CHAPTER I
FOUNDATIONS OF INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS
I n d i a ' s r e l a t i o n s with t h e Soviet Union h a v e a l w a y s been a
subject
of
between
enduring
the
two
interest
countries
for
with
both
the
countries.
different
traditions
Friendship
and
social
systems h a s been considered a model of i n t e r n a t i o n a l co-operation.
I n f a c t , the f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s between I n d i a a n d Soviet Union
are
rooted i n t h e i r history.
I n d i a ' s r e l a t i o n s with t h e Soviet Union c a n
be
15th
traced
back
to
the
century
when
the
Russian
merchant
Afanasy Nikitin v i s i t e d Northern I n d i a a n d published a n account of
his
travels.
In
the
17th
century
Indian
businessmen
Astrakhan from where they s e n t goods to Russia.
settled
There h a d been
a n a s c e n d a n c y i n t h e contacts between t h e two countries
end of t h e 18th c e n t u r y .
and
British
empires
in
from t h e
But d u r i n y t h e 19th century t h e iiussian
clashed
as
the
British
India
pushed
into
Afghanistan.
The Great
October
Revolution
and
anti-colonial
a,apeals
of
t h e Bolshevik l e a d e r s to other peoples of t h e world g a v e a boost to
I n d i a n nationalism.
There is a logic of history i n t h e close r e l a t -
ions between I n d i a a n d t h e USSR.
socialist s t a t e ,
struggle.
Lenin, t h e founder of
the first
showed keen i n t e r e s t i n I n d i a ' s n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n
Several references to I n d i a c a n be seen i n t h e Collected
--
Works of Lenin which contain h i s observation on I n d i a from 1900-1903.
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A
staunch champion of freedom a n d t h e cause of self-determination
a s he was, he h a i l e d t h e I n d i a n National Movement i n t h e followiny
words:
I am g l a d to h e a r t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e s of self-determination a n d t h e l i b e r a t i o n of opgressed n a t i o n s
from exploitation by foreign a n d n a t i v e c a p i t a l i s t s ,
:>reclaimed by t h e ' w o r k e r s ' a n d p e a s a n t s 'Republic'
have met with such a r e a d y response amony progressive I n d i a n s , viho a r e waging a heroic f i g h t f o r
freedom.
The
working
massas
of
Russia
are
followiny with u n f l a y y i n g attention t h e awakening
of
the
Indian
workers
and
peasants.
The
o r ~ a n i z a t i o n a n d d i s c i p l i n e of t h e working people
a n d t h e i r perseverence a n d t h e s o I i d a r i t y with t h e
working geogle of world a r e a n e a r n e s t of ultimate
success.
YJe welcome t h e close a l l i a n c e of Moslem
and non-Moslem elements.
We sincerely want to see
t h i s a l l i a n c e extended to a l l t h e t o i l e r s of t h e E a s t .
Only when t h e I n d i a n , Chinese, Korean, J a ~ a n e s e ,
P e r s i a n a n d T u r k i s h workers a n d p e a s a n t s join
h a n d s and march together i n t h e common c a u s e of
l i b e r a t i o n only then w i l l decisive victory over t h e
exploiters be e n s u r e d .
Thus,
marked
the
developed
beginning
into
every f i e l d
and
-
progress
Foreign
Lenin's
support
of
Long l i v e a f r e e Asia
to
Indo-Soviet
f r i e n d s h i p between
a
in
Relations
the
the
Indian
freedom
interaction
two
.
1
which
countries
in
movement
has
virtually
f r i e n d s h i p which is a n important factor of
the
of
world.
In
June
Soviet Russia
1918.
released
situation ~ r e v a i l i n yi n B r i t i s h I n d i a .
the
a
Lenin, Collected Works
Blue
I t s editor, K.M.
(MOSCOW,
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peace
Commissariat
Book
1964). Vo1.31,
on
of
the
Troyanovski
wrote:
1. V.I.
now
p.138.
There c a n be no g e n e r a l peace without a free
independent I n d i a
I n d i a is t h e centre of Western
activity i n the East.
I n d i a w i l l , t h e r e f o r e , be t h e
f i r s t fortress of t h e Revolution on t h e Eastern
We, Russian Revolutionaries a n d I n t e r Continent.
n a t i o n a l Socialists, f e e l i t o u r d u t y to rejoice a t
t h e announcement of a revolution i n I n d i a b u t a l s o
to sup9ort t h i s revolution by direct o r i n d i r e c t
....
means a n d with a l l o u r powersL.
J a w a h a r l a l Nehru
had
g r e a t respect
for Lenin
and he had
repeatedly emphasized t h e importance of t h e works of
of
Marxism-Leninism.
a
genius of
world's
the
Great
importance
Nehru called Lenin " a master of thought a n d
revolution";
immortals".
October
for
the
t h e founders
he
Nehru
Socialist
world.
further
was
well
wrote
aware
Revolution
The
"he become
October
as
of
an
the
one
of
the
significance
event
Revolution
of
of
of
historic
1917
was
r i g h t l y assessed by J a w a h a r l a l Nehru i n h i s speeches when he s a i d :
...
with your October Revolution under t h e l e a d e r s h i p of t h e g r e a t Lenin we i n I n d i a s t a r t e d a new
phase of our s t r u g g l e for freedom.
Our people were
engrossed i n t h i s s t r ~ ~ g g lfor
e many y e a r s a n d f a c e d
3
heavy re9ression with courage a n d e n d u r a n c e
.
2. Documents of Foreign Department,
(Secret Proceedings) F e b r u a r y
1920, File Nos .258-267, National Archieves of I n d i a , New Delhi.
Cited i n Vinod Bhatia ( e d . ) , Indo-Soviet Relations Problems a n d
Prospects (New Delhi, 1984). p.10.
--
3. I n d i a ,
Ministry of Information a n d Broadcasting, J a w a h a r l a l
Nehru's Speeches:
March 1953
August 1957, (New Delhi, 1983).
Vol.111, p.302.
-
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Britain was well a w a r e of t h e d a n ~ e rt h a t might be created
by
the
October
,~osition i n
Revolution
India.
In
a
on
India,
report,
and
its
impact
on
British
t h e Secretary of State for
India,
Edwin Montague, a n d t h e Viceroy of I n d i a , Lord Chelmsford, admitted
t h a t the Revolution i n Russia a n d h a d been received i n I n d i a a s a
victory over
develogment
India
used
despotism
and
of
political
"the
bogey
that
it h a d
aspirations
of
the
given
in
Russian
India
an
.
4
irn9etus to t h e
The
menace",
British
in
to encourage t h e
I n d i a n hostility to t h e first Czarist regime a n d then to t h e Soviet
Russia.
The I n d i a n n a t i o n a l i s t l e a d e r s d i d not accept t h e so-called
British plea of
"Russian menace" a n d they considered Soviet Union
a s a f r i e n d a g a i n s t t h e British imperialism.
The
October
Revolution
was
positively
welcomed
by
tlie
I n d i a n National C o n g r e s s , although some of its l e a d e r s d i d not s h a r e
its
socio-political
programmes.
the
At
same
time,
the
Left
Nationalists i n I n d i a , vrho h a d e s t a b l i s h e d underground revolutionary
orljanizations, r e g a r d e d t h e Soviet Republic a s t h e i r a l l y a n d began
to e s t a b l i s h
Lenin
Pratap,
direct
received
justly
re9resentative
a
contacts with
group
of
described
delegation
leaders
in
of
Soviet
a
Indian
4. Rostislav
Okulov,
USSR-INDIA:
(New Delhi, 1981), p.15.
Union.
headed
recent
On
by
study
revolutionaries
7
Raja
as
May
1919,
Mahendra
the
first
t o contact t h e
An Important Factor of Peace,
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head of t h e Government
ary
Association
masses
of
of
Russia
5
.
Kabul
I n h i s message to t h e I n d i a n Revolutioni n May
follow t h e
6
J a w a h a r l a l Nehru v i s i t e d
the
tenth
anniversary
Revolution
was
being
celebrated.
and
planning.
admired
its
rapid
.
Soviet Union for t h e f i r s t time i n
when
Union
"the t o i l i n g
of t h e I n d i a n worker a n d
awakening
peasant with u n a b a t i n g attention"
1927
1920 Lenin remarked
of
the
He
Great
was
industrial
October
sympathetic
progress
Socialist
to
Soviet
under
central
t h a t I n d i a could l e a r n a g r e a t d e a l from t h e
He thought
Soviet ex9erience i n solving its ovvn ~ r o b l e m s a s both t h e countries
were
$redominantly
industrialization.
features
in
agricultural
Since poverty
both
the
countries
and
and
it
on
the
illeteracy
was
Nehru's
Russia found a s a t i s f a c t o r y solution f o r t h i s ,
were
threshold
other
conviction
the task
of
common
that
if
before I n d i a
would be e a s i e r .
