus on several thematic
areas. First, they promote the Russian version of
the international situation, e.g. the current crisis in Ukraine, or the re-interpretation of history according to Moscow’s interest in the spirit
of support for the long-term Russian-Serbian
alliance. Second, they attempt to discredit the
Western cooperation structures (NATO, the EU)
claiming that they operate against Serbia’s interests (e.g. in the case of the EU – by supporting
the separatism in Vojvodina) and pose a threat
to global peace and stability. Third, they present
Russia as Serbia’s closest ally, whose actions are
always consistent with the interests of the Balkan partner, and as an attractive partner with
a strong position in the global arena, a thriving
economy and fascinating culture. Common aspects of Serbian and Russian history are also
emphasised, in particular the tradition of fighting shoulder-to-shoulder in the two world wars.
Fourth, they criticise the pro-European actions
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of the current government. In this context, Serbia’s pro-European aspirations are presented as
an example of the “Stockholm syndrome”. According to them, Serbia, as a country repeatedly humiliated by the EU states, has decided to
become a part of its “tormentor”, i.e. the EU, to
the detriment of its society. Fifth, they provide
constant reminders of the disputes, the conflict
victims and the real and imaginary damages
suffered by Serbs and inflicted on them by their
neighbours. Sixth, they present Russia as a state
upon which the economic development of Serbia depends. An analysis of the message spread
by the organizations associated with Moscow
suggests that Russia is mainly determined to
challenge Serbia’s EU integration plans and the
The strengthening of Russia’s influence in
the Serbian diaspora enables Moscow to
influence the internal situation and the stability of Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo, and is an element of pressure exerted on the authorities in Belgrade.
process of reconciliation in the region, carried
out under the auspices of the EU, claiming that
these initiatives are contradictory to Serbian
state interests. It also seems that Russia intends
to foster close cooperation between Belgrade
and Moscow, promoting it as the most natural
project from the perspective of the development of the two states.
Moscow’s Serbian allies
The actions carried out by Moscow in Serbia
have received support from groups which are
hostile towards the idea of the country’s EU
membership, rather than overtly pro-Russian.
Among these groups are the oligarchs who
have built their position by undertaking unlawful actions and using their political ties (e.g. in
the energy sector). For them, the introduction
of EU regulations would mean losing their influence and, more often than not, criminal liability. Another significant group are the conservative and anti-liberal circles associated with the
Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) which considers the EU a threat to traditional Serbian values.
Frequently emphasised in this context is the opposition towards the liberal West, which in the
Balkans promotes principles contradictory to
the “Slavic” system of values. In neighbouring
Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the SOC is fighting for supremacy
over the orthodox churches of these states; it
questions these countries’ independence, supports Serbian nationalist organizations in their
attempts to regain the “Serbian territories” and
fosters plans to maintain Serbian influence in
this region via a network of church organizations. Thus, the actions of the SOC seem to be
consistent with the Russian policy of aiming to
perpetuate ethnic tensions in the region. In his
conversation with Vladimir Putin during his visit to Moscow in 2013, the SOC Patriarch Iriney
criticised Serbian authorities’ policy towards
Kosovo as being pursued under EU pressure,
and solicited support for the actions of the SOC
in Macedonia and Kosovo. According to the
Patriarch’s words, “the Church can only count
on support from God and from Moscow”16.
Serbia’s integration with the EU has also been
a fear factor for certain groups in the security
sector associated with the old regime, as they
could be made accountable for war crimes. The
aim of all these groups has been consistent
with the Russian aim – they intend to block the
introduction of EU regulations in Serbia.
Serbian minorities as a tool
Russia’s actions in the Balkans include intensification of the relations with the Serbian minority in neighbouring states – mainly in Bosnia
http://www.kurir-info.rs/irinej-kod-putina-nadamo-seu-boga-i-rusiju-clanak-909257
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and Herzegovina, as well as Montenegro and
Kosovo. The strengthening of Russian influence
in the Serbian diaspora has two aims. Firstly, it
enables Russia to influence the internal situation and the stability of these states. A good
example here is provided by the propagation of
anti-NATO attitudes among Serbs living in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, which
has resulted in blocking the integration of these
states with the Alliance. Furthermore, it has
been an element of pressure exerted on the authorities in Belgrade. Any strengthening of separatist aspirations among the Serbs could pose
a threat to the current policy of Belgrade, which
is determined to develop cooperation with the
region’s states – which in itself is a condition for
making progress in the EU integration process.
