Australia
Australie
Australien
Report Q175
in the name of the Australian Group
by Andrew MASSIE, Ross MCFARLANE, Grant FISHER
The role of equivalents and prosecution history in defining
the scope of patent protection
Questions
1.
If your country has a doctrine of "equivalents", what is it and how are equivalents assessed? Is it provided for by statute or case law?
The general position
The position in Australia in relation to non-literal infringement of patent claims is that Australia does not have a US-style doctrine of equivalents, but case law has developed to
provide for non-literal infringement. In particular, the courts have accepted that non-literal infringement can be found in favour of the patentee and the courts have historically
adopted one of two approaches when considering the issue of such infringement. Those
approaches are embodied in case law, and neither is provided for by statute.
Each of the approaches is discussed below and from that discussion it will be apparent
that Australian courts provide for non-literal infringement by ascribing a meaning to words
and phrases in a claim in the context of the invention described in the patent specification. Whilst Australian courts do recognise a doctrine of mechanical equivalents, the
doctrine is now rarely applied, and only to elements of an invention which are found by
the courts to be non-essential to the invention.
The two approaches which have been adopted by Australian courts over the years in relation to non-literal infringement are:
1.
the pith and marrow approach; and
2.
the purposive construction approach.
The "pith and marrow" approach
The "pith and marrow" approach was first raised in a British case decided in 18771. At
that time, patent specifications typically did not include claims and it was up to the court
to read the specification and to determine for itself the "pith and marrow" of the invention,
or in other words, the substance or essence of the invention. The court would do this by
identifying what it considered to be the essential features of the invention, gleaned from
its own reading of the patent specification, after which it would then consider whether the
alleged infringer had taken each of those essential features. If so, infringement was generally established.
1
Clark v Adie [1877] 2 AC 315.
1
The pith and marrow approach allowed a finding of non-literal infringement, by permitting
the infringing product or process to omit non-essential, unsubstantial or immaterial elements of the invention, or to replace such elements with a mechanically equivalent element which performed the same function.
Accordingly, by the application of the pith and marrow approach, an infringer who had
taken the substance or essence of an invention, by taking each of the essential features
of the invention, could not avoid a finding of infringement on the basis that the infringement did not include one or more non-essential features.
The purposive construction approach
Following a further UK decision, Catnic Components Ltd., -v- Hill & Smith Ltd.2 in 1981,
the "purposive construction" approach evolved. In that decision, the court indicated that,
"a patent specification should be given a purposive construction rather than a purely literal one……". Using that approach, the court would consider whether a person with
practical knowledge in the relevant field would understand that terms or phrases employed in the specification were to be understood as having their purely literal meaning,
or whether they could instead embody some variation.
In the Catnic case, critical deliberation took place in relation to the term "vertical" as it related to the disposition of a support member. The infringer had disposed its support member at 6o to 8o from literal or true vertical (90o), but there was no material difference in the
operation or effectiveness of a support member so disposed nor was there any advantage provided. The court decided that in the context of the specification, as understood
by the person having practical knowledge, the term "vertical" was not limited to 90o, but
could encompass deviations from true vertical to the extent that the operation of the support member remained unchanged.
The present position
Australian courts now tend to favour the purposive approach over the pith and marrow
approach. See for example the "Old Digger"3 trial and appeal decisions. The courts
moreover favour an approach to claim interpretation, that claim wording deliberately chosen by the patentee cannot be disregarded, or in other words, that the patentee is bound
by that wording. Accordingly, if the patentee elects to limit its patent by the inclusion of a
particular element in a claim, even though subsequently it is found that infringement can
be avoided by omission or replacement of that element, access of the patentee to the
doctrine of mechanical equivalents must be balanced by the requirement that the patentee be bound by its choice of wording. The courts in Australia appear now to assume
that all claim elements are essential, and so beyond application of the doctrine of mechanical equivalents, unless clear statements in the specification, or evidence to the contrary exists.
