Economic and Political Weekly
The Left in Latin America and the
Caribbean
• Vol - XLVII No. 51, December 22, 2012 | Deepak Bhojwani Perspectives
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The New Left in Latin America and the Caribbean has not only come into being, but
has also survived because of manifest failures of the ruling class in several
countries. Its legitimacy has been reaffi rmed through democratic elections. Strong
management of natural resources, generous social and redistributive programmes,
tight political control over the party apparatus as well as over the military
establishment, have ensured longevity. Traditional patterns of economic
collaboration have been successfully challenged by these leaders, and efforts to
dislodge or discredit them have not met with great success.
Deepak Bhojwani ([email protected]) is a former diplomat who served
as ambassador in seven Latin American countries.
The Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region consists of three principal
subregions: the South American continent; Central or Meso America, from Mexico to
Panama; and the Caribbean. The region comprises 33 disparate countries, from tiny
island states to mighty Brazil. Racial, ethnic, lingui-stic, historical, political, and
economic differences have complicated -efforts at regional integration.
In 1791, African slaves in the Caribbean revolted against their French colonisers,
and on 1 January 1804, Haiti -became the first independent country in the region. On
the other hand, Brazil, the largest country in the region, achieved a peaceful
transition from the Portuguese empire to its own monarchy in 1822. Independence in
most of Hispanic Latin America came at a heavy price. Though debilitated by
Napoleon Bonaparte, the Spanish empire would not give up its possessions without
a fight. From Mexico down to Chile, -Creole1 armies gained independence by force
of arms in the course of the early 19th century. They were inspired in part by the
American and French revolutions, aware of the weakness of the Spanish empire,
and backed in many cases by anti-Spanish (mainly British) merce--naries. Most of
the English-speaking Caribbean states won their independence well into the 20th
century. The Caribbean -islands of Martinique and Guadaloupe, and French Guiana
on the South American continent, are still French territories. The Dutch Antilles have
been granted considerable autonomy, but are still -dependent on the Netherlands for
their budgets and certain aspects of their -international affairs.
Latin America adopted a liberal free trade model after independence. By the 20th
century, its terms of trade had tur-ned adverse. Most countries systematically
disengaged from the global economy, erecting tariff barriers and substituting
domestic for foreign investment. Following the second world war, -nationalism and
corporatism resulted in the adoption of the autarchic Import Substitution
Industrialisation (ISI) policy.2 For Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, the ISI model was
pragmatic economic nationalism. Far from squeezing out the private sector,
however, this strategy afforded unprece-dented opportunities for multinational
corporations and domestic -enterprises alike. For a while, it proved remarkably
successful in delivering -accelerated growth, structural transformation and up to a
point, export diversification.3
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, they faced recurrent external deficits and
massive foreign debt. Mexico defaulted in 1983, and Brazil in 1987, leading to a
fundamental reappraisal. The policy corr-e-ctive applied has been referred to as the
“Washington Consensus”.4 The left in LAC prefers the term “neo-liberalism”. Drawing
on the free-market experiments of Chile in the 1970s, admini-strations across the
region embraced globalisation, reduced barriers to trade and invest-ment, privatised
state-owned enterprises, and deregulated domestic markets.5
These policies had assumed the status of a new orthodoxy by the mid-1990s. In
Brazil, the early reforms of President Fernando Collor de Melo were overtaken by the
world‟s largest privatisation programme, initiated by President Fernando Henrique
Cardoso. In Argentina, President Carlos Menem carried out -exten-sive market
deregulation and -actively courted foreign, especially US, investors. Bolivia and
Venezuela sought to attract more foreign participation in the hydrocarbons sector. In
Mexico, market reforms accompanied the end of the Institutional Revolutionary
Party‟s (PRI) decades-long monopoly in power. The dictates of globalisation became
the economic mantra in Chile, Uruguay, and Colombia. Panama, Ecuador, and some
smaller LAC economies adopted the US dollar as legal tender.
In retrospect, it became evident that the Washington Consensus rested on -unstable
structural foundations. Excessive demands on limited domestic savings led to
greater reliance on foreign capital markets, even as states faced structural deficits
and hyperinflation. Countries such as Bolivia and Venezuela were unable to reduce
their overwhelming dependence on commodity exports. Prices for metals and fuels
remained -relatively depressed throughout the 1990s. Thanks to a concentrated
pattern of asset ownership, the benefits of growth were very unevenly dispersed,
both among regions and population groups. This created a sense of lingering
political grievance, which was to find its voice very effectively in the years that
followed.
The Traditional Left
Cuba was the last Spanish colony to gain independence, in 1898, thanks to US
-intervention. The US political and economic domination, formalised through the Platt
Amendment to the Cuban consti­tution in 1902, prevailed till Fidel Castro‟s revolution
deposed President (General) Fulgenico Batista in January 1959. US reaction to
Castro‟s determination to strike an independent path led to a split. Cuba turned firmly
left, nationalised US-owned properties, and embraced the -Soviet Union. By 1965,
the Integrated Revolutionary Organisation (ORI), which mer-ged the erstwhile
communists with Castro‟s 26 July Movement and other revolutionary parties, gave
way to the monolithic Communist Party of Cuba. This is the only political party
permitted legally in Cuba. The US broke off relations in 1961. It then virtually
quarantined the island, through trade and travel embargoes that persist till now.