The right-wing Serbian government, supported mainly by a nationalist-oriented electorate,
would have to respond to the separatist ambitions of the Serbian diaspora.
The strengthening of Russia’s influence in the
Serbian diaspora enables Moscow to influence
the internal situation and the stability of Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo,
and is an element of pressure exerted on the
authorities in Belgrade.
Russian influence is strongest in Republika
Srpska (RS) – one of the two entities making
up Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moscow is closely
cooperating with Milorad Dodik, the President
of RS. The support granted by Russia to Serbian
politicians in BiH has been one of the factors
blocking the reform of the extremely inefficient political system in this country, and further deepening the divisions between the three
BiH nations – the Serbs, the Bosniaks and the
Croats. Russia has offered its support, including financial support17, for Dodik’s attempts to
gain maximum independence from the central
authorities in Sarajevo. An example of this support has been the invitation extended by the
In 2014 Russia granted a 72 million euros loan to Republika Srpska to help it maintain its budgetary stability.
17
Russian side to Milorad Dodik to travel to Belgrade to take part in a meeting with Vladimir
Putin during his visit to Serbia in October 2014.
The invitation was used by Dodik in his electoral campaign before the general elections in
BiH. This was also a clear signal suggesting that
Belgrade’s influence on the relations of Serbian
politicians in BiH with Moscow is diminishing.
This appears to be contrary to the policy pursued by Belgrade which wishes to act like an
intermediary between Banja Luka and Russia
and to weaken the position and independence
of Dodik himself.
On a smaller scale, Russia has also granted support to Serbs in Kosovo, aiming to torpedo the
peace plan calling for normalization of the relations between Belgrade and Pristina and to
include Serbs in the Kosovan institutional system. One example of such actions has been the
initiative of the Russian embassy in Belgrade
concerning the signing of a petition to the Russian government to grant Russian citizenship to
Serbs living in Kosovo. The petition’s aim was
to disrupt the negotiations carried out by Belgrade with the government in Pristina; it has
been signed by 20,000 Serbs18. As part of other initiatives, Russia has sent humanitarian aid
convoys to Kosovo and emphasised the dramatic situation of the Serbian minority in the province, claiming that it has been left without the
necessary support and attention by Belgrade.
EU membership on Russian conditions?
Serbia’s Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić has
decided to continue the two-track policy initiated in 2008 by President Boris Tadić of pursuing EU integration while simultaneously maintaining close relations with Russia. In January
2014 Serbia opened EU accession negotiations,
and the government has announced a plan to
carry out quick reforms in order to fulfil the EU
18
Srpska Zajednica na Kosovu, http://www.helsinki.org.rs/
serbian/doc/Srpska%20zajednica%20na%20Kosovu.pdf
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membership criteria within five years. Yet Russia’s ambassador in Belgrade, Aleksandr Chepurin, had already stated in 2013 that Serbia’s
EU membership should not be devised so as to
hamper the country’s long-term close relations
with Russia, as these should be Belgrade’s priority19. As the Ukrainian crisis has demonstrated,
the deepening of cooperation both with Brussels and Moscow will be difficult, if not impossible, in the long term. Serbian authorities have
not joined the EU’s sanctions against Russia, although Serbia as a candidate country should be
harmonising its foreign and security policy with
the EU’s actions. The Serbian-Russian agreements on visa abolition, trade preferences or –
most importantly – the rules of cooperation in
the energy sector and the agreement on the
construction of the South Stream gas pipeline
will need to be renegotiated, which is against
Russia’s interests. Serbia has already been criticised by the Energy Community for its failure to
introduce energy regulations directly aimed at
breaking the monopoly of Russian companies
on the Serbian market. The restructuring of the
state-owned company Srbijagas, managed by
pro-Russian politicians, has been hindered due
to pressure from Moscow.
The development of military cooperation between Serbia and Russia is likely to be another
problem for partners from the EU and NATO.
After a long period of military cooperation with
NATO within the Partnership for Peace programme, Serbia has been intensifying its cooperation with Moscow in this area since 2011. In
that year a Regional Humanitarian Centre was
established in Niš, where, for example, Russian
sappers are stationed. Due to its strategic location it might be considered a bridgehead of the
Russian military presence in the region. In 2013
Serbia and Russia signed a military cooperation
agreement and Serbia joined the Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as an ob Serbia’s NATO membership - “red line for Russia”, http://
www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2013&mm=11&dd=27&nav_id=88482
19
server state and the only non-CIS participant20.