Soviet Union
was
India's
powerful
neighbour,
which
might
be f r i e n d l y to I n d i a a n d co-operate with h e r o r be a thorn i n h e r
side.
In either case,
it w a s e s s e n t i a l for I n d i a n s t o know it well
so t h a t they might b e a b l e to s h a p e t h e i r i ~ o l i c y correctly
7
.
Nehru
realised t h a t independent I n d i a a n d Soviet Union would l i v e a s good
--
5'. G . Adhikari, Documents of t h e History of t h e Communist P a r t y of
I n d i a (New Delhi, 1971). p.16.
6. V.I. Lenin,
n.d.1, p.50.
The Awakening of Asia: Selected E s s a y s
7 . J a w a h a r l a l Nehru,
Impressions
-
(New York,
Soviet Russia: Some Random
- Sketches a n d
(Bombay, 1949) , p.34.
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neighbours a s t h e r e were no c l a s h of i n t e r e s t s between them.
Nehru
was convinced t h a t t h e Soviet Union was a powerful a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t
force a n d t h a t t h e colonial countries h a d
the
Soviet
system.
He
considered
a g a i n s t t h e forces of reaction,
obscruantism
8
Soviet
Union
aggression a n d w a r ,
a
fortress
ignorance a n d
.
events
TWO
the
something to l e a r n from
which
took
place
in
1930 s i g n i f i c a n t l y
contri-
buted to the growth of I n d i a n t r a d i t i o n of f r i e n d s h i p f o r t h e Soviet
Union.
One vias t h e solemn a s well a s s p e c t a c u l a r demonstration of
the y r e a t love a n d affection which t h e most m i l i t a n t section of t h e
I n d i a n n a t i o n a l i s t s , a l w a y s felt f o r t h e Soviet Union
important
event
Soviet Union.
of
1930
He vias
was
greatly
Rabindranath
pleased
9
Tagore's
.
The second
visit
by t h e Soviet s t a t e
to
the
systcm
and h i s impressions were communicated t o t h e I n d i a n s through h i s
l e t t e r s a n d speeches.
the
Indians
in
The 9 o e t ' s
favour
of
the
words produced
Soviet
Union.
He
much
wrote
impact
on
that
the
f u t u r e of I n d i a degended on i t s a b i l i t y to work together with those
vrorld forces which wanted to end
of nation by nation
10
exploitation of man by man, a n d
.
8. A .
Vafa,
"An Architect
of
Soviet-Indian
Friendship",
in
J a w a h a r l a l Nehru i n Soviet Perspective: A Symposium (New Delhi,
19801, p.53.
9.
V.V.
Balabushevich a n d Bimla P r a s a d ( e d s . ) , I n d i a a n d t h e
Soviet Union: A Symposium (New Delhi, 1969). p.14.
10. Soviet Land (b:oscovi), No.8,
April 1987. p.3.
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So f a r a s t h e p o l i t i c a l l y conscious I n d i a n s were concerned,
t h e i r views r e g a r d i n g
extreme s t e p s i n t h e course of
the
freedom
movement continued to be reflected by t h e I n d i a n National Congress
With a s h o r t b r e a k i n 1931, it busied itself with
from 1930-'34.
organising
a
mass
movement
of
civil
disobedience which
b r e a k i n g law a n d t a k i n g its consequences.
involved
Nehru became President
of t h e Congress i n April 1936 a n d h i s views became t h e b a s i s of t h e
Indian
outlook
on
world
affairs.
Nehru
analysed
the
world
situation
a n d called upon t h e Congress t o i d e n t i f y i t s e l f with t h e
socialist
and
nationalist
forces
in
the
world
struggling
against
imperialism a n d fascism, t h e two faces of decaying c a p i t a l i s m .
The
manifest
at
campaign
the
against
Fazipur
fascism
session
of
and
Congress
nazism
was
(19361,
quite
where
it
declared unequivocally:
Fascist
aggression
has
increased,
the
fascist
powers forming a l l i a n c e s a n d grouping themselves
together for w a r with t h e intention of dominating
Europe a n d t h e world a r e c r u s h i n g politica1 a n d
social freedom.
The Congress is f u l l y conscious of
the necessity of f a c i n g t h i s world menace i n
co-operation with t h e progressive n a t i o n s a n d t h e
peoples of
world.
The Congress d e c l a r e s t h e
s o l i d a r i t y of t h e I n d i a n people with t h e people of
t h e USSR
..
11
I n t h e T r i p u r a Congress Session (19391, Nehru sponsored a
11. G.S. S a r d e s a i ,
1967), p.91.
I n d i a a n d t h e Russian Revolution,
-
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(New
Delhi,
resolution
which
stated:
"The
Congress
dissociates
itself
entirely
from t h e British foreign policy which h a s consistently a i d e d f a s c i s t
powers"12.
Here he
saw
clearly
that
only
t h e Soviet
Union
was
He believed t h a t if these
s t a n d i n g up a g a i n s t nazism a n d fascism.
new ideologies succeeded, t h e colonial peoples would h a v e a worst
f a t e i n store f o r them.
imperialists,
i.e.,
He was very c l e a r i n h i s mind t h a t t h e
fascists and nazists
had
only
one
common objective,
to destroy t h e Soviet Union.
India
could
not
Second World War.
t h e Soviet Russia
Soviet Union.
afford
to remain
unconcerned
Nehru boldly c r i t i c i s e d British. a t t i t u d e towards
13
.
Abruptly on 22 June 1941, Hitler i n v a d e d t h e
The I n d i a n National Congress was seriously concerned
with H i t l e r ' s i n v a s i o n of t h e Soviet Union.
Working
during the
Committee
of
the
Party
at
I n December 1941, t h e
its meeting
held
at
Bardoli,
wished for t h e success of t h e Soviet Union a n d resolved to e x p r e s s
its
great
courage
freedom
admiration
of
14
the
for the
Soviet
astounding
people
in
self-sacrifice
defence
of
their
and
heroic
country
and
.
Eventhough
many
nations
suffered heavily
for the
victory
over Nazi Germany d u r i n g t h e World War I1 it was t h e Soviet Union
t h a t made t h e g r e a t e s t s a c r i f i c e .
12. Ibid.,
13.
The heroic s t r u g g l e of t h e Soviet
p.92.
Jauiaharlal
p.419.
Nehru,
A Bunch of Old Letters,
-
(Bombay,
1 4 . Rajkumar,
Background of I n d i a ' s Foreign Policy
1952). p.85.
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(New
1958).
Delhi,
people
against
Nazism
inspired
the
Indians
s t r u g g l e to achieve t h e i r independence.
to
continue
their
There was much s i m i l a r i t y
between t h e governance of I n d i a a n d t h a t of Russia.
A s Gandhiji
wrote i n h i s Collected Works,
The Power of t h e Viceroy is no way l e s s t h a n t h a t
of t h e Czar
We, too, c a n r e s o r t to t h e Russian
remedy a g a i n s t t y r a n n y .
The movement i n Bengal
for t h e use of Swadeshi goods is much l i k e t h e
Russian movement?
Our s h a c k l e s w i l l b r e a k t h i s
very d a y if t h e people of I n d i a become united a n d
patient,
love t h e i r
country
and think
of t h e
well-being of t h e i r motherland d i s r e g a r d i n g t h e i r
self-interest.
The governance of I n d i a i s possible
only becuse t h e r e e x i s i people who s e r v e . . We a l s o
can show t h e same s t r e n g t h t h a t t h e Russian people
....
..
r-
have done
He f u r t h e r
13
wrote:
" I f t h e Russian
people succeed,
this
Revolution
(of 1905) i n Russia w i l l be r e g a r d e d ' a s t h e g r e a t e s t v i c t o r y ,
g r e a t e s t event of t h e present century" 1 6
Mahatma
Gandhi,
who
had
.
some
initial
reservations
r e g a r d to R u s s i a ' s involvement i n t h e Second World War,
with
came out
i n t h e open i n o r d e r to record h i s s u p p o r t to t h i s country.
message to China,
the
In a
s e n t on 7 August 1942, Gandhiji observed,
"Let
China know t h a t t h i s s t r u g g l e i s a s much for h e r defence a s it is
15. Mahatma
p.132.