Cuba stood out as a symbol of dignity and defiance, admired by some and feared by
others in the region. It cons-tructed a socialist system, which, till date, provides free
health, education, housing, and maintains other elements of a paternalistic state.
Soviet support ended in the 1990s, causing considerable hardship. Over the last
decade, Cuba has relied on Venezuelan largesse to sustain an economy showing
signs of severe stress. Recent attempts at loosening state controls are not sufficient
to revive the economy. The US stranglehold comp-licates Cuba‟s attempts to take
full -advantage of its tourism and service -sectors. A vituperative section of the
-Cuban emigré community in the US continues to lobby against any attempts to
loosen the trade and travel embargo. The European Union (EU) has no restrictions
on trade and investment, though it maintains a proforma policy of urging political
reform in Cuba.
The New Left
The advent of the 21st century has seen a resurgence of the left, this time far more
resilient. Armed with hindsight, aware of the pitfalls of the traditional communist
models, it is selective about external support. Its leaders are conscious of the need
for regional support to reduce vulnerability. Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Rafael
Correa in Ecuador, Evo Morales in Bolivia and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua have
been supple in their application of socialist policies, careful not to alienate their
popular base. This has paid dividends, in the form of re-election through popular
ballot. They have also managed to co-opt, or neutralise, powerful military
establishments that may present a threat. Extreme steps, nationalisation of foreign
assets, for instance, have been balanced by the lure of access to oil, mineral and
other resources. Dome-stically, they have relied on targeted, often lavish, social
programmes and -effective redistribution of wealth. These measures have reduced
the Gini coefficient across the region, though they have had a fallout on conventional
economic parameters such as inflation, foreign -investment, and currency stability.
The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA, Spanish acronym)
was inspired by the example of -Simon Bolivar, the most prominent freedom fighter
of the 19th century, hailed as the liberator of Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador,
Panama and Bolivia. It took formal shape in December 2004 in -Havana, where
Chavez and Fidel Castro signed an agreement to lower trade -barriers and barter
Venezuelan oil for Cuban -expertise. The alliance was joined by Bolivia (2006),
Nicaragua (2007), Dominica (2008), Ecuador, St Vincent and the Grenadines, and
Antigua and Barbuda (2009).
ALBA was the brainchild of Chavez, who reacted ferociously to the US proposal for a
free trade area of the Americas, mooted in 1994, but formally proposed at the
Summit of the Americas at Quebec, Canada in 2001.6 Chavez succe-ssfully
orchestrated regional opposition to the proposal. He was supported by the
MERCOSUR bloc (Paraguay, Brazil, Argen-tina, and Uruguay, in addition to
Venezuela) at the 2005 Summit at Mar del Plata, Argentina. The idea died a natural
death. The US then sought, and concluded, such agreements regionally (Central
America) and bilaterally (Chile, Panama, Colombia and Peru).
ALBA has moved to consolidate economic integration, centred on supplies of
Venezuelan oil; technical expertise from Cuba; a virtual currency for intra-ALBA
trade (SUCRE) to reduce dependence on the dollar; and social prog-rammes
targeting low-income sectors.7 Near unanimity of political views and opinions lends
strength to the bloc in -regional and multilateral forums. The Summit of the Americas,
in April 2012 in Colombia, ended without a political declaration because of ALBA‟s
insistence that Cuba be invited without preconditions.
Socialism of the 21st Century
This doctrine, which perhaps defines best the principal ideological currents of the
Latin American left, was evolved by Heinz Dieterich Steffan, a German -Marxist, and
propagated in the mid-1990s. Chavez, a Venezuelan paratrooper, -discerned, early
in his career, the dyna-mics of politico-military domination in the region.8 He
formulated his ideo­logy of 21st century socialism broadly on ­Dieterich‟s tenets.
• Ethics and morality are essential to fight the demons spawned by capitalism,
individualism, selfishness, contempt, pri-vileges, and corruption. (Chavez claims
Jesus Christ was the original -socialist. He is unabashedly Christian, though he does
not accept the authority of the Catholic Church in political affairs.)
• Participatory democracy seeks to reach the people directly. Representative
democracy, prevalent in most countries, superimposes an elite between the -voters
and political parties, frequently distorting the mandate given to the -ruling class.
• Equality goes hand in hand with lib­erty. Chavez stresses that his socialism does
not arrogate all powers to the state. It -respects private property.
• Cooperativism and association in the economic sphere. This implies priority to
collectivism and instruments of public economic activity, as well as endogenous
development.9
After assuming office in February 1999, Chavez strengthened his hold on the military
establishment, rooting out those whose loyalty was suspect. He dismantled the
existing social programmes managed by corrupt and inefficient elements of the
armed forces and bureaucracy. He formed his own United Socialist Party of
Venezuela (PSUV) and marginalised the traditional political parties AD and COPEI.
The vast resources of the state-owned oil giant Petroleos de Venezuela (PdVSA)
would finance his social programmes or Missions.
The first Mission, Barrio Adentro (Into the Slums), relies on thousands of Cuban
doctors and nurses to provide constant healthcare to poorer neighbourhoods.
