The Journal of Modern African Studies, 4, 2 (1966), pp. 193-212
National Integration and the
Southern Sudan
by GEORGE W. SHEPHERD Jr.*
T H E question of national unity for the new states of Africa stands at the
centre of their political problems. Progress in a variety of fields is blocked
until they are able to resolve internally the constitutional question of
loyalty to a new system of authority which was conceived under colonialism and made a reality through nationalist drives for independence.
Africa, more than any other continent, is troubled by the divisions
between ethnic, racial, and religious groups who found temporary
consensus in the struggle against the common colonial enemy, but who,
having achieved independence, find the principle of self-determination
now internally a divisive force against a unified national polity and
purpose. According to James Coleman and Carl Rosberg, 'Just as the
one-party trend is the most striking feature of the political structure of
new African states, so the problems of integration are the major issues
and obstacles in the task of nation-building, which is itself the primary
preoccupation of the leadership of the new states.' 1
Despite the similarities of the national integration problem of the
Sudan to those of other African states, the situation and history of the
struggle between the North and the South is considerably different.
These factors need to be taken into account in understanding the conflict
and analysing the question of integration. Among African analysts, as
well as African nationalists, there is a tendency to presume the necessity
of national unity and integration within the new states. Such presuppositions inevitably influence their conclusions regarding such problems
as the Southern Sudan. So far as possible, this writer seeks to consider
impartially the relevant factors in the problem of Sudanese national
integration.
National unity and internal stability are, in large measure, determined
by the extent to which two major factors are present—national consensus
and public order. As suggested by Karl Deutsch and William Foltz, the
intensity of the presence of these national integrating forces varies
* Associate Professor of Political Science, Graduate School of International Studies,
University of Denver, Colorado.
1
James Coleman and Carl Rosberg, Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical
Africa (Berkeley, 1964), p. 8.
194
GEORGE W. SHEPHERD, JR
substantially among the new states and determines the strength of unity.1
Both factors, national consensus and public order, involve a number of
sub-factors which might be discussed. Suffice it to say here that national
consensus is considered with factors of cultural, ideological, and economic
unity, while public order comprises the law-making and enforcement
process.
In applying this analysis to the Sudan, we are concerned with two
primary questions: first, What has led to the obvious breakdown of
initial national unity ? and secondly, Are there grounds for re-integration?
A F R O - A R A B SCHISM
National consensus, which is a sense of common loyalty to new
national values, institutions, and policies, emerges first among the
modernised elites, in the new states of Africa. Of course, not even this
elite sheds completely its traditional attachments to tribal and ethnic
authority patterns. However, there is a minimal consensus of loyalty and
pride in the new political authority system that has emerged from the
nationalist struggle against the colonial power. And because the elite
shares these values and goals, and controls the instruments of power and
persuasion, it is able to spread rapidly a general acceptance of this new
perspective among the masses ofilliterate and tradition-bound peasantry.
Thus the extent of national consensus in the various sections of Sudanese
society must first be determined.
It is not difficult to find evidence of such a national consensus among
the diverse groups of the Northern Sudan. Despite differences between
religious sects such as the Khatmiyya, predominant in the Eastern
Sudan, and the Ansar, based in the West, and strong tribal feelings among
groups like the Beja and Nuba peoples, there has emerged among their
elites a sense of loyalty to a new Sudanese nation. The Arab culture and
language of these groups have provided the unifying element that modern
elites have been able to build upon. 2
However, when one looks at the South, particularly the three Southern
provinces of Upper Nile, Equatoria, and Bahr el Gazal, a schism in the
national consensus is observed. Here the modernised sections of the
population are much weaker, and moreover they appear to lack any
strong conception of consensus concerning a Sudanese nation. This
1
K. W. Deutsch and W. J. Foltz (eds.), Nation Building (New York, 1963), pp. 8-10. For a
detailed explanation of these and other factors in national and international integration, see
K. W. Deutsch, Political Community at the International Level (New York, 1954).
2
For a brief history of the rise of nationalism and rivalries between northern parties, see
P. M. Holt, A Modern History of the Sudan (London, 1963 edn.), pp. 141-61.
NATIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE SOUTHERN SUDAN
I95
schism was noted by Richard Gray:' Completely isolated from the North
until little more than a century ago, embittered by decades of subsequent hostility, and administered separately until the threshold of
independence, the Southerner feels himself to be an African, while the
ruling Northerner is proud of his Arab consciousness.'1 This sense of
being an African, and therefore alienated from the new Arab-dominated
Sudanese nation, has been expressed on a number of occasions by
Southern nationalist leaders, and most forcefully by the then President
of the Sudan African National Union (S.A.N.U.), Aggrey Jaden, at the
March 1965 Khartoum Conference on the Southern Sudan:
The Sudan falls sharply into two distinct areas, both in geographical area,
ethnic group, and cultural systems. The Northern Sudan is occupied by a
hybrid Arab race who are united by their common language, common culture,
and common religion; and they look to the Arab world for their cultural and
political inspiration. The people of the Southern Sudan, on the other hand,
belong to the African ethnic group of East Africa. They do not only differ
from the hybrid Arab race in origin, arrangement and basic systems, but in all
conceivable purposes . . . There is nothing in common between the various
sections of the community; no body of shared beliefs, no identity of interests,
no local signs of unity and above all, the Sudan has failed to compose a single
community.2
This statement by a leader of the separatist wing of southern nationalism is more absolute in its conception of the schism than those of many
other Southern leaders.3 However, it sets the problem in precise terms
from an important point of view. The reasons for this attitude should
first be uncovered.
