Filozofski vestnik
L etnik/V olum e XXII • Številka/N um ber 2 • 2001 • 7-20
AESTHETICS: PHILOSOPHY OF ART
OR PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE?
A leš E rjavec
T h ro u g h o u t its m u ltifario u s history aesthetics in its various historical, cul­
tu ral a n d th e o re tic a l fram ew orks has b e e n c o n c ern e d with issues o f cogni­
tion , beau ty , n a tu re a n d art, a n d th eir m utual relations a n d relationships.
H e n c e , aesthetics, as estab lish ed by B aum garten, was in te n d e d to establish
th e scien ce o f c o g n itio n as c a rrie d o u t by th e senses (alth o u g h n o t in opposi­
tio n to scientific ratio n ality ); in K ant the n o tio n s o f th e beautiful a n d the
su b lim e sim u ltan eo u sly re la te to n a tu re a n d to art, b o th in relatio n to the
p re c o n d itio n s o f h u m a n co g n itio n a n d u n d ersta n d in g , w hile in H egel aes­
th etics firm ly b eco m es p h ilo so p h y o f art, alth o u g h it still retains th e um bili­
cal c o rd w ith th e sen suous, for, by b ein g th e “sensuous a p p e ara n ce o f the
Id e a ,” by its very d e fin itio n , a rt c a n n o t exist w ithout it. A lth o u g h in H egel a rt
is a n essen tial step in th e d e v e lo p m e n t o f th e self-awareness o f th e A bsolute
Spirit, its specific sen suous featu res p rev en t it from attain in g the ultim ate
p o sitio n o f th e p u re co n c ep t. T his is reserved fo r philosophy, w hich deals, in
H e g e l’s view, w ith co n c ep ts only.
H e g e l’s id en tificatio n o f aesthetics with philosophy o f a rt a n d th e tu rn
away fro m n a tu re to a rt as th e fu n d a m e n tal object o f aesthetic reflection re p ­
re se n ts a cru cial h isto rical m o m e n t, for it n o t only establishes aesthetics as
p h ilo so p h y o f a rt b u t, con seq u en tly , also signals th e dem ise o f its relevance by
elim in a tin g th e fu rth e r h isto ric im p o rtan ce o f its subject, i.e. art.
As P e te r B ü rg er n o tes in his Theory of the Avant-Garde, in H egel can be
fo u n d a sk etch o f a c o n c e p t o f p o stro m an tic art: “Using D utch g en re p ain tin g
as his ex am p le, h e w rites th a t h e re the in tere st in th e object turns in to in te r­
e st in th e skill o f p re se n ta tio n . ‘W hat sh o u ld e n c h a n t us is n o t the subject o f
the p a in tin g a n d its lifelikeness, b u t the p u re appearance (interesseloses Scheinen)
w hich is wholly w ith o u t th e s o rt o f in tere st th a t the subject has. T h e o n e th in g
c e rta in a b o u t b ea u ty is, as it w ere, a p p e ara n ce [sem blance ( Scheinen)] for its
ow n sake, a n d a rt is m astery in th e portrayal o f all the secrets o f this ever
A l e š E r ja v e c
p ro fo u n d e r p u re a p p e ara n ce (Scheinen) o f ex te rn a l re alities’ (vol. I, p. 598).
W hat H egel alludes to h e re is n o th in g o th e r th a n w h at we called th e d ev elo p ­
ing au to n o m y o f th e aesthetic. H e says expressly ‘th a t th e a rtis t’s subjective
skill a n d his application o f the m eans o f artistic p ro c e d u re are ra ise d to th e
status o f an objective m atter in works o f a r t ’ (vol. I, p. 599). T h is a n n o u n c e s
th e shift o f the fo rm -content dialectic in favor o f fo rm , a d e v e lo p m e n t th a t
characterizes the fu rth e r course o f a rt.”1 B ü rg er draws fro m this passage th e
conclusion th at H egel h im self foresaw th e se p a ra tio n o f th e c o n te n t a n d th e
form , o r w hat h e calls “the antithesis b etw een a rt a n d th e praxis o f life.”2
T h e re exists a n o th e r in te rp re ta tio n o f th e H e g elia n thesis o f th e in te r­
m ediate position o f a rt in relation to philosophy, w hich can b e fo u n d in H e n ri
Lefebvre a n d m o re recently in Luc F erry a n d w hich relates to c o n te m p o ra ry
dilem m as intrinsic to aesthetics. A cco rd in g to this se c o n d in te rp re ta tio n o f
H egel (th e sim ilarities o f w hich w ith th a t o f B ü rg er, a n d h e n c e in d irec tly
with th a t o f A d o rn o , Ferry disputes) co n te m p o ra ry a rt has lost its p o w er o f
n egation. It follows from F erry’s theses th at, b ecau se it tu rn e d in to p h ilo so ­
phy, a rt becam e su b lated an d by this act o r process it was tra n sfo rm e d in to its
opposite, alth o u g h at the sam e tim e re ta in in g its n a m e as its em p ty shell. In
the words o f Ferry, “if a rt is sim ply an in c a rn a tio n o f a c o n c e p tu a l tru th in a
sensible m aterial, a rt is d e a d .”3 T h e a rt th a t is re fe rre d to h e re is c o n c e p tu a l
a rt in its b ro a d est sense a n d it this a r t th a t increasingly a p p e ars as th e a r t afte r
m o d ern ism par excellence. It is also this a rt w hich is o n e o f th e causes fo r th e
p re sen t re-exam ination o f the re la tio n betw een a rt a n d c u ltu re a n d , th e re ­
fore, o f th e relatio n betw een aesthetics as p h ilo so p h y o f a rt a n d aesthetics
in te rp re te d as p h ilosophy o f culture.
A dilem m a w hich confronts us today is as follows: ca n we tre a t all c o n te m ­
porary a rt as a single entity, w h e th e r it is co n c e p tu a l o r o th e r, o r d o we have
to distinguish betw een (1) co n cep tu al, (2) tra d itio n a l (classical) art, a n d (3)
p red o m in an tly com m ercial, co m m o d ified a n d , fo r th e m o st p a rt, visual a rt
which is closely related to w hat used to b e called m ass a n d c o n su m e r c u ltu re ?
A step necessary for answ ering this d ilem m a m ay b e in historically d e fin in g
th e initial object o f o u r inquiry.
How can we d efin e a rt historically? First, we m ay d e fin e it as a shifting
fu n ctio n w hich gives a sem blance o f o n to lo g ical stability sim ply b ec au se we
d o n ’t view it from a long term historical perspective. F rom this view point
artworks are tran sien t entities with onto lo g ical, cognitive, aesth etic, id eo lo g i­
1 P eter Bürger, Theory of the Avant-Garde (M inneapolis: University o f M innesota Press,
1984), p. 93.
2 Ibid., pp. 93-4.
s Luc Ferry, Le Sens du Beau (Paris: Cercle d ’Art, 1998), p. 200.
8
A e s t h e t i c s : P h i l o s o p h y o f A r t o r P h il o s o p h y o f C u l t u r e ?
cal, a n d o th e r fu n c tio n s, a n d ardsts a n d w riters are ap p reciate d a n d valued
fo r a b rie f h isto rical m o m e n t a n d th e n slip in to oblivion to be, perhaps, resu r­
re c te d years, d ec ad es o r even cen tu ries later. T hey may, in the m eantim e,
b e c o m e a p a rt o f th e C an o n , b u t even in this case it c a n n o t b e said th a t they
are a p p re c ia te d w ith th e sam e intensity th ro u g h o u t history. T h e Czech struc­
tu ralist ae sth e tic ia n fro m th e thirties, J a n Mukarovskÿ fu rth e rm o re suggested
th a t ea ch new artistic m o v em en t o r tre n d - an avant-gardist, for exam ple first o p p o ses a n d subverts th e p ast artistic norm s, b u t subsequently b ecom es
itself a p a rt o f th e trad itio n a n d h e n c e itself a norm .
In this first h isto rical d efin itio n , a rt is so m eth in g th at attains the function
o f art. Its essen tial fe a tu re co u ld b e defin ed in N elson G o o d m a n ’s m anner:
th e q u e stio n is n o t w h at is art, b u t w hen is it art? Mukarovskÿ follows h e re in
th e fo o tstep s o f th e R ussian form alists, who have already claim ed th a t art­
w orks - th ey w ere c o n c e rn e d alm ost exclusively with p o etry a n d prose an d
n o t w ith works o f th e visual arts - attained, lost and perh ap s reg ain ed th eir
artistic status th ro u g h history. O r, q u o tin g D anto from eig h t decades later,
“W e m ig h t d e fin e th e ir h isto rical m o m e n t as any time in w hich they could
have b e e n works o f a r t.”4
A c co rd in g to th e sec o n d historical defin itio n which is a historicist one,
a rt follows a h istorically p re e x iste n t norm . In H eg el’s case (a n d also, b u t to a
lesser e x te n t, in th a t o f H e id e g g er) this is o f course th e G reek m odel. As
P e te r S zondi observes, “W hile in H egel everything starts to move a n d every­
th in g h as its specific place value in historical d e v e lo p m e n t... the c o n c e p t o f
a rt can h ard ly dev elo p , fo r it b ears th e u n iq u e stam p o f G reek a rt.”5 R om an­
tic a r t do es n o t fulfill th o se crite ria a n d th eir ideal; to re tu rn to B ürger again,
“F o r H eg el, ro m a n tic a rt is th e p ro d u c t o f the dissolution o f th e in te rp e n e tra ­
tio n o f sp irit a n d sen su ousness (ex tern al ap p e ara n ce) characteristic o f classi­
cal art. B u t b ey o n d th at, h e conceives o f a fu rth e r stage w h ere ro m an tic art
also dissolves. T his is b ro u g h t a b o u t by the radicalization o f the opposites o f
inw ard n ess a n d e x te rn a l reality th a t d efine rom antic art. A rt disintegrates
in to ‘th e subjective im itatio n o f th e given’ (realism in d etail) a n d ‘subjective
h u m o r.’ H e g e l’s ae sth e tic th eo ry thus leads logically to th e idea o f the e n d of
a rt w h e re a rt is u n d e rs to o d to b e w hat H egel m e a n t by classicism, the p erfect
in te rp e n e tra tio n o f fo rm a n d c o n te n t.”'’
B ut d o es it necessarily follow th at post-rom antic art has lost the historic
ro le it p u rp o rte d ly possessed in th e past? W hile a positive answ er is obligatory
4 A rth u r D anto, After the End of Art (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p.
196.
5 Q u o ted in B ürger, op. cit., p. 92.
0 B ürger, op. cit., p. 93.
9
A l e š E r ja v e c
if o n e follows H eg el’s designation o f th e d e v e lo p m e n t o f th e A b so lu te S pirit,
an d m ay even be necessary if we follow F erry’s a rg u m e n ts, it is also tru e - as
A d o rn o claims an d , later, B ürger - th a t after ro m an ticism , art, especially in
th e n in e te e n th and m ost o f the tw en tieth century, a tta in e d o r r e ta in e d a very
privileged social a n d existential po sitio n , o n e th a t was left practically u n d is­
p u te d at least u n til th e sixties, w hen th e e m e rg e n c e o f stru ctu ra lism a n d la te r
p o ststru ctu ralism sta rte d to radically q u e s tio n a n d a tta c k th e prev io u sly
san cro san ct n otions o f the artw ork, th e artist a n d artistic creativity —a p ro cess
which co in cid ed with th e ch ange fro m th e m o d e rn is t in to th e p o s tm o d e rn is t
p aradigm . W ithin such a ch a n g ed c u ltu re sc ap e th e c o n te m p o ra ry altern ativ e
to the two historical definitions previously d esc rib ed w ould b e th a t o f A rth u r
D anto: “T h e picture th e n is this: th e re is a k in d o f tran sh isto rica l essen ce in
art, everyw here a n d always the sam e, b u t it only discloses itself th ro u g h his­
tory. ... O n c e b ro u g h t to the level o f self-consciousness, this tru th reveals itself
as p re se n t in all the a rt th a t ever m a tte re d .”7 T his essence o r tru th c a n n o t b e
id en tified with a p artic u la r style o f art, co n tin u e s D anto.
W h at is th en disclosed th ro u g h history is th e h isto ricized essence o f art.
A nd D an to con tin u es m u ch like B ü rg er a n d especially Ferry: “ [T ]h e e n d o f
a rt consists in th e co m ing to aw areness o f th e tru e p h ilo so p h ic al n a tu re o f
a rt.”” T h e passage o f a rt in to philosophy, the e m e rg e n c e o f in te lle c tu a l re ­
flection u p o n art, p u rp o rte d ly signals th e final d e a th knell to a rt p ro p e r, b u t
while in Ferry o r Lefebvre a rt has n o t only lost its h isto ric ro le b u t has lost its
role alto g eth er, D anto sees in this c h a n g e the e m e rg e n c e o f a post-historical
a rt w hich, alth o u g h n o lo n g er historic, legitim ately co n tin u e s th e tra d itio n o f
its p red ecesso r an d is th ere fo re a c o n tin u a tio n o f a rt as such. A c o rre la te o f
th e previous belief in th e im p o rtan ce a n d th e essential tru th -re v ealin g fu n c ­
tion o f a rt are th e n in e te e n th a n d tw en tieth ce n tu ry beliefs in creativity o f
which a rt was the p a ra m o u n t instance. T h e view th a t th e ro le o f a r t m ay have
b een dim in ish in g for centuries at least, is obvious also from H e id e g g e r’s q u es­
tion in 1950: “ [I]s a rt still an essential a n d necessary way in w hich tru th th a t is
decisive fo r o u r historical existence h ap p e n s, o r is a rt n o lo n g e r o f this c h a r­
acter?”'1
T his sam e issue was picked u p in th e re c e n t book, The Work o f Art fro m
1997, by th e F rench aesthetician G é ra rd G e n e tte , w ho n o te d th a t A d o rn o
an d H eidegger “systematically overvalued art,”10 thereby ec h o in g D a n to ’s views
o n posthistorical art. Truly, may we n o t say th a t a rt is b u t yet a n o th e r m a ste r
7 D anto, op. cit., p. 28.
8 D anto, op. cit., p. 30.
!l M artin H eidegger, “T he O rigin o f th e A rtw ork,” q u o te d in D anto, p. 32.
1(1G érard G enette, L ’oeuvre de l ’art. La relation esthétique (Paris: Seuil, 1997), p. 11.
10
A e s t h e t ic s : P h il o s o p h y o f A r t o r P h il o s o p h y o f C u l t u r e ?
n arrativ e o f m o d e rn ity a n d th a t m odernism was its last a n d p erh ap s p ara­
m o u n t h isto rical instance? In o th e r words, th at th e d o m in a n t co n tem p o rary
a rt has lost its p rivileged social, political, cognitive, even ethical role a n d th at
it has b e e n tra n sfo rm e d in to its op p o site, this opposite b e in g the visual arts
a n d , especially, th e ir co m m o d ified p o stm o d ern version? T h e essential differ­
en c e a p p e a rs to o cc u r w ith th e d em ise o f the m o d ern ist p aradigm in art. This
d e sc rip tio n is, I th in k , g en erally accep ted , for th e re seem today to b e n o co n ­
te m p o ra ry d e fe n d e rs e ith e r o f m o d ern ity as an in com plete p ro jec t o r o f in­
te rp re ta tio n s o f p o stm o d e rn ism as yet a n o th e r facet or in stan ce o f hig h m o d ­
ern ism , as was freq u en tly a rg u e d in the eighties. If, th e n , p o stm odernism
a p p e a re d as a relatively h o m o g e n o u s p h e n o m e n o n , which with its firm an d
d istin c t fe a tu re s co u ld persuasively stan d u p to m o d ern ism , th e latter bein g
ex e m p lified by its d istinct, exclusive a n d easily recognizable p ro p e rtie s, th en
in th e n in e tie s a n d th e re a fte r we seem n o lo n g er capable o f affirm ing such
d i s t in c t p r o p e r t i e s in p o s tm o d e r n is m . In o t h e r w o rd s, th e c u r r e n t
p o stm o d e rn ism in creasingly ap p ears as a series o f localized artistic a n d cul­
tu ral p h e n o m e n a , ex isting as a series o f local a n d tra n sie n t events with no
p a rtic u la r claim s to universality a n d historic im portance. H e n ce H e id e g g e r’s
o bserv atio n a b o u t th e possible re d u c e d im p o rtan ce o f a rt a n d G e n e tte ’s com ­
m e n t a b o u t th e overev aluation o f a rt in A d o rn o a n d H eid eg g er correctly an ­
n o u n c e o r d iag n o se th e c u r re n t status o f art. N onetheless, such diagnoses are
possible o n th e b a c k g ro u n d o f a specific a n d o u tstan d in g historical situation
o f th e previous cen tu ry, i.e. th a t o f m odernism . As F redric Ja m e so n notes,
e c h o in g A d o rn o fro m his Aesthetic Theory, “W hatever th e validity o f H eg el’s
feelings a b o u t R o m an ticism , those cu rren ts w hich led o n in to w hat has com e
to b e called m o d e rn ism are th ereb y surely to be identified with o n e o f the
m o st re m a rk a b le flo u rishings o f the arts in all o f hu m an history.”11 It is h en ce
p ro b ab ly also fro m th e vantage p o in t o f m odernism th at th e c u rre n t dim inish m e n t o f th e im p o rtan ce a n d th e relevance o f a rt appears to b e stark en o u g h
to cause a series o f a u th o rs - som e o f w hom I have m e n tio n e d - to question
th e c u r re n t status o f a rt alto g eth er. M oreover, since the avant-garde p ro ject
o f a rt has b e e n se p a ra te d from th e gen eral p ro jec t o f life a n d society as an a rt
p ro jec t, as two in stan ces o f th e sam e u to p ian process (th e co n seq u en ces o f
w hich w ere d e sc rib e d well in th e case o f th e Russian avant-garde by Boris
Groys in his Gesamtkunstwerk Stalin b o o k from 1988), w hat we are co n fro n ted
w ith a re th e co n se q u en ce s o f w hat A chille B onito Oliva, C harles Jencks an d
Ja m e so n have a t an early stage, i.e. in 1972, 1975 a n d 1984 respectively, diag­
11
F redric Jam eson, The Cultural Turn. Selected Writings on the Postmodern, 1983-1998
(L ondon: Verso, 1998), pp. 80-1.
11
A l e š E rjavec .
n o sed as trans-avant-garde, post-avant-garde a n d p o stm o d ern ism . If, th e n ,
D u c h a m p ’s ready-m ades a p p e a r today as a n e v e r-re c u rre n t issue o f a e sth e tic
a n d p h ilo so p h ical debates, this does n o t m e a n th a t this was th e case also in
the first h a lf of th e tw entieth ce n tu ry w hen D u c h am p was in te rp re te d vari­
ously as a dadaist, a surrealist a n d a co n cep tu alist. It was only w h en a r t c re ­
a ted according to o r resem bling th at m ade by h im alm ost a ce n tu ry ago sta rte d
to b eco m e the exclusive recognizable d o m in a n t tre n d o f re c e n t a rt th a t his
work b ecam e an object o f in ten se a tte n tio n a n d was re v ealed as a n early a n d
p arad ig m atic in stan ce o f co n te m p o ra ry art. M arcel D u c h a m p has b e e n in ­
stinctively re su rrre c te d as the p ro to -p o stm o d ern ist, fo r p o stm o d e rn ism c o n ­
sists, to q u o te an insightful observation by Slavoj Žižek, “in displaying th e
ob ject directly, allowing it to m ake visible its own in d iffe re n t a n d a rb itra ry
ch aracter. T he sam e object can fu n c tio n successively as a d isg u stin g re je c t
an d as a sublim e, charism atic a p p a ritio n : th e d iffe ren c e, strictly stru c tu ra l,
does n o t p erta in to the ‘effective p ro p e rtie s ’ o f th e ob ject, b u t only to its
place in th e symbolic o rd e r.”12 D o e sn ’t this observation perfectly fit th e his­
tory o f th e early ready-m ades? O f th e “F o u n ta in ,” fo r ex a m p le , w hich tu rn e d ,
b u t in this instance from a less th an a m e m o ra b le object, re stric te d m ostly to
public toilets, in to o n e o f the m ost discussed works o f a rt o f th e se c o n d h a lf o f
th e previous century, with the issue o f how m any holes th e o rig in al h a d b e­
co m in g o n e of th e highlights o f th e discussions a n d d isp u tes o f a rt h isto rian s
a n d critics? Isn ’t it also true th a t D u ch am p , since h e was a p re d e c e sso r o f
p o stm o d ern ism a t least in this respect, fitte d only w ith difficulty in to th e d es­
ignations assigned to him by tw entieth ce n tu ry a rt theory?
In a re c e n t article in TheJournal o f Aesthetics and Art Criticism P é te r György
a rg u ed th a t “the e n d o f a rt history [w hich György posits a ro u n d 1984] also
signified th e logical collapse o f the b o rd e r b etw een h ig h a rt a n d n o t-h ig h art,
a n d is acco m p an ied by the re n d e rin g senseless o f th e d ista n c in g o f a rt fro m
n o t a rt.” F u rth erm o re , “Inasm uch as th e reality o f essentialism a n d in stitu ­
tionalism can b e o rd e re d into p erio d s, we can state th a t th e d o m in a n c e o f
essentialism and functionalism was a p p ro p ria te fo r th e history o f art, fo r th e
cen tu ries o f the g re at narrative. T h a t e ra lasted fro m V asari to G o m b rich , o r
D anto, we m ig h t say from the R enaissance to ab stra ct expressionism . W h a t
h a p p e n e d afterwards an d w hat is h a p p e n in g now is n o n e o th e r th a n th e p re p a ­
ratio n for th e d e th ro n e m e n t o f h ig h c u ltu re .”13
12 Slavoj Žižek, Looking Awry. A n Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture
(Cam bridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), p. 143.
I!1 P éter György, “Between and After Essentialism an d Institutionalism ,” The Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 57, no. 4 (Fall 1999), p. 431.
12
A e s t h e t i c s : P h il o s o p h y o f A r t o r P h il o s o p h y o f C u l t u r e ?
D o e sn ’t this p e rio d iz a tio n coincide with the passage from m odernism
in to p o stm o d e rn ism , nam ely, with the advent o f th e visible dem ise o f m od­
ern ism , a n d o f th eo ries o f L yotard, Zygm unt B aum an’s analysis of the changed
roles o f leg islators a n d in te rp re te rs, as well as J a m e s o n ’s sem inal essay from
1984 —im plicitly s u p p o rte d also by theses by Lyotard a n d B audrillard - o n
p o stm o d e rn ism as th e cu ltu ra l logic o f late capitalism ? It is unnecessary to
m e n tio n a series o f p u b licatio n s diagnosing the visual tu rn in cu ltu re p u b ­
lish ed sin ce th e late eighties, a n d it is this sam e visual c u ltu re , o r ra th e r the
g e n e ra l a n d all-pervading o cu larcen trism , th at exem plifies m uch, if n o t all,
o f c o n te m p o ra ry c u ltu re , o r is, at least, its d o m in an t featu re. W hat we are
p re d o m in a n tly e x p e rie n c in g th e n are basically two re la ted b u t relatively dis­
tin c t form s o f c o n te m p o ra ry art: the first is the co n cep tu al o n e, the paradig­
m atic case o f w hich is D u c h am p , a n d the second consists o f the visual arts
w ith th e ir c o n tin u a tio n in a p re d o m in a n tly visual culture.
It was, I th in k , a t this p o in t th a t th e issue o f cu ltu re a n d h en c e o f the
p h ilo so p h y o f c u ltu re h a d , afte r th re e decades, re e n te re d co n tem p o rary dis­
cussions a b o u t art. F o r a lo n g tim e - certainly because o f th e cultural shock
e x p e rie n c e d , a n d so persuasively a n d influentially expressed by som e o f the
a u th o rs o f th e F ra n k fu rt S chool, be it a t the tim e w hen they w ere still in G er­
m an y (a n d e x p e rie n c e d A m erican cu ltu re, w h e th e r jazz o r Hollywood) o r
la te r, d u rin g th e stay o f som e o f th em in the US (which obviously only con­
firm e d th e ir previous d e n ig ra tin g views), the p ro fo u n d critiq u e o f mass an d
c o n s u m e r c u ltu re severely b lo ck ed - u n til th e p ro liferatio n o f th e so-called
p o s tm o d e rn th eo rie s - any totalizing philosophical attem p ts at its analysis
fro m a positive van tag e p o in t. W hen these cridcal ideas w ere transposed back
in to E u ro p e in th e sixties a n d seventies they h e lp e d cause cu ltu re to becom e
an o b je c t o f sociological re searc h , b u t only occasionally o f philosophical in­
v estigation, e x c e p t in th e ir m o re ideological an d political form s, w here cul­
tu re was tre a te d (a n d o ften still is) as a set o f ideological em anations o f vari­
ous class, g e n d e r o r racial issues a n d conflicts. At th e sam e tim e, i.e. in m od­
e rn ism a n d h ig h m o d e rn ism , c u ltu re also signified a social realm devoid o f
n o rm ativ e d esig n atio n s so fre q u e n t in relatio n to art, w h erein m uch o f the
in stitu tio n alizatio n o f a rt to o k place via the inclusion o f n o n -a rt into the realm
o f art, very m u ch in a c co rd a n ce w ith Mukarovsky’s n o tio n o f the artistic norm .
It was th u s th e visual tu rn o f th e eighties, th e rise o f p o stm o d ern culture
a n d its g lo b alizatio n as d e p ic te d a n d analyzed by n u m ero u s authors in the
eig h ties a n d , ea rlie r, in th e seventies, also b y je a n B audrillard in his analyses
o f th e sign a n d its eco nom y, th a t offered first a critical a n d th e n a resigned
analysis a n d assessm en t o f p o s tm o d e rn cu ltu re, o n th e o n e h a n d , a n d a
13
A l e š E r ja v e c
eu p h o rical o n e o n th e o th er, with c u ltu re as such now b e in g a p p ro a c h e d in
an increasingly n eu tra l m a n n e r.14
In his b o o k o n A dorno, M artin Jay writes: “T o sp eak o f c u ltu re m ean s
im m ediately to be co n fro n ted by th e basic te n sio n b etw e en its a n th ro p o lo g i­
cal a n d elitist m eanings. For the fo rm e r, w hich in G erm an y can b e trac ed
back a t least to H e rd e r, cu ltu re signifies a w hole way o f life: p ractices, rituals,
in stitutions a n d m aterial artifacts, as well as texts, ideas a n d im ages. F o r th e
latter, w hich developed in G erm any as a n a d ju n c t o f a p e rso n a l inw ardness
co n trasted with th e superficiality o f courtly m an n ers, c u ltu re is id e n tifie d w ith
art, philosophy, literatu re, scholarship, th e a tre , etc., th e allegedly ‘h u m a n iz ­
ing p u rsu its’ o f th e ‘cu ltivated’ m an. As a su rro g a te fo r relig io n , w hose im p o r­
tance was steadily ero ding, it em e rg e d in th e n in e te e n th ce n tu ry as a rep o si­
tory o f m a n ’s m ost n o b le accom plishm ents a n d h ig h e st values, o fte n in te n ­
sion with e ith e r ‘p o p u la r’ o r ‘folk’ c u ltu re , as well as w ith th e m o re m ateria l
achievem ents o f ‘civilization’. B ecause o f its u n d e n ia b ly h ie ra rc h ic a l a n d elit­
ist co n n o tatio n s, cu ltu re in this m o re re stric te d sense has o fte n a ro u s e d h o s­
tility from p o p u list o r radical critics, w ho allege its n a tu ra l com plicity with
social stratificatio n .”l!i
In m ost o th e r E u ropean countries (o n e w ould w ant h e re to say “c u ltu re s”)
cu ltu re carries a sim ilar m eaning, w ith a m o re d ista n t o n e b e in g th e F re n c h ,
w h erein th e n o tio n is probably less fre q u e n tly u sed th a n elsew here. H e n ce,
acco rd in g to Larousse, the term “c u ltu re ” relates to (1) th e ac tio n o f cultivat­
ing: “th e cu ltu re o f flowers,” for ex am ple; (2) th e u nity o r th e w hole “o f ac­
q u ired know ledge;” (3) the unity o r th e w hole social, religious a n d o th e r
stru ctu res ch aracterizing a certain society; (4) “m ass c u ltu re ;” (5) “physical
cu ltu re ;” a n d (6) a cu ltu re in a biological sense, such as th a t o f m icrobes.
A n o th e r usage, sim ilarly distant fro m th e usual sense o f c u ltu re , b u t with a
d ifference arising from an even m o re d iffe re n t h isto rical b a c k g ro u n d , is a
Russian in te rp re ta tio n o f cu ltu re, w h erein c u ltu re is, as th e R ussian p h ilo so ­
p h e r M ikhail E pstein stated som e years ago, d esig n ed “to lib era te a p e rso n
from th e very society in w hich h e is d o o m e d to live. C u ltu re is n o t a p ro d u c t
o f society, b u t a ch allenge an d alternative to society.”11’ C u ltu re is a p arallel
world, in w hich a rt is “m o re tru e ,” in th e w ords o f th e c o n te m p o ra ry R ussian
14An outstanding example of symbolic com m odification carried o u t by postm odernism
is first the work and then the views of Je a n B audrillard, w hich started as an all-pervading
critique o f p ostm odern culture and in a single decade en d e d by b ein g o n e o f its m ain
theoretical supports with him becom ing o n e o f its pro p o n en ts.
15 M artin Jay, Adorno (London: F ontana, 1984), p. 112.
111Mikhail Epstein, After the Future (Am herst: University o f Mass. Press, 1995), p. 6.
14
A e s t h e t i c s : P h il o s o p h y o f A r t o r P h il o s o p h y o f C u l t u r e ?
p a in te r E rik Bulatov, th a n real life. C ulture thus offers a spiritual shelter from
th e m in d less p u rsu its o f everyday life a n d its chaos.
T h ese d iffe re n t m ean in g s o f the term cu ltu re offer various inroads into
th e issue o f a possible p h ilo so p h y o f culture. It is mostly th e trad itio n o f the
F ra n k fu rt S chool, c o m b in e d w ith co n tem p o rary discussions o f new tech n o lo ­
gies, altern ativ e cu ltu re , p o stm o d ern ism , postm odernity an d , especially, co n ­
te m p o ra ry visual c u ltu re , w hich are am o n g the second g ro u p o f reasons for
p re s e n t a ttem p ts to b rin g to g e th e r p hilosophical aesthetics a n d the n o tio n o f
cu ltu re . T h e re is a c e rta in a n tin o m y in such an attem pt, fo r cu ltu re was in the
p a st e ith e r a n o rm atively n e u tra l term or, in the trad itio n o f the F ran k fu rt
S ch o o l, o fte n a n eg ativ e o n e , fo r it was conceived as a n op p o site to the
u n c o m m o d ifie d avant-garde art. T h e views an d theories o f W alter B enjam in
w ere in this re g a rd ex cep tio n s w hich gained authority only w hen the tenets o f
A d o rn o o r M arcuse b ec am e increasingly obsolete in re la tio n to th e re c e n t
d ev e lo p m e n ts in a rt a n d cu ltu re. T h e n o tio n o f cu ltu re ap p ears to resp o n d
well to its re c e n t n e u tra l o r a t least non-norm ative n o tio n , to “the d e th ro n e ­
m e n t o f h ig h c u ltu re ,” to use P é te r György’s phrasin g, a n d to the im p lem en ­
ta tio n o f th e in stitu tio n al o r, to use S tep h en Davies’s term inology,17 the “p ro ­
c e d u ra l” d e fin itio n a n d th eo ry o f a rt as theoretically an d practically the ru l­
in g d e fin itio n , o fferin g a p h ilo so p h ic al fram ew ork in aesthetic discourse o n
art. N o n e th e le ss, it w ould b e w rong to assum e th a t no o th e r definitions an d
u n d e rs ta n d in g s , fo r ex am p le, follow ing Davies again, the “fun ctio n al defini­
tions o f a r t,” exist any lo n g er. T h e difficulty with th e institu tio n al o r p ro c e­
d u ra l d efin itio n s (a n d in te rp re ta tio n s) o f a rt today is th at they disregard the
h isto rical ch an g es th a t have o c c u rre d with the passage from m odernism into
p o stm o d e rn ism a n d tre a t a rt as if it was still fu n c tio n in g as it h ad in the tim e
w h en m o d e rn ism was v ib ran t a n d exclusive while, in fact, they mostly use as
th e ir ex am p les c o n c e p tu a l a rt w hich often functions as W ittg en stein ’s lan­
g u ag e gam es. If, o n th e o th e r h a n d , the social a n d existential functions o f art
have a p p a re n tly substantially d im in ish ed d u e to a series o f reasons (these
b e in g analyzed in th e last few d ecad es by H e n ri Lefebvre, Lyotard, Jam eson,
A n d re as H uyssen, David H arvey, Z ygm unt B aum an, a n d G ianni V attim o,
a m o n g o th e rs ), th e n we m ay possess a good reason to ask w h eth er in the
p re s e n t tim e th e very o b je c t o f such theories a n d o f the en su in g definitions is
n o t flaw ed at its very o u tse t a n d does n o t - a n d ca n n o t - authentically re p re ­
s e n t th e ir p e r tin e n t re fe re n c e p o in t a n d the subject o f its definition. M ore­
over, even if su ch attem p ts re m a in legitim ate, m ean in g th a t a rt still basically
fu n c tio n s as it d id in th e p ast (a lth o u g h p erh ap s n o t to th e sam e extent, o r
17 Cf. S tephen Davies, Definitions of Art (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).
15
A l e š E r ja v e c
with th e sam e intensity, o r equally freq u en tly ) th e p ro b le m still re m a in s how
to establish the relatio n o f such a rt to cu ltu re in th e sense o f m ass a n d c o n ­
su m er c u ltu re - w hich today applies p re d o m in a n tly to th e visual c u ltu re a n d
its h y b r id fo rm s , th e s e r a n g in g fr o m d re s s c o d e s , d e s ig n , a n d th e
aestheticization o f everyday life to th e e n su in g a n a esth eticizatio n a n d its re t­
roactive consequences. C o n tem p o rary a rt in m o st cases obviously n o lo n g e r
strives to b e partisan, subversive a n d radical. Even if a u th o rs su ch as T erry
E agleton (in his Ideology o f the Aesthetic, 1990) claim th a t p o stm o d e rn a rt is
b o th rad ical an d conservative, m ost freq u en tly its rad ical fe atu res are im m e ­
diately com m o d ified o r carry an d , especially, re ta in little w eig h t if m e a su re d
by th e ir social consequences. C o m m o d ificatio n is o n e o f th e essen tial com ­
m on featu res o f co n tem p o rary a n d p ast c u ltu re a n d o f c o n te m p o ra ry a rt a n d
is the th ird cause for the question o f how to re la te th e p h ilo so p h y o f a rt to a
ph ilosophy of cu ltu re so as to avoid sep a ratin g these two realm s o f in q u iry
whose subjects increasingly a p p e a r to b e m e rg in g o r a re rev ealin g n u m e ro u s
sim ilarities - for h a s n ’t art, by losing o r d im in ish in g its tru th -d isclo sin g fu n c ­
tion, la n d e d in the b ro a d a n d norm atively n e u tra l re alm o f cu ltu re?
M o d ern ist a rt te n d e d to d istance itself fro m cu ltu re: c u ltu re was eth n ic ,
local, trad itio n al o r mass a n d c o n su m e r c u ltu re , w hile a r t was p re d o m in a n tly
elitist (a n d a p a rt o f “h ig h ” c u ltu re ), b e it in th e tra d itio n a l m o d e rn is t sense
o r th e avant-garde o ne. O n e o f its d istin g u ish in g characteristics was its sub­
versive n atu re , b e it in relatio n to previous a rt o r to society, as well as its tru th d isclo sin g ro le, d e fe n d e d by p h ilo s o p h e rs fro m H e g e l, N ie tz sc h e , a n d
H e id eg g er to A d orno, M erleau-Ponty a n d A lthusser. It fu rth e rm o re re q u ire d
an effo rt o n the p a rt o f the au d ien c e to achieve aesth e tic a n d artistic a p p re ­
ciation. Such m o d ern ist a rt is today o fte n assim ilated a n d in te g ra te d in to th e
repository o f cu ltu ral h eritag e a n d is m o d e rn in th e L yotard sense (as is th e
theory w hich s u p p o rte d it). O n e o f th e featu res o f p o s tm o d e rn a r t a n d cul­
ture, re la te d o f course to th eir co m m o d ified n a tu re , is th e ir accessibility, th e ir
“user-friendly” n a tu re which, on th e o n e h a n d , allows b o th to b e global a n d ,
on th e o th er, to raise the q u estio n w h e th e r this is still a r t a n d n o t sim ply
cu ltu re in its trad itio n al com m odified form . S uch works a re h e n c e o fte n hy­
brids betw een m o d ern ist a rt (from w hich they re ta in th e n o tio n o f a rt) a n d
cu ltu re u n d e r m o d ernism (from w hich they have g a in e d th e ir accessibility
and, th e re fo re , w hat was th en p erceived as its c o m m o d ified fe a tu re s ). A p a ra ­
m o u n t exam ple o f such a rt o r cu ltu re is c o n te m p o ra ry a rc h ite c tu re , w hich is
sim ultaneously artistic, aestheticized, m a rk e t-o rie n te d a n d re p re se n ts a p u b ­
lic space. It is th ere fo re n o t su rp risin g th a t th e issue o f p o stm o d e rn ism was
first raised in arch itectu re, in w hich th e d e m a rc a tio n lin e b etw een a r t a n d
16
A e s t h e t i c s : P h il o s o p h y o f A r t o r P h il o s o p h y o f C u l t u r e ?
c u ltu re is o ften ex trem ely difficult to draw. In m o d ern ex h ib itio n spaces the
a rc h ite c tu ra l e n v iro n m e n t o fte n carries eq u a l o r sim ilar im p o rtan ce to the
w orks e x h ib ite d in it.
T h e re aso n why an a tte m p t to designate aesthetics as philosophy o f cul­
tu re seem s a t first sig h t d o o m e d to failure is th at aesthetics, n o t only in its
fu n c tio n a list fo rm , b u t also in its p ro ced u ralist o r institutionalist variants, in
spite o f in n u m e ra b le attem p ts to d isru p t the institution o r th e realm o f art,
n o n e th e le ss co n tain s a n in trin sic norm ative feature. W hile co n tem p o rary a rt
m ay b e lo sin g its real o r im ag in ed existential o r tru th disclosing fun ctio n an d
value w hich it p resu m ab ly possessed u n d e r m odernism , th e designation o f
“a rt” n o n e th e le ss a t least p o ten tially retains artifacts an d o th e r p h e n o m e n a
ex istin g u n d e r su ch a d esig n atio n within the unavoidably, i.e. by definition,
no rm ativ e re a lm o f “a r t.” T o b e a n artist today often designates prim arily
o n e ’s self-d esignation a n d only secondly th a t o f the audience. I may b e an
artist in m y ow n eyes a n d for this I d o n ’t re q u ire co n firm atio n from o th ers a fe a tu re w hich radically distinguishes a co n tem p o rary artist from a m o d e rn ­
ist o n e , w ho re q u ire d a t least th e ap p reciatio n o f a narrow circle o f sim ilarly
in c lin e d individuals. But, o n th e o th e r h an d , such a desig n atio n does n o t
elim in a te, n e g a te o r re p la ce its norm ative im plications.
So, how w ould aesthetics, in spite o f the afo re m e n tio n e d possible reser­
vatio n , b e possible as a p h ilo so p h y o f culture? I shall c o n c lu d e my p a p e r by
discussing two su ch attem p ts.
T h e first is th a t o f H e in z P aetzold w ho has developed his views in a series
o f articles a n d b o oks p u b lish e d since 1990. (I am thin k in g particularly o f his
Ästhetik der neueren Moderne fro m 1990 an d his m o re re c e n t b o o k The Symbolic
Language o f Culture, Fine Arts and Architecture from 1997.) T h e essential arg u ­
m en ts fro m th ese two books have b een p re se n te d and u p d a te d in a re c e n t
article e n title d “A esthetics A n d /A s P hilosophy o f C u ltu re” a n d published in
th e 1999 v o lu m e o f th e IA A Yearbook. I shall thus lim it m y discussion o f
P a e tz o ld ’s views to this essay.
P a e tz o ld ’s in te n tio n is to develop a critical philosophy o f culture. In his
w ords, “T his u n d e rta k in g finds a historical backing in th e stance o f the ea r­
lie r critical th eo ry , o n th e o n e h a n d , a n d in th e project o f the philosophy o f
sym bolic fo rm s, o n th e o th e r. I am arg u in g - co n tin u es P aetzold - in favor o f
a synthesis b etw een th ese two stran d s w hich m oved historically alo n g sepa­
rate ro u te s.”18 W h at m akes P aetzo ld ’s project o f a philosophy o f culture inter18 H einz Paetzold, “A esthetics A n d /A s Philosophy o f C ulture,” The IAA Yearbook, vol. 3
(1999); <h ttp ://d a v in c i.n tu .a c .u k /ia a /ia a 3 /a e sth e tic sa n d .h tm >, p. 1.
17
A l e š E r ja v e c
esting is th e re q u ire m e n t for such a p h ilo so p h y to b e critical, fo r w ith o u t this
critical e le m e n t it is difficult if n o t o u trig h t im possible to p ro p o s e a p e rsu a ­
sive p h ilo so p h ical project. W hat P aetzold th e n a p p ro p ria te s fro m C assirer is
his u n d e rsta n d in g o f cu ltu re as a “process o f m a n ’s progressive self-libera­
tio n .” But, for this to b e possible, in c u ltu re two sides have to b e re co g n ized :
“All this leads m e to the co n clu sio n ,” states P aetzold, “th a t p h ilo so p h y o f h u ­
m an c u ltu re becom es a critical e n d e a v o r only to th a t e x te n t th a t we grasp
c u ltu re ’s two sides: Its h o p e giving prom ises a n d its th o ro u g h fa ilu re s.”ly Sec­
ondly, argues P aetzold, “the p h ilo so p h y o f h u m a n c u ltu re has to d ea l w ith
th e p lurality o f sym bolic form s in a n o n h ie ra rc h ic a l, p lu ralistic way. ... D e­
th ro n in g scientific a n d technological ratio n ality fro m b e in g th e fo u n d a tio n a l
p arad ig m o f cu ltu re does n o t m ean to e n th ro n e th e arts a n d p o e try in place
o f science as rom anticism w anted to d o .”2H T hirdly, th e p h ilo so p h y o f h u m a n
cu ltu re con tain s an answ er to the q u estio n o f w hat m akes a c u ltu re d subjec­
tivity. T his includes bodily a n d som atic c o m p o n e n ts w hich c a n n o t b e su b lated
in to p u re rationality.21
A m o n g the early p h ilo so p h ers o f cu ltu re P aetzold finds n o t only H e rd e r
a n d G eorg Sim m el, b u t also Vico, R ousseau, C ro ce a n d C ollingw ood, a n d
places aesthetics w ithin a critical p h ilo so p h y o f c u ltu re as a c o m p o n e n t o f
it,22 w h erein works o f a rt exist as “sym bolically sig n ifican t expressions o f cul­
tu re.”23 H e ends his essay by explicitly e m b ra c in g a fu n c tio n a l u n d e rs ta n d in g
o f sym bolic form s, a rt included.
W hile P aetzo ld ’s p ro jec t o f a critical p h ilo so p h y o f c u ltu re , a se g m e n t o f
w hich is also aesthetics as a philosophy o f art, a p p e a rs very p ro m isin g , it lacks,
for th e tim e b eing at least, an analysis o f the negative side, i.e. c u ltu re ’s fail­
ures. W ith o u t ex p lain in g this side, his p ro je c t seem s to fall u n d e r a sim ilar
category as the n eo p ragm atist theories o f S h u ste rm an a n d R orty th a t P aetzold
criticizes fo r h ig h lig h tin g only th e aesth e tic d im en sio n o f c o n te m p o ra ry cul­
ture, i.e. only o n e o f its sides. H e n ce the p ro je c t o f a critical p h ilo so p h y o f
cu ltu re rem ains for the tim e b ein g in co m p lete.
A n o th er, m u ch b e tte r know n re c e n t p ro je c t o f a p h ilo so p h y o f c u ltu re , is
th a t o f F re d ric J a m e s o n , m a n y o f w h o se w ritin g s a f te r th e essay o n
p o stm o d ern ism p u b lish ed in the New Left Review in 1984 w ere d ev o ted to vari­
ous aspects o f n o t only p o stm o d ern ism as th e c u ltu ra l d o m in a n t o f th e c u r­
re n t late capitalism , i.e. its m u ltin atio n al form , b u t also to b ro a d e r cu ltu ra l
Ibid., p. 2.
20 Ibid., p. 3.
21 Cf. ibid., pp. 3-4.
22 Cf. ibid., p. 8.
23 Ibid., p. 9.
18
A e s t h e t i c s : P h il o s o p h y o f A r t o r P h i l o s o p h y o f C u l t u r e ?
issues, th ese b e in g d ev o ted to a n d su p p o rted by a variety o f works ran g in g
fro m film s by David Lynch, co n tem p o rary poetry a n d p o stm o d ern arch itec­
tu re , to p ain tin g s by A ndy W a rh o l a n d H e d eig g er’s analysis o f a p ain tin g by
van G ogh. In ce rta in respects J a m e so n ’s analysis a n d critique o f c o n tem p o ­
rary c u ltu re is sim ilar to th a t discussed in P aetzo ld ’s project, alth o u g h it rests
n o t only u p o n th e tra d itio n o f th e F ran k fu rt School b u t especially th at o f
G eorg Lukâcs a n d partly o n Lyotard an d B audrillard. In fact, m ost o fja m e so n ’s
th eo ry is surp risin g ly trad itio n alist, finding, with its totalizing tendencies, its
p ro p e r h isto rical place p e rh a p s m o re in th e first h a lf o r th e m iddle o f the
previous c e n tu ry th a n at th e o u tse t o f p ostm odernism . By stating this I in n o
way wish to d im in ish its im p o rta n c e a n d influence o r insightfulness. O n the
co n trary , I in ste a d w an t to p o in t o u t th at such a totalizing stance obviously
reveals, firstly, th e c o n te m p o ra ry n e e d for such a view point a n d the privileges
it offers an d , secondly, it avoids th e shortcom ings o f reg ard in g postm odernism
as a c o m p le te b re a k w ith th e p ast which th e n prevents a serious historical
co m p arativ e analysis. O n th e o th e r h an d , J a m e s o n ’s fre q u e n t alm ost in te r­
c h a n g e a b le use o f th e term s a rt a n d cu ltu re an d his tre a tm e n t o f the fo rm er
as a n im p licit e x te n sio n a n d p e rh a p s a relatively special case o f the latter,
avoids so m e o f th e pitfalls o f th e desire to establish a clear division betw een
th e two, im p ly in g a d esire to collapse them into a single entity. T h e reason
th a t J a m e s o n ’s a p p ro a c h a p p e ars successful, be it in re latio n to realist, m o d ­
e rn is t o r p o s tm o d e rn is t a rt a n d cu ltu re, is in his im plicit in te rp re ta tio n o f a rt
a n d c u ltu re as a vehicle fo r c reatin g m eaning, for creatin g a re p resen ta tio n
a n d se lf-rep re sen tatio n o f ourselves as social beings. H en ce his requests ad­
d ressed to a u th e n tic a r t a n d c u ltu re are requests fo r political an d partisan
views a n d artic u la tio n s, fo r subversion o f established norm s a n d views - an
in te rp re ta tio n th at is highly successful w hen aim ed at politically o rien ted works
o r an A d orno-type in te rp re ta tio n o f a rt a n d its place in society, b u t which falls
s h o rt w h en a p p lie d to acclaim ed works o f a rt w hich n o n eth eless show no
co v e rt o r o v ert p o litical in te n tio n s. T his q u estio n is fre q u e n tly raised by
J a m e s o n him self, as in th e case o f W a rh o l’s works: “T h e q u estio n [is] why
A ndy W a rh o l’s C oca-C ola b o ttles a n d C am pbell’s soup cans - so obviously
re p re s e n ta tio n s o f co m m o d ity o r co n su m er fetishism - d o n o t seem to func­
tion as critical o r p o litical statem en ts?”24 It is exactly this question th at sets
th e lim its to J a m e s o n ’s e n d e a v o r to d eterm in e the fun ctio n o r functions o f
a rt in a u n ifo rm way. Yet, a n a p p a re n t way o u t o f this im passe is offered by the
n o tio n o f “cognitive m a p p in g ,” w hich is in fact, as Jam eso n h im self adm its, a
24
F redric Jam eso n , Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London:
Verso, 1991), p. 158.
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A l e š E r ja v e c
p a ra p h ra se of L ukacs’s class consciousness. P u t d ifferently, th e basic p u rp o se
o r fu n c tio n of a rt - any a rt o f any e p o c h - is to offer a cognitive m a p p in g o f
o n ese lf a n d of the society to w hich we b elo n g , to disclose th e tru th o f o n e s e lf
w ithin o n e ’s place a n d to offer co o rd in a tes w hich h e lp us establish o u r h e r e
an d now w ithin a given social, h istorical a n d m e n ta l space. In 1984 a n d also
in 1991 (w hen th e essay was p u b lish ed in a b o o k b e a rin g th e sam e title) h e
ex p ressed his view th a t p o stm o d ern ism h a s n ’t d ev e lo p e d sufficiently y et to
allow fo r a cognitive m ap p in g w hich w ould b e n o t only th e o p p o site o f its e lfsch izo p h ren ia, chaos, tem p o ral d isp lace m e n t, etc. T o o u r su rp rise this to p ic
is later d ro p p e d - so m eth in g th a t m akes us w o n d e r w h e th e r this h a p p e n e d
becau se it was irrelevant o r because in n o in stan ce an answ er fo r it has yet
b ee n fo u n d . In o th e r w ords, p o stm o d e rn ist a rt a n d c u ltu re seem to o ffer n o
clue as how to establish a cognitive m a p p in g sim ilar to th a t o ffe re d in m o d ­
ernism by m o d ern ist works as d esc rib ed a n d e x p la in e d by Lukacs, A d o rn o
a n d o th ers. It thus appears as if Ja m e so n accepts L y o tard ’s views fro m The
Postmodern Condition, in the English In tro d u c tio n to w hich J a m e s o n offers n o
way o u t o f what, fo r him , sh o u ld b e a failure, b u t w hich is, fo r L yotard, exactly
th e c e n tral featu re o f p o stm o d ern a rt.25
T h e n o tio n o f cognitive m ap p in g som ew hat co rre sp o n d s to ideas p ro ­
m o ted by H einz Paetzold, for cognitive m a p p in g d o e s n ’t necessarily m e a n
only a ratio n al en d eavor, b u t is, ju d g in g also from J a m e s o n ’s H e g elia n b ack­
g ro u n d , equally sensuous, re p re s e n tin g in this way a case o f sym bolic form s.
If this is tru e, a lin k betw een these various attem p ts to fo rg e a p h ilo so p h y o f
cu ltu re m ay be established, b u t we seem to b e still a lo n g way fro m a relatively
co n sisten t a n d theoretically persuasive p h ilo so p h y o f c u ltu re , a lth o u g h so m e­
th in g o f th e kin d ap pears, after h a lf a cen tu ry , to be again a necessity w hich
will h e lp us productively relate a rt a n d c u ltu re , b u t in a c o n te m p o ra ry h isto ri­
cal setting.
25 Cf. F redricjam eson, “Introduction” inJean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition
(M anchester: M anchester University Press, 1984), pp. xxiii-xxv.
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