Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
Managing Crisis in the European Union:
The Commission and
‘Mad Cow Disease’
Jesper Grönvall
1
Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
Titel:
Managing Crisis in the European Union:
The Commission and ‘Mad Cow Disease’
Utgiven av: Överstyrelsen för civil beredskap
Grafisk form: Ateljé/Faktor AB
Tryck:
Tryckeri AB Knappen, Karlstad, 2000
Upplaga
600 ex
ISBN:
917097081-5
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
Contents
1. Introduction ................................................................................................. 5
1.1 Aim and Research Questions ................................................................. 6
2. Method ...................................................................................................... 8
2.1 Single Case Studies ................................................................................ 8
2.2 Sources .................................................................................................. 12
2.3 Delimitation .......................................................................................... 14
3. Theory ....................................................................................................
3.1 A Cognitive-Institutional Approach .....................................................
3.2 Defining a Crisis ...................................................................................
3.3 Complexity of Decision-Making in the Commission ..........................
3.4 Experts in the Decision-Making Process .............................................
3.5 Decision-Making at the European Level ..............................................
3.5.1 The Commission – Actor or Arena? ...........................................
16
16
18
23
26
28
30
4. Context and Background ..........................................................................
4.1 BSE ....................................................................................................
4.2 The European Union and Agriculture ..................................................
4.2.1 The Internal Market ....................................................................
4.3 The European Commission ..................................................................
34
34
36
39
40
5. Chronology and Decision Occasions........................................................
5.1 Chronology: February 1996 – June 1996 .............................................
5.2 Decision Occasions: March 20 – June 26, 1996 ..................................
5.2.1 Decision Occasion I (March 20): Public Statement on BSE
from the UK ................................................................................
5.2.2. Decision Occasion II (March 21): Unilateral British Beef
Bans Implemented by Several Member States, Violating
EU Community Legislation ........................................................
5.2.3 Decision Occasion III (March 22): Additional Countries
Impose Unilateral British Beef Bans and the ScVC Responds ..
5.2.4. Decision Occasion IV (March 25): How will the SVC
Respond to the Proposal? John Major Calls Santer ...................
5.2.5 Decision Occasion V (March 26): How will the SVC
Respond to the Proposal? ...........................................................
5.2.6 Decision Occasion VI (May 8): What Should be Decided
Regarding Gelatin, Tallow and Bull Semen? ..............................
44
44
49
50
53
56
59
63
66
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
5.2.7 Decision Occasion VII (May 21): The United Kingdom
Initiates a Blocking of the EU Institutions .................................
5.2.8 Decision Occasion VIII (June 3-4): The Agricultural Council
Leaves the Issue of Deciding on Gelatin to the Commission .....
5.2.9 Decision Occasion IX (June 26): Final Report on Gelatin is
Delivered .....................................................................................
5.3 The Aftermath: Crisis De-escalation (July 1996 – August 1999) ........
6. Analysis ....................................................................................................
6.1 Problem Framing and Decision Units ..................................................
6.2 Experts in the Decision-Making Process .............................................
6.3 What Role does the European Commission Play in Crisis
Decision-Making? ................................................................................
70
72
73
74
77
77
84
92
7. Conclusions ................................................................................................ 98
List of References ......................................................................................... 102
List of Abbreviations .................................................................................... 112
Swedish summary of this Report ................................................................ 113
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
”…the BSE crisis constitutes one of the most difficult crises
I have had to face throughout my career”
Jaques Santer, President of the EU Commission
(European Parliament, 1997a:431).
1. Introduction1
On Wednesday March 20, 1996, the British government made a statement regarding
an expert report which revealed a possible connection between a disease in cattle,
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), and a new variant of a human disease,
Creutzfeldt-Jakobs disease (nv-CJD). Humans could be at risk of contracting a
fatal and an incurable disease by consuming contaminated beef and it did not
matter if consumption was halted, as there was an incubation period of a few
years. What the government in the United Kingdom had denied for years could
now be a reality. The government had previously gone to great lengths to display
the safety of beef by having (forcing?) the young daughter of the Agricultural
Minister, John Gummer, to eat a beef burger in front of the TV cameras in 1990
(Ford, 1996:113). What happened in the United Kingdom, in a short period of
time, was a scare over a single product that changed the eating habits of a nation
and spread throughout Europe and the world. Government officials and experts
were trying to calm down their panic stricken citizens. But the public fears were
monumental and the sales of beef were down 70% in several countries. As some
of the most basic human needs, the need for safety and health vanished, panic
spread around the world. Both food and politics are similar in that they both involve
a large amount of trust: ‘you are what you eat’. Due to this statement on that
Wednesday, which is now called the ‘Black Wednesday’ in the United Kingdom,
intergovernmental relations deteriorated and the unity and functioning of the
European Union was threatened. As the issue of agriculture is one of the truly
integrated policies in the European Union, the Commission found itself confronted
with a serious problem concerning one member state, which had significant
implications for the other member states.
The modern society is vulnerable to many sorts of crises which can have a
powerful impact at many levels: local, regional, national and increasingly at the
trans-national level, which then affects considerably larger populations. The
1
The author would like to express great appreciation for useful comments and inspiration from Eric Stern,
Daniel Nohrstedt, Lina Svedin and all of my other colleagues at CRISMART (Crisis Management Research
and Training). The author would, as well, like to express great gratitude to the interviewees for their
willingness to speak with me and for their open and rewarding interviews.
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
consequences too often have an impact on many sectors of society and governments
and organizations are expected to cope with. After the Kosovo conflict in 1999,
the issue of a common European approach to crisis management has been a top
priority on the political agenda in the European Union. But the discussions have
focused mainly on military crisis management and have almost entirely excluded
the issue of cooperation in the civil sphere of crisis management. The European
continent has not been an exception when it comes to crises in the civil area.
There are many examples of crises which have had an impact at several levels and
sectors of society in Europe: the Chernobyl fallout in 1986, the sinking of the M/S
Estonia in 1994, vast flooding in central Europe in 1997, large numbers of refugees
from Albania to the neighboring countries in 1998, terror bombings in Moscow,
and the scandal with toxic animal feed in Belgium in 1999. It could very well be
so that a common approach to civil crisis management is imperative as Europe
and the European Union enters the next millennium.
A specific and concrete type of an emerging problem in many societies is the
risk posed to public health, including diseases which spread from animals to
humans and other related problems in agriculture that affect the food intended for
human consumption. That is a particularly difficult problem to handle, as national
borders can not contain the problem. This could be an indication of the downside
of integration and internationalization. The increasing incidence of public health
crises can depend on a number of factors; for example: new techniques in food
production, human activities which bring on environmental changes that can evolve
into unforeseen events, and human and livestock populations have grown
worldwide in recent years which brings them into closer contact. Global trade has
expanded rapidly with increased transportation which has made it possible to
transport humans, goods and livestock all over the world in a short period of time.
This is often combined with a relaxation of border controls. The common market
in the European Union is an example of where borders have been dismantled for
intra-European trade and movement (Emerging Infectious Diseases, 1997:5). But
whether this is a new phenomenon or not is left aside. It could be the case that
there is a heightened perception and awareness of the risks in public health due to
the intervention of the global media.
1.1 Aim and Research Questions
The general aim of this study is to explore the decision-making process in the
European Union, especially the Commission, in crisis conditions as the news of
the suspected lethal beef was made public in the United Kingdom. More specific
research questions are:
• How was the BSE disease managed internally within the Commission? How
did the actors frame the problem of BSE and what were the consequences?
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
How was the question of leadership worked out by the decision-units? Did
bureaucratic-politics, information and coordination problems emerge
between the decision-units?
• What was the role of the experts in the process of the Commission’s
decision-making? What was the relationship and division of labor between
the experts and the decision-makers in this highly complex and technical
crisis?
• What role did the Commission perform during this crisis? Was the Commission merely an arena for the member states during the crisis or was the
Commission an actor by its own merit?
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
2. Method
2.1 Single Case Studies
Research goals, irrespective of the field of research could be to explore the world
we live in, how it is constituted and how the future could develop. When an
academic endeavor is embarked upon, there is a choice to be made between using
quantitative or qualitative methods. The former is often connected with numbers,
frequencies and percentages, while the latter strives for comprehension or an
explanation of a phenomenon with words and not numbers (Ragin, 1994:xii).
This study will be carried out as a qualitative single case study, but the status and
value of that way of conducting science is debated. It has been argued that a
single case can not be used to develop, verify or falsify a theory, since a single
case can not be used for generalizations (King, Keohane, and Verba; 1994:211).
But that depends on how the case study is designed and what is meant to do with
the results when completed. Lijphart suggests six different ideal types of single
case studies, with divergent purposes, ranging from a purely descriptive form to a
hypothesis-generating form (Lijphart, 1971:691).2 The qualitative case study is
focused on the process, where the context is important and the discovery is placed
in the front seat rather than the task of testing something. In the words of Alexander
George, “The case study is used as a means of stimulating the imagination in
order to discern important new general problems, identifying possible theoretical
solutions, and formulate potentially generalizable relations that were not previously
apparent. The case study is an opportunity to learn more about the complexity of
the problem studied” (George, 1979:51-2). It is then possible to execute a ‘thick
description’, a highly detailed representation of the phenomenon studied which
can display the complexity of the case and inspire theory development. The
heuristic form can facilitate and improve the readers understanding of the case
and the possibility to follow a process will be feasible. A case study can use a
multi-disciplinary approach from various fields, e.g. psychology, economy,
sociology and anthropology. Such an approach can yield a more multifaceted
study than perhaps the more stringent quantitative study (Merriam, 1988: 9).
The drawbacks of single case studies should not be hidden. The objective to
reach full understanding, can be severely challenged by the fact that the cases are
often so extremely detailed that the researcher has to construct a procedure for
determining what information is most vital during the course of work. The original
goal of doing a thorough analysis of the phenomenon in question will lead to that
certain themes are chosen. A researcher usually can not include every single aspect
2
8
The suggested ideal types are: atheoretical, interpretive, hypothesis-generative, theory-confirming, theoryinfirming and, finally, deviant case studies.
Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
in a study. It would be too time-demanding, but that does not mean that such
elements are not studied. Such comprehensive perfection is described by Lijphart
as unrealistic and finally destructive (Lijphart, 1971:690). The reader is, therefore,
dependent upon the researchers’ sensibility, sensitivity and judgment when
conducting a case study, as the researcher is a main component in such studies.
(Merriam, 1988:46 and George, 1979:49). The difficult, but necessary feat, is to
balance the sometimes intriguing idiosyncrasies of the case with the ‘big picture’,
which is probably more interesting and rewarding for academic purposes (Stern,
1999:18).
How should a study, which has as its goal to examine the decision-making
process, be carried out? An inspiring mode is to apply the process-tracing method,
which has been advocated by Alexander George. Process tracing is about
investigating, clarifying and explaining a decision-making process. It means that
the reasoning behind the proverbial ‘black-box’ of decision-making, e.g. that the
decision-making process is concealed and it is not possible to get insight into is
not pertinent. Instead, it is just that which will be placed in the forefront of the
study, “The process-tracing approach attempts to uncover what stimuli the actors
attend to; the decision process that makes use of these stimuli to arrive at decisions;
the actual behavior that then occurs; the effect of various institutional arrangements
on attention, processing, and behavior; and the effect of other variables of interest
on attention, processing and behavior” (George & McKeown, 1985:35). This study
will strive at acquiring insight into how the decision-makers have reasoned by
reconstructing the situation. Therefore the process-tracing method stands out as
the most promising path with which both psychological and institutional factors
are considered.
Just as there are different types of case studies, there are distinct types of
process-tracing techniques. The selected type depends on the goal of the study.
Of the five examples outlined by Bennet and George, the most simple type does
not use theory or variables, and it is mainly a historical chronicle, describing the
events leading up to a phenomenon. The four remaining models all contain more
or less theoretical elements. They also have in common that the ambition is to
discover causalities or, if that is not possible, to uncover certain patterns or themes
(Benett & George, 1998:2). A weakness is the difficulty in reconstructing a
decision-making process, as Gray and ‘t Hart points out, “It is hard to identify not
only who did what in a particular disastrous sequence of events, but also which
part of a particular sequence of decisions and actions was crucial to the resulting
outcome” (Gray & ‘t Hart, 1998:11). James J. March also identifies this
complication, “Decision histories are often difficult to describe. When (and even
whether) a decision was made, who made it, with what intentions, and with what
consequences are all often obscure” (March, 1994:177). This can hopefully be
overcome by using many diverse sources, i.e., primary and secondary materials
together with interviews with the involved decision-makers. This method resembles
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
putting together a jig-saw puzzle: first the pieces are gathered and put together to
study its entirety and then the puzzle is broken down into pieces so that he specifics
can be studied. This achieves a holistic overview of the case, and is used to alert
the readers to the most interesting themes.
It could be argued by some that the case study as such, does not have the same
scientific significance as statistical work. But if an element of comparison is
introduced, one persuasive argument is gained for even the most convinced
positivist. Lijphart argues that, “The comparative method resembles the statistical
method in all respects except one. The crucial difference is that the number of
cases is too small to permit systematic control by means of partial correlation’s”
(Lijphart, 1971:684). When making the choice to study a phenomenon by using a
case study, which is intended to use the method of comparison to draw
generalizations or patterns, it does not have to be a problem that there are few
cases. As Lijphart states, “…the intensive comparative analysis of a few cases
may be more promising than a more superficial statistical analysis of many cases”
(Lijphart, 1971:685). Performing comparisons is of basic importance for science;
certain researchers are of the opinion that it is of major significance, Swanson
states, “Thinking without comparison is unthinkable. And in the absence of
comparison, so is all scientific thought and scientific research” (Swanson cited in
Ragin, 1987:1). But, performing comparisons between separate phenomena can
be counterproductive if the chosen phenomena are too diverse. A procedure to
avoid this risk has been developed by Alexander George.
Alexander George has proposed the method of structured and focused
comparison, which is one avenue to presenting knowledge from historic cases in
a structured and systematic fashion. The first step is to group a phenomenon, such
as crises, into a class of phenomena instead of considering them to be isolated
events. By placing this case of transnational and civil (non-military) European
crisis management into a class with a wider spectrum of crises, it will be possible
to produce further studies in the same class and later compare them to newly
discovered patterns and hopefully make some generalizations. Thus, it is focused
as only phenomenon in one specified class is compared. The comparison will be
structured as a set of general questions will be posed in the process of gathering
information and in the analyses. By using this approach, the huge risk of getting
lost in the idiosyncrasies the specifics of a case, which can prevent the goal of
comparison and the development of generalizations, should be avoided. But the
usage of general questions does not prohibit the usage of specific questions, which
may interest the researcher and could possibly unveil the complexities of the case.
The method can be summed up by three criteria: firstly, general concepts are used
for a description and the analysis; secondly, the type of phenomenon analyzed is
defined; and thirdly, the researcher is selective and is focused when choosing
what aspects of the case are to be studied (George, 1979).
In short, the type of case study should be well suited to probing an under10
Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
researched area. The type of case study that appears to be most promising and
that will be used in this study is a combination of type II interpretive and explorative
mixed with type III hypothesis-generative which have been suggested by Lijphart
(1971:692). In addition the basic type of the process-tracing method will be applied.
The objective is not explicitly to generalize nor to discover patterns but to give
solid empirical insight into a phenomenon that has rarely been explored before in
a systematic manner. When conducting a thorough examination of the literature
regarding crisis management at the European Union level, the results have been
poor. That which has been found has exclusively dealt with military-security crises
and mostly on problems with an external threat e.g., the collective response and
crisis management during the Poland crisis in 1980-82, the Libya bombing in
1986 and the conflict in former Yugoslavia. Not much has been written in a
systematic fashion regarding civil crises, especially those concerning the internal
problems of the European Union (Winn, 1986; Jörgensen, 1997). When exploration
is initiated in a previously under-researched area, especially when an implicit
comparison is the goal, the question of facilitating comparisons must be addressed.
Hopefully there will be future studies on European crisis management, but this
should be a coordinated effort to be worth while. Whether this study will provide
the general questions for analysis, that can facilitate further studies and not risk
getting entangled in the idiosyncrasies of the case, cannot be satisfactorily answered
at this stage. It is believed that the case selected for this study is representative of
the phenomenon in question and can thereby provide the first brick of an emerging
theory on European crisis management. The goal is to provide a tool for getting
out of “…the empirical swamp to a more conceptual view of the landscape”
(Merriam, 1988:152).
In conclusion, how then shall the study be constructed? Instead of studying
this crisis by using, for example, game theory or bargaining models, Stern (1999:45)
suggests a decision-making approach to crisis (Paige, 1968). Such an approach
will pay necessary attention to the context and the process, and it will capture the
complexities involved in crisis decision-making.3 Four distinct phases can be
outlined (Stern, 1999:45). Firstly, there is the extensive task of collecting
material. By performing this, the crisis can be put into a historical, institutional
and political context. Secondly, by collecting material, a narrative with the course
of events can be compiled. In this phase the central actors can be identified. The
third phase is pin-pointing occasions for decision, since the study will analyze the
3
Stern (1999:14) identifies five types of complexity in crisis decision-making: 1. Political complexity,
which refers to the threat of basic values. 2. Institutional complexity, which focuses on cooperation and
conflict between the actors in a crisis. 3. Temporal complexity, which takes into consideration how prior
experiences will have an influence on the perception and behavior of future events and how historical
choices can have an effect on future decision-making. 4. Informational complexity, which centers on the
problem of gathering information, having too little or being overloaded with information. 5. Finally,
problem complexity, which implies that decision-makers are not confronted with just a single problem but
many problems which have to be managed simultaneously or sequentially.
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
decision-making process by reconstructing the decision-making events as close
to the perception of the decision-makers as possible. A crisis is by definition a
situation where it is not business as usual, but a situation where it is necessary to
take action. A crisis is usually not a single event, and decision-makers are
confronted with a number of difficult problems that have to be managed
simultaneously or one after the other. But there can also be periods of ‘nondecisions’, meaning when actors chose not to act.
How should these decision-occasions be pinpointed? One way of approaching
this task is to search for decisions per se, i.e. to look for reactions to a problem.
Another way can be, as is in this study, to search for an impetus or stimuli, a
problem, which will have such an effect on the decision-makers that they will
pose the question, “What do we do now”. This is in line with the cognitiveinstitutional approach of the study, which will be discussed in Chapter 3. An
example of such an impetus is when a case of Ebola was reported at a Swedish
hospital in the 1990’s, which plausibly made decision-makers ask, “What do we
do now”? There lay a danger of scholarly subjectivity embedded in the method of
identifying decision-making occasions as the researcher tries to trace the situation
as perceived by the decision-makers. This dilemma, is for example, pointed out
by both Vertzberger (1990:37) and Stern (1999:53), since the researcher could be
giving a subjective and distorted interpretation of the reality perceived by the
decision-maker. But a maximum effort of collecting empirical material will, at
least, diminish the danger making plausible interpretation feasible. During the
stipulated time frame, nine decision-making occasions has been identified. The
decision-occasions have then been analyzed in order to determine which decision
units were involved, how they were formed, how they were used, how a problem
was perceived, which options were considered and what options were actually
chosen when confronted with an impetus.
The fourth step of this approach was to address various analytical themes in
the material. These themes were selected by connecting the international research
literature on decision-making and crisis management. But since this is a study on
decision-making which is focused on the institutions of the European Union,
inspiration has naturally been drawn from this literature as well. These analytical
themes will be discussed and highlighted in Chapter three.
2.2 Sources
To be able to perform a solid empirical process-tracing case study it is necessary
to gather comprehensive material. But, decision-making in the EU is complex,
and much of it is conducted in secrecy, which makes it a difficult task to study it
systematically. Pierce means that, “The European Community combines novelty,
complexity, and secrecy. It is therefore, both a challenge and unique target of
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
opportunity for the student of political decision making.” (Pierce, 1994:8 ). The
researcher must be one part historian and one part detective to be able to gather
needed material.
All sorts of material have been used in this study including: official documents
mainly from the various European Union institutions and Sweden, newspapers
mainly from Sweden and the United Kingdom, journals of both academic and
scientific nature, memoirs, internet sites representing both governments and NGOs
and personal interviews. As this is a sensitive case and several of the protocols
from the various scientific committee meetings were not recorded at the time, not
all the documents were available. This problem was also present earlier when
writing a study about Sweden’s response to the BSE crisis. An official inquiry
was then made for the purpose of gaining access to EU documents, but it was
denied for reasons of inter-state relations, which required secrecy. The hearing
protocols and other documents, which were made public as the European
Parliament conducted an investigation of the management of the BSE issue late
in 1996, have been valuable to this study. Hearings were conducted with several
decision-makers such as Commission President Santer, Agricultural Commissioner
Fischler, Consumer Commissioner Bonino and the General Director of DG VI
Mr. Legras – just to mention a few.
However to achieve greater insight into matters concerning details, personal
relationships, the institutional context and the perception of the situation, interviews
were desirable. During a five-day period, I had the opportunity to conduct
interviews with ten centrally placed officials at the European Commission in
Brussels. The DGs concerned were the Secretariat-General, DG III (Industry),
DG V (Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs), DG VI (Agriculture,
including their own legal service), DG XI (Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil
Protection), DG XV (Internal Market and Financial Services) and DG XXIV
(Consumer Policy and Consumer Health Protection). These interviewees ranged
in level and position from Directors to Principal Administrator.4 Some interviews
were cancelled just days before my trip, as officials were absorbed dealing with
the Dioxin crisis in Belgium which had recently erupted. Regrettably, not all of
the interviewees were directly involved or even present during the BSE crisis in
1996 but they could present valuable details, which would have been difficult to
find without them. Unfortunately, it was not possible to conduct any interviews
with the people on the cabinet nor at the Commissioner level since all inquires for
interviews were denied at that time. Interviews were also performed in Sweden
with centrally placed individuals in the committee system.5
In order to conceal the identity of the interviewees, the method of using letters,
(such as “Respondent A” to denote a certain official) instead of names, was utilized.
4
5
On request to the author the positions of the interviewees can be disclosed.
Six of the interviewees were directly involved with the management of the BSE situation.
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
Of course further and deeper interviews would have been desired, but time and
financial resources were not limitless.
The interviews have been structured in the following manner, more than half
were general questions posed to all of the interviewees and the remaining questions
were more specific in nature regarding the individuals occupation and place in the
institutional context. This is what May calls a semi-structured interview (May
1997:111). The answers used in this study to analyze the case underwent critical
examination since the decision-makers who are in central positions’ may not have
given a complete picture or they may have, themselves, been exposed to distorted
or inaccurate information. It can also be the case that the interviewee’s want to
display themselves, as much as possible in a favorable light so then the researcher
risks receiving tainted responses. Interviews can also be an opportunity to criticize
present or former colleagues. By using many diverse sources and comparing them,
dangers of bias, rumors, hearsay and proximity to events is minimized (Sundelius
et al., 1997:46).
2.3 Delimitation
In certain cases it is unproblematic to determine the onset and the de-escalation
of a crisis. In this case, the onset and de-escalation have not been easily determined
in comparison to, for example, the U137 ‘Whiskey on the Rocks’ incident. In that
case the crisis began when the submarine was discovered and it clearly ended
when the submarine was later released (Sundelius & Stern, 1992). In the BSE
situation, it is difficult to determine when the crisis actually began and even harder
to state when it definitely ended. As this study rests on a cognitive approach, the
decision-makers have set the delimitation. The crisis was triggered on March 20,
1996, when an announcement from the United Kingdom stated that there could
be a possibility that BSE could be spread to humans. Even though it could be
argued that the crisis started earlier, but it was not actually perceived or
acknowledged as a crisis. The ending of the crisis is more troublesome to determine.
When is there an end of the crisis, a closure? Rosenthal et al. have defined the end
of a crisis to be when “…the short term danger has subsided, and that the need for
urgent remedial action has decreased” (Rosenthal et al., 1989:22). In order to
restrict this study, the end date has been established as June 26, 1996, when the
pressing question of gelatin was solved and when the United Kingdom reactivated
its cooperation with the European Union institutions.
Directly after the end date of this study the crisis changed configuration. At
that point it became more of an exclusively internal confrontation between the
European Parliament and the Commission since the European Parliament inquiry
on the mismanagement of the BSE issue was initiated. Earlier the crisis had been
more centered in an external setting.
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
For whom was this crisis, and who were the key actors in this crisis? In this
case, there were a number of actors: the Commission and its various committees
(consisting of independent experts or national representatives), the (Agricultural)
Council, the European Council, the governments and the respective agencies of
the member states, the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice, the
media, various lobby groups (for example the farmer unions and consumer groups),
private companies, the citizens of the Union, and so on. It would not be possible
or even interesting to closely examine all of the key actors in this case, so the
main focus of this study is on the Commission and its various committees. The
member states have been primarily studied in relation to their work with the
committee system. The Council and the European Parliament have not be
extensively covered but they have a role to play in the crisis.
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
3. Theory
3.1 A Cognitive-Institutional Approach
In the field of political science literature, there is a major rift between theories
which strive to explain decision-making, a realistic mode of thought and other
theories that seek to explain deviances from that idealistic stance. Especially
interesting is the notion that decision-making does not necessarily have to be
based on a objective, conscious and focused analysis of a problem which the
decision-makers are confronted with, but rather that, more or less unconscious
and arbitrary modes have a powerful impact on decision-making (Sundelius et
al., 1997:18).
The cognitive-institutional perspective does not adhere to the writings of the
rational theory, which will be further elaborated latter in the study. Instead the
stance is taken that when a crisis occurs individuals, groups and organizations
take front stage (George, 1980; Vertzberger, 1990; Sundelius et al., 1997; Stern,
1999). Without turning the following discussion regarding the rational choice
literature opinion on decision-making into a straw-man analysis, certain criteria
can be discussed.
A rational decision-making procedure is one that pursues a logic of
consequence, it implies that all of the alternatives and all of the consequences
are known which then assumes full knowledge on behalf of the decision-makers.
Thus there is no post-decision surprise, no insecurity, which can be pleasant or
unpleasant, that is a characteristic of the decision making process. “Although
decision makers try to be rational, they are constrained by limited cognitive
capabilities and incomplete information…” (March, 1994:9). In normal day-today work, and especially in a crisis situation, there are problems of attention.
No decision-maker is capable of knowing it all and not all tasks can be
accomplished at the same time. Instead of a rational process in search for the
optimal decision it could be that decision-makers ‘muddle’ through and settle
for the best solution that they come across. Decision-makers search for
information, but they may only see what they expect to see and overlook the
unexpected. Previous experiences and how the problem is framed influences
the entire situation in that it guides the decision-makers towards which decisionunits should be used, what options will be seriously considered and what
additional information is needed. These ‘frames’ focus the attention and make
it easier for the decision-makers. “There is a tendency for frames to persist over
a sequence of situations. Recently frames hold a privileged position, in part
because they are more or less automatically evoked in a subsequent situation”
(March, 1994:15). In general it is hard to apply the rational model since it assumes
16
Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
complete awareness and knowledge of each choice and its respective outcomes.
Applying the rational model would have been particularly difficult in the BSE
situation since no one had complete information. Even the scientific community
was on the brink of its own knowledge.
Therefore the cognitive processes in decision-making should not be
downplayed. Cognitive factors are interesting and also provide guidance as to
how one should act depending on how a situation is perceived. According to Haas,
cognitive factors “…stress the conditioning role that prior beliefs and established
operating procedures play in determining how individuals will respond to new
situations or events and choose a course of action when confronted with
uncertainty” (Haas, 1992:28). Especially in a crisis situation there is no reason to
assume that decision-makers and the decision-units are unaffected by the stress
that mounts when a situation is characterized by: important values on the line,
limited time is available and uncertainty. Then complex cognitive processes will
be heightened and should be taken into consideration, since decision-makers are
exposed to individual and collective stress (Sundelius, Stern, with Bynander,
1997:20; Janis 1989; Stern, 1999).
The institutional setting is also of importance as this will have an impact on
the formal and informal practices of the decision-making. The definition of
institutions that will be used is: “…meaning formal and informal institutions
and conventions, the norms and symbols embedded in them, and policy
instruments and procedure” (Bulmer, 1998:365). That facilitates bringing in
both the formal arrangements, as well as the informal arenas, i.e. ‘the smokefilled rooms’. Also important are the norms, values and routines embedded within
the institutions that shape an individual’s actions. It is meaningful to look at the
micro-institutional setting: the routines, norms and values that affect the decisionmaking (Bulmer, 1998:365). “The organizational and social environment in
which the decision maker finds himself determines what consequences he will
anticipate, what ones he will not; what alternatives he will consider, what ones
he will ignore” (March & Simon, 1959:140). Prior history and earlier experiences
will have an effect on the structure of the organization, routines, plans and values.
Past choices can restrict future decision-making possibilities and cause pathdependency (Allison, 1971). Institutional rules are crucial in establishing which
actors will have the opportunity to have ‘voice’, meaning actors who have the
opportunity to have a major impact on the decision-making process (Zito,
1998:675). Institutionalism describes how individuals, assumed to be rational
and autonomous actors are constrained in that their behavior is shaped by
institutions. “Simple stimuli trigger complex, standardized patterns of action
without extensive analysis, problem solving, or use of discretionary power.
Institutions have a repertoire of procedures and they use rules to select among
them” (March and Olsen, 1989:21-2). It may not be as simple as, “…it is the
men who govern the processes and not the processes that govern the men”
17
Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
(Rosenthal, 1975: 14).6 It is more likely that they can influence each other.
Organizational structures influence the behavior of the individual; for example,
the post of the Prime Minister does have some restrictions on what is considered
appropriate behavior. However, the individual can also effect the organizational
structure; for example, what a previous Prime Minister performed or
accomplished while in office can set new guidelines. In modern institutional
theory, institutions are viewed as flexible systems of values and norms rather
than rigid structures. Interactions between individuals and institutions should
be seen as an on-going process rather than singular events, and there exists the
capacity for mutual adjustment (Peters and Pierre, 1998:1-2).
As decision-makers occupy different levels and different places in the
organizational structure, differing preferences and interests can influence the
decision-making process. The chosen cognitive-institutional perspective focuses
on the individual decision-maker’s perceptions and analyzes the organizational
structure from their position in it. The cognitive institutional perspective takes
into account of that individuals and groups do have a major impact on decisionmaking but that structural and institutional constraints as well have an effect on
decision-making.
3.2 Defining a Crisis
What then is a crisis, since not every serious situation deserves to be labeled a
crisis? It is a locution that is often overused. It is frequently utilized to express a
situation when there has been some difficulties in evaluating the situation and
when it is difficult to predict the events which could follow. There are several
definitions of crisis circulating in academic literature and the major contributions
in this area will be highlighted.7 Several of the existing definitions from the Cold
War Era have been dominated by the threat of a conflict or a war. Classic studies
have been performed concerning how the central actors at the national level manage
a security crisis, like, Korea (Paige, 1968), in Cuba (Allison, 1971) and in the
Middle East 1967 and 1973 (Brecher, 1974).
Snyder and Diesing argue that a high level of conflict, a great risk of war and
severe emotional burden constitute a crisis (Snyder and Diesing, 1977:4).
Brecher and Wilkenfield contend a crisis to be when the highest level of decisionmakers perceive that there is a threat against substantial values, a consciousness
that finite time is available and that there exists a high probability of involvement
in a military conflict (Breacher and Wilkenfield, 1989:14). The emphasis on the
probability of war, that these two definitions call attention to, will not be of great
6
7
The author would like to point to the fact that it can, of course, be the women who govern the processes as
well.
For an excellent and full exposition please see Brecher (1993).
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
use in this study as it does not include a military conflict. Charles F. Hermann
added the element of perception on behalf as the decision-makers and stipulated
the following criteria, “A crisis is a situation that threatens high-priority goals of
the decision-making unit, restricts the amount of time available for response before
the decision is transformed and surprises the members of the decision-making
unit by its occurrence” (Hermann, 1972:13). Even though the element of military
conflict is not present, this definition will not be used since the concept of surprise
does not necessarily have to be present in all aspects of a crisis. It could be so that
elements of a crisis are detected in advance and therefore come as no real surprise
for decision-makers.
Recently researchers have elaborated upon the definition of a crisis which deemphasizes the military connotation and shifts the locus to other non-military
threats to society. Naturally the military threat will always have a place on the
national agenda since international politics continue to be anarchic in nature.
However, other types of threats posed to a state for example: economical, ecological
and societal, are evolving into increasingly more important issues which need to
be managed (Buzan, 1991:133). Rosenthal, ‘t Hart and Charles define a crisis as
“…a serious threat to the basic structures of the fundamental values and norms of
a social system, which under – time pressure and highly uncertain circumstances
– necessitates making critical decisions” (Rosenthal et al., 1989:3). This facilitates
the inclusion of disasters and other disturbances that can have adverse effects on
society e.g., natural disasters, nuclear accidents, riots, acts of terrorism or
epidemics. This was an elaboration of Hermann’s definition, in that it is not always
necessarily a high-prioritized goal which is threatened, but rather that the available
time for decision-making is limited. Regarding the element of surprise, it is more
clearly understood when viewed as a factor leading to insecurity (Rosenthal et al.,
1989:3). But the lack of clarity in the notion of a social system can be an
obstacle if put to use. More recently, Sundelius et al (1997) have developed the
following definition of a crisis, which is the one chosen for this study, “…that the
central players interpret the situation as: important values are on the line; limited
time is available; the circumstances are marked by a great deal of uncertainty”
(Sundelius et al., 1997:13). This definition highlight that the perceptions of the
actors involved are crucial in determining whether or not a situation can be
described as a crisis.
How does the BSE situation relate to the three criteria of the chosen crisis
definition, what important values were on the line, limited time and uncertainty?
What sort of threat was there? What values were at stake for the decision-makers
at the European level? Public health and safety was at risk and needed to be
protected. The legitimacy and the credibility of the EU institutions were as well
threatened both internally in regard to the EU citizens in whether or not they
could effectively manage an internal problem and externally before the rest of the
world to display the image of the EU as an emerging powerful international entity.
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
There was a significant economic dimension arising from the crisis since
confidence in agricultural products vanished and costly intervention measures
had to be taken. Consumer confidence had to be upheld, otherwise spill-over effects
into other foodstuffs could contribute to further economic looses. The crisis has
cost the UK and the EU a lot of money. The total cost calculated for the 1996/
1997 financial year (in terms of compensations paid to the farmers, payments to
slaughterhouses, cost of storage and incineration, etc.) was over £1.5 billion and
the EU’s contribution was £28 million (Baggott, 1998:62). The crisis could as
well add to already high unemployment figures.
There was also the issue of the internal market and the potential of new member
states. Many member states are prepared to open up the Union to the countries
knocking on the EU membership door, but if the internal market is not functioning
well then the attraction might wear off. It could perhaps be hypothesized that the
standard of food stuffs may be of lesser quality due to a less advanced industry
and production facilities in applicant countries. Beyond the pure financial costs,
the cost of legitimacy and continued trust in the government institutions are
incalculable. Politically, it could disturb diplomatic relations and sabotage efforts
from the EU institutions and certain member states from pursuing deeper
integration, especially since the important Turin and Florence IGC meetings were
coming up and such discussions were on the agenda. Since the United Kingdom
was the main country involved in the crisis it was even more important that the
situation was managed effectively seeing that the United Kingdom has been
reluctant to further discussions concerning increased integration and has been
largely regarded as an outsider by the other EU member states.
Often there is a conflict between the threatened values, a value complexity for
decision-makers. A crisis can develop into distressing dilemmas for the decisionmakers when choosing between possible solutions (Stern & Bynander, 1997:3246; Janis & Mann, 1977). For example, when confronted with a riot, decisionmakers have to choose between firmness, accommodation or, in a major disaster
sending in large rescue forces even though there is a lack of information regarding
what is needed or what is awaiting. There is a trade-off to be made. In the first
example, if the riot is violently surpressed, there can be allegations of excessive
violence, which can diminish the public’s confidence in the police force. On the
other hand by choosing not to use force can suggest to the public that the police
force are slack and will not use force which can arise to further riots. In the second
scenario, if help is directly sent to the site there can be harsh accusations from the
public that the government is spending the taxpayers’ money in an irresponsible
manner. Or in the other alternative where rescue forces are not sent out early, can
be used to say that the government is not interested in saving peoples lives
(Rosenthal et al., 1991a:217).
Was there limited time available for the decision-makers? A crisis implies that
there is a need to make critical decisions, and that there is no time for ‘politics as
20
Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
usual’ with a wait and see attitude (Rosenthal et al., 1989:10). (Stern, 1999:10)
has pointed to the fact that time is a crucial factor in a biological crisis since
effective action is often dependent upon timely intervention. In the BSE case the
decision-makers had to make some critical decisions, such as should there be
decisive action immediately or should we wait for additional from the British
scientists? It was a difficult decision, with a considerable impact by sounding the
alarm would have probably caused panic and economic ruin for many industries,
or the wait and see approach which could turn out to be at least as disastrous in
the long run. The decision-makers had to reassure the public that they were not in
direct danger and, at the same time, they had to protect the member states internal
and external beef markets. The beef suspected of being contaminated with the
fatal disease could have had to be removed immediately. This aspect definitely
fulfilled the uncertainty criteria, that is one feature that stands out in this case,
was there a risk of human fatalities caused by British beef or not? Whatever the
opinion regarding the connection between BSE and Creutzfeldt-Jakobs, there was
need for action.
Unexpected events do not always create the same type of uncertainty. There
are events that occur but are uncertainty reducing, i.e., fitting the framework of
the decision-makers can be regarded as a ‘normal’ surprise. On the other hand,
events that do not fit into the decision-makers framework can provoke a higher
degree of uncertainty. Uncertainty depends on the cognitive reactions of the
decision-makers; it is formed by previous experiences (Turner & Pidgeon,
1997:126). There are several types of crises that all implicate what kind of factors
effect the crisis criteria. Natural disasters like floods, tornadoes and man-made
disasters, which are caused when there is a loss of technological control or a
human error are not often conflict ridden by decision-makers. It is seemingly
easier to determine what has happened and what is at stake when a dam breaks or
when a train crashes. The uncertainty factor does not have to be exorbitant. The
uncertainty in the BSE situation can be seen as a two-stage crisis, first a creeping
crisis phase, which then turned into an acute crisis which, required critical decisionmaking. A creeping crisis usually refers to a situation when there are signs of an
impending crisis but are for different reasons neglected or misinterpreted and
further action is not taken which could have mitigated the following crisis. That is
a signal that existing warning systems are not functioning properly (Rosenthal et
al., 1989:3).
Signals can be disregarded because they do not fit into the existing beliefsystem or that vital information is not transmitted to the correct receiver who
could have used the information. Perfect communication is difficult to achieve in
any but the most simplistic organizations (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997:86). That kind
of behavior commonly leads, sooner or later, to an acute situation. Examples of
creeping crises are the hunger crises in Africa, and the Love Canal crisis in the US
where it was discovered that beneath a residential area there was a plant producing
21
Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
dangerous chemicals 50 years ago and it had begun to leak and infect the residents
(Fowlkes & Miller, 1988). As an acute crisis, the BSE situation can be viewed as
an unnatural disaster in that it contrasts with most natural and man-made disasters
since, “…the unnatural disaster does not strike and its occurrence cannot be
precisely defined as to time, place or extent of destruction” (Fowlkes &
Miller,1988:38). That makes it more difficult for actors to concur on what has
happened, what should be done and who is responsible for what; thus this increases
uncertainty. “The most insidious feature of the unnatural disaster… is its capacity
to become increasingly widespread at the same time that it goes unrecognized
and its unidentified casualties increase proportionately” (Fowlkes & Miller,
1988:38). A crisis is thus seen as a process rather than as an unexpected ‘act of
God’ or perhaps more appropriately an ‘act of the Devil’. BSE did not occur as a
divine intervention. Rather it developed and spread because dead cattle were used
as feed; thereby turning the cattle into cannibals. Together with other factors,
which are described in the next chapter, it appears that the lethal BSE disease was
probably spread from cows to humans. The BSE situation accurately displays the
uness of a crisis, unimaginable, unthinkable, unmanageable, unwanted and so on
(Beck, 1992:54).
There is also the issue of upholding the legitimacy of an individual, a group,
an organization or a government. Therefore a crisis may be regarded not only as a
threat but equally as an opportunity by certain actors to reconstruct the balance of
power between and within the governmental or organizational structure. Thus
they have a chance to enhance their own legitimacy and resources,
“…bureaupolitics are an integral part of government decision making in crises”
(Rosenthal et al., 1991a). Additionally, it could be perceived as a possibility to
push forward legislation, it has even been suggested that in order to generate
results in the European Union, a crisis atmosphere must be present (Stern &
Nohrstedt, 1999:18).
Crisis is a concept that should be approached in a social constructivist fashion.
Generally it is thought that a society with its different groups have different norms
and values, it is socially constructed by its actors. In more specific terms, then, a
crisis situation can be depicted as the perception of an alteration in the ‘normal’
state of things. It should be noted that there is always room for individual
perceptions regarding a crisis situation and that no social culture is completely
homogeneous. The social constructivist definition of a crisis implies that there is
no such thing as an objective crisis situation going on “out there”, but that this
image of a crisis is produced in a social context of society. But for an incident or
event, to be defined as a crisis, it must be socially constituted between a number
of actors. If no one reacts to an event, then no crisis is produced. W.I Thomas’
theorem should therefore receive renewed attention, “…when situations are defined
as real, they are real in their consequence” (Fowlkes and Miller, 1988:23). Reality
is thus a social construction,”…individuals, groups and societies tend to place
22
Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
interpretations upon reality-interpretations which may or may not be true in an
absolute sense” (Rochefort & Cobb, 1994:5).
Epistemologically, the world and our conception of it is mediated by prior
assumptions, expectations and experience (Haas, 1992:21). Media often has an
active part in this process in framing and constructing the perception of the public
and the decision-makers. The reality created by media can quickly become the
accepted reality. For example, at the Three Mile Island nuclear incident TV crews
asked residents in the nearby city to move indoors so the sights of a deserted town
could be depicted (Lagadec, 1991:123). Likewise the media took a great interest
in the BSE problem. This is not surprising since health issues are often at the top
of the public agenda since it is an issue that concerns everybody (Baggott, 1998:73).
A crisis in the category of public health, like the BSE crisis, the social constructivist
side is high-lighted, as factors of the crisis which had been previously neglected
due to faulty perceptions or previously unknown relationships come to light for
decision-makers. Because what happened is not that there is a new event in itself,
it was “…the convergence of a set of conditions that gives rise to a new definition
of an existing situation” (Fowlkes & Miller, 1988:23).
3.3 Complexity of Decision-Making
in the Commission
The section on decision-occasions, section 5.1 and 5.2, will provide useful insight
on where, how and by which actors’ decisions were taken at the European level
with a focus on the Commission throughout the BSE crisis. Also in that section
the framework for the first analysis chapter will be presented. It will center on the
cognitive-institutional approach discussed above. In addition it will look more
closely at the internal functions and dynamics of the Commission’s DGs by
assuming that the Commission is not a unitary actor and that the analysis will be
even more fruitful when a bureaucratic-politics perspective is applied.
The rational and realist models are a bit simplistic since they assume that actors
are unitary with common preferences and goals, but this tends to overlook the
bureaucratic-politics perspective (March, 1994:46). The rational model of
organization and decision-making is basically unproblematic. It is an unitary actor
with non-competing values and goals and all people who belong to an organization
have identical norms and values and work towards common goals. “It has become
something of a truism that when looked at closely. …an agency that appears to be
a single organization with a single will turns out to be several sub-organizations
with different wills.” (Pressman and Wildavsky,1973:92). If competing interests
are present within an organization and the goals are not necessarily the same for
all parties involved, especially when there is uncertainty or conflicts about the
goals for the organization, that can be an opportunity to give the analysis another
23
Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
dimension (Fischer, 1990: 272). The focus of bureaucratic-politics studies is
on the competition, conflict or cooperation, between different administrative
agencies and departments. Or to put it as Allison describes it, “the pulling and
hauling” between the actors that is the art of decision-making. Governmental
action is the result of political bargaining among multiple actors (Allison,
1971:173).
This is similarly the case when the Commission is regarded. “One of the most
enduring myths surrounding EU decision-making is that the Commission is a
purposive, single-minded institution. …it is highly fragmented, even if it often
unites in defense of its institutional prerogatives, as it did in 1999 when the college
resigned en masse” (Peterson & Bomberg, 1999:39). Little has been done to break
down the monolithic picture of the Commission and to examine its internal
dynamics, which should be a promising perspective, “…looking at the Commission
in terms of internal tension… …avoids the pitfalls of envisaging the Commission
as a single, unitary organization, without having to abandon the idea of institutional
self-interest” (Christiansen, 1996: 82). The administrative structures within
the Commission are also actors. There should be opportunities for the DGs to
take the lead and to place an issue on the agenda. There can even be conflicts
within the DGs about which policy alternative to support (Peters, 1994). The DGs
appear to be developing their own cultures and agendas when it comes to policymaking. Like most organizational structures, the boundaries are not clear; this
might especially be the case at the European Union level since there is no clear
idea when and where the integration process is going to stop. The responsibilities
and structures of the Commission are not written in stone, changes do occur from
time to time (Peters, 1992:107). Also in agreement with this reasoning is the
description of the EU bureaucracy as an ‘adolescent’ one, meaning the borders of
the DGs are not well established and cemented (Mazey & Richardson, 1995:343).
But through the development of an esperit de corps, there is an increased
possibility that goals will be perceived as shared and common. That argument can
be contested by the fact that the Commission has been described as being a porous
institution. When setting up the Commission, people who believed in the idea of
a united Europe were recruited into the Commission but as it has expanded, it was
compelled to employ people who may not have been ‘believers’. Therefore some
call it a ‘porous’ institution. That sort of development threatens the institutional
identity, common values and loyalties within the Commission may be desecrated
by national beliefs. A porous organization can cause a defensive reaction; if the
common European idea is lost and there are formations of coalitions based on
norms and values of a single DG, which demolishes the unity of the organization.
The incentive is then to protect the own DG, which can trigger an expansion of
bureaucratic procedures and rules (Coombes, 1970: 257). One example of
regular conflicts observed between the DGs in the Commission, is the disunity
concerning the state aid policies between DG IV (Competition) and DG XVI
24
Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
(Regional Policies and Cohesion). The former is advocating for an end to state
intervention in the market and the latter is in favor of supporting the regions
where unemployment is high. But tension may not only be, horizontal, that is
between the DGs, it can be vertical, between the more technical officials in the
DG and the more political cabinets (Christiansen, 1997).
There are some conditions that will be necessary to break an eventual unitary
mode. That is when there is a need for joint decision-making and there are
differences in the perceptions of the problems and goals. One crucial factor that
will influence the perception of the problem is whether or not there are efficient
systems for transferring information if only one actor has information available.
If there are no routines or systems of transferring information, there may be
conflicts and the willingness to cooperate can be reduced (March and Simon, 1959:
38). It is often asserted in administrative and organizational literature that during
crisis conditions, governmental and organizational officials will ‘rally around the
flag’ with resulting unanimity and consensus. Bureaucratic-politics, i.e. conflicts,
will be put aside during the crisis. But several studies on crisis management have
shown that the contrary may well occur. For example, at the site of an earthquake
in El Salvador in 1986, domestic and international rescue teams had immense
difficulties in cooperating with each other which delayed the operation. Another
example was the Heizel football stadium tragedy in 1985 where poor coordination
and communication exchange between the police forces worsened the situation
(Rosenthal et al., 1991a).
Four main causes contributing to bureau-politics are emphasized in the
literature. Actors do not lose their interest in values such as power and prestige
since their continued existence could be at stake, as there might be altercations in
the budget allocations in the aftermath of a crisis so it is important to ‘be there’
and to perform well. The crisis might create a situation where actors which are
not used to cooperate with each other will be forced to work together. Finally that
every actor is convinced that its solution is the most effective (Rosenthal et al.,
1991a: 212). But there may be positive sides to the phenomenon of bureaucraticpolitics, in that the system is tested when different actors have to interact and it
can prevent single-mindedness and groupthink as the system is opened up (Preston
& ‘t Hart, 1999). This is why it may be rewarding to apply the bureau-politics
model, which does not assume unitary actors, but instead maintains that there are
multiple actors and that the actors have diverse and conflicting goals and not just
one common single goal. The Commission will, thus, not be regarded as a
monolithic entity, it is fragmented and thereby made up by several actors.
In the beginning of a crisis, it is not exclusively a question of what the problem
is about, it is as well a question of problem ownership. At the onset of a crisis, an
organization may believe that its competence and methods represents the superior
way to solve the problem and may aggressively seek leadership to solve it. That
will often lead to increased competition to deal with the problem. When a new
25
Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
crisis situation arises for the actors it will not be a given situation of which
organization is in charge and which organization is responsible since most new
problems that arise in society fall outside existing organizational boundaries, as
they were obviously unforeseen and unplanned for (Barker & Peters, 1993:8).
Such a situation can lead to a vacuum where there is no apparent leadership or at
least no evident leadership. The motivation for seeking leadership in such a matter
could be to safeguard or expand resources, enhance its reputation, or expand its
competence and authority.
A crisis is thus not always portrayed as a threat, it can also be viewed as an
opportunity by an individual or an organization. On the contrary a situation could
arise where no actor is willing to shoulder the leadership responsibility in a new
situation and instead use the politics of avoidance when the problem is perceived
as too complex, hard to manage, and where there is probably nothing to gain
(Rochefort & Cobb, 1994:14). The risk of failure stands out clearly so it becomes
a matter of avoiding the issue and attempt to shift the responsibility to other actors
to manage the situation. Other ways that an organization can deal with a crisis
situation is to engage in denial, simplification, externalization / responsibility
reallocation (for example, defining it as an ‘act of God’), framing other actors as
the culprits and irresponsible party or bolstering / wishful thinking (Dror, 1986:
49). So the actors may perform a cost- benefit analysis when confronted with a
problem which has no certain guidelines on who is responsible for what. The
benefit of being involved in the decision-making process is that legitimacy increases
if the decision-making is a success, but there is also a cost associated with
responsibility, in that leadership is attached to the actions taken and blame for any
failures can be allocated afterwards. But the greatest benefit for an actor lies in
the opportunity to influence the decision-making process (Crozier, 1964).
3.4 Experts in the Decision-Making Process
The BSE crisis was a complex crisis in terms of responsibilities and decisionmaking, as the BSE problem had extensive affects and several actors were involved
at different levels. Due to the scientific character of this crisis, it is plausible that
the scientific experts played an important role in its management, since the decisionmakers from the Commission had relied heavily on them in great parts for their
previous decisions. According to Peterson (1995) the experts have typically had a
strong position in the Commission since the scientific committees have to be
consulted before a proposal is drafted by the officials in the DGs. Likewise since
many questions managed at the European level are technical in nature, epistemic
communities can be expected to have an important role in the decision-making
process i.e. defining, identifying, compromising and supplying arguments which
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
can be used to give legitimacy to certain actions taken.
Modern society is becoming increasingly complex, science and technology is
changing rapidly and all the possible consequences can not be foreseen. Societies
are as well becoming more interdependent. Decision-makers will have to deliberate
more frequently with experts as they are hopefully aware of that their actions can
have implications not only within their national territory but elsewhere as well
(Benveniste, 1977). This means that decision-makers are more dependent upon
experts who can provide high-quality advice. It could be that the age of experts
has come, where “…expert knowledge and technocratic practices have become
key political resources…”. The term technocracy refers to “…a system of
governance in which technically trained experts rule by virtue of their specialized
knowledge and position in dominant political and economic institutions” (Fischer,
1990: 3). Decision makers do not always recognize that their understanding of
a complex issue and its potential outcomes are unsatisfactory. Therefore, crises
often have the effect of alerting decision makers of their limitations in
understanding the issue at hand and, thus, can initiate a search for advice from an
epistemic community of experts for plausible answers and solutions (Haas, 1992:
13). An epistemic community is defined by Haas as “…a network of professionals
with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authority
claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (Haas,
1992:3). The members of such a community have shared beliefs, mutual values,
shared causal beliefs, a shared concept of validity, a consensual knowledge base,
common interests and a common way to tackle problems. Utilizing the epistemic
communities is one source of relief for tackling the uncertainty, which strikes the
decision-makers (Haas, 1992:3). Decision-makers may become heavily reliant on
experts in situations of uncertainty. If such a situation is prolonged and if there is
a well-established network of experts, an epistemic community that could develop
into a monopoly situation for that particular group of experts which could trigger
the phenomenon of groupthink (Rosenthal et al., 1991b).
One hazard that faces decision-makers when using long-time established experts
is that the phenomenon of groupthink may be present. Groupthink is when a group
of decision-makers become close-minded and develop a strong feeling of cohesion,
which can lead to faulty decision-making. “The more amiability and esperit de
corps among the members of a policy-making in-group, the greater is the danger
that independent critical thinking will be replaced by groupthink…” (Janis, 1982:
9). Groupthink refers to a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing
and moral judgment that results from in-group pressures. That kind of behavior
can lead to, for example, that all alternatives, objectives and risks are not evaluated
correctly and that there is not openness for new information. Discussions then
become extremely consensus seeking, which can occur, in small and cohesive
groups that are isolated. The consensus seeking can result in that information is
neglected or misinterpreted and that no critical discussions transpire that can alter
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
their way of thinking (Janis, 1982; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997:177). But that does
not necessarily have to be all bad since the opposite of groupthink could develop
into chaos and cooperation difficulties.
Uncertainty stimulates the need for information and expertise. That can put
the experts in a strong position. The established communities of experts can deliver
advice to the Commission in times of uncertainty. In crises, and especially in
novel situations, uncertainty is often considerable turning expert advice into
fundamental importance. Uncertainty can be defined as by Alexander George, as
situations under which actors must make choices without having, “…adequate
information about the situation at hand… …the inadequacy of available general
knowledge needed for assessing the expected outcomes of different courses of
action” (Quoted in Haas, 1992:13). One aspect of an unnatural crisis as the
BSE situation is the lack of obvious victims. If the source of the crisis cannot
easily be located or understood, who then are the victims. This increases the degree
of uncertainty (Fowlkes and Miller, 1988: 36). Many policy areas contain
intricacies that are hard for a policy-maker to understand so experts are needed.
Yet in a few areas the level of complexity is even higher, that is in areas where
science itself is on the brink of its own comprehension. That is experts themselves
may be having a hard time grasping what is occurring. Then not only is the decisionmaker a layman, but also the experts in policy areas where all the facts are not
known or understood accurately (Barker & Peters, 1993:3). This can enhance the
stress for a decision-maker, to obtain rapid answers from the experts, if and when
they are consulted. When science is on the brink of its own knowledge, experts
can not in a magical way offer answers to all of the questions. Rather they can
offer advice on a few limited aspects of a problem and, thus, it is not uncommon
that disclaimers are included. A US senator got so upset with always hearing the
experts finish their reports with ‘on the other hand’, that he finally uttered, “Find
me an expert with one hand” (Lagadec, 1991:98). The BSE case was a similar
situation: the decision-makers and the experts were confronted by something
unfamiliar, there was a need for urgent decision-making, and there were no clear
ideas on how to manage the situation. Most certainly the most unwanted situation
for a decision-maker to be in. It was not certain that the victims presented on
March 20 had been infected with a human equivalent of BSE.
3.5 Decision-Making at the European Level
How shall the decision-making process be studied at the European level? Where
are the decisions taken and which actors have access to that arena? Simply put,
where do the decisions originate?
The member states do not act in a political vacuum in the community pillar of
the Union, the Commission has a responsibility. Is the decision-making primarily
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
located in the member states and the Council? Or does the Commission actively
take part in the decision-making process? As the joint policy initiator with the
European Parliament by accord of the Treaties and agenda-setter the Commission
should have an opportunity to influence ideas and knowledge and, hence, on the
final outcome. Realist / intergovernmentalism thinking has dominated the studies
concerning the European Union and, thus, has significantly affected what is studied.
Since realists regard the state as the main actor, the other actors’ i.e. supranational
institutions, organizations, regimes and so on are viewed as merely supporting
actors without any real influence standing on the sideline. Focus has predominantly
been on what Peterson labels the ‘history-making’ level. Two examples of such
decision are: the bargaining and decision-making connected to the birth of the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the 1960s, and the launch of the Euro in
1999. But by studying only these types of decision processes, only the tip of the
iceberg is observed. The process of decision-making in the Council, or its
committees, start at a much lower level, namely in the Commission and its various
committees. One can describe the EU system as a multi-level decision-making
system. Peterson has developed a typology, which classifies three levels of EU
decision-making. At the top, the so-called super-systemic level, history-making
decisions are taken which have a large impact on the structure and legislative
landscape of the EU. The main actors at this level are deemed to be the national
governments in the Inter Governmental Conferences. The second level, the socalled, Systemic level is regarded as mainly policy-setting. The Council and the
Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) are the most important
actors at this level. Finally the third level, the so-called sub-systemic / meso-level,
deals with policy shaping and at this level many policy options are decided upon.
The key actor at this level is the Commission with its DGs, and the various
committees with national civil servants or experts (Peterson, 1995).
The level that will be in focus in this study is the third level, the sub-systemic
/ meso level. EU policies and decision-making may not only be regarded as a
product or an outcome of inter-state bargaining at the super-systemic level, rather
it can be seen as a complex process with many different actors participating at
different levels (Richardson, 1996:5). By studying EU decision-making from the
sub-systemic / meso level, one can examine the early and important stages in the
decision-making process, a bottom-up perspective, that looks at what determines
policy outcomes (Peterson, 1995). “The Commission’s power of initiative is critical
because the content of early drafts is essential in shaping the final text” (Peterson
& Bomberg, 1999:142). So, it could be argued that the Commission has an
influence that is greater than merely giving administrative support through the
decision-making process. In the words of Yates the Irish President in Office of the
Council from July 1, 1996, “I recognize that the Agricultural Council has not
been directly involved in the preparation and adoption of the various measures.
…the measures were taken on the basis of the favorable opinion given by the
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
Standing Veterinary Committee on which the Member States are represented…”
(European Parliament, 1997a: 5). It may as well be the case that the Commission’s
influence is greater when the member states, i.e. the Council, is unsure of what its
preferences are in a certain situation with great uncertainty and when a decision
needs to be taken (Hooghe, 1997:3) Mark Pollack argues this as well, especially
in situations when the Commission has the upper-hand regarding information
(Pollack, 1997)
3.5.1 The Commission – Actor or Arena?
What role does the Commission play in decision-making during crisis? In general,
the Commission’s involvement in decision-making at the European level has been
described in two distinct ways: as being a passive structure, or as being a purposeful
actor seeking to influence the work of the EU as it actively sets the agenda and
shapes the expectations. The reasoning behind the view of institutions as passive
structures is in line with the intergovernmentalist perspective, which implies that
the member states (governments) retain the leadership in the EU decision-making.
The other stream of thought, institutionalism, highlights the role and impact
institutions have in decision-making. So the question boils down to how the
Commission should be regarded: as merely an arena for the member states to
battle out their differences, or as an actor in its own merits that can display its
autonomy, push through its own agenda and thereby have an impact on the EU
decision-making (Moravcsik, 1991:47). A definition of autonomy is an entity’s
capacity to define and to pursue, on an ongoing basis, a relevant political agenda
(Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997:305). But before taking up that issue, it is at
present more fruitful to illuminate the different views on how to describe the
Commission itself.
The Commission has been likened to that of a secretariat of an international
organization, an international regime and an emerging embryo for a federal
government. The thought of the Commission being merely a secretariat is brushed
aside by some, in that the Commission, can act quite independently from the
member states in some policy areas (Christiansen, 1997: 75). The EU has been
painted as a regime in that it, “…establishes common expectations, provides
information and facilitates arm’s-length intergovernmental negotiations” (Keohane
and Hoffman, 1991:10). The Commission cannot be regarded merely as an
international regime, since the legal aspect is different; no international regime
has the same legal status as the EU. The legislation of the European Union is
supervised by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) which is a powerful actor
whose verdict has supremacy over national legislation; even though the powers of
the WTO can probably be regarded as influential in its own limited area.
Furthermore, compared to a regime, the commitment of the members are more
far-reaching, more centralized and institutionalized. Authority in some policy
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
sectors has been yielded to the Commission and the ECJ by the member states
(Keohane and Hoffman, 1991:10). Some of the powers of the Commission for
example, that of initiating policy suggests a resemblance to that of an executive
government or the central level of a federation, but there are many differences as
well. The Commission is unlike state institutions since it operates in a political
sphere where it cannot rely on a common identity or claim territorial sovereignty
(Christiansen, 1997: 75). Neither does the Commission have direct power in
defense or foreign affairs and thus has to rely on the Council to decide upon
European legislation, it has no independent sources of revenue (the amount to the
Commission budget is decided by the member states), it cannot look for majority
support from the European Parliament, and it cannot call a referendum (Coombes,
1970:84). There is also a hindrance for the Commission to gather more power visà-vis the Member States in that the subsidarity principle is in affect; functions
should only be transferred to the supranational level, which can not be executed
as well or better at the national level. “If in comparison with the authority of
contemporary international organizations the Community looks strong, in
comparison with highly institutionalized modern states it appears quite weak
indeed” (Keohane and Hoffman, 1991:10). The executive authority in the EU is
divided between the Commission and the Council, which is a clear deviation from
the normal functions of a federal government. This special relationship has led
many scholars to treat the structure of the Community as sui generis, that is atypical
of a federal government system as well as of any ordinary international
organization, but showing characteristics of both (Coombes, 1970:44).
As initially stated two streams of thought dominate the debate:
intergovernmentalism and institutionalism. Intergovernmentalists explain the
functioning of the EU as “…the distribution of preferences and the conduct of
bargaining among governments (who are the only actors) of the member states
broadly explain the nature, pace, and scope of integration, and neither supranational
organizations nor transitional actors generate political processes or outcomes of
seminal importance” (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz; 1997:298). As problems appear
in member states it is a question exclusively for the member states with its local,
regional and national levels. The EU institutions are, therefore, arenas for decisionmaking by the member states. One major advocate of this line of thought,
Moravcsik, views EU politics as, “a subset of international relations,…example
of interstate cooperation sustained by an international regime” (Moravcsik, 1991:
47). Thus, the Commission is regarded as a successful regime that facilitates the
ongoing coordination of policy among member states, by reducing the cost of
information, policy innovation, and negotiations. Moravcsik advocates that
sovereignty has not been transferred to any other level because the member states
have not allowed this to occur. This can be said to be a realist perspective in that
the states are viewed upon to be the only influential actors. If any other actors are
active, that is because they are allowed, by states, to exert influence. Bargaining is
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
conducted from the viewpoint of power and national interest, and international
regimes are created to facilitate a decrease in the uncertainty concerning transaction
costs between the states. Supranational institutions are given the minor role, of
securing the institutionalization of earlier bargains (Moravcsik, 1991: 47 ). One
of the most important objectives for the Commission is, therefore, to perform the
role of an ‘honest-broker’, a mediator and a consensus builder to be used by the
member states (Cini, 1996).
The opposing line of thought, institutionalism, contends that supranational
institutions have an affect on interstate bargaining and EU decision-making.
Institutionalism is a reminder that institutions have a role to play and may just as
well push their own agendas forward. The basic principle is that institutions matter,
“…they [institutions] are the source of much political behavior and not impartial
‘black boxes’ which simply transform [member state] preferences into policies”
(Peterson & Bomberg, 1999:16). Intergovernmental bargaining and decisionmaking is embedded in the processes and the activities of supranational structures.
The supranational structures are capable of constraining the behavior of all the
actors, including the member states. Governments are indeed seen as powerful
players but their bidding power is not always decisive the final outcome (Stone
Sweet, and Sandholtz, 1997:305). One example of when the Commission acting
as a policy entrepreneur, i.e. pushing its own agenda is argued by Sandholtz and
Zysman, was the launch of the internal market in 1992. On the other hand,
Moravcsik takes an intergovernmentalist stance and argues that it was the interstate
bargaining between Britain, France and Germany that made the internal market
possible (Cram, 1997:23). Thus, the Commission is more than sheer windowdressing, i.e. a puppet of the member states, “…the Union’s common institutions
are often more than mere arbiters in the decision-making process, and have become
key players in their own right” (Peterson & Bomberg, 1999:17). In line with this
reasoning is the thought that a multi-level governance system is developing in
Europe. It is characterized by fragmentation, an unclearness of authority and the
interlocking of actors across both national and transnational levels. Not only are
the member states actors but supranational institutions can have a significant role
in the management, “State centrists contend that state sovereignty is preserved or
even strengthened through EU membership. An alternative view… is in which
authority and policy-making influence are shared across multiple levels of
government – subnational, national and supranational… While national
governments are formidable participants in EU policy-making, control has slipped
away from them to supranational institutions” (Marks, Hooghe and Blank,
1996:342).
Regardless of the different views on what the EU institutions make up, an
intriguing question is whether or not they, in this study the emphases lies on the
Commission, possess any influence in the community decision-making process
in crisis. Do supranational institutions in the EU context influence decision-making
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
or are the member states totally in control? Another very interesting question is
whether the institutions have claimed a role for and by themselves, or whether the
member states have allowed them to play a role, but such a power analysis is
beyond the scope of this particular study.
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
4. Context and Background
4.1 BSE
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), or as it is referred to in the media,
Mad Cow Disease, is an epizootic disease in cattle and a suspected zoonotic disease,
a sickness that can be transferred between animals and humans. BSE is a
neurological disturbance that simply stated turns the brain into sponge and the
end result is, without exception death. There is no reliable test available at present
to determine whether or not it is BSE or so other disease. Another complication is
that the incubation period is four to five years, which makes an estimate of future
cases difficult to assess. The only way it can be determined for certain is to perform
an autopsy and to examine the brain.
How BSE first developed is not yet known but two theories are given more
weight than the others. It could have developed spontaneously in cattle. These
kinds of brain diseases have been known for some time and have also effected
humans. Then thereafter the infected carcasses were later used to produce cattle
feed which started an epidemic. The other theory is that scrapie infected sheep,
scrapie is a brain disease that kills sheep had been used to produce cattle feed.
Scrapie had then converted from being only a disease in sheep to one that also
infect cattle. Sheep infected with scrapie have been used in the production of
cattle feed since humans have consumed sheep with scrapie without being infected.
Thus, it was believed that cattle would not be infected either (SVA, 1997).
BSE has a very special feature, which has never been encountered before in
other types of spongiform encephalopathys. The disease is promiscuous meaning
that it does not discriminate in the type of host it will affect. It has infected basically
all species where it has been tried. Mice, cats, monkeys, pigs and probably dogs
have been infected when exposed to BSE; therefore it supports the case that humans
could be at risk as well (BBC, 1996-11-18).
The first case of BSE was discovered in the United Kingdom in 1986; thus,
with consideration to the estimated incubation period the animal was probably
infected in the beginning of the 1980s. Through research it was verified that the
meat and bone meal feed (made from the carcasses of sheep and cattle) was the
causing agent of BSE. Cows had been forced into cannibalism, by being fed their
fellow dead. Why the feed was suddenly dangerous was presumably due to altered
procedures in manufacturing: the temperature was lowered in the factories in the
1970s to save energy during the oil crisis, and some solvents were removed in
order to protect the workers. Because of these measures, the causing agent of
BSE was no longer inactivated (Dagens Nyheter, 96-03-28). Up until 1996, 171
650 cases of BSE had been reported in the United Kingdom. At the height of the
34
Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
epidemic in 1992, 36 681 cases were reported, and in 1993, 37 370 cases. Then
the epidemic decreased steadily and in 1996 there were ‘only’ 6059 reported cases.
But it is very likely that the number of BSE cases were underreported because
during the first years of the epidemic, British farmers only received 50% of the
total value in compensation from the government (European Parliament, 1997d:
20). To put the BSE epidemic in perspective, there was an outbreak of the dreaded
foot-and-mouth disease in 1967 in the United Kingdom and 400 000 animals
were destroyed to limit the potential spreading (The Times, 96-03-22). Other
countries have had single cases of BSE but they can probably be explained by
imports, but countries such as Switzerland (230 cases), Ireland (185) and Portugal
(51) are suspected of having a domestic outbreak of BSE8 (European Parliament,
1997d:20).
The human equivalent of spongiform disease, Creutzfeldt-Jakobs disease (CJD)
has similar characteristics to the other spongiform diseases: an extended incubation
period, and the immune system can not deal with it so the end result is always
death. On March 20, 1996, British scientists revealed that they probably had
discovered a new variant of CJD, nv-CJD. What was worrying was that nv-CJD
was clearly unlike CJD. People struck by CJD are normally 55-70 years old, but
the reported cases on were between the ages of 16 to 39. Nine of the ten victims
had been meat eaters for the last ten years, but none of them had consumed brain.
One of them had been a strict vegetarian since 1991. What caused great turmoil
was that the victims could have been orally infected by consuming BSE meat
since the scientists could not rule out that they had been struck by a human form
of BSE. Facts that pointed in that direction was that nv-CJD were more similar to
BSE than any previously known form of CJD (The Lancet, 1996:923). As CJD is
not that dissimilar to Alzheimer’s disease, there could have been a huge
underestimation in the number of cases regarding nv-CJD.
Since the legislation regarding BSE in the United Kingdom and at the European
level is extensive, a short summary of the EU legislation will be presented here.9
The first actions taken by the Commission, in 1989 and 1990 was to restrict all
cattle exports from the United Kingdom; that is all cattle older than six months,
89/469/EEC, 90/59/EEC, 90/134/EEC and 90/200/EEC. But between 1990 and
1994 when the BSE epidemic was at its peak, no further legislative measures, nor
inspections, regarding BSE were taken at the European level. This could be
explained by the fit of rage exercised by the Chief Veterinary Officer in the United
Kingdom, Keith Meldrum, during an inspection in 1990. It was then he explained
that the EU did not have any authority in such domestic issues and that the British
safety regulations were the best in the world. A shortage of inspectors could also
be one explanation; the Commission had 12 inspectors in this area and they had
8
9
Figures from 1996.
For a full description, please see Grönvall in ‘Crisis and Internationalization’, 1998:240-286.
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
the entire Union to review before the implementation of the single market in
1995. But an army of inspectors from Brussels would not be an appealing idea,
since the administrations of the member states also have responsibility. The
Commission did not take any action until 1994 when it was decided that cattle
shall not be given any feed that contained parts of dead animals, 94/381/EEE
(Dagens Nyheter, 97-02-19; European Commission, 1993). It is easily forgotten
there were also other animal epidemics that had to be monitored and acted upon
by the Commission.
The BSE issue had been on the top of the EU agenda at the highest level, even
before the crisis in 1996. It had been on the Agricultural Council agenda twice, in
1990 and 1994. In 1990 there were discussions in the Agricultural and Health
Councils in response to demands from the continental countries. This was largely
sparked by the British beef bans in Germany, Austria and France, but the bans
were revoked in June at the same year after the Commission had threatened to
involve the ECJ and extended their reassurances of tightened health measures
(European Commission, 1998: 32; European Parliament, 1997d: 25). During
the period from 1990-94, silence and passivity seem to have been the key methods
for managing the BSE issue. Germany once again put the issue on the agenda of
the Agricultural Council in July 1994, but nothing was decided upon
(European Parliament, 1997d:18). Even though the BSE question has been excluded
from the Council agenda, members of the European Parliament have been active
in posing the BSE questions to the Commission on a regular basis through the
nineties. For example on January 26, 1996, a Member of the European Parliament
(MEP) asks DG VI about BSE. The response was that there was no risk to humans
and that the best available experts are closely following the case (European Parliament, 1997b: 156). It was not until the embargo decision in 1996 that decisive
action was taken.
4.2 The European Union and Agriculture10
The Commission is the executive body of the Union, and is responsible for
implementing and managing policy. In some areas, like agriculture and trade policy,
the Commission has a considerable amount of autonomy in taking decisions
without the needing to submit proposals to the Council of Ministers, either because
of its specific powers under the Treaty or by delegated authority from the Council
(Presentation of the EU Commission 1995-2000, Internet). Authority in the area
of agricultural area is shared between the Council, the Commission and the member
states (European Parliament, 1997a:4).
10
As the functioning and legal bases of the European Union institutions are not written in stone, this section
will attempt to at least give a general picture of the situation during the BSE incident.
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
The Commission has extensive executive functions in managing the agricultural
area, stipulated in Article 43. Its executive functions consists of four main
categories: direct policy implementation, creating legislation and the ground rules
for national administrations, supervision of policy implementation made by the
national bodies, and the management of the Community’s’ finances. These powers
are delegated from the Council, but there are some ‘strings attached’; for example
the member states have the right to involve themselves in the Commission’s
decision-making process. So the Commission’s possibilities are constrained. The
tool devised to supervise the delegated power to the Commission is through
comitology or the committee system where national officials have the right to
input on the Commission’s proposals. The committee system has five different
procedures, which will be clarified in the empirical part of this study. Comitology
came about as a compromise between the need for more rapid decision-making in
the Community, and the wish of the member states to be able to secure national
influence over the Commission’s’ decision-making since they are extremely
reluctant to hand over all the power to the Commission (Wessels, 1998).
The committees with national officials prepare the national administrations to
implement what is discussed so that they are not surprised by what is decided at
the European level. This can be seen as an attempt by committee members to
sensitize the national officials to the legislative and executive rules, which they
will have to implement into national regulations. National difficulties with
implementing legislation are made known much earlier to the Commission officials
with this procedure since it can be used as a sonar device to detect where there is
a possibility to agree and where further discussion are needed before a proposal
can be drafted. It is also an opportunity for the Commission officials to acquire
and to increase their own level of knowledge. The committee procedures in
agricultural matters have been in use since 1962 and in the veterinary field since
1968. One key aspect of the decision-making process lies in how the various
committees operate. When these committees are unable to agree upon an opinion
or are negative about a measure, the proposal is then referred to the Council where
the member states can block it. The committees are chaired by a senior Commission
official who controls the agenda and submits draft measures to the committee.
Proposals are voted upon in the same manner as in the Council; that is, qualified
majority voting 62 of 87 votes are needed. Otherwise the proposal will have to be
sent to the Council in question (Docksey and Williams, 1994: 121; Wessels,
1998: 209). The comitology system denies the European Parliament access to
the decision-making process in some areas, which it naturally is not content with.
“The [European] Parliament… is opposed [to the committee system] since it fears
that its prerogatives under the legislative process are restricted by forms of
delegation of powers to the Commission under which the Council and the Member
States retain control, but which bypass the legislative role of the Parliament.”
(Shaw, 1996:161).
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
The member states have an obligation to implement decisions taken by the EU
institutions, Article 5 states; “Member States shall take all appropriate measures,
whether general or particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out
of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community”
(Shaw, 1996:208). Thus the Commission does not have a significant role in the
ex-post of the decision-making or in the implementation process, as it is heavily
dependent the compliance of the member states (Laffan, 1997). The Commission
acts as a guardian for the treaties. Article 169 states that the Commission can
bring member states who are in violation of the rules, to the ECJ. But member
states can argue with the help of, for example Article 36 and 100A to justify their
deviance of EU law (Shaw, 1996:117). Member states are obligated to transpose
Community law into national law, and monitor and control its practical
implementation in an effective manner. That is a fundamental principle in the
Community, and it was restated in the Treaty of Maastricht (MAT). Unless there
is evidence, the Commission has to assume that the member states are fulfilling
their obligations. The system is, thus, based on the member states willingness to
cooperate with the Commission. Alternatively the Commission would have to
have thousands of inspectors traveling around Europe which would not really
fulfill the founding fathers’ concept of integration (European Parliament,
1997a:395).
The basis for community action is stated in the subsidarity principle and is
codified in Article 3b of the treaty, “…the Community shall take action, in
accordance with the principle of subsidarity, only if and in so far as the objectives
of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and
can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better
achieved by the Community”. There is a principle of proportionality. The EU
institutions should avoid becoming involved in narrow issues and concerns that
may be perceived as an obstruction to matters already dealt with by the authorities
of the member states. The Commission has different roles in coordinating policy;
forge constructive relationships at all levels, formulate and improve strategies for
effective implementation of policies and measures; and ensure the transfer and
flow of knowledge, expertise, and materials when it is to the mutual benefit of all
parties concerned (Commission i, 1993:7).
Prior to the Treaty on the European Union, there was no specific legal basis or
competence vested in the Community institutions in the field of public health.
This does not, however, mean that the treaties did not contain provisions of
relevance for the protection of health and welfare for its citizens. One example, is
that health and safety at work was given a prominent place from the beginning in
the EEC Treaty (Commission, 1993i: 7-8). Other provisions in the EEC Treaty
directly or indirectly concern the area of health; for example Article 36 allows for
restrictions on imports and for goods in transit in order to protect human health.
But it is not intended to be used as an arbitrary technique for discriminating against
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
other countries’ goods or as a cover for disrupting intracommunity trade
(The EU Treaty, 1995:87). Article 100a has a major impact on health since all
proposals for directives establishing the Internal Market for products, services,
capital and persons must, by virtue of this article, have a high-level of health
protection as a basis. The protection of human health is the ultimate goal of
environmental protection. The objective for protecting human health is enshrined
in Article 130 in the EEC Treaty as amended by the SEA. The MAT has not only
been used to maintain these provisions but has also been used to enforce them.
Consumer protection has been given a clear mandate to protect the health and
safety of consumers in Article 129A (European Commission, 1993:7-8).
4.2.1 The Internal Market
In 1986 the SEA, Single European Act, was signed by the then twelve members.
The ratification of this document meant that an internal market was to be created
by the end of 1992. It was defined as “…an area without any inner borders, where
free movement for goods, people, services and capital is secured in accordance
with the rules in this treaty” (Cameron, 1992:24). The single market was a
deepening of the common market that was established within the Treaty of Rome
in 1957. It came about after a period of weakness in the European integration
project, often referred to as a period of ‘euro-sclerosis’. The Single Market contains
the four principal freedoms: free movement for people, goods, capital, and services
(Bernitz, 1996:21). On the home page of DG XV (Internal Market and Financial
Services) the following is expressed, “The single market is one of the EU’s greatest
achievements and has a growing impact on the citizens of the Community” (DG
XVs mission statement, 1996). To be able to achieve the four principal freedoms,
it was necessary to remove all national obstacles that could limit the free trade
within the community. That meant that no controls shall or can be performed any
longer at the border of another member state. The Community’s intention was to
have controls concentrated at the place of origin instead at the receiving party. In
connection with the transition to the common market, an evolution has taken place
regarding the EU institutions and the member states’ authority and responsibility
to implement controls to prevent risks and dangers being posed upon the health of
the public and animals (European Parliament, 1997-02-07b:32).
Before the completion of the Single Market in 1993, the Member States were
allowed to introduce their own trade measures in cases where it was believed a
serious health risk for humans or animals health existed in any other Member
State. The Commission’s role was then to examine the measures, assess if they
were necessary or went too far, and finally propose steps to harmonize the trading
conditions in all the countries involved. The Commission has had a completely
different role since legislation regarding the single market was introduced in 1993
(European Parliament,1997i:16).
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
4.3 The European Commission
As the focus of this study is primarily on the European Commission, it is necessary
to elucidate on the organization and structure of the institution itself. Parts of the
EU legislation concerning the Commission’s competence and so fourth is
continuously changing, but this study will focus only on the situation regarding
the designated time period, March 1996-June 1996. The idea with the Commission
(The High Authority as it was called initially) was to transform the traditional
methods of international cooperation. Traditionally national governments bargained
individually with each other, to a system where collective action could become a
reality (Coombes, 1970:20). It is necessary to separate within the Commission
between the political dimension, i.e. the Commissioners and the cabinets and the
administrative / bureaucratic dimension, i.e. the Commission civil servants
(Ludlow, 1991: 88). At the political level where decisions are finally agreed
upon is the college of Commissioners. Their legal framework for fulfilling their
duties is explained in Articles 155-163 of the Treaty of Rome. There are twenty
Commissioners; the large countries Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy
and Spain have two each and the small countries have just one Commissioner
each. The nomination of the EU president and the Commissioners are the result
of lengthy negotiations between the member states. The President of the
Commission does not have any power over the commissioners but, rather, acts
more as a consensus-builder, which naturally varies in accordance to the personality
of the person holding this office. The Commissioners are supposed to be neutral
and to be able to articulate a European rather than a national view on policies.
They, therefore, must swear an allegiance of national objectivity in front of the
ECJ before taking office, in order to stress their independence and autonomy,
irrespective of national state interests (Christiansen, 1996). The college of
Commissioners is a collegiate body. Thus, for a proposal to be agreed upon, an
absolute majority has to be reached by the twenty Commissioners, although in
practice consensus is preferred. Every Commissioner has one vote, including the
president. Once the college has taken a decision, all commissioners are obligated
to defend the proposal even if they voted against it (Cini, 1996:150).
The administrative part of the Commission consists of 24 Directorate-Generals
(DG), which are comparable to governmental departments at the national level.
Each DG has its own policy domain to monitor. There are also five Commission
services that coordinate horizontal matters. One service unit is the SecretariatGeneral (SG), which is under the direct supervision of the Commission President
and supervises the coordination of all aspects concerning the Commission’s policies
and relations with the outside world. It coordinates the relationship between the
Commission, the European Parliament, the Council, the member states and other
institutions. Internally it has a secretarial role and plays the role of a ‘watch-dog’
since it is present at other DG meetings. The SG has an important role, acting as
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
a clearinghouse between the DGs, and as a gatekeeper both internally and externally
(Christiansen, 1996). During the period of 1958-1996 the SG has only had two
Director Generals, the first one being Emile Noël and the SG was regarded as a
very influential department (Ludlow, 1991:95). But the SG:s role changed under
the direction of David Williamson, a former British civil servant under Margaret
Thatcher. He did not continue the high-profile role that his predecessor had, but
concentrated more on a neutral administrative function with coordinating as the
primary goal.
The Legal Service (LS) is also a significant department. These ‘people of the
book’, are obligated to review every proposal that the Commission issues. Since
it is the primary responsibility of the LS to defend the Commission if taken to
court. This task implies an important role as gatekeeper, since the LS do not want
to be taken to court and risk defeat. The three remaining horizontal services are
the Translations service, the Spokesman’s service and the Statistical Office (Cini,
1996:101).
The Commission employs around 16,500 people, but that number includes all
of the interpreters, which are not directly involved in managing EU policy
(Swedish Institute for International Affairs, 1999:20). The Commission is fairly
small. Civil services in the bigger cities (e.g., Amsterdam or Madrid) are equipped
with more staff (Ludlow, 1991:94). Again, the Commission manages policy for
370 million citizens. The DGs vary in the number of officials, each DG usually
has 200-400 staff members, but particular DGs have considerably more, like IX
(Personnel Matters) has 2600 officials and VI (Agriculture) has over 800 officials.
DG VI is the second largest DG, and it has benefited from being in charge of one
of the EU’s genuinely common policies. DG VI is also unique in that it has its
own legal service and public relations department, which makes it a comparably
strong and independent department compared to the other DGs (Peterson &
Bomberg, 1999:135).
Internally, every DG is led by a Director-General and generally divided into
three or four Directorates (some deviations do exist), which are each headed by
directors. Under directors are the heads of units. Each Directorate is then composed
of several units. The Commissioner and the top Director-General are customarily
not from the same member state (Cini, 1996). There is a deputy Director-General
who has the role of coordinating, mediating and transferring the opinions from
below upward to the Director-General (Spence, 1994:101).
Each Commissioner has his/her own personal staff: a cabinet. Cabinets are
central to the political decision-making within the Commission and the
Community. They act to help coordinate horizontal, as well as vertical, matters
in the Commission. Their main functions are to: assist the Commissioner, act as
a sonar device. to provide information, to coordinate Commission business at
the chefs the cabinet meeting every Monday, and at the Commissioners’ meeting
on Wednesdays, to maintain relations with the European Parliament and to act
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
as a liaison between the Commissioner and his/her own member state. The
Commissioner personally selects them and there is usually a connection between
the nationality of the Commissioner and the nationality of the people working
on the cabinet. There is a convention stating that at least one member of the
cabinet should come from a member state other than that of the Commissioner.
The cabinet’s most important function, besides assisting with the tasks mentioned
above, is to act as a intermediary between the more politically oriented cabinet
and the more technically oriented DG (Ludlow, 1991:93). There is a built-in
tension between the cabinet members and the DG officials in that the latter does
not enjoy being supervised, especially if they feel that the technical issues are
being tainted with political considerations. Advice from the cabinet can be seen
as a counter-balance to the advice given by the DG officials. This could be
interpreted as double bureaucracy. This is a sensitive issue since it could be
perceived that the cabinets are injecting national preferences into the DGs
‘European’ proposals, since the cabinets are in charge of maintaining
communication between the Commissioner and his/her ‘own’ national
government. And indeed cabinets are sometimes suspected of leaking information
from the Commission documents to the national governments so that they can
obtain information on a prospective Commission proposal before a debate is
taken in the college (Donelly and Ritchie, 1994:40). One commentator has
stated, “Intergovernmentalism starts in the cabinet. They’re mini-Councils within
the Commission” (Cini, 1996:154).
An agricultural proposal makes its way through the system, after a draft proposal
has been worked out in one of the DG units. Contacts are then taken with the
Legal Service to guarantee that it complies with existing legislation and to give it
their blessing. Amendments are made if necessary by the unit, and a scientific
committee, which usually consist of national experts acting independently is
consulted for an opinion on scientific matters if needed. The official will be the
rapporteur of the proposal and will be responsible for the proposal even after it
leaves the College, for example in the Council’s working groups. The cabinet
decides when it is time to put forth the proposal to the College of Commissioners,
which will then decide if it should be taken to a management or a regulatory
committee. The college then ratifies an affirmative decision by the committee.
There is also a need to achieve consensus within the Commission that is all of the
departments involved in the policy draft should be consulted before it is discussed
in the college. The SG is formally in charge of circulating a proposal before it is
brought up in the college. If the proposal is rejected, it is then brought to the
Agricultural Council (Cini, 1996:143).
A brief exposé will be given of the DGs that have had a stake in the BSE
matter. At the EU level the Community’s authority in the area of agriculture and
public health is shared among several of the Commission’s DGs: DG III (Industry,
responsibilities include foodstuffs and pharmaceuticals), but it has no direct
42
Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
responsibility concerning BSE or the bovine meat market. DG III was involved
because there was an accountability issue for a number of products further in the
food- or product chain that might be somehow affected by the infected meat,
particularly pharmaceutical products and processed food products (European
Parliament, 1997a: 158). DG V (Employment, Industrial Relations and Social
Affairs) is responsible for public health, but has mainly dealt with programs
regarding cancer and AIDS prevention. This area is still placed in pillar three and
regarded primarily as an intergovernmental policy area. Other DGs affected were,
DG VI (Agriculture), DG XI (Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection),
DG XV (Internal Market and Financial Services) and DG XXIV (Consumer Policy
and Consumer Health Protection). In addition to this list are the relevant committees
that function under each individual DG. There is no single structure in charge of
safeguarding public health at the European level (European Parliament, 1997c:41).
But that is not so surprising since at the national level the responsibility for public
health is often shared between different ministries and agencies. It can even be an
advantage with having several agencies fighting for the lead, i.e. not having a
well-ordered government structure. If there was only one agency and that agency
was wrong then matters would not be beneficial (Libertore, 1993:33). The
horizontal departments as the Secretariat-General (SG) and the Legal Service
(LS) were important actors in the BSE crisis as well.
The relations with the two other major EU institutions, the Council and
Parliament will not be elaborated on in detail. There is a mutual dependency
between the two institutions and not much can transpire, in terms of legislation at
least, without an agreement between the Commission and the Council. The
Commission has a strong position in setting the agenda and initiating policy but it
is also dependent on the other institutions if it want, its proposals to become
implemented (Cini, 1996:132). The Council is really several different councils –
one for each policy sector. The presidency or the chair of the Council rotates
every six months. The president of the Council has become increasingly important
over the past years as a result of being a broker between the member states. The
sector Councils make more mundane decisions, and the more comprehensive
decisions are made by the European Council, which consists of the Heads of State
(Wessels, 1991:135).
The relationship between the Commission and the European Parliament has
changed over time. The European Parliament has received greater capabilities
with co-decision powers in some areas but not in the area of agriculture. The
European Parliament has the power to censure the College of Commissioners,
which it used for the first time in 1999. It can not, however, censure one individual
commissioner. Commissioners are also held accountable in parliamentary sessions
and in its committees. Parliamentary questions are also an important tool for the
European Parliament in keeping an eye on the functions of the Commission (Cini,
1996:136).
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
5. Chronology and Decision
Occasions
5.1 Chronology: February 1996 – June 1996
February 1996: In Germany, five Länder (political regions) place bans on beef
imports from the United Kingdom. This was regarded by the EU Commission as an
illegal act and the process of taking legal action against this violation of the rules
governing the European internal market was planned (Dagens Nyheter, 96-03-22).
March 18: Douglas Hogg and Stephan Dorrell, the Agricultural and Health
Ministers of the United Kingdom, writes a memo to John Major, the Prime Minister
of the United Kingdom at the time, that the Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory
Committee (SEAC) was about to publicly announce new evidence linking BSE to
CJD. Major receives the memo the same day. An emergency meeting is called
between several of the cabinet ministers to discuss what the possible effects of
this will be (Seldon, 1997: 639).
March 19: The Major cabinet questions the British experts, have they maybe
overreacted in light of this new evidence and is it appropriate to go public with
the news now. The Cabinet’s final decision is to make an early announcement the
next day (Seldon, 1997: 640).
March 20 – Decision Occasion I: The Commission is informed about the BSE
findings in the United Kingdom.
March 21 – Decision Occasion II: France, Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Portugal,
Italy and the Netherlands introduce unilateral bans against the import of beef and
beef-related products from the United Kingdom.
The reaction to the banning of British beef in the member states is received
with mixed sentiments in the United Kingdom. The opposition party, Labour,
announces that it understands the reaction from some of the member states, but
conservative backbenchers criticize the actions and in particular the French
embargo. Some call for a retaliation in the form of an embargo against French
products, especially French wine (Fax, 96-03-21).
British schools take beef off the school menu. Downing Street declares the EU
countries’ ban illegal and the Commission supports their claim (The Times, 9602-22).
March 22 – Decision Occasion III: Other countries follow suit and introduce a
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
ban on British beef. The Commission have the Scientific Veterinary Committee
(ScVC) met.
Richard Lacy (a British professor in microbiology who has repeatedly criticized
the British government for a lack of concern and preventative measures regarding
the BSE problem) issues a warning that there could be 5000, up to 500,000, cases
of nv-CJD after the year 2000 (Svenska Dagbladet, 96-03-23).
March 24: British meat was replaced with Dutch meat at McDonald’s (The
Electronic Telegraph, 96-03-25). French farmers set up roadblocks at French
harbors to ensure that no meat is smuggled in British trucks into France (Svenska
Dagbladet, 96-03-25).
March 25 – Decision Occasion IV: The Standing Veterinary Committee (SVC)
approves the Commission proposal to ban British beef. Major calls Santer.
The French authorities announce that three cases of BSE have been detected
during the month of March in Brittany. The probable cause is thought to be imported
feed (Fax, 96-04-01).
March 26 – Decision Occasion V: SVC approves the Commission proposal a
second time.
British beef is taken off the menu at Burger King in the United Kingdom and
on British Airways flights (Skånska Dagbladet, 96-03-26).
March 27: The Commission adopts emergency measure 96/239.
The EP issues a resolution that supports the measures taken by the Commission
(Westlake, 1997:28).
March 28: The death of a 29-year old woman from nv-CJD in the United Kingdom
was reported on in the media. It was confirmed by a hospital in the region of Kent.
The woman was not one of the ten nv-CJD cases in the sample of young people
investigated by SEAC (The Electronic Telegraph, 96-03-29).
The chairman of COPA (the European Farmers Organization) calls for an
extensive and rapid slaughter of all British cows. The media reports in Egypt and
Saudi Arabia allegedly depict that nearly the entire European continent is infected
by BSE. In Costa Rica, tourists’ baggage is searched for British meat (Scribona Info., 1996:7).
March 29: Intergovernmental Conference summit in Turin, Italy.
March 30: Commissioner, Fischler, met with the British Agricultural Minister,
Hogg, to discuss the British government’s plans for slaughtering the domestic
cows and to discuss the matter of financial compensation (Westlake, 1997:13).
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
The Health Minister of the United Kingdom, Dorell, declared that the issue
was no longer a question whether or not British beef was safe, but whether the
public had confidence in it. “It is people who are mad, not the cows” (Dagens
Nyheter, 96-03-31).
In Germany, consumer mistrust was blamed for a 50-65 % drop in sales of
domestic beef. This occurred in spite of the fact that only 0.1% of the beef sold in
Germany, prior to the ban, was imported from Britain (Financial Times, 96-0401).
April 1-3: The EU Agricultural Council met in Luxembourg
April 2: Another suspected victim of nv-CJD is reported (The Times, 96-04-03).
April 3: WHO made a public statement, “The group concluded that there is no
definite link between BSE and nv-CJD, but that circumstantial evidence suggests
exposure to BSE may be the most likely hypothesis” (WHO press release, 96-0403). Gelatin, tallow and milk were reported to be safe, if treated, even in countries
with a high incidence of BSE (European Parliament, 1997a:277).
April 4: John Major declared in the House of Commons that he is upset that the
EU Council failed to lift the embargo and he contemplates taking the Commission
to the ECJ (Westlake, 1997:14).
April 10: The CMO (the high-level EU committee on health which consists of
the Chief Medical Officers from every member state) and SVC meet. The purpose
of the meeting was to ensure proper network of coordination between the Member
States and to reach a consensus on which path to proceed in the area of public
health. After this meeting the Commission services established the appropriate
mechanisms to which the member states could report CJD cases (European
Parliament, 1997a:97).
April 11: Meetings of the ScFC (Scientific Food Committee) and ScC (Scientific
Committee for Cosmetics).
April 14: Commissioner Fischler states, during an interview with a newspaper,
that he would personally eat British beef in Britain and continued with saying, “I
see no medical reason not to. For [public safety alone] a ban would not have been
needed. We also want to make sure that the whole beef market did not collapse as
dramatically as was unfortunately the case in Britain” (DG XV's mission statement,
96-04-17).
These statements caused anger on behalf of the British leaders. For example, Sir
David Naish (President NFU) exclaimed, “British farmers have been under siege
46
Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
because of a decision by the Community, and it is just unacceptable to me if that
was taken for purely political reasons”. Fischler’s spokesman tries to calm down the
situation by saying, “If we really thought that British beef was unsafe its sale would
have been banned in Britain as well as everywhere else in the world. Besides, it was
not Fischler who closed the borders but ministers” (London Times, 96-04-15).
April 15: The ScFC convenes.
April 18: Santer, Major and other European leaders meet in Moscow for a G7
summit (European Parliament, 1997a:440). Late that night, there was an informal
meeting on BSE instigated by Major. Santer, Chirac, Kohl and Dini were reportedly
present (Seldon, 1997:645).
April 26: The ScVC meets to discuss the issue of gelatin.
April 29-30: The Agricultural Council meets to discuss the issue of BSE. The
Council confirmed that the temporary ban on the export of live cattle, meat and
meat products from the United Kingdom should be seen as a safeguard measure
and the Council also welcomed the action taken by the United Kingdom following
the implementation of the ban. The Council concluded that with the continued
usage of the best available scientific advice, a progressive lifting of the ban should
be taken into consideration (European Parliament, 1997a:7).
May 1: In Britain, the sales of beef return to 85% of its previous level (that is,
before the announcement about BSE was made). Beef sales in France are back to
75% of its previous level and in Germany only 50% (London Times, 96-05-02).
May 3: A letter from Major is sent to Santer.
May 6: The sub-group for BSE in DG VI meets (European Parliament, 1997b:192).
May 8 – Decision Occasion VI: The Commission decides to give a proposal
concerning gelatin to the SVC. Santer answers Major’s letter.
May 15: The SVC meets to discuss the issue of gelatin.
May 20: The SVC meets again and continues its discussion on gelatin.
May 20-21: The EU Agricultural Council meets.
May 21 – Decision Occasion VII: The United Kingdom in retaliation begins to
strategically block the various EU Councils.
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
May 21: The NFU (The UK National Farmers Union) takes their case to the ECJ.
With the support of the British government, the NFU makes a plea to the Court of
First Instance against the Commission regarding the embargo decision (Westlake,
1997:25).
May 22: The Commission drafts a proposal on gelatin.
May 23: The first signs of the British policy of non-cooperation are visible. At a
meeting of the EU Civil Protection Council, three items on the agenda were
opposed by the United Kingdom (Westlake, 1997:20).
May 24: The United Kingdom launches a full-scale legal campaign, through the
ECJ, against the Commission. The United Kingdom asked that the emergency
decision: 96/239/EEC be annulled (European Court of Justice,1997). The decision
is greatly influenced by the admission by Fischler, stating he would happily eat
British beef because there was no medical reason not to”. It was believed that the
statement backed supported their view that there was no scientific justification for
the ban and that it was kept in force in order to protect the other EU countries’
markets (The Electronic Telegraph, 96-04-17; Westlake, 1997:25).
Thirteen measures were blocked by the United Kingdom in Brussels at the
various EU Council meetings (The Electronic Telegraph, 96-05-29).
The Office International des Epizooties (OIE) advises that gelatin and tallow
is safe, if it is produced with the methods that have been shown to inactivate the
BSE agent (European Court of Justice, 1996:3917).
June 3: The United Kingdom puts forth a plan to the Commission with
supplementary actions to limit and to eradicate BSE in the country. See the terms
listed in 96/385.
June 3-4 – Decision Occasion VIII: The Agricultural Council fails to take a
stand on the gelatin issue. The Commission decides.
June 6: EP Resolution on the Agricultural Council meeting 3-4. The Commission
is urged to find a solution to the BSE problem because it is feared that it could
damage the European integration process. The non-cooperation policy being executed
by the United Kingdom is considered to be unacceptable, since it comes at a critical
time for the European Union with the upcoming IGC (OJ, 1996: No C 181/47).
June 9: President Santer declares that the “…moment of truth…’ was coming up
if the United Kingdom continued its policy of sabotaging the EU and the EU
functions. He also said that people were asking themselves whether or not
“…Europe would be better off without Britain…” (The Times, 96-06-10).
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
June 10: Example when the United Kingdom decided not block proposed
measures. At the EU General Affairs Council, the United Kingdom does not block
measures concerning aid for monitoring the Bosnian elections, negotiations with
Algeria, signing an agreement with Slovenia and a declaration on Nigeria
(Westlake, 1997:18).
Commissioner Fischler holds an informational seminar on BSE. 68 non-EU
members attend it. The mission is to convince these countries that they could deassemble any eventual unilateral bans of beef from the EU. “I can assure you all
that the Commission does not take chances with health of consumers, inside or
outside the European Community, and I hope that you will leave here today
reassured by that message” (Europa, 1996-06-10).
June 11: Decision 96/362/EEC is accepted by the Commission, which relaxes
the ban on gelatin, tallow and bull semen from the United Kingdom.
June 19: The plan for eradication of BSE from the United Kingdom is approved
by the SVC (European Parliament, 1997b:187).
June 21-22: The IGC meets in Florence. The United Kingdom reactivates its
cooperation with the EU. Since the Commission’s proposal, for a step-by-step
lifting of the beef ban is approved by the Council. But the decision did not specify
any particular date for a termination of the beef ban (Westlake, 1997:22). The EU
Council decides that funding of 850 million ECU will be devoted to supporting
and reimbursing European livestock farmers affected by the crisis (Europa, 1996-622: DOC / 96 / 3). The United Kingdom promised to slaughter 100, 000 cows
(born after 1989) and to equip every cow with a ‘passport’. In addition, cows
older than 30 months will be taken out of the food chain when they do not give
milk, improved measures to remove risk material from slaughtered cows and the
cadavers must be burned (Dagens Nyheter, 96-06-24).
June 24: The BSE plan (96/385) is approved by the Commission from the United
Kingdom on how to limit and to eradicate BSE (OJ, 1996: No L 151/39).
June 26 – Decision Occasion IX: The final report on gelatin is delivered to the
Commission.
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
5.2 Decision Occasions: March 20 – June 26, 1996
I.
II.
Public Statement on BSE from the UK (March 20).
Unilateral British beef bans are implemented by several member states
(France, Germany etc.), violating EU community legislation (March 21).
III. Additional countries impose unilateral British beef bans and the ScVC
responds (March 22).
IV. How will the SVC respond to the proposal? John Major calls Santer (March
25).
V.
How will the SVC respond to the proposal? (March 26).
VI. What should be decided regarding gelatin, tallow and bull semen? (May 8).
VII. The United Kingdom initiates a blocking of the EU institutions (May 21).
VIII. The Agricultural Council leaves the issue of deciding on gelatin to the
Commission (June 3-4).
IX. Final report on gelatin is delivered (June 26).
5.2.1 Decision Occasion I (March 20): Public Statement
on BSE from the UK
On March 201996, a leak in the British newspapers the Times and the Daily Mirror
reveals a probable forthcoming announcement by Prime Minister John Major regarding
the BSE disease, which raises the expectations for the afternoon meeting at the House
of Commons where the news allegedly will be announced. The speculations made by
newspapers are correct (Seldon, 1997:640). The public is informed that the CJD
Surveillance Unit in Edinburgh has identified a new type of CJD and that there are no
facts that can explain its appearance. The main message is:
…although there is no direct evidence of a link, on current data and in the
absence of any credible alternative the most likely explanation at present is
that these cases are linked to exposure to BSE before the SBO ban in 1989
(Statement from SEAC, 1996-03-20).
The Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee (SEAC) recommends that
more stringent controls at the slaughterhouses should be implemented and more
strongly observed to protect public health. SEAC ends its statement by reiterating
that if the stipulated measures are implemented properly together with the preexisting measures, “…the risk from eating beef is now likely to be extremely
small” (Statement from SEAC, 1996-03-20). The British government agrees
to implement such measures as a precaution but tries to minimize the feelings of
insecurity with a string of statements. The Health Minister Dorell said, “There
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
remains no scientific proof that BSE can be transmitted to man by beef,…” and
the Agricultural Minister Hogg says, “…, we believe that British beef can be
eaten with confidence.” On the other hand, various experts express more bleakness
in their comments. The British government’s chief adviser on the subject says that
it could turn into an epidemic. Dr. John Pattison (the chairman of SEAC) said, “It
is totally unpredictable…” and Dr. Robert Will (the head of the CJD Surveillance
Center) said, “I believe this is a new phenomenon. There is reason for major
concern” (The Times, 96-03-21). The Mental Health Foundation suggested that
the number of deaths caused by CJD could be higher, as it often goes unrecognized,
or is mistaken for either Alzheimer’s disease or some other form of dementia (The
Electronic Telegraph, 96-03-21).
When the announcement was declared in the United Kingdom neither the
Commissioners nor the Commission officials were prepared. They had not been
briefed on the latest findings that SEAC’s had reported to the U.K. government.
The reason that the Commission was not informed in advance by the government
was because they feared a leak. That was later considered a mistake by the British
government, who was later heavily criticized by the Commission, the European
Parliament and the other member states (Seldon, 1997:642).
The announcement came on a Wednesday, which meant that the College of
Commissioners would be having their weekly meeting. Upon hearing the news,
Commissioner Bonino of DG XXIV (Consumer Policy and Consumer Health
Protection) proposed the creation of an inter-service group and a BSE subgroup,
which would be chaired by the DG of Consumer Affairs. The Commission
immediately endorsed that proposal and the inter-service subgroup was set up on
March 27. The purpose of this group was to collect and coordinate information
about BSE and CJD to concerned consumers. “We considered it our duty to present
documents that were intelligible and as simple as possible, even if there is a
difference between the findings of the scientists, who speak their own language,
and their translation into terms that are perhaps not simplistic, but are certainly
comprehensible to the general public. I felt it was up to us to do this”, Bonino.
The first report, the vademecum, to consumers was published on May 28, 1996
(European Parliament, 1997a:419). From that day, the debate in the College of
Commissioners regarding BSE and public health became a permanent item on
the Wednesday meeting agenda. Agricultural Commissioner Fischler continually
informed the college of the latest details (European Parliament, 1997a:427).
Commission President, Jaques Santer, did not hear of the BSE announcement
(made by the U.K. government) until the day thereafter, March 21, in Paris.
Surprisingly, no one thought the Commission President should be informed at
once.
Santer was in Paris visiting President Chirac discussing a job-creation scheme.
It was during a press conference that Santer was informed about both the BSE
situation and the unilateral French embargo on British beef. In response to a
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
question by a journalist, Santer expressed his comprehension and understanding
of the measures taken by the French, knowing that the measures were inspired by
a concern for the protection of public health. Santer also stressed the necessity to
find a solution at the European level (European Parliament, 1997a:432).
At DG V (Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs) the first reaction
was to gather all the health ministers for a meeting which took place three weeks
later. That meeting reviewed the action of DG VI (Agriculture), and discussed
how to set up a surveillance mechanism for CJD. The talks resulted in an informal
network which was set up in the member states (Respondent J)11. There were
requests from both France and Italy to meet and discuss the potential repercussions
of BSE to public health. Initially, this was not considered appropriate because two
such meetings had already been planned by the SVC and WHO was holding a
meeting to scrutinize the whole question. But the Health Ministers went ahead
and met on April 10 to consider all the relevant data. Data that came out was
limited, but some conclusions were gathered which eventually figured in the
document that was transmitted by the Commission service to the Council (European
Parliament, 1997a:97).
Agricultural Commissioner Fischler read about the BSE findings in the morning
paper but was later on formally informed by Hogg, the British Agricultural Minister,
who telephoned him but only after Major had made the proclamation in the House
of Commons. Fischler then passed on the information to the top officials in his
DG. The DG VI officials, who have worked with such issues for an extensive
period of time, already had knowledge about the BSE problem, but the problem
had now changed configuration. The risks were much greater and the potential
effects could be far-reaching. Everybody recognized that the repercussions on the
Communities’ production and exports could be great. A discussion on what to do
now commenced since, no plans existed for this sort of contingency (Respondent
B). Officials in the other DGs were also taken by surprise for the reason that the
British had been boosting for a long time that their domestic animal protection
standards were the best in Europe (Respondent C).
The first major action taken by the Commission was made by DG VI. The
Scientific Veterinary Committee (ScVC), which is an advisory committee, was
summoned for a meeting in Brussels on Friday, March 22. Independent veterinary
experts from all over the European Union was called in to examine the news
concerning British beef and to give an opinion and a risk assessment, on how to
proceed (Respondent B). In addition to the ScVC there existed a special expert
group on BSE at DG VI, which was a sub-group to the ScVC, but it was not used
at this time. Many of the subgroup delegates came from the ordinary ScVC and
11
In order to conceal the identity of the interviewees the method of using letters, (such as “Respondent A” to
denote a certain official) instead of names, has been utilized in this study.
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
others belonged to the British Agricultural Ministry, also known as MAFF (European Parliament, 1997c:9-10). Through the Councils’ decision, 87/373/EEG,
the committee system is regulated.
There are three types of regulated committees and five types of governing
procedures. 1. Advisory committees only advise the Commission. These
committees are created by the Commission in order to deal with the first steps of
drafting a proposal. 2. Management committees – In order for a proposal to be
sent to and decided on by the Council, a qualified majority of the Management
committee members is required. 3. Regulatory committees, which will be,
explained further when the involvement of the Standing Veterinary Committee is
discussed (Przedpelska, 1997:7). DG VI, based on proposals submitted from the
Member States nominates the experts in the ScVC, then a selection is made. “We
are not scientists but we try to select the scientists we think are best suited for the
particular activity in the SVC” said Hoelgaard, from the DG VI, (European
Parliament, 1997-02-07a: 265). The Commission takes the advice from the
veterinary committee on whether or not more steps are needed to protect consumers
from any significant risks. Legally the Commission is not bound to the opinion of
the ScVC. It is only an opinion. But the Commission is not allowed to take a
decision by itself – it has to a submit proposal to the Standing Veterinary Committee
(SVC) (European Parliament, 1997a: 66). The members of the management and
regulatory committees come from the member countries and represent them. It is
not necessarily the case that the college will automatically ratify a proposal from
the SVC.
A spokesman for Fischler said, “If the scientists say more action is needed
then more action will be taken”. The European authorities were in a delicate
position over British beef. Throughout the years the Commission had resisted
many attempts made by some of the continental authorities to take measures against
British beef imports. The Commission has always stated that nothing should, or
could, be done without sufficient scientific evidence proving a real threat to public
health. Up to this point the Commission has supported the British government’s
reasoning that no scientific evidence could link BSE to any human disease. In fact
a month prior (February), the Commission had begun proceedings against
Germany’s Länder after the implementation of unilateral bans on British beef.
The Commission had claimed it illegal, on the grounds, that the ban was an illegal
barrier to trade. But on the other hand, the Commission had taken a firm stance on
imports of American hormone beef because it thought the issue was underresearched and that beef from the United States could pose a threat to public
health (The Times, 96-03-21).
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
5.2.2. Decision Occasion II (March 21): Unilateral British
Beef Bans Implemented by Several Member
States, Violating EU Community Legislation
On Thursday (March 21) the following member states, France, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Sweden, Portugal, Italy and Germany (where several Länder already
implemented bans) had decided, and in some cases already imposed bans, called
for the sales to be stopped throughout the EU (Dagens Nyheter, 96-03-22). Import
bans on British beef spread rapidly across the continent. The snowball effect had
been set into motion after France, the biggest overseas market worth £220 million,
takes the decision to ban British beef (The Electronic Telegraph, 96-03-22;
European Parliament, 1997a:308).
The Health Minister of the German government, Horst Seehofer, expresses
his doubts to whether a national government is legally able to take such decisions.
He stated, “If a national level ban on imports were legally possible, the federal
government would have done it long ago” (The Times, 96-03-21). The German
government urged the Commission to ban all exports of live cattle, beef and beefrelated products from the United Kingdom, and urged the Commission to legalize
the actions that had been already taken at the national level (The Electronic
Telegraph, 96-03-22).
When the British government learned that France ha taken unilateral action,
the Cabinet decided on March 21, that Britain should make urgent and strong
representations to the Commission and if necessary ask that the countries banning
British beef to be taken to the ECJ for breaching EU regulations. Hogg later
confirmed on British television that the U.K. government would slaughter all, or
at least part, of its 12 million cattle herd, if advised to do so by the scientific
advisers on BSE who planned to meet the following weekend. The U.K. exports
242,000 tons of beef every year, of which 187,000 goes to other member states
(The Electronic Telegraph, 96-03-22). Hogg stated that the French move raised
“…very strong questions of illegality”. One shred of hope was left for the British
when Denmark dismissed the other countries’ bans “…as a very violent reaction”
(The Times, 96-03-22).
The Commission’s joint reaction to the spreading of unilateral bans across
Europe and across the world was to sternly warn the first EU member country
which had taken action, France, that such action is unlawful. The Commission’s
Agricultural Spokesman said that France had broken EU rules by failing to give a
prior notice of the ban. The French Agricultural Ministry defended the move by
citing two (most probably Articles 36 and 129) European directives which state
that such action is permitted in “cases of doubt about the sanitary quality of a
product or animal” (The Times, 96-03-22).
Within the Commission (VI) there was a feeling of bitterness that the United
Kingdom did not inform the Commission before making the statement public.
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
The fact that some of the member countries implemented unilateral import bans
was not in line with the EU treaties. If in such a case that a member state finds it
necessary to make a safeguard decision, it should alert the Commission and ask
for permission to implement safeguard measures (Respondent B). The Commission
then has 10 days to evaluate the problem and decide if such a measure should be
taken or not. If the Commission gives a non-affirmative answer, then a member
state can go ahead anyway. It is also possible for the Commission to take such a
decision without being asked to do so if it is considered to be necessary and
justifiable. If any member state desires to take such a measure, it shall be referred
to the Council, which can confirm, amend or revoke a decision (Nugent, 1994:111).
In DG III (Industry), the general sentiment was that the member states had the
right to take unilateral bans, in accordance to Article 36, and it therefore did not
provoke any special reaction. “The reaction was more that we will discuss this…and
wait for more information to become available” (Respondent C). At that point, it
was more important to protect the functioning of the internal market. In DG XXIV,
the unilateral bans were at first questioned since it was a clear breach of the treaties
and should be directly condemned, but it was not politically possible to take any
action against the member states. It should have been the Commission’s right to
act first. But from the perspective of being the consumer DG there was a complete
understanding and total agreement that the member states acted with good reason
considering the circumstances at hand and especially in regards to consumer
concerns (Respondent K).
However the Commission maintained that the British beef concerns were not
scientifically proven, and thus not a health risk, as it waited for the results from
the members of Scientific Veterinary Committee. A Commission spokesman said,
“British beef is perfectly safe as far as we are concerned unless we receive
information to the contrary”. There were no discussions suggesting that a total
ban should be imposed. Such a move would only occur if conclusive evidence
were found which proved a threat to public health. There were also attempts to
minimize the problem and its eventual spillover effects. The Commission
spokesman continued, “We must not exaggerate the problem. It is only a problem
in the United Kingdom and we should not overstate the extent of it” (The Electronic
Telegraph, 96-03-22). By publicly expressing that the problem was not applicable
on the European level, but rather that it was mainly a national problem, there
would be no need for unlawful actions. Furthermore the need for the Commission’s
involvement would be limited and extensive financial assistance would not be
necessary. It would be sufficient with the United Kingdom taking action.
Presumably all of the member states feared that the crisis could have spillover
effects on their own beef markets. If prices would fall drastically, the EU would be
forced to buy the surplus beef (according to its own legislation) in order to keep
prices up. That would be unfortunate since the EU had not needed to intervene for
two years and there were hopes that the situation could be maintained. The BSE
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
situation occurred just as the EU had reported a surplus in agricultural support
funds from the previous year and discussions were just starting to take place regarding
what should be done with the extra funds (Svenska Dagbladet, 96-03-23).
The EU is the second largest beef producer in the world and a crash in prices
would have a huge drain on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) budget.
Intervention rules state that the farm authorities must buy up stocks if the prices
fall by more than 20 per cent of its typical average; at that point, cattle prices were
down by as much as 28 % at some British markets (The Times, 96-03-23). To buy
and store one million tons of beef a year produced in the United Kingdom would
cost the European taxpayers £2 billion (The Electronic Telegraph, 96-03-22). At
least there would be no action until the independent scientific experts in the ScVC
had met to review the latest findings.
5.2.3 Decision Occasion III (March 22): Additional
Countries Impose Unilateral British Beef Bans
and the ScVC Responds
WHO issues a statement on the March 22 that no solid evidence indicated a definite
connection between BSE and nv-CJD. The connection was described as probable
(Dagens Nyheter, 96-03-23). The WHO health experts reacted forcefully against
the European states that have implemented a ban on British beef. They thought to
be unjustified, it was an overreaction. “We do not see any massive outbreak of nvCJD. We are talking of only 10 cases in Britain, not hundreds of thousands”, says
Lindsay Martinez. From the perspective of WHO, there was no reason to be
concerned about getting infected with BSE from British beef, since the risk was
remote. All of the panic was groundless and people did not have to be hesitant
eating beef (Svenska Dagbladet, 96-03-23).
On Friday the Scientific Veterinary Committee (ScVC) meets. A scientific
committee like the
ScVC consists of independent members who speak for themselves and take
individual responsibility for their own comments. The group elects the chairman.
Its purpose is to give the Commission an opinion or information on matters that it
does not have adequate competence in. The committee has no vote within the
meaning of the Treaty, it is basically an opinion by a group of scientists who share
their knowledge, experience and opinions (European Parliament, 1997a:87). In
the ScVC, the procedure had been to produce a report that all members agree
upon. There was no standard procedure for voting within the group; it was done
by consensus. But, if anybody did not agree, they would raise their hands and ask
for a minority opinion to be reflected in the report (European Parliament,
1997a:334). The ScVC had from 1989 upto the meeting on March 22, 1996, always
maintained the opinion that the risk of BSE transmitted to humans, if it existed at
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
all, to be insignificant (European Parliament, 1997c:30).
The discussions at the meeting focused upon the fact that after the disease had
been discovered, many decisions had been taken to ensure public health – not
only in the United Kingdom but also at the European Union level. The BSE disease
had never been found in the muscles, that is the part, beef, which is primarily
consumed by humans. Another relevant piece of information concerning the ten
suspected nv-CJD victims was the fact that the ten people had been infected before
1989 when potentially contagious organs in slaughtered cattle were taken out of
the human food chain. If the victims had been infected after 1989, the problem
was even less serious because then the incubation time would have been shorter
and a lot of other cases would have been reported. When the news broke, all the
relevant measures were already thought of being in place for more than six years.
This was the general opinion prevailing ScVC’s eight hour meeting, which was
complemented with CJD-experts, after a thorough account and evaluation of the
ten reported nv-CJD cases.
The enormous costs for the proposed action from governments and media had
to be weighed against what was thought to be achieved from a public health
perspective if compared to how other food-related diseases had been addressed.
In the United Kingdom ‘only’ ten cases of suspected nv-CJD had been identified
that could have been caused by BSE. Other food-related problems, such as poor
cattle facilities, cause a number of diseases and contribute to thousands of people
getting sick every year. For example in 1992, two million Germans, of which 200
died, came down with salmonella (Dagens Nyheter, 96-05-25).
Although the meeting stoped short of recommending an official ban, it called
for the destruction of infected animals and concluded that it would, “…welcome
any practical measure taken by the Commission to address the incidence of the
disease and the possible risk of its transmission” (The Electronic Telegraph, 9603-25; Svenska Dagbladet, 96-03-23). But nothing could be decided until the
proposal had been given to the SVC.
That same night, the Commission dramatically changed its tone of voice and
declared the unilateral bans, implemented by eleven EU countries, legal as the
world boycott spread. The countries in question had, according to the Commission,
responded to legitimate concerns over public health. That was a 180-degree turn
from the Commission’s previous statements given at the beginning of the crisis
that had maintained that the unilateral bans were illegal. The unilateral bans,
employed by some of the member states, were in fact breaching Community law,
but the need for action in a situation marked by uncertainty and urgency made the
adopted measures certainly more understandable. It would have been difficult for
the Commission to stand up and defend Community law in such an atmosphere.
Decisive action seemed inevitable in the face of the panic that had urged most
member states to close their borders.
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
Soon thereafter, the eleven EU states were joined by South Africa, New Zealand,
Switzerland and Singapore among others (The Times, 96-03-23). Important export
markets like the USA, Canada, Australia and Japan had closed their borders for
British meat already in the early nineties (Svenska Dagbladet, 96-03-23). President
Santer’s spokesperson asserted, “It’s more than a legal question. This is a very
important public health question which concerns us all” (The Times, 96-03-23).
Earlier in the crisis the Commission had insisted that it would not be rushed
into taking action, arguing, “We are obviously at the peak of the reaction, so there
should be no rash decisions” (The Times, 96-03-23). But other Commission
officials acknowledged that the pressure for radical measures was so great that
Fischler was virtually obliged to agree. Fischler had to delicately weigh public
health, political, consumer, and financial and industrial factors in reaching a
decision. Consideration had not only to be taken to the scientific advice but also
the Commission’s credibility, as the guardian of Europe’s well being, was clearly
at stake. Furthermore, the need to save the Communities’ beef industry from a
total collapse was critical and the danger of the intensifying British hostility to
Brussels as the Maastricht Treaty (MAT) was about to be reviewed. One official
said, “It’s a hell of a painful problem. We are not going to get much sleep until this
is over.” The decision to whether or not the bans should be formalized will be
taken on the following Monday, that is depending on the reaction of the Standing
Veterinary Committee (The Times, 96-03-23).
At the DG VI the officials and the cabinet agreed upon sending an invitation,
which called for a meeting of the veterinary chiefs in the member states. Why the
invitations were not sent out earlier could be attributed to banal factors (i.e. no
meeting rooms or interpreters were available). Most member states can dispatch
representatives with just a one-day’s notice (Respondent L). But it was probably
the case that the DG VI wanted to consult their scientists on the ScVC, which was
the standard operating procedure, before passing the matter on to the SVC. There
were deliberations between the cabinet and the officials in charge of the BSE
dossier throughout the weekend and the focus of their discussions revolved around
the issue of what to do next. As the days went on and more countries imposed
import bans, the DG VI realized that there were not so many alternatives close at
hand for controlling the problem or for effectuating a community approach. It
was necessary to take a decision, such as imposing a ban, at the European Union
level not unilaterally. But even though the experts did not give any advice for any
far-reaching measures, the officials drafting a proposal in the DG VI gave the
SVC a proposal with an open end.
A ban would achieve the following goals: to relieve the public’s feelings of
uncertainty, to protect public health, to protect the beef market in other member
states by restoring confidence in European beef, and to regain the initiative from
the member states. But the question of how it should be done had been left
undiscussed. The result was that a proposal was drafted that would impose an
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
embargo against the United Kingdom. At that point, the officials felt that, “…we
had to go for the ban” (Respondent B). Thus, the plan was that the proposal would
be given to the SVC on Monday, March 25.
When designing the proposal to place an embargo on British beef and related
products, the legal aspects were discussed with the DG VI’s own legal service.
They have to give clearance since it is they who will have the task of defending
the actions taken by the Commission if they are brought to court. The legal service
gave its consent but said that the proposal was on the edge of the Commission’s
legal sphere, but that they would defend it if it ever came so far (Respondent B).
In general the legal service “…do not give the go-ahead if we are not sure that it
will hold in an eventual lawsuit.” The DG VI’s legal service was also in contact
with the WTO to check that imposing such a ban was not breaching any of the
trade rules, although such concerns are clearly second to those concerning public
health and consumers’ concerns. There was awareness that the unilateral bans,
employed by some of the member states, were in fact in opposition to existing
community legislation, but that such an urgent situation understandably justifies
it. It would have been difficult to defend community legislation in a situation like
this. Common sense suggests that this would have been futile and would have
only served to upset the public if the superiority of EC law was so strictly insisted
(Respondent I). The DG VI decided to forward the proposal, “We hesitated about
that decision [to give the proposal to the SVC] but we wanted to err on the side of
caution and went ahead” (Respondent B). The Commission was faced with a
difficult situation, and it needed some sort of scientific basis to justify the export
ban on British beef. The U.K. could demand compensation for lost revenues of
exports (Respondent A), but evidently the Commission felt it had enough and
was prepared to discuss compensation to the British farmers if needed.
5.2.4. Decision Occasion IV (March 25): How will the
SVC Respond to the Proposal? John Major Calls
Santer
At this stage of the crisis, all of the EU countries, except for Denmark and Ireland,
have terminated their imports of British beef (Dagens Nyheter, 96-03-26).
Because the Standing Veterinary Committee (SVC) is a regulatory committee
of the safety-net/contra-file/ III b type, it must reach a majority in order for a
proposal from the Agricultural Council (DG VI) to be implemented after a vote in
the College of Commissioners. The SVC exercises its power through delegation
in the Agricultural Council’s jurisdiction. If the SVC does not take a position on a
proposal or if it is turned down with a QMV (62 votes of 87), the proposal is then
sent to the Agricultural Council. The chairman of the SVC, who also represents
the Commission, does not have a vote (Przedpelska, 1997:7).
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
When a proposal is sent to the Agricultural Council, there are two different
procedures: III a and III b. The essential difference between the two types of
procedures is that with procedure III a the Agricultural Council can only accept
or reject the proposal with an unanimous vote. On the other hand, with the III b
procedure the Agricultural Council only has to reach a simple majority, which is
presumably easier to achieve, in order to be able to reject a proposal.
Procedure III b gives the SVC less room to maneuver. If the SVC does not get a
QMV, the SVC’s delegation power in the Agricultural Council is dissolved. The
SVC then takes the proposal to the Agricultural Council which has fifteen days to
act; either by accepting or rejecting the proposal with a QMV. The Agricultural
Council can accept the proposal by implementing certain changes but then such a
decision must be unanimous. If the Agricultural Council does not act within the
time limitation, the proposal then goes back to the SVC who can decide on its own
if the proposal shall be implemented or not. In the case that the proposal is rejected
by the SVC, the proposal can not be brought back to the Agricultural Council again.
But if the proposal is accepted by the SVC, it is immediately effective after the
College of Commissioners has voted on it (Przedpelska, 1997:25).
On March 25 at 9:00 am the SVC met to discuss the British beef ban proposal.
The meeting consisted of the Heads of the veterinary and food agencies in all of
the respective 15 member countries and several top officials from DG VI were
present, but no one from the Commissioners cabinets are present to monitor the
discussions. It is extremely seldom that anyone from the Commissioners cabinets
is present at such committee meetings; they are mainly monitored by the DG
officials. The atmosphere at the meeting was visibly stressful and intense
(Respondent L).
The SVC had received some information from the ScVC meeting, but the
representatives of the SVC were disappointed since the material given was very
inconclusive. The experts had been unable to come up with anything substantial
which clearly proved BSE was the agent causing the human fatalities, and they
had no clear opinion of what to actually do about the situation. Clearly action was
needed but what sort was not specified, only that further measures were welcomed
(Respondent L). Some had claimed that it was difficult for the more technically
oriented people in the SVC to criticize the experts, in the words of Susann
Ammendrup, “…we do not believe that” (European Parliament, 1997a:259). At
the SVC meeting the question was raised as to why the ScVC was not given the
opportunity to gather and to further discuss the scientific material from the United
Kingdom. The answer given to this by the Commission officials was that no rooms
had been available for further meetings (Respondent L). Sometimes it is the
insignificant details that make the management of a crisis difficult; for example,
an expert who is greatly needed but is unable to get past a police barricade or an
executive who is unable to work since a secretary was not there to operate the fax
(Lagadec, 1991).
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
When discussing what to do at the SVC meeting there was one top DG VI
official, who continuously ran in and out of the meeting, probably periodically
keeping the cabinet informed. The Commission brought only one point to be
discussed at the meeting, that being what to do about the BSE crisis. There was
not really anything else to do but to ban British beef, since it was what the member
states wanted and several of the member states had already implemented such a
ban. What had to be discussed were how to do it and the legal aspects of it
(Respondent L).
During the various interludes, the top DG VI officials walked around and
separately conferred with the individual national delegations about how to solve the
BSE problem. Since the meeting dragged on well into the evening, the interpreters
were asked for special clearance to continue their work and an affirmative answer
was given. After that the legal aspects had been sorted out, a vote was taken on the
proposal to place an embargo on British beef and beef-related products. The embargo
would include third-party countries for two reasons: 1) They did not want British
beef exports to third countries to be imported back into the European Union. 2) It
would seem strange to ban British beef exports to just some countries because there
could be a public health risk and not to others. A vote was taken and the result was
that fourteen members voted for the embargo and only one member voted against it
(Respondent L). Not surprisingly, it was the United Kingdom who voted against the
embargo. Voting in the SVC is proportionately weighed, which means that votes are
subject to a country’s political weight. So the British delegation has more influence
than for example Portugal or Sweden when making a risk assessment on scientific
matters (European Parliament, 1997-02-18:52).
Nevertheless since the SVC functions under a qualified majority vote, the
proposal was approved. Furthermore, the United Kingdom was required to report
every two weeks on their progress. The SVC’s decision would be effective starting
the next day after the implementation of certain emergency procedures by the
Commission (The Electronic Telegraph, 96-03-26). At 10:00 p.m. the meeting
was adjourned (Respondent L).
Immediately after the meeting the British chief veterinary medical officer, Keith
Meldrum, condemned the decision as being, “…rushed, unscientific and completely
disproportionate” (Respondent B). Commissioner Fischler on the other hand, said
that the decision “…had been taken on the basis of scientific evidence and a need
to give consumers sufficient protection from CJD”. One British official said, “There
is not a shred of scientific evidence which was provided to the committee to support
this decision. It was driven by political and consumer pressure in other member
states” (The Electronic Telegraph, 96-03-26).
When asked what measures the Commission would take to compensate the
British farmers, Fischler said that it would depend on further scientific evidence
being sought as a matter of urgency (The Electronic Telegraph, 96-03-26). Fischler,
continued, “The aim is to ring-fence the problem inside the United Kingdom and
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
help consumers to recover confidence in the beef market”. Fischler made it clear
that the Commission’s experts believed the United Kingdom’s response so far to
the BSE crisis was inadequate and was urged to take further measures (The Times,
96-03-26).
The College of Commissioners prepared to adopt the proposal to ban British
beef on the evening of March 25. The EU was ready to implement an embargo
against the United Kingdom, no beef or beef-related products could be exported
to any of the other EU member states or to the rest of the world. The college was
going to ratify it by a written procedure, which the Commission uses when urgent
decisions have to be made. The college can use a written procedure if there are no
objections to it after having a proposal circulated to all of the Commissioners
(Westlake, 1997:13).
As Commissioner Fischler was ready to go down to the waiting press in the
basement of the Commissioners building and announce the ban panic broke out
on the eleventh floor. Two signatures were missing. The two British Commissioners,
Sir Leon Brittan and Neil Kinnock, had not signed the proposal and refused to do
so (Svenska Dagbladet, 97-02-16). The two insisted that additional British experts
should be allowed to present their case (Dagens Nyheter, 96-03-27). Then the
telephone rang in Santer’s office.
The action, which was about to be taken in Brussels, provoked anger and
disbelief in Westminster. The British government was upset over the fact that the
Commission claimed it had the legal power to order a ban on a sovereign member
state’s exports involving third-party countries. British officials in Brussels alleged
that there were serious doubts as to whether the Commission had such legal rights,
despite the fact that Britain had already ceded some of its trading rights (The
Times, 96-03-26). Furthermore, the decision infuriated the British because it was
a complete reversal of the Commission’s original position which had been
announced on the previous Thursday (just a few days prior) when the Commission
had condemned the unilateral embargoes implemented by some of the member
states (The Electronic Telegraph, 96-03-26).
When the phone rang in Santers office, it was J. Major, a furious British Prime
Minister, who had forgotten all diplomatic etiquette and yelled at Santer claiming
that British beef was safe and that the ban was simply a conspiracy by the Europeans
to gain market shares. Major informed the Commission President Santer that the
British government was fiercely opposed to the embargo and thought it was totally
unjustified. He made it clear that in such an event, his government intended to
take legal action against the Commission and would sue for financial compensation
(European Parliament, 1997a:432). Major said the move went well beyond any
action justified by the available scientific evidence and demanded that the
Commission reconvene a meeting of the SVC the next day to hear additional
views from Britain’s Chief Medical Officer and from leading experts on BSE
from the British SEAC committee (The Electronic Telegraph, 96-03-26).
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There are conflicting facts as to whether Santer contemplated the proposition
or if he immediately surrendered to Major’s demands Respondent B from the
Commission stated that Santer had agreed to Major’s demands while they were
on the phone (Respondent B). Other sources claim that Santer called Major back
after a few minutes to say that the committee of European veterinary officials
(who had proposed the ban) would reconvene the next day and that additional
British experts would be allowed to argue their case once again in front of the
committee (The Times, 96-03-26). Many participants on the SVC had, at that
point, already left Brussels for their national capitals, but were then called back
for the new meeting.
5.2.5 Decision Occasion V (March 26):
How will the SVC Respond to the Proposal?
Ireland becomes the latest EU country to introduce a formal ban on the import of
British beef and beef-related products (The Electronic Telegraph, 96-03-27).
At the second meeting of the SVC, in two days, the British bring in two additional
experts: Sir Kenneth Calman, an independent medical adviser to the British
government; and Professor John Pattison, the chairman of SEAC. They elucidate
the scientific material on BSE more thoroughly (than had been done at the previous
ScVC on Friday) and also presented some tests that had been completed as late as
the day before (Fax-Belfrage, 96-03-26). The atmosphere was even more heated at
this meeting since it was not only the British who had brought additional experts to
plea on their behalf, but also several of the other member states had brought in
additional experts and people from their agencies, especially Germany. The British
once more gave a presentation concerning the inconclusive findings on BSE, which
gave the delegates from the other countries another chance to ask questions; however,
the discussion soon got out of hand and turned into a heated scientific debate among
the experts. The more general delegates (as opposed to the delegates who were
more specialized) had considerable difficulties in following the arguments being
advocated by the different experts. One of the Swedish delegates said after the
meeting, “They just made matters worse. When we heard them we were convinced
that we had taken the right decision and just confirmed what we had said the day
before” (Svenska Dagbladet, 97-02-16).
The question of whether or not to ban gelatin was brought up at the last minute
by the UK’s Chief Medical Officer. The British tried to persuade the Commission
officials that gelatin should be excluded from the proposal. There were a lot of
questions regarding the safety of gelatin, “…it was brought up ad absurdum”. But
there was a lot of uncertainty in the matter as well. The delegates were informed
as to how many different areas within the field of industry would be effected by a
gelatin embargo. For example, gelatin is used for such things as pharmaceuticals,
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
cosmetics, camera films and yogurt (Respondent L). Thus, the question of a possible
ban on gelatin, tallow and semen was left to the Commission to decide (Fax
from Belfrage, 96-03-26).
A vote was taken by the SVC and once again there were fourteen members for
such an embargo and one against it. There were still great doubts regarding the
safety of British beef and beef-related products. However, the status of a possible
ban on gelatin was not discussed at DG VI. No exceptions were granted since
they did not want to have a discussion about exclusions. Milk and dairy products
were excluded since their safety had never been questioned during earlier
discussions (Respondent B). It should be pointed out that the decision was a ban
on exports and not a ban on consumption at the European level. For example, the
government tightened legislation in the United Kingdom so that only beef from
animals younger than 30 months was allowed on the market. However, a ban on
consumption of British beef was never introduced.
National officials described the second SVC meeting as a pointless exercise
undertaken at Major’s insistence. One French official said, “Why doesn’t this fellow
[J. Major] deal with the problem he’s got instead of trying to unload the blame on
Europe”. The ban was to be formally announced after a vote among the
commissioners. The outcome was inevitable since possibly only Sir Leon Brittan
and Neil Kinnock were likely to oppose an embargo (The Times, 96-03-27).
An embargo on British beef and beef-related products was formally introduced
after the College of Commissioners had decided to proceed with the proposal that
the SVC had voted on twice. This was done with a written procedure in the college.
It was a safeguard measure that had been agreed upon. (Article 3 of the comitology
decision stipulates that the Commission can take such a measure to protect the
interests of the Community as a whole, or of individual member states). The Council
and the member states have to be informed of the decision before it is acted on. A
member state may refer the decision taken by the Commission to the Agricultural
Council which will then reevaluate the decision and have the chance to take a
different decision (that is, confirm, amend or revoke the decision) with a qualified
majority vote. That kind of decision has been used before, for example, in 1991
there was a safeguard measure taken by a veterinary committee under the III b
procedure in regards to a Cholera epidemic in Peru which lead to a ban on imports
of foodstuffs from Peru (Docksey and Williams, 1994:129).
The Commission emphasized that the measures were of a provisional nature.
The decision was regarded as a first step in stabilizing the situation, reassuring
the consumers and safeguarding the EU’s beef industry both internally and
externally. Fischler said that the situation was serious and in no way stable, “…it
is futile to talk about scientific fact or evidence. There is a crisis of confidence in
beef from the United Kingdom of the consumers”. He stressed that the proposal
had been made with serious reflection and consultation. The situation had not left
the Commission or the member states any other option (Europa, 1996-03-27:IP/
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
96/265). The two British Commissioners, Brittan and Kinnock, ensured the British
people that the EU ban, that was originally intended to last for two years, would
be reviewed after six weeks (The Electronic Telegraph, 96-03-28).
The Commission decision 96/239 stated that the United Kingdom was not
permitted to export to other countries: living cattle (including semen and embryos),
beef from animals slaughtered in the United Kingdom, products derived from
animal slaughtered in the country that could enter the human/animal food chain
(including products used for medicinal, cosmetically and pharmaceutical
purposes), or bone-meal.
In addition, the EU decision stated that the United Kingdom would also be
responsible for sending a report to the Commission regarding the implementation
of the measures taken (OJ, 1996:L78/48).The decision to halt beef exports from
the UK was estimated to be worth about £600 million a year (London Times, 9604-15). The decision can be regarded as a sort of symbolic action since no one
was likely to want to consume British beef anyway, and all but two member states
had already closed their borders to British beef. But, it did help to facilitate the
Commission regaining the initiative in the crisis.
Conflict between the British governmental officials and the EU administration
continued. Major said, “What has happened is that the collective hysteria, partly
media, partly opposition, partly European, particularly the ban by the standing
veterinary committee of vets has fractured public confidence in beef ”. Fischler
defended the action at the EU Parliament, “We have reached the limits of what
can be explained scientifically, but have also pushed EU consumers’ credulity to
the limit. We now need proof that the two diseases are not linked” (The Electronic
Telegraph, 96-03-28).
An event that supposedly took time from the services of the Commission was
the preparation for the Turin IGC (Intergovernmental Conference) on March 29.
It was a very important European Council meeting with all the heads of states
gathering to discuss among other things, the guidelines for the upcoming
‘Amsterdam Treaty’ (which would replace the MAT which had served the purpose
as a temporary solution to the challenges of making the EU function. German
Chancellor Kohl stated at the beginning of the EU Council meeting, “This is an
important day for Europe” (NY Times, 96-03-30).
At the launch of the summit, many government leaders were concerned that
the BSE crisis would have spill-over effects and monopolize the agenda. One of
the principal proposals to be discussed at the EU Council meeting was the increased
usage of QMV on legislative issues. This was judged to be necessary in view of
EU enlargement and as a solution to the risk of paralysis of the EU institutions.
The only government to object to such a development was the UK government.
UK officials had declared that they saw “…no case for extending qualified majority
voting [as] it would not mean more effective decision-making in comparison with
unanimity” (Devuyst, 1998:626).
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
Most of the leaders had presumably come to the meeting to discuss further
integration and cooperation in Europe, but Major came to the meeting with the
intention to seek a lift of the beef ban. Santer explained the reasoning behind the
decision taken by the Commission. The embargo was not to be lifted, even partially,
and it would not be considered without further measures introduced by the United
Kingdom, which included the eradication of BSE (European Parliament,
1997a:432). The European leaders promised Major substantial financial help as
a conciliatory action (NY Times, 96-03-30).
The Agricultural Council met in Luxembourg April 1-3, for an emergency
meeting, to discuss the safeguard action taken by the Commission. The Agricultural
Commissioner, Fischler, explained to the assembled ministers the reasoning behind
the Commission’s decision (European Parliament, 1997a:432). The Agricultural
Council gave its support for the precautionary measures taken by the Commission
after a 40-hour meeting. The Agricultural Council stated that its overall aim was
the protection of public health based on the best scientific evidence available. The
Agricultural Council recognized that decisive action was warranted, and agreed
on a set of additional health and market support measures with the aim of restoring
consumer confidence, market stability and the single market (European Court of
Justice, 1996:3914). Hogg demanded, in negotiations, that the EU should pay at
least 80% of the cost of destroying cattle over 30 months, which would amount to
more than £500 million a year (The Times, 96-04-02). The Agricultural Council
decided to pay 70% of the costs of compensating the British farmers but the United
Kingdom had to single-handedly pay for slaughtering and incinerating the cattle
(Scribona Info., 1996:8). Hogg demonstrated the United Kingdoms immense
displeasure with the decision and refused to ratify the minutes of the meeting.
Hogg stated afterwards, “The ban is not justified. It is not based on sound scientific
analysis. It is disproportionate, it should be removed” (The Electronic Telegraph,
96-04-04; Westlake, 1997:13).
In the conclusions of the meeting Commission was invited to submit the matter
regarding the safety of gelatin, tallow and bull semen to the ScVC as a matter of
urgency (European Parliament, 1997a:432). It was also concluded that the United
Kingdom would have to present an eradication plan by April 30, 1996 (The Times,
96-04-04).
Fischler made the statement, “The BSE problem has been simmering for over
10 years and a final and comprehensive solution as we have found today is long
overdue”. Fischler also expressed his hopes that the third-party countries would
lift their restrictions imposed on all beef from the EU member states (not just that
from the United Kingdom) since the Commission had taken decisive action (Europa,
1996-04-03a: DN:IP/96/289).
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5.2.6 Decision Occasion VI (May 8): What Should be
Decided Regarding Gelatin, Tallow and Bull Semen?
It was clear that the United Kingdom was very concerned that the issue of at least
gelatin had not been resolved. But the formal procedures had been put into place
to make sure that the experts could judge from the material whether or not it was
safe (Respondent B). The Agricultural Council meeting (April 1-3) had been unable
to come to a conclusion about gelatin, tallow and bull semen, and had therefore
left the matter for the Commission to decide. After lengthy debates in several
scientific committees, it was decided how to proceed and when. Fischler spoke
before the EP, and he tried to convince them that gelatin and tallow were not meat
and, furthermore, that the Commission’s proposal on lifting the ban on gelatin
was in line with the recommendations from the ScVC and the WHO (European
Parliament, 1996k: 14). The Commission and the DG VI had realized that a mistake
had been made regarding gelatin when drafting what had earlier become 96/239/
EEG. Judging from the research done on the matter, there was no uncertainty
regarding the safety of gelatin. What had been overlooked was the chain of nonconsumable products; for example, the gelatin used in cameras was apparently
safe to use. There had been no time to reflect on that when the crisis hit. That was
the reason for putting the proposal, that latter was legislated in 96/362/EEG, to
the ScVC and the SVC (Respondent I).
The process of deciding further action was preceded by an extensive committee
evaluation. The contents of some of the most important meetings are presented
below. DG VI convened the ScVC, on April 9, to discuss lifting the ban on gelatin.
On the basis of the information they had, they concluded that gelatin from the
United Kingdom could be used in food, pharmaceuticals, and cosmetics. They
had only an interim report from the gelatin manufacturers of Europe; the full
report had not been released yet (European Parliament, 1997a:232). On April 10,
the SVC decided that there would be no early easing of the worldwide ban on
British beef and beef-related products. The delegates discussed, as well, whether
or not to lift the ban on gelatin exports (Ratzan, 1998:101).
On April 11 the Scientific Committee for Cosmetics (ScC) which is under the
EU Industry DG (DG III), was consulted on the issue of gelatin (European
Parliament, 1997a:442). The joint committee for the European affiliates’ perfume
and cosmetic industries (COLIPA) had several years ago recommended that their
members should not use raw materials from bovines originating from the United
Kingdom. The committee explained that their members had followed this advice
(OJ, 1996:No L 139). The ScC stated it was negative regarding the use of gelatin
in cosmetics as it was potentially dangerous “…all bovine tissues and body fluids
from geographical areas with endemic BSE should be treated as materials that
potentially could transmit the causing agent” (European Parliament, 1996f:42).
The Scientific Committee for Food (ScF) met on April 15 to study the report
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
on gelatin without any involvement from DG VI. The experts on this committee
stated that they were against lifting the ban on gelatin and felt that gelatin from
areas where BSE was endemic should not be used. According to officials in DG
VI the ScF committee had not been involved with the issue of BSE since 1993
and, therefore, did not have that all the currently available information in order to
make an accurate risk assessment (European Parliament, 1997a:232). The ScF
took a precautios stance since the European gelatin manufacturers had not given
the permission to publicize the entire report. The committee stated, “…had very
limited material in hand to allow the evaluation of the production processes…”
(European Parliament, 1996f:42). No experts on the subject of BSE were present
at the ScF meeting (European Parliament, 1996f:42).
On April 17, the European gelatin manufacturers asked to speak to the SVC.
Since the EU committees do not typically meet with private organizations, the
DG VI denied the request. DG VI later denied that they ever refused to meet the
European gelatin manufacturers. On the contrary, DG VI claimed that they had
asked the European gelatin manufacturers for any information they had
(European Parliament, 1997b:185).
On April 18, the ScVC issued an opinion that concluded that bovine semen did
not present a risk for the transmission of BSE and that embryos were considered
to be safe under certain conditions (European Court of Justice, 1996). On April
26, the ScVC gave a unanimously favorable opinion regarding the lifting of the
embargo on gelatin, tallow and bull semen. There was a strong consensus on this
matter. The statement was based on several documents: one was a WHO statement
on the subject from April 2-3, 1996, and another was a preliminary report from
April 1994 from the European gelatin manufacturers. On the basis of this scientific
opinion, a proposal was drafted by DG VI, which aimed for a partial lifting of the
embargo on gelatin (European Parliament, 1997a: 442; European Parliament,
1997b:187). Fischler was authorized by the College of Commissioners on May
8 to propose a partial lifting of the embargo on these products (European Parliament,
1997a:432).
That same day, when it was decided that a proposal would be drafted by DG VI
regarding gelatin, Santer replied in a letter to Major. In the letter he repeated that
the ban in place was of a temporary character, and its purpose was to clarify the
situation at hand concerning public health and to restore consumers’ confidence.
He also informed Major that the college had had a discussion and had encouraged
Fischler to give a proposal to the ScVC on the lifting of the ban on gelatin, tallow
and semen. “The Commission and I will continue to actively work to reach a
solution to the difficult problems that stand before us” (European Parliament,
1997d:49 – author’s own translation). The letter was a reaction to Major who stated
the following in a letter to Santer on May 3, which contained implicit threats that
if the Commission did not show an effort to ease the bans, there would be grave
difficulties in the cooperation. “We have to show that Europe can cooperate in a
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
European crisis situation which has the capability to take decisions under that
kind of circumstances. …I think you know what effects this crisis has upon the
perception of Europe in the United Kingdom, even with those who usually are
ready to promote the EU” (European Parliament, 1997d:48 - author’s translation).
The Commission submited a proposal to the SVC for May 15. The proposal
called for a modification of the gelatin export ban or, in the longer term under the
right conditions, for a complete terminatation of the ban (European Parliament,
1997a:399). Once the appropriate measures had been implemented for the safe
manufacturing of these products, the Commission would consider the products to
be safe and the export ban could be dropped. These measures were also supported
by the recommendations given by the WHO and were approved by the ScVC.
Fischler said this about the Council resolution: “…the renewed impetus on the
need to rely on sound scientific advice for all future decisions, form part of a
process which should allow the export ban to be progressively lifted, on a step by
step basis.” (Europa, 1996-05-05:IP/96/399).
The SVC discussed the Commission’s proposal to lift the embargo against
gelatin on May 15 (European Parliament, 1997a:432). After seven hours of
discussion, the meeting was adjourned since an agreement could not be reached.
The SVC chairman announced that the proposal, whether or not to recommend
the three products be eligible for export, would be taken at the committee’s next
meeting on May 20 by a qualified majority vote (Westlake, 1997:14).
The SVC met again on May 20 to discuss a partial lift of the ban on the three
products. The discussion was heated regarding the advantages and disadvantages
of the gelatin proposal. It was clear that the Commission wanted to lift the ban,
and they argued hard for it. Germany was the hard-liner in the discussion and it
persuaded other countries to follow a more restrictive attitude (Respondent L). A
qualified majority was not reached so the proposal had to be referred to the
Agricultural Council according to the rules. Spain, Portugal, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Austria and Germany voted against the proposal
(Westlake, 1997:15). A Swedish representative said “…we should work on the
basis of animal health, and not play politics” (Fax from Åhnberg, 96-05-22).
Commissioner Fischler, made a statement at the Agricultural Council meeting
which was held on May 20-21, informing the others as to the progress on the
veterinary aspects of the BSE situation. The SVC had not been able to reach the
necessary majority on the Commission’s proposal to lift the embargo on gelatin,
tallow and semen from the United Kingdom. Thereby according to directive 89/
662/EEC, the Commission was obliged to submit the proposal to the Agricultural
Council. It was stipulated that the Council had to respond within fifteen days,
either by adopting the proposal with a qualified majority or by rejecting the proposal
with a simple majority (Europa, 1996-05-21: PRES/96/138). If neither majority
can be obtained in the Agricultural Council, then the proposal goes back to the
College of Commissioners, which can take the final decision (European Parliament,
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
1997 - 02 - 07a: 395). The representative from the United Kingdom informed
the Agricultural Council of their plan for eradicating BSE. Repeated requests
were conveyed by the British for a more precise timeline regarding the termination
of the ban on British beef and veal exports. The Agricultural Council did not take
any action at this meeting but decided, instead, to meet for a special session in
Luxembourg June 3-4 to scrutinize the proposal again (Europa, 1996- 05-21, DN:
PRES96/138).
5.2.7 Decision Occasion VII (May 21): The United
Kingdom Initiates a Blocking of the EU Institutions
As the Council did not come to any conclusion when to lift the embargo and
especially that the Council did not accept the proposal from the Commission that
was first placed on the table of the SVC, the threats of activating a non-cooperation
policy on behalf of the United Kingdom was executed.
Major announces in the House of Commons that as a result of the EU’s refusal
to agree on a partial lifting of the ban, the government would introduce a policy of
non-cooperation in the European institutions. Major said,
The Commission have played a notably helpful role in following carefully
the scientific advice. A balanced proposal based on the best scientific advice
has been ignored by a number of Member States, in some cases despite
prior assurances of support. The top priority of our European policy must
be to get this unjustified ban on beef derivatives lifted as soon as possible…
…I have to tell the House that without progress towards lifting the ban we
cannot be expected to continue to cooperate normally on other Community
business. Progress will not be possible in the IGC or elsewhere until we
have agreement on lifting the ban on beef derivatives and a clear framework
in place leading to lifting of the wider ban. I expect an agreement on how
to deal with these problems to be behind us by the time the European Council
meets in Florence on 21/22 June. If they are not, the Florence meeting is
bound to be dominated by this issue (UK House of Commons, 1996-05-21).
By taking this course of action Major satisfied the domestic arena, especially his
own conservatives that have been euro-sceptics for a long time and the agricultural
lobby. One Conservative MP said, “Playing the game like English gentlemen has
failed. It is time we took the gloves off ” (The Electronic Telegraph, 96-05-22).
At that time, no one is certain what the ‘obstruction policy’, actually meant,
should it be used when decisions have to be reached by unanimity etc. Whitehall
departments and delegations from the United Kingdom in the EU flood the cabinet’s
office with questions (Seldon, 1997:650). It effected mainly pillar II and III but all
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EU business was affected by the unwillingness to cooperate. Decisions that were
subject to simple or QMV where not included. In the unanimity sectors the goal of
delay and disruption was achieved. One of the first actions to be blocked was trade
negotiations with Mexico which would hurt Spain (Ratzan, 1998:103). But, there
were several exemptions to the British policy. The threat of non-cooperation did not
pose the severe threat that was thought from the beginning. The other member states
soon realized that the policy in reality did not concern all areas. Many areas were
delayed that would hurt the United Kingdom as much or more than other EU
countries, for example there could not be draft letters concerning the Iranian fatwa
against British citizen Salman Rushdie (Westlake, 1997:17).
During the period of May 21 to June 22, the United Kingdom had blocked a
total of 117 measures in the Council. One was an anti-fraud action that the United
Kingdom had been demanding for years (Seldon, 1997:651). There were no explicit
vetoes from the British, approval was withheld, reserves were placed, documents
were not signed and statements were not made which did not paralyze the business
of the Council as much as a veto would have (Westlake, 1997: 17). Major’s
threat revived memories from the ‘empty chair politics’ that France exercised in
1965 regarding subsidies to the farming sector. France boycotted the Council
meeting for six months until the others caved in on the French demands. When
France introduced its non-cooperation policy in 1965 by de Gaulle it had more far
reaching implications because it was more difficult to decide anything without
France being a part of it, but UK has been regarded as an outside player that is not
interested in pursuing deeper cooperation. For example, the United Kingdom was
for a long time against signing any social chapter (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999:49).
The next day the Commission issues a statement where it condemns the route
taken by the United Kingdom, cooperation is what is needed. “The BSE problem
affects all member states as is evidence by the serious decline of beef market
prices throughout the Union. It is, therefore, a problem for the whole of the
European Union” (The Electronic Telegraph, 96-05-22).
Within the Commission it was believed that the pressures from the domestic
scene in the United Kingdom on the government had forced this action. Major did
not have much of a choice if he was going to survive politically and satisfy voters on
the domestic arena but of course there was not any thoughts that this was beneficial
for the European idea (Respondent A). The upcoming elections in the United
Kingdom had already been termed ‘the beef elections’ (Ratzan, 1998:102). In DG
III, the decision to block the functioning of the EU institutions was not really regarded
as a problem. The indisputable looser was the United Kingdom (Respondent C).
But the course of action instigated political pressure on the Commission. President
Santer stated, “I have had many problems with the British government. I have been
subjected to many threats, to a great deal of pressure, but I have never given way
(European Parliament, 1997a:437). Commissioner Bonino articulated that,
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
I think all of us read the papers during and after that period… I meant that
obviously everyone knows what the debate was about in March, April, May,
June. What I mean is that at that point the pressure, whether political or
other, was very overt, The issues were clear, non-cooperation, noncollaboration, the date of the summit… (European Parliament, 1997a:425).
At the Commission meeting, the college followed the recommendation of Fischler
and persisted in lifting the ban on derived products. The proposal was brought to
the special meeting of the Agricultural Council June 3-4 (Westlake, 1997:15).
But there were intense discussions in the college about the gelatin proposal. Some
Commissioners wanted to undertake a hard-line attitude as the British had declared
that they were not going to cooperate on Union business. But President Santer
meant that the credibility of the Commission was on the line. That would bring
the decision-making process down to a state of fighting in a sandbox like children.
As the Commission had the policy of following scientific advice it would not be
credible to disregard it. Santer,
…always said… that the Commission should base its actions strictly on the
most recent scientific opinion available. I have never deviated from this
line and I never will. It is not credible to take advantage of science when it
suits you and ignore it when it does not (European Parliament, 1997a:433).
The Commission proceeded to adopt a proposal with the intention of lifting the
ban on gelatin, tallow and bull semen with the condition that the new improved
processing techniques are implemented. The proposal would be put to the
Agricultural Council June 3-4. The proposal was in line with the recommendations
put forward by the WHO and also by the ScVC. Fischler emphasized that a scientific
approach rather than a political one was the one to be favored. Fischler said,
…the protection of human health must continue to be a top priority of the
EU and in this context all decision relating to BSE should be firmly based
on the most up to date and accurate scientific knowledge. It is regrettable
therefore that the SVC did not succeed in taking a decision on gelatin,
tallow and semen in spite of the existence of scientific proof regarding
measures which ensured their safety… (Europa, 96-05-22:DN:IP/96/433).
5.2.8 Decision Occasion VIII (June 3-4): The Agricultural
Council Leaves the Issue of Deciding on Gelatin to
the Commission
The Agricultural Council did not achieve the qualified majority needed to dismiss
the proposal regarding the lifting of the three products. Only Spain had changed its
position. Portugal, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Austria and Germany
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
still withheld their position and voted against the proposal. When a simple majority
was not reached, it was up to the Commission to continue on the matter. By lifting
part of the ban, the Commission became like a government, which is not elected, to
implement its own decision. The Commission went against six Member States,
among them one that is often considered to be the most influential one, Germany
(Westlake, 1997:15). The Council noted that there was not a qualified majority in
favor of the Commission proposal but there was no single majority to dismiss the
proposal. It was now up to the Commission, acting under its own powers, to approve
the proposal that had been before the Council. The United Kingdom made a statement,
“The United Kingdom government is voting in favor of this measure because its
represents a step in the right direction for the lifting of the export ban on British
beef… The United Kingdom is voting in favor without prejudice to its overall position
on the remaining parts of the ban which it regards as disproportionate and unlawful”
(Europa, 1996-06-03:DN: PRES/96/153).
The Commission still thought that the proposal was scientifically solid and
should be accepted. Santer made a plea to the United Kingdom to stop the policy
of obstruction, which did not have a place with a common basis of law, and it
stands in direct conflict with member states obligations according to the Treaty.
The Commission had the right to lift the ban on the three products since a majority
of the member states do not oppose it, but the formal decision could not be taken
until June 10 (Europa, 96-6-11:DN:IP/96/484). In spite of the Commission decision
to cancel the embargo on three products the British government made it clear that
it would continue with the same non-cooperation policy until there was a scheme
on how the whole embargo would be terminated. Despite the threatening tone,
Santer promised to keep cooperating with the United Kingdom to find a solution
to the problem as soon as possible (Svenska Dagbladet, 96-06-06).
The decision was codified on June 11, 96/362/EG. Commission adopts the
decision to ease the embargo on three products, gelatin, tallow and semen, with
the written procedure. But only bull semen would be on the market in the near
future since gelatin and tallow had to be produced under stringent controls before
exports would be allowed. The Commission went ahead with the decision since
the Council did not reach an agreement (European Parliament, 1997b:187; London
Times, 96-06-12).
5.2.9 Decision Occasion IX (June 26):
Final Report on Gelatin is Delivered
There had been several attempts by officials at DG VI to obtain the final report on
the safety of gelatin, as they only had a preliminary report. For example, on June
13, Brian Marchant (VI) calls the European Gelatin Manufacturers secretariat to
ask if there is any final report but there was no reaction to the inquiry. Marchant
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does this on his own initiative. He wanted to be sure that he had the most recent
information and wanted to avoid future problems and criticism. He did not expect
to find out that there existed a second report that invalidated the first one (European Parliament, 1997b:192).
Criticism was gaining in voice in some of the involved committees in the
Commission. The ScF that met on June 13 states on the subject of gelatin that
there was, “…divergence of views among the experts…” and that many of the
arguments were “…based upon assumptions”. It could therefore not be possible
to assess the risk for human health from the present scientific base (Europa, 9606-13: DN:IP/96/514).
C. Berge a Swedish national who is temporally at DG VI, sends a fax to the
European Gelatin Manufacturers on June 14 to ask if there is any final report. The
European Gelatin Manufacturers sends the final report by fax without any
comment. During all the contacts between April 15-June 27 did the European
Gelatin Manufacturers give any hint that there was reason to question the results
of the studies (European Parliament, 1997b:187).
When DG VI finally does receive the report from the Invernesk research
laboratory it completely invalidates the first preliminary report that was used for
discussion in the ScVC, the DG and the SVC. The DG had then to totally reevaluate its decision to lift the embargo on gelatin. It was necessary to consider
the issue again and submit it to the BSE sub-group of the ScVC on June 26. While
waiting for the results, there was no question about revoking the decision to
authorize exports of gelatin from the United Kingdom. The committee concluded
that with the new information, a new study should be carried out, which would
take some time (European Parliament, 1997a:432). The laboratory that performed
these tests had among many mistakes, used scrapie and not BSE infected brains
which totally invalidated the scientific reports (Respondent B). Not a single gram
of gelatin was exported (European Parliament, 1996f:7). The report had been
completed by the Invernesk laboratory around April 9 or 10 and thus available for
the Gelatin Manufacturers of Europe. This report was not made available to the
Commission until more than two months later.
When the report was ‘found’, it caused an internal discussion about the
credibility of DG VI, within the Commission. DG VI had been the driving force
behind the relaxation of the gelatin ban. Santers cabinet called for an internal
investigation how this could have happened, had the VI knowingly given the British
an advantage. It was a critical period for the people at VI who had been dealing
with the BSE dossier, but it could be shown that there was no one to blame, since
there was no knowledge of any second report (Respondent B). This could be
shown due to all the faxes and correspondence which could be displayed, there
had been a lot of contacts when VI asked for and even demanded that they wanted
the final laboratory report (European Parliament, 1997b:189). That the report
was eventually found was lucky in the sense that there was time to revoke the
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decision 96/362, but unlucky in that the decision was prepared and advocated at
all by DG VI. This incident can show that during crisis conditions and especially
one that is extended in time, there can be difficulties in managing every issue.
5.3 The Aftermath: Crisis De-escalation
(July 1996 – August 1999)
On the 12-13 of July 1996, the European Court of Justice gave its verdict in the
cases of the National Farmers Union (United Kingdom) and the United Kingdom
versus the Commission regarding the decision to ban British beef. The ECJ rules
in both cases that the implementation of the ban was justified (European Parliament,
1997a:231). The judge stated:
Since the most likely explanation of this fatal disease is exposure to BSE
there can be no hesitation. The ban has a legitimate aim…the protection of
health…and, as a containment measure prior to eradication of [BSE], it
was essential to the achievement of that aim… (Sunday Times, 96-06-13).
In July, the French newspaper, Liberation, claims that it has in its possession a
memo by a French Official written in 1990. It describes how an unnamed
Commission official had told a committee, comprising of veterinary officers from
the member states, “We have to have a cold attitude so as not to provoke unfavorable
reactions on the market. We will not speak about BSE. This matter will not appear
on any agenda… We will officially ask the UK not to publish the results of their
research”. The memo concludes: “On the general plan, this BSE affair must be
minimized using misinformation. It is better to say that the press has a tendency
to exaggerate”. The Commission denies the plans were ever acted on, says that it
no longer has the memo or the official minutes of the meeting held in Brussels six
years ago (Sunday Times, 96-06-14; Daily Telegraph, 96-07-09).
June 21-22 at the IGC summit in Florence, the United Kingdom reactivates its
EU- cooperation as the Commission’s proposal for the lifting of the ban, but with
no fixed dates, was approved by the Council (Westlake, 1997:22). The Council
decides that funding of 850 million ECU will be devoted to supporting European
livestock farmers that have been affected by the crisis (Europa, 96-6-22:DN:DOC/
96/3). The United Kingdom promised to slaughter 100.000 cows born after 1989,
every cow will be equipped with a ‘passport’, cows older than 30 month shall be
taken out of the food chain when they do not give milk improved measures to
remove risk material from slaughtered cows and the cadavers shall be burn. The
EU:s ban shall then be lifted step-by-step (Dagens Nyheter, 96-06-24).
On the 18th of July the EP uses its new powers according to the MAT under
Article 138c to investigate alleged contraventions or mal-administration. A temporary
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committee of inquiry is set up to investigate the management of the issue by the
Commission. Hearings are conducted with former and present Commissioners,
officials from both member states and the Commission and experts. On February
20th 1997 the EP votes on censure for the Commission. The motion is rejected with
336 against, 118 for and 15 abstentions. (Westlake, 1997:22).
On the 1st of August 1999 the ban on British beef is partially lifted. Exports
are only allowed under severe restrictions, exported cattle can not be older than
two and a half years and meat with bones is still not allowed to export. Up until
this date a total of 42 deaths by suspected nv- CJD has been recorded. Mainly in
Britain, but single cases have been recorded in France and Italy. There have also
been additional deaths in relation to the BSE crisis, 23 British farmers have
committed suicide when facing economic ruin. The ban has cost the British farmers
around 19 billion SEK. The most EU negative opinion of all member states is the
United Kingdom (Svenska Dagbladet, 99-07-15).
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6. Analysis
6.1 Problem Framing and Decision Units
The previous and subsequent problem framing of a situation is important for the
following management of a situation, in that it implies where in an organizational
complex decisions should be taken, how the decision will be made, what kind of
solutions will be considered and who is responsible for what. When looking at the
definition of the problem indicators based on the central actors perceptions have
guided my search. This is one major aspect of the cognitive-institutional analytical
perspective. Even if it could be argued that crises are not individual events
spontaneously occurring but rather a series of interconnected problems that face
the actors, the initial problem-framing will be decisive in determining how the
crisis will be managed. It can be difficult for decision-makers to change their
initial or longstanding perception and understanding of a problem. Thus, this makes
it difficult for them to focus management on an alternative problem scenario.
What will be further examined is the interaction between, and within, the various
active decision-making units during the crisis.
A brief account will be given here on how some of the actors perceived the
BSE crisis. The former Agricultural Commissioner MacSharry (1989-1992) stated,
…BSE received full attention at all times. When the disease first came to
notice, and indeed for several years afterwards, it was treated largely as an
animal health problem and the knowledge of scrapie was a big influence on
our thinking. This followed the conclusions of the scientists at the beginning
of 1990 that scrapie proved a valid model for assessing the human health
risks with BSE (European Parliament, 1997a:380).
At DG VI the general conclusion for several years had been that BSE did not pose
a threat to humans.
Because of the unknown nature of the disease in the beginning,
the Commission based the problem on the available information which
at the time was that this disease was like scrapie in sheep and had existed
for 250 years. And thus, BSE was primarily viewed as an animal health
issue (Hoelgaard in the European Parliament, 1997a:207).
Also in DG V which also deal with public health issues it was the general view of
BSE. “Until March 1996, BSE was always regarded as an animal disease and
consequently it should have been dealt with in a veterinary way”said Flynn (European
Parliament, 1997a:229). At DG III, the long standing assumption was that BSE
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pertained only to animal health and it was mainly a problem for the United Kingdom
(Respondent C).
Another factor is the benefit of hindsight; what is clearer today was not so
definite a couple of years ago. Mr. Janssen (Adviser of the DG VI; Head of Unit
Veterinary Legislation and Zootechnics) exemplified this, “You find out about a
disease after it has begun. It was the same with AIDS. In the beginning you just
do not know” (European Parliament, 1997a:351). The actors were caught in a
perception bubble; it was believed that BSE was like scrapie in sheep, which had
been around for 250 years and had not been harmful for humans. The conclusion
drawn was simple, if there was no risk of consuming scrapie-infected meat, there
would be no risk involved consuming BSE-infected cattle. This indicates that the
actors were to a great extent influenced by the previous experiences of scrapie
which proved to be venturesome as displayed in this case (Neustadt & May, 1986;
Khong, 1992). That bubble was painfully burst on March 20, 1996, when the BSE
situation changed from being a creeping crisis into an acute crisis. The various
DGs in the Commission all concurred that the situation had changed configurations
from being exclusively an animal / veterinary problem to a problem with serious
implications for public health.
What had originally been perceived, as a tragic animal disease resulting in
many livestock deaths was not considered of having any larger implications
other than that. This is one of the important concepts that institutionalism brings
forward: path dependency. “Once a historical choice is made, it both precludes
and facilitates others. Political change follows a branching model. Once a
particular fork is chosen, it is very difficult to get back on the rejected path”
(Krasner, 1984:225). There may be a certain stickiness in policy areas where a
long-standing assumption has not been challenged internally or externally; thus,
change will only be possible when there is an occurrence, for example a crisis,
that can challenge the assumption. There is also an issue of sunk costs in the
policy, both regarding credibility and finance. A new standpoint could prove
costly if not supported with further evidence.
The Commission’s initial reaction was to declare that the unilateral bans taken
by the member states were illegal and should be revoked immediately. The
responsibility for managing the BSE situation was allocated to the United
Kingdom. The problem was British, since it was where the infected beef originated.
The majority of the BSE infected cattle population and victims in the U.K., were
not on the European continent. There was no general need for urgent decisionmaking at the European level or in any other specific member state, since it was
not regarded as a European problem. An indication of this was the fact that
Commission President Santer was not informed immediately of the BSE findings
by his own employees. Rather he found out when attending a press conference in
Paris on March 21, one day after the U.K. announcement, when a journalist
addressed the issue. It could be that the ambiguous concept of subsidarity played
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a role; according to that principle, action should not be taken at the EU level
unless there are clear advantages of managing it at a higher level than at the national
level. This puts the decision-makers at the European level in the dilemma of when
and if they should intervene. In the words of Commissioner Bonino, “The concept
[of subsidarity] is certainly rather vague and sometimes applied in a quite different
way from its true sense and, at times, not very coherently” (European Parliament,
1997a: 424). Deliberations of what should be done could have had an impact on
the stance taken. How to avoid over-reacting just in case it turned out to be no real
danger. Decision-makers often strive to reassure and calm down the population in
an attempt to avoid a state of uncontrolled panic. A state of panic was not desired
was because dramatic decisions could be made that would affect the beef markets
in all of the member states for an extended period of time, especially in such a
complex and uncertain issue as the BSE incident. On the other hand, by repeatedly
issuing optimistic messages in the beginning of a crisis, a credibility trap could
develop later on if the beef proved to be dangerous and the Commission had from
the start claimed that it was not. Clearly the uncertainties at the beginning of the
crisis were considerable (Sundelius et al., 1997:203).
It has been suggested by March and Simon that when an individual or an
organization is triggered to action by a stimuli, it can be done so in a routinized or
problem-solving fashion. If the situation is defined to be similar to a previously
managed situation, a routine response behavior will take place. On the other hand,
if the situation is perceived as unfamiliar and unlike previous encounters before,
a problem-solving behavior will be initiated by searching for other types of
appropriate responses for the situation at hand (March & Simon, 1959:140). Even
though as discussed, the perception of the problem has perhaps been altered, the
situation has to be managed according to the routines and procedures employed
when new scientific facts are published.
In the BSE crisis, the procedure was to call in the relevant experts in order to
determine if further action was warranted. This aspect will be further elaborated
in the next chapter with particular focus on the experts’ influence on the decisionmaking process. As the situation escalated both member states and non-member
states imposed unilateral bans in a snowball fashion, the situation changed.
Uneasiness had become widespread and people were uncertain about buying any
sort of beef because of the potential health risks. These factors naturally influenced
the stability of the whole beef market and there were demands from the member
states to protect public health. Hence the Commission’s standpoint was dramatically
altered. On March 22 the Commission declared that the unilateral national bans
were in compliance with existing EU legislation used to protect the publics health
and safety. The feeling was that there was a need to retake the initiative to be able
to achieve an united European solution to what had developed into a European
problem. The member states were seen as intruding on the Commission’s
competence.
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What was wrong in this procedure was that several member states
unilaterally took the decision, pre-judged the outcome and preempted the
prerogative of the Commission to take a decision on a community basis or
to tell the member states not to do such a measure… (Respondent B).
When an issue is to be managed by the Commission, the horizontal service of the
Secretariat-General is in charge of designating which DG or DG’s will shoulder
what responsibilities and who will take the leadership role. The SG has this role
as it regards itself as a neutral service, like a state chancellery, with no interests of
its own. It has a watchdog role and sees to it that there is firm compliance with the
decisions taken on inter-institutional matters (Europa, 2000 Mission Statement).
The lead DG has the advantage that it is in the driving seat and can control the
directions but it is of course obligated to consult the other DG’s that have a stake
in the matter. Unlikely risks, which could potentially have great implications, are
often unplanned for, because it is thought that such an unlikely situation will
happen in the distant future, not tomorrow, or if at all (Libertore, 1993: 45).
This was the situation that faced the decision-makers in the Commission. There
were no plans available as to what to do, no standard operating procedures for a
contingency like BSE since such was unforeseeable. It could therefore be an
intricate assignment for the SG to assign the leadership regarding the BSE crisis
to any particular DG.
There was no obvious struggle for the leadership role in the BSE question.
Since DG VI had been the leading DG and responsible for the dossier throughout
the entire BSE era, or perhaps because no other DG stepped up to the plate, DG
VI kept its leadership position throughout the crisis. Commissioner Emma Bonino
leader of the DG XXIV, demonstrated an interest in taking the lead or at least a
co-leading position in the issue, since she perceived the issue to be more closely
connected to public health and not exclusively or totally an agricultural or veterinary
issue. DG XXIV was developed from the subgroup Consumer Protection Service,
which had formerly been under DG XI. As of 1995 it had been transformed into a
full-blown DG, but there were few people who worked with consumer protection
in general and with BSE in particular. It is difficult to conclude whether or not the
DG XXIV had the leading or even co-leading position. However, the DG XXIV
was very active in forming an inter-service group with the responsibility of
coordinating information. No other DG made any clear attempt to take charge of
the issue, so clearly the DG VI was sitting alone in the hot seat.
But an internal conflict over the leadership issue can be detected as the SG
claimed that it took over the lead from DG VI on April 5, from one day to another.
Their objective for doing so, was that there was the immense need for coordination
and for a more integrated view when dealing with such a complex and multifaceted
question (Respondent A). This appraisal is judged as a miss-perception at DG VI,
the crisis management was there. Contact with the other DG’s (like I, III, V, XII
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and the SG) increased on behalf of DG VI. But their role was no different than the
others. Contact with DG XI (Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection)
was not extensive at all. It was not until the initiation of the European Parliament’s
inquiry in July 1996 that the SG was given, or took, the lead (Respondent B). One
official made the comment that DG VI “…wanted more than the lead” (Respondent
K). The view in DG III was that the SG had indeed performed the task of
coordination, but since this was a very specialized issue, DG VI had the lead
(Respondent C). One fact that should be taken into account is that the DirectorGeneral of the SG at that time, David Williamson, had previously occupied a
high-ranking post in DG VI. It seems that DG VI did indeed have the lead until
June when the EP initiated its investigation of the management of the BSE crisis.
Since the problem was considered by the Commission to be of an agricultural and
veterinary nature the decisions were made according to Article 43. Decisions were
thus shared between the Council, (meaning the regulatory committees to where
the Council power is delegated) and the Commission; thus the European Parliament
was thereby excluded from the decision-making process.
At DG VI there are routine procedures for foreseeable crises, which concern
animal health, but they were not put into action during the BSE crisis, since it was
perceived as a problem with implications for public health. There was nothing in
place, so improvisation was thought to be needed (Respondent B). They took
charge and routinely called in the ScVC as soon as the Commission was informed
of the new findings reported by the British scientists. On March 22 the experts
met to give their opinions regarding the new information given to DG VI, but the
member states’ delegates in the Standing Veterinary Committee (SVC) was not
invited until March 22 to have a meeting until March 25. This illustrates how
much time it took for the machinery to get started. Even the normal everyday
procedures take time. It is a vast and slow structure, but the BSE crisis situation
needed swift and critical decision-making. The Commission did not react until
March 25 when the embargo decision was agreed upon by the SVC, but then an
unlikely decision was made by Santer to abstain, letting the already agreed decision
to be implemented. Santer gave in to the threats from the British and called in the
SVC again to debate the issue. After an extended scientific debate in the SVC, the
decision was once again to implement a ban on British beef and beef-related
products following the proposal from DG VI. The dominance of the DG VI is
visibly noted since neither DG V or XXIV were allowed to give any input or were
asked to comment on the decision to ban beef from the United Kingdom
(Respondent K and C).
In the process of deciding on gelatin Commissioner Fischler claimed that there
was an interdepartmental procedure before the decision on the gelatin could be
taken with DG I, III, XXIV, XV and the legal services (European Parliament,
1997a:398). There were no signs of that. This will be discussed in more detail in
the next analysis section. But what was actually being managed were the
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consequences of the decisions taken (or not taken) several years ago primarily at
the national level in the United Kingdom but also at the European level (namely
the incubation period). It would have been impossible to rectify the problem
immediately. Whatever was to be done, was too late in the sense that the cows
were dead, the victims had already been infected and likely more victims could
turn up in the future. Only the prevention of further cases could be accomplished
at that point.
It is often believed that in a crisis, inter- and as well as intra-organizational
rivalry is set aside for the benefit of national or organizational interest. But, there
is reason to believe that this view is incorrect or at least incomplete. It can be
difficult to detect, since this sort of rivalry is not often displayed in front of the
media but behind the scenes (Sundelius et al., 1997:153). During the BSE crisis,
rivalry for resources i.e. bureaucratic in-fighting can be detected. DG VI explicitly
asked for increased personnel during the most intense periods of the crisis, when
the demands were significant.
It was an incredible thing to be in the middle of the crisis that was effecting
the whole Commission and the Commission was unable to provide the
manpower and support that would have allowed us to do a better job. It now
came down to a few people that would have to manage the crisis…
(Respondent B).
The period between May and June 1996 was described as ‘intense’ by the Director
General of DG VI, Guy Legras, as a time with hundreds of phone calls, meetings
and questions which made it difficult to secure a stringent management of all
aspects of the BSE crisis.
The personnel that worked with the BSE case worked late every evening,
including weekends, to be able to manage the case. Not much time was
given to thought. When it comes to managing crisis it is only possible to
deal with essential elements of the crisis as they appear if the resources are
not extended considerably (European Parliament, 1997b:192 author’s own
translation).
Certainly the other DG’s might have been apprehensive to lend extra resources to
one of the largest DG’s in the Commission (referred to by some as ’a state within
the state’). Furthermore the other DG’s did not know if they would be reimbursed.
DG VI is exceptional since it has its own legal service which none of the other
DGs have and its own external affairs department. Such DG services are uncommon
and could have provoked a defensive attitude from the other DGs that could have
lent an extra hand. Such internal conflicts suggest that a large bureaucracy should
establish procedures on how to transfer personnel in a rapid manner to where
assistance is needed. This could enhance the quality of crisis management.
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On the other hand the assertion of DG VI being ‘a state within the state’ might
not be an overstatement. At that time DG VI had a couple hundred ‘Grade A’
officials, compared to the DG XXIV which at that time had 41 ‘Grade A’ officials.
More revealing, is the fact that DG VI had a budget of 40 billion ECU and DG
XXIV had only 19 million (European Parliament, 1997a:429). Even if a postcrisis comparison may be a bit misleading, DG VI has the largest portion of the
current budget; about 50% of the resources are allocated to the agriculture. It may
as well be a sign that other DGs did not want to involve themselves in the
management of the BSE crisis considering its complexity and its lack of apparent
gains for the participators.
Another important resource was information. DG VI opened its committee
meetings for participants from other DGs. DG III could for example keep
themselves informed, and put to use their established personal contacts. This was
certainly the case since some of the people in DG III had worked for DG VI in the
past. The flow of information between the two was characterized by openness, but
DG III did not have any influence on the formulation of proposals generated in
DG VI regarding the embargo (Respondent C). So the importance of informal
contacts played a considerable role in the exchange of information, not only
between DG VI and III but also between the other DGs. It seems commonplace to
circulate between positions in the various Commission services. Yet the notion of
total transparency between the DGs was probably not completely achieved. Bonino
commented on this,
Our friends in DG VI keep producing all these documents and we do not
even have the officials to read them. …we do not have the necessary structure
to sort out every document. I am not saying they [DG VI] are doing this
deliberately. I am simply saying that total transparency means having ten
thousand pages and 41 officials (European Parliament, 1997a:429).
It could well be that the other DGs who were interested in monitoring the issue
were simply overloaded by the material from DG VI as DG XXIV was. Whether
this can be regarded as a strategy to avoid involvement or simply the result of
having an unequal distribution of resources among the various departments is
unclear but it highlights the difficulties in cooperating in a crisis.
In conclusion, it was shown that the perceptions of the actors within the
Commission were guided by the well-established assumption that BSE was
exclusively an animal disease with no apparent impact on human health. None of
the actors could deny that on March 20 BSE became a problem for human health.
After a few days of hesitation on behalf of the Commission, when responsibility
for BSE was placed in the United Kingdom, the Commission involved itself and
went into action. Within the Commission, the existing decision-making structures
were utilized. The Agricultural DG kept its leadership role, which it strengthened
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during the BSE era. Since no contingency plan for an unexpected event such as
BSE existed, the normal time-consuming procedures were used. This illustrates
the need for crisis specific systems. No other DG was either asked or invited to
give their input into the drafting of the proposals voted on by the national delegates
in the Standing Veterinary Committee. Bureaucratic-politics was shown as officials
in the agricultural DG under burdensome stress were denied additional help from
other DGs during the crisis.
6.2 Experts in the Decision-Making Process
Problems associated with the relationship between experts and decision-makers
in decision-making processes will be discussed below. In particular, the discussion
will focus on two rather distinct phases of the BSE crisis. The first phase will be
centered on the interaction between the experts and the decision-makers regarding
the issue of what to do about British beef. The second phase concerns the decision
process regarding the issue of gelatin, tallow and bull semen.
The usage of experts in coping with uncertainty by decision-makers during
crisis conditions is not a new phenomenon. Experts occupied the front stage during
the Chernobyl accident, the outbreak of chicken flu in Hong Kong in 1997 and
the recurring Ebola outbreaks, just to mention a few. Experts are utilized for several
reasons: to legitimize decisions taken under grave uncertainty and thereby
reassuring nervous citizens by upholding the posture of being in control supported
by expert advice and to reduce uncertainty. Experts have a legitimating function
when they are used in the decision-making process. It can be displayed to the
public that the decisions taken have had rational and technical reasons behind
them (Benveniste, 1977:55). It is not an uncommon opinion that an expert, in
contrary to a politician, is rational and only concerned with the facts. As the public,
often, cannot even explain the most mundane technological or biological feat, the
trust in expert advice is considered to be high. But the question of acceptable risk
seems to have a different meaning for experts than for citizens. Society seems to
accept the expenditure of smoke-related illnesses or traffic fatalities more easily
than those of food poisoning. So far the misuse of Viagra is responsible for more
deaths than BSE; however, Viagra is regarded as a wonder-drug. The side that can
bring forward the strongest evidence and expertise will have the upper hand in
forming the public perception (Fowlkes and Miller, 1988:36). The decisionmaker can then use the advice (as legitimacy insurance) and relieve the pressure
of responsibility from themselves. But this can also be the notion of that the expert
is some sort of Messiahs who has all the answers; this is especially the case in the
beginning of a crisis when the situation is is overcome by a fog of uncertainty
(Lagadec, 1991:102). How does a policy-maker know what is good science? Often,
the answer is that they do not. Decision-makers often lack the necessary skills to
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know what ‘good’ advice is. Especially when a decision must be made rapidly
which is usually the case in a crisis situation. Decision-makers may choose to
satisfice or muddle through and select a policy that appears ‘good enough’. That
type of behavior can of course expose the decision-making process to failures
(Barker and Peters, 1993:9; Janis and Mann, 1977:33).
When are experts to be incorporated into the decision-making process? Their
role is supposedly more influential the earlier they come into the decision-making
process since they can have an influence on how a problem is perceived by decisionmakers (Libertore, 1993:35). Since the outbreak of the BSE disease, experts had
been used to advise the Commission decision-makers since they were unfamiliar
with the disease. Experts and science have been utilized frequently to calm worried
citizens. For example on February 23, 1996, Commissioner Fischler is asked by a
MEP if there is any reason to be concerned about a possible spread of BSE to
humans. The Commissioner answers in a way by minimizing the insecurity and
emphasizing the role of the experts, “All the results of research and epidemiological
information are available to the Commission and are reviewed regularly by the
scientific veterinary committees… These committees consist of eminent scientists
from all Member States” (European Parliament, 1997b:156).
There were traces of evidence that BSE could spread to humans; in 1990
scientists succeeded in transferring the BSE agent to pigs. Even though that was
achieved by injecting the agent straight into the brain and not by consuming beef,
it should have been a wake-up call since pigs are closely related to humans
(genetically speaking of course). For instance, pig organs have been transplanted
into humans. It could be the case that the ‘cry wolf ’ syndrome was present. It is
often unfavorable for an employee in an organization to blow the whistle and if
information regarding a risk does not materialize, the effects will not be benevolent
for the future career of the individual or the organization. Thereby there is often a
tendency to wait-and-see even if suspicion is high, “…a crisis inspires those
involved to reject responsibility up and down the line more often than it encourages
anyone resolutely to take charge. This is how the development of the situation
escapes the organization’s control. Outside players, such as the media, take over”
(Lagadec, 1991:53). This may be especially prevalent if there is an established
esperit de corps, a camaraderie, within and or among the various expert groups.
One example of this sort of behavior was displayed when a Commission accountant
made serious allegations to the EP about the misuse of money within the
Commission, and was later suspended and ridiculed. Later the allegations proved
to be correct (Peters, 1995:299). Even though an individual or a group can recognize
a risk, it is a strenuous task to make that view a generally sanctioned one. If one or
more influential group(s) can dominate and hijack the opinion of a policy-area,
they can influence how the risk is perceived and understood by others.
The ScVC (which was DG VI major scientific committee on veterinary
matters) had earlier formed a subcommittee on BSE. The subcommittee was to
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a large extent populated with British citizens. Committee members were not
appointed based on their nationality but on their scientific qualifications. The
presence of many British experts in the subcommittee was because the knowledge
of the disease and the availability of infected tissue to perform experiments was
almost exclusively found in the United Kingdom according to the Commission.
The SVC discussions can have been hijacked by the ScVC and the subgroup on
the BSE disease (Baggott, 1998:70). The ScVC and its subgroup had been
involved in the BSE matter for an extensive period and can be regarded as an
epistemic community with a shared belief system regarding the BSE disease
and its eventual influence on human health. The British way of defining this
problem may have influenced the views of others. As the subgroup worked solely
on the matter of BSE, its influence must have been considerable on the reasoning
and perceptions of the ScVC. The phenomenon of groupthink can have been
present as the conditions discussed earlier apply here. The ScVC subgroup on
BSE had met over fifty times, it reconvened essentially every month to discuss
the issue, and in that way the Commission was regularly informed of any new
developments (European Parliament, 1997a:25). These two expert groups had
never before expressed any great doubts in that BSE could pose a risk for human
health. The experts seemed to have established a monopoly on expertise. That
can be an explanation to why earlier indications and warnings were overlooked
by the experts and the decision-makers. These expert groups were employed by
the Commission during the BSE crisis. However, the subcommittee on BSE
was not called in during the first days of the crisis since most of the members
belonged to the ScVC.
The usage of experts in crisis decision-making is not unproblematic. The
experts’ non-partisan status can be questioned; they may themselves be beholden
to one or another constituency and therefore give a biased opinion. When experts
are asked for an opinion regarding a complex problem they utilize socially
constructed models and concepts, which are dependent on the experts’
conceptualization of social reality. Decision-makers have to aware of this when
they are given an answer from experts (Benveniste, 1977:3). That can result in
conflicting views of science by experts, which puts the decision-maker in a bit of
dilemma. Quarreling experts can in itself lead to a crisis, as this will delay an
opinion and will enhance stress for decision-makers when hearing technical
discussions that lead nowhere (Lagadec, 1991:98).
In the BSE crisis, this problem was present, but not with the Commission’s
own experts. The experts employed in the ScVC performed the first evaluation
when DG VI was preparing a proposal on what to do about the beef from the
United Kingdom. It did not result in any discussion, and a consensus document
was reached. At the next stage in the process, the SVC did debate the issue twice.
During the second meeting experts from the United Kingdom were granted
permission to present their case, the debate quickly deteriorated into a scientific
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discussion among experts which the more generalist national delegates had
difficulties following. By then additional experts had been brought in from other
member states as well. If there were any doubts of the most appropriate decision
to take in the light, or perhaps darkness, of science, the expert communities heated
discussions manifested at least that there was no certainty that BSE could not be
spread to humans. The Commission’s own experts were not quarreling like the
outside experts brought in from the member states.
How a problem is defined by decision-makers is consequential, as it will
have serious repercussions for which structures of experts and organizations
are eventually consulted to have an opinion when a crisis is perceived. This
kind of issue capturing can have many unforeseen consequences. For example
when the AIDS crisis broke out, the problem was mainly defined by decisionmakers as one of involving virologists, which resulted in that other types of
expertise were not employed as for example public health experts which could
have altered the path of the crisis. Simple things such as education about safesex practices in the beginning of the crisis could have probably saved many
lives (Perrow & Guillén, 1990:28). The definition of the problem may not only
concern which experts are used, but also which solutions are considered. “That
problem may be solved to some degree once the problem is defined; certain
experts go with certain problem definitions” (Barker & Peters, 1993:8). Instead
of decision-makers themselves being in charge of the definition of a situation,
an alternative is to let the commonly used experts define the problem themselves.
“There is a tendency for organizations to be colonized by a single perspective
on a problem and therefore by a single set of experts” (Barker & Peters, 1993:8).
That can result in a situation where not much new advice or perspectives are
offered but the advantage is that the policy-makers are not meet with any surprises
and no time is wasted in getting acquainted.
If decision-makers are not familiar with an issue, which entails that there is no
existing policy, there is a high probability that the experts themselves frame the
issue and define the interests of the decision-makers (Baggott, 1998). If decisionmakers implement the expert advice that they have received without any changes,
they themselves might become “…caught in the mistakes, modes and uncertainties
of scientific knowledge” (Beck, 1998: 13). There is also the risk that by
delegating the task of defining the problem to experts, they hand-over as well the
assignment of clarifying which possible options and solutions are available for
the emerging situation. “The definition of the alternatives is the supreme instrument
of power” (E.E. Schattschneider quoted in Haas, 1992:16). As the BSE crisis
erupted DG VI handed over the findings from the British experts to their own
experts to conclude whether or not any action should be taken by the SVC after a
proposal from DG VI. The task of defining the problem and solutions were therefore
handed over to the experts. The spokesperson for Commissioner Fischler, Gerry
Kiely, said,
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Clearly there is concern. If the veterinary committee decides something
must be done, the Commission will react rapidly. The only way to restore
trust and credibility over BSE and beef is not more assurances from
ministers, but clear and firm advice, based on scientific evidence – evidence
(The Electronic Telegraph, 96-03-22).
Decision-makers have to decide which expert structures to make use of, inclusion
versus exclusion. When asking for or taking advice, it is not an unbiased action.
The question of who should be asked has an influence on the response (Street,
1993:151). But it is also a question of availability, especially in a novel situation,
necessary expertise has to be located. There are several options available. One is
the use of in-house experts, i.e. existing structures in the organizational sphere.
But the legitimacy commanded by in-house experts are regularly not in parity
with the kind of reputation that ‘outside’ expertise provide. In-house experts can
be regarded as ‘pet-scientists’ of the organization and their objectivity can be
questioned by outside actors. The other option is to search for outside expertise
but that can be time-consuming. Regularly the need for outside expertise is not
recognized and when it is, there is often hesitation acting on it because that would
mean a loss of prestige for having to seek expertise from another organization or
even another country. “In general, no organization and no country likes to admit
defeat and may struggle along with inadequate advice rather than seek it externally”
(Barker and Peters, 1993:9). This might not be regarded, as a problem for the
Commission since it does not have any expertise of its own. Instead a technique
to relieve great uncertainty before a complex issue can be used to avoid an eventual
blame-game after the crisis by sharing the burden and the risk by, “Making sure
that, at every stage of the policy process, the right chairs have been warmed at the
right committee table by the appropriate institutions, everything possible has been
done and no one could possibly be blamed if things go wrong” (Henderson, 1977
quoted in Richardson, 1996:15). In a crisis situation with high stress and
uncertainty, the need for swiftness urges decision-makers to use their regularly
consulted experts. There is no time to expand the circle of experts involved. The
advantages are that it is probably a more rapid conduct since there is no time
needed to get acquainted. But the risk is that the experts do not possess the
qualifications called for and that legitimacy can be disputed (Lagadec, 1991:95).
As the BSE problem was a novel situation, there were no standard operating
procedures or routines on what action should be taken by the decision-makers.
Since DG VI took the lead and defined it as mainly a veterinary question, albeit
with public health implications, they reacted by making use of the standard
operating procedures used when facing a scientific problem. The procedures had
been to convene the ScVC to analyze new findings, and to evaluate and to conclude what should be considered regarding future action (European Parliament, 1997a:49).There is a tendency to use the normal procedures that have
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functioned well in the past but which may not be appropriate in other situations,
meaning using politics as usual when vigilant decision-making is called for,
“…procedures tend to produce standard responses to non-standard problems.”
(Baggott, 1998:204). A standard procedure was used,the DG VI gathered ScVC
two days after the announcement, which was the first major action taken by DG
VI after the crisis had broken out to evaluate the findings from the United Kingdom.
This is a situation where we are talking about a totally new disease. It was
a disease about which no one had any knowledge. It is a new phenomenon.
Under those circumstances you do not jump into deep water and take a lot
of decisions without any foundation (Hoelgaard in the European Parliament, 1997a:31).
The experts did not offer any advice, which was later considered helpful by the
decision-makers in the SVC. Although the ScVC met for several hours, the opinion
reached during the meeting was a consensus document, which stated that the
precautions taken thus far were adequate and only a few details had to be looked
over. The role of the ScVC is to supply the DG VI officials with a risk assessment
about further action when drafting a proposal that will be given to the SVC. It
could be questioned why a matter that had been presented by experts in Britain
had to be discussed by experts of the Commission. Valuable time could have been
saved if a proposal had been put directly to the SVC that would have decided how
to react to the British experts’ statement. Instead the national officials in the SVC
who were about to vote, received an interpretation by the Commission’s own
scientific experts. The argument from the Commission was that it needed a scientific
risk assessment, which it was not legally bound by, from its experts in order for
the arguments to be valid before the ECJ. Political decisions had to be based on
expert opinions, otherwise that could cause further problems (European Parliament,
1997a:21). The officials are neither experts nor scientists and they had no
competence in the area, so it was difficult for them to come to the conclusion that
the British scientists were either right or wrong (European Parliament, 1997a:66).
There were no clear communication lines between the ScVC and the SVC.
The risk assessment was given to the Commission officials, who then designed a
proposal, which was then given to the national officials in the SVC. They did not
receive the complete minutes of the deliberations in the ScVC. One delegate in
the SVC stated in front of the hearings that they were only partially aware of the
information coming from the experts (Ammendrup in European Parliament,
1997a:15). The Commission can thus be said to have a powerful tool in setting the
agenda in the scientific committees (Joerges and Neyer, 1997:617). But it may
only be a superficial view that the national officials are not aware of what is debated
among the experts. It may well be so that notes are given to ‘their’ national
delegates.
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DG VI did not in a decisive way open up the network of experts in the first
phase of the crisis. A couple of experts on CJD research were included at the
meeting of the ScVC. The group of experts who had been dealing with the matter,
since it first appeared in the late 1980s, was given the task of defining the problem
and, also in a way, the solution to the problem. Since DG VI had the leadership, no
other expert group within the Commission was utilized in the first phase. The idea
of additional expert sources was not regarded as an option. Hoelgaard at DG VI,
We do not normally have competing scientific committees where one can
correct the other. We have scientific committees which are composed of
reputable scientist proposed by the Member States. It would be a strange
situation if we were to institute a parallel scientific group which could
contradict or criticize what the other scientific group has done. Then we
would not be able to have any scientific advice on which we could act.
There would then be the situation where scientific advice was going in all
sorts of different directions (European Parliament, 1997a:271).
Visibly there is a difference in the BSE crisis. In the first phase there was no time for
experts from the other DGs to have an opinion regarding what to decide on the
safety of British beef. But when the gelatin issue was debated in the Commission, it
was different. A different procedure was used. This process was more extended in
time and other DGs used their scientific committees to deliberate whether gelatin,
tallow and bull semen should be allowed to be traded. This may have been the case
since initially the problem of banning British beef was not thought of having any
grave consequences at the European level and, hence the need for extensive evaluation
was not present. What had been forgotten in the haste to decide on British beef
when the crisis broke out was the chain of products. It was not the usual procedure
to have several scientific committees evaluating the same material. Even though
there were voices raised during the proceeding deliberations on British beef to allow
gelatin be excluded, no exceptions were made. The officials in DG VI and some
member states on the SVC commenced to push for the relaxation of the ban on
gelatin soon after the Agricultural Council on April 1-3 had left the issue for the
Commission to decide. Thereby several other committees had the issue of gelatin
on their agenda. The ScVC was soon to convene on April 9 after the Council meeting.
DG VI had in its possession reports from the WHO, an preliminary report from the
Gelatin Manufacturers of Europe and other scientific reports, and it stated that gelatin
was safe with certain restrictions which were given to the experts to evaluate. The
fact that the Commission officials based themselves on scientific material from
outside organizations such as the WHO and the Gelatin Manufacturers of Europe
displays that the Commission is in fact dependent upon outside expertise. The
Commission does not have its own research laboratories and is therefore vulnerable
if the material they receive and use is inaccurate.
After having met several times to discuss these issues and based on the material
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from DG VI, the veterinary experts gave the clearance to ease the ban on gelatin,
tallow and bull semen. This was done in a consensual fashion on April 26. But a
member of the ScVC has testified that there were a pressure to conclude that
gelatin was safe to use with certain restrictions. “When members or bureau staff
on the SVC were present, our discussions [on gelatin] were never easy. They [DG
VI and member state officials] tried to present their views in these other committees
too…” (Somogyi in European Parliament, 1997a:151). Tension began to grow within
the Commission as other scientific committees belonging to other DGs had drawn
the conclusion that the ban on gelatin should not be lifted due to the fact that the
safety of gelatin had not been thoroughly researched. Both the Scientific Committee
on Cosmetics and the Scientific Committee on Food were against such a proposal.
But DG VI did not regard these committees to be fully informed, since they had
not been dealing with BSE for a long time. So they went ahead with the proposal
and were therefore neglected when the proposal was drafted.
The process of deciding on the gelatin proposal will be elaborated in the next
section. It turned out that the material that was used as the foundation for the
ScVC’s decision was found to be erroneous. When the Invernesk laboratory handed
in the final report from the Gelatin Manufacturers of Europe, it was found to
falsify the results of the preliminary report that the ScVC had used. The
Commission and especially DG VI (who had strongly advocated that gelatin be
allowed for export) were heavily criticized internally as well as from the member
states that voted against the proposal. The officials tried to distance themselves
from allegations of having sided with the British in the gelatin proposal. Hoelgaard
at DG VI stated at the EP hearings, “I wish to state publicly that they [The Gelatin
Manufacturers of Europe] deliberately withheld information from the Commission
and from scientists which was the basis on which the Commission made its proposal
[to ease the embargo on gelatin] to the Council” (European Parliament, 1997a:233).
The Commission tried to avoid blame by displaying that several other sources had
been used as a basis for the proposal and that other organizations like the WHO
and OIE had stated that gelatin was safe with certain restrictions.
In conclusion, the BSE issue demonstrates clearly how rapidly a ‘technical’
issue can transform into a question with far-reaching political repercussions for
all member states. Committees composed of independent experts of Commission
and national officials, and of veterinarians in the SVC (who were used to dealing
with specific and technical issues) were given the responsibility of managing the
complex situation. It was no longer a technical problem, i.e. non-political, but a
highly political and sensitive one with delicate national feelings connected to the
management and the final outcome. The committees (of both types; with experts
and national officials) played an important role in several phases of the decisionmaking process, preparation, decision-making and implementation. Committee
processes had a considerable impact since they were involved in the decisionmaking that was legally binding at the national level.
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Experts who had a leading role from the beginning of the BSE disease continued
to be influential in the outcomes of the crisis decision-making. After DG VI had
defined the crisis as a veterinary matter the ScVC was given the task of defining
what actions, if any, were to be considered. The expert monopoly that the ScVC
and its subgroup on BSE enjoyed continued to display itself during the decision
process regarding gelatin. Even though other committees in the Commission gave
voice to other opinions regarding gelatin, they were disregarded until the report
(which claimed gelatin to be safe) that the DG VI experts had used turned out to
be false. That incident exposed the vulnerability of the Commission without having
its own research capabilities and having to use (among others) a source closely
connected to the agricultural industry.
6.3 What Role does the European Commission
Play in Crisis Decision-Making?
It was initially asked what kind of system the European Union has become. Has a
multi-level governance system developed where the member states have to yield
their power to a supranational structure, namely the Commission? Both of the
two streams of thought have a diametrical understanding of the Commission’s
status in the decision-making process. Intergovernmentalists contend that the
Commission should be regarded as an arena for the member states to solve their
common problems, and insititionalists on the other hand claim that the Commission
should be regarded as an actor influencing the member states with its own merits.
The following discussion will focus on the role of the Commission in the various
steps of the decision-making process in the BSE crisis. What also will be touched
upon is the argument that the Commission’s influence might be even greater in
times of great uncertainty (in terms of a specific issue) and no clear preferences
are expressed by the member states on how to deal with the issue.
When the crisis was triggered, the Commission did not initially react forcefully,
since BSE was not believed to cause any dangerous consequences for the other
member states. As discussed in 6.1, the Commission began to involve itself once
the member states began to implement import bans which breached the EU
legislation and intruded on the Commission’s competence. The decision-making
triggered by the crisis began in the member states because most of them introduced
their own measures before the Commission could react; thereby, causing a struggle
over leadership. These national unilateral decisions were overstepping the member
states competence, as a safeguard decision has to be first approved by the
Commission. By doing this, the member states by-passed the one institution created
for just the purpose, to manage problems that could not be effectively managed
on the national level. The purpose for this action was stated publicly at least, as a
reaction to the fear for public health and safety, but it could be that the stability of
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their own beef markets and export markets could have been undermined by the
presence of British beef on their domestic markets. Another speculation is that
the crisis was used as an opportunity to increase national market shares in beef
exports as the United Kingdom was a significant export country. Or perhaps the
member states wanted to simply ‘teach’ the United Kingdom a lesson, since it had
blocked many suggestions put forth by the other member states to speed up
European integration. Several issues (such as the social chapter in the Union, the
launch of the European Monetary Union and institutional reforms proposed to
meet the challenge of enlargement) had been delayed or blocked by the United
Kingdom.
Irrespective of the reasons, the national actions did not facilitate a common
approach to a problem, which effected all the member states. Earlier studies which
have investigated the common approaches to international military crises taken
by the EU member states (like Afghanistan in 1979, Poland in 1980-82 and Libya
in 1986), found that even if cooperation had been desired, it had not been achievable,
“When it comes to a crisis, every member government would like political
cooperation to be more effective, more solid and faster-moving in its defense of
vital concerns…” (Winn, 1986:68). One explanation for those difficulties has
been that the member states have diverse, and sometimes even opposing, interests,
which stands in the way of a collective stance when a crisis appears. However the
United Kingdom was partly successful in gaining support for a common stance in
the EU, when it introduced economic sanctions against Argentina during the conflict
over the Falkland Islands in the early eighties (Martin, 1992). There are, of course,
significant differences between that type of crisis and the BSE crisis. The BSE
crisis did not have a military dimension and it was not an external problem, but
rather an internal problem with repercussions for all of the EU member states.
The Commission, employed its own expert committees, which were
independent of the member states, to analyze the findings from one of the member
states. The Commission has a great amount of influence on the discussions since
it sets the agenda for the scientific committees. These committees are subordinate
to the will of the Commission, e.g. used when thought to be relevant (Joerges and
Neyer, 1997:617). From the results of the expert deliberations, the Commission
proceeded to draft a proposal, which was to be given to the Councils delegated
instrument of decision-making, the regulatory committees, which in this case was
the Standing Veterinary Committee. The Commission was free to disregard the
recommendations of the experts and had the opportunity to formulate its own
preferences in the proposal. In addition, the Commission set the agenda and acted
as the chair people in the SVC as well. Hence, the Commission had according to
the treaties, the privilege of being the initiator of decision-making and it can be
said that it had considerable influence on the proposals contents.
The proposal for a ban on British beef that was given to the SVC by the
Commission on March 25 was not limited but was left open-ended. The ScVC had
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not been overly drastic when suggesting measures; the legislation in place was
considered sufficient enough for protecting public health even though further
measures would have been welcomed. It is difficult to conclude how much pressure
the Commission officials felt to deliver a British beef ban proposal from the
governments of the member states, the consumers and the agricultural lobby groups.
But the conclusions made by the British experts and government officials that British
beef was not dangerous did not obviously convince the EU officials. Since the
Commission officials initiate policies at the European level, which are then
implemented and observed nationally, the Commission is vulnerable to criticism
and blame since the responsibility can be placed on the supranational level.
The Commission has always had the difficulty that if it goes too far it will
be criticized; if we do not go to far enough, we will be criticized. When you
are criticized from both sides, it often means that you are somewhere in the
middle and you have probably got it right (Marchant from the DG VI
in European Parliament, 1997a:331).
The Commission seems, in general, to avoid proposing legislation that does not
have the support from the member states in the Council or committees, because
the Commission would loose credibility without such support. Studies that have
been performed on the voting behavior in the various EU committees display that
90 per cent of opinions were favorable to the Commissions standpoint (Demmke,
1998:16).
When the decision was made by the SVC to implement a ban, President Santer
was threatened by Prime Minister Major to abstain from such a decision, which
Santer later did. A leader from one member state compelled the Commission to
refrain from taking a decision which the other fourteen member states had agreed
upon. But, what must be remembered is that a large, influential and sovereign
country like the United Kingdom risked loosing a business worth £550 million
per year because fourteen member state governments and the Commission thought
its beef was a public health hazard which could have grave implications on the
common market. This issue was greatly debated by the scientific community, and
perhaps it could be that there was no risk involved with consuming beef (Ratzan,
1998:169).
During this first phase, the Commission was pressured by the member states
governments and can not be said to have had much influence on the outcome of
the proposal to ban British beef exports. The Commission would have reached a
certain dismissal of a proposal on any other action than a ban of beef in the SVC.
The issue would then have gone directly to the Agricultural Council where the
outcome would as well have been given as most of the member states had already
implemented unilateral bans. But on the issue of gelatin, the uncertainty was as
well great but several member states did not have a clear opinion about it at the
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time of the Agricultural Council April 1-3. Nevertheless the Commission was
given the task to decide. So the Commission had more room to maneuver on how
to decide on gelatin after having consulted expertise on the subject. The
Commission, DG VI, who in this case had the lead, forcefully advocated lifting
the ban on gelatin after the ScVC had given its vindication. Before the proposal
on gelatin was given to the SVC, a harsh exchange of letters between President
Santer and Prime Minister Major had taken place. Major had kept threatening
Santer with the objective to ease the ban that had been put in place or there would
be retaliation in the form of sanctions against the Commission and the Union.
Santer and the Commission responded by claiming such threats and blackmailing
would not be effective and that the decision to ease the ban and allow gelatin to be
exported would be based on scientific reasoning. When the proposal was debated
by the SVC on May 15 great uncertainty was displayed by the fact that the meeting
was adjourned without a conclusive vote. When a final vote was taken on May 20,
the Union was divided, and a QMV was not achieved. Germany, Spain, Portugal,
Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria and Luxembourg had voted against the
Commission’s proposal. The Council’s delegation of power to the regulatory
Standing Veterinary Committee was then revoked. It was decided that the issue
would be settled instead by the member states agricultural ministers in the Council.
Since there was no definitive agreement on the issue of gelatin, the United
Kingdom implemented its threat to introduce a non-cooperation policy. The United
Kingdom introduced it on May 21 as a way of showing displeasure that no
agreement had been attained on gelatin and as a way of blackmailing the other
member states into accepting a relaxation of the ban. Normal cooperation would
not be possible until tangible results had been achieved. In the first (common)
pillar of the Union, the United Kingdom could not significantly disrupt business.
For example UK officials did not show up or take part in the decision-making but
it did not mean the end of the EU since voting is conducted by either a simple or
qualified majority vote. In the second and third intergovernmental pillars (where
unanimity is needed for decision-making), it would not be possible to achieve
anything without the cooperation of the United Kingdom. The situation had
changed. Earlier the United Kingdom had previously thought that it had been
bullied and locked into a corner when the Commission and the other member
states decided on the beef ban. But the Commission and the member states were
at that time being held hostage to a degree by one member state. This came at a
most disadvantageous time for most of the member states, although not for the
United Kingdom. One important Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) had
already been hijacked by the BSE issue, (in Turin on March 29). The main task
had then been to discuss a new treaty to follow the Maastricht Treaty and to lay
the foundation for the upcoming IGC in Florence in June. That meeting would
mainly focus on institutional reforms’, for example, to reform the voting rules to
be able to manage an eventual eastward expansion. Other important subjects (like
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a common foreign and defense policy, and programs to combat mounting
unemployment) had also been on the agenda. When Major announced the noncooperation policy, he stated:
Progress will not be possible in the Intergovernmental Government
Conference or elsewhere until we have agreement on lifting the ban on
beef derivatives and a clear framework in place leading to lifting of the
wider ban. I expect an agreement on how to deal with these problems to be
behind us by the time the European Council meets in Florence on 21/22
June. If they are not, the Florence meeting is bound to be dominated by this
issue (John Major in UK House of Commons, 96-05-21).
Major therefore had considerable leverage in trying to coerce the other member
states to abolish the ban and if that was not possible, to at least accept a relaxation
of the ban on gelatin, tallow and bull semen. The Commission responded by stating,
A solution can only be achieved through the proper functioning of the
Union’s institutions and procedures which it is in all member states’ interests
to safeguard. The Commission will continue to work towards a progressive
lifting of the export ban in the light of available scientific evidence and
eradication measures (The Electronic Telegraph, 96-05-22).
The Commission thus kept arguing for a relaxation of the ban on gelatin, tallow
and bull semen despite the non-cooperation policy from the United Kingdom.
The Commission tried to free itself from suspicion that it had sided with any
member state and especially the United Kingdom. Instead the Commission tried
to manifest a sense of neutrality in retaliation to the pressures from the member
states by claiming that science was the determining factor behind the gelatin
proposal. Santer asserted,
I did not allow myself to be swayed by political pressure, or submit to
blackmail, but that I kept the ship headed on the basis of the scientific
opinion we had available at the time, that we were able to resolve the crisis,
at least in part (European Parliament, 1997a:437).
A proposal from the Commission was presented to a special meeting of the
Agricultural Council June 3-4. Negotiations regarding the Commission’s proposal
at the Council did not turn out to be productive; neither a dismissal nor an approval
had been achieved. The only member state to alter its position was Spain which
decided to vote for a relaxation of the ban. The uncertainties of the status of the
three products (gelatin, tallow and bull semen) were such that the member states
could not come to an agreement.
According to the treaties, it was now the task of the Commission (acting on
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behalf of its own powers) to decide on the proposal which the member states had
failed to dismiss or accept. The College of Commissioners decided to accept the
proposal and to ease the embargo, which it had designed by itself. By exercising
its decision privilege, the Commission acted like a government, which is not
popularly elected. The popularly elected European Parliament could not involve
itself since the matter was to be decided according to Article 43 of the Treaty. The
Commission had overruled six member states, including Germany (which is often
regarded as one of the most influential member states since it was one of the
original members) and the third biggest economic power in the world. Through
the acceptance of the proposal of the Commission, it supports the reasoning that
the Commission’s power to promote its own line of thought is greater when the
member states are unsure of their own preferences.
In conclusion, the Commission’s role in the decision-making process throughout
the BSE crisis can be described as being both an arena for the member states to
negotiate out their differences and an actor in its own right. The process leading
up to the beef ban was led by a few member states that wanted a specific decision
to be taken. The Commission had no other conceivable possibility, but to facilitate
the terms of a ban and to act as an ‘honest broker’ of the interests even though it
had the right of initiative. On the other hand, regarding the issue of gelatin (where
uncertainty was as well great but there seemed to be no clear preference on behalf
of the member states neither in the SVC or in the Council), the Commission was
able to advocate its own line of thought successfully. By doing so the Commission
triumphed over six member states, including Germany, for the sake of three
products. In the BSE case the presumption that the Commission as a supranational
institution can have a decisive role when it comes to decision-making at the
European level can be observed.
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
7. Conclusions
This study set out with the ambition to perform an explorative and hypothesisgenerative single-case study by applying a process-tracing method directed at the
decision-making process of the EU Commission during the BSE crisis. This was
carried out with a cognitive-institutional framework, which combined
psychological and organizational modes of explanation. It was hoped that such a
study should be valuable in gaining insight into crisis decision-making at the
European level. Furthermore, since a crisis is not regarded as an isolated event
but rather as a reoccurring phenomenon, a single-case study with the goal of
facilitating a comparison should be a promising contribution to the effort of theory
development on crisis management at the European level.
The BSE case demonstrated well how a national occurrence had significant
effects on the developing multi-level European system (i.e. at the local, regional,
national and supranational level). As an integrated community in many policy
sectors, the EU is like a wind-chime or a nursery mobile; when there is a disturbance
somewhere, consequences move up and down the different levels of the European
Union. The BSE case adequately displayed the downsides of integration and
internationalization. The European Union’s weakness of being vulnerable for one
member state’s actions was shown and suggests the continued need for barriers
(for the sake of public health) even if it means interfering with the fundamental
idea of freedom of movement for goods within Europe.
It was assumed that the crisis definition written by Sundelius et al., would be
useful as a departure point for assessing if the BSE situation had been perceived
as a crisis. The three criteria that define a crisis definition were satisfied. Decisionmakers in the Commission recognized that several values were at stake, that there
was limited time available and that great uncertainty plagued the situation. The
values found to be at stake were issues of public health and restoring consumer
confidence. If beef originating from any member state was called into question it
would have in turn affected the stability of the EU beef market and subsequently
the financial situation. The Commission could be at risk of loosing its legitimacy
and credibility by not successfully managing an internal problem within the Union.
The United Kingdom exercised a non-cooperation policy during the BSE crisis
just as an important Inter-Governmental Conference was approaching and several
member states were giving voice to isolationistic and protectionistic ideas. There
was a danger of loosing pace in the integration process and in the long run the
whole idea of close cooperation in Europe.
Besides the negative effects associated with the crisis (the death of innocent
people, public panic, and economic, legitimacy and credibility losses for the
involved actors), there is another side of the coin, crisis as an opportunity. The
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
idea of a crisis only having negative implications is common, but opportunities
can arise. The notion of a crisis being a facilitator of change and learning in the
European Union system should be entertained and studied further. The BSE crisis
focused attention on the secretive committee system which was then radically
changed in 1997 when many scientific committees were transferred to the
Consumer DG, a multi-disciplinary committee was established to avoid having
an issue being captured by a single expert group, attempts have been made to
reconstruct decision-making in the Unions’ largest area agriculture (Article 43)
and thereby increasing the role of the popular elected European Parliament and
increasing transparency as the flow of documents from the Commission to the EP
improved during the investigation of mismanagement of BSE.
In section 6.1 the internal dynamics of decision-making in the Commission
were scrutinized by assuming that the Commission was not to be regarded as a
unit but rather composed of several actors and that it would be rewarding to apply
a bureaucratic-politics perspective. The perception of the officials all converged
into the notion that the BSE disease would not be harmful for public health, thereby
no preparation for such a contingency was needed. In the beginning the
Commission did not involve itself since the responsibility of managing the BSE
issue was allocated to the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, when several member
states began to implement unilateral bans (in violation of EU legislation and the
Commission’s competence), the Commission went into action. It decreed that the
bans were legitimate for protecting public health and for the sake of reaching a
common approach to BSE. It could as well be a token that the Commission’s
structure and system was not designed nor prepared, for crisis decision-making
when time is limited. Within the Commission there was no overt struggle for
leadership which could be expected given the fact that the BSE issue was
multifaceted combining agricultural, veterinary, public health and industrial
elements.
The agricultural DG, which had a well-established leadership position and
was in charge of BSE since it had appeared, continued to be in the lead until July
1996. Even if attempts were made by the Secretariat-General to take over the
issue to achieve a centralized Commission approach and the Consumer DG tried
to obtain at a minimum a co-lead position, these were not successful. But the
Consumer DG was at the time a small DG with limited resources and could not be
said to be an equal partner to the large Agricultural DG. After having studied the
internal dynamics of the decision-making during the crisis in the Commission, it
can be suggested that the Commission should not be regarded as a single actor
but is constituted of multiple actors advocating their individual views on how a
problem should be dealt with. The Agricultural DG was strained by the pressures
of the crisis and during the course of the crisis asked for reinforcements in the
form of extra personnel, but the requests were denied by the other DGs. One
possible reason for that could have been the concern for an already unfavorable
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
balance of bureaucratic power to get worse. It can therefore be suggested that
during crises an eventual unity and a state of cooperation between the various
DGs will not be present but replaced by turf-fighting, i.e. bureaucratic-politics
over leadership and resources.
In section 6.2 the experts’ role in the decision-making process was explored.
Due to the complex and technical character of the crisis, the experts’ role was
found to be very influential. As the agricultural DG VI held the lead, its experts on
the Scientific Veterinary Committee and in the subgroup on BSE were given the
task of defining the problem and suggesting solutions in accordance to the standard
operating procedures that were utilized. These well-established committees were
shown to inhibit a monopoly on the advice about BSE expressed in the
Commission. The monopoly position was prominently displayed during the
decision process on gelatin, tallow and bull semen. Expert committees belonging
to other DGs did not approve of the idea that the ban on these three products
should be lifted, but their views were not taken into account by DG VI since they
were regarded as not knowledgeable enough on BSE. The vulnerability of the
Commission, in being dependent upon external scientific material, was displayed
when a report ordered by an organization with close ties to the Agricultural Industry
proved to be inaccurate. This report, among others, had been decisive for the
Commission’s experts when giving authorization to relax the ban on the three
bovine products from the United Kingdom. It may therefore be suggested that the
Commission’s capacity to manage crises is dependent upon how it receives access
to information (which is needed by its experts to issue an opinion to the officials
in charge of drafting proposals for the member states’ delegates).
In section 6.3 the Commission’s role in the decision-making process during the
BSE crisis was discussed. Could the Commission be described as being an arena
for the member states to battle out their differences or as an actor displaying its
autonomy from the member states? It was found that the Commission assumed
both parts in various phases of the crisis. The process leading up to the British beef
ban was led by member states, which demanded a specific decision to be taken. The
Commission had no other conceivable possibility but to facilitate the terms of a ban
and to act as an ‘honest broker’. On the other hand, when it came to the decision on
gelatin, tallow and bull semen the Commission could advocate its line of thought
successfully since there was a great sense of uncertainty and the member states had
no clear stance in the SVC or in the Council. By exercising its autonomy the
Commission neutralized six member states, including Germany, which did not want
a relaxation of the ban. From the BSE, case the presumption can be made that the
Commission as an supranational institution can have a decisive role when it comes
to decision-making in crises at the European level. This may certainly be the case
when there are uncertainties on behalf of the member states. That suggests that it is
of interest and value to continue studying the Commission in crisis decision-making
and not focus solely on crisis decison-making in the member states.
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Furthermore the vulnerability of the Commission and the European Union
system as a whole was vividly shown when a member state concludes that it will
not cooperate until its preferences are implemented. The Commission and the
other member states were in a precarious situation since the Intergovernmental
Conference was coming up where the future of the European Union was to be
discussed. On the other hand, the BSE crisis may be an indicator that a single
member state is just as vulnerable to the pressures of the other member states that
have decided a certain course of action. The Commission can also be seen as
being exposed to criticism from the member states. There are inspections on
agricultural products at the local, regional, national levels but not at the
supranational level. But, responsibility and blame can be allocated to that level. It
is often said that in war the first victim is the truth. When it comes to managing
internal EU crises at the European level the first victim could be suggested to be
‘the will to cooperate’.
Several suggestions have been made that could be used in further studies on
crisis decision-making at the European level. Objections that the BSE case is in
itself a unique occurrence could probably be sustained due to its vast implications,
but the inherent characteristics and processes of this case should be similar to
other crises. This goes as well for the argument that the structure of the European
Union changed after the BSE crisis, (for example, features such as decision-making
in a crisis where important values are at stake, limited time is available, there is
great uncertainty and the vast involvement of experts) are most likely to be present
in other crises cases. It should therefore be possible to use the results of this study
for comparisons with previous or future crisis management cases at the European
level.
Finally, the BSE crisis displayed that crises do not come and go; they often
stay with decision-makers, but change configuration. A crisis can have effects for
a long time after the acute period. The member states now in the year 2000 are
having immense difficulties agreeing upon the status of British beef; now that the
EU’s own experts have declared it to be safe. A crisis after the crisis seems to be
well on its way.
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Appendix 1
List of Abbreviations
BSE
CAP
CJD
COPA
DG
ECJ
EP
DG I
DG III
DG V
DG VI
DG XI
DG XV
DG XXIV
IGC
LS
MAT
MEP
NFU
nv-CJD
OIE
QMV
ScC
ScFC
ScVC
SEA
SEAC
SVC
SG
WHO
112
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
Common Agricultural Policy
Creutzfeldt-Jakobs Disease
European Farmers Organization
Directorate-General of the EU Commission
European Court of Justice
European Parliament
External Relations
Industry
Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs
Agricultural Council
Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection
Internal Market and Financial Services
Consumer Policy and Consumer Health Protection
Intergovernmental Conference
Legal Service of the Commission
Maastricht Treaty
Member of the European Parliament
National Farmers Union (UK)
New Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakobs Disease
Office International des Epizooties
Qualified Majority Vote
Scientific Committee for Cosmetics
Scientific Food Committee
Scientific Veterinary Committee
Single European Act
Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee (to the government
of the United Kingdom)
Standing Veterinary Committee
Secretariat-General of the Commission
World Health Organization
Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
Appendix 2
EU-kommissionens hantering
av galna kokrisen 1996
I mars 1996 presenterade regeringen i Storbritannien en rapport som pekade på
att människor kunde ha blivit drabbade av en mänsklig form av galna kosjukan.
Rapporten visade att 10 ungdomar hade infekterats eller hade dött av något som
man misstänkte var en mänsklig variant av djursjukdomen galna kosjukan (BSE).
Vid den tidpunkten var redan 165 000 djur sjuka eller avlidna i BSE. EU-kommissionen övervägde möjligheten att stoppa britternas export av nötkött. Men
innan kommissionen hann fatta något beslut började medlemsstaterna agera på
egen hand. Relationerna mellan länder i unionen försämrades snabbt. Beslutsfattarna i kommissionen behövde skyndsamt visa medborgarna i Europa att det inte
var någon fara för människors hälsa, skydda den interna och den externa köttmarknaden och samtidigt visa handlingskraft och krishanteringsförmåga. Jesper
Grönvall har skrivit en rapport om hur kommissionen hanterade denna kris.
Sedan 1986 hade enskilda experter påpekat att galna kosjukan skulle kunna
överföras till människor. Myndigheterna i Storbritannien förnekade detta tills den
20 mars 1996, då man alltså offentligt gick ut med en expertrapport som påvisade
en eventuell koppling. Galna kosjukan är en neurologisk sjukdom som förstör
hjärnan på djuren. Den mänskliga varianten (ny variant av Creutzfeldt-Jakobs
sjukdom, nv-CJS) har en liknande effekt, människan dör när hjärnan slutar att
fungera.
Svåra val för kommissionen
Stressiga situationer som kriser innebär ofta svåra val för de personer som måste
fatta beslut. Jesper Grönvall skriver i sin studie ”Managing Crisis in the European
Union, The Commission and ‘Mad Cow Disease’”, om vilka val och dilemman
EU-kommissionen ställdes inför i och med galna kokrisen. Skulle man genast
stoppa Storbritanniens export av nötkött? Ett sådant beslut kunde skapa panik
bland medborgarna och ekonomisk katastrof för många bönder och industrier.
Eller var det bättre att vänta tills brittiska experter kunde komma med mer information och klargöra situationen? Detta val kunde också få katastrofala konsekvenser
om det sedan visade sig att galna kosjukan kunde överföras till människor. Politiskt var det mycket viktigt att situationen hanterades väl. En instabil politisk
situation kunde bli ett svårt hinder för de kommande regeringsmötena i Turin och
Florens samma år där bland annat utvidgningen av EU skulle diskuteras.
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Beslut som påverkar krisen
Jesper Grönvall har valt att fokusera sin studie på de beslut som institutionerna i
EU fattade under perioden 20 mars – 26 juni 1996. Han har analyserat flera kritiska beslutstillfällen i galna kokrisen. Två av dem är särskilt intressanta och har
påverkat utvecklingen av krisen mycket.
Det första beslut som kommissionen tog var att kalla in oberoende veterinära
experter för en bedömning. I övrigt avvaktade man. Men en panik för galna kosjukan hade redan fått fäste. Länder både i och utanför EU tog självständiga beslut
om att stoppa importen av brittiskt nötkött. Initiativet kom från Frankrike, därefter valde också t ex Sverige, Tyskland, Holland och Italien att sluta importera kött
från Storbritannien. EU-kommissionen varnade sina medlemsstater för att de bröt
mot EU:s grundlag då de på egen hand stoppade handeln. Men utvecklingen gick
inte att hindra och kommissionens enda utväg var att föreslå ett exportstopp, vilket också godkändes efter två omröstningar bland medlemsstaternas representanter i stående veterinärkommittén. Beslutet fattades den 26 mars.
Ett annat problem som beslutsfattarna ställdes inför handlade om Storbritannien skulle få exportera gelatin. Varan är en biprodukt från nötkreatur vilken ingår i bl a läkemedel och kosmetika När medlemsstaterna i EU inte kunde enas om
vilka regler som skulle gälla fick EU-kommissionen i uppgift att utreda om gelatinet var farligt. Flera Generaldirektorat (DG, departement inom Kommissionen)
var inblandade i utredningsarbetet men de olika experterna kunde inte enas. Till
sist vann jordbrukets DG diskussionen. Experterna där menade att gelatin från
Storbritannien var säkert och borde få exporteras. Men även efter utredningen
hade medlemsstaterna svårt att komma överens. Frågan lämnades över till Kommissionen som valde att gå på ”jordbrukets linje” och tillåta britterna att sälja
gelatin till andra länder. Tre veckor senare, bara ett par dagar innan beslutet skulle
träda i kraft, blev det känt att uppgifter som jordbrukets DG använt sig av var
direkt felaktiga. Upptäckten gjorde att gelatinexporten kunde förhindras, men
förtroendet för kommissionen skadades.
Konsekvenser av krisen
Galna kokrisen visar hur ett nationellt problem inom EU snabbt kan få effekter på
flera nivåer, både inom ett land och mellan olika stater. Ingen stat i Europa undkom effekter som oroliga medborgare och ekonomiska förluster i jordbruks- och
industrisektorn. Konsekvenserna på såväl individ-, nationell- och EU nivå har
varit omfattande. Fram till våren år 2000 har åtminstone 50 människor avlidit av
nv-CJS samtidigt som flera bönder har gått i konkurs. På nationell nivå har den
brittiska regeringen varit tvungna att betala ut miljardbelopp i pund för att stödja
sin jordbrukssektor då exportmöjligheterna har försvunnit. På EU nivå visar krisen att effekterna kan vara långlivade. Medlemsstaterna i EU har fortfarande år
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Managing Crisis in the European Union: THE COMMISSION AND ‘MAD COW DISEASE’
2000 svårt att samarbeta. Några stater, bland andra Frankrike, har svårt att acceptera att kommissionen är överens med majoriteten av staterna om att Storbritannien får börja exportera visst nötkött igen. En kris efter krisen verkar vara under
uppsegling.
Samtidigt menar Grönvall att kriser som denna inte enbart skall betraktas som
negativa händelser. Utan galna kokrisen hade det idag varit svårare att omorganisera och tränga igenom det ”hemliga” systemet av kommittéer inom EU. Europaparlamentet har fått större inflytande inom jordbrukssektorn och diskussioner har
inletts kring en europeisk livsmedelsmyndighet som skulle kunna medverka i skyddet av konsumenterna. Öppenheten från EU-kommissionens sida har ökat efter
det att europaparlamentet undersökt hur EU hanterade galna kokrisen.
Vilka praktiska lärdomar kan man dra av rapporten?
Jesper Grönvalls studie utgår ifrån psykologiska och organisatoriska faktorer för
att få insikt i europeiskt beslutsfattande i krissituationer.
• Galna ko-krisen belyser behovet av ett fungerande varningssystem eller nätverk där det går att utbyta information och slå larm om sjukdomar som kan
hota människor. Sjukdomen hade varit känd sedan 1986, forskare hade gett
signaler om att den kanske kunde spridas till människor, men informationen
negligerades. EU-området har ett särskilt behov av effektiva varningssystem
då gränserna för den inre marknaden är borttagna.
• Den vetenskapliga dimensionen och den stora osäkerheten i krisen gjorde att
experter fick stort inflytande på beslutsfattandet. Expertgrupper har normalt en
stark position i kommissionens arbete då de måste tillfrågas innan ett förslag
ges till medlemsstaternas representanter. I galna kokrisen fick experterna från
jordbrukets DG ett avgörande inflytande. De fick till uppgift att definiera problemet och därmed definierade de även lösningarna.
De hade monopol på att ge råd till beslutsfattarna inom kommissionen. När
andra experter (än de från jordbrukets DG) lade fram förslag mot gelatinexport
användes de ej. Andra experter som småningom fick rätt blev inte hörda då de
ansågs som icke insatta i ärendet och därmed ej tillförlitliga. Grönvall pekar på
att tillgång till motexpertis är viktigt för att kunna utvärdera expertråd i krissituationer.
• Krisen belyser brister i Unionen i och med att en stat, Storbritannien, kunde
påverka hela det europeiska samarbetet och hindra avgörande diskussioner om
EU:s framtid (t ex diskussioner om nya medlemmar från öst under regeringskonferenser). Samtidigt visar också krisen att ett enskilt medlemsland inte har mycket att säga till om när de övriga medlemmarna har bestämt sig för ett beslut. Det
sägs ofta att i krig är det första offret sanningen. När det handlar om krishantering inom EU kan man kanske säga att det första offret är samarbetsviljan.
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• De europeiska staterna är ömsesidigt beroende av varandra och graden av integrationen inom EU har fördjupats under senare år. Det medför att ett en stat
som utsätts för olika typer av kriser påverkar även andra stater. Europa har på
senare år ej varit förskonat från kriser där ett gemensamt tillvägagångssätt kunde
ha medfört en effektivare krishantering. Exempel på sådana kriser är förlisningen av m/s Estonia 1994, flodöversvämningar i väst- och Centraleuropa
1993, 95 och 97 och Dioxinskandalen 1999. En kapacitet och beredskap för
krishantering i den civila sektorn bör kunna stärkas inom ramverket för EU då
det ger möjlighet till en effektivare hantering av svåra påfrestningar på regionen.
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