There has been greater intermingling of peoples, over the 1,000 and
more years in which Arabs and Africans have mixed together in this
area of the Sudan, than Jaden's statement indicates. Sudanese Arabs
have experienced a much stronger racial influence than have other Arab
societies, derived in part from the once possibly dominant position of
black Africans in the Sudan.4 Also, with the Islam and Arab migration
into the area during the Middle Ages, many African groups were
assimilated, especially in the Western Sudan by the Baggara, Hamar,
1
R. Gray's Introduction to Joseph Oduho and William Deng, The Problems of the Southern
Sudan (London, 1963), p. 2.
2
Khartoum Conference on the South, March 1965 documents; speech by Aggrey Jaden
(mimeo.), p. 4.
3
William Deng described Jaden's speech as 'unsuitable'; Khartoum News Service, 31 March
1965. P- 94
See W. MacGaffey, 'The History of Negro Migration in the Northern Sudan', in The
South Western Journal of Anthropology (New Mexico), XVII, 1961.
IO.6
GEORGE W. S H E P H E R D , JR
1
and Mesiriya. Certain African tribal groups in the Nuba mountains,
while retaining much of their Africanism, have been partially Islamised.
The composition of the approximately 13 million peoples of the Sudan,
according to the 1955-6 census, is 39 per cent Arab, 30 per cent Southern,
13 per cent Western, 12 per cent Beja and Nuba, 3 per cent Nubian, and
3 per cent foreigners and miscellaneous. Out of these, 52 per cent are
Arabic-speaking and 48 per cent speak other languages. Arabic is
generally considered the lingua franca in the Sudan; but many Southerners are opposed to it. If culture is used as the criterion, slightly more than
one-third are Arabic, slightly less than one-third are African, and the
rest are various degrees of an Afro-Arab mixture.
The extent of Islamic and Arab penetration of the three Southern
provinces has been very limited, in part because of British administrative
policy, which will be discussed later. In 1955 it was estimated there were
12,000-23,000 southern Muslims, and 16,500-17,500 northern Muslims
in these three provinces. There were also 25,000-30,000 Protestants and
180,000-200,000 Catholics.2 The vast bulk of the approximately four
million Southerners continue to practise their traditional beliefs and
way of life. Among the Southerners, the Nilotes (a group of tribes of
which the Dinka, Shilluk, and Nuer are the largest) have important
language and cultural differences within the Nilo-Hamite and ' Sudanic'
tribes, which overlap the Uganda, Congo, and Kenya borders.3 Despite
extensive Arabisation of African groups in the Sudan, the hard core of
African life has been touched only superficially in the three Southern
provinces, and the Nilo-Hamites of the southern border retain the purist
sense of Africanism as well as having suffered the most from the nineteenth-century slave trade. It is not surprising that it is from the NiloHamites that the strongest demands for separation have arisen. And in
the three Southern provinces there is a widespread African consciousness
that regards the Arab-dominated Sudan Government with great
suspicion.
There are many historical reasons for this hostile attitude in the South.
Several of the border tribes such as the Luanda, Kakwa, and Zande are
split by the boundaries between the Sudan, Congo, and Uganda.
But most important is the belief that they have always been exploited by
1
2
K. M. Barbour, The Republic of the Sudan (London, 1961), p. 88.
Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Disturbances in the Southern Sudan during August 1955
(Khartoum, 1956), p. 9.
3
All these three groups of peoples span the borders. But most important cultural affinities
with the Uganda and Congo peoples are found among the Nilo-Hamitics and Zanda peoples.
'The most southerly group extends as far south as central Tanganyika', according to K. M
Barbour, op. cit. p. 85.
NATIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE SOUTHERN SUDAN
I97
' imperialist groups' from the North. Under the reign of Mohammed Ali
in the first half of the nineteenth century the Southern provinces of
Equatoria and Upper Nile were subject to the most ruthless exploitation,
particularly for slaves and ivory.1 This was a major area for slave raids;
names like Zubeir Pasha are associated with Arab rule by Africans, who
often refer to the Northerners as ' the sons of Zubeir Pasha'; in return
the Northern peasants frequently use the word abaidiov the Southerner,
meaning 'slave'.
The attitude of revolt against the imperialism of the North carried
through into the Mahdist period. Although Southern tribesmen fought
with the Mahdi against Egyptian rule, they fought for their own independence and not for the idea of a united nation.2 Thus, under the
period of the Mahdist state, they were in a continuous state of rebellion.
Relative peace and stability came to the South only with the AngloEgyptian conquest under Lord Kitchener. However, in addition to
their superior force, the initial policy of the Condominium was to
administer the Southern provinces separately from the North, and the
idea was held at one point that they would be ultimately joined with East
Africa.3 A long-standing difference of opinion on this matter within the
administration of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium was not resolved
until December 1946.4 There is strong evidence that suggests that the
decision to link the South with the North had very little support in the
South, as a close reading of the Juba Conference Report of 1947 reveals.5
Attitudes of suspicion in the South and resistance to the increasing
influence of the Northern parties grew with the approach of independence, culminating on its very eve in the August 1955 revolt of the
Equatoria Corps with widespread violence in Equatoria and Bahr el
Gazal, although the Upper Nile was not greatly affected.
Contemporary Northern opinion takes the view that Southern hostility
1
Richard Gray, A History of the Southern Sudan, 1830-1889 (London, 1961), pp. 120-5.
R. O. Collins, The Southern Sudan, 1883-1898 (New Haven, 1962), p. 23: 'In battle the
Dinkas often used the Mahdist war cry and frequently carried into battle a green Mahdist
flag lent to them by the Mahdi.' But Collins makes it clear they fought for their own independence, not Mahdism.
3
Major Stigand, Governoi^jf Mongulla Province (Upper Nile) wrote in 1919, 'An administrative change which is sorely needed and must take place before great advances can be made
is the complete separation of the Negro provinces of the Sudan from the Arab provinces.'
