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ROLE OF INDIA AFTER BREAK-UP OF SOVIET UNION IN
DEVELOPMENT, PEACE AND SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
OF RUSSIA SINCE 1989-2000
In this context, we can say that both the countries were firm on their
continued efforts to develop and strengthen relations in every sphere through
regular visits and dialogues and to support each other endeavor so what ever the
case may be. Hence we will continue examining relations under various heads:
Indo-Russian Relations from 1989-1990-VP Singh Regime
On 12 March 1990, V.P. Singh spoke to Gorbachev on phone
congratulating him on his election as Soviet president. Again on 27 May he had
an 18 minute telephone conversation with Gorbachev covering the Indo-Pak
confrontation situation over Kashmir. His call was motivated by India’s concern
that Gorbachev should remain well informed of India’s position before he went to
Washington for his coming summit with the US president George Bush. It was
also particularly motivated by certain reports emanating from American sources
that India was getting ready for a nuclear confrontation with Pakistan.1
In a significant foreign policy move, V.P. Singh decided to go to Moscow
on 23 July 1990. It was the first summit level visit after the installation of the
National Front Government in India and the first contact at the top between the
two countries after a year. Considering the developments in the Soviet Union,
East Europe and Washington Moscow détente on the one hand and the sea change
in the south Asian region and end of the Congress rule in India, they had enough
to talk about.2
V.P. Singh’s main concern was to seek clarification on the economic
policy of Gorbachev which he had outlined at the Communist party congress. He
was reported to have called for introducing certain corrections in the Soviet
Union’s cooperation with third world countries with particular reference to the
conversion of rouble value. During the discussions the rupee-rouble exchange rate
figured in a big way as the entire amount of trade relations between the two
countries revolved around the rupee payment. Under the protocol signed in
Moscow last month, the trade and payment agreement between India and the
Soviet Union which formed the basis of rupee payment had been extended up to
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31 December 1995. The Indo-Soviet trade plan for 1990 envisaged a trade
turnover of Rs. 8800 crores of which the exports to the Soviet Union would
amount to Rs. 5300 crores and imports from that country to Rs. 3500 crores.3 The
Soviet Union offered to sell high technology aircrafts IL-76, YAK 42 and
helicopters to India. USSR maintained that India and Pakistan should resolve the
issues through bilateral cooperation as envisaged in the Shimla Agreement.
V.P. Singh had taken with him the external affairs minister I.K. Gujaral,
finance minister Madhu Dandwate and commerce minister Arun Nehru, each
meant to meet his Soviet counterpart. Both the leaders were engrossed with their
domestic worries. As V.P. Singh and Gorbachev met at the summit neither could
shake off the shadows of his domestic crisis. At one of the meetings, Gorbachev
looked twice at his wrist watch. A hundred critical domestic issues claimed his
attention in the wake of the CPSU’s 28th Congress V.P. Singh’s mind too
continued to turn back to Delhi where a larger agenda of image repairing jobs
cried out for his return. His was a minority coalition of the two disparate allies
BJP and the leftists, who had hardly seen eye to eye on any issue, national or
international. In the week before he left for Moscow his government faced its first
serious crisis. Despite these handicaps the two leaders worked sincerely for two
days to see that Indo-Soviet relations remained stable.4 Gorbachev in his talks
with V.P. Singh categorically stated that the Soviet Union stood as firmly as ever
behind India on this issue in reiterating that Kashmir was an integral part of India.
Moscow was against internationalizing this issue and Washington had already
been informed accordingly. Shevardnadze, on behalf of his boss declared that
there was complete understanding between the two sides on the Kashmir issue.5
The Indian side was left with no doubt whatsoever, that if it came to the
confrontation or conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir, the Soviet Union would
stand firmly by India.
However, as a sort of parting message Gorbachev told V.P. Singh that the
Soviet Union did not compare their ties with India with those with any other
country, the Indo-Soviet relationship was unique. The relationship was still
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relevant to both countries and to a world searching for a new order of peace and
cooperation, India had to reciprocate these sentiments.
On his way back home, V.P. Singh said that the policy decisions on
cooperation between India and the Soviet Union taken during talks would take a
concrete form in a comprehensive agreement which would be signed during
Gorbachev’s visit to India early next year. The proposed agreements would cover
the entire gamut of economic issues besides science and technology.
The
proposals were meant for long range economic cooperation covering the period
upto 2000 and were included to set the tone for the 21st century. The agreement
could record the decision to continue the rupee trade till 1995. Meanwhile, some
ancillary agencies would be set up to explain the rules and procedures of one side
to the other apart from taking care of coordination and monitoring of cooperative
arrangements.6
Indo-Russian Relations from 1991-P.V. Narsimha Rao Govt.
On August 8, 1991, the two countries renewed the Indo-Soviet treaty of
1971 for another twenty years reaffirming their faith in the treaty as having
served the national interests of both the countries providing a reliable basis of
cooperation between the two countries in defence and economic matters and as
a potential factor in maintaining peace in Asia. Hardly the ink was dry on new
renewed document treaty when a coup was staged in Moscow on 19 August
challenging reforms introduced by Gorbachev. The developments took place so
rapidly that the Indian Govt. could not keep pace with trends to realize how this
event would interact on Indo-Soviet relations. However the Govt. on 22nd August
sent congratulatory message to both Gorbachev and Yeltsin expressing relief at
the outcome and reiterating their faith in the abiding nature of Indo-Soviet
friendship.
It was well realized in official circles that in the light of momentous
changes taking place in Soviet Union, India’s relations would have to be
restructured. First step in this direction was taken when the external affair
minister Madhav Singh Solanki was chosen to visit Moscow as a special envoy of
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Prime minister from 13-15 November, 1991.He was have been preceded by a
team of top officials but their visit was cancelled because of sweeping changes
introduced by Boris Yeltsin in Russian Federation, by scraping old ministries,
creating new ones and merging some giving an entirely new look to the
administrative set up. Hence it was very difficult to identify the counterparts. For
a variety of reasons, including domestic preoccupations, Russian leaders were
slow in responding to India’s move for renewal of contacts with Russian
Federation. By what he said and observed, Solanki inferred that the incessant
struggle of supremacy between Gorbachev and Yeltsin was likely to unsettle
India’s traditional ties of friendship with Soviet Union. While Gorbachev as head
of Union still valued the Indo-Soviet connections, Yeltsin as head of Russian
Federation was reluctant to commit himself to anything until India acknowledged
him to be its valid and indeed the only spokesman of what remained of the
country. Yeltsin was more interested in maintaining status quo. His entourage had
made it clear that Indo-Soviet relationship had lost its dynamism and momentum.
Solanki wind up his visit with the assurance of continuing goodwill of Soviet
leaders but trade and defence issues were uncertain.
Disintegration of Soviet Union
The weakening of the Soviet government led to a series of events that
eventually caused the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a gradual process that took
place from about January 19, 1990, to December 31, 1991. This process was
characterized by many of the republics of the Soviet Union declaring their
independence and being recognized as sovereign nation states
In February, 1990, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union agreed to give up its monopoly of power. Over the next several weeks, the
15 constituent republics of the USSR held their first competitive elections.
Reformers and ethnic nationalists won many of the seats.
The constituent republics began to assert their national sovereignty and
started a "war of laws" with the Moscow central government, wherein the
governments of the constituent republics repudiated union-wide legislation where
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it conflicted with local laws, asserting control over their local economies and
refusing to pay tax revenue to the central Moscow government. This strife caused
economic dislocation as supply lines in the economy were severed, and caused the
Soviet economy to decline further.7
The pro-independence movement in the Lithuanian SSR, Sajudis,
established on June 3, 1988, caused a visit by Gorbachev in January 1990 to the
Lithuanian capital, Vilinius, which provoked a pro-independence rally of around
250,000 people. On March 11, 1990, the Lithuanian SSR, led by Chairman of the
Supreme Council Vytautas Landsbergis, declared restoration of independence.
However, the Soviet Army attempted to suppress the movement. The Soviet
Union initiated an economic blockade of Lithuania and kept troops there "to
secure the rights of ethnic Russians.8
On March 30, 1990, the Estonian Supreme Council declared Soviet power
in Estonian SSR since 1940 to have been illegal, and started a process to
reestablish Estonia as an independent state. The process of restoration of
independence of the Latvian SSR began on May 4, 1990, with a Latvian Supreme
Council vote stipulating a transitional period to complete independence.
On January 13, 1991, Soviet troops, along with KGB Spetsnaz Alpha
Group stormed the Vilnius TV Tower in Vilnius Lithuania to suppress the
nationalist media. This ended with 14 unarmed civilians dead and hundreds more
injured. Later that month in Georgian SSR anti-Soviet protesters at Tbilisi
demonstrated support for Lithuanian independence.9
On March 17, 1991, in a Union-wide referendum 76.4% of all voters
voted for the retention of the Soviet Union in a reformed form.10 The Baltics,
Armenia, Georgia, Chechnya (which was by now referring to itself as Ichkeria
and despite previously being a region within Russia officially, had a strong desire
to emulate the independence of its neighbors)
11
and Moldova boycotted the
referendum. In each of the other nine republics, a majority of the voters supported
the retention of the renewed Soviet Union. Following the results, Armenia
indicated it wanted to rejoin in Union discussion.
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On June 12, 1991, Yeltsin won 57% of the popular vote in the democratic
elections for the post of president of the Russian SFSR, defeating Gorbachev's
preferred candidate, Nikolai Ryzhkov, who won 16% of the vote. In his election
campaign, Yeltsin criticized the "dictatorship of the centre", but did not suggest
the introduction of a market economy. Instead, he said that he would put his head
on the rail track in the event of increased prices. Yeltsin took office on July 10.