The authorities in Belgrade are trying to balance the deepening of cooperation with Moscow by intensifying the relations with NATO. In
September 2014 it was announced that Serbia
would sign an Individual Partnership Action
Plan (IPAP) shortly. However, the military parade with the participation of Russian soldiers
in Belgrade, the planned Srem 2014 Serbian-Russian military exercises of airborne troops
near the Croatian and Hungarian border in the
period when Moscow is carrying out military
operations in Ukraine, bring Serbia’s credibility
into question in the context of its cooperation
with the Western states21.
Prospects
Vladimir Putin’s visit to Belgrade carried a largely symbolic meaning. Its aim was to strengthen
the pro-Russian groups within the ruling elite
and in society, as well as to confirm that Serbia
lies within Russia’s zone of influence. The Serbian side has failed to gain any concessions from
Russia22, and the signed agreements concern
matters of secondary importance or serve the
purpose of strengthening the Russian presence
in Serbia23.
It is not inconceivable that if tensions between
the EU and Russia continue to grow, and as
a consequence pursuing a friendly policy towards the two partners becomes impossible,
the Serbian government would have to drop
the EU integration project under pressure from
Apart from Afghanistan.
Cf. M. Robinson, With a parade for Putin, Serbia walks
a tightrope, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/10/14/
uk-serbia-russia-eu-idUKKCN0I30CA20141014
22
The Serbian authorities have solicited for the consent to
raise the tax on the extraction of minerals, eliminate intermediaries from the trade in gas, introducing export
quota for Fiat carsetc.
23
Although seven agreements, memorandums and protocols have been signed, they concern mostly the performance of agreements already in force. The contents
of the only agreement which could considerably change
the relations between Moscow and Belgrade, concerning the guarantee of the extraterritorial status of the
Russian military base in Niš, has not been revealed.
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Serbian society, persuaded by the pro-Russian
and anti-EU circles that the revision of relations
with Russia, carried out on the EU’s demand, is
not favourable for Serbia. This is all the more
important as public support for EU membership has declined to 51% (in December 2013)24.
According to a survey conducted in October
2013 by the conservative organization NSPM,
67.5% of Serbs support their country’s alliance
with Russia, whereas 53.7% opt for Serbia’s
membership of the EU25. In this context, the
declaration made by Prime Minister Aleksandar
Vučić during President’s Putin visit, stating that
Serbia is grateful to Russia for respecting its
sovereign decision to opt for European integration, should be considered as a request rather
than as gratitude.
The attempts to block the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Balkan states have been directly
related to the rivalry between Russia and other
actors for influence in the region. The weaker
and more feuding the Balkan states are, the
more vulnerable they will be to Russian influence. In this context, Moscow’s aim is to sabotage EU efforts focused on introducing democratic principles and the rule of law, building
strong state institutions and a liberal economic
system, as well as fostering reconciliation in
the region. Moscow’s actions are designed to
challenge the attractiveness of the EU’s political and economic model and to encourage Serbia to choose another integration project, one
that is promoted by Russia (CSTO, the Customs
Union). If the Serbian authorities decide to develop closer cooperation with Russia at the cost
of the country’s integration with the EU, this
would be a strong blow to the EU concept of
fostering stabilization in the Western Balkans.
In such circumstances, Belgrade would most
probably return to conducting a revisionist policy towards its neighbours, which would represent a threat to the entire region.
European Orientation of the Citizen of the Republic
of Serbia. http://www.seio.gov.rs/upload/documents/
nacionalna_dokumenta/istrazivanja_javnog_mnjenja/
opinion_poll_14.pdf
25
ht tp: // w w w.mc.rs /upload /documents /prezentacije/221113_NSPM_Juzni-tok_Srpsko-ruski-odnosi.pdf
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EDITORS: Olaf Osica, Mateusz Gniazdowski
Centre for Eastern Studies
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Koszykowa 6a, 00-564 Warsaw
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CO-OPERATION: Timothy Harrell
e-mail: [email protected]
DTP: Bohdan Wędrychowski
The views expressed by the authors of the papers do not
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