Subsequent Missions were aimed at literacy (Robinson and Rivas); provision of
identity cards (Identidad, to ensure access to subsidised essentials and services,
and ensure voting); subsidised supermarkets (Mercal); employment through
cooperatives (Vuelvan Caras); housing (Habitat), and others. Billions of petrodollars
have been invested in these -programmes, which have been a priority for Chavez.
He also moved to gain control of the mighty PdVSA, widely seen as elitist and
corrupt. In keeping with his pledge to -reduce links with the US economy, he
expelled US companies Exxon and Conoco Philips from the country, allowing
Che-vron to stay, after it accepted the far more drastic terms set by Chavez in 2001
on the oil industry. Chavez has natio-na-lised foreign holdings, mainly US and
Euro-pean, in several other industries, inclu-ding petrochemicals,
telecommu-ni-cations, electri--city, mining, banking, steel, cement, food processing,
and -retail supermarkets. He has also pressured -surviving foreign companies, such
as Japanese automobile manu-facturers, to progressively indigenise production
lines.
Chavez has won every election he has fought since 1998, survived a coup in 2002,
and defeated a fractured opposition‟s attempt to dismiss him by referendum in
2004.10 He lost a referendum in 2007 seeking to amend the 1999 constitution to
provide, among other things, the right to re-election. In 2009, another referendum
approved the re-election law. He won in October 2012 with a margin of 11% over
Henrique Capriles Radonski. The election was notable for its lack of acrimony.
Capriles, though, has managed to unite the opposition, which will continue to
challenge Chavez in forthcoming elec-tions. Chavez is recovering from cancer, after
treatment in Cuba, and his ability to survive this disease is debatable. He still
continues to be the ideological spirit ­behind the New Left. Venezuela‟s oil ­reserves,
which exceed those of Saudi Arabia, provide him sufficient material underpinning.
Bolivia
Successful US pressure on the left-wing regime led by the Nationalist Revo-lutionary
Movement (MNR) that came to power in 1951, and over subse-quent decades,
ensured the subordination of the Bolivian political economy to US -interests.
Evo Morales, born to a poor family, who became the leader of growers of coca leaf in
the Bolivian highlands, has transformed politics in Bolivia since his election in 2006.
After a tumultuous decade in a country which saw considerable political turnover,
Bolivia‟s first president of indigenous descent rode the socialist wave. Closely allied
with his vice president, Alvaro Garcia Linera, a Spanish-origin Marxist and former
guerrilla leader, he launched a new political party, Movimiento al Socialismo
(Movement towards Socialism). Claiming Boli-via could not be a socialist state
because of the absence of a significant prole-tariat, Garcia propagated a vision of
-Andean Capitalism.11
Morales reduced the holding of the powerful Brazilian oil and gas company,
Petrobras, in a crucial natural gas venture, and negotiated fresh terms with Brazil for
the continued supply of natural gas. President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of Brazil
conceded Bolivia‟s right to renegotiate, aware of Brazil‟s need to ­access Bolivia‟s
massive gas reserves, thereby prudently reaffirming his leftist credentials. Morales
then took similar measures on foreign ownership in mining, telecommunications,
power generation and distribution. His repeal of the infamous water privatisation
measures was a significant step.
Morales has legalised the cultivation of the coca leaf, sacred to the indigenous
Aymara community for its medi-cinal and other properties. He withstood US pressure
on the domestic coca lobby, refusing to accede to demands for indiscri-minate
eradication, which the US insists is the most effective method to arrest the narcotics
trade. The US pressure, through eli-mination of prefe-rential tariffs for -Bolivian
exports under the Andean Trade Preference regime, and allegations of conspiracy
with the opposition against Morales, led to the expulsion of the US amba-ssador to
-Bolivia in 2008. Morales also expelled representatives of the US Drug Enforcement
Administration, which had been operating in Bolivia for 35 years. 12 His defiance has
affected foreign investment in Bolivia, but his own popularity is buoyant. He won a
recall referendum in 2008 with 67% of the vote, overcame a virtual coup attempt,
and won re-election in 2010.13
Ecuador
The election of Rafael Correa in 2006 was a turning point in Ecuador‟s political
history. His popularity enabled him to amend Ecuador‟s constitution approved by
referendum in 2008 and win re-election the following year. A PhD in economics from
the University of Illinois, Correa had served in the earlier government, but had
definite views on the poli-tical economy, which he implemented vigorously. He
seized control of the important oil and gas industry; diminished the power of the
powerful business oligarchy, centred in the southern port city of Guayaquil;
established state control over essential resources such as water and minerals; and
enhan-ced benefits for labour and other vulnerable sections of society. Correa has
also sought to consciously protect the environment, at the cost of forgoing oil
exploration in sensitive Amazonian zones. His defence of the “Plurinational State”14
guarantees the rights and welfare of -indigenous commu-nities. Correa, who speaks
fluent Quechua, an indigenous language, has gai-ned political capital from a cause
that has gathered strength in the Paraguay-Bolivia-Peru-Ecuador belt, where
indigenous communities count for a significant percentage of the population. He has
successfully resisted pressure from some tradi-tional indigenous leaders, who feel
thre-atened by his pan-Ecuadorian appeal.