Khartoum Conference on the South, March 1965 documents; 'Extracts from Notes' (mimeo.).
This did not become official British policy but does illustrate the strong feeling of part of the
Colonial Service.
* The first statement of this change is found in a letter from the Civil Secretary dated 16
December 1946; ibid.
* The Southern Chiefs at this conference appeared most reluctant to commit themselves to
sending representatives to the newly created National Assembly. See Proceedings of the Juba
2
Conference on Political Developments of the Southern Sudan (Khartoum, 1947).
14
I98
GEORGE W. SHEPHERD, JR
towards unity with the North was the product of separatist policies under
the British administration. There is a great deal of evidence that
British administrators, up to 1947, initiated a number of procedures for
sealing off the Southern provinces from the Muslim Arab influences of
the North. The use of Arabic was suppressed, the adoption of Arabic
clothing and names by Southerners was discouraged, and Northern
merchants were discriminated against in favour of Greek and Lebanese.1
In addition, Christian missions were encouraged while Islamic missionaries were restricted. The three Southern Governors held their own
conferences, and political contacts for Southerners in the North were
very limited. Even after the Juba Conference, many Northerners felt,
the policy of unity was not genuine.
While British and missionary policy clearly militated against the
emergence of a modern, national consensus for unity in the South, it
would be a simplification to see in this the sole reason. The cultural,
racial, and historical reasons for difference have a continuity over a long
period of time. If the British had attempted to press integration, it is
possible that they, rather than the new Sudanese nation, would have
faced the problem of revolt in the South. Their greatest error was in their
ambivalence and failure to accept the necessity for integration much
earlier than they did, and their consequent failure to provide the kind of
social development and constitutional transition that might have had
some chance of safeguarding and integrating the interests of the two major
sections of the country.2
In the process of modernisation, through the introduction of new
industries and commerce and the spread of education, many new states
have found a bridge'across the historic hostility between groups. While
the Sudan has one of the best-educated elites and one of the strongest
civil service establishments in Africa, the Arabic element is overwhelmingly predominant. ^African representation in this elite is disproportionately low, compared to the population figures.
Part of the explanation of this lies in the economy of the Sudan. The
major commercial and manufacturing centres are in the North, around
the Khartoum, Atbara, Port Sudan complex, where the new consumer
goods industries, such as shoes, matches, and soft drinks, have clustered.
1
See Muddathir Abdel Rahim, 'The Development of British Policy in the Southern Sudan,
1899-1949' (Central Archives, Khartoum, 1965), pp. 10-13.
2
For example, the rejection by the Civil Secretary at the Juba Conference of Clement
Mboro's suggestion that a Southern Advisory Council be established. See Proceedings of the
Juba Conference, p. 1 o.
The alternative of attaching the Southern provinces to Uganda was also open in the early
part of the century. This was not done primarily because the Sudan was administered under
the Foreign Office, and the influence from Cairo was much against such a step.
NATIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE SOUTHERN SUDAN
I99
The major primary product, cotton, is based in the Gezira scheme, south
of Khartoum, but still in the North. Most of the irrigation schemes are
in the North, and so are the railways, with the exception of the Wau
extension, only completed in 1962. Southern leaders claim that the
Northern Sudanese have deliberately continued this policy of modernisation in the North and have neglected the South.1 In fact, examination
reveals that recent economic development has been almost entirely in
the North. No major development has been initiated in the South since
Tothill's Zande agriculture scheme, and most new industries have been
started in the North.2
One of the most serious problems of friction has arisen from the
Southern supply of cheap labour to the North. Southerners perform a
variety of the menial tasks in the North at substantially lower wages than
Northerners receive. Their living conditions are very poor and they feel
they exist in a hostile social climate.3 In addition, the Northern Sudanese
have become the major group in the new merchant and entrepreneurial
class in the South.
The Ten-Year Development Plan of the independent Sudan, adopted
in i960, provided for £36,485,500 to be spent in the South, most of which
was allocated to education and social services. Northern leaders,
especially at the Khartoum Conference of March, 1965, accepted the
facts of the economic neglect of the Southern provinces. It is a pity that
the Jonglei Scheme of the Equatorial Nile Project was abandoned. It
would have saved much of the White Nile water now lost in the Sudd and
protected Equatoria and Upper Nile against flood damage.
Educational opportunites for the South have always been disproportionately small and the period of independence has widened this inequality rather than narrowed it. In 1955 there was one secondary school and
seven intermediate schools in the South. By 1965 this had improved to
seven secondary and 26 intermediate schools. But this must be compared
with the 88 secondary schools and 175 intermediate schools in the
North.4
Problems of education have been further aggravated by the issues of
language and religion. The British official and missionary policy was to
1
See Oduho and Deng, op. cit. pp. 49-52.
R. O. Collins notes that many British schemes for Southern development were abandoned
or moved north, e.g. sugar cane and refining at Malakal. 'The Sudan Link to the North',
unpublished manuscript.
3
See F. Rehfisch, 'A Study of Some Southern Migrants in Omdurman', in Sudan: Motes
and Records (Khartoum), 1962, p. 92.
4
Secretariat Round-Table Conference, Khartoum, 1965; 'Financial Data on the Southern
Provinces' (mimeo.). Until the 1940's, secondary students from the South went to Uganda.
As yet, there is no girls' secondary school in the South.
