MEANING IN PROJECTION
(A suggested device for arriving at a cuantitative
index of personality)
The major thesis underlying this analysis may be
briefly stated; the present dependence on Qualitative rather
than cuantitative methods of evaluating projective tests
flows from a neglect of the factor of meaning in the pro­
jective process. The writer is convinced that the resources
of the projective test have scarcely begun to be tapped
through the Rorschach and the Thematic Apperception Test.
However because of their extraordinary sensitivity and depth
these instruments have been used as the prototype for eval­
uation through the projective method. Without discussing the
failure of the inventory as a personality probe, we may say
that the preference for the projectives is founded on the
basic advantages they offer in the clinical situation.
However because projectives have emerged without
basic quantification and the personality inventories have
been essentially quantificational, it does not follow that
quantification should be dismissed because the inventories
have been unsatisfactory. The v.eaimess of the inventory
has been the naivete of the presentation; the subject with
any capacity can organize a suitable answer. The strength
of the projectives resides in fact that the subject cannot
evaluate the meaning of his answers as psychological entities
and must fall back on some other rationale for the organization
of responses.
As has been mentioned, this paper is primarily directed
at presenting an instrument to evaluate personality. Because
the projective method is used in a somewhat unorthodox
fashion, and because the organization of the test flows
primarily from a concept of meaning, some space will be
devoted to an analysis of meaning and the relationship
of this concept to personality and projection.
Something may be considered to have meaning only when
it is a signal for a response. Mere sensation does not
infer the accrual of meaning; when the stimulus is a cue
for reaction, it has meaning. This demands that whenever.a
stimulus results in a meaningful response, the„organisrn
has previously contacted a similar stimulus. V.hen an or­
ganism makes an adventitious response to stimuli which
have no previous experiential history, this is meaningless
responding.
Ogden and Richards ( ) in their "Meaning of Meaning"
refer to signs (words), which relate to external reality
or referents:
The child who finds all his fingers sticky might
eouaily well have found each of them sticky. On
other occasions his smallest fingers will not need
to be washed. Thus the. difference between inclusive
and non-inclusive sets of objects as referents, the
difference between*some *and »all’ references will
early develop appropriate signs.( ,pG6)
In this situation we may see that a response organization
which relates to a stimulus context may extend or generalize
so that the "sign" may be used for many referents. However
the meaning component is seen as a function of stimulus
relations which give direction and integrative value for
responses. The symbolic*sign1 has an external referent(stimulus)
vhic” obtains meaning as a function of sensations, perceptions,
emotions* and drives contingent to the available stimulus
matrix. A neat illustration of this relationship was demon­
strated by McClelland and Atkinson ( ). They demonstrated that
under conditions of food deprivation objects tended to change
in meaning, this change in meaning was related to their need
for food in that food related responses occurred with increasing
frequency as the food need increased.
The meaningfulness of stimuli as a function of need has
been demonstrated repeatedly. Perhaps the most informative
in terms of distortion of stimuli in terms of purely social
factors was done by Postman and Goodman ( ). Poor children tended
to distort the size of coins in a probable direction while
rich children tended to judge coin size more objectively.
The effect of the learning history on the perception of
objects has been demonstrated by Ruch( ). Ambiguous stimuli
were presented to both male and female subjects. Judgment cat­
egories related to masculine and feminine interests were provided.
The females tended to see the objects in terms of their learning
histories as cooking utensils,hats etc; the males saw them as
electro-magnets, and other male-history objects.
Postman,
Bruner and McGinnies ( ) demonstrated that, individuals familiar
with particular areas recognized stimuli associated with their
interests more rapidly than other stimuli.
It is evident that in order for a familiar
area to exist,
there must be a history of learning associated with it. In order
for a need to have stimuli available which reduce it, there must