Gandhi,
Collected Works
(New
16. I b i d .
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Delhi,
1961),
Vol.V,
for
India's
liberation,
for,
in
that
is
liberation
involved
her
a b i l i t y to give effective a s s i s t a n c e whether to China or t o Russia or
even to
Great
meeting
in
Britain
or
Bombay t h e
~ m e r i c a " ' ~ . While
same d a y ,
the
AICC
Mahatma Gandhi declared:
"the
coming of Japan w i l l mean t h e end of China
too"
18
.
He f u r t h e r a d d e d ,
Russia's
myself"
defeat,
19
in
a n d p e r h a p s Russia,
" I do not want t o be t h e instrument of
China's.
that
If
happens,
I
would
hate
.
A t this
were
nor
addressing
prison
time most of t h e Congress l e a d e r s i n c l u d i n g Nehru
as
a
result
of
the
individual
movement which h a s been s t a r t e d a s a protest
civil
disobedience
against the British
r e f u s a l to declare I n d i a independent i n s p i t e of t h e I n d i a n o f f e r of
full support to t h e w a r e f f o r t i n r e t u r n .
no
question
situation.
progress,
about
In
Indian
their
sympathy with
struggle
Indian leaders
support of the Soviet Union.
had
for
However,
Soviet
national
invariably
t h e r e could be
Union
liberation
relied
on
the
in
and
such
a
social
consistent
Following t h e p r i n c i p l e s l a i d down by
Lenin, Soviet Union pursued a policy of a l l i a n c e s with t h e n a t i o n a l
l i b e r a t i o n movement i n t h e common s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t imperialism a n d
colonialism.
17. Mahatma
p.377.
Gandhi,
Collected Works
(New
18. I b i d . , p.380.
-
19. I b i d .
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Delhi,
19791,
Vo1.76,
For
the
Sanfransisco
first time
Conference
important
Conference
delegate,
Molotov,
independent
India
Jawaharlal
Nehru,
Government
of
relations
with
for
the
the
in
who
the
in
UN
his
near
Soviet
April
of
hope
to
the
expressed
This
world.
and
met
at
was
an
The
Soviet
hear
the
voice
From
the
Indian
Vice-President
the
Union
delegates
1945.
the
future.
became
Soviet
and
future
expressed
India,
the
of
Indian
of
of
an
side
the
Interim
cultivate
cordial
desire
to
the
United
States.
Nehru
admired Soviet Union f o r t a k i n g " a v a s t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r s h a p i n g
world
events"
tasks",
and
India
was
ready
with t h e Soviet Union.
golicy
of
"undertake
But no such
many
response
common
was
heard
However, it was c l e a r t h a t I n d i a wanted to
from t h e US delegate.
follow a
to
non-alignment
by
which
India
opted
"to keep
away from t h e power politics of groups
which h a v e led i n p a s t to world w a r s a n d
d i s a s t e r on a n even v a s t e r s c a l e "
20
.
i
It
had
been
generally
believed
Soviet Union t h a t t h e Congress u n d e r
consistently
following a
path
of s t r u g g l e but
was t r y i n g
to
work
out a compromise with B r i t i s h imperialism i n o r d e r to s a f e g u a r d t h e
vested
i n t e r e s t s of t h e
Indian
landlords
and
bourgeoisie.
Nehru
continued to t a k e a f r i e n d l y a t t i t u d e towards t h e Soviet Union.
20.
He
I n d i a , Ministry of Information a n d Broadcasting, J a w a h a r l a l
N e h r u ' s Speeches: September 1946
May 1949 (New Delhi, 1983).
V0l.I. p.2.
-
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-
bel.ieved
that
India's
mighty country,
tIowever,
relations
was
September
as
the
the
Union,
not
just
a neighbouring country
a
was
a l e t t e r proposing t h e establishment of diplomatic
forwarded
i.e.,
to
Moscow
by
12
nearly
of
the
Interim
Jawaharlal
months
of I n d i a ' s independence.
head
Soviet
.
1946,
proclamation
with
for u s i n I n d l a ,
but,
" v e r y important" 21
relations
Nehru
before
on
the
21
formal
I n h i s very f i r s t b r o a d c a s t
Government
in
1946,
September
J a w a h a r l a l Nehru greeted t h e Soviet Union a s :
...
t h a t other g r e a t nation of t h e modern world,
which a l s o c a r r i e s v a s t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r s h a p i n g
They a r e our neighbours i n Asia
world events
a n d i n e v i t a b l y we s h a l l have to u n d e r t a k e many
common t a s k s and h a v e much to do with each
22
other
.. ..
.
There a f t e r on 2 October a l e t t e r from t h e Soviet Government
was
sent
to
establish
stating
diplomatic
emphasized
mutually
India
that
that
relations
co-operation
beneficial
and
would
the
Soviet
Union
with
India.
between
the
promote
was
Nehru
two
peace
prepared
in
countries
and
his
reply
would
progress
to
in
be
the
whole world.
Nehru i n s t r u c t e d V . K .
two
most
prominent
21. I b i d . ,
p.10.
22. I b i d . ,
p.3.
Indian
Krishna Menon a n d K.P.S.
diplomats
to
Prepared by BeeHive Digital Concepts Cochin for Mahatma Gandhi University Kottayam
conduct
Menon, the
talks
and
consultations with t h e Foreign Minister, V . M .
Molotov, t h e l e a d e r of
the Soviet delegation i n New York who a r r i v e d to p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e
f i r s t session of t h e General Assembly of t h e United Nations.
meeting
Menon
Molotov
in
observed
New
that
he
York
on
28 September
did
not
see
any
strongest feelings of f r i e n d s h i p betwen
not
form
Menon
the
permanent
delivered
assistance
to
Nehru's
meet
delegates held
basis
the
of
personal
famine
preliminary
talks
reason
as
Krishna
to
why
the
I n d i a a n d t h e USSR should
closer
Indo-Soviet
message
situation
with
1946, V . K .
After
to
in
him
relations
Molotov
India.
asking
The
i n cpnnection
23
.
for
Indian
with
the
establishment of diplomatic r e l a t i o n s with t h e USSR.
On
1 2 November
1946 Nehru
told
the
Constituent
Assembly
t h a t Foreign Minister of USSR, Molotov h a d conveyed to V.K.
Menon
in
Paris,
the
information
that
the
Soviet
exchange diplomatic r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s with I n d i a .
Soviet
Union
and
India
diplomatic r e l a t i o n s .
announced
the
Krishna
Union
would
I n April 1947, t h e
establishment
of
formal
The o f f i c i a l announcement was greeted by t h e
Soviet press a s a s i g n of I n d i a ' s independent policy.
India
In
view
and
the
of
the
USSR,
ever-growing
the
friendly
governments
of
relations
both
these
between
countries
considered i t f i t to cement t h e i r a l r e a d y e x i s t i n g t i e s i n t h e form
--
23. Hindu
( M a d r a s ) 1 October 1946.
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24
of diplomatic r e l a t i o n s h i p on 14 April 1947
.
The establishment of diplomatic r e l a t i o n s between New Delhi
and
Moscow
was h a i l e d
by
Hindustan Times welcomed
the
the
press
of t h e two
countries.
s t e p i n t h e i n t e r e s t of
The
exchange of
a c c u r a t e information a n d expressed t h e view t h a t
arrangements w i l l be made a t a n e a r l y d a t e for t h e
t r a i n i n g of I n d i a n s c i e n t i s t s i n Russia a n d t h e
engagement for short periods of Soviet t e c h n i c i a n s
to a d v i s e t h e P r o v i n c i a l a n d Central Governments i n
t h i s country r e g a r d i n g t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y of t h e
Russian experience to I n d i a n economic problemsL3.
-
An e d i t o r i a l i n New Times described the establishment of diplomatic
relations a s an
"event
of
international
significance"
and
an
"evidence of f r i e n d l y sentiments t h e peoples of t h e
two countries e n t e r t a i n for one another", a n d a s i g n
that
" I n d i a is moving towards a n independent
26
policy"
.
Soviet sympathies c l e a r l y
developing
world
and
with
were with
those
colonies
t h e new
s t a t e s of t h e
struggling
to
became
The p r e s s communique, r e l e a s e d by t h e government of I n d i a on
1 4 April 1947 observed, "Being desirous of maintaining a n d
f u r t h e r s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s e x i s t i n g between
India
a n d t h e USSR,
t h e Government of
India
and the
Government of t h e USSR h a v e decided to exchange diplomatic
missions a t embassy l e v e l " .
See Statesman,
- 15 April 1947.
The Hindustan Times
26. Nevi Times
(New Delhi), 14 April 1947.
(Moscovi), Vol.3,
18 April 1947, p.3.
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independent.
However,
t h e d e c l a r a t i o n of I n d i a ' s independence was
welcomed a n d Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov s e n t h i s g r e e t i n g s t o
27
I n d i a on t h e eve of independence on 15 August 1947
1947,
two weeks
India
was
before
announced
sister,
Vijay
USSR.
By
Lakshmi
the
Mountbatten
plan
Nehru
announced
the
Pandit
as
appointing
Ambassador t o the
Vijaya
also
announced
K .V.
Noviko.
Lakshmi
Soviet Union,
h e attached to t h i s country.
India's
Nehru
.
On 25 June
for t h e p a r t i t i o n
appointment
first
of
Ambassador
Pandit
as
highlighted
India's
of
his
to the
first
t h e importance
On 23 October 1947, t h e Soviet Union
t h e appointment of
its first
Ambassador
to I n d i a ,
The I n d i a n Ambassador presented h e r c r e d e n t i a l s i n
Moscow on 17 August 1947 a n d t h e Soviet Ambassador on 1 J a n u a r y
1948.
In
a
speech a t
t h e founding meeting of
the
Cominform i n
September 1947, Andrei Zhdanov. one of S t a l i n ' s l e a d i n g ideologues,
declared t h a t t h e world h a d become divided i n t o two i r r e c o n c i l i a b l e
blocs
- t h e i m p e r i a l i s t headed b y USA a n d t h e a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t camp
headed by t h e Soviet Union.
exceptional
states,
that,
Zhdanov included I n d i a
while not s o c i a l i s t ,
was
among those
not p a r t of t h e
imperialist camp.
During the f i r s t few y e a r s a f t e r I n d i a n independence i n 1947,
27. Amrita Bazar P a t r i ka
( C a l c u t t a ) ,22 August 1947.
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the Soviet l e a d e r s h i p
Nehru
for
had
d i d not reciprocate t h e f r i e n d l y f e e l i n g s t h a t
the
USSR.
Stalin
initially
saw
the
Indian
Government headed by Nehru a s compromise with B r i t i s h imperialism.
The Soviet Union h a d c r i t i c i z e d t h e Mountbatten P l a n ,
independence
was
given
to
India
and
Pakistan,
and
under
it
which
believed
t h a t t h e l e a d e r s h i p of t h e Congress h a d a g r e e d to t h e British terms
for a political settlement.
Further,
I n d i a ' s unequivocal s u p p o r t to
the British adherence t o t h e Western Union Pact;
Commonwealth
aggressors;
Communique for re-armament
and
her
reluctance
to
her support to the
d r i v e a g a i n s t would be
utilise
t h e . Soviet
offer
of
technical a s s i s t a n c e a t t h e ECAFE i n 1948, made I n d i a a suspect i n
the eyes of Russia.
By
early
1948
East-West
Cold
war
positions
had
been
regidified a n d I n d i a was to f a l l victim to these new tensions.
Soviets
enunciated
imperialism
in
areas
imperialism".
independent.
'sham'
India
suspicion
India,
was
a
Non-alignment
While
India's
i t s policy of
boration
like
new
and the
with
yrief
message
was
by
independence
British
were
condolence
came
from
was
as
was
an
thus
not
truly
"imperialist
dubbed
as
a
was s h a r p l y censured a s colla-
capitalism.
Gandhiji's
that
perceived
non-alignment
British
evoked
of
continuing
I n d i a n bourgeoisie
semi-colony
including t h a t of Gandhiji a n d Nehru,
the
of
a s i n 1928-35 viewed as r e a c t i o n a r y a n d "the camp of
once a g a i n ,
device".
their
The
death
The
nationalist
leadership,
came i n f o r criticism.
was
Russia,
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almost
not
a
While
universal,
word
of
"no
comment
appeared
in
Soviet
Security Council
"great
newspapers".
meeting
Indian",
who
But
undoubtedly
freedom
of
insurrection
Communists
the
in
were
colonies
the
left
t h e country,
the
Indian
had,
Telengana
however,
Communist
28
"a
delegate
for
deep
c a l l i n g him
imprint"
to
work
revolution.
region
a t the
on
of
for
the
The
South
'genuine'
C O I I I ~ U ~ ~ S ~
India
in
1948,
amidst growing communal tensions i n
a t r a u m a t i c effect on Nehru.
Party
a
.
encouraged
and
encouraged by the Comintern,
Soviet
t r i b u t e s to Gandhiji,
paid
history of I n d i a a n d t h e I n d i a n people
The
the
He saw
a s a n instrument o f ' Moscow, b l i n d to
t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e country.
However, i n o r d e r t o obviate t h e i n e v i t a b l e impression t h a t
I n d i a was slowly s i d i n g i n t o t h e Western camp, Nehru,
a t t h e same
time, made i t a point t o e x p r e s s openly h i s anti-imperialist
On numerous
occasions he proclaimed
become independent,
subjugated
t h a t t h e colonial world must
and actually assured the nationalists
countries
of
India's
moral
and
material
Although there is no doubt t h a t by adopting such
was
giving
expression
to
his
views.
genuine
a
of
many
support.
policy
convictions
Nehru
against
imperialism.
Thus d u r i n g t h e f i r s t two y e a r s of h e r independence,
India
28. S.P.
Singh,
Political Dimensions of India-USSR-Relations
Delhi, 1987), p.34.
(New
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found
herself
in
imperialist
nation
attainment
of
the
position,
eager
the
assist
to
independence
on
and
one
the
on
hand,
colonial
the
other,
of
an
world
of
anti-
in
the
establishing
s i g n i f i c a n t economic a n d political r e l a t i o n s with t h e west.
On t h e
other h a n d , I n d i a ' s a t t i t u d e to t h e Soviet Union a l s o grew lukewarm
and i t became a p a r t y to c e r t a i n decisions on i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s s u e s .
The Soviet Asian Republics a n d North Vietnam were not i n v i t e d
to the Asian Conference t o 1949 with t h e concurrence of I n d i a .
I n d i a supported t h e Dutch-Indonesian
Agreement of December
1949 a s well a s t h e r u t h l e s s suppression of t h e communist elements
i n Indonesia.
Obviously,
a l l these s t e p s of
misgivings i n t h e Soviet mind
29
I n d i a created f u r t h e r
.
J a w a h a r l a l N e h r u ' s visit to t h e US c a p i t a l
November
1949) led
to
(11 October
some apprehensions to obviate t h e
-
7
security
implications for I n d i a of t h e victory of communists i n China.
Seen
i n t h e l i g h t of t h e aforementioned f a c t s , it seems t h a t many of t h e
international
Doctrine
in
Churchill's
-
developments
March
Fulton
and
like
Marshal
(March
1946)
the
enunciation
Plan
and
in
June
Zurich
speechees a g a i n s t t h e so-called Soviet expansion
of Soviet a n x i e t i e s .
The formation of t h e NATO,
of
1947
the
Truman
along
(September
with
1947)
- were a t t h e root
intensification
in
t h e cold-war tension a n d simultaneous US efforts to win t h e support
..
29. G D Bhatt , Indo-Soviet Relations a n d I n d i a n P u b l i c O p i n i o ~
(Delhi, 1989), p . 7 .
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of Nehru caused concern to Moscow.
Britain
in
most
of
the
I n d i a ' s continued dependence on
important
matters
even
in
the
post-independence period was not a p p r e c i a t e d .
Stalin
communism
considered
and
the
imperialism
between t h e two f r o n t s .
world
and
divided
there
was
into
no
two
room
camps
for
-
anyone
He who was not with t h e Soviet Union was
considered a s h e r enemy.
I n d i a ' s n e u t r a l i t y i n world a f f a i r s was
regarded by the Soviet Union a s a n "imperialist device" i n o r d e r t o
" s l a n d e r " t h e Soviet Union by
American imperialism.
placing h e r on t h e same level with
S t a l i n was s k e p t i c a l about I n d i a n moves a n d
he stoutly refused to acknowledge t h e r e a l i t y of I n d i a .
The Soviet
l e a d e r s h i p did not reciprocate t h e f r i e n d l y feelings t h a t Nehru h a d
f o r t h e USSR.
Russia,
It i s a well-known f a c t t h a t our f i r s t Ambassador.to
Mrs. Vijayalakshmi P a n d i t h a d not been a b l e to h a v e a n
audience with S t a l i n .
India had
to keep
away
from war of
a n y time fought by
both t h e blocs anywhere i n t h e world e i t h e r d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y .
Internally
India
satisfying
the
had
to
follow
ideological
a
policy
prejudice
of
of
mixed
both
economy
thus
blocs.