2
200
GEORGE W. SHEPHERD, JR
encourage the use of English rather than Arabic, and there was favouritism toward Christian mission education.1 After independence the new
government attempted rapidly to Sudanise the educational system with
Arabic, new curricula, and Arab teachers. Sharp reactions arose against
this among Southerners. While Northerners claimed they were trying
to raise standards, Southerners charged them with 'cultural imperialism'. 2
The conclusion seems inevitable, from these historical and social
factors, that the national consensus between the North and South of the
Sudan is very weak. However, to say that it does not exist in any form is
too sweeping a judgment. Among the educated elite of the Sudan there
has been a brief history of participation in the administrative and elective
systems of authority in the new Sudan, yet even this broke down under
the period of military rule. It is this tenuous link that the post-military
Sudanese Government is seeking to revive. Their task has been made
infinitely greater by the suppressive military period that drove a mighty
wedge into the existing Afro-Arab schism.
T H E B R E A K D O W N OF P U B L I C O R D E R
The establishment of public order is a necessity in building unity in
new nations. It is the authoritative organisation of society around the
instruments of government which is represented in the law-making and
law-enforcing agencies. The strength of public order can be assessed in
terms of the extent of participation of ethnic and interest groups in the
process of law making and their co-operation with law enforcement.
In many of the new states the nationalist struggle against colonialism
has provided an arena for merging diverse elements in a movement
against the common enemy. In the Sudan the participation of Southern
elements in this national struggle was minimal at best. The significant
1
This preference of British administratorsforwestern Christian influence was expressed by
one during the preliminary discussions to the Juba Conference, 1947. He suggested 'that we
the British, who, whatever our failings, are better qualified than any other race, by tradition
and taste and training, to lead primitives up the path of civic progress, are going to stand
guard here till the South can dispense with a guard, and are not going to see the South dominated by an Arab civilization in Khartoum, which is more alien to them than our own.' Letter
of 5 January 1947 from B.G.A. to the Governor of Equatoria Province; Khartoum Conference
on the South, March 1965 documents.
2
The Northern case is presented in Basic Facts About the Sudan (Ministry of Information,
Khartoum, 1964). In all S.A.N.U. documents there are detailed charges against the'Arabisation' of education, which they feel has been motivated primarily by religious and colonial
interests. See 'The Memorandum presented by the Sudan African National Union to the
Commission of the O.A.U. for Refugees' (Kampala, November 1964, mimeo.).
NATIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE SOUTHERN SUDAN 2OI
nationalist movements such as The White Flag League and later the
Graduate General Congress were primarily Arab organisations.1
One of the strongest reasons for this was that, in the Southern view,
during the period of 1947-56 (which can be considered the period of
transition) Sudanisation came to mean Arabisation. As the British and
Egyptians gradually handed over administrative and representative
control, it went primarily to the Northern elite. This might be considered
a natural process, since most of the educated and experienced elite came
from the Northern provinces. However, the degree of Southern representation in the administration of the Southern provinces was surprisingly
small.2 To the Southerners this meant that the Arabs were replacing the
colonial British with their own colonial structure. 3 Therefore the struggle
to remove the British became, in Southern eyes, neither a true national
struggle nor one which could improve their position.4 This attitude was
further reinforced by the representation in the National Assembly, where
the Southerners felt they did not receive an equitable number of seats,
although in 1957 they had 46 seats, or 26 per cent of the total (173), for
30 per cent of the population. More serious are the Southern claims that
the administration of the elections discriminated against genuine
Southerners.5
Political parties have been instrumental elsewhere in African states
in integrating plural groups. In the Sudan, again, the history of Southern
participation in national political parties has been minimal and usually
followed by withdrawal. Initially a section of the Southerners, mostly
Gallaba (Northern merchants) supported the National Union Party
(N.U.P.), whose leader, Prime Minister El Azhari, included two
Southerners in his first Council of Ministers as provided in the 1953
Cairo agreement. El Azhari, in order to gain Southern support, had
made a number of attractive promises, including the consideration of
federation. In 1953 a commission was created to advise the GovernorGeneral on amendments to the Constitution, and the Southern member
pressed hard for federal safeguards. However, his suggestions were
rejected, and he walked out. The Northern parties also opposed certain
British suggestions for safeguards that would have given the Governor1
The leader of the White Flag League, Ali Abdel Latif, was a Muslim of Dinka origin. His
first movement was the Sudanese United Tribes Society, founded in 1921. But his support was
among the Northern Arabs. See Holt, op. cit. p. 130.
2
See Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Disturbances in the Southern Sudan, p . 16.
3
Bona M. Ring, a leader of the Southern Front, presented this view in a pamphlet, The
Causes of Southern Dissension; Khartoum Conference on the South, March 1965 documents.
4
Ibid. p. 5.
6
Oduho and Deng, op. cit. p . 35.
202
GEORGE W. SHEPHERD, JR
General continuing administrative power in the South. The final
constitutional structure for the Sudan was outlined at the 1953 Cairo
Conference, where Southerners had no direct representation apart from
the Northern-led political parties they had joined; the transitional
Constitution adopted was distinctly a unitary one, with no significant
concessions to Southern aspirations for local autonomy.
As the Sudan moved towards independence, constitutional deliberations continued with the Assembly's adoption of the famous 1955 resolution calling for consideration of a federal form of government. In the
Committee deliberations that followed, the Southerners made little
progress and finally withdrew.
During these constitutional debates a Southern Liberal Party emerged
under Southern members of the Assembly, Joseph Oduho and Father
Saturino being the primary leaders. This party campaigned for the
federal idea and many of its representatives in the National Assembly
formed an alliance with Umma, the primary opposition party. However,
this alliance proved as abortive as an earlier one with the N.U.P. In
1958, after their demands in the Assembly for a federal form of Government were rejected, the Southern Liberal representatives withdrew.
Thus the representation of Southern interests in the National Assembly
had already broken down over the federal issue by the time of the
military coup d'etat in November 1958.