Correa renegotiated terms, despite -resistance from foreign oil companies, mainly to
his insistence on service (as against production sharing) contracts for oil
concessions. He has also challen-ged the World Bank, declining to service and
repay debt contracted by earlier “illegi­timate regimes” on unfair terms. This led to a
dramatic reduction in debt service payments. In 2009, he refused to extend the lease
on the Manta Port military base, which served as a Forward Ope-rating Location for
US forces. In 2010, he expelled the US ambassador, whose anti-Ecuador remarks
were -exposed by Wiki-Leaks. In August 2012, he granted asylum to the founder of
-WikiLeaks, -Julian -Assange, in the Ecuador Embassy in London. Pressure from the
US and UK to hand Assange over for extradition to Sweden, on charges considered
trumped up, was resisted by -Correa, with almost unanimous backing from regional
leaders.
Correa‟s success at reforming Ecuador, and his popularity, enabled him to survive a
brief police revolt in October 2010, during which he was personally attacked and held
hostage for several hours.
Nicaragua
Daniel Ortega Saavedra‟s guerrilla force, the Sandinista15 National Liberation Front
(FSLN) fought to overthrow the dictator Anastasio Somoza (backed by the US) in
1979. He went on to win the presidency in 1985, lost the next three elections, and
won again in 2006. After a controversial Supreme Court decision in 2011 permitted
re-election, he won another five years. Ortega has mixed Christian faith with his left
ideology. His alliance with Venezuela has helped fina-nce social programmes in
housing, education, agriculture, microcredits, and even cash transfers. Prudent
economic policies have succeeded in attracting some foreign investment and
promoting economic growth.
Paraguay and Honduras
President Fernando Lugo of Paraguay, a former priest, who won the election in 2008
despite having no party of his own, was hobbled by his need for support from his
right-wing vice president, Federico Franco. The latter blamed Lugo for instigating a
peasant-led land-grab move-ment, which led to several deaths by -police firing.
Franco‟s Party, the PLRA (Aut­hentic Radical Liberal Party), in collusion with the
right-wing Colorado Party, enginee­red Lugo‟s impeachment in a parliamentary coup
in June 2012. Paraguay was expelled from the political councils of UNASUR and
MERCOSUR, two of the most important regional organi­sations. Paraguay‟s
presidential election in 2013 will determine its standing in the region.
In Honduras, a similar, more blatant coup was mounted in 2009 against -President
Manuel Zelaya. This wealthy rancher, elected in 2006, alienated the conservative
business and military esta-blishments through his people-friendly policies. He took
Honduras into ALBA, and was poised to change the constitution to permit reelection. The conservative opposition convinced the military to physically deport him
to Costa Rica, -after forcing him to resign. Regional and international condemnation
did not prevent the right-wing Porfirio Lobo, elected under the new dispensation,
from being gradually accepted into regional forums. Honduras is shunned by ALBA.
Zelaya -returned to Honduras in 2011 under a deal seen as an attempt at
reconciliation, though the political future of the left in Honduras is uncertain.
The Soft Left
The victory of Lula in October 2002 in Brazil after three successive defeats was
momentous. The Brazilian currency (real) was fragile, given high national debt, and
fell precipitously during and after the election. Inflation was contained by high interest
rates, while the economy struggled to integrate with the world. Lula proved his
sceptics wrong and turned the economy around. Referred to as “Lula-Lite”, he
ratified the agreement signed by his predecessor with the IMF in 1998, and
undertook drastic pension reform. Measures such as introduction of genetically
modified seeds, and a low minimum wage, were some of the steps -resisted by the
Movement of Rural Landless Workers (MST) and some of his own Workers Party
(PT) activists. By 2004, a section of the party split to form the -Socialism and Liberty
Party (PSOL). Lula and the bulk of PT nevertheless prevailed through his two terms.
His successor, Dilma Roussef, a former guerrilla fighter, won a hard-fought election
against the conservative candidate of the PSDB (Brazilian Social Democrat Party) of
former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 2010, and has continued his
policies. Brazil has effectively implemented emblematic programmes such as Fome
Zero (Zero Hunger) and Bolsa Familia (cash transfer programmes conditioned on
steps taken by poor recipients on family health, education, and so on). President
Dilma‟s latest, Brasil Sem Miseria (a massive poverty reduction campaign), is widely
acknowledged as having a significant effect on poverty and indigence in Brazil.
Brazil‟s leftist credentials were bolste­red by the creation of the World Social Forum
(WSF), which held its first meeting in the southern city of Porto Alegre in 2001.
Patronage of the ruling PT has -enabled the WSF to hold seven of its 12 meetings till
date, in Brazil. Seen as a counter to the World Economic Forum held every year in
Davos, the WSF deals with social issues through civil society. It has no specific
agenda. This open space, in accordance with its Charter of Prin­ciples is ­“plural and
diversified, non--confessional, non-governmental and non-partisan”.16
Mexico and Argentina
Mexico was one of the earliest Latin American countries to have a communist party,
on the platform of the Socialist Party launched by M N Roy in India in 1917. Power
was held tightly by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) for 70 years, ceded
only in 2000 to the right-wing National -Action Party (PAN). -Andres Manuel Lopez
Obrador, the left-wing candidate of the Democratic Revolution Party (PRD), lost the
election in 2008 to the PAN candidate. Sensing the popular mood, in 2012, he
advocated a less radical economic policy, but lost to the PRI candidate, Enrique
Peña Nieto.
Argentina saw its fortunes decline precipitously in 2001, with the tidal wave of the
Asian crisis finally swamping its Atlantic shores. The egotistical, neo--liberal policies
of President Carlos Menem (1989-99) and Finance Minister Domingo Caballo
guaranteed parity of the Arge-ntine peso to the dollar, creating the illusion of
prosperity with low inflation. With erosion of confidence and virtual bankruptcy by
2001, the peso was finally devalued, wiping out the savings of millions of
Argentinians. Through 2002-03, the economy suffered recession and high inflation.
Nestor Kirschner, a provincial economist from Menem‟s Peronist Party, became
president in 2003, determined to steer the economy left.
In August 2004, Kirschner suspended payments to the IMF, though they
subsequently resumed. He imposed economic austerity and autarchy. His wife, and
successor, Christina Fernandez de Kirschner, elected in 2007, before his death in
2010, was re-elected in 2011. She contin-ued his policy of economic nationalism.
She has taken some significant steps, such as nationalisation of the assets of the
Spanish oil company Repsol. She is also taking on powerful trade unions and rural
lobbies. Argentina has been enjoying a steady rate of growth, though its international
credibility is low.
Peru
Peru has been home to ancient cultures, notably the famous Inca empire, the largest
state in pre-Colombian America. After independence in 1821, Peru underwent
alternating periods of political -unrest, economic crisis and stability. It was subjected
to considerable violence in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, when the guerrilla
movement, Sendero Luminoso, gained momentum (see section on Ultra Left below).
President Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) imposed an authoritarian model, which
yielded stability at great political cost.
In 2006, Ollanta Humala, a mestizo (mixed race), of the Gana Peru alliance, fought
and lost the election on a leftist platform. In 2011, wary of accusations he would take
Peru into the ALBA, he adop­ted a more moderate stance and defeated Fujimori‟s
daughter. After assuming the presidency, he has adopted a business-friendly policy,
and steered clear of the ALBA. Humala‟s Peru is a member of the Pacific Alliance, to
which Peru acce-ded under his predecessor, Alan Garcia. It links Peru with the
market--oriented economies of Mexico, Colombia and Chile.
Chile
The Communist Party of Chile (PCCh), the oldest and largest communist party in
Latin America, was founded in 1922. It participated in the Popular Front government
of 1938, growing rapidly among the unionised working class in the 1940s. Concern
over the PCCh‟s success at building a strong electoral base, combined with the
onset of the cold war, led to its being outlawed in 1948, for almost a decade. As a
component of the Popular Unity coalition, with the Socialist Party that elected
Salvador Allende to the presidency in 1970, the PCCh played a strong moderating
role. Allende represented the moderate wing of the Socia-list Party. His economic
restructuring programme championed state ownership and intervention in the
economy, and promoted redistributive policies. -After the coup by General Augusto
Pinochet in 1973, the PCCh leadership was decimated, as were the revolutionary
groups, Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) and the Movement of the
Revolutionary Left (MIR).17
In 1988, external pressure forced Pinochet to hold a referendum on the return of
democracy, which he lost. By then, structural changes in Chilean society, the decline
of traditional manufacturing and extractive industries, the weakening of the labour
movement, and the -collapse of the Soviet Union had debilitated the left. A coalition
of the Socialists and the Christian Democrats formed the -Concertación por la
Democracia (Coalition for Democracy). The economy, however, was doing so well
that the policies of the Concertación, first under the Chri-stian Democrats, then from
2000-10 -under the Socialist presidents Ricardo -Lagos and Michelle Bachelet,
conso-lidated the existing economic model.18 In 2010, Sebastian Piñera, the
candidate of the centre-right Coalición por el -Cambio (Coalition for Change) won the
presidency.
Uruguay
Through the 20th century, Uruguay had a relatively stable political system dominated
by the two traditional conservative parties, the Blancos and the Colorados. In the late
1960s, a deterioration in the economic situation led to an increase in social
movements. In the early 1970s, the Tupamaro National Liberation Movement,
established earlier by militants, joined the other left groups to form the Frente Amplio
(Broad Front). In 2004, its candidate, Tabaré Vazquez, won the presidency. He was
succeeded in 2009 by the Broad Front candidate, José Mujica, a former guerrilla
leader. Both followed moderate policies. Uruguay´s left has shown similar tendencies
in power to those of Brazil and Chile, leading some analysts to label it a role model
for the left in Latin America.19
Mauricio Funes, a former guerrilla leader, was elected president in El Salvador after
a campaign in which he dis-tanced himself from radical regimes. He has pursued a
centrist, moderate -economic policy.
The Ultra Left
Through the course of the 20th century, most attempts in the region to steer a course
similar to that of Cuba had to contend with a vigilant US establishment. Left-wing
governments and movements in Mexico, Guatemala, Argentina, Chile, Peru,
Colombia, Bolivia and elsewhere were subverted or stamped out, through overt
and/or covert support to military or right-wing alternatives. Castro‟s atte­mpts to
export his revolution within the region, spearheaded by his Argentine-born alter ego,
the legendary Che -Guevara, were monitored and targeted -meticulously by the US
establishment, ending with Che‟s assassination in Boli-via in 1967.20 US forces
blatantly invaded the Dominican Republic (1965), Grenada (1983) and Panama
(1989).
Several countries in the LAC region have been through situations bordering civil war.
Innate inequities, economic turbulence and uncertainty, racial and ethnic tensions,
and reaction to the -collaboration between local and foreign business elites, gave
rise to several guerrilla movements. The most significant were in El Salvador,
Nicaragua, Guatemala, Peru and Colombia. In the late 1950s, the split between
Beijing and Moscow created new opportunities for Latin American revolutions. The
Maoist model of peasant-based revolution ins-pired those Latin Americans who were
dissatisfied with the orthodox, Moscow-influenced communist parties.
The Central American movements have since been largely pacified. Successive
governments in most of these countries have ensured a balance between social
priorities and economic growth. Free and fair elections, monitored by vigilant regional
organisations, have even brought former guerrillas to power. The larger guerrilla
movements in Peru and Colombia merit study.
Shining Path in Peru
The Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso; SL) movement was founded by Marxist
intellectual and educationist Abimael Guzman, who split the Communist Party of
Peru in 1963, advocating the Maoist philosophy of peasant revolution. One of the
most successful insurgent groups in the western hemisphere, it gained -control of a
substantial portion of Andean (highland) Peru through violent insurgency. In 1966,
President Fernando Belaunde Terry authorised troops to put down the peasant
revolt, commencing two decades of violent military action.21 By 1984, more than
8,700 Peruvians had been killed and 4,000 had disappeared. 22
By 1990, when President Alberto -Fujimori took office, SL numbered almost 25,000
militants and controlled about a quarter of all the municipalities. He admi-nistered
“Fujishock,” engineering an auto-coup and assuming emergency powers. In
September 1993, Guzman was captured and imprisoned. Sympathisers of Guzman,
whose surrender was not an acceptance of defeat, are still fighting his cause through
the Peruvian legal system. There have also been recent reports of sporadic guerrilla
activity in Peru, attributed to SL.23
Colombia
The assassination of popular radical leftist leader, and candidate for Colombian
presidency, Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, in 1948 resulted in bloody civil strife that -wrac-ked
Colombia for 10 years. The -cohabitation established between the Conservative
Party and the Liberal -Party, for decades thereafter, marginalised the left. The
Colombian Communist Party (PCC), accredited to the Comintern in 1930, had
organised the peasants and working class against landholders and the military
establishment. It was violently repressed, with the overt and covert support of the
US.24 The left then regrouped in guerrilla movements such as M19, the People‟s
Liberation Army (EPL) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). The last is still active,
along with the more powerful Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Rich
landholders, with the blessings of successive Colombian governments, began
forming armed paramilitary forces for protection in the 1970s. These in time morphed
into gangs with their own agendas, involved in drug-trafficking and kidnapping.
-Under international pressure, the Colom-bian government managed to disband the
principal paramilitary bands, though vestiges remain. The civil conflict resulted in
thousands of deaths and more than three million internally displaced. 25
The FARC-People‟s Army (FARC-EP) is Latin America‟s oldest, largest, most
-capable and best-equipped insurgency of Marxist origin. Inspired in the early 1960s,
it took shape under the leadership of Manuel Marulanda Velez, who in 1961 declared
an independent “Republic of Marquetalia” within Colombian terri­tory. By 1982,
FARC had grown to several thousand strong and was reputed to be living off the
drug trade.26 Attempts by successive presidents Belisario Betancur in 1982, Cesar
Gaviria in 1990, Ernesto Samper in 1994, and Andres Pastrana in 1999 failed to
negotiate a settlement. By 2002, FARC-EP had been granted a safe haven of
around 42,000 square kilometres, con-trolled by around 20,000 armed fighters. It
carried out high-profile kidnappings, assassinations of political figures, and soldiers,
and attacks on civil and military targets. The guerrillas managed to take advantage of
the porous borders with neighbouring Ecuador and Venezuela to evade capture and
maintain supply lines.
Pastrana signed on for US government assistance in 2000. Through Plan Colo-mbia,
the US, ostensibly acting against the drug trade, has provided material and training
worth an estimated $500-600 million annually. Colombia‟s atte­mpts to obtain more
international support have been partially successful. Most Latin American
governments refuse to refer to the FARC as terrorists, though neighbouring countries
collaborate, as far as possible, to ensure the guerrillas do not use their territory.
Recently there have been arrests and extradition to Colom-bia of FARC activists,
especially from Venezuela.
President Alvaro Uribe (2002-10) undertook an aggressive military campaign to
reduce FARC influence and presence. By early 2012, FARC had lost its -major
leaders. Marulanda died of natural causes in 2010. Its current strength is estimated
at less than 9,000 activists, operating in small groups. Its tactics have changed to hit
and run bombings and assassination attempts, and it has reportedly released all its
captives.
In August 2012, representatives of FARC met with representatives of the -Colombian
government in Havana to discuss a ceasefire and a negotiated settlement. Chile has
offered assistance, as has Venezuela. Preliminary talks were held in Oslo, Norway,
in October 2012, and again in Havana in November 2012. The FARC delegation
demands agrarian reform as a primary condition for a -settlement, and wants to put
on the agenda the nation‟s economic model, free trade deals, and military war
crimes. The Colombian government refuses to halt its military campaign against the
guerrillas and claims its economic model is not negotiable. It also includes in the
agenda the narcotics trade, surrender and laying down of arms by militants, and
compensation to victims.27 It is clear that a settlement will take time.
Conclusions
The New Left in Latin America, resurgent in the core states of Venezuela, Ecuador,
Bolivia and Nicaragua, is dormant or nascent in Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay,
Paraguay, Peru, Mexico and some Central American and Caribbean states. Inspired
by Cuba, its survival is underwritten by the hydrocarbon reso-urces of Venezuela.
Successful social programmes implemented in some of these states have, to some
extent, vindicated their radical political stance. Poverty levels have been reduced,
although resistance to these regimes, mainly from traditional investors and
commercial partners in the developed world, has -adversely affected their
economies. They resort to unorthodox methods to overcome difficulties arising from
-unstable currencies, inflation, reduced foreign -investment, poor credit ratings,
adverse trade balances, and dependence on -primary resources.
Telesur (La Nueva Televisora del Sur: The New Television of the South) is a pan-
Latin American terrestrial and satellite network headquartered in Caracas. It was
launched in January 2005, with the objective of providing independent and locally
generated information, to counter the established Latin American and international
networks. Active diplomacy by Chavez was responsible for the formation of the
South Bank (BancoSur) under the aegis of the pan-South American organisation
UNASUR (Union of South American Nations). Its seed capital of around $7 billion is
contributed mainly by Venezuela, Brazil and- Arge-ntina, with Bolivia, Ecuador and
others participating. It is an attempt to reduce dependence on the traditional sources
of multilateral financing.
ALBA members have chosen to -en-hance economic linkages with China, Russia,
India, and other non-traditional partners, with varying results. China‟s inexorable hunt
for resources and markets has created a network of projects and linkages, which it
finances on generous terms all over the region. It has become the prime trading
partner of several Latin American countries. Its imports from, and exports to, the
region, amounted to around $250 billion in 2011. India‟s trade with the region has
gone up from $500 million in 1990-91 to more than $32 -billion in 2011-12. India‟s
imports of oil from Venezuela in 2011 amounted to just -under $7 billion. Close
relations between Iran and some of these regimes have -rai-sed eyebrows, and
allegations, in the US and Europe. ALBA members have also been quick to
denounce -western actions in Iraq, Libya, Lebanon, and have either tenuous or nonexistent relations with Israel.
The phalanx presented by ALBA has provoked reaction within the region. The Pacific
Alliance was formed in June 2012 between Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile, after
two years of discussions, to harmonise and consolidate economic exchanges and
policies. It is also seen as an attempt to coalesce these four economies on a
trajectory of high, market--oriented growth, with international linkages.
ALBA members are represented in -other regional forums CAN,28 MERCOSUR,29
UNASUR,30 and CELAC.31 In all these, Alba‟s views are incorporated in collegiate
fashion. Strategic and economic considerations have prevailed. Even far-right
regimes acknowledge that while they may agree to disagree with ALBA, the -region
can only benefit from joint and collaborative policies, as each nation is allowed to
steer its own course within the parameters laid down by the constitutive treaties of
the subregional and pan-regional organisations. These have demonstrated a
considerable degree of resilience, and at present, few regimes in the region appear
to maintain more than an arm‟s-length relationship with the US.
It is also clear that guerrilla warfare and the Ultra Left can no longer count on political
or material support of the esta-blished left-wing regimes in LAC. There may be
sympathy, and the occasional aberration on account of individual -actors. Much will
depend on the sincerity of the governments that negotiate and implement
settlements to end such -conflicts in the region. As for ideological support, Castro in
the late 1980s conveyed to the FPMR, a Chilean revolutionary movement, that the
era of armed struggle was over. Ever since then, Fidel and his brother Raul (current
president of Cuba) have sought to facilitate negotiations between regional
governments and guerrilla groups.32
It would appear that the New Left in Latin America and the Caribbean is here to stay.
It has come into being, and survived, on account of manifest failures of the ruling
class in several countries. Its legitimacy has been reaffirmed through democratic
elections. Some analysts des-cribe this movement as post-liberal or post-neoliberal.33 Strong management of the disposition of natural resources, generous social
and redistributive programmes, tight political control over party apparatus, as well as
over military establishments, have ensured longevity, even respectability. Traditional
patterns of economic collaboration have been successfully challenged by these
leaders. Efforts to dislodge or discredit them have had the effect of bringing them
closer together.
Regional organisations like MERCOSUR, UNASUR and CELAC, which play an
impor-tant role, abide by defined democratic charters. These will ensure that the
New Left will only be challenged successfully if their opponents manage to co-opt at
least some of the more successful elements of their paradigm.
Notes & References
1 From the Spanish word Criollo, for descendants of the conquerors and immigrants
to Latin America, as distinct from Spanish-born immigrants. See Tulio Halperin
Donghi (1993), The Contemporary History of Latin America, John Charles Chasteen
(ed and trans) (Durham, NC: Duke University Press).
2 V Bulmer-Thomas (2003), An Economic History of Latin America since
Independence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
3 R Thorp (1998), Progress, Poverty and Exclusion: An Economic History of Latin
America (Washington DC: Inter-American Development Bank).
4 The Washington Consensus refers to a set of 10 relatively specific economic policy
prescriptions believed to constitute the “standard” reform package promoted for
developing countries in crisis by Washington DC-based institutions such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and the US Treasury -Department.
The term was first used by John Williamson in “What Washington Means by Policy
Reform” in John Williamson (ed.), (1989), Latin American Readjustment: How Much
Has Happened, Washington: Institute for International Economics.
5 Jorge Castenada (2006), “Latin America‟s Left Turn”, Foreign Affairs, Vol 85, No 3.
6 See www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements- accords-commerciaux
7 See www.alianzabolivariana.org
8 Dieterich Heinz (2005), Hugo Chavez y el Socialismo del Siglo XXI (Buenos Aires:
Nuestra America).
9 Horacio Benitez (2005), “President Chavez Defines XXI Century Socialism”,
www.aporrea.org
10 “Chavez‟s Referendum Victory”, 25 February 2009, www.socialistworker.org
11 “It is a question of building a strong state, which can coordinate in a balanced way
the three „economico-productive‟ platforms that coexist in Bolivia: the communitybased, the family-based and the „modern industrial‟. It is a question of transferring a
part of the surplus of the nationalised hydrocarbons [oil and gas] in order to
encourage the setting up of forms of self-organisation, of self-management and of
commercial development that is really Andean and Amazonian. Up to now, these
traditional sectors have not been able to develop because of a „modern-industrial‟
sector that has cornered the surpluses. Our idea is that these traditional sectors
should have an economic support, should have access to raw materials and
markets, which could then generate prosperity within these artisan and family-based
processes. Bolivia will still be capitalist in 50 or 100 years.” (Interview with Alvaro
Garcia Linera, Inter-national Viewpoint, IV, 373, December 2005).
12 Economist, 6 November 2008.
13 Economist, May 2012.
14 Jayati Ghosh (2012), “Redefining Development and Quality of Life”, Economic &
Political Weekly, Vol 47, No 7.
15 Named after legendary guerrilla Augusto Sandino who fought the US occupation
of Nicaragua in the early 20th century.
16 See World Social Forum India, www.wsfindia.org
17 Peter Kingstone (2010), The Political Economy of Latin America: Reflections on
Neoliberalism and Development (New York: Routledge), pp 84-85.
18 Ibid.
19 David Altmann, Rossana Castiglioni and Juan Pablo Luna (2008), “Uruguay: A
Role Model for the Left?” in Jorge Castañeda and Marco Morales (ed.), Leftovers:
Tales of the Latin American Left (New York: Routledge).
20 Richard Gott (2010), “Green Beret behind the Capture of Che Guevara”, The Age,
8 September.
21 Cynthia McClintock (2001), “Peru‟s Sendero Luminoso Rebellion: Origins and
Trajectory” in Susan Eckstein (ed.), Power and Popular Protest: Latin American
Social Movements (Berkeley: University of California Press), pp 61-101.
22 Dennis M Rempe (1995), Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol 6, No 3 (London:
Frank Cass), pp 304-27.
23 Yael Shahar (2008), “Sendero Luminoso: Insurgency Resurgent?”, 29 October,
www.ict.org.il
24 Thomas E Skidmore, Peter H Smith and James Green, ed. (2009), Modern Latin
America, seventh edition (New York: Oxford University Press).
25 Human Rights Watch (2009), World Report 2009, www.hrw.org
26 National Counter Terrorism Centre, US Government, www.nctc.gov
27 See www.eltiempo.com, 24 September 2012.
28 CAN (The Andean Community), Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia.
29 MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market), Para-guay, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay
and -Venezuela.
30 UNASUR (The Union of South American States), all 12 sovereign nations of the
South American continent, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay,
Peru, Ecuador, -Colombia, Venezuela, Suriname and Guyana.
31 CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States), conceived in
February 2010 and formalised in December 2011, comprising all 33 sovereign states
of LAC, including Cuba; a sort of Organisation of American States, without the US
and Canada.
32 Gabriel Gaspar, Interview in La Tercera, 8 September 2012, p 17.
33 Post (Neo) Liberalism: “A set of political aspirations centred on reclaiming the
authority of the state to oversee the construction of a new social consensus and
approach to welfare, and the body of economic policies that seek to enhance or
rebuild the capacity of the state to manage the market and the export economy in
ways that not only ensure growth but are also responsive to social needs and
citizenship demands.” In Jean Grugel and Pia Riggirozzi (2012), “Post-neoliberalism
in Latin America: Rebuilding and Reclaiming the State after ­Crisis”, Development
and Change, Vol 43, No 1, pp 1-21.