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NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES
IN SOUTH KOREA
ARDUOUS ESCAPE AND DIFFICULT INTEGRATION
Norbert Eschborn / Ines Apel
“We can’t live in North Korea because of fear, we can’t
live in China because of fear of deportation and we can’t
live in South Korea because of ignorance.” This saying is
widespread among North Korean refugees living in South
Korea. It perfectly sums up the dilemma of a group of
thousands of people who are no longer willing to live their
lives under the totalitarian regime of the Kim family in
North Korea. They therefore undertake an arduous and
highly risky escape from their homeland – a journey that
often takes many years – only to find they then have to
face the many difficulties of integrating into the society of
Dr. Norbert Eschborn
is Resident Represen­
tative of the Konrad-­
Adenauer-Stiftung in
Seoul.
their final destination, South Korea.
The status of these refugees in South Korea is somewhat
ambivalent. On the one hand, they are ideal subjects for official propaganda and it was not without a certain undertone
of irony that South Korea’s Kore Joongang Daily announced
in February 2007 that the 10,000th North Korean refugee
had arrived in South Korea on 16 February 2007, the 65th
birthday of former North Korean dictator Kim Jong-il.1 Since
that day, the number of refugees has more than doubled.
At the same time, their political status in South Korea is
not necessarily that of refugees. A common South Korean
description for such people can be translated as “someone
who has renounced North Korea”. Almost as pejorative
is the term “defector”, commonly used by South Korea’s
English-speaking press and which also appears in official­
1 | Cf. Myo-ja Ser, “10,000th defector arrives on Kim Jong-il’s
birthday”, Korean Joongang Daily, 17 Feb 2007,
http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.
aspx?aid=2872545 (accessed 20 Jun 2014).
Ines Apel, B.A. studied
Japanese and Korean
Studies at the Eberhard Karls University
in Tübingen. She was
a Junior Researcher at
the Konrad-­AdenauerStiftung’s Korea office
between March and
June 2014.
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government documents. In this way, North Korean refugees find themselves stigmatised by native South Koreans. This is particularly true of the younger generation,
who tend to feel totally alienated from North Korea and
its people. How do North Koreans manage to escape and
what kind of material and personal sacrifices do they have
to make in the process? Is it worth it and what kind of
prospects do these people now have?
REFUGEE MOVEMENTS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA
SINCE 1945
On 22 August 1910, Korea officially came under Japanese
colonial rule and so became part of the Empire of Japan.2
Japanese rule ended on 2 September 1945 following the
country’s surrender at the end of the Second World War.
Korea was subsequently divided up along the 38th parallel
by the USA and Soviet Union, the victorious powers in the
Pacific War. After the division, some two thirds of the total
population ended up living in the U.S.-controlled South.
However, the industrial centers and most of the country’s
mineral reserves were in the North, which meant that for a
long time the North’s economy was superior to that of the
rural South. Even before the outbreak of the Korean War in
1950, the Soviet Union prevented the exchange of goods
between the two Koreas and sent products manufactured
in the North to the USSR instead.
Before the official founding of the two
states in 1948 around one third of North
Koreans migrated to the poorer South,
mostly people who had been forcibly
displaced or politically persecuted.
In spite of North Korea’s economic advantage,3 around one third of North Koreans
migrated to the poorer South before the official founding of the two states in 1948. These
migrants were predominantly people who
had been forcibly displaced and made to work in the industrial regions of the North and Manchuria, along with those
who had been politically persecuted in North Korea after
1946, including landowners, business people, ­
followers
of various religions and alleged political opponents of the
2 | As early as 1876, Japan had forced Korea to open K
­ orean
ports to Japan in Busan, Wonsan and today’s Incheon. For
more on Korea’s recent history, see: Bruce Cummings,
Korea’s Place in the Sun. A Modern History, New York and
London, W.W. Norton & Company, 2005.
3 | It has been documented that until 1970 North Korea’s
economic output was higher than that of South Korea.
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Kim Il-sung regime. Only around 4,000 refugees moved in the opposite direction and
settled in the North between 1946 and 1948,
mostly out of political conviction. Relations
The conflict between the two countries
turned into a war on 25 June 1950 with
an attack on South Korea. Until the end
in 1953, 4.5 million people had been
killed.
between the two countries worsened, with
repeated clashes at the border until eventually an attack
by North Korea on South Korea heralded the start of the
Korean War on 25 June 1950.4 On 27 July 1953, an armistice agreement was signed after 4.5 million people had
been killed during the hostilities.5 No official peace agreement has ever been signed by the two countries.
The country was divided by a four-kilometer-wide demilitarised zone. After the war was over, many prisoners
of war saw the South as a more attractive option than
the North. During the prisoner exchanges known as the
­Little Switch (20 April to 3 May 1953) and the Big Switch
(5 August to 23 December 1953) a significant number
of prisoners taken by the U.S.-led United Nations forces
(7,604 North Koreans and 14,235 Chinese) chose not to
return to their homelands. By comparison, only 347 prisoners of the North, among them 21 Americans and one
Briton, opted to stay in North Korea.6 In order to be sure
that those involved had made their decisions of their own
free will, a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission was
set up and presided over by India to ask each individual
about the motives for their decision.7 Those who refused
to return to the South mostly did so for political reasons:
one black American non-commissioned officer, for example, claimed that race discrimination in his own country
4 | Particularly since the opening of the Soviet archives, it is now
known that Kim Il-sung had been seeking agreement from
Stalin for a military solution to the reunification of Korea for
some time before the outbreak of the Korean War. Cf. inter
alia Simon Sebag Montefiore, Stalin. Am Hof des roten Zaren,
Frankfurt am Main, Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2nd edition,
2007, 692 et sqq.
5 | A more recent German-language account of the conflict has
been written by: Bernd Stöver, Geschichte des Koreakriegs:
Schlachtfeld der Supermächte und ungelöster Konflikt,
Munich, Verlag C.H. Beck, 2013. Among the classic histories
of the Korean War is Max Hastings, The Korean War, London
et al., Pan Books, 2010.
6 | Cf. Stöver, ibid., 125 et seq.
7 | Cf. James L. Stokesbury, A Short History of the Korean War,
New York, William Morrow, 1988, 189.
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motivated his decision.8 However, not all repatriations took
place voluntarily. Later – for example when the prisoners
returned – it became clear that the majority of UN soldiers
had been subjected to indoctrination and that some of
them had been trained as spies.
Constant monitoring: North Korea’s people are permanently
controlled by the state for loyalty to the regime. | Source: Roman
Harak, flickr c b a.
Over time, the number of refugees heading to the South
fell dramatically. This was in part due to the North’s economic power but also because of the efficiency of the border control system that North Korea had put in place in
the mid-1950s. Until the early 1990s, only five to ten people per year succeeded in escaping to the South, almost
exclusively members of the North Korean elite. These refugees were not only in a position to give the South Korean
authorities valuable information about the North, but they
could also be used for propaganda purposes against the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The South Korean
government therefore tried to encourage people to defect,
rewarding those who did with a significant amount of
money and providing them with bodyguards for a while
after their arrival.9
8 | Looking back, we can see that Germany also experienced
voluntary migration to the communist East. Between 1950
and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, some half a million
people moved from the Federal Republic of Germany to the
GDR. Cf. Stöver, n. 5, 140 et seq.
9 | Cf. Andrei Lankov, “Bitter Taste of Paradise. North Korean
Refugees in South Korea”, in: Stephan Haggard and Marcus
Noland (eds.), The North Korean Refugee Crisis. Human ▸
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Seoul’s policy towards the refugees changed in the 1990s
when North Korea lost almost five per cent of its population
in the crisis that academic literature refers to as the “great
famine” (1996 to 1999).10 Although certain external factors contributed to this outbreak of famine, including the
collapse of the Soviet Union, (which had always provided
essential support to North Korea), and the floods of 1995,
(for which the North Korean government must take the
lion’s share of the blame), these were not the only contributing factors. The majority of the population relied on
the national food distribution system, but this was clearly
beginning to break down and the government was not
doing enough to prevent its collapse.
North Korea’s dramatic economic situation may have
increased the freedom of some North Koreans to do business and travel, but it also created the ideal environment
for corruption as a way for individuals to ensure they had
sufficient personal supplies. The economic liberalisation of
China that had begun in 1978 and the collapse of border
controls between the two countries in the early 1990s
allowed many North Koreans who wanted to flee the famine
to escape to the People’s Republic by crossing the Tumen,
the river at the North Korean-Chinese border. The majority
came from North Korea’s three northern provinces, Chagang-do, Hamgyŏng-pukto and Ryanggang-do, which were
the ones most affected by the famine. In China it was easy
for them to find work as day labourers. The Chinese were
initially well-disposed towards the North Koreans, as in the
1960s many Chinese had sought refuge in North Korea
during the Cultural Revolution.11
According to a study carried out between November 1998
and April 1999 by the South Korean non-governmental
organisation “Good Friends”,12 there were between 143,000
Rights and International Response, The Committee for Human
Rights in North Korea (HRNK), Washington D.C., 2005, 55.
10 |Cf. Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Hunger and the
Human Rights: The Politics of Famine in North Korea, HRNK,
Washington D.C., 2005, http://hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/
Hunger_and_Human_Rights.pdf (accessed 20 Jun 2014).
11 |Cf. Andrei Lankov, “North Korean Refugees in Northeast
China”, Asian Survey, Vol. 44, No. 6, 2004, 856-873 and 859,
http://jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2004.44.6.856 (accessed
20 Jun 2014).
12 | Cf. ibid.
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At the turn of the millennium, instead of
privileged members of North Korean society, refugees were mostly poor farmers or workers who tried to find a way
to South Korea.
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and 195,000 North Korean refugees living in
Northeast China. Meanwhile, 34 North Korean
refugees reached
South
Korea
between
1990 and 1993, 306 arrived between 1994
and 1998 and 1,043 between 1999 and 2001. Instead of
privileged members of North Korean society, these refugees were now mostly poor farmers or workers who were
driven by hunger to find a way to China and then onwards
to South Korea. As the number of refugees increased,
their political value to the government in Seoul started
to lessen. It felt that the dangers posed by communism
were now significantly diminished after the collapse of the
Eastern Bloc. The South Korean government reacted by
no longer trying to encourage North Koreans to flee their
country. The reason they gave for this change in policy was
that they feared a worsening of relations with North Korea.
At the same time, the fact that the social status of the
refugees was now different led to the concern that North
Koreans from a predominantly poor background would be
unable to adjust to life in South Korea and would end up
being a burden on the country’s economy.13
REASONS FOR FLEEING
Social Constraints
Individual motivations for wishing to flee North Korea
should be viewed against the backdrop of the DPRK’s fundamental ideological principles. Juche is North Korea’s state
ideology and is often translated as “autarchy” or “self-reliance”. At the core of this ideology, which was developed
during the 1970s, is the requirement to put national interests and characteristics before all else.14 The brains behind
it is believed to be Hwang Jang-yop, who fled to the South
in 1997. He is considered to be the highest-ranking North
Korean refugee of all time on account of his former party
function as chief ideologist.15 Another key element of Juche
is the idea that North Koreans are too innocent and pure to
13 |Cf. Lankov, n. 9, 55 et seq.
14 |Cf. Andrei Lankov, The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in
the Failed Stalinist Utopia, New York, Oxford University Press,
2013, 67.
15 |Cf. “Highest-ranking N. Korean defector found dead”, The
Korea Times, 10 Oct 2010, http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/
nation/2010/10/113_74270.html (accessed 20 Jun 2014).
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live in a world of evil without a father-figure to lead them.
This role of the “Great Leader” and the “Eternal President”
was assigned to Kim Il-sung.16
Another peculiarity of North Korea is the
songbun system,17 which classifies the status
of individuals in terms of their loyalty and
trust using three main and 51 sub-categories.
According to North Korea’s ideology the
people are classified into three social
categories that represent their loyalty
to the system.
The main categories are called haeksim, dongyo and choktae. Members of the haeksim or “core” class are considered
to be the most loyal. They enjoy significant advantages in
all areas of life, including social welfare, educational opportunities, medical care, food supplies and the allocation of
housing and job assignments. Next come the members of
the dongyo or “wavering” class. The loyalty of this group to
the government is seen as not necessarily guaranteed, but
it is credited with being able to serve the regime through
economic and political efforts. However, ongoing ideological indoctrination is necessary to maintain the reliability of
this class of citizens. The lowest class is the choktae, the
“hostile” class. Its members are seen as opponents of the
regime and are discriminated against in the same way that
members of the haeksim class are favoured.
Although the information is not made public, most North
Koreans know the class they have been assigned to. Of a
population of 23 million in 2008, 28 per cent belonged to
the haeksim class, 45 per cent to the dongyo class and 27
per cent to the choktae class. The North Korean Ministry of
State Security holds a file on every citizen from the age of
17 onwards. The file contains details of their songbun classification and is updated every two years. It is not unusual
for a person’s songbun classification to be downgraded, for
example if a crime is committed. And if someone commits
a political crime, they will not only have their classification
downgraded to the lowest level, but are also likely to be
sentenced to prison for life, a punishment that can also be
meted out to up to three generations of their family. Marry­
ing someone from a lower songbun level is unthinkable,
16 |Cf. B.R. Myers, The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See
Themselves – And Why It Matters, Brooklyn, Melvine House,
2011, 9.
17 |A detailed description of the songbun system can be found
in: Robert Collins, Marked for Life: Songbun. North Korea’s
Social Classification System, HRNK, Washington D.C., 2012.
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as this too will lead to one’s own level being lowered.18
Improving one’s songbun level is near to impossible.19
Even before the founding of the DPRK, there had been
attempts to establish a system of social classes. The future
leaders of the North tried to restructure the Confucian feudal system of the Korean Chosun Dynasty (1392 to 1897)
and of the Japanese colonial system (1910 to 1945) in
order to empower the working classes. The idea was that
this would be at the expense of landowners, businessmen
and followers of religion. The people of North Korea, 80 per
cent of whom were peasants at that time, were generally
positively disposed towards this policy. One of the first
goals was land reform. The main targets were landowners,
supporters of the Japanese colonial administration and
followers of religion, who were basically excluded from the
new society and had their assets confiscated. The result
was that millions of people from these classes fled to South
Korea. Their relatives who stayed behind suffered discrimination before being exiled to mountainous regions in the
north of the country.
Over the years, the gulf between the
classes grew, because the job assigned
to each person by the party is based on
that person’s songbun level.
Following a three-year study, the citizens
of North Korea were finally divided into the
three classes mentioned above. While loyal
citizens initially had little to fear from the
consequences of the introduction of the system, the gulf
between the classes continued to grow. This was partly
due to the fact that the job assigned to each person by the
party is based on that person’s songbun, and this job allocation is binding for the rest of their lives. Someone with
a low songbun level may have to work in the mines, while
those with a high level would be given the opportunity to
18 | A good example of this system at work is the 1972 marriage
of Kim Kyong-hui, sister of the dictator Kim Jong-il who
died in 2011, to Jang Sung-taek, who later became a highly
influential party functionary and was suddenly executed in
December 2013. Rumour has it that the country’s founder
Kim Il-sung was vehemently opposed to the marriage of his
daughter to Jang on songbun grounds. Songbun problems
are also credited as being the reason behind the suicide of
Jang and Kim’s own daughter, as marriage to her partner of
choice was deemed impossible due to his lower level.
19 | The only known example is that of a victorious Olympic athlete
who was allowed to move to Pyongyang with her family after
she won her medal. The capital is considered to be the best
place in the country to live.
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attend university. Using bribes in an attempt to circumvent
the restrictions imposed by the songbun system are not
uncommon but risky. In 2003 the Ministry of Public Security introduced the Chungbok 2.0 software to digitalise citizen registration data,20 so the North Korean state security
apparatus now possesses a copy of all songbun files.
The Attractiveness of the South and Modern
Communications
In the early days after division, very little information about
the rest of the world made its way into the closed country
of North Korea. But since the breakdown of the food distribution system and the emergence of new markets, it has
become much harder for the government to control the
flow of information into and out of the country. Today, for
example, it is possible to find foreign DVDs, CDs and USB
sticks on the black market.21 In 2006 alone, 350,000 DVD
players were apparently imported from China. By manipulating equipment, it is now even possible to receive foreign
TV and radio broadcasts.
It is clear that North Koreans have become far too disillusioned with their country’s own unrealistic propaganda
to disbelieve all the things they hear about South Korea
via these media. As a result, North Koreans are becoming
increasingly aware of South Korea’s economic superiority,
to such an extent that, since the year 2000, government
propaganda has stopped referring to impoverished South
Korea and begun talking about a South Korea that is not
unsuccessful economically, but one in which people lead
unhappy lives because of their cultural oppression by
American imperialists.22
Information also continues to flow into and out of the
country via smuggled Chinese mobile phones, which many
refugees use to keep in contact with their families in border
20 |Cf. Collins, n. 17, 26.
21 |Cf. Kim Yonho, Cell Phones in North Korea. Has North Korea
Entered the Telecommunications Revolution?, US-Korea
Institute at SAIS, 2014, 7, http://uskoreainstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/03/Kim-Yonho-Cell-Phones-in-NorthKorea.pdf (accessed 20 Jun 2014).
22 |Cf. Lankov, n. 14, 103.
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regions by taking advantage of Chinese phone networks.23
In March of this year, there were reports that North Korea
had introduced new detection systems to identify and punish those who receive foreign telephone calls. As a result,
the number of calls made with foreign countries has apparently gone down.24 It was also reported in the same month
that five new paragraphs had been added
Besides the betraying of state secrets,
the reception of foreign radio oder television might be considered an act of
treason and could be punished by death.
to North Korea’s criminal code making the
following activities an act of treason: making
illegal telephone calls to foreigners; watching
South Korean soap operas or DVDs; listening
to foreign radio broadcasts; using or selling drugs; transnational human trafficking; enforced prostitution; helping
or inciting somebody to flee the country and betraying
state secrets.25 According to the law, harsh penalties
will be imposed against those committing such offences,
including the death penalty. Since the criminal code was
amended, there have increasingly been reports of executions due to breaking these new laws. For example, it has
been reported that a man was executed for contacting his
family in South Korea;26 as had two men for breaching the
laws on prostitution. Prior to the changes in legislation, it
was likely they would “only” have been sent to a re-education camp. It remains to be seen whether these executions
are only intended to act as a deterrent or whether such
crimes will continue to be so harshly punished in future.
But it can be assumed that such activities would not have
been criminalised if they were only considered to be minor
issues.27
23 |Cf. Kim, n. 21, 7.
24 |Cf. Mi Jin Kang, “Cellphone Use Drops as Detectors Close in”,
DailyNK, 4 Mar 2014, http://dailynk.com/english/read.php?
num=11592&cataId=nk01500 (accessed 20 Jun 2014).
25 |Cf. Mi Jin Kang, “Criminal Code Inciting Border Fears”,
DailyNK, 21 May 2014, http://dailynk.com/english/read.
php?num=11885&cataId=nk01500 (accessed 20 Jun 2014).
26 |Cf. Mi Jin Kang, “Hyesan Man Executed as Example for Rest”,
DailyNK, 22 May 2014, http://dailynk.com/english/read.php?
cataId=nk01500&num=11891 (accessed 20 Jun 2014).
27 |Cf. Mi Jin Kang, “Two Shot over Prostitution as Article 60
Enforced”, DailyNK, 18 Jun 2014, http://dailynk.com/english/
read.php?num=11980&cataId=nk01500 (accessed 20 Jun
2014).
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Excursus: The Role of the People’s Republic of China
in the Treatment of North Korean Refugees28
In order to fully understand the North Korean refugee
problem, it is important to look at the role played by the
People’s Republic of China. The main escape route for North
Koreans is across the border between the two countries
which runs along the Yalu and Tumen rivers. Therefore
China always plays the role of a transit country, even if it
is not the final destination itself. The Chinese government
considers the escapees to be illegal immigrants who are
fleeing because of hunger, not because they fear persecution. They refuse to afford them refugee status, even
though the People’s Republic of China is a signatory to the
Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees, but also
recognises that the DPRK has not itself signed the Convention. China therefore sees it as its duty to repatriate
them. In doing so, Beijing justifies its actions by referring
to a number of treaties and agreements it has signed with
Pyongyang, such as an extradition treaty for criminals,
agreements on border surveillance and China’s own law
on the repatriation of illegal immigrants and anyone who
crosses the border illegally.
Crossing borders: North Korea and China are geographically
­divided by the Tumen River. Strict controls on both sides are
­supposed to prevent the escape from North Korea. | Source:
Roman Harak, flickr c b a.
28 |Cf. Yoon Yeo-sang, Park Seong-cheol and Lim Soon-hee,
North Korean Defectors in China. Forced Repatriation and
Human Rights Violations, Seoul, Database Center for North
Korean Human Rights, 2014, 31 et sqq.
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However, China only really began taking action against
North Korean escapees in the 1990s, when it was specifically requested to do so by Pyongyang. Part of the reason
may have been China’s gratitude towards North Korea for
supplying its neighbour with food aid during the 1960s.
What was also evident at that time was that many North
Korean escapees were returning to their homeland once
they had increased their food and money supplies in China.
However, with the North Korean famines of 1995 and 1996,
the number of refugees and those who wanted to stay in
China for a longer period or flee to another country rose
once again.
Penal and Prison Camps
Caught refugees will be brought to police
facilites. Their fate will be decided after
long questioning, during which they are
regularly tortured.
People who are caught trying to escape to
China or who are repatriated from China are
interrogated in North Korean police facilities
(ku-ryu-jang). Here they are questioned
about the reasons for their flight, where they stayed and
what they did. Later they are questioned about visits to religious buildings and any activities relating to South Korea.
Their fate will be decided after what may be several months
of questioning, during which they are regularly beaten and
tortured. Most are then sentenced without trial to a short
period of forced labour in detention centers (jip-kyul-so),
or in mobile labour brigades (ro-dong-danryeon-dae).
If their escape is considered to be politically motivated,
then they may, in individual cases, be sentenced to life
imprisonment in re-education camps (kyo-hwa-so) or in
the “revolutionary zones” of the kwan-li-so, often referred
to as “gulags” after their Soviet equivalent. Many of those
who are repatriated from China end up in the jip-kyul-so,
where they serve sentences of up to six months. The fact
that the sentences are relatively short does not mean the
treatment meted out in these prisons is any less inhumane.
Many prisoners die before the end of their sentences from
a combination of hard labour and starvation. Prison sentences in the ro-dong-danryeon-dae, which were originally
set up to deal with the growing number of North Koreans
repatriated from China, are even shorter than those in the
jip-kyul-so. There, escapees who have been repatriated
are separated from other prisoners to prevent them from
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reporting on the relative freedom and prosperity they have
witnessed in China. Many prisoners even receive some
form of trial.29
Others are sent to the kyo-hwa-so penitentiaries that
exist in every North Korean province. They are designed
to re-educate prisoners and make them better citizens
through hard work and indoctrination. They are forced
to learn Kim Il-sung’s speeches by heart and exercise
self-criticism, particularly when it comes to fulfilling their
work quotas. In contrast to the kwan-li-so,
which are designed for political prisoners,
Unlike political prisoners, felons are not
arrested with their whole family and
their sentence can be decided by a trial.
the kyo-hwa-so handle all serious offenders
or felons. An example of a “serious” crime is
singing a South Korean pop song. Another
difference is that prisoners know the “crime” they are
accused of and their whole family is not arrested with
them, as can be the case in the kwan-li-so. The families
know where they are being held. Not all, but some prisoners are even given a trial to decide their sentence. However, conditions in these camps are so hard most prisoners
die before completing their sentence,30 which is why the
kyo-hwa-so are also known as “death camps”.
Prisoners may be sent to a kwan-li-so for crimes (in the
eyes of the regime) such as wrong-doing, wrong-thought,
wrong-knowledge,
wrong-association
or
wrong-class-
background. People may be accused of wrong-class-background if their ancestors were aristocratic landowners.
Practising a religion such as Christianity is also a serious
crime that may result in imprisonment. This may be due
to a historical fear on the part of North Korea’s rulers, as
before Korea was freed from Japanese colonialism Pyongyang was known as the “Jerusalem of the East”.31 At that
time, 22 per cent of North Korea’s population of 9.6 million
29 |Cf. David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag. The Lives and Voices of
“Those Who are Sent to the Mountains”. Exposing North Korea’s
Vast System of Lawless Imprisonment, HRNK, Washington D.C.,
2nd edition, 2012, 84 and 119 et sqq., http://hrnk.org/uploads/
pdfs/HRNK_HiddenGulag2_Web_5-18.pdf (accessed 20 Jun
2014).
30 |Cf. Hawk, ibid., 84.
31 |Cf. Andrei Lankov, “North Korea’s missionary position”, Asia
Times Online, 16 Mar 2005, http://atimes.com/atimes/Korea/
GC16Dg03.html (accessed 20 Jun 2014).
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were considered to be religious.32 Kim Il-sung’s parents
were even thought to be Christians.
Under North Korea’s widespread belief
in “three generations of punishment”,
not only the offenders, but also their
families can be sent to the camps.
In theory, the kwan-li-so are divided into
two zones: one for prisoners serving a life
sentence and one for those who have the
possibility of release, as can occur on public
holidays such as New Year or Kim Il-sung’s birthday.33 But
there are no records of anyone being freed since 2007.34
Under North Korea’s widespread belief in “three generations of punishment”, based on the penal practices of the
feudal Chosŏn dynasty, not only the offenders themselves,
but also up to three generations of their families can be
sent to the camps.
In 2013 South Korea’s Institute for National Unification
(KINU) estimated the number of political prisoners to be
between 80,000 and 120,000.35 The North Korean government denies the existence of the camps, which sprang up
in the 1950s when Kim Il-sung was consolidating his power,
but eye-witness reports and satellite photos mean they can
no longer be kept a secret. Many camps have gradually
been closed down, but after the execution of high-­ranking
party official Jang Seong-taek, the uncle-by-marriage
of ruling dictator Kim Jong-un, the Japanese newspaper
Sankei Shimbun reported that the prison camps were
being expanded.36 Inside the camps food is a means of
exercising power. Breaches of camp rules result in threats
to reduce rations. Guards also use the promise of food or
better working conditions to entice women into providing
sexual favours. As this violates camp rules, these women
are often executed if they get pregnant.37 North Koreans
32 |Cf. Collins, 78.
33 |Cf. Hawk, The Hidden Gulag, 34.
34 |Cf. David Hawk, North Korea’s Hidden Gulag: Interpreting
Reports of Changes in the Prison Camps, HRNK, Washington
D.C., 2013, 11, http://hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/NKHidden
Gulag_DavidHawk(2).pdf (accessed 20 Jun 2014).
35 |Cf. Chico Harlan, “Population of North Korea’s gulag has
shrunk, experts say”, The Washington Post, 12 Sep 2013,
http://wapo.st/1v7pkWK (accessed 20 Jun 2014).
36 | Cf. also the South Korean report by: Song Sang-ho, “N. Korea
expanding prison camps: Pyongyang appears to have locked
up many arrested for connections to Jang Song-thaek”, Korea
Herald, 7 Apr 2014, http://koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=
20140407000982 (accessed 20 Jun 2014).
37 |Cf. Hawk, n. 29, 31 et seq. and 34.
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believe they are a racially pure people that is superior to all
others, so unions with Chinese are treated as defilement.
Women who are pregnant when they arrive in the camps
from China are forced to have abortions.38
The camps are also home to informants, who
tell the guards when other prisoners break
the rules. This creates an atmosphere of
mistrust and hostility. Escape attempts are
Mortality rates in the labour camps are
high because of the bad conditions,
lack of food, hard labour, torture and
poor safety in the workplace.
punished by public executions, usually by hanging or firing
squad. In general, executions are frequently held in front
of other prisoners as a deterrent. Mortality rates in the
labour camps are high because of the bad conditions, lack
of food, hard labour, torture and poor safety in the workplace.39 And it should not be assumed that treatment in
the short-term prisons is any better than in the kwan-li-so
or kyowa-so. The conditions in all these prisons are totally
inhumane. There is some evidence to suggest that convicts
with a good songbun background are favoured in terms of
length of sentence and place of imprisonment.40 Upon their
release, prisoners are given a passport that allows them to
be immediately identified as former convicts by the North
Korean authorities.41
FIRST STOP: CHINA
After 1990, the once well-secured border between China
and North Korea gradually began to open up. This was
mainly due to the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the
economic crisis this triggered in North Korea. The country’s worsening financial situation led to a huge increase in
corruption, including among border soldiers and officials.
These changes made it possible for refugees to flood into
China, particularly when North Korea was afflicted by famine between 1996 and 1999. The three northern provinces
of Chagang-do, Hamgyŏng-pukto and Ryanggang-do were
particularly badly affected, and it is likely that the famine
led to the deaths of one third of their population.42
38 |Cf. Hawk, n. 29, 95.
39 |For a comprehensive list of human rights abuses in North Korean internment camps (in German), see: Nordkoreanischer
Menschenrechtsfallbericht: Victims’ Voices, Database Center
for North Korean Human Rights, Seoul, 2013.
40 |Cf. Collins, n. 17, 19.
41 |Cf. Hawk, n. 29, 35.
42 |Cf. Yoon, n. 28, 32.
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Seeking refuge in the big cities: China is oftentimes the first stop
after escaping North Korea. A metropolis such as Shanghai offers
anonymity to the refugees, who, nevertheless, live in constant
fear of being sent back. | Source: Riwan Erchard, flickr c b n d.
At the end of 1998, non-governmental sources estimated
the total number of North Korean refugees in China to be
between 140,000 and 200,000. Numbers dropped off as
the crisis began to ease – between 2001 and 2003 the
figure was still at 100,000, but today it is somewhere
between 10,000 and 15,000. Reasons for this trend
included stricter border controls, the improved food situation in North Korea, the growing number of people successfully leaving China for South Korea and regular arrests
and repatriations on the part of the Chinese government.
In 2002, large numbers of North Korean escapees stormed
various embassies in China seeking refuge. This led the
Chinese authorities launching large-scale search operations in three provinces of Northeast China. According to
press reports, these led to the repatriation of some 4,500
refugees and tighter border controls. The refugees had
mainly gathered in China’s north-eastern provinces, where
a significant proportion of the population were ethnic
Koreans. After the year 2000 they began to spread out
to other regions, including Beijing, Qingdao, Shanghai and
the Tibetan region of Western China. Today, the majority live in large cities or in areas where the population is
predominantly Han Chinese. This resettlement seems to
have occurred because of the heightened risk of being discovered in Chinese communities that have large Korean
populations. Reasons for China’s clampdown on refugees
include the fact that North Korea is still a vital strategic
partner. But it is also because of Beijing’s fear of masses
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of refugees surging into China, which could lead to the collapse of the North Korean regime. The aim of this stricter
refugee policy is to reduce the number of escapees and the
international attention they attract.
Over the years, the number of refugees has fallen, but their
profiles and preferred destinations have also changed.
During the 1990s, men and women were leaving the North
in equal numbers, but now the majority of refugees are
women. One of the reasons for this is the one-child policy,
which has created a severe gender imbalance in China.
This has resulted in a trade in women, and North Korean
women often become victims of trafficking who will be
sold on to China. Traffickers can earn between 1,000 and
10,000 yuan (120 to 1,200 euros) for every woman they
deliver to a buyer.43 If these women are living with Chinese
men, then it is certainly easier for them to stay hidden in
China and find work, often in the service sector, but they
are still illegal immigrants. They enjoy no legal protection
because their marriages are not recognised by the Chinese
authorities. Women who manage to escape these kinds
of forced marriages generally end up doing casual jobs to
earn a living, including prostitution. Their wages are far
below those of the local population – if indeed they get
paid at all.
Of those who make it to China, only a small proportion
dares to try to reach South Korea. In China there are no
legal channels for them to seek refuge in South Korea, so
they have to try to enter via a third country. Brokers offer
to smuggle them into South Korea for a payment of 10,000
U.S. dollars. The broker’s fee is around 10,000 U.S. dollars, a sum that normally can only be raised by people who
have relatives in South Korea. In 2000, half of all refugees
who made it to South Korea already had family there. As
refugees, North Koreans who present themselves to the
authorities in South Korea receive South Korean citizenship
and financial assistance.44
43 |Cf. Hae Young Lee, Lives for Sale. Personal Accounts of
­Women Fleeing North Korea to China, HRNK, Seoul, 2009,
9, http://hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Lives_for_Sale.pdf (accessed
20 Jun 2014).
44 |Cf. Lankov, n. 11.
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LAST STOP: SOUTH KOREA
Social Familiarisation
People who successfully flee to South Korea have to submit
to a hearing. Depending on their status and background,
this can take as long as 180 days.45 It is followed by a
comprehensive program of social familiarisation (revised
in April 2012). This lasts for over twelve weeks and
involves more than 400 hours of instruction. All refugees are placed on a central register and complete this
program in Anseong, a city 80 kilometers south of Seoul.
The Hanawon, a facility run by the Ministry
Through comprehensive programs in
South Korea the refugees should regain
their physical and emotional strength,
learn about South Korean culture, and
receive career training.
of Unification, is designed to help refugees
settle into South Korean society. Upon completion of the program, they receive a family
register and become citizens of South Korea.
According to the Ministry of Unification, the aim is to help
refugees regain their physical and emotional strength, give
them a better understanding of South Korean culture, provide career advice and training and familiarise them with
the government’s settlement program.
The program is divided into 123 hours of instruction on
South Korean society. Participants learn about the political
concept of democracy and the market economy and attend
history and language classes.46 They are also taken on field
trips to learn how to deal with everyday situations. In addition, refugees have to attend a 49-hour program to help
them with emotional stability and health issues. There is
another 51 hours of instruction on government assistance
for refugees, along with training on how they can become
more independent. Other courses include bookkeeping and
gaining a driving licence. Hanawon even has its own small
clinic.47
45 |Cf. Chico Harlan, “In South Korea, high-profile defector is
accused of spying for the North-by his sister”, The Washington
Post, 18 May 2013, http://wapo.st/1pB3e9A (accessed
20 Jun 2014).
46 |Language classes are necessary because experts estimate
that, since Korea split in two, some 3,000 different terms
have emerged in every area of life. These have to be learned
in order to understand the colloquial language of South Korea.
47 | Cf. more details on integration courses in: White Paper on
Korean Unification 2013, Ministry of Unification, Seoul, 2013,
http://eng.unikorea.go.kr/index.do?menuCd=DOM_000000
204001001000 (accessed 20 Jun 2014).
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The Hanawon in Anseong only has space for 200 people,
but the actual number of refugees had grown to 400. So
on 5 December 2012 a second Hanawon was opened in
Hwacheon, 90 kilometers from Seoul, with a capacity of
500. This Hanawon is designed for male refugees only,
whereas the facility in Seoul will house women only. South
Korea still has a very traditional view of gender roles, as
evidenced by state regulations that make courses gender-specific. Cooking courses are restricted to women,
whereas only men can learn to become car mechanics.48
Arrival with obstacles: Integration into South Korean society is not
easy for refugees from the north. In addition to looking for jobs
and getting oriented in a city like Seoul, they face the problem
that many South Koreans know very little about the refugees and
their situation. | Source: Mark Goh, flickr c b n a.
The 2012 revision of the program was sorely needed. In
“Eyes of Pyongyang”, a column for North Korean refugees
on the website of the North Korean Strategy Center (an
organisation that works to promote democracy in North
Korea), a young woman writes how she was unable to cope
when she was released from Hanawon and had to travel
48 |For more details cf. Tongil baekseo, Unification White Paper
2014, Ministry of Unification, Seoul, 2014,
http://www.unikorea.go.kr/index.do?menuCd=DOM_
000000105003005000 (accessed 20 Jun 2014).
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alone on the subway for the first time.49 Many refugees
also complained they were already familiar with 50 to
60 per cent of the subjects on the curriculum. They also
said it was difficult to really concentrate on the classes, as
they were worrying about the family and friends they had
left behind and simply wanted the program to be over as
quickly as possible.50
At the end of the program, the refugees receive help to find
accommodation, often close to family members. Each refugee also gets a payment in instalments totalling seven million won (in the region of 5,000 euros at current exchange
rates). Additional financial assistance is available to seniors
over 60 years of age, people with physical or psychological
illnesses, people who need long-term medical care and
children with only one parent.51 Other assistance includes
an easing of recruitment requirements for refugees and
tax breaks for companies who employ refugees.52
Integration – Problems and Assistance
In order to reach South Korea, many
refugees use a broker who helps to get
to a third country from where they
can legally apply to emigrate to South
Korea.
Refugees say one of the main problems they
face until they leave Hanawon is the fact that
they live in a constant state of dependency
and supervision. This not only applies to the
time spent in the reception center and during their hearings in South Korea, but also to their journey up to this
point. In order to reach South Korea, many of them use a
broker who helps them to get to a third country from where
refugees can legally apply to emigrate to South Korea. But
this process can take a long time. Then there are the longdrawn-out hearings, as previously mentioned. Since 2010,
a government ruling means that refugees from the North
49 |“My most Shocking Moment in South Korea”, NKSC, 13 Feb
2014, http://nksc.co.kr/english/bbs/board_view.php?bbs_
code=bbsIdx9&num=9825 (accessed 20 Jun 2014).
50 |Cf. Hak Min Chung, “To become the Hana Center that
defectors need”, NKSC, 31 Jul 2013, http://nksc.co.kr/
english/bbs/board_view.php?bbs_code=bbsIdx9&num=9779
(accessed 20 Jun 2014).
51 |Cf. n. 47, chapter 6.
52 |Cf. Ministry of Unification, “Press Release: A revised law
on protection and resettlement support for North Korean
­defectors promulgated”, 26 Mar 2010, http://eng.unikorea.
go.kr/board/view.do?boardId=BO0000000090&menuCd=
DOM_000000201002000000&startPage=1&dataSid=220127
(accessed 20 Jun 2014).
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can now be held in detention centers during their hearing
for twice as long as before – 180 instead of 90 days. This
is due to the growing number of arrests of alleged spies.
During their hearings, refugees are kept under constant
surveillance (video cameras in their cells) and are also
questioned at night without a lawyer in attendance. Activists have criticised these practices as being a legal grey
zone.53
An assessment of the psychological pressures placed on
refugees, not only during their long and dangerous journey
to South Korea, but also after their arrival, shows that they
find it difficult to get used to and enjoy their new freedoms.
According to a survey by the Yeo-Myung School,54 60 per
cent of North Korean refugees felt insecure and 30 per cent
of respondents displayed symptoms of depression. It also
revealed that 60 per cent of students suffered from diabetes and anaemia as a result of their escape. They receive
help during their stay at Hanawon, but this is not enough
for refugees to recover from their trauma and overcome
their worries about family members left behind in North
Korea or China.55
After they have completed the Hanawon program, refugees
can seek help from one of 32 Hana centers throughout the
country. These centers offer an intensive three-week program which helps refugees to find jobs and to learn about
medical care and training opportunities. After completion
of the program, the centers offer ongoing regular consultations for up to one year and recommend other help
organisations. In contrast to Hanawon, which is run by the
Ministry of Unification, the Hana centers are run by private
contractors on behalf of the government. In 2012, 95 per
cent of refugees attended a Hana center, and 92 per cent
completed the program.56
53 |The sister of accused spy Yoo Woo-sung describes how she
was verbally abused, humiliated and forced to make false
statements during her time in the detention center. She
claims she was forced to stand in front of other North Korean
refugees wearing a sign stating “I come from China”. In the
end, Yoo Woo-sung was cleared of being a spy after it was
proven that the South Korean secret service had falsified
evidence. Cf. Harlan, n. 45.
54 |This school is based in Seoul and works to integrate young
North Korean refugees into South Korean society.
55 |Yeo-Myung School brochure.
56 |Cf. n. 47, chapter 6.
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In South Korea, huge emphasis is placed on obtaining a
good education and it is difficult to get a good job without
attending one of the country’s elite universities. So it is not
easy for North Korean refugees to enter the labour market.
A job center was set up in 2012 to help them find work.
There are also monthly job fairs where refugees can find
employment with small and medium-sized
Monthly job fairs offer a chance for refugees to find employment. Almost 5,000
attended those events so far.
companies.57 From January 2010 to December 2012, 4,800 refugees took part in these
job fairs. 1,632 of these received job offers,
which were accepted by 312 people (19.2
per cent). This kind of government initiative is vital, as
20.7 per cent of refugees only do casual work. It is true
that this figure has fallen by 32.2 per cent since 2011, but
it is still high. This also explains the pay gap between North
Korean refugees and employees of South Korean descent.
With a weekly average of 47.9 hours, North Koreans tend
to work harder than their South Korean colleagues (by
7.9 hours), but their wages are well below the national
average. Unemployment among former refugees stands at
9.7 per cent compared to just 2.7 per cent among South
Koreans.58
In an attempt to prevent high staff turnover, the South
Korean government rewards North Korean refugees who
stay in the same job for a year or more. In 2009 this
amounted to 5.5 million won (approximately 4,000 euros).
There are also financial incentives to complete training
courses and gain qualifications. The money that refugees
are given when they complete the foundation course at
Hanawon is often used to finance the escape of family
members left behind in North Korea or China.59
57 |Although it cannot be empirically proven, it seems fair to
assume from this that major South Korean conglomerates
never or only rarely take on North Korean refugees. Small
and medium-sized companies in South Korea still do not have
a good reputation as employers, partly due to their poor pay
and conditions.
58 |For more details see: Eun Ju Moon, “Defectors in SK Report
Incomes Half National Average”, DailyNK, 13 Feb 2014,
http://dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk01501&num=
11504 (accessed 20 Jun 2014).
59 |Cf. n. 47, chapter 6.
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How Happy Are They with Their New Lives?
Existing studies on whether North Korean
refugees are happy with their new lives in
South Korea have given rise to some interesting points. 54.2 per cent of respondents
According to a survey, three quarters of
respondents believe – at least publicly –
that they made the right decision to flee
their homeland.
say they are happy and 20.3 per cent even describe themselves as very happy. This suggests that three quarters
of respondents believe – at least publicly – they made
the right decision to flee their homeland. Reasons given
include the fact that they are now paid more appropriately
for their work, along with economic freedom and the lack
of constant surveillance and controls. Those who claim to
be unhappy cite financial difficulties (70.2 per cent) and
discrimination against refugees (33.6 per cent) as the
main reasons.60
65 per cent of refugees live in Seoul because it offers better opportunities for jobs and education. Since 2012, North
Korean refugees are also allowed to work for provincial
authorities and the national government.61 Although the
assistance given to refugees by the South Korean government is portrayed in a positive light, the time they spend
at Hanawon is simply too short to prepare them for life
in a totally different country. And it is not only the refugees who need to learn about life in South Korea. In turn,
South Koreans need to learn more about North Korea and
its refugees. Many of them still seem to have little understanding of the refugees’ situation. Since 2011, South
Korean broadcaster Channel A has been running a program
on Sunday evenings in which North Korean refugees talk
about their lives in North Korea and the difficulties they
face in South Korea. But discrimination or perceived discrimination remains a problem.62 According to the YeoMyung School, six out of ten students conceal their origins
because they fear discrimination.63 The constant use of
60 |Cf. Moon, n. 58. The value of the survey results are somewhat
limited because of the strong imbalance between male and
female respondents (almost 1 to 3).
61 |Cf. n. 47, chapter 6.
62 |Cf. “Gu Ga-in, [Saturday sketch] Channel A, ‘Let's go and
meet them’, episode 100…Conversations that could not be
held by beautiful refugee women” [author’s translation],
dongA.com, 4 Nov 2013, http://news.donga.com/NewsStand/
3/all/20131101/58630761/1 (accessed 20 Jun 2014).
63 |Cf. n. 55.
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borrowed English words in the South Korean language also
causes communication problems. Perhaps this is another
reason why five out of 100 young North Korean refugees
drop out of university, compared to just one in 100 South
Koreans. It also seems that short-term psychological help
is not sufficient. The terrible ordeals they have endured in
North Korea and during their escape mean that many need
long-term help.
NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES – FOREIGNERS IN KOREA?64
After completion of the familiarisation program at Hanawon,
North Korean refugees are given a South Korean passport.
However an intensive three-month course and an official
document are not enough to turn them into South Koreans.
It is not possible to simply erase or overwrite their former
lives and the experiences that have shaped their personalities. Both Koreas still officially uphold the myth of “one
Korea” and “one people”. But in reality the people of the
two countries are becoming increasingly estranged from
each other as time goes by. This is not only because of the
considerable disparity between the living conditions of the
two nations, but media reporting on both sides serves to
ramp up mutual distrust. This is another reason why it is a
mistake to believe that having Korean origins is enough in
itself for North Korean refugees to integrate smoothly into
the South.
South Koreans have many reservations about their Northern compatriots. This is because of the refugees’ ideological
indoctrination in the North Korean system and the fact that
many have lived illegally in China. Many South Koreans
believe the things they had to do to survive are immoral
and barely legal. This is why South Koreans tend to be suspicious of North Koreans and why an invisible gulf divides
them. South Koreans are also worried about North Koreans
“taking their jobs” and are envious of the fact that it is
easier for these new citizens to gain access to the coveted
places and scholarships at elite universities in Seoul due
to more relaxed entry requirements, while South Koreans
have to work hard and take an entrance exam.
64 |The information provided in this article is the result of conversations between the author and young North Korean refugees.
The interviews were organised with the help of the Yeo-Myung
School.
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Credibility and compassion: If the South was more open-minded
it would help to give credibility to the inter-Korean dialogue of
President Park Geun-hye, here at a commemoration on 6 June
2014 in Seoul. | Source: Jeon Han, Korean Culture and Information Service, flickr c b a.
As long as the North Korean regime is in existence and
people continue to seek asylum in South Korea, it is necessary to forge a basic sense of understanding and actively
work to reduce prejudices on both sides. The Hanawon
program seems to be a good start for helping refugees to
settle into their new home. But is this the only and best
way of achieving successful integration? When it comes to
familiarisation, it should be noted that South Korea differs
hugely from North Korea and the refugee’s transit country of China. Despite many thousand years of common
Korean history and the same basic language, the cultural,
political and technological gap yawns so widely that they
would seem to need more than just a three-month stay at
Hanawon to prepare them for their new lives.
Based on the experiences of German reunification, it can
be concluded that North Koreans need to learn about the
South, but in turn South Koreans need to learn about the
North. They need to gain a better understanding of the
people, daily lives and culture of their neighbours. However, this requires easy access to such information from
the government in Seoul – particularly via new media
channels – but this is being prevented by Seoul’s prevailing
legal climate. Greater openness on the part of the South
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would help to spark the interest of young South Koreans in
the issue of reunification and lend credibility to President
Park Geun-hye’s policies on Korean rapprochement. North
Korean refugees would also benefit from this, as there
is still one element that is really lacking in South Korea:
compassion.65
65 |Cf. in this respect the speech given by President Park Geunhye at Dresden University of Technology on the occasion of
her state visit to Germany on 28 March 2014: “An Initiative
for Peaceful Unification on the Korean Peninsula”, 31 Mar 2014,
Korea.net, http://korea.net/Government/Briefing-Room/
Presidential-Speeches/view?articleId=118517 (accessed
28 Jul 2014).