The most serious breach of public order has been the growing rebellion
in the Southern provinces that began with the Equatoria Corps revolt
of 1955. This first revolt was largely suppressed, but by September 1963
a new, violent campaign began with the attacks of guerrilla bands called
Anya Nya, operating in the forests and high grass country of the South.
After the overthrow of the military government in 1964, the rebellion
spread widely in the South, to the point where many observers have
claimed that the government only controlled the major centres and not
the countryside in the three provinces.
The reasons for the initial 1955 revolt were closely examined by the
Cotran Commission. They rejected the views commonly held in the
North of the missionary and British inspirations for the revolt. But they
were critical of British ' closed-district policies' of the past, and even
more so of El Azhari's N.U.P. politicians, for making 'rash and irresponsible promises' to the Southerners and then, when difficulties began
over Sudanisation, deciding to 'use the force of iron in dealing with any
Southerners who will dare to divide the nation'. 1 The Equatoria Corps
in Torit, after their revolt, had sent signals to the British in Nairobi
1
See Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Disturbances in the Southern Sudan, pp. 20 and 2.
NATIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE SOUTHERN SUDAN 2O3
appealing for help. The Commission concluded that there was no
foundation for the rebel expectation that British forces were prepared
to help them against the Northerners. However, there remained a
widely-held Northern view that the revolt was a last-ditch foreign
intervention to sabotage the drive towards independence.1
The revolt spread to the police and to sections of the Southern public
who looted and killed Northern Sudanese merchants and administrators
by the hundreds. It was only put down after many casualties. Many of
the rebels fled into exile, thousands were imprisoned, and 200 officially
sentenced to death. 2
The North had been forced to resort to the maximum use of force to
attempt to restore public order and could only achieve it with what
amounted to an emergency occupation of the South. Order was partially
restored, since elections in the Southern provinces were successfully held
in 1958. However, the necessity for military force to restore order was
undoubtedly a contributory factor in the military take-over of the
country in November 1958.
Both Northerners and Southerners agree that the six years of military
rule was a dark period of suppression and injustice in the South that
failed to restore order and spread increased violent opposition.3 During
this period tens of thousands fled to neighbouring countries and in
September 1963 a widespread revolt began again. Most significant of
all, in 1961 a new political organisation, S.A.N.U., had emerged with a
programme aimed at 'self-determination', meaning variously separation from the North or federation and local autonomy.
Thus the weak bridge of national consensus between the Arabs of the
North and the Africans of the South, together with the breakdown of
public order in the South, produced a significant separatist movement
in the Southern Sudan in the early sixties. The eight years of repressive
military rule further alienated the Southern elite.
Given the history of the Afro-Arab split during the past 10 years of
independence, one might easily conclude that ultimate separation is the
inevitable result. However, the revolution of October 1964 which overthrew the Abboud military regime created a new opportunity for the
Sudan to find a basis for integration of the South.4
1
See Basic Facts about the Southern Provinces ofthe Sudan (Khartoum, 1964)^.45. This pamphlet
was published under military rule.
2
T. S. R. Duncan, The Sudan's Path to Independence (London, 1957), p. 199.
3
Speech of the Prime Minister, Sayed Sir El Khatim Khalifa, to the Round Table Conference
on the South, reported in Morning News (Khartoum), 17 March 1965.
4
See Richard Kershaw, 'Sudan's Last Chance in the South', in Twenty-One: a magazine
from Africa (Khartoum), March 1965, p. 16.
2O4
GEORGE W . S H E P H E R D , J R
T H E KHARTOUM
CONFERENCE
The dominant political parties of the North emerged from the military
period for the first time fully conscious of the grave nature of their
relations with the Southern provinces. The Northern leaders decided to
face these problems frankly and to invite the leaders of S.A.N.U. in exile
to return to the Sudan for democratic discussion of their differences.
This took place first through private negotiations, culminating in the
Round Table Conference on the Southern Problem at Khartoum in
March 1965.
Apart from a few intellectuals, there was little change in the Northern
opposition to separation for the South. The Northern political parties
remain determined to obtain a solution on the basis of a unified Sudan.
However, many Northern leaders did admit publicly that they had
made mistakes, particularly concerning constitutional safeguards for
the autonomous aspirations of Southerners and in providing for Southernisation of the administration and economic development in the South.1
Some support for a federal approach has emerged in the North, but the
Khartoum Conference revealed very strong opposition to it, particularly among the traditionalist Muslim parties of the P.D.P., Umma, and
Islamic Charter Front (Muslim Brothers).2 The issue turned on the
extent of the powers the Northern parties were prepared to devolve upon
a regional Southern Assembly. Prior to the Conference the Northern
parties issued a joint statement accepting a Southern Regional Assembly.3
However, they backed away from this in the Conference.
Neighbouring African states have taken a keen interest in the problem
of the Southern Sudan; and six African Governments—Algeria, U.A.R.,
Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria, and Ghana—played an official role in the
Khartoum Conference as observers. These states, in the past, have been
officially neutral and have not given much aid to S.A.N.U., as the
Sudan is a member of the O.A.U. and has a powerful army able to cross
frontiers at will. Only Uganda has offered significant sanctuary to a
large refugee group, including many students. But now the six states,
particularly Uganda, were instrumental in bringing the two sides
together for discussions. Mr. Felix Onama, then Minister of Home
1
Ismael El Azhari, leader of the N.U.P., and Sadig El Mahdi, president of Umma, have
both spoken in these terms; see Khartoum Conference on the South, March 1965 documents.
Sadig has written a book on 'The Question of the Southern Sudan', available only in Arabic
(Khartoum, 1964).
2
The Islamic Socialist Front (not to be confused with the Muslim Brothers, Islamic Charter
Front) opposed the discussions with the 'Southern Outlaws'.