In favouring the purposive construction approach, the courts now rarely permit a claim
feature to be replaced by a mechanical equivalent (as was permitted in the pith and marrow approach), but rather they permit the words or phrases of the claim to be given an interpretation appropriate for the context of the invention, so as to establish the proper
meaning of a claim. In other words, the purposive construction approach rarely now results in the patentee being able to broaden the scope of its claims by permitting the omission or replacement of claim elements to capture an alleged infringement. Rather, the result is that the purposive construction approach permits broadening of the scope or mea-
2
[1981] FSR 60.
3
Old Digger P/L v Azuko P/L [2000] FCA 676; Azuko P/L v Old Digger P/L [2001] 52 IPR 75.
2
ning of particular words or phrases, in keeping with the context of the invention described
in the patent specification, to capture infringements that do not fall within the literal meaning of those words or phrases.
However, despite the fact that the doctrine of mechanical equivalents is now very rarely
applied by the courts, it is still available to be applied at the courts' discretion. If the court
chooses to apply the doctrine, the court will assess if any of the claim elements are nonessential and if so, whether they have been replaced with a mechanically equivalent element that performs the same function. The assessment includes:
1.
consideration of the patent specification and of expert evidence as to
whether the claim element is essential or non-essential;
2.
if non-essential, further consideration as to whether the feature of the infringement performs the same function as the claim element; and
3.
consideration as to whether the feature of the infringement operates in the
same manner as the claim element and whether any differences in operation provide material advantages not realised by the claim element.
It will be appreciated that the requirement that a mechanical equivalent can only apply to
non-essential features, significantly distinguishes the Australian position from the US
and the European positions.
2.
Can the scope of patent protection change with time, or is it fixed at a particular date? If
it is fixed, at what date (e.g. priority, application date or date of alleged infringement)?
Once a patent has been granted, the scope of a patent does not change with time, unless it is subject to post-grant amendments (either at the request of the patentee, or as
ordered by the court). While the court is necessarily engaging in interpretation of the
claims at a later date, in the context of proceedings, the court must interpret the claims of
the patent with reference to the understanding of the skilled addressee at the priority
date, rather than the date of infringement or opposition.
The words of the claims, and therefore the scope of claims, should be interpreted as at
the priority date. When interpreting the claims, the court considers the ordinary meaning
which a person skilled in the art would have understood at the priority date.4 The assumption is that the words of the claims have been chosen by the draftsperson in order
to convey a particular meaning to the relevant skilled addressee at that date. Where it appears that words have been chosen carefully, there is generally no scope for subsequent
widening of the claim.5
When determining whether a variant falls within the scope of a claim for the purposes of
infringement, the court determines whether, at the date of publication of the patent
application, it would be obvious to a person skilled in the art that the variant had no material effect on the way the invention works.6
Although the court can refer to the specification, the boundaries of the monopoly (as
fixed by the words of the claim) cannot be narrowed or expanded by reference to limitations in the body of the specification which are not express or by proper inference repro-
4
Décor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc. (1988) 13 IPR 385; Patents, Trade Marks & Related Rights, Lahore
(2001) ("Lahore"), 18,130; Note the Australian Patent Office Manual of Practice and Procedure at paragraph
10.8.7 states that the reference to "priority date" ... "ought to more correctly refer to 'filing date'".
5
6
E Street Enterprises Inc v CPS Housewares Pty Ltd (1996) 36 IPR 431, 436.
Catnic Components Ltd v Hill & Smith Ltd [1981] FSR 60, 66 (Lord Diplock); Root Quality Pty Ltd v Root Control
Technologies Pty Ltd (2000) 177 ALR 231, 247 (Finkelstein J); Lahore, 18,145.
3
duced in the claims themselves. That is, the meaning of the claims cannot be "glossed
down" from the specification. The court may refer to the specification and expert evidence for guidance, however, it cannot narrow or expand the claims by reference to the
specification, nor can it leave construction of the claims to an expert witness. Expert evidence should only be given as to the meaning of technical and scientific terms.7
The proper construction of the specification is a matter of law. The specification is to be
read in light of the common knowledge in the art at the priority date, bearing in mind that
it is public document which defines a monopoly and must be able to be understood.8
3.
Does the prosecution history play a role in determining the scope of patent protection? If
so, how does it work? In particular:
a)
Is there "file wrapper estoppel" and if so in what circumstances does it arise?
i)
File wrapper estoppel
Australian courts have not found it necessary to reach a decision as to
whether the doctrine of file wrapper estoppel exists in Australia. However,
an obiter dictum view has been expressed by the Federal Court of Australia that it is unlikely that such a doctrine will be found to exist in this
country.9
In the United States, the doctrine of equivalents is relied upon by the patentee in infringement proceedings to expand the scope of a patent claim
to include integers that perform substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result. The doctrine of file wrapper estoppel applies where a narrowing amendment has been made during prosecution of the patent application for any reason related to
patentability. The doctrine of file wrapper estoppel prevents the patentee
from expanding the scope of a claim under the doctrine of equivalents to
include integers that were abandoned by that narrowing amendment.
The Federal Court of Australia has indicated that the doctrine of equivalents embraces concepts to which analogies can be found in Australian
law.10 It referred specifically to "the distinction drawn in infringement suits
between "essential" and "inessential" integers in claims for a combination,
to the "pith and marrow" doctrine, to the substitution of "inessential features" by "mechanical equivalents" and to the ... notion of "purposive construction"". However, the provisional view of the Federal Court of Australia
is that, in spite of these analogies, the doctrine of file wrapper estoppel will
be unlikely to be found to exist in Australia. This view is based upon three
grounds.
Firstly, the emphasis in Australian law is on the principles of construction
applicable generally to patent claims, and "the concept of mechanical
equivalents ... is applicable not to all the integers in patent claims, but only
to what can be construed as 'inessential features'; the doctrine of equivalents does not appear to be so limited."11 The doctrine of file wrapper es-
7
Flexible Steel Lacing Co v Beltreco Ltd (2000) 49 IPR 331, 81 (Hely J); Lahore, 18,130.
8
9
10
11
Welch Perrin & Co Pty Ltd v Worrel (1961) 106 CLR 588, 610.
Prestige Group (Aust) Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Incorporated (1990) 26 FCR 197, 212 (Gummow J).
ibid., 208 (Gummow J).
ibid., 209 (Gummow J).
4
toppel was created in the United States as a counter-balance to the interpretation of specifications in accordance with the doctrine of equivalents.
Since the doctrine of equivalents has no immediate counterpart in Australian decisions, there is unlikely to be a need for a corresponding doctrine of file wrapper estoppel.
Secondly, the patent specification is "much more that a document setting
down a commercial bargain.12 It is not a written instrument operating inter
partes, but is a public instrument".13 The granting of a modern standard
patent in Australia is not a contractual activity but rather an activity that is
quasi-legislative in character. Hence, the restrictions which apply to the
admission of negotiations prior to contract as aids to construction would
apply a fortiori to dealings and procedures preceding the grant of patent
protection.
Finally, the meaning of claims is a matter of law, or at least fact and law.14
Admissions made by the patentee against their interest in Patent Office
proceedings are generally of little weight, being founded on opinion, unless they amount to an estoppel.15 But it would usually be required of a
representation founding an estoppel that it has been directed to the other
party in the cause or to his privy or at least that the other party has relied
upon it.16 Representations made to the Patent Office do not meet these
criteria, and therefore do not amount to an estoppel.
Whilst indicating its view that there are significant difficulties in founding
"file wrapper estoppel" in the law as it is understood in Australia, the Federal Court of Australia did not, however, regard the issue of the role of file
wrapper estoppel in Australia "as other than still open for decision."
ii)
Role of prosecution history in interpreting amended specifications
Legislative encouragement to consider prosecution history in the interpretation of a patent specification is provided by section 116 and subsections
138(3)(d) and (e) of the Australian Patents Act 1990. Section 116 provides
that the Commissioner of Patents or a court may, in interpreting a complete specification as amended, refer to the specification without amendment. However, it has been held that it is neither useful nor legitimate to do
so where the amended specification is clear.17 This is an invitation, rather
than an obligation.18
It was in the context of such examination that the Deputy Commissioner of
Patents considered the fact that there had been an amendment to a specification (during the prosecution stage) was relevant to the decision in a
later proceeding.19 The patent in question was under consideration because the patentee had applied for an extension of term. When the patent
12
ibid., 211 (Gummow J).
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Welch Perrin and Co Pty Ltd v Worrel, above n 8, 610.
Prestige Group (Aust) Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Incorporated, above n 9, 212 (Gummow J).
Phipson on Evidence, 13th ed, 1982, s19-19.
Wigmore on Evidence, Chadbourn Revision, vol IV, s1057.
Martin and Biro Swan Ltd v H Millwood Ltd [1956] RPC 125, 135.
Emory University v Biochem Pharma Inc [1999] APO 50 (5 August 1999).
Merck & Co., Inc v Arrow Pharmaceuticals Limited [2002] APO 13 (17 April 2002).
5
application was originally filed, it included claims to a substance, unlimited
to any particular use or environment. During examination, the claims were
amended to remove any explicit reference to the substance, because of
an objection raised by the Examiner based on the prior claims of another
patent. The patentee by way of the amendment gave up express monopoly rights.
The Deputy Commissioner, when examining the eligibility of the patent for
extension of term, noted that given the substance was not within the scope
of the claims when the patent was originally filed, there was no need to
form a concluded view on the issue of file-wrapper estoppel. However, his
view was that it would be appropriate to have regard to the deletion that
occurred. In particular, he thought that it would be inappropriate to assess
such overtly deleted monopoly rights as in fact continuing by reason of
what is "in substance" within the scope of other claims - absent clear intention. In this case, there was no such intention evident - only a desire to
construe the claims in this manner such that there was a basis to extend
the term of the patent. This could be viewed as a type of "estoppel", along
the lines of the approbate and reprobate doctrine, which is discussed below.
This example can be confined though to the facts of the particular application - that is, satisfying the requirements under section 70 of the Australian
Patents Act 1990 for extensions of the term of a patent for a pharmaceutical substance.
iii)
Role of prosecution history in patent invalidity
It is a ground for revocation of a patent under subsection 138(3)(d) that a
patent was obtained by fraud, false suggestion or misrepresentation. It is
also a ground for revocation under subsection 138(3)(e) that an amendment of the patent request or the complete specification was similarly obtained.
"Fraud" implies that there has been moral culpability on the part of the patentee, by an intentional act of wrongdoing, or at the minimum, a statement
made by the patentee in circumstances where the patentee is recklessly
careless as to whether the statement is true or false.20 Revocation of a
patent on the basis of fraud is not common, as alternative bases of revocation are usually available, such as lack of entitlement to the patent.
The words "false suggestion'' or "misrepresentation'' are "based on equitable notions of good faith, fairness, conscionable conduct and honesty''.21
The Federal Court has stressed that false suggestion or misrepresentation
is a developing concept which should not be narrowed or circumscribed by
judicial decision.22
One of the general categories of types of conduct that may amount to false
suggestion or misrepresentation relates to the conduct of the patentee
20
See further Dwyer J and Dufty A (eds), Patents, Trade Marks and Related Rights (Sydney: Butt, 1996), [12,980],
[12,985].
21
22
Prestige Group (Aust) Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Incorporated, above n 9, 198 (Lockhart J).
ibid., 198-199 (Lockhart J).
6
during the process of applying for the grant of the patent. This is an area
increasingly being employed as a basis for alleging invalidity, although
usually unsuccessfully.23
In establishing false suggestion or misrepresentation in the prosecution
history of a patent, the Federal Court of Australia has stated that there is
no requirement to prove deliberate intent to deceive.24 It is also not necessary to prove that the conduct constituting the false suggestion or misrepresentation is such that in its absence the patent would not have been
granted.25 The real question is whether the conduct constituting the false
suggestion or misrepresentation materially contributed to the Commissioner of Patents' decision to grant the patent.26 It has been held that if
statements are made in correspondence with the Commissioner of
Patents claiming that the invention is an advance on the prior art because
of certain features, but that these features are not included in the complete
specification when it is filed at a later date, it is possible that the patent
may be invalid for false suggestion.27
b)
Is there a difference between formal (e.g. oppositions) and informal (e.g. discussions with examiners) actions in the patent office?
Upon completion of the examination process and grant of a patent, there is no difference between the role of formal and informal actions in the Australian Patent
Office during prosecution of the patent application in determining the scope of
patent protection.
c)
Is there a difference between actions taken by the patent office and by third parties?
Similarly, actions taken by the Patent Office and by third parties during patent
prosecution are treated no differently from each other in determining the scope of
patent protection.
4.
Is there any way the scope of claims can be limited outside prosecution, e.g. by estoppel
or admissions?
As outlined above, the court construes the claims of a patent with reference to the specification and with the assistance of expert evidence, if required, but presently without reference to the conduct of a patentee and without recourse to the doctrine of "file-wrapper"
estoppel. While the equitable doctrines of approbate and reprobate, res judicata and issue estoppel (discussed below) could be applied by Australian courts in the context of
claim construction, they have not been applied in this way to date. Patent claim scope
may also be limited by admissions made during an Australian court proceeding.
23
ibid.; Yamazaki Mazak Corporation v Interact Machine Tools (NSW) Pty Ltd (1991) 22 IPR 79, 97 (Gummow J);
Winner v Ammar Holdings Pty Ltd (1993) 41 FCR 205, 219-220 (Davies J); Atlantis Corporation Pty Ltd v Schindler
(1997) 39 IPR 29, 54 (Wilcox and Lindgren JJ).
24
Prestige Group (Aust) Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Incorporated, above n 9, 199-200 (Lockhart J); Re Kromschroder
AG's Patent Revocation [1960] RPC 75, 83.
Prestige Group (Aust) Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Incorporated, above n 9, 218 (Gummow J), 200-201 (Lockhart J).
ibid.; Nesbit Evans Group Australia Pty Ltd v Impro Ltd (1997) 39 IPR 56, 98 (Lindgren J); Cooper v Sten-Crete
Pty Ltd (1997) 38 IPR 546, 552 (Delegate Haggar).
Prestige Group (Aust) Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Incorporated, above n 25.
25
26
27
7
Approbate and reprobate doctrine
The doctrine of approbate and reprobate means that a party cannot choose between two
inconsistent courses of conduct, and having chosen a course from which the party has
benefited, resile from that position. In other words, a party cannot adopt two inconsistent
stances, once benefit has been derived from one. A party cannot "blow hot and cold in
the attitude" they adopt.28 The doctrine has been recognised in Australia.29
The doctrine of approbate and reprobate has not been explicitly applied in Australia in the
context of patent cases. The Commissioner of Patents has applied this type of argument
in refusing an application for an extension of term of a patent.30
Res judicata
The principle of res judicata provides that no other proceedings may be maintained on
the same cause of action if judgment has previously been entered in that action. This
principle has been applied by an Australia Court in the context of a granted patent (but
not specifically in relation to the scope of the claims) in refusing leave to re-open a crossclaim or to file and serve a second cross-claim, seeking revocation of a patent. The Court
held that as the previous action between the parties had been dismissed and no issue in
the cross-claim had been left undetermined, the issue of the validity of the patent was
considered res judicata.31
It would seem that where a party seeks to revoke a patent based on invalidity of the
patent, and the court determines that the claims are not invalid (for example, are fairly
based on the specification), the applicant is subsequently prevented from mounting an
identical cause of action ie, a party is not able to continue to assert the same invalidity argument in relation to the patent. In the same way, a patentee may be prevented from continuing to tend for a broader construction of a claim in a subsequent proceeding.
Res judicata is limited in that both the cause of action and the parties must be the same.
Accordingly, any determination made as to the scope of the claims of a patent will only
be relevant where the same cause of action is argued as between the same parties. This
could arise where a foreign jurisdiction has considered the same cause of action between the same parties. However, this is limited, as the foreign court must be recognised
as a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, given the different requirements under the
patent laws of different countries, it could be argued that the relevant questions and relevant considerations in relation to the cause of action would be sufficiently different to
prevent res judicata from operating.
Issue estoppel
Issue estoppel arises to prevent a party in a subsequent proceeding from asserting to the
contrary any issue fundamental to the initial judgment. In this way, a patentee could be
precluded from asserting, for example, a broader or a different construction of a claim of
a patent where a court has previously determined its construction. For issue estoppel to
arise, the parties in two proceedings must be the same. Although the cause of action can
be different, the issue to be argued between the parties must be the same and there must
have been final determination of this issue in the prior proceeding. It should be noted that
28
Express Newspapers Plc v News (UK) Ltd & Ors [1990] 1 WLR 1320 (Browne-Wilkinson J).
29
Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, 421-2 (Brennan J); Fried v National Australia Bank Ltd [2000]
FCA 911; VACC Insurance v BP Australia (1999) 47 NSWLR 716.
Merck & Co., Inc v Arrow Pharmaceuticals Limited, above n 19 (discussed above).
Old Digger Pty Ltd v Azuko Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 1158.
30
31
8
issue estoppel arises in regard to the final determination of the judge, and does not arise
in relation to submissions made by either party during the course of the proceedings.
Issue estoppel has been discussed in Australia in the context of patent cases. However,
according to recent judicial consideration by the Federal Court, issue estoppel does not
necessarily arise in subsequent proceedings in relation to the same patent specification.
The question which may be under consideration by a judge in a first proceeding, for example during a pre-grant opposition, may differ from the question which is before another judge, for example, during a post-grant revocation proceeding, even though the same
specification is being scrutinised in each instance on virtually identical grounds.32 This
same concern may not apply in relation to the issue of the scope of the claims.
There are no Australian decisions which discuss whether or not issue estoppel can be
applied to foreign judgments in relation to patent cases. It would seem that issue estoppel in relation to foreign cases would only be relevant to questions of fact, as the exact
question for determination before a judge in a different jurisdiction would be different
where the laws are not homogenous.
Admissions
It might be possible to limit the scope of claims by reference to admissions made by one
party by notice served on the other party or made in Court pleadings. Admissions are
only available during the proceeding (and any appeal), and are not admissible in evidence in any subsequent proceeding.33 There are no Australian cases which discuss using admissions made in correspondence between the parties or otherwise made outside
the scope of a proceeding, to limit the scope of claims.
5.
Do you have recommendations for harmonisation in this area?
Any patent system endeavours to achieve a compromise between the need to provide
fair protection for the patentee and the need for the patentee's competitors to have reasonable legal certainty in their understanding of the scope of protection afforded to the
patentee. The positions adopted by various countries range from the purposive construction approach in Australia, the US doctrine of equivalents approach and the even
broader equivalents doctrine applied in some European countries, such as Germany.
The Australian purposive approach to claim interpretation relies upon ascribing a meaning to words and phrases in a claim in the context of the invention described in the patent
specification, but rarely allows the substitution or omission of claim features or steps.
This almost-literal approach to claim interpretation arguably errs on the side of providing
legal certainty to third parties.
In an increasingly globalised marketplace, both patentees and their competitors are
seeking greater conformity between countries in the interpretation of the scope of protection provided by patent claims. In the opinion of the Australian group, a middle position between the Australian position on the one hand and the German position on the other, merits consideration for harmonisation. Accordingly, we recommend moving towards
an approach that enables infringement to be found when an alleged infringement contains one or more equivalent elements, and that this approach be tempered by taking into
account matter excluded from the scope of the claims during the prosecution of the
patent application in Australia. The Australian group acknowledges that this needs to be
32
Genetic Institute Inc v Kirin-Amgen Inc (1999) 44 IPR 257, 262 (Black CJ, Merkel and Goldberg JJ).
33
British Thompson-Houston Co v British Insulated & Helsby Cables Ltd [1924] 1 Ch 203, 210.
9
achieved by legislative changes and that there are inherent drafting difficulties in enshrining such doctrines in legislation.
Summary
The present Australian position provides a very narrow approach to non-literal infringement. The
position is that only on very rare occasions can a claim element be substituted by an equivalent
element to find non-literal infringement and only where the claim element is found to be non-essential.
The courts generally favour a "purposive" construction in interpreting the meaning of claim elements, so that the meaning of those elements can be interpreted not necessarily in accordance
with their strict literal meaning, but with some flexibility or variation according to the context of
the invention and the understanding of the skilled addressee.
The scope of patent protection can only change over time, if post-grant claim amendments are
made. However, regardless of whether or not post-grant amendments take place, the courts are
required to interpret the claims with reference to the understanding of the skilled addressee at
the priority date of the claims of the patent.
There is presently no doctrine of file wrapper estoppel in Australia. Although the courts have not
ruled out the possibility of the doctrine being applied in future cases, to date the doctrine has not
been applied in any Australian court decisions. The Australian Patents Act 1990 does include a
specific provision which permits reference to the prosecution history of a patent, but to date that
provision has only been applied in a single Patent Office case, relating to an application of an
extension of term for a pharmaceutical substance.
There is the possibility that the scope of the claims can be limited outside prosecution, through
the doctrine of approbate and reprobate, the principle of res judicata and issue estoppel. To
date, there have been no Australian decisions that have applied these principles in relation to
claim scope. It is possible that claim scope could be limited in court proceedings through admissions made by the patentee in the proceeding. Accordingly, to date, claim limitation outside
prosecution (excluding post-grant amendments) has not occurred in Australia, and there is no
indication that it will occur in the future.
The Australian group favours a harmonised position in which non-literal infringement can be
found by substitution of one or more equivalent claim elements, but with reference to the prosecution history to ensure that the patentee has not made comments that should preclude such
substitution.
Résumé
La position australienne actuelle se caractérise par une approche très étroite de la contrefaçon
non littérale. Cette position dispose qu'un élément de revendication ne peut être remplacé que
très rarement par un élément équivalent pour conclure à une contrefaçon non littérale, et
uniquement si l'élément de revendication s'avère être non essentiel.
Les tribunaux privilégient généralement une interprétation "utilitaire" du sens des éléments de
revendication, de sorte qu'il est possible de ne pas automatiquement interpréter ces éléments
en fonction de leur signification strictement littérale, mais avec une certaine souplesse ou latitude selon le contexte de l'invention et l'idée que s'en fait l'homme de métier.
La portée de la protection des brevets ne peut changer qu'avec le temps, si tant est que l'on apporte des modifications de revendication après la délivrance des brevets. Toutefois, indépen10
damment d'éventuelles modifications intervenant après la délivrance des brevets, les tribunaux
sont tenus d'interpréter les revendications en se référant à l'idée que s'en fait l'homme de métier à la date d'antériorité des revendications du brevet.
À l'heure actuelle, il n'existe pas de doctrine dite de "file wrapper estoppel1" en Australie. Bien
que les tribunaux n'en aient pas exclu l'application éventuelle lors de futures actions, jusqu'ici
cette doctrine n'a été appliquée dans aucune décision judiciaire australienne. La loi australienne
de 1990 sur les brevets (Australian Patents Act 1990) contient une disposition particulière qui
permet de faire référence aux antécédents juridictionnels d'un brevet, à ce jour cette disposition
n'a été appliquée que dans une seule action de l'Office des brevets concernant une demande
de prorogation pour une substance pharmaceutique.
Il est possible que la portée des revendications puisse être limitée sans poursuites judiciaires,
par le biais de la doctrine de l' "approbate and reprobate2", le principe de la "res judicata3" et l' "
issue estoppel4". Jusqu'ici, aucune décision n'a été prise en Australie qui appliquait ces
principes en matière de portée des revendications. Il est possible que la portée des revendications puisse être limitée lors d'actions en justice par des admissions faites par le titulaire du
brevet au cours de l'action. En conséquence, à ce jour, aucun cas de limitation des revendications sans poursuites judiciaires (à l'exclusion des modifications réalisées après la délivrance du
brevet) ne s'est présenté en Australie, et rien ne laisse présager qu'un tel cas se présente à
l'avenir.
Le groupe australien privilégie une position harmonisée aux termes de laquelle la contrefaçon
non littérale peut être prouvée par la substitution d'un ou de plusieurs éléments de revendication
équivalents, mais en se référant aux antécédents juridictionnels afin de s'assurer que le titulaire
d'un brevet n'a pas fait de commentaires susceptibles d'empêcher une telle substitution.
Zusammenfassung
Der aktuelle australische Standpunkt gibt ein sehr enges Herangehen an nicht-buchstabengetreue Patentverletzungen vor. Der Standpunkt ist, dass ein Anspruchselement nur in sehr seltenen Fällen von einem entsprechenden Element ersetzt werden kann, um eine nicht-buchstabengetreue Patentverletzung festzustellen und nur dann, wenn das Anspruchselement als
nicht unbedingt erforderlich erachtet wurde.
Im allgemeinen ziehen die Gerichte eine "zweckorientierte" Auslegung bei der Interpretation der
Bedeutung von Anspruchselementen vor, so dass die Bedeutung dieser Elemente nicht unbedingt entsprechend ihrer strengen buchstäblichen Bedeutung interpretiert wird, sondern mit
einem dem Kontext der Erfindung und dem Verständnis der fachlichen Zielgruppe entsprechenden Maß an Flexibilität und Abweichungen.
Der Gültigkeitsbereich des Patentschutzes kann sich nur über Zeit ändern, wenn nach der
Erteilung Änderungen vorgenommen werden. Unabhängig davon, ob nach der Erteilung Änderungen vorgenommen wurden oder nicht, haben die Gerichte die Ansprüche jedoch in Bezug
auf das Verständnis der fachlichen Zielgruppe zum Prioritätsdatum der Patentansprüche
auszulegen.
NOTES DU TRADUCTEUR (sous toutes réserves) :
1
2
3
4
Doctrine du droit des brevets qui interdit à une partie de revenir par la suite sur la portée des revendications faite
dans sa demande originale.
Doctrine du choix entre l'acceptation et le refus.
Principe de l'effet de chose jugée.
Forclusion, non-recevabilité, fin de non-recevoir
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Der Grundsatz der Einschränkung des Erteilungsverfahrens gilt in Australien derzeit nicht. Obgleich die Gerichte die Möglichkeit nicht ausschließen, dass dieser Grundsatz in künftigen
Fällen Anwendung finden mag, ist er bislang in keiner Entscheidung eines australischen
Gerichts angewendet worden. Das australische Patentgesetz von 1990 enthält eine spezielle
Klausel, die die Bezugnahme auf die Geschichte der Anklageerhebung eines Patents zulässt,
allerdings wurde diese Klausel bislang nur in einem einzigen Fall des Patentamtes angewendet
und zwar im Zusammenhang mit der Verlängerung der Patentfrist einer pharmazeutischen Substanz.
Es besteht die Möglichkeit, dass der Gültigkeitsbereich der Ansprüche beschränkte Klageerhebung von außen durch den Grundsatz, Vorrechte in Anspruch zu nehmen, aber Verpflichtungen
abzulehnen, das Prinzip res judicata und die Abgabe einer prozessbehindernden Einrede sein
kann. Bislang hat es keine australischen Urteile gegeben, bei denen diese Prinzipien bezüglich
des Gültigkeitsbereichs eines Patents angewendet wurden. Es ist möglich, dass der Gültigkeitsbereich des Anspruchs während der Gerichtsverhandlung aufgrund von Zugeständnissen des
Patentinhabers in der Verhandlung beschränkt werden könnte. Dementsprechend hat es bislang in Australien keine Anspruchsbeschränkungen außerhalb des Einklagens einer Forderung
(nachträgliche Änderungen nach der Patenterteilung sind ausgeschlossen) gegeben und es gibt
keine Anzeichen, dass dies in Zukunft der Fall sein wird.
Die australische Gruppe zieht eine ausgleichende Stellung vor, in der nicht-buchstabengetreue
Patentverletzungen durch Ersatz eines oder mehrerer entsprechender Anspruchselemente festgestellt werden können. Dies geschieht jedoch unter Bezugnahme auf die Geschichte der Anklageerhebung, um sicherzustellen, dass der Patentinhaber keine Äußerungen gemacht hat,
die einen solchen Ersatz ausschließen würde.
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