THE FALL OF THE
HOUSE OF WESTMINSTER:
A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW UK CONSTITUTION.
By W. Elliot Bulmer and Eva M. Dominguez
Preface
The authors believe that at this point in Britain’s history nothing can be of more
urgent importance than the drafting of a Constitution. The United Kingdom is ruled by a
powerful, heavily centralised and highly secretive State, where the executive dominates a
theoretically omnipotent but practically emasculated Parliament, and where the ancient
balancing counter-powers have been undermined. For fifty years this heavy-handed and
ill-guided State has presided over Britain’s relative decline in quality of life compared to
our European neighbours. Worse still, the increasingly authoritarian tone of the present
government bodes ill for the future of freedom in this land. A mere change of government
will not help, however; the problems are systematic, and only a radical new constitutional
settlement, which reforms the system of government itself, will do any lasting good. This
need has been much debated in Parliament and in academia but few detailed proposals for
a new United Kingdom Constitution have been forthcoming. The last published draft UK
Constitution was produced in the early 1990s by the Institute for Public Policy Research
– it was a bold and comprehensive document, but is much in need of updating to reflect
the new realities of our post-devolution State. Since then there has been nothing of note.
Thus the critical task, for all who believe in the desirability of liberal-democratic
constitutional reform, is to go beyond mere statements of intent, such as those formerly
advocated by Charter 88, and instead to produce some concrete proposals. This paper
and the draft Constitution which accompanies it is written as a practical contribution to
that process. It represents a serious attempt to apply the established principles of liberal
constitutionalism and the best practices of European parliamentary democracy to the
United Kingdom’s rather unique circumstances. . It does not attempt to be definitive –
hopefully it will spark debate, and from that debate further improvement will result.
However, it does attempt to be specific: it sets out to propose a complete and workable
Constitution, which could be adopted as it stands, and not just a shopping list of inventive
but ill-applied ideals. By proposing a specific Constitution in chapter and verse, we aim to
produce a document around which constitutional reformers can unite. At the very least,
the most potent (and yet the most ridiculous weapon) in the hands of Britain’s
complacent reactionaries, namely that “constitutions are too impractical” and “too
complex”, and that “it cannot be done” because “people won’t agree about what to put in”
can once and for all be disarmed. We have the technology: all we need is the political will.
To those who endorse these ideals, and who recognise that the present form of
government in the United Kingdom falls far short of them, the text of the proposed
Constitution should speak largely for itself; there is nothing particularly radical, unusual,
or unexpected about it. Nevertheless, a few explanatory remarks may help reformminded readers to attain fuller understanding of the authors’ intentions, whilst also
convincing those of a more conservative temperament that the time for complacency is
over, and that fundamental reform is Britain’s only hope.
Section 1 - Introduction: From Scandal to Constitutional Reconstruction
The parliamentary expenses scandal of 2009 has torn a hole in the fabric of the
British State. There have been scandals before, from Cash for Questions to the sale of
Peerages, but those were interpreted by the political class, the media, and the general
public, as aberrations – a few bad apples in the British State’s essentially sound, if
somewhat old and dusty, barrel. This scandal goes deeper. It has revealed that our
unwritten system based on nods, winks, conventions, traditions, custom, precedent, and
the “good chaps theory of government”, has final broken down.
It is perhaps a poor reflection on the state of public spirit in Britain today that it
took a scandal of this nature for the realisation to come. The rumblings of reform can be
traced at least as far back as 1988, when Charter 88 was founded, but constitutional
reform was very much a fringe issue for a geeky minority. At a lecture given at Stirling
Unversity in 1994, Paddy Ashdown, then leader of the Liberal Democrats, put it like this:
“People don’t turn to each other in their living room, workshop or pub and say,
‘You know, I believe the nineteenth century model of Parliamentary democracy
has broken down. We need to establish a new constitutional settlement between
the State and the individual.’ Ordinary people are not – probably to their credit –
sufficiently interested in political theory to articulate their views in that way. No.
What they say is this: ‘Why don’t you ever get your act together. You’re all as bad
as each other. I don’t want to trust my children’s future to you lot.’”1
Since those words were uttered 15 years ago, there been many serious instances
of the breakdown of our institutions, from the erosion of liberties to the fighting of unjust
wars; all these have been kept within the normal rules of Westminster yah-boo politics,
and the underlying constitutional issues have, until now, remained far from the public’s
consciousness. But now the realisation has come. The system is broken. Politicians of
all stripes have begun to flirt with ideas previously consigned to the sidelines of British
politics: electoral reform, sovereignty of the people, recall of MPs, a written Constitution.
People are, of course, saying “You’re all as bad as each other”, but they are also saying,
for the first time, “The nineteenth century model of Parliamentary democracy has broken
down. We need to establish a new constitutional settlement.” The change is profound.
The two traditional governing parties both expect to be punished at the polls. The
Conservatives, who are desperate for a general election, clearly expect to be punished less
severely than Labour. They are trying to out-bid each other in proposals for reform: a
Labour Minister proposes a new electoral system, the Leader of the Opposition accepts
the need for decentralisation, the Liberal Democrats make the case for recall elections.
Yet both of the main parties, despite their recent, superficial conversion to constitutional
reform, are desperate to draw a line under this feeling of rage and disappointment in the
people, and to return as soon as possible to Westminster’s “politics as usual”. To let the
main parties get away with burying the issue would be a disaster – not only for the people
of these Islands who have to put up with a dysfunctional system, but also, in the long run,
for the politicians themselves. We have an opportunity to use this crisis constructively,
to put right all that has been going wrong in Britain during recent decades. We must not
let this rare opportunity pass us by. If we do let it pass by, a disappointed and apathetic
populace will be more and more drawn towards extremes, and our low-quality nineteenth
century democracy will be stumble on, drifting from decline to disaster, until it expires.
The last time we experienced an economic shock of this magnitude, in the 1930s,
half of the liberal-democracies in Europe expired. Britain was saved, not because of the
strength of its invisible constitution, but because we had a healthy civic society and an
elite which had a strong public-service ethos. Neither of these benefits has endured; our
1
Paddy Ashdown, “Beyond Westminster” (Williamson Memorial Lecture, Stirling University, 15
April 1994)
civic society has been eroded by the heavy hand of bureaucratic socialism and the blind
logic of crony capitalism, while our elites have proven themselves to be dishonourable to a
remarkable degree. Our liberal-democracy now stands in a uniquely vulnerable position,
dangerously exposed to ambitious, populist, authoritarian, and self-serving, Governments.
In order to get out of this mess we need to understand how we got into it. That
means going back into our history. During the nineteenth century the electorate was
gradually widened, with the old oligarchic restrictions being lifted in 1832, the lower
middle class being enfranchised in 1867, and a near-universal male suffrage being
adopted in 1885 (fully universal male suffrage was not achieved until 1918, and female
suffrage only in 1928). At first, these extensions of the franchise had breathed new life
into our parliamentary institutions, and in the period between the first and second
reform acts (1832 – 1867) Britain experienced truly parliamentary government for the
first and only time. That is to say, Parliament, or more precisely the House of Commons,
possessed the legislative power and controlled the executive power.
It was during this
period that the traditional understanding of British parliamentary government was
developed by Walter Bagehot, whose mistitled treatise “The English Constitution”
described a system in which Parliaments could, and did, really hold governments to
account. Almost as soon as it was published, however, Bagehot’s account ceased to
describe reality. With the Second Reform Act of 1867 came the rise of mass parties,
disciplined ranks of lobby-fodder whose duty was not to represent their constituents, nor
apply their wisdom to the government of the country, but to vote as their leaders told
them to. So, during the era of Gladstone and Disraeli, at the apogee of British greatness,
something went horribly wrong in our system of government: it ceased to operate in as a
parliamentary system, and started to operate as a Cabinet system, or Prime Ministerial
system. The steady trend over the last hundred years or more has been towards Prime
Ministerial dominance: the role of Parliament as an independent legislature, as a check on
the power of the Government, was first eroded, then eclipsed, then forgotten about. Now
David Cameron speaks of Conservative backbenchers as “My MP’s”, as if they were not
the representatives of the people, but merely the standard bearer of their party leader –
which is, of course, exactly what they have become.
Those of us who believe in the virtues of parliamentary government should be
alarmed and appalled at this situation. Our Parliament is not just greedy and corrupt, it
has ceased to operate as a real Parliament. The only function of Parliament is to decide,
on the night after a general election, who is to be Prime Minister (or rather, which party
will get to decide on the Prime Minister, since as we have seen, the Prime Ministership is
a prize which can be passed on from holder to holder within the governing party, without
consent of either Parliament or people). Its role as a debating chamber is ludicrous, as
the members are told what to say by their whips, its role as a legislature is a sham, since
the votes are determined in advance; as a consequence, its role as a check on the power
and activities of the government has become almost non-existent. The hundreds of years
of history to which conservative-minded people will appeal in defence of the status quo
have been betrayed. Parliament today would be quite unrecognisable to Edmund Burke.
Instead, the Westminster Parliament bears a striking resemblance to the Roman
Senate at the time of the principate. It still meets with all pomp and ceremony. It still
debates (albeit in stilted tones, under the whips’ watchful eyes). Its honourable members
still play the part of “patres conscripti”. But it is a façade, and the “Senators” know it.
Power has slipped from their hands and the res publica is only a shadow of its former
self. So what is there to do? Orgies and ornamental duck ponds must fill their shallow
lives, when all hopes of using their virtue for the public good cease. So one side shouts,
“Ave Gordon!”, the other side conspires for an electoral coup, and hopes that their time
might soon some to share the perks and privileges of high office. Both wallow in the wellfilled golden trough, jangling their golden chains, not understanding where freedom went.
The fault lies in the so-called “British Constitution”. The British Constitution is
like the Emperor’s New Clothes in Andersen’s fable: just as the Emperor’s clothes are
seamless, lightweight, and totally breathable, so we in Britain have a “Constitution” which
is unwritten, unenforceable, and unprotected against the government of the day. Despite
all the learned treatises written on the British Constitution, it is becoming clear that, in
reality, no such thing exists. We stand naked before the State. As Strøm et al point out:
“[Constitutions are not] mere behavioural regularities that reflect habit, tradition,
or self-interest. Such patterns may persist as long as the actors in question find
them profitable or convenient, but have no force or compulsion if that is no longer
the case. […] Therefore, for a rule to qualify as a mechanism of delegation or
accountability, it must be enforceable. Voters, politicians, or civil servants must
expect such rules to be backed up by direct or indirect sanctions from their
principals, or from courts or other third parties that can enforce them.”2
A Constitution, in the proper sense of the word, is the supreme and fundamental
law of the State, by which the State is “constituted”. A Constitution established, rather
than merely describes, the rights of the people, the powers and functions of the various
2
Strøm, Müller and Bergman, 2005, p.113.
institutions of government, and the relationships between them. The Constitution will
also include a mechanism for its own amendment which will be more complex than the
mechanism for making ordinary laws, and will establish a body – such as a Supreme
Court or Constitutional Tribunal – which has the authority to strike down any laws which
are deemed to be contrary to the Constitution. Thomas Paine defined a Constitution as:
“..the body of elements to which you can refer, and quote article by article; and
which contains the principles on which the government shall be established, the
manner in which it shall be organised, the powers it shall have, the mode of
elections, the duration of Parliaments… …and, in fine, everything that relates to
the complete organisation of a civil government”. 3
As Paine noted, an unwritten Constitution, which cannot be produced on paper
and quoted chapter and verse, is not really a Constitution at all. Likewise, a Constitution
which is created by the government and subordinate to the government (being capable of
being changed or overridden by the ordinary process of legislation) is not worthy of the
name. Thus, by Paine’s definition, all talk of a “British Constitution” is nonsense, for, as
Paine continues, “no such thing exists, or ever did exist”4.
Britain, uniquely amongst the nations of Europe, stumbled into mass democracy
without pausing to adopt a modern, written Constitution. Instead, we got a “sovereign
Parliament”, able through its almighty legislative power to do almost anything humanly
possible, except to place any limits upon its own godlike power. Like Brahma, Vishnu and
Shiva, the King, Lords and Commons could create, sustain and destroy laws, rights and
privileges at will. Owing to universal suffrage, this was called “democratic”; in fact, the
people had (and have to this day) no guarantee of their rights since, rather than
delegating their sovereignty to a limited Parliament under the fixed terms and conditions
of a Constitution, as in other countries, the people are required at each general election to
entirely abdicate themselves to a sovereign Parliament, with no guarantee that their
interests will be pursued or their liberties upheld. Jean Jacques Rousseau, from the City
Republic of Geneva saw through this sham in 1762. As he put it,
“the people… …regards itself as free; but it is grossly mistaken; it is free only
during the election of members of parliament. As soon as they are elected, slavery
overtakes it, and it is nothing. The use it makes of the short moments of liberty it
enjoys shows indeed that it deserves to lose them”.5
3
4
5
Thomas Paine, The Rights of Man. p.220. Penguin, 1987.
Thomas Paine, The Rights of Man. p.221. Penguin, 1987
J J Rousseau, “The Social Contract”, Book III, Chapter 15.
Demanding a written Constitution is a necessary logical consequence of a belief in
popular sovereignty, since it is only by establishing a superior constitutional law, enacted
by the people and enforced by the courts, that Parliament and the government of the day
can be prevented from usurping sovereignty and violating the people’s rights. That is the
challenge facing Britain today. Sadly, Britain is ill-equipped to meet this challenge. We
are a constitutionally illiterate country, lacking experience in constitutional government
and not even having a lexicon to discuss constitutional questions at a sophisticated and
detailed level.
Hence, the first step in meeting this challenge must be to advance and
inform the constitutional debate by showing citizens what a good Constitution might look
like. That is the purpose of the rest of this paper.
Section 2 - The Head of State
Accepting that many people in the United Kingdom retain a residual historical
loyalty to the Crown, or at least to the person of the Queen as head of State, a republican
solution to our constitutional problems, although theoretically superior, has for the time
being been put to one side. However, within the constraints imposed by the existence of a
hereditary head of State, an attempt has been made to produce a liberal and democratic
Constitution which could be described as “quasi-republican” in character. The proposed
Constitution declares that sovereignty resides in the people, and not in the Queen-inParliament. This sovereignty would be exercised under a written Constitution, which
would be superior to Acts of Parliament, enforced by a Supreme Court, and capable of
amendment only by a special procedure involving supermajorities in Parliament and
approval by the people in a referendum.
The Queen should not possess, even in legal theory, executive powers. Instead, as
a non-executive Head of State, the Queen should perform only limited and clearly defined
functions. Most of these would be of a symbolic nature, and would be performed by the
Head of State at her own discretion. Some, however, would be constitutionally significant;
the Prime Minister, or the Speaker, or some other constitutional authority, would be
responsible for these functions. The crucial difference between this arrangement and the
current system is that the Queen, under the proposed Constitution, would not necessarily
rely on Prime Ministerial advice: premature dissolutions of the House of Commons, for
example, would be performed on the advice of the Speaker, civic honours would be
awarded upon the advice of a parliamentary committee, and judges would be appointed on
the proposal of an independent Judicial Council. The overwhelming power and patronage
of the Prime Minister would thereby be reduced: a Prime Minister would no longer be able
to hide from public and parliamentary scrutiny by lurking behind the cloak of royal
prerogative, and the Head of State – acting on the advice of others, not the Prime
Minister – would be in a position to act as a very real check against the abuse of power.
One constitutional power which ought to be returned to the Head of State is that
of vetoing legislation by withholding Royal Assent. This has become a legal fiction, a bare,
unused, ceremonial formality; the Queen always acts on Ministerial advice (and the House
of Commons rarely acts of its own will, instead following the will of the Ministers, so this
is unlikely to result in any effective balance). Under a new constitutional settlement, the
Royal Assent should be transformed into a real, if extraordinary and occasional, check on
the Government’s power. The Queen should have the authority to refer any bill to the
Supreme Court for advice on its constitutionality, and should be required to refer a bill if
so demanded by one-third of the members of either House of Parliament, or by the First
Minister of any Region. If the Supreme Court advises that the bill is unconstitutional, the
Queen would be required to withhold Assent, and to return the bill to Parliament for
reconsideration. Parliament should then be able to amend the bill and re-pass it by a twothirds majority in each House, or even re-pass it without amendment; and in this case the
Queen would be obliged to grant Assent. Thus there would be a form of abstract judicial
review before a bill is enacted, but the Court would not be able to prevent the enactment
of a law if Parliament insists by a sufficient majority.
For the avoidance of doubt, Parliament’s ability to insist on granting Assent even
against the advice of the Supreme Court would not give Parliament the power to enact
laws which are unconstitutional; it would only give it the power to insist that a law comes
into effect before its constitutionality is challenged before the courts in the usual manner
(i.e. by concrete judicial review, where there is an actual case concerning the
constitutionality of a law which has already come into effect).
Section 3 - Fundamental Rights
Since 1997 human rights and civil liberties in Britain have been under sustained
threat. There is no question about the risk of Britain becoming a “big brother State” – we
are, to our shame and disgrace, already there. To restore our traditional civil liberties, in
particular our right to privacy, freedom of assembly, freedom of protest, and freedom of
speech, must be a priority. The Liberal Democrats have proposed a “Freedom Bill” which
would go some way to restoring our liberties, but mere legislation is not enough. The
pressures and temptations on governments are too great, when in office, for mere laws to
be sufficient. Fundamental rights and liberties must be enshrined in a higher law, which
is superior to ordinary legislation, and which can be amended only with great difficulty.
There are four generations in the development of constitutional rights. The first
generation encompasses those traditional “liberal” civil and legal rights, such as freedom
of speech, religion, assembly, association, and the press, which came out of the national
and religious revolutions of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The
second generation of rights, arising in the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
from the problems of industrialisation, includes certain socio-economic rights which are
essential for the effective enjoyment of liberty, such as the right to an education, basic
healthcare, and the right not to be exploited at work. The third generation of “lifestyle”
rights arises from the sexual revolution of the mid-twentieth century, and includes rights
associated with gender, sexuality and human reproduction. Finally, the fourth generation
of rights arises from the technological revolution of the late twentieth and twenty-first
centuries, which have increased the scope, and potential risk, of mass surveillance. Each
of these generations of rights protects the weak against the strong: the first generation
protects the individual against the State and Church authorities, the second generation
protects the poor against the rich, and the third generation protects women against men.
The fourth generation of rights returns in principle to the first generation: the aim, once
again, is to protect the individual against the State. The technological revolution has
made the power of the State so much greater, and so, if a free society is to be preserved,
the immunity of the individual must be strengthened in compensation. A new British
Constitution must include strong protections for all four generations of rights, but those
of the fourth generation – freedom from surveillance, monitoring and tracking, and from
spybots on the internet – are most urgent if Britain’s distressed liberty is to be rescued.
Section 4 - The House of Commons
The key to reforming Parliament is to change the electoral system from one which
constructs artificial landslide majorities based on a minority of the votes, to one in which
power is shared proportionally to the number of votes received by the candidates of each
party. Proportional representation often seen as a trade-off between representativeness
and effectiveness. The advocates of proportional representation argue that it is “fairer”
and more “inclusive”. The opponents, on the other hand, argue that the present system,
for all its faults, at least guarantees “strong, stable, effective government”, and that any
move to proportional representation would risk reducing Britain to the chaos of post-war
Italy. This opposing argument deserves to be thoroughly routed, because it does not
stand up to either rational argument or empirical evidence. It is a bogey-man argument,
created by those with a vested interest in our unreformed and indefensible system, and
circulated by politicians, journalists, and Tory academics, who really should know better.
Most are willing to concede that proportional representation is fairer and more
inclusive, but even its supporters rarely recognise that it also produces a more effective
and stable government than the present first-past-the-post system. A first-past-the-post
or winner-takes-all system might guarantee a single-party government, which can remain
in office for a full term, and legislate just as it pleases, but this is no guarantee of genuine
stability or effectiveness. Indeed, it might have the opposite effect, as the concentration
of power in one party can breed a haphazard and inconsistent approach to policy-making
and legislation. A proportional system, on the other hand, can ensure good government,
as policy-making must be informed by a wider variety of interests, and since co-operation
and compromise have to be sought from other parties is the principal governing party is
to get its way. This apparent paradox was perhaps best explained by Benjamin Constant:
“Those institutions which act as barriers against power simultaneously support it.
They guide it in its progress; they sustain its efforts; the moderate its excesses of
violence and stimulate it in its moments of apathy. They rally around it the
interests of the various classes. Even when it fights them, they impose upon it
certain considerations which makes its mistakes less dangerous. But when these
institutions are destroyed, power, lacking anything to contain it, begins to march
haphazardly; its step becomes uneven and erratic. As it no longer follows a fixed
rule, it now advances, now recoils, now becomes agitated, now restless; it never
knows whether it is doing enough, or too much. Sometimes it is carried away and
nothing can stop it; sometimes it subsides and nothing can revive it. It rids itself
of allies while thinking to be rid of enemies.”6
That seems to sum up the record of the British State since 1945.
We have a
system which puts an erratic power in the hands of one party and then, through the
workings of an equally erratic electoral system, transfers that power – again without
restraint – to the other party. The effects of this on our industrial infrastructure, social
services, and general wellbeing, are clear to see. In the space of twenty years, the British
6
B. Constant, “The Spirit of Conquest and Usurpation and their relation to European Civilisation”, in
“Constant: Political Writings”, Bianca-Maria Fontana (Ed.), Cambridge, 1988. p. 133.
steel industry was nationalised, denationalised, renationalised, and then privatised – is it,
then, any wonder that our steel industry collapsed as it did? The economic reforms made
by the Conservatives in the 1980s were probably necessary and ultimately beneficial, but
they were clumsily handled because the government had no incentive to compromise with
those who were adversely affected. Owing to the electoral system, it made no difference
to Mrs Thatcher whether all people in South Wales or Lanarkshire hated her, or only most
of the people. There was no need, no incentive, to appeal to moderate sentiment, and the
Government could easily afford to sustain considerable collateral damage in the form of
empty towns and destroyed communities. On the opposite side, Labour were able to ban
fox hunting any concern for votes in rural areas. Regardless of the rights or wrongs of
either issue, First Past the Post does not translate into effective government, but blind,
reckless government, a government which sees no need for compromise, and which can
sacrifice long-term progress and stability in the rush to pursue its own headstrong whim.
Arendt Lijphart argues, from a study of thirty-six liberal-democracies, that those
States with proportional electoral systems and multi-party politics tend to produce better
macro-economic results, in terms not only of growth, but also control of inflation, strike
activity, and unemployment, compared to those with the supposed advantage of “strong”
single-party majority government7. The need for consensus-building, for the consent and
co-operation of others, reduces the risk of bad policy-making and increases the likelihood
of being able to achieve stable, effective and lasting policies. Moreover, consensual
liberal-democracies based on proportional representation are able to offer a higