IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY,ILLINOIS
COUNTY DEPARTMENT,CRIMINAL DIVISION
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PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, )
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Plaintiff-Respondent,
Permissible Resentencing Range
96-CR-01838-02
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ERIC ANDERSON,
Honorable Arthur F. Hill, Jr.,
Judge Presiding
Defendant-Petitioner.
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On May 3, 2016, petitioner, Eric Anderson, filed a document entitled "Eric Anderson's
Motion to Set Permissible Statutory Range", as well as a memorandum of law in support of this
motion, requesting that this court issue a ruling stating the permissible sentencing range which
will apply at petitioner's resentencing hearing. On June 28, 2016, the State filed a response. On
July 11, 2016, petitioner filed a reply. After considering the arguments, the court finds as
follows.
BACKGROUND &PROCEDURAL HIS'T'ORY
Petitioner's conviction stems from the fatal shooting of two 13-year-old girls, Helena
Martin and Carrie Hovel. At trial, the evidence demonstrated that on December 14, 1995,
petitioner, who was 15 years old at the time, fired shots into a van parked near 62nd and Melvina
in Chicago, fatally wounding Helena Martin and Carrie Hovel.
Petitioner and one of his codefendants were convicted in separate jury trials on two
counts of first-degree murder. Two additional codefendants pled guilty and agreed to testify for
the State in exchange for 30-year sentences. A fifth codefendant's case was handled separately.
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On direct appeal, petitioner argued that: (1) the trial court erred in refusing to suppress
identification evidence; (2) the trial court erred in admitting gang-related evidence; (3) the
prosecutors made improper arguments; (4) the trial court erred in tendering an accountability
instruction; and (5) the statute pursuant to which petitioner was sentenced was unconstitutional.
The appellate court affirmed petitioner's conviction and sentence. People v. Anderson, No. 198-2438 (2000) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). On March 1, 2002, the
Illinois Supreme Court denied petitioner's petition for leave to appeal. People v. Anderson, 2002
Ill. LEXIS 461.
On April 8, 2003, petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief and a section 21401 petition alleging that his conviction was obtained using perjured testimony and that the
State committed a Brady violation. The trial court dismissed the petitions, and the appellate
court affirmed. People v. Anderson, No. 1-04-1534 (2005)(unpublished order under Supreme
Court Rule 23). On December 1, 2005, the Illinois Supreme Court denied petitioner's petition
for leave to appeal. People v. Anderson, 2005 Ill. LEXIS 1851.
Next, on July 10, 2013, petitioner filed a successive post-conviction petition, requesting
this court grant him a new sentencing hearing pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Miller v. Alabama, which came down in 2012. 'This court docketed the petition, and
the State agreed that petitioner was entitled to a new sentencing hearing. In March of 2015, this
court vacated petitioner's sentence. On May 3, 2016, petitioner filed the instant Motion to Set
the Permissible Statutory Range, requesting that this court issue a ruling stating that the
permissible sentencing range which will apply at petitioner's resentencing is 20-60 years. On
June 28, 2016, the State filed a response arguing that the permissible sentencing range is 20-60
years or natural life. On July 11, 2016, petitioner filed a reply.
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LEGAL STANDARD
In Miller v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court held that a mandatory life
sentence without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the
Eighth Amendment. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012). The Court held: "[A]
judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing
the harshest possible penalty for juveniles. By requiring that all children convicted of homicide
receive lifetime incarceration without possibility of parole, regardless of their age and agerelated characteristics and the nature of their crimes, the mandatory sentencing schemes before
us violate this principle of proportionality, and so the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and
unusual punishment." Id. at 2475. It noted, "children are constitutionally different from adults
for purposes of sentencing" and that "in imposing a State's harshest penalties, a sentencer misses
too much if he treats every child as an adult". Id. at 2464, 2468.
Although the Court refused to categorically declare that a juvenile can never receive life
imprisonment without parole for a homicide offense, the Court stated that "given all we have
said in Roper, Graham, and this decision ***, we think appropriate occasions for sentencing
juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon." Id. at 2469. Further, Miller v.
Alabama applies retroactively on collateral review. MontgomeNy v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718,
732(2016).
ANALYSIS
In the instant matter, petitioner has elected to be resentenced under the 1995 sentencing
statutes. Petitioner requests that this court find that the sentencing range applicable at his
resentencing is 20-60 years. The State requests that this court find that the sentencing range
applicable at petitioner's resentencing is 20-60 years or natural life.
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The 1995 sentencing statute applicable in this case is 730 ILLS 5/5-8-1 (West 1995). 730
ILLS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(a) states: "Except as otherwise provided in the statute defining the offense, a
sentence of imprisonment for a felony shall be a determinate sentence set by the court under this
Section, according to the following limitations: *** for first degree murder, *** a term shall be
not less than 20 years and not more than 60 years". 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(a)(West 1995).
Both. parties agree that, based on this provision, petitioner may be sentenced from 20-60 years
for each count of first-degree murder.
The matter the parties disagree on, and thus the issue currently before this court, is
whether statutory authority exists to extend petitioner's sentence beyond the 20-60 year term
authorized by section 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(a). The State asserts that this court may resentence petitioner
to a discretionary life sentence pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii). Petitioner contends
that Section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) only confers authority to impose a mandatory life sentence on
adult offenders, and that it does not confer authority to impose a discretionary life sentence on
juvenile offenders.
Section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) states that for first-degree murder,"the court shall sentence the
defendant to a term of natural life imprisonment when the death penalty is not imposed if the
defendant *** is a person who, at the time of the commission of the murder, had attained the age
of 17 or more and is found guilty of murdering an individual under 12 years of age; or,
irrespective of the defendant's age at the time of the commission of the offense, is found guilty
of murdering more than one victim".
730 ILLS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1995) (emphasis
added). The State asserts that while Miller deemed it unconstitutional to impose a mandatory life
sentence on petitioner, a juvenile offender, pursuant to this provision, the court may nevertheless
impose a discretionary life sentence on petitioner pursuant to Section 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii).
This court disagrees. This is the exact statutory provision the court used to impose
petitioner's original life sentence. That sentence was subsequently deemed unconstitutional and
vacated pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's holding in Miller v. Alabama, which
stated that it is unconstitutional to impose a mandatory life sentence on a juvenile offender. The
mandatory nature of the wording of Section 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) —that the court "shall" impose a
natural life sentence on those defendants who are found guilty of murdering more than one
victim — is the precise reason petitioner's original life sentence was found unconstitutional
pursuant to Miller v. Alabafna. Despite the State's contention, there is absolutely nothing in the
wording of Section 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) that suggests that this provision authorizes the imposition
of a discretionary life sentence.
In support of its position, the State cites People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, asserting that
the facts of Davis are analogous to the instant case. In Davis, the defendant, who was 14 years
old, was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, as well as two counts of attempted
murder and one count of home invasion, in 1993. Because Davis was found guilty of murdering
more than one victim, section 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) required the trial court to impose a natural life
sentence. After the Court decided Miller v. Alabama in 2012, Davis argued on post-conviction
review that his sentence was invalid. The appellate court agreed, and it vacated and remanded
the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing. Following the resentencing hearing, the
trial court again sentenced Davis to a term of natural life. The State asserts that in that same
opinion, People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, Davis's "natural life convictions were affirmed".
However, the State is mistaken. People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, is the appellate court's ruling
that Davis's original sentence must be vacated and the case remanded to the circuit court for
resentencing. Despite the State's contention, this opinion does not contain the appellate court's
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affirmance of Davis being resentenced to natural life at his second sentencing hearing. To the
contrary, at the time this opinion was entered, Davis's second sentencing hearing had not even
taken place yet. Davis's appeal of the imposition of a natural life sentence at his resentencing is
still currently pending before the appellate court. People v. Davis, No. 1-15-2060.
Moreover, the trial court's resentencing order did not specify through which statutory
provision it imposed Davis's natural life sentence. As petitioner correctly points out, the court
could have resentenced Davis to natural life through a sentencing enhancement, such as finding
the offense "brutal and heinous" pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(b). Therefore, it is unclear
whether the court even resentenced Davis to natural life pursuant to 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii).
Accordingly, the State's reliance on Davis for the proposition that a court may properly impose a
discretionary natural life sentence on a juvenile offender pursuant to Section 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii)
is inappropriate. For these reasons, the court finds that Section 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) does not
authorize it to impose a discretionary life sentence.
Additionally, this court notes that it lacks authority to impose a discretionary life sentence
under either 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(b) (West 1995) or 720 ILLS 5/9-1(3)(b) (West 1995). The
imposition of a discretionary life sentence under either provision would violate the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), in which the Court
held that any fact, other than prior conviction, that increases the maximum penalty for a crime
must found by the trier of fact to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, the
jury returned general verdict forms. Thus, the record fails to demonstrate that the jury found the
offense "exceptionally brutal and heinous" or any of the other factors which would be needed to
extend petitioner's sentence to natural life pursuant to 730 ILLS 5/5-8-1(b) or 720 ILCS 5/91(3)(b). In addition to violating App~endi, this court also notes that it could not use the
aggravating factors listed in 720 ILLS 5/9-1(3)(b) to extend petitioner's sentence beyond 20-60
years because the statute clearly states that it only applies to "a defendant who at the time of the
commission of the offense has attained the age of 18 or more". At the time of the commission of
this offense, petitioner was 15 years old. For these reasons, this court lacks authority under
either 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(b) or 720 ILCS 5/9-1(3)(b) to extend petitioner's sentencing range
beyond 20-60 years. The parties agree that petitioner's sentences for each count of first-degree
murder shall run concurrently.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the court finds that the permissible sentencing range
applicable at petitioner's resentencing is 20-60 years pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(a)
(West 1995).
Circuit Court of Cook County
Criminal Division
DATED:
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