The
the
non-aligned movement came t o s t a n d f o r a s t r u g g l e f o r s t r e n g t h e n i n g
the
independence
colonialism
and
of
the
newly
imperialism.
emerging
Non-alignment
countries
and
arose
a
as
against
reply
to
cold war politics i n t h e e a r l y f i f t i e s a n d it h a s come to s t a y a n d
I n d i a being one of i t s l e a d i n g spokesman.
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India's
create
a
stand
climate
India.
The
of
on
certain
international
rapprochement
appointment
S.
of
between
questions,helped to
the
Soviet
Radhakrishnan
ambassador to Moscow i n J u l y 1949 w a s t h e best
opportune a s he was a man f r e e from anti-Soviet
of removing the Indo-Soviet
Nehru
had
good
might come together
as
Union
the
choice
bias,
and
Indian
and
quite
and capable
misunderstanding.
reason
to suspect t h a t Moscow
a n d Beijing
The occupation of Tibet by t h e
against India.
Communist China brought a hostile regime closer to I n d i a .
Though
faced with such a p e r i l o u s s i t u a t i o n , Nehru h a d l i t t l e manoeuvrability.
To join
forces
would
have meant
with
giviny
the
up
Western
a l l that
bloc
in
such
a
he believed i n ,
situation
particularly
h i s policy of non-alignment.
I n the
tried
to
Only
if China
might
follow
China,
circumstances,
prevent
it
was
the
emergence
changed
suit
not
in
he
of
because
was
sympathy
growing
basically
for
Indian
opposition
of
for b e f r i e n d i n g
critical
of
India's
he
long
his
Moscow
faith
association
in
with
believed t h a t t h e revolution i n
and
that
aspirations
and
policies.
United
and
monolith.
thought,
placed
nationalist
the
China
communist
India,
If Nehru
course.
t h a t county b u t a l s o because Nehru
China
a
its s t a n c e on
due
only
opted
States to
adopted friendly posture towards China.
it
the
would
So,
new
have
greater
i n s p i t e of t h e
China,
Nehru
He advocated its admission
into the UN a n d i n s i s t e d on t h e r e t u r n of Formosa t o t h e m a i n l a n d .
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He
also
China
refused
entered
Resolution,
even
to
the
the
Korean
which
when
sign
Japanese
War,
condemned
China
India
its
Treaty.
declined
as
China
established
Peace
an
to
And
support
aggressor.
dominance
over
when
UN
the
Similarly,
Tibet
through
military means, Nehru d i d not want t h i s f a c t to come between I n d i a
and
China
as
an
All
irritant.
these
brought
a change i n
about
P e k i n g ' s a t t i t u d e towards I n d i a .
The s t a n c e adopted by
Prime Minister
Nehru i n t h e Korean
war was appreciated a n d admired by t h e Soviet Union
a test c a s e for I n d i a ' s non-alignment
north
at
of
the
the
UN
38th
heartening gesture
31
military
command's
parallel.
.
For
.
This was
and she acquitted very
i n adopting a s t r i c t l y i m p a r t i a l position.
protest
30
well
I n d i a registered a strong
decision
the
Soviet
to
extent
Union
the
this
war
was
a
Nehru's a p p e a l for peaceful settlement of t h e
Korean conflict was welcomed by S t a l i n ,
b u t rejected by t h e United
States.
that
This
made
Stalin
interested i n p u r s u i n g
to
recognise
Nehru
was
a n independent policy i n world
genuinely
affairs and
he made a s e r i e s of g e s t u r e s of f r i e n d s h i p s towards I n d i a .
Archives, Vol.VII1,
30. Kissing's Contemporary
1950-52, p .10847.
31. I n d i a ' s forceful advocacy of t h e admission of p e o p l e ' s China
into t h e U N was t h e second important i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s s u e upon
which Soviet a n d I n d i a n i n t e r e s t s converged i n t h e e a r l y 1950's.
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Kashmir Dispute
The
Indo-Pak
Kashmir
relations,
dispute
constituted
a
major
a n d even a f t e r t h e two Indo-Pak
Sirnla Agreement t h e d i s p u t e h a s not been s e t t l e d .
between
India
irritant
and
Pakistan
over
Kashmir
in
the
wars and the
After a dialogue
proved
fruitless,
took the matter to t h e Security Council on 31 December
India
1947 u n d e r
Article 35 of t h e United Nations Charter a n d c h a r g e d P a k i s t a n with
"an
act
of
Council held
aggression
against
on 17 J a n u a r y
~ n d i a " ~ ~
A t.
Andrei Gromyko,
a
meeting
of
the
r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e USSR
observed:
...
the whole question should be adopted a s soon
a s possible on t h e s u b s t a n c e of t h e question i n
order to rectify
a n d improve t h e
situation
in
Kashmir a n d to s e t t l e r e l a t i o n s between I n d i a a n d
33
Pakistan
.
The
the
power
Pakistan
manner
in
politics of
which
the
t h e United
was sought to be
Kashmir
question,
quagmired
Nations a n d t h e manner
propped
up by
in
i n which
some powerful countries
a s a counter weight to I n d i a by u t i l i s i n g t h e Kashmir d i s p u t e w a s
a f r u s t r a t i n g experience for I n d i a a n d immeasurably influenced t h e
UN, Security Council Official Record,
32. p .28 ( h e r e a f t e r cited a s SCOR,
)
.... .
33. I b i d . ,
17 J a n u a r y 1948, pp.123-124.
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S/628,
1
January
1948,
c o u n t r y ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d i n s i g h t into i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s a s
well a s her foreign policy s t a n c e
34
.
The Western powers time a n d a g a i n brought up t h e Kashmir
issue
in
the
UN
with
the
objective
of
helping
Pakistan.
The
Security Council a t t h a t time was dominated by t h e Western powers
a n d I n d i a had to f a l l
the
adoption
back
of p a t e n t l y
powers.
Though
Nehru
Kashmir
problem,
he
on t h e Soviet veto i n o r d e r to prevent
hostile resolutions
initially
d i d not
moved
by
the
Western
a plebicite to decide t h e
offered
p u r s u e it a s conditions h a d
changed
substantially.
The US
the i s s u e of
a t t i t u d e towards
India
US arms a i d to P a k i s t a n
move a s Washington
was
already
was
not
appreciative
was t r e a t e d
as a
hostile t o I n d i a
on
since
dangerpus
the
Kashmir
-
issue.
-
By a s k i n g t h e UN to withdraw all US personnel from Kashmir,
I n d i a g a v e notice to Washington t h a t
considered
35
affairs
by
India
Pakistan
3 4 . V.P.
an
(Washington) was no more
impartial
judge
in
Indo-Pakistan
.
While I n d i a
Chinese
as
it
and
into
and
Korean
Western
US were
questions,
sponsored
having
the
US
military
divergent
quitely
opinion
started
alliances
in
on
the
drawing
order
to
Dutt, I n d i a ' s Foreign .- Policy (New Delhi, 19841, p.9.
3 5 . Vinod
Bhatia,
I n d i r a Gandhi a n d Indo-Soviet Relations
Delhi, 1987). p.8.
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(New
establish
military
Kashmir.
bases
ayainst
Soviet
over
Kashmir
understanding
two
in
between
when i n April 1952
about
in
the
This development forced S t a l i n to change
draw I n d i a closer to t h e Soviet Union.
silence
Union
years
favour
Soviet
of
Union
I n 1952,
India
and
at
India
Pak
held
h i s mind
and
Moscow broke i t s
the
UN
had
and
become
better
clear
S t a l i n who had not met a n y f o r e i g n d i g n a t o r i e s
granted
an
audience
to
Indian
Dr.Radhakrishnan just before h i s r e l i n q u i s h i n g office.
Ambassador
This meeting
helped to remove many confusions i n S t a l i n ' s mind about I n d i a a n d
signalled
the
beginning
of
a
new
era
of
Indo-Soviet
relations.
1
Radhakrishnan on h i s r e t u r n to I n d i a p r a i s e d t h e Soviet Union a n d
rebuked
the
Western
powers
for
attempting
to
destroy
the
Soviet
Union.
I n 1953, i n a f u r t h e r g e s t u r e of good-will S t a l i n g r a n t e d a n
interview to the new I n d i a n Ambassador,
the improvement of t r a d e r e l a t i o n s .
concluded i n December 1953.
K.P.S.Menon,
resulting i n
A worthy t r a d e agreement was
This was a t u r n i n g point i n Moscow's
a t t i t u d e towards I n d i a .
The death of
S t a l i n i n March 1953 came to be a watershed
i n t h e Soviet history a n d i t s policy towards I n d i a .
death of Stalin,
unprecedented
Soon a f t e r t h e
t h e Soviet Prime Minister i n August 1953 made a n
friendly
reference
to
India
in
his
speech.
"The
position of such a c o n s i d e r a b l e s t a t e a s I n d i a " he s a i d , is of g r e a t
importance f o r t h e s t r e n g t h e n i n g of peace i n t h e East.
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India has
made her own s i g n i f i c a n t contribution to t h e e f f o r t s of peace-loving
countries directed to t h e e n d i n g of t h e war i n Korea.
Our r e l a t i o n s
with I n d i a a r e growing s t r o n g e r a n d c u l t u r a l a n d economic t i e s a r e
developing.
Union
will
We
hope
that
continue
to
co-operation a s t h e i r
Meanwhile,
relations
develop
keynote
36
between
and
India
and
strengthen
the
with
was
not a p p r e c i a t e d by
I n d i a a n d China signed a
friendly
.
I n d i a began to move closer t o both
Soviet Union which
Soviet
China
Washington.
and
I n 1954,
T r e a t y i n which t h e five p r i n c i p l e s
of
Nehru followed t h i s u p with a v i s i t
Panchasheel were incorporated.
to China i n 1954, a n d accepted a n i n v i t a t i o n to v i s i t t h e USSR.
Just before N e h r u ' s v i s i t to t h e USSR, t h e two countries h a d
signed t h e f i r s t economic agreement i n F e b r u a r y 1955 for t h e s e t t i n g
up
of
Bhilai
Steel
Plant.
Nehru
later
embedded i n t h e n a t i o n a l consciousness of
t h e symbol of a
new
era
37
.
stated
that
"Bhilai
is
t h e people of I n d i a a s
The Soviet Union
not
only
provided
concessional f i n a n c i a l c r e d i t b u t a l s o t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e to I n d i a .
The
Soviet
offer to
put
landmark i n t h e history
and
Soviet
Western
Union
powers
but
were
up
this
project
must
be
regarded
as
a
not merely i n t h e r e l a t i o n s between I n d i a
also
between
dragging
on
the
the
East
and
discussions
the
West.
regarding
The
the
western f i n a n c i a l a n d t e c h n i c a l s u p p o r t for t h e construction of steel
36. V.V.Balabushevich
a n d Bimla P r a s a d ( e d . ) , n.9,
p.25.
37. A.Appadorai ( e d . ) , I n d i a : Studies i n Social a n d Political Development 1947-'67
(New Delhi, 19681, p.232.
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plants.
Thus
began
an
era
of economic co-operation
between t h e
two.
Nehru's v i s i t to t h e Soviet Union i n June 1955 was used by
the Soviet Union to develop f r i e n d s h i p with
considered
accorded
as
a
an
leading
figure
extra-ordinarily
non-communist
to
build
of
independent
warm
reception
l e a d e r was ever given.
22 June 1955, both t h e p a r t i e s
further
their
India
India.
which
on
the
principles
enlarge
area
peace,
no
other
promote
mutual
not only
of
b u t a l s o to work to make them u n i v e r s a l .
of
was
I n t h e i r joint communique of
co-existence,
the
He
stressed t h e determination
relations
was
a n d Nehru
peaceful
This " w i l l
confidence
amongst
.
nations, a n d p a v e t h e way for g r e a t e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l co-operation ,838
It
was
also
co-operate,
agreed
that
the
and
USSR
India
were
ready
to
to t h e f u l l e s t extent, i n solving t h e b u r n i n g problem of
our time a n d i n f i n d i n g ways of lessening tension i n t h e "hotbeds"
of t h e world
39
.
The r e t u r n
v i s i t of
Prime Minister N.A.Bulganin
first
and
Secretary of the C e n t r a l Committee of t h e CPSU, N.S.Khruschchev
India
(18
November
friendly ties
between
-
13
December
1955)
these two countries.
further
cemented
Prime
Indo-Soviet
-T r e a t y 15 Years
-- (New Delhi, 1986). p.27
-
39. I b i d .
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the
Speaking i n honour of
the v i s i t i n g Soviet d i g n i t a r i e s on 20 November i n New Delhi,
38. V.Mikhin,
to
Minister Nehru r e f e r r e d t o :
d ~ e p e r f r i e n d s h i p a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g between t h e
people
of
our
two
great
countries
have
p r o g r e s s i v e l y g r o w n , e v e n t h o u g h t h e p a t h s we h.a.v e
...
40
political
pursued i n our respective countries have varied
.
The
all
Soviet
Union
not
only
q u e s t i o n s l i k e Kashrnir
supported
India
pharmaceuticals,
etc.
engineerings,
These p r o j e c t s a r e s u p p o r t e d with
t o t a l c r e d i t commitment of over t h o u s a n d c r o r e s of r u p e e s
The
Soviet
e f f o r t to l i b e r a t e
implied
that
Union
Goa
India
declared
and
should
other
that
possessions
as
it
should
quickly
liberate
potential
them
if
a
41
support
P o r t u g h e s e colonies i n
m i l i t a r y means b e c a u s e t h e American
Portughese
major
a n d Goa b u t a l s o e x t e n d e d l i b e r a l
c r e d i t s for s e t t i n g u p of b a s i c i n d u s t r i e s l i k e h e a v y
power,
on
India's
India
and
necessary
by
" m i l i t a r y c l i q u e " viewed t h e s e
bases
for
use
against
New
Delhi.
I n the
summer of 1954, t h e Slno-Soviet
policy to be followed t o w a r d Nehru
differences over t h e
a n d other neutralist
l e a d e r s of
Asia a c c e l e r a t e d t h e Soviet d e s i r e t o b u i l d u p c l o s e r r e l a t i o n s with
India.
Peking,
In
the
end
he realized
of
September
1954
when
I<hrushchev
visited
t h a t i t w a s d i f f i c u l t t o t a c k l e Mao-Tse-Tuny
h e w a s uncompromising.
as
He f u r t h e r r e a l i z e d t h a t i t t h e Soviet Union
40.
J a w a h a r l a l Nehru, n .3, p .309.
41.
Sukhbir Choudhary,
Delhi, 1 9 7 3 ) , p . 2 .
&do-Soviet
Treaty
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--view
(New
wanted C h i n a ' s f r i e n d s h i p a n d s u p p o r t , s h e would h a v e to s a c r i f i c e
her n a t i o n a l a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l g o a l s .
Khrushchev
"vehemently"
returned
objected
to
home
the
with
Soviet
a
feeling
that
Mao
policy
towards
India
and
described Nehru a n d other n e u t r a l i s t l e a d e r s of Asia a s " l a c k e y s of
American
against
imperialism".
India
on
the
Mao demanded unambiguous
issue
of
Sino-Indian
Soviet s u p p o r t
border
dispute.
The
Soviet l e a d e r d i d not give i n t o t h e Chinese p r e s s u r e to s u p p o r t t h e
Chinese t e r r i t o r i a l claim a g a i n s t I n d i a .
mind
Khrushchev went
ahead
After r e a l i z i n g t h e Chinese
with h i s policy
of
winning
over t h e
Indian friendship.
I t is nc~t c l e a r a s t o when a n d a t what point t h e d e s i r e for
a
counter-weight
to China
became
a
major
According to T.N.Kau1,
towards I n d i a .
Vice-President
Dr.Radhakrishnan
in
f a c t o r i n Soviet policy
Khrushchev
1956 t h a t
'in
the chief enemy (Soviet Union) would be C h i n a ' 42
told t h e I n d i a n
ten
year's
time
.
Soviet Stand on Sino-Indian Border Dispute
I n 1959, t h e border c l a s h e s between I n d i a a n d China l e d to
Soviet c a l l s f o r t a l k s a n d to reaffirmations of Soviet f r i e n d s h i p with
both s i d e s .
This n e u t r a l position pleased t h e I n d i a n s b u t s u r p r i s e d
t h e chinese.
42. Peter
19891,
However,
J.S.
p.15.
t h i s does not mean t h a t t h e containment of
Duncan,
-
The Soviet Union a n d I n d i a
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(New
York,
China
was
altogether
sudden only i n
the
Soviet
a
new
phenomenon
that
sprang
up
a l l of
a
1959 a n d b e g a n to dominate I n d i a ' s r e l a t i o n s with
Union.
As
Michael
Brecher
points
out: "No
Indian
statesman can ignore t h e compelling f a c t t h a t two g r e a t powers of
the
communist
sub-continent
world
,,43
at
stand
the
gates
of
the
Indian
.
The Soviet Union was t h e only g r e a t power which thought i t
to
be
in
its
interests
that
India
should
emerge
as
a
strong,
consolidated country c a p a b l e of p l a y i n g a n important role i n Asian
and
world
politics.
Soviet policy
It
is,
towards I n d i a
therefore,
important
tonote
a r o s e out of its consciousness
that
this
( i ) that
a f t e r t h e emergence of a s t r o n g China, t h e major power confrontation
i n Asia would occur b e t ~ e e nChina on t h e one h a n d a n d t h e United
States on t h e o t h e r ;
( i i ) t h a t by i t s e l f , t h e Soviet Union would not
be a b l e to p l a y a dcminant power role i n Asia;
(iii) t h a t , it would
be detrimental to Soviet i n t e r e s t s i f e i t h e r t h e USA o r China were to
dominate
s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t s of Asia;
the interest
of
the
Soviet Union
to
and (iv) that,
promote
hence i t was i n
diversity
i n Asia
and
welcome t h e coming i n t o being of other independent c e n t r e s of power
i n Asia,
with
whom t h e Soviet Union would be a b l e to work close,
friendly relations on t h e b a s i s of e q u a l i t y a n d mutual benefit 44
--
43.
Micheal Brecher, =i_a's
York, 1957). p.4.
44.
M.S.Rajan, S h i v a j i Ganguly ( e d . ) , Sisir Gupta: I n d i a a n d
I n t e r n a t i o n a l System (New Delhi, 1981). p . 249.
Foreign P o l i c ~An I n t e r p r e t a t i o n
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.
(New
the
In
Soviet
1960,
-
Union
China.
In
publish
dispute
Aksaichin
In
on
India.
when
negotiations
during
world
did
was
were
bought
for
the
with
not
border
like
from
use
1958.
path
the
against
dispute
hope of
the
Indian
India
did
solving the
of
peaceful
a s u r p r i s e a n d sudden
made
contemplated
as
the
unprepared
arms
possible
as e a r l y
1962 China
India
India
planes
China
the
China
October
attack
and
by
news to
peacefully.
time
area
imprisoned
this
negotiation.
first
the
helicopters
the
o f f i c i a l s were
not
for
for the
on
sudden
the
basis
betrayal
of
the
McMohan l i n e . I n t h e 1962 a t t a c k China took away a l a r g e t e r r i t o r y
a n d on 29
November 1962 China declared a u n i l a t e r a l c e a s e f i r e .
Initially
hard
gone
sided
with t h e Peking i n t h e 1962 border
Soviets were not v e r y h a p p y i n t h i s development a s y e a r s
dispute.
of
Moscow
striving
for
nothing
as
for
Indian
a
friendship
result
of
and
Peking's
Indian
actions.
cautious a p p r o a c h 2owards t h e border
adopted a
t h e s i d e of
India,
neutrality had
Soviet
incident.
War;
Government
probably
with I n d i a
46
Taking
Soviet Union criticised t h e a g g r e s s i v e war
a s obstructing t h e progressive democratic s t r e n g t h i n I n d i a
Soviet
Union
did
because
try
of
to
bring
Soviet
an
early
pressure,
end
China
to
45
blocs
.
The
Sino-Indian
stopped its
war
.
45. Alexy Kosygin expressed t h e Soviet's anti-China official f e e l i n g
on Indo-China conflict on t h e occasion of 45th a n n i v e r s a r y of
the October R ~ v o l u t i o n . See The Statesman,
- 6 November 1962.
46. Sanjay Gaikwad, Dynamics of Indo-Soviet Relations: The E r a of
I n d i r a Gandhi (New Delhi, 1990). p.41.
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Following
India
asked
assistance.
worth
47
.
the
United
However,
further,
when
produce
MiG-21
Missiles
on
India
f o r $ 500 million
States
when
of
India
approached
what it wanted.
the
Soviet
aircraft
only MiG-19s t o China
types
attack
in
October
worth
of
1962,
military
But, America responded with a n offer of only $70 million
l a t t e r gave I n d i a
all
Chinese
arms
and t a n k s .
another steel p l a n t
48
.
and
Soviet
The m i l i t a r y
government
under
the
agreed
licence,
Union,
relationship
to
follow
it
although
the
went
India
had
to
supplied
Besides, i n 1963 Moscow s t a r t e d s u p p l y i n g
equipments
for
mountain
warfare,
MiGs,
This was followed b y a n agreement t o s e t up
a t Bokaro which was o r i g i n a l l y
promised
t o be
taken up by US government a n d l a t e r backed out because of v a r i o u s
p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e s i n t h e a n t i - I n d i a n lobby.
The i n i t i a l pro-China
attributed
s t a n c e of
the
Soviet Union
has
to t h e f a c t t h a t t h e R u s s i a n s needed Chinese s u p p o r t i n
the Cuban Missile C r i s i s .
After t h i s c r i s i s was defused t h e Soviet
l e a d e r s switched back to a policy of c o r d i a l i t y with Nehru.
November,
silence
been
however,
over
the
Moscow
McMohan
changed
line
in
the
an
line.
editorial
Pravda
whish
On 5th
maintained
appealed
-i.
-.
~,
47. I b i d ' p.42.
%
48. Peter.J.S.Duncan,
n.42,
p.16.
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'.
,.
to
both
p a r t i e s to
agree
imposing pre-conditions
When
49
a ceasefire a n d to negotiate without
to
.
Jawaharlal
Nehru
died
27
on
May
1964
a
memorial
meeting was held i n Moscow i n t h e H a l l of Columns where eloquent
tributes
were
paid
to
the
late
Prime
Minister,
architect of I n d i a ' s f r i e n d l y t i e s with t h e USSR.
who
was
the
This was a r a r e
sort of condolence, such honour being reserved for Communist h e a d s
of States only
All
relations
Minister
declared
would
.
apprehensions
Indo-Soviet
Prime
50
that
be
designate
Nehru's
continued.
re-assessment
after
of
the
with
regard
Nehru's
of
course
Nehru's
to
any
probable
death
were
set
La1
India
both
in
death
Bahadur
home
did
Soviet a t t i t u d e towards
and
not
shift
aside
by
Shastri,
foreign
bring
India.
in
the
who
policies
about
It was
any
fully
confirmed d u r i n g t h e v i s i t of t h e Defence Minister a n d t h e President
of I n d i a to Moscow i n September 1964.
Indo-Soviet Relations a f t e r Nehru E r a
Within l e s s t h a n a month of President R a d h a k r i s h n a n ' s v i s i t
to Moscow,
L.I.
Brezhnev took
over
a s t h e chief
of
the
CPSU
49. Vinod
Bhatia,
I n d i r a Gandhi a n d Indo-Soviet Relations
Delhi, 1987), pp.15-16.
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and
(New
On t h e d a y Khrushchev w a s removed
Kosygin a s t h e Prime Minister.
the
Indian
government
in
carefully-worded
statement
attention of t h e new Soviet l e a d e r s t h a t " I n d i a ,
ties
with
the
Soviet
vivid
contrast
Khrushchev's
28 October.
cabinet
Moscow
the
fall
and
Mrs.
as
to
meet
Chinese
the
of
grew
it
as
values h e r f r i e n d l y
under
a
confidence t h a t
51
new l e a d e r s h i p "
were
delighted
by
"major
victory"..
On
Gandhi,
Nehru's
daughter,
Information
and
Broadcasting
new
Soviet
leaders and
the
with
Communists
regarded
Indira
Minister
a n d looks forward
continue t o
will
these f r i e n d l y t i e s
In
Union
drew
in
Shastri's
arrived
in
on .the following d a y
Prime Minister Kosygin
assured her that
policy towards I n d i a .
"Our f r i e n d s h i p with I n d i a i s not a p a s s i n g
New
continue i t s
"It is one of t h e best f r i e n d s h i p between o u r
thing" he declared.
tvio countries" 52
Moscow would
.
Delhi
studiously
watched
all
this
and issued
a
brief
statement, which expressed t h e hope t h a t f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s between
I n d i a a n d the USSR would continue t o grow s t r o n g e r under t h e new
Soviet
l e a d e r s h i p 53
reiterated
.
Soviet
pledge
of
friendship
on s e v e r a l occasions by t h e new l e a d e r s h i p .
51. Times of I n d i a (New Delhi), 17 October 1964.
-
52. The Statesman, 31 October 1964.
53. Ibid.,
with
17 October 1964.
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India
was
On t h e e v e
of the 47th a n n i v e r s a r y of t h e October Revolution,
Brezhnev r e f e r r e d
to good neighbourly, t r a d i t i o n a l a n d f r i e n d l y t i e s with I n d i a
9 December 1964, i n h i s r e p o r t t o t h e Supreme Soviet,
Kosygin
observed
that
Soviet
f r i e n d s h i p with
" b r o a d e r and more f r u i t f u l " y e a r a f t e r y e a r
55
began
in
the
spring
c l a s h e s on t h e Indo-Pak
of
1965 with
.
On
Prime Minister
India
was
becoming
.
A new p h a s e i n t h e r e l a t i o n s between
which
54
India
the
a n d t h e USSR,
of
outbreak
border i n t h e Rann of Kutch,
armed
was c h a r a c -
terised by a firm d e s i r e on t h e p a r t of t h e Soviets t o develop t h e i r
time-tested
r e l a t i o n s with New Delhi a n d e x p l o r e some new v i s t a s i n
t h e i r formal state-to-state
r e l a t i o n s with P a k i s t a n .
I t is t r u e t 6 a t t h e r e w a s no question of b a r t e r i n g a w a y a
time-tested
further
friend
increased
like
India.
the
element
between I n d i a a n d t h e USSR,
to
be
augmented,
military
Since
of
Sino-Pak-US
collusion
inter-dependence
economic co-operation
assistance
to
her
had
in
with
to
relations
India
be
reinforced a n d p o l i t i c a l s u p p o r t t o h e r on t h e i s s u e s of h e r
interest
the
had
war
to be reaffirmed
with
China
two
56
.
years
had
had
further
direct
Perceiving I n d i a as weakened b y
earlier,
the
new
Soviet
leaders
sought t o improve t h e i r r e l a t i o n s with P a k i s t a n , a n d to t r y t o wean
54. pravda
55. I b i d . ,
(MOSCOW),
7 October 1964.
1 0 December 1964.
56. S.P.Singh,
n.28,
p.115.
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i t a w a y from C h i n a .
task.
Certainl'r,
The major i s s u e ,
whlch t h e Soviet Union f a c e d , a p p e a r e d i n
t h e form of armed c l a s h e s
of
Kutch,
which
t h i s b a l a n c i n g a c t was a n up-hill
between I n d i a a n d P a k i s t a n i n t h e Rann
ultimately
led
to the
outbreak
of a n a l l - o u t
war
between t h e s e two c o u n t r i e s i n September 1965.
In
the
India
and
Union
moved
assumed
a
f a l l of
Pakistan
away
April
broke
from
"neutral"
1965
out
her
stand.
a
when
minor
over t h e Rann
whole-hearted
Prime
of
conflict
Kutch,
support
Minister
to
Shastri
between
t h e Soviet
India
and
believed
that
though t h e Soviet Union h a d t a k e n a n e u t r a l s t a n d i n t h e c o n f l i c t ,
her
of
sympathy had
the
country
remained
he
could
with
not
H e felt t h a t a s a leader
India.
sacrifice
f r i e n d s h i p f o r t h e b e n e f i t of t h e people.
the
Soviet
support
and
On t h e e v e of h i s v i s i t t o
t h e Soviet Union on 12 May h e p r a i s e d Moscow a s a " b i g f r i e n d " of
I n d i a which h a d
rendered
"us v a r i o u s k i n d s of a i d a n d a s s i s t a n c e
The f r i e n d s h i p between o u r two c o u n t r i e s is of
a t d i f f i c u l t times".
tremendous s i g n i f i c a n c e t o t h e whole world 57
In
Pakistan
August
broke
and Pakistan,
1965 a
out
over
The
armed
Kashmir.
c o n f l i c t between
In
the
clashes
India
between
and
India
which e r u p t e d i n t o a f u l l s c a l e w a r i n August, Moscow
stayed officially neutral,
India.
major
.
United
although i t
States
57. Amrita B a z a r P a t r i k a ,
continued t o
declared
12 May, 1965.
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an
arms
supply
embaryo,
arms
to
which
affected Pakistan
much
more
adversely t h a n
It was from
India.
about t h i s time t h a t t h e USSR became a major e x p o r t e r of
58
I n d i a , while China supported P a k i s t a n
arms t o
.
he
friendly relations
between
India
and the
Soviet Union
were demonstrated a g a i n i n 1965 when h o s t i l i t i e s broke out between
P a k i s t a n a n d I n d i a over Kashmir.
peace
and
interests
universal
of
government
the
peoples
insisted
differences between
with
this
security
purpose
of
that
India
in
Guided by i t s wish to s t r e n g t h e n
and
proceeding
India
it
and
was
from
Pakistan,
possible
to
31e USSR
called
for
the
vital
Soviet
overcome
a n d P a k i s t a n only through
mind,
the
a
the
negotiations;
ceasfire
and
offered i t s good office t o s e t t l e t h e differences.
I n d i a a n d P a k i s t a n accepted t h e Soviet proposal a n d a g r e e d
to hold a meeting between Prime Minister La1 B a h a d u r S h a s t r i a n d
President
Kosygin
Ayub
played
Khan
the
in
role
Tashkent.
of
a
process Washington encouraged
India
and
Pakistan
against
The
mediator
Soviet
between
Kosygin to p l a y
China.
When,
on
Prime
them.
In
t h i s role
22
Minister
this
to u n i t e
September
1965,
I n d i a a n d P a k i s t a n accepted t h e c e a s e f i r e resolution of t h e Security
Council of the U N t h e Soviet Union welcomed t h e i r agreement.
On
19
January
1966
historic Tashkent Declaration,
Shastri
and
Ayub
Khan
signed
the
whereby both s i d e s undertook not to
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resort to force a n d to solve t h e i r d i s p u t e s peacefully on t h e b a s i s
of the principle of non-interference i n each o t h e r s i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s .
They
noted
with
deep
appreciation the
constructive,
friendly,
noble role of the Soviet Union i n b r i n g i n g about t h e meeting,
resulted
i n mutually
satisfactory result
a s a n Asian
so i n public,
Menon
.
The Soviet objective to
'Zhough t h e Soviet l e a d e r s d i d not s a y
power.
former I n d i a n Ambassador to t h e Soviet Union
asserted
that
the
which
of course, to e s t a b l i s h t h e Soviet
hold the Tashkent conference was,
Union
59
and
Soviet
proposal
for a
conference
K.P.S.
between
I n d i a a n d P a k i s t a n was a "strong evidence of R u s s i a ' s Asianess ,,60
At
totally
Tashkent,
different
Soviet
Union
behaved
as
a
big
power
of
.
a
It was t h e first i n s t a n c e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l
type.
diplomacy when a b i g power t r i e d its most to b r i n g peace between
two comparatively weaker n a t i o n s i n s t e a d of exploiting t h e i r discord
of further i t s i n t e r e s t s
.
61
The Tashkent declaration was signed on 1 0 J a n u a r y 1966 which by
59. For d e t a i l s of Tashkent Declaration, See, I n d i a , Ministry of
External A f f a i r s , Foreign Affairs Record (New Delhi) , Vol . X I I ,
No.1, J a n u a r y 1966.
60. Times of I n d i a , 28 November 1965.
61. K.Neelkant, P a r t n e r s i n Peace
(New Delhi, 1972). p.19.
-
A Study i n Indo-Soviet
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Relations
-
India
the
and
two
Pakistan
countries
pledged
to
to
promote
restore
good
peaceful
relations
between
neighbourly
relations
and
to
reaffirm t h e i r f a i t h i n t h e U N C h a r t e r so a s not to h a v e recourse to
force.
This
Soviet
role
declaration
in
South
accorded
It
Asia.
considerable
allowed
Moscow
success
to
for
maintain
the
good
relations with both I n d i a a n d P a k i s t a n u n t i l t h e e n d of t h e 1960's.
But to those who looked forward to f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s betwen I n d i a
and
Pakistan,
very
aptly:
encircle
world,
"In
-
friendship
Tashkent
any
more
a
a
gave
way
Tashkent
friendship
nation,
tremendous
whose
is
hope.
an
purpose
but
to
promote
the
particularly
in
South
Asian
As
epitome
is
of
not
cause
has
to
of
regiorl'
62
been
Indo-Soviet
threaten
peace
.
in
Thus,
Indo-Pak
conflict of 1965 ended because of t h e Soviet mediation.
provided
a
between
sound b a s i s
India
and
for the
Pakistan,
establishment
a n d helped
of
put
normal
i n ending t h e
or
the
the
It
relations
s t a t e of
war between the two c o u n t r i e s .
62. K.P.S.Menon, "steady growth of Relations",
- cited i n V.V.Balabushevich a n d ~ i m l a ~ r a s a( d
E d s . ) , n.9, p.34.
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