On the night of July 31, 1991, Russian Omon from Riga, the Soviet military
headquarters in the Baltics, assaulted the Lithuanian border post in Medininkai
and killed seven Lithuanian servicemen. This further weakened the Soviet Union's
position, internationally and domestically.
Faced with growing republic separatism, Gorbachev attempted to
restructure the Soviet Union into a less centralized state. On August 20, 1991, the
Russian SFSR was scheduled to sign the New Union Treaty, which was to convert
the Soviet Union into a federation of independent republics with a common
President, foreign policy and Military. The new treaty was strongly supported by
the Central Asian republics, which needed the economic power and common
markets of the other Soviet republics to prosper. However, this meant the
preservation of the Communist Party's control over economic and social life.
The more radical reformists were increasingly convinced that a rapid
transition to a market economy was required, even if the eventual outcome
included the disintegration of the Soviet Union into several independent nationstates. Disintegration of the USSR also accorded with the desires of Yeltsin's
presidency of the Russian Federation as well as regional and local authorities, to
establish full power over their territories and get rid of pervasive Moscow
ideological control. In contrast to the reformers' lukewarm approach to the new
treaty, the conservatives and remaining 'patriots' and Russian nationalists of the
USSR, still strong within the CPSU and military establishment, were completely
opposed to anything that might contribute to the weakening of the Soviet state and
its centralized power base.
On August 19, 1991, Gorbachev's vice president Gennadi Yanayev, prime
minister Valentin Pavlov, defense minister Dmitriy, KGB chief Vladimir
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Kryuchkov, and other senior officials acted to prevent the signing of the union
treaty by forming the "General Committee on the State Emergency." The
"Committee" put Gorbachev (vacationing in Foros, Crimea) under house arrest,
reintroduced political censorship, and attempted to stop the perestroika English
means Restructuring rebuilding.
Perestroika was a political movement within the communist party of
Soviet Union widely associated with the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Its
literal meaning is "restructuring", referring to the restructuring of the Soviet
political and economic system. Perestroika refers to major changes initiated by
Mikhail Gorbachev to the structure and function of both the political and
economic control of the Soviet Union allowing more independent actions from
the various ministries and eventually to the dismantling of the Soviet-era
command economy and its replacement with a market economy. However, the
process arguably exacerbated already existing social and economic tensions
within the Soviet Union, and no doubt helped to further nationalism among the
constituent republics, as well as social fragmentation.12
Glasnost means publicity or openness to public. This was the policy of
maximal publicity, openness, and transparency in the activities of all government
institutions in the Soviet Union, together with freedom of Information, introduced
by Mikhail Gorbachev in the second half of the 1980s. The word was frequently
used by Gorbachev to specify the policies he believed might help reduce the
corruption at the top of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, and
moderate the abuse of administrative power in the Central Committee.13
Perestroika is often argued to be one reason for the fall of communism in
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and for the end of the Cold War. The coup
leaders quickly issued an emergency decree suspending political activity and
banning most newspapers. While coup organizers expected some popular support
for their actions, the public sympathy in large cities and in republics was largely
against them. Russian SFSR President Boris Yeltsin was quick to condemn the
coup and grab popular support for himself.
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Table 3.1 : Leaders of Union of Soviet Socialists Republic (USSR) 14
Sr.
Leaders
Started & Ended
No.
1.
Vladimr Lenin
Nov.8, 1917- Jan.21, 1924
2.
Grigory Zinoview
1922-1925 (Troika)
Joseph Stalin
Lev Kamenev
3.
Joseph Stalin
April 3, 1922- March 5,
1953
4.
Georgy
March 5, 1953- Feb. 8, 1955
Malenkov
5.
Georgy Malenkov
March 13, 1953-June 26,
Lavrentiy Beria
1953 (Troika)
Vyacheslav Molotov
6.
Nikita Khrushchev
Sep. 7, 1953-Oct. 14, 1964
7.
Alexei Kosygin
Oct. 14, 1964-June 16, 1977
Anastas Mikoyan
(Troika)
Nikolai Podgorny
Leonid Brezhnev
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8.
Leonid
Oct. 14, 1964- Nov. 10, 1982
Brezhnev
9.
Yuri Andropov
Nov. 12, 1982- Feb. 9, 1984
10.
Konstantin
Feb. 13, 1984- March 10,
Chernenko
1985
11.
Mikhail
March 11, 1985-December 25, 1991
Gorbachev
The August developments marked a turning point in the history of the
erstwhile USSR. The coup fizzled out within 72 hours and Mr. Gorbachev, who
had been placed in a sort of preventive custody, returned to Moscow in his
capacity as the President of the Soviet Union. President B N Yeltsin of the
Russian Federation, displaying rare courage and qualities of outstanding
leadership, played a crucial role in bringing about the collapse of the coup. The
restoration of constitutional order following the abortive coup marked the victory
of the will of the people and a reassertion of democratic values.
Thousands of people in Moscow came out to defend the White House (the
Russian Federation's parliament and Yeltsin's office), then the symbolic seat of
Russian sovereignty. The organizers tried but ultimately failed to arrest Yeltsin,
who rallied mass opposition to the coup. The Special Forces dispatched by the
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coup leaders took up positions near the White House, but would not storm the
barricaded building.
The final round of the Soviet Union collapse took place following the
Ukranian popular referendum on December 1, 1991, wherein 90% of voters opted
for independence. The leaders of the three principal Slavic republics (the Russian,
Ukrainian and Belarussian SSRs) agreed to meet for a discussion of possible
forms of relationship, alternative to Gorbachev's struggle for a union.
On December 8, 1991, the leaders of the Russian, Ukrainian, and
Belarusian republics met in Belavezhskaya Pushcha and signed the Belavezha
Accords declaring the Soviet Union dissolved and replacing it with the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Gorbachev described this as an
unconstitutional coup, but it soon became clear that the development could not be
halted.
On December 12, 1991, Russia's secession from the Union was sealed,
with the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR formally ratifying the Belavezha
Accords and denouncing the 1922 Treaty on the creation of the Soviet Union.
On December 17, 1991, alongside 28 European countries, the European
Community, and four non-European countries, twelve of the fifteen soviet
republics signed the European Energy Charter in the Hague as sovereign states.
Post Soviet States in alphabetical order:
1. Armenia,
3. Belarus, 4. Estonia,
6. Kazakhstan,
2. Azerbaijan,
5. Georgia,
7. Kyrgyzstan,
8. Latvia, 9. Lithuania, 10. Moldova,
11. Russia,
12. Tajikistan,
13. Turkmenistan, 14. Ukraine,
15. Uzbekistan
Doubts remained over the authority of the Belavezha Accords to affect the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, since they were signed by only five of the Soviet
Republics. However, on December 21, 1991, representatives of all member
republics except Georgia signed the Alma-Ata Protocol, in which they confirmed
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the dissolution of the Union. That same day, all former-Soviet republics agreed to
join the CIS, with the exception of the three Baltic States and Georgia. The
documents signed at Alam-Ata also addressed several issues raised by the Union's
extinction. Notably, Russia was authorized to assume the role of the USSR in the
United Nations, which meant inheriting its permanent membership on the
Security Council. The Soviet Ambassador to the UN delivered to the Secretary
General a letter by Russia's president, Boris Yeltsin, dated December 24, 1991,
informing him that, in virtue of that agreement, Russia was the successor state to
the USSR for the purposes of UN membership. After being circulated among the
other UN member states with no objection raised, the statement was declared
accepted on December 31.
On December 25, 1991, Gorbachev resigned as President of the USSR,
declaring the office extinct and ceding all the powers still vested in it to the
president of Russia: Yeltsin. Mikhail Gorbachev in a televised broadcast said,
“We live in a new world. The cold war is finished…..”15 That new world saw the
emergence of Russia as the continuer state 16 of the Soviet Union losing its super
power status but retaining the permanent seat in the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC). On the night of that same day, the Soviet flag was lowered for
the last time over the Kremlin. Finally, a day later on December 26, 1991, the
Council of Republics (a chamber) of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR recognized
the dissolution of the Soviet Union and dissolved itself (another chamber of the
Supreme Soviet had been unable to work during some months before this, due to
absence of a quorum). By December 31, 1991, all official Soviet institutions had
ceased operations, as individual republics assumed the central government's role.
A combination of many factors leaded to the disintegration of the USSR which
are as under:
1. The USSR was stagnating economically during this time. The socialist
economic setup meant that state was paying for all the Arms that the USSR
bought. It had a huge burden on the state.
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2. There was large scale red tapism & corruption in the country. The
state became unaccountable to the people and they refused to support a
government that did not give them any political freedom.
3. The people of USSR had been isolated from the west for a long time.
In the 1980s, when they finally saw that they were economically, politically,
culturally and technologically behind USA, there was a huge psychological
shock.
4. Gorbachev tried to introduce reforms, but the Communist Party felt
that he was
going too fast and the people thought he was going too slow. He
was stuck in the middle and lost support everywhere. The people decided that
they could do without the Soviet Party.
5. There was a rise of nationalism in states like Belarus, Estonia and
Ukraine. Revolts here were not crushed and finally they began to break off.
The Russian Federation inherited 75 percent of former territory of USSR,
51 percent of its population 60 percent of basic assets and 76 percent of Industrial
enterprises17. It accounts for 90 percent of oil output, 73 percent of extraction of
gas, 63 percent of the production of electricity, 80 percent of the export of crude
oil and almost 100 percent of the export of natural gas (compared with USSR).
The GDP is about 50 percent of that produced by the Soviet Union on the eve of
its collapse.18
Impact of Disintegration of USSR on India
The initial two years (1991-93) were most difficult years in bilateral
relations. The confusion and intense debate in Russian foreign policy
establishment regarding the course of action to be undertaken i.e. whether to
pursue a vigorous pro-west policy giving up the old relations or maintain a
balance among old and new partners, further delayed the evolution of a concrete
foreign policy. Russian economy was undergoing difficult phase of transition
from a socialist society moving towards a market oriented pattern; the transition
swept the whole society that was unprepared for such a drastic change. In this
complex scenario, it was but natural that Indo-Russian relations underwent a huge
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churning process. T.N.Kaul former ambassador to the Soviet Union observed :
“there is bound to be some changes in these(Indo-Russian) relations because of
the systematic, geographical and geo-political mutations taking place in the far
flung areas, regions and states of the erstwhile USSR.”19
The post-disintegration Russian political scene witnessed serious debates
among various political leaders and factions regarding foreign policy choices.
Various scholars and political leaders criticized the extreme pro-Western
orientation of Kozyrev. Georgy Kundadze, Deputy Foreign Minister argued
against retaining the `special relationship’ with India that the Soviet Union had
cultivate in the interests of cold war confrontation with the United States and
China. Yevgeny Pudovkin, member of the Foreign Relations Committee,
contested this position and said it was a major mistake of Russian diplomacy to
renounce the special relationship with India. He said there were few countries in
the world with which Moscow had such a long standing not be squandered.
Yevgeny Chelysev, an academician and an authority on India, said it was deeply
distressing to see Russian-Indian relations coming to ruin because of Moscow’s
pro-Western orientation. India is a great power, while Pakistan and other
countries are just states like others.
Russian’s policy of developing closer ties with both, India and Pakistan,
was evident when its foreign policy documents stated: “Economic and geopolitical considerations demand close ties with India. Russia’s policy must be
formed with considerations of India’s significance as a country affirming itself as
a regional power among the developing countries.” The gap in the mutual
understanding between Russian and India leaders was one of the important factors
that led to the worsening of relations. Yeltsin offered to sign a treaty with India
during Foreign Minister Madhav Singh Solanki’s visit to Moscow, but much to
the chagrin of Yeltsin government it was quietly rejected. Times of India wrote,
“despite the chagrin it causes to Mr. Boris Yeltsin, India like other countries still
regards Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev as the principal interlocutor….”20 This was the
first direct contact between Indian Government and the Russian leaders after the
August Coup. Yeltsin in a welcome address on 15 Nov., 1991 stressed that this is
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the first visit in the history of Russian Indian Links
21
and stated that the changed
situation in USSR has made the present meeting historically necessary. He
expressed his keenness to establish ties with India and accepted the Indian PM
invitation to pay an official visit to India.
India and Russia finalized a new political treaty and signed memoranda
of understanding on trade and supplies of defence and power generation
equipment on 15 January 1992. The political treaty contained elements of the
1971 Indo-Soviet friendship treaty; the memoranda on trade and defence and
power equipment supplies had been structured to allow flexibility to meet changes
in the economies of the two countries, as stated by the Indian Foreign Secretary
J.N. Dixit.22 Yeltsin and Narasimha Rao met in New York where they were
attending UNSC meeting. In their discussion, Yeltsin stated that Russia followed
the old Soviet line; there was no change in their policy on Kashmir and other
issues.
Initially Russia’s policy towards India was thus not identical with that of
the erstwhile Soviet Union. India's response to the developments in the erstwhile
Soviet Union was in keeping, inter alia, with her geopolitical, strategic and
economic imperatives. India has in the past had wide ranging and intensive
cooperation with different Republics under the overall umbrella of Indo-Soviet
cooperation. The Government thus undertook task of disaggregating, Republicwise, Indo-Soviet ties.23
In September, India recognized the independence of the three Baltic
States. In December, India positively assessed the proposed Commonwealth of
Independent States and accorded diplomatic recognition to all the Republics of
the former Soviet Union. It is intended to establish diplomatic relations with all 15
Republics. Accordingly, it was decided to concurrently accredit India's
Ambassador in Helsinki to Estonia, India's Ambassador in Stockholm to Latvia
and India's Ambassador in Warsaw to Lithuania. A decision was also taken to
open, at this stage, new Embassies in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus and upgrade
India's Consulate General in Tashkent (Uzbekistan) and to open Consulates/CGs
in Vladivostok and St. Petersburg. For the present, the other countries, viz,
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Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Kirghizstan, Turkmenistan and
Tajikistan would be covered by concurrent accreditation.
The Minister for External Affairs visited Moscow from 14 to 19
November. He held extensive, and useful discussions with the Soviet and Russian
leaders on International and bilateral issues. His meetings with President Yeltsin
and other senior leaders of the Russian Federation were extremely useful as they
laid the foundation for further development of relation between India and the
Russian Federation, The Russian leadership conveyed that it attached priority to
development of multi-sectoral ties with India.
India’s Assistance to Russian Federation
India offered humanitarian assistance to the Russian Federation
amounting to Rs 15 crores. The purpose was to offer some succor to those
sections of the population which have been adversely affected by the dislocation
of economic activities following the recent political and economic changes in the
erstwhile USSR. The amount is to be used to supply urgently required items
including baby food, rice, standard medicines, including sulphur drugs and
antibiotics.
India also contributed an amount equivalent to US$ 250,000 for assistance
to those affected by the Chernobyl disaster. This pledge was made in the context
of the United Nations' efforts towards this end. A Russian delegation visited India
from 14 to 22 February and finalized the first-ever India-Russia Trade Protocol.
The Protocol is valid for 1992.
Many of the critical issues in Russian-Indian defence ties were to be
negotiated and resolved by defence officials from both sides in the course of a
series of visits all through 1992-98, including exclusive defence visits and of
military delegations accompanying the high-level political visits. The first in the
series of defence visits was that of Indian Defence Minister Sharad Pawar to
Moscow in September 1992. It took place at a very critical phase when India was
in dire need of spare parts for the massive inventory of its MIG aircraft acquired
from the Soviets over the years. It was then feared that the MiGs would have to be
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grounded soon unless replenishment of spare parts was resumed. In fact, exactly a
year earlier, Pawar’s visit to Moscow ( September 1991) had not yielded much,
forcing India to turn to Ukraine for the supply of spares for the AN-32 and TU142 M aircraft, in return for the export of “medicines and cloth and partial
payment in hard currency”. In May 1992, in the course of Russian Deputy Prime
Minister Gennedy Burbulis’ visit, while assuring India that Russia would continue
the supply of defence spare parts, the condition laid down was that ‘the new
credits would be available at double the existing interest rates plus one-tenth of
the payment was required in advance’. Against this background of hard
negotiations characterizing the Russia position in the opening years of the Yeltsin
period, Pawar was extended a “red carpet treatment”, including a meeting with
Yeltsin. Under an agreement signed in September 1992, India received a credit
line of US$830 million to buy special equipment. Soon thereafter, India received
a proposal from the Russian’s for co-production of spare parts for the MiG 21s
and they also offered the sale of the latest MiG model on favourable terms.
Boris Yeltsin visit to India
In 1993 New Delhi and Moscow worked to redefine their relationship
according to post-Cold War realities. During the January 1993 visit of Russian
president Boris Yeltsin to India, the two countries signed agreements that signaled
a new emphasis on economic cooperation in bilateral relations. The 1971 treaty
was replaced with the new Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which
dropped security clauses that in the Cold War were directed against the United
States and China. Yeltsin stated that Russia would deliver cryogenic engines and
space technology for India's space program under a US$350 million deal between
the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and the Russian space agency,
Glavkosmos, despite the imposition of sanctions on both organizations by the
United States. In addition, Yeltsin expressed strong support for India's stand on
Kashmir. A defense cooperation accord aimed at ensuring the continued supply of
Russian arms and spare parts to satisfy the requirements of India's military and at
promoting the joint production of defense equipment. Bilateral trade, which had
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fallen drastically during the 1990-92 period, was expected to revive following the
resolution of the dispute over New Delhi's debt to Moscow and the May 1992
decision to abandon the 1978 rupee-ruble trade agreement in favor of the use of
hard currency.
An agreement signed in 1993 terminated the rupee trade arrangement and
mandated all bilateral trade transactions to be conducted on hard currency basis.
The issue of repayment of civilian and military loans taken by India also came up.
After prolonged negotiations, the rouble credit was denominated in rupees and
repayment schedule was drawn up. It was agreed that India will pay about
Rs.3,000 crores annually to Russia for 12 years from 1994, and that Russia would
use the rupees to buy Indian goods. Later, it was also agreed that this amount
could be put to auction to Russian and third party enterprises at discount to make
Indian goods more economically viable. Today, Indo-Russian bilateral trade is
based on payments in freely convertible currencies. All Russian exports to India
follow the new system. But only about 20 per cent of Indian exports follow the
new route. The rest are financed through the renegotiated rupee-debt repayment
mechanism.
As a result of these economic policy changes, traditional actors in IndoRussian trade and other economic relations, such as the public sector units and
state trading corporations, are no longer as relevant as they used to be in the
Soviet era. Sections of the Indian private sector, which used to get away with
selling many products of questionable quality under the bilateral trading system,
are finding it difficult to adjust to the radically changed economic and commercial
environment in Russia today, driven by market forces.
Indo-Russian trade has declined substantially in the last decade. In 1999
bilateral trade was only $1,5 billion which accounted for only 2.5 percent of
India’s Exports and about 1.3 percent of imports. Through out the 1990s the trade
balance was in favour of India.
The main items of traditional export from India are tea, readymade
garments, drugs and pharmaceuticals, coffee, tobacco, rice and leather goods.
120
Recently, some non-traditional items like electronic goods have also shown strong
growth. But there has been some negative growth in respect of tea and coffee.
Table 3.2
Indo-Russian Trade
(1993-94 to 1999-2000)
in dollars million
Year
% share in total
exports
Total imports
from Russia
% share in
total imports
1993-94
Total
exports to
Russia
648.80
2.92
256.89
1.10
1994-95
807.80
3.07
504.54
1.76
1995-96
1046.55
3.29
857.53
2.33
1996-97
811.84
2.42
628.96
1.61
1997-98
954.12
2.72
679.02
1.63
1998-99
709.26
2.14
54.42
1.29
1999-00
952.60
2.53
618.23
1.31
Source CMIE
Traditional imports from Russia include fertilizer, iron and steel, nonferrous metals, newsprint, synthetic rubber and chemicals. Last year, India
imported coal, coke and briquettes, worth $40 million, from Russia. There has
also been strong growth in r aw cotton, electronic goods and printed books.
Negative growth is noticed in iron and steel, organic and inorganic chemicals and
gold and silver.
These statistics do not reveal the full story. Many imports from Russia,
particularly of metal, metal scrap, fertilizers, paper and paper products, are
sourced through international suppliers. Hence they do not reflect in the
figures. Similarly, many Indian goods enter Russia via "shuttle trade'', or
through third countries.
At the governmental level, an Indo-Russian Inter Governmental
Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technological and Cultural
Cooperation has been engaged in certain activities through 11 joint working
groups. Some infrastructural projects are being implemented with Russian
participation. India and Russia have also cooperated in the oil and gas sector. But
most of these initiatives are cooperation at the public sector level. Since the future
121
of most of these units are uncertain in both countries, the presence of some big
Indian business houses in the Russian market is important. Indian industry has
already
identified
areas
of
mutual
interest
-
IT,
pharmaceuticals,
telecommunications, financial services, hydro-carbons, energy and power, oil and
gas, food processing, financial consultancy, management services, textiles and
diamond processing.
The agreement on an India-Russia transport corridor may help in
reducing transport costs. The present shipping route, which passes through the
Suez Canal and enters the Russian port of St. Petersburg via Kotka (Finland) and
Rotterdam (the Netherlands), is long and time-consuming. The proposed route
comprises sea and land links across India, Iran and Russia, and will shorten travel
time by as much as 10 days. The new route will be Mumbai- Bandar Abbas (Iran)
Astrakhan (Russia).
The joint declaration also says that both countries would enhance
cooperation and coordination at international trade, economic and financial
bodies. This may be useful in formulating common positions and responses to
emerging global economic issues. In fact, there is also great scope for learning
from each other in the area of economic policy making. The experiences of both
countries concerning privatization and liberalization of trade could be understood
better through regular consultations. Overall, future bilateral economic relations
will depend on the importance Russia gives to India's developmental needs. The
USSR had played an important role in India's industrialization process. It had a
comparative advantage in sectors like steel, which was central to India's industrial
needs. India has to assess Russia's current comparative advantage. Similarly, India
can help Russia in the process of restructuring and modernization through its
expertise in IT, management and financial services.
Two factors will determine the immediate future of Indo-Russian
economic relations. First, sustained growth of the Russian economy and
second, competitiveness of Indian industry, commerce and services. Further,
things would have been much more transparent if the majority of Indian exports
to Russia were not financed through the rupee-debt repayment mechanism. The
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strong political will in both countries to improve bilateral economic relations
could have been converted into real economic gains if some bold policy initiatives
have been taken. The present level of Indo-Russian trade is certainly not
commensurate with the existing potential. In order to improve these relations,
some bold policy initiatives were needed. The joint declaration says that both
countries will explore the possibilities of regional trading arrangements with third
countries. If policy-makers were serious and imaginative, they could have
proposed a bilateral free trade agreement, although there would have been
reservations from some industries in both countries. The free-trade agreement had
the potential to give a new direction to bilateral relations. It could have created a
feeling of special economic relationship. There are strong signs that the Russian
economy is picking up. This year it is expected to grow by 5 to 6 per cent. This
was the right time to give a boost to Indo-Russian economic relations.
Pressure from the United States, which believed the engines and
technology could be diverted to ballistic missile development, led the Russians to
cancel most of the deal in July 1993. Russia did, however, supply rockets to help
India to develop the technology to launch geostationary satellites, and, with
cryogenic engine plans already in hand, the ISRO was determined to produce its
own engines by 1997.
Despite Yeltsin's call for a realignment of Russia, India, and China to
balance the West, Russia shares interests with the developed countries on nuclear
proliferation issues. In November 1991, Moscow voted for a Pakistani-sponsored
UN resolution calling for the establishment of a South Asian nuclear-free zone.
Russia urged India to support the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons and decided in March 1992 to apply "full-scope safeguards" to future
nuclear supply agreements. Russia also shares interests with the United States in
cooling antagonisms between India and Pakistan, particularly with regard to
Kashmir, thus making it unlikely that India could count on Russia in a future
dispute with Pakistan.
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Rao's Moscow visit
However, it was with Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s visit to Russia in
June 1994 that Indo-Russian ties were put on a firm foundation. “The Moscow
Declaration on the Protection of Interests of Pluralist States” signed by India
and Russia has become the bedrock of the relations. The Declaration drew
attention not only to the nature of the challenges faced by the two countries, but
also focused attention on the source from which this threat emanated for both. It
also reiterated support of the signatories for each other’s territorial integrity. This
is highly important given the fact that India and Russia were battling with these
challenges in Kashmir and Chechnya, respectively. In the changed context, it was
the space that lay between India and Russia that acquired significance. Once
again, it was the commonality of their geopolitical interests that paved the way for
the relationship to become strong and stable. Later, India and Russia backed
opposition to the Taliban that had crystallized into the Northern Alliance. On the
issue of religious extremism and terrorism, India and Russia share many
commonalities: the source of tension, funding, training, etc. India and Russia
wanted a secular Central Asia working towards a democratic setup. From this
perspective, stability and security were important. Instability hampers growth and
helps in sustaining extremism and terrorism to an extent. Consequently, India and
Russia have established institutional linkages to strengthen this aspect. To date,
this commonality has not diminished. Russia views India as a major regional
power whose involvement in international politics would make a positive
contribution. The two leaders signed declarations assuring international and
bilateral goodwill and continuation of Russian arms and military equipment
exports to India. Rao's Moscow visit lacked the controversy that characterized his
May 1994 visit to the United States and was deemed an important success
because of the various accords, one of which restored the sale of cryogenic
engines to India. In the course of this visit, Yeltsin, as per press reports, is said to
have informed the latter about his decision to “auction 50 per cent of the import
quota for India to Russian businessmen.” This included agreements to set up joint
ventures in the fields of civil and military aviations; the Indo-Russian Aviation
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Private Ltd was set up in India to ‘manufacture spare parts to upgrade and service
military aircraft of Russian origin…such ventures are to be based on purely
commercial considerations’. Soon thereafter, in the course of the Russian Deputy
Prime Minister Yuri Yarov’s visit to India in the summer of 1994, follow up
discussions took place and plans to set up engine overhaul plants for MiG 29 and
for upgrading of T-72 tanks were also finalized.
Bilateral relations between India and Russia improved as a result of eight
agreements signed in December 1994. The agreements cover military and
technical cooperation from 1995 to 2000, merchant shipping, and promotion and
mutual protection of investments, trade, and outer space cooperation. Political
observers saw the visit of Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin that
occasioned the signing of the eight agreements as a sign of a return to the earlier
course of warm relations between New Delhi and Moscow. In March 1995, India
and Russia signed agreements aimed at suppressing illegal weapons smuggling
and drug trafficking. And when Russian nationalist Vladimir V. Zhirinovsky
visited India in March 1995, he declared that he would give India large supplies
of arms and military hardware if he was elected president of Russia.
During the same time frame as the cryogenic engine fiasco, the "rupee
versus ruble" debate flared up in Indo-Russian relations. As the Cold War
concluded, India had an amassed debt of $12-16 billion owed to the Soviet Union
for arms purchases. While India proved willing to pay off its debt, a dispute
emerged between the two states over the nature of the currency and the exchange
rate that would be used. As noted earlier, the Soviet Union had been willing to
accept rupee-for-arms arrangements since the initial Soviet intent in the military
cooperation was to use India as a strategic counter-balance, not a financial pool.
Since there was not a huge demand for Indian imports in the Soviet Union, almost
half of the rupee-based debt remained in Indian banks uncollected. When the new
and financially strapped Russian state took over the old Soviet trade books, the
vast Indian debt became an issue of concern. "Goodwill alone cannot forge
mutually advantageous economic ties. Trade between Russia and India almost
collapsed in 1991-92 because of arguments over the rupee-ruble exchange rate
125
and the amount India owed Russia as the successor state to the USSR." After
much domestic squabbling in each country, a resolution was reached in January
1993 that called for India to repay Russia $1 billion a year in Indian goods until
2005, after which the remaining thirty-seven percent of the debt would be repaid,
interest free, over forty-five years.
Although a repayment schedule was established, controversy over
distribution of the "Rupee Fund" continued. Russia had originally agreed to
establish a three-year import schedule with India which would allow Indian
exporters to forecast the amount of products needed in advance. In September
1994, the Russian government reversed this decision out of fear that long-term
financial commitments would be too constricting. The new plan offered by
Moscow provided a 180 day’s export forecast to Indian producers.
Strained Indo-Russian Relations
It was in this atmosphere of uncertain Russian foreign policy objectives
that the post-Cold War relations between Russia and India were further strained
by two events. The first of these destabilizing events centered around a contract
dispute between the Russian space directorate "Glavkosmos" and the government
of India for the purchase of cryogenic engines and the related technology. The
contract, signed on 18 January 1991, stemmed from India’s desire to gain
knowledge of the liquid oxygen propulsion system of Russian cryogenic engines
in order to advance India’s Geo-synchronous satellite launch vehicle (GSLV)
program. If produced indigenously and without Russian assistance, the project
was forecast to require fifteen years until it would be operational. For
Glavkosmos, the $350 million deal would provide crucial funds during a period of
tremendous reductions in Russian defense expenditures.
Over the next two years, the United States protested the proposed transfer
of missiles and technology to India on the grounds that the sale would violate the
April 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The growing threat of
missile proliferation became well known to the United States following the Iraqi
Scud missile attacks during the Gulf War and the testing of India’s Agni IRBM
126
missile in 1989. However, the ability of the United States to coherently protest the
sale was hampered by the changing of governments in Moscow as the Soviet
Union collapsed and as the U.S. Executive Branch changed administrations from
President Bush to President Clinton.
From the Indian and Russian perspectives, the cryogenic engine deal was
legal under the MTCR on the grounds that the treaty did not block the support of
"peaceful space ventures." Furthermore, India asserted that U.S. attempts to block
the sale were financially motivated since General Dynamics and the French
space-booster manufacturer Arianespace had both been outbid by Glavkosmos.
The new Russian government under Boris Yeltsin promised India’s
leadership that it would not give in to U.S. diplomatic pressure. This promise was
compromised, however, after the United States applied sanctions in May 1992,
and threatened further economic measures. On 16 July 1993, Boris Yeltsin agreed
to suspend the transaction and to alter the nature of the transfer to the sale of only
the cryogenic engines and not the technology. In exchange, Glavkosmos was
given bidding rights on over $950 million worth of future U.S. space projects.
While the ability of India to indigenously produce GSLVs and ICBMs was
delayed by several years due to the cancellation of the original cryogenic engine
deal, the main concern in New Delhi was that the Yeltsin government had given
in to Western pressure. "The conclusion they drew was that Russia’s overriding
need for American economic aid would make it susceptible to American pressure.
In Indian eyes, Russia is unreliable, and it has also lost its international stature."
As Indo-Russian relations appeared to weaken under Western pressure, direct
bilateral interactions between the two states also revealed tensions.
To further stimulate investor interest in India’s currency, the Russian
government began to auction off vast sums of the Indian currency to Russian
importers at discounted rates. The average discount of fifteen percent during the
auctions led to rampant corruption and manipulation of the rupee fund, especially
among Russia’s banking oligarchy. Meanwhile, the Indian government continued
to petition Russia to accelerate the repayment schedule while it simultaneously
maintained its protectionist import-export policies. By 1993, the level of bilateral
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trade between India and Russia had dropped to one-fifth of the 1990 level of $5.5
billion.
In 1995, the sale of Russian arms on the international market increased by
sixty percent over the previous year’s total as the state shifted from "an
ideological to a market-driven approach to selling its military hardware."
Old traditional relations gained momentum
India was finally revived in the Russian strategic focus in January 1996,
when Yevgeny Primakov replaced the pro-Western Andrei Kozyrev as Russia’s
Foreign Minister. The result was an immediate swing in Russia’s foreign policy
focus that included considerations for both the Western and Eastern Hemispheres.
A clear signal was sent by Moscow to New Delhi, and the rest of the world, one
year later when an agreement was reached to build two Russian light-water
nuclear reactors (LWR) in India in defiance of a Nuclear Suppliers Group ban.
"The two countries signed an accord paving the way for the construction of two
1,000 MW light water nuclear reactors at Kudankalam in Tamil Nadu. Hence it
seems that Russia would not succumb to external pressure this time."
Diplomatically, Russia appeared to no longer look strictly westwards. Within a
month of his taking over in March 1996, Primakov visited India where in a
meeting with the Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs, he
underscored the durability of Russian-Indian relations by emphasizing that they
would remain ‘unaffected by the political fortunes of the ruling parties in the two
countries’. He ‘spoke of India as a global power and a priority partner for
Russia’. The idea of a ‘strategic partnership’ between India and Russia was set
afloat.
The Deputy Director of the Rosvooruzhenie, Oleg Sidorenko, who
accompanied Foreign Minister Primakov on his visit to India from March 29 to
30, 1996, is said to have given assurances that there would be no interruption in
the supply of spare parts. In August1996, Yeltsin sent his top adviser on defence
and foreign policy, Boris Kuzyk, to New Delhi to settle ongoing discussions on
the proposed Sukhoi-30 deal ‘billed as one of the biggest aircraft deals between
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the two countries in decades of defence cooperation…. As of now, no plane in the
IAF (Indian Air Force) possessed such an interception range…as the Su-30’. This
deal, which was signed by the Narasimha Rao government, in its last days, when
election campaign was in full swing, came under a cloud of suspicion when a
leading National Daily, the Indian Express broke the story in 1996. Almost a
decade later on March 18, 2005, Shekhar Gupta, Chief Editor of this daily, in his
article ‘One Aircraft and Great Statecraft; the Sukhoi-30 Deal and how it
brought three India-Russia Strategic Partnership mutually hostile political
parties together in India’s interest’, revealed some interesting tit-bits of this
deal, based on his conversations with top leaders of the two parties that
succeeded the Rao government and also with Narasimha Rao himself upon
retirement. Gupta claims to have learnt that the Rao government ‘had paid an
advance of around $350 million to the Russians without any final price
settlement’. He went on to add that the Indian Express ‘checked out their usual
sources… and it did not seem that the decision, though hasty, was malafide’.
Gupta then reveals the more juicy tit-bits without on this occasion, revealing the
specific source, and adds ‘it seems that Yeltsin had told Narasimha Rao that he
too was heading for elections, that the Sukhoi factory, which happened to be in
his constituency, was too broke to even pay salaries to its staff and if India could
pay it, that advance it (sic) would work like magic in his election campaign. That
advance was, therefore, a political deal…to be adjusted in the final pricing later’.
Gupta goes into interesting details of his conversations with the leaders of three
different political parties, which were in power in close succession, citing this as
an example of how they were able to close ranks by not making an issue of this in
the larger national interest. Gupta concludes his article by contrasting this with
‘general antagonism in our politics through this past month and you know why
that Sukhoi story is so worthy of recall’. If this story is credible, then as a
researcher, I found it useful for pointing to the following: First, it once again
reveals the superb, almost cunning negotiating skills of Yeltsin, though often used
to serve his own larger interest. Second, it also confirms a broad national
consensus cutting across party lines in India, a point I have made earlier on
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continuing the traditional close ties with the Soviets/Russians, even while
diversifying and upgrading their strategic partnership with other global players.
From Russia’s vantage point, the unfolding developments in Europe,
Eurasia, and the energy security issue were reminiscent of the Cold War mindset.
Its response was the propagation of the idea of a multi polar world. In this regard,
a historic agreement with China on a “Multi polar World and the Formation of
a New World Order” was signed in Moscow in April 1997. This was the
beginning of a partnership with China. A multi polar world is an order that is just
and fair and democratic in which all nations are considered as equals and more
importantly, enjoy equal security. It is a world order in which there is no place for
hegemony. In this order, the UN would occupy a position of centrality. On its
part, India upheld that the world order was not a unipolar one, as new centers of
power and influence were emerging. While acknowledging the need for a
multipolar world, the Indian approach was not in terms of blocs, but the need to
maintain a balanced and stable world order. Since a unipolar world could lead to
instability, there was a need for a balancing force. Among the other initiatives
taken by Russia is the idea of an India- Russia-China strategic triangle, coming
together in the interests of the challenges faced by them in the region. During
Primakov’s visit to India in December 1998, he proposed at an informal level that
India-Russia-China should come together and form a strategic triangle in the
interests of peace and stability in the region. The initial response of India was one
of caution that could be explained by the fact that a strategic triangle implied
common perceptions and convergence of interests vis-à-vis a common threat.
Similarly, China expressed no opinion on this idea.
In the course of Primakov’s second visit to India in 1998, Russia came out
in full support of India’s candidature for the Security Council as was reflected
in the joint statement, according to which “Russia considers India . . . to be a
strong and appropriate candidate for permanent membership of an expanded
UN Security Council” and it also “underscored the commonality of approach of
the two countries on a number of international issues.”
130
India-Russia cooperation in the developmental activities of Central Asia
can be accelerated if they can provide the landlocked countries access to the
outside world. In this regard, the North-South Corridor connecting St. Petersburg
with Mumbai is the best option. The corridor, a combination of sea, rail, and road
routes was planned in 2000 with Russia, Iran, and India agreeing to this ambitious
project.
The congruence of views between India and Russia had a favorable impact
on defense cooperation. This cooperation was put on a firm footing with the
landmark Sukhoi deal signed in late 1996. The salutary features of Indo-Russian
defense
cooperation
were
its
long-term-basis
transfer
of
technology,
modernization of existing equipment, and access to the latest equipment,
weaponry, etc. in the Russian arsenal. In fact, defense cooperation had gone
beyond the main “buyer-seller” syndrome and had moved to the plan of joint
design, research, and production. The chief of the Indian Armed Forces was in
Russia to assure the Russians that enhanced interaction with the United States
would not lead to a drift towards that country on the question of defense
cooperation.
Based on continuity, trust and confidences relations with the Russian
Federation are an important foreign policy priority for India. Both countries have
emphasized the importance which they attach to bilateral relations and consider
them not to be subject to political vicissitudes. With post Cold War transitional
difficulties now left well behind, India's relations with Russia are progressing well
in almost all areas of bilateral cooperation, including trade and economy, science
and technology, culture and defence. There is recognition both in India and Russia
of the strategic dimension of Indo-Russian relations. Both countries share similar
perceptions on many international issues. Interactions on developments in the
region lying between the borders of India and Russia have been found to be
beneficial and contacts are being maintained on the evolving situation in
Afghanistan. A major event during the year was the landmark official visit to the
Russian Federation undertaken by the Prime Minister from 24- 26 March 1997,
which provided a new impetus to the traditionally close, friendly and multi-
131
faceted ties between India and Russia. While in Russia, the Prime Minister had
meetings with President Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin
during which the high priority accorded to bilateral relations and the importance
of intensifying these further to mutual benefit was reaffirmed by both sides.
Opinions and assessments on a wide range of international and regional issues
were also shared. Several important bilateral documents were signed during the
visit.
There have been many frequent high level exchanges between India and
Russia during 1996-97, effectively contributing to the further strengthening of
bilateral links in a very wide range of areas of mutual interest. A delegation of
young Russian Parliamentarians from the State Duma (Lower House of the
Russian Parliament) visited India from 12-17 September 1996. Mayor of Moscow
Yuri Luzhkov visited India from 16-19 September 1996 at the invitation of the
Chief Minister of Delhi. Apart from his host, he called on the Prime Minister and
the Minister of External Affairs. Russian Defence Minister Igor Rodionov visited
India from 21-23 October 1996. This was the first visit by the Russian Defence
Minister to India following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Russian Defence
Minister Igor Rodionov, signed an agreement with his Indian counterpart, M S
Yadav, wherein the two sides inter alia agreed to conduct joint exercises between
the armed forces of the two countries to promote friendly ties and also to hold
periodic exchange of information on military matters Soviet/Post-Soviet Security
Perspectives towards South Asia ‘including operational doctrines of military
equipment’. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Davydov, in the course of his
visit to India declared on October 30, 1996, that his country ‘would not supply
arms to any country inimical to India’ and the major outcome of his discussions
with Defence Minister Yadav was that it was decided that a large number of
important defence related projects between the two countries should be
implemented. During Yadav’s return visit to Moscow in 1997, it was decided to
extend the existing defence agreement for 10 years, i.e., up to 2010, and in the
course of Prime Minister Primakov’s visit in December 1998, the two countries
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formally signed the long-term military technical cooperation agreement till the
year 2010, estimated at $10.15 billion.
During the visit, an agreement providing for cooperation between the
armed forces of the two countries was signed. Russian Deputy Prime Minister
Oleg Davydov visited India from 26- 30 October 1996 to participate in the India
Economic Summit organized by the Confederation of Indian Industry. He called
on the Prime Minister and held discussions with the Minister of External Affairs,
the Finance Minister and the Minister of State for Commerce.
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Fortov visited India from 9-13
November 1996 for attending a Conference on high pressure physics at Mumbai.
He met the Minister of External Affairs and the Minister of State for Science and
Technology while in New Delhi. A seven-member delegation of the Russian State
Duma Committee on Nationalities Affairs visited India from 25-30 November
1996 at the invitation of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs.
Russian Minister for Fuel and Energy Pyotr Rodionov visited India from
6-9 December 1996 in connection with the Fifth International Conference on
Energy held in Goa. While in Delhi, he held discussions with the Minister of State
for Power. From the Indian side, the Minister for Human Resource Development
Shri S R Bommai represented the Government of India at the inauguration of the
"Days of Indian Culture" in Russia from 16-28 September 1996. During his stay
in Moscow, he met Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and other high level Russian
dignitaries.
A Parliamentary delegation, led by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha Shri P A
Sangma visited Russia from 20-26 October 1996 and met Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin apart from the Chairmen of both Houses of the Russian
Parliament. Home Minister Shri Indrajit Gupta visited Russia from 4-8 November
1996 at the invitation of Russian Minister for Interior Anatoly Kulikov. Apart
from his host, he met the Secretary of the Security Council Ivan Rybkin and other
senior Russian dignitaries. The Defence Secretary visited Russia from 26
November 2 December 1996 during which a contract for the supply to India of
SU-30 MKI aircraft was signed.
133
The Seventh Review Meeting of the Integrated Long Term Programme
of Cooperation in Science and Technology (ILTP) joint Council between India
and Russia was held in New Delhi on 8 & 9 January 1997 under the cochairmanship of Director General of Council of Scientific and Industrial Research
(CSIR) Prof C N R Rao, and Member of the Presidium of the Russian Academy
of Sciences Academician Guriy Marchuk. Meetings of the concerned Working
Groups under the Indo-Russian Inter-Governmental Commission were held as
follows-i) Working Group on Pharmaceuticals met in New Delhi from 1-5 April
1996; ii) Working Group on Coal met in New Delhi from 10-13 July 1996; (iii)
Working Group on Metallurgy met in New Delhi from 23-28 September 1996; iv)
Working Group on Science and Technology met in Moscow from 24-28
December 1996; (v) Working Group on Power met in Moscow from 13-15
January 1997; (vi) Working Group on Culture met in New Delhi from 15-17
January 1997; (vii) Working Group on Trade and Economic Cooperation met in
Moscow from 23-27 January 1997, while its Sub-Group on Transport met in
Moscow from 22-24 January 1997; (viii) Working Group on Information
Technology met in New Delhi from 23-25 January 1997; and ix) Working Group
on Petroleum met in Moscow on 24 & 25 January 1997.
Minister of External Affairs Shri I K Gujral visited Russia from 9-13
February 1997 as a guest of the Government of the Russian Federation. During
the visit, he met Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, First Deputy Prime
Minister Viktor Ilyushin, Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, Speaker of the
State Duma Gennady Seleznyev, Mayor of Moscow Yuri Luzhkov, Secretary of
the Security Council Ivan Rybkin and other senior Russian dignitaries. He also
co-chaired the Third Session of the Indo- Russian Inter-Governmental
Commission (IGC) on Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technological and Cultural
Cooperation. Besides the Protocol of the Third IGC Session, an Agreement on the
Establishment of a joint Shipping Service between India and Russia and a
Memorandum of Understanding on Certification in the field of information
Technology were signed during the visit.
134
The Chairman of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation Sergei
Dubinin visited India from 10-16 February 1997 at the invitation of the Governor
of the RBI. Chief Justice of India justice Shri A M Ahmadi visited Russia from
15-23 February 1997 at the invitation of the Chairman of the Russian
Constitutional Court Vladimir Tumanov.
Pokhran II and Russia’s response
Even on the nuclear issue, Russia showed considerable understanding of
the Indian position when the Pokhran-II blasts took place in 1998. Initially, there
was disquiet in Russia over the blasts, but later, Russia did not go public in
criticizing India. Importantly, it did not impose sanctions. In fact, in June 1998, an
agreement for the construction of two 1000-MW reactors at Kundankulam was
signed during the visit of the Russian minister for atomic energy, Evgenii
Adamov.
On 17 August 1999, India’s National Security Advisory Board (NSAB)
released a draft copy of its long awaited nuclear doctrine. Arriving fifteen months
after the May 1998 Pokhran II nuclear tests, the draft document refueled the
debate within the United States over the future course of American policy towards
India. But while the U.S. State Department was warning, "We think it would be
unwise [for India] to move in the direction of developing a nuclear deterrent" due
to the potential "action-reaction cycle" for a South Asian arms race, the Russian
response was diametric. Rather than aligning Russia’s reaction with that of the
other global powers, Grigory Karasin, the Russian Deputy Minister in charge of
relations with India, stated, "We shall carefully study this draft and in due time
clearly state our opinion." More telling is the fact that as the Clinton
Administration pushed for a continuation of sanctions against India, Russia was
negotiating with India for the sale of TU-22 BM strike-bombers. This contrast in
American and Russian approaches to Indian "security needs," and the legacy
created by these polar approaches, typifies Indo-Russian and Indo-American
relationships over the last five decades.
135
Contrary to America’s nuclear-focused approach to India, Russia adopted
a more balanced approach to India in the period following Pokhran II. While the
reaction of Russia’s political leadership to India’s proliferation was mixed, the
signing of a ten-year treaty of military and technological cooperation in
December 1998 sent a clear signal that Russia would neither condemn India
nor would it support American nonproliferation efforts in South Asia. Claiming
that it would continue to honor the historically "special" relationship, Russia
would solidify the Indo-Russian military bond during this period.
11 may 1998: Pokhran II
The current disharmony, therefore, between India and rest of the globe is
that India has moved from being totally moralistic to being a little more realistic,
while the rest of the nuclear world has arrived at all its nuclear conclusions
entirely realistically. With a surplus of nuclear weapons and the technology for
fourth-generation weapons, the other nuclear powers are now beginning to move
towards a moralistic position. Here is the cradle of lack of understanding about
the Indian stand.
-Jaswant Singh
Russia’s Support of Indian Expansion
While India continues to invest in the development of its indigenous
aviation, naval, and tank programs, notably the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) and
Arjun tank, it has been forced to continue to rely upon imports to meet its
requirements for modernization of its conventional forces and the development of
a nuclear triad. For strike aircraft, India is acquiring forty SU-30MKIs aircraft,
plus IL-78 refuelers and IL-76 airborne early warning aircraft for strike support.
Additionally the purchase of four Russian TU-22Ms strike aircraft and 16 to 18
French 2000 D Mirage fighter aircraft "soft wired for carrying nuclear missiles" is
also being negotiated. To compensate for the high cost associated with the direct
purchase of these systems, Russia has even offered to "lease" IL-76s and Tu-22s
to India.
136
The most controversial area, however, where India is reported to be
receiving military assistance is in the development of its "indigenous" nuclearpowered submarine and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). India’s
Advanced Technological Vessel (ATV) program dates back to 1988 when India
leased a Soviet Charlie-I Class SSN for three years. The knowledge shared and
relationships established with the Soviet Navy during this period are reported to
continue today as India struggles with the design of its propulsion plant and the
installation of the reactor in the submarine hull. Additional reports indicate that
the hull design and reactor design of the two unfinished ATVs are based on the
new Russian Project 885 Severodvinsk Class and its 190MW pressurized water
reactor. Additionally, the former "apprentices" of the Indian Navy during the
three-year period of the submarine lease "have taken key posts in Indian design
offices developing nuclear submarines." Finally, an entire Indian submarine crew
is reported to have spent at least six months during 1999 "on an official mission"
in the closed northern Russian city of Severodvinsk.
The U.S. Department of State reported during 1998 that Russia was
helping India develop the "Sagarika," a submarine-launched ballistic missile. The
Sagarika has caused Indian scientists difficulty, especially with its guidance
systems, and many foreign observers state that the system is a "far cry" from
being operational. Again, Russian scientists are reported to be supporting this
"indigenous" project.
While the transfer of nuclear technology for military purposes is in
violation of numerous international treaties, it is difficult to determine whether
"Russian support" of the ATV and Sagarika projects is state-sponsored or a
product of individual scientists left unemployed and unaccounted for after the
collapse of the Soviet Union. "No one knows where all the weapons scientists
have gone." However, if one considers the role of Russian interest groups in
influencing Russian policy decisions, it is worth noting that the Rubin design
bureau of St. Petersburg, one of Russia’s two major submarine design bureaus,
designed and developed the Severodvinsk-class submarine.
137
Kargil Conflict and Role of Russia
However, when hostilities on the Indo-Pakistan border broke out as Kargil
Conflict in 1999, in keeping with the time-honoured traditional Soviet position,
Russia did not hesitate to brand Pakistan as the aggressor. A press release by
the Russian Foreign Ministry in June 1999 made an ‘earnest appeal’ to Islamabad
to ‘refrain from violations of the Pakistani-Indian accords on the location of the
agreed line…any attempt to change this line may have grave consequences’.
The Indian armed forces began Operation Vijay on 26 May 1999 with the
objective of completely evicting Pakistan’s armed intrusion and aggression. While
the Operation was on, the External Affairs Minister also received the Foreign
Minister of Pakistan for talks in New Delhi (12 June, 99). The Pakistan Foreign
Minister was told clearly that Pakistan’s armed intrusion and aggression was
completely unacceptable, that it constituted a blatant violation of the Line of
Control (LOC) and the Shimla Agreement and that there was no question of any
talks on this issue without Pakistan first addressing itself to vacating its
aggression against India and restoring status quo ante on the LOC. India’s outrage
at the inhuman and barbaric treatment meted out to our soldiers in Pakistani
custody was also conveyed to him. We demanded that those guilty of these
atrocities be brought to justice. The Pakistan Foreign Minister was also told that
Pakistan’s aggression was a grave breach of trust and while its territorial
aggression against India would be evicted, it would be extremely difficult to
restore the trust and confidence that had been damaged by Pakistan’s betrayal.
India-Russia Strategic Partnership quite often it is sentiments such as
these, outside the pale of conventional diplomatic jargon, which truly touch the
heart of the leaders and people in question, and contribute towards laying solid
and deep foundations in relationships, as has been in the case of the time-tested
Soviet/Russian-Indian partnership. On 27 July 1999. EAM once again had a
meeting with Mr Ivanov in Almaty, Kazakhstan, on 14 September 1999 on the
margins of the Conference on Interaction on Confidence Building Measure
(CICA) and on the sidelines of the 54th UNGA in New York. During these
meetings, bilateral, regional and international issues were discussed. The Russian
138
Foreign Minister, Mr Igor Ivanov, transited through New Delhi on 25 July 1999
and on 28 July 1999 on his way to and from the 6th ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF) Meeting in Singapore. A delegation from the Central Election Commission
(CEC) of the Russian Federation led by Mr Sergei Bolshakov, Commissioner,
paid an official visit to India from 2 -7 September 1999. The delegation called on
the Chief Election Commissioner of India and visited polling stations in and
around Delhi and Haryana during the first phase of the Lok Sabha poll on 5
September 1999. Interaction between the Election Commissions of the two
countries has been institutionalized since 1997.
Mr Vladimir Putin, Chairperson of the Government of the Russian
Federation, transited through New Delhi on 14 September 1999 on his way back
to Moscow from the APEC Summit in Auckland. Principal Secretary to PM had
detailed discussions with Mr Putin on issues of mutual interest and concern.
Foreign Secretary visited Moscow on 16 September 1999 for Foreign Office
Consultations. He called on Mr Igor Ivanov, Foreign Minister of the Russian
Federation and had detailed discussions with Mr Alexander Avdeev, Mr. Grigory
Karasin, First & Deputy Foreign Ministers. The Chief of Naval Staff paid an
official visit to the Russian Federation from 15 - 20 September 1999. Gen.
Anatoly Kornukov, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Air Force, visited India
from 4 - 10 October 1999. The Days of Delhi were held in Moscow from 26
October – 2 November 1999. The official delegation from the Government of the
NCT of Delhi was led by Dr. Narendra Nath, Minister of Education of the
National Capital Territory of Delhi. More than 130 artists from India participated
in this event. The Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation in-charge of
military-technical cooperation, atomic energy, space and other subjects, Mr Ilya
Klebanov paid an official visit to India from 4 – 8 November 1999. Mr Klebanov
was accompanied by a high-powered delegation which included the Minister for
Atomic Energy, the First Deputy Defence Minister, the First Deputy Minister of
Trade, the Chairperson of the Inter State Aviation Committee and many senior
Government representatives. During the visit, Mr Klebanov called on PM and had
separate meetings with the External Affairs Minister, Raksha Mantri and Principal
139
Secretary to PM. The 6th Meeting of the Indo-Russian Group on MilitaryTechnical Cooperation was also held, coinciding with the visit. At the conclusion
of the visit, a joint statement was issued.
After the hijacking of IC-814, EAM spoke to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the Russian Federation, Mr Igor Ivanov on 26 December 1999. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation issued an official statement
on 27 December 1999 and two official statements on 28 December 1999
condemning the hijacking.
The Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation and
Co-Chairman of the Indo-Russian Inter- Governmental Commission for Trade,
Economic, Scientific, Technological and Cultural Cooperation (IRIGC), Dr
Viktor Khristenko, visited India from 14 - 15 January 2000. The 6th session of the
IRIGC was held during the visit. It was co-chaired by the Finance Minister (CoChairman of the IRIGC) and Dr Khristenko. Dr Khristenko called on the
President of India and the Prime Minister of India and met the Minister of Power,
Minister of Civil Aviation and Minister of Surface Transport. A Protocol on the
6th Session of the IRIGC was signed on 15 January 2000. The Acting President
and Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Mr Vladimir Putin called the Prime
Minister on the hotline on 27 January 2000 to offer felicitations on the occasion
of the 50th anniversary of the creation of the Republic of India. The 1st session of
the Indo-Russian Working Group on Export Controls took place in Moscow from
2 - 3 February 2000.
Table 3.3 : Presidents of Russian Federation since 1991
Sr.
Name
No.
1.
Term in office as
President
Yeltsin, Boris
Nikalayevich
 June, 1991-July,
1996
 July, 1996- Dec.
1999
140
2.
 Dec. 1999-
Putin, Vladimir
Vladimirovich
Mar.2004
 March,2004-May,
2008
3.
 May, 2008-
Medvedev, Dmitry
Anatolyevich
1. On 12 June, 1991 Yeltsin was elected as First President of Russian Federation.
He was reelected President on 3 July, 1996.
2. On 31 Dec. 1999 Yeltsin appointed Putin as acting President. On 26 March,
2000 Putin was elected in office and on 7 May, 2000 he was inaugurated as
President. On 14 March, 2004 Putin was elected for his second term.
3. On 2
nd
March, 2008, Medvedev was elected in office. On 7 May, 2008, he
was inaugurated as President.24
In the new Foreign Policy Concept released by Russian Federation on July 10,
2000, it has been stated that one of the crucial directions in the Russian foreign
policy in Asia will be to develop friendly relations with the leading Asian states
including India. It further states that Russia intends to strengthen its traditional
partnership with India, including in international affairs.25
Putin visits India
A major breakthrough was achieved
when the Russian President, Vladimir
Putin visited India in October 2000. Both
countries
strategic
signed
a
partnership,
Declaration
and
10
on
(ten)
141
agreements on various aspects of India and Russia bilateral relations. The
strategic partnership is a dynamic and forward-looking principle which provides
an anchor of certainty and dependability.
The Declaration on strategic
Partnership spelt out in detail the long-term nature of Indo-Russian relations in all
aspect of mutual cooperation, like political, defence, economic and trade, science
and technological and cultural spheres. Russia continues to occupy a very
important place in our foreign policy and this approach is reciprocated by Russia.
The Joint Statement issued at the conclusion of the bilateral talks affirmed Indian
and Russian positions on various bilateral, regional and international issues.
India will acquire 300 T-90 tanks, licence for the production of 150 multirole Sukhoi-30 MKI fighter aircraft and the aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov
from Russia under five defence agreements signed on Wednesday to give a new
impetus to bilateral military and technical co-operation. The single largest defence
pact, estimated to be in the range of three billion dollars, will enhance India's
defence capabilities and meet its long-term requirements. The agreements
signaled a new era in Indo-Russian defence ties, which are poised to enter a phase
that will focus on joint defence production, shifting away from the existing buyerseller relationship. Defence Minister George Fernandes and Russian Deputy
Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov also inked an umbrella agreement for the setting up
of an intra-governmental commission on military-technical co-operation. Until
now, defence co-operation between the two countries was at the joint working
group level. The commission will be co-chaired by Fernandes and Klebanov. The
agreement for the purchase of the T-90 tanks was signed by joint secretary
(ordnance) Ranjit Issar and the Deputy Director General of Rosvooruzheniye,
Russia's state owned arms manufacturer. The tanks will substantially increase
India's capabilities to carry out armored thrusts. The tank, reported to cost over
two million dollars each, has underdone desert trials in Rajasthan and will equip
the Indian army to meet the challenge from across the border. In December 1998,
the cabinet committee on security had taken the decision to acquire 124 fully built
tanks and 186 in semi-knocked down and completely knocked down condition.
The SU-30 MKI, which will go in for licensed production in India, will be a
142
multi-role fighter with much more improved avionics. The Indian Air Force
currently possesses SU-30s, which have aerodynamics that are upfront, air
defence capability and radars. However, what India requires is multi-role
capability and thrust vectoring for additional maneuvering. India and Russia have
an ongoing deal for the purchase of 40 SU-30s, which have been designed in the
genre of the current generation of multi-role fighter aircraft with awesome
performance. While one squadron is already with the IAF, another ten warplanes
are expected by 2001 end.
The licensed production of the fighter plane in India marks a new thrust in
Indo-Russian defence co-operation with Moscow willing to go beyond being just
a seller by transferring licence and technological documentation to manufacture
the fighter aircraft in India. Fernandes and Klebanov, who signed the SU-30
licensed production deal, also initialed the agreement on Admiral Gorshkov, the
45,000-tonne vessel, which was withdrawn from the Russian Northern Fleet in
1995 and is being given as a 'gift' to India. However, refitting and upgrading the
ship, before it is delivered from its base in Rosta shipyard, is expected to cost
India about $700 to $800 million. The modifications to the aircraft carrier, which
can hold 24 planes, is likely to take about three years. The ship suffered a major
fire in its engine room in 1994, but that has been repaired. Besides, India will also
have to buy the warplanes and helicopters that it intends to keep on the aircraft
carrier, two squadrons of MiG-29K and six Kamov-31 helicopters. The Admiral
Gorshkov proposal has been pending since a Memorandum of Understanding
was signed during Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov's visit to India in
December, 1998. After the de-commissioning of the INS Vikrant, India has been
left with just one aircraft carrier INS Viraat, which is currently undergoing an
upgrade in Bombay. The indigenous project to build an air defence ship is
underway at Cochin, but the ship is not likely to be inducted before the end of the
decade. Admiral Gorshkov is bound to give more teeth to the Indian Navy on the
western and eastern seaboards. Besides this, Klebanov and principal secretary to
the prime minister and national security advisor Brajesh Mishra signed an
agreement for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
143
Putin displayed dynamism is not only cultivating relations with the US but
also with the powers such as China, India and Japan. Regarding the expansion of
NATO, Putin observed, “we do not see NATO as a hostile organization, but given
the demise of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, we do not see why it is needed
anymore.”24 He listed international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, regional conflicts as some of the most serious threats of the 21st
Century, which can only be resolved by the united efforts of the international
community, relying on the tools of the UN and International law.
Declaration on Strategic Partnership 2000
The Declaration was signed during above mentioned the Russian President
Putin’s visit to New Delhi in 2000. In full text as Annexure-II26
Highlights of the declaration:

Not directed against any other State or group of States and does not seek
to create a military-political alliance.

Convening of Annual Summit Level Meetings, closer cooperation at
international and regional forum and joint initiatives on key international
and regional issues.

Deepening and diversifying cooperation in sectors such as metallurgy, fuel
and energy, information technology, communications and transport.

Consolidating defence and military technical cooperation in a long-term
perspective; deepening service to service cooperation.

Cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and peaceful use of
outer space.

Cooperating in areas such as ocean logy, agricultural sciences, medical
sciences and biotechnology.

Cooperating in the fight against international terrorism, separatism,
organized crime and illegal trafficking of narcotics.
144
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee expressed hope that the strength of
the Indo-Russian relations will prevail in the creation of a global order which
fosters international peace, security and stability. Addressing a special meeting of
both Houses of Parliament, organised in honour of the visiting Russian President
Vladimir Putin, the prime minister said both countries have given a formal shape
to their relations by signing the declaration on strategic partnership. He said it was
of significance that the views of both India and the Russian federation overlap and
intersect on a wide range of international issues. The prime minister also referred
to the need for reform of the United Nations. "We welcome Russia's continued
support to India's candidature for permanent membership in an expanded United
Nation's Security Council," he said. Vajpayee made a mention to the dangers of
international terrorism, religious extremism, drug trafficking and narco-terrorism.
He said these dangers did not recognize borders and affected all. "Terrorism
cannot be allowed to become an instrument of state policy. The international
community should resolve to overcome these challenges through concerted
efforts," he added. The prime minister said India and Russia shared common
concerns and had common interests. "The history of the past five decades
demonstrates that close Indo-Russian understanding is essential to peace and
stability in Asia and the world. This is what makes us strategic partners. Our
friendship is not based on short-term calculations, but transcends the twists and
turns of history and politics," he added.
Welcoming the Russian President to Parliament, Rajya Sabha Chairman
Krishan Kant spoke of the technological horizons that the two countries together
were capable of creating in the 21st century. He said India and the Russian
Federation were home to some of the highest achievements of the human mind
and spirit. "We will not allow this to be wantonly destroyed by those self serving
merchants of death," he said. "Both our countries have suffered the destructive
consequences of this ferocious phenomenon, which wears several garbs -- now
religious, now ethnic, now regional and, often times, all of them," he added. In his
address, Lok Sabha Speaker G M C Balayogi said both India and Russia were
committed to the cause of world peace and a democratic and just global order.
145
"We believe in a multi-polar world where nations co-exist peacefully, and where
progress, prosperity and development is ensured," he said. We have been
working very fruitfully with India in the atomic energy sector for a long time
now, on peaceful nuclear technologies,' Putin told India Today magazine ahead of
his visit.
146
REFERENCE
1.
Hindu 30 May, 1990 for Moscow denial.
2.
K.Subrahmanyam, ‘Discovering a new USSR’ Hindustan Times 17 July, 1990
3.
Indian Express, 13 July, 1990
4.
Bhavani Sen Gupta, ‘VP Goes to Moscow’ Hindustan Times, 21 July, 1990; Nikhil
Chakravarti, ‘Facing a New USSR’, Times of India 22 July, 1990
5.
Indian Express, 13 July, 1990
6.
G.K.Reddy in Hindu; Amulya Ganguli in Statesman; Bharat Bhushan in Times of
India 25 July, 1990
7.
Acton Edward, Russia, The Tsarist and Soviet Legacy (Longman Group Ltd. 1995)
8.
Nina Bandelj, From Communists to Foreign Capitalists : The Social Foundations of
Foreign Direct Investment in Postsocialist Europe (Princeton University Press, 2008)
p.41
9.
Time Magazine, Hastening the End of the Empire, January 28, 1991
10.
1991: March www.referendum Soviethistory.org
11.
King Charles, The Ghost of Freedom: History of the Caucasus
12.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/prestroika
13.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/glasnost
14.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/list_of_leaders_of _soviet_union
15.
Geoffrey Roberts, The Soviet Union in World Politics, Coexistence, Revolution and
Cold War1945-91(London: Routledge, 1999), p.100
16.
Line followed of the former Russian Minister Andrei Kozyrev who said in an interview
on April 1, 1992,” the legal successor states are in fact allthe former republics of the
Soviet Union but the continuer is precisely Russia” in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow,
Summary of World Broadcast, April 3, 1992
17.
V.Stoyan, ‘Brief Analysis of Geostrategic Consequences of Disintegration of the Soviet
Union’ Russia and the Muslim World, no.7(145), p.19
18.
Ibid
19.
T.N.Kaul, The Future of CIS…Will it survive(New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt.
Ltd. 1992), p.77
20.
Times of India (New Delhi), 22 November, 1991
21.
Summary of World Broadcast, 18 November, 1991, p.SU/1232, A3/3
22.
Summary of World Broadcast, 16 January, 1992, p.SU/1279, A3/1
23.
Indian Express (New Delhi), 2 Feb., 1992, quoted in J.A.Naik, Russia’s Policy towards
India from Stalin to Yeltsin(New Delhi: MD Publications Pvt. Ltd., 1995) p. 179
24.
http://globalpolitician.com/articles.asp
25.
Bilateral Relations between India and Russian Federation on www.indianembassy.ru
26.
Embassy documents of Russia in India http://www.rusembassy.in /index.php?option=
com_alphacontent&view