3
Khartoum News Service, 3 March 1965, pp. 1-2.
NATIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE SOUTHERN SUDAN
205
Affairs in Uganda, publicly condemned those refugee leaders who
refused to return for negotiations. The influence of the observer states
was clearly against separation and in support of integration, as demonstrated by the final speeches of the Nigerian and Ugandan representatives,
who drew on their own federal experiences to suggest that Sudanese
problems could be solved just as equitably. The Nigerian Minister of
Mines, Yousif Maitame, said in summing up for the observer delegations :
the problems which you have here today are not at all peculiar to this country.
We in Nigeria are quite familiar with such problems, problems that almost
inevitably confront any country of your size and diversity. With God's help
and the determination of our leaders, we reached an acceptable solution based
on a series of compromises which preserved both the general interests of the
whole and the particular interests of the parts . . . Ifirmlybelieve that you
too can do the same.1
Mr Onama of Uganda, in a parting speech, warned the Sudan against
the dangers of foreign intervention in a dispute that threatened all
African unity. While the Southern delegates felt the African observers
were inflating their own accomplishments and generalising too easily,
they could not help but feel the weight of these arguments, as any
separatist military campaign had little chance for success without the
support of the neighbouring states. However, Ethiopia and the Congo
were not invited to the Conference, and their absence was a conspicuous
breach in Pan-African solidarity towards the Sudan.
The Khartoum Conference was not able to produce any agreement
between North and South on the basic constitutional question. But it
reached limited agreement on a number of reforms, which, if implemented, might have had the effect of rebuilding confidence and
national consensus among a significant section of the Southern leadership. The major reforms agreed upon concerned the Southernisation
of the administration, stepped-up educational opportunity, particularly
at the secondary and technical level, and an increased emphasis on
Southern economic development.2
The task of reaching a Constitutional Agreement and implementing
the reforms of the Khartoum Conference was handed to a 12-man
committee; but this committee soon broke down over differences, and
nothing in the way of a hopeful compromise can be said to have emerged
from the Conference. Yet it was marked by the recognition it gave to
two new aspects of the problem: first, the neighbouring African states
1
2
Khartoum News Service, 31 March 1965, p. 5.
Khartoum News Service published these agreementso n 30 March 1965.
206
GEORGE W. SHEPHERD, JR
clearly indicated their support for a policy of unity within the Sudan, and
secondly, a moderate Southern group emerged under the leadership of
William Deng. This group accepted the broad outline of Sudanese unity
but with federal autonomy for the South.
SOUTHERN GROUPINGS
The Southern elite is divided into several factions and organisations,
whose differences have widened since the October revolution. There are
two small groups that in general support the Northern Sudanese
parties—the Sudan Unity Party and the Liberal Party. The leadership
of these groups is made up of older conservative chiefs like Santino Deng,
who served in previous cabinets, including the military Government,
and who have negligible support in the South.1 The Liberal Party
leader, Philimon Majok, has held a prominent position as a member of
the five-man Supreme Council. Buth Dieu of the Sudan Unity Party, as
Minister of Animal Resources, was the only representative of the South
in the Mahgoub Government, for the first six months.
The Southern Front emerged during the revolution of 1964 as the
voice of the Southern civil servants and professional leaders who had not
gone into exile. Southern Front leaders such as Hilery Paul Lugali and
Bona Malwal Ring officially support' self-determination' for the South;
but the left wing take this to mean a definite policy of separation, while
the right wing, who are in favour of integration, can still support 'selfdetermination' in the form of a plebiscite to determine the issue.2
This organisation with branches in Khartoum and throughout the
South became, after October 1964, the largest Southern grouping. Its
President, Clement Mboro, as Minister of the Interior during the
transition Government, had a unique opportunity to rally a number of
the intelligentsia into the Front. Other leaders of the Southern Front
also served in the Government during the unusual period of the transition, November 1964 to June 1965. However, their influence on
government policy was not sufficient to achieve substantial reforms for
the South. Despite the Front's strongly expressed criticism of Northern
policies, stated with remarkable frankness in the pages of The Vigilant, it
suffered from attacks from both sides.3 Northern papers accused the
Front of giving secret support to the Anya Nya, and Southern extremists
considered them 'quislings'. At the termination of the transition
1
These two parties were not seated at the Khartoum Conference. However, they became
the most acceptable Southern parties after the formation of the Umma-N.U.P. Government.
2
The proposal for a plebiscite was put forward at the Khartoum Conference but rejected
by the North.
3
This newspaper was banned in July 1965, but resumed publication early in 1966.
NATIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE SOUTHERN SUDAN 2O7
Government the Front refused to participate in the new Umma-N.U.P.
coalition and its spokesmen became bitterly critical of the policies of the
Northern-dominated Government.
S.A.N.U. (Sudan African National Union) is the oldest Southern
organisation, founded by a number of Sudanese exiles in Leopoldville
in February 1961. After the fall of the military government it developed
several factions. A moderate wing, led by William Deng, who had been
international secretary of S.A.N.U., responded to the conciliatory
approach of the October revolutionaries with a revival of the historic
Southern demand for federation. Deng denned his conception of a
federal state based on provincial governments at the Khartoum Conference, where he acted as one of the major spokesmen of S.A.N.U.1
Following the conference he decided conditions had changed sufficiently
for him to return from exile and campaign for acceptance of this programme by peaceful democratic means.2
Despite the objections of some of his fellow S.A.N.U. leaders in exile,
Deng formed a S.A.N.U. party in the Sudan in April 1965 and set out to
try to win the support of the South. A provisional central executive
committee with Deng as acting chairman included Philip Obang, a
former student of theology turned journalist, as administrative secretary,
Andrew Wiew, a former district commissioner, and Ambrose Wol Dhal,
a former newspaper editor.3 A fierce struggle ensued with the Southern
Front. The major differences were the close ties of the Southern Front
with S.A.N.U. (outside) and Deng's advocacy of a federal settlement.
Because of his moderate position Deng's S.A.N.U. has gained the respect
of many Northern leaders who seek to keep in touch with Southern
opinion. A move to bring S.A.N.U. into the coalition in the autumn of
1965 was frustrated by the N.U.P., who have a number of supporters
among Northern merchants in the South. Deng has held large meetings
in the South and has a growing following among Southern intelligentsia.
However, he has produced very little in the way of reforms to show the
Southerners that his moderate methods have some prospect of success.
Because he has strongly criticised separation and has attacked the Anya
Nya tactics, his party's popularity is limited in the South.4 While not a
tribal party, its strongest support is among Deng's own Southern tribe,
the Dinka, the largest tribe in the Sudan.
The Southern groups outside the Sudan have also been split into
1
The Vigilant (Khartoum), 25 March 1965, pp. 5-6.
Khartoum News Service, 31 March 1965, p. 8.
3
Ibid. 19 April, 1965.
4
See Khartoum News Service, 24 December 1965, for a report on Wiliam Deng's tour of the
South.
2
208
GEORGE W. SHEPHERD, JR
factions. While S.A.N.U. (outside) denounced William Deng's S.A.N.U.
(inside) and expelled him from the party, two major groups emerged
outside. Aggrey Jaden, who 6ecame President of S.A.N.U. m October
1964, remained in exile following the Khartoum Conference and
continued to agitate for separation. Within Jaden's S.A.N.U. there were
two tendencies. The majority tended towards seeking separation through
the moderate means of external pressure on the Sudan from other
African states and the O.A.U. Men like Lawrence Wrol Wol, editor of
The Voice of the Southern Sudan, advocated this approach. The minority
group, calling themselves ' extremists', led by Joseph Oduho, identified
themselves with the Anya Nya. This group broke off from S.A.N.U. and
formed the Azania Liberation Front in June 1965 because they felt that
S.A.N.U. had not irrevocably chosen separation and was following too
moderate tactics.1 AtfirstJaden opposed the Azania Liberation Front,
as an extremist group that would be inevitably banned by the East
African states. However, the shift to a hard line under the new Sudanese
Government resulted in a strong trend among S.A.N.U. (outside) leaders
in favour of the Azania approach. By the end of 1965 Jaden's faction had
decided to merge with the Azania Liberation Front, with Oduho as
President and Jaden as Vice-President.2
The Azania Liberation Front was linked to the Anya Nya within the
Sudan. Not much is known, at the time of writing, about the leaders of
the ' forest fighters' as they are called. Several, such as Ali Batala, the
western commander, are former soldiers of the Equatoria Corps who
revolted in 1955 and escaped into the bush. A former minister in the
transition Government, Izbouri Mondiri, has joined them; and Joseph
Lagu, a second lieutenant in the Sudan Army as recently as 1962, is now
Commander in Chief. They are surprisingly well trained and equipped.
There has been a great deal of speculation over where they obtain arms.
Some were captured from the Sudanese army, but most of their equipment appears to have been bought and captured from the Congolese
rebels. Some of their modern guns may have been obtained from the
Congo army in return for attacking Congolese rebel camps in the Southern Sudan. The Congo Government has denied directly aiding the
Sudanese rebels, but there is evidence that they have utilised this method
of eliminating the remnants of their own rebels who took sanctuary
across the Sudanese border. Once the Sudanese Government removed
those remnants of the Stanleyville rebels, on a quid pro quo basis the Congo
source of supply for Southern Sudanese rebels dried up.
1
Information based upon interviews with S.A.N.U. and Azania leaders in Kampala.
%
Khartoum News Service, 29 December 1965, p . 5.
NATIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE SOUTHERN SUDAN 2Og
While the Sudanese army has been able to limit the supply of weapons
to the rebel bands, they have not been able to control their wideranging operations. The Anya Nya moves within a friendly population
over a vast terrain. Their activities have brought widespread disruption
of services in the South; in 1965 many Northern administrators and
merchants vacated their posts outside the three major provincial centres.
In mid-1965 the Anya Nya controlled most of the countryside. At the
end of the year the Sudan Government claimed it had restored control;
but it was unable to hold elections in the South early in 1966, as had been
hoped.
The fortunes of the various Southern groups have shifted rapidly under
the rapidly changing policies and events. Their factionalism is one of
their greatest weaknesses, and Northern leaders claim with some justice
that they do not know with whom they can deal in trying to reach a
settlement. For a brief time following the Khartoum Round Table
Conference the moderates held the upper hand. But their success
depended upon a rapid implementation of reforms and constitutional
change that would persuade the extremists in the Southern forests to lay
down their arms. Neither the reforms nor the cease-fire came into effect.
Which was to come first, reforms or a cease-fire ? The vicious circle was
never broken. As in most conflicts of this kind, the moderates on both
sides who wanted a peaceful settlement were not strong enough to carry
along with them the extremists who did not want a settlement if it meant
a compromise.
Consequently the position of both sides has hardened, with the
Southerners outside the Sudan demanding the acceptance of secession
before talks and the Sudan Government demanding the acceptance of
unity before reforms, a cease-fire, and further talks. After the UmmaN.U.P. coalition Government came into power, the amnesty for Anya
Nya ended and negotiations with exiles virtually ceased. The two major
Southern organisations inside the Sudan were no longer represented in
the Government, and increasing police surveillance was placed over
their leaders. The army was given virtually a free hand to control the
situation in the South and indulged in indiscriminate attacks against
Southern civilians that led to strong protests in certain Northern
Sudanese circles, as well as from Church and humanitarian groups
abroad. 1
The immediate outlook for peace or integration in the Sudan is
gloomy. Politically, the Khartoum negotiations have failed. Prime
Minister Mahgoub presented a plan to the Cabinet in April 1966 that
1
The Morning Post (Khartoum), 13 July 1965; editorial.
2IO
GEORGE W. S H E P H E R D , JR
would introduce some regional autonomy. But the more militant
Southern leaders saw little merit in the scheme. Moderates on the 12man committee responded favourably. However, the control of the
moderates over the insurgents has never been strong and has grown
weaker. Militarily, the conflict is a stalemate with neither side having
the power decisively to defeat the other. The Sudan appears to have
entered a stage of large-scale civil conflict, of unknown duration and
uncertain outcome.
At the end of 1965 the Government declared that sufficient stability
had been restored in the South for elections to be held in April 1966.
However, by mid-1966 there was still insufficient stability to permit the
lifting of martial law in the South. Under these conditions the Southern
parties were cool to the idea of elections and the Southern Front was
outright opposed to them until all elements would be free to participate.
The exile leaders, while under greater official restrictions by East
African Governments, were able to consolidate their relations with the
internal insurgent movement, which showed little evidence of having
been weakened by Government forces.
CONCLUSIONS
The weak bridge of national consensus between North and South
established in the late forties and early fifties of this century has been
virtually destroyed by the failure of the independent Sudanese parliamentary and military governments to recognise the nature of their
problem in the South and to adopt measures capable of meeting Southern
aspirations for development and autonomy. Northern Sudanese, with
the exception of a few intellectuals, have never faced realistically the
lack of historic and cultural community with the South. They have
tended to hold British colonialism responsible for the differences that
existed. After the departure of the British, the missionaries and 'neocolonial' influences, such as the United States and Israel, were blamed.
While foreign influences may have exacerbated basic ethnic differences,
they do not deserve all the blame for a divided Sudan. The Southerners,
in their turn, have regarded every Northern programme with suspicion
based on racial, ethnic, and religious differences. Hostility and suspicion
have compounded on both sides and demonstrated that racialism can
confound human reason even among those recently freed from western
imperialism. Antagonisms of this nature are the most destructive of
consensus.
Public order has broken down almost completely in the three Southern
NATIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE SOUTHERN SUDAN 211
provinces outside the major urban centres. All schools were closed in
1965 and communications were disrupted while famine threatened.
There is little prospect for the restoration of public order, as a stalemate
in the struggle has been reached that could last indefinitely. The consequences of this stalemate have been severe on both sides. For the South
it has meant continued loss of life and the end of development. Economic
and military losses have been a major drain for the North over a long
time and might well be fatal to the re-established party system besides
frustrating schemes for economic advances.1
The prospects for national integration, therefore, are slim. What
chances do remain rest primarily on the offer of major constitutional
and administrative reforms that would guarantee a high degree of
autonomy in the Southern provinces. The attitude of the Southern elite
is the key to the future. While restraining the Southern extremists, the
Government cannot afford to resort to tactics that will alienate the
moderates, who may still be interested in a settlement giving them the
dignity of autonomous status within the Sudan. The Northern fear that
such federal compromises might be the first steps toward ultimate
separation has some validity. However, it is a lesser risk than the prospects for integration following a protracted civil war.
Federation may still be a possible path to re-integration in the Sudan.
But, as T. S. R. Duncan, a man with long experience in the Sudan,
observes, ' Only in theory can the problem of such minority groups be
reduced to a matter of constitutional safeguards on a piece of paper. ' 2
The crack in the tree trunk cannot be merely covered over with moss.
Both sides must have sincere intentions to make a just and equitable
settlement work.
National integration cannot be achieved primarily by force where the
differences of peoples are so historically deep and geographically
widespread as in the Sudan. New nations with such large racial and
cultural differences can only be built by leaders of modernisation who
are prepared to compromise and seek unity within diversity. In justice
to the Sudan it should be noted that she has inherited probably the most
difficult ethnic integration problem in Africa, involving indigenous
African populations. The problem is not insoluble; but if it is to be
solved, it will only be through a much greater understanding of the
requirements of integration than exists at present.
The consequences of failure are not attractive. While it is possible to
conceive of a state carved out of the Southern Sudan, it would be one of
1
2
See Mohammed O. Beshir's letter to The Times (London), 31 July 1965.
Duncan, op. cit. p. 195.
212
GEORGE W. SHEPHERD, JR
the most remote and undeveloped nations in Africa. The prospect of its
affiliation with Uganda or an East African federation do not seem bright,
in view of all the internal problems of these countries. Though independence is not the best solution, in the end it may be the one adopted,
as the odds are against the moderates on both sides.
This is a conflict with grave international implications for Africa. The
Sudan has a chance to demonstrate that an Afro-Arab synthesis can be
made to work. At the same time there are dire consequences for failure,
as the Sudan is the potential centre of an Afro-Arab confrontation in
Africa. Outside intervention, at the time of writing, has been held to a
minimum. The cold war has not penetrated the issue, and the Sudan
has, temporarily at least, persuaded most of the African states to support
its policy of unity. However, the shifting tides of the cold war and the
changing patterns of alliances in Africa could alter this situation. Some
international interests would like to promote an Afro-Arab split and seal
off 'black Africa' from the 'radical' north. Also, the Chinese are
constantly probing areas of conflict to find new allies in their struggle
with the west.
Across the Sudanic belt from Eritrea to Senegal, Muslim and nonMuslim populations live in varying degrees of uneasy relations and what
happens in the Sudan will have reverberating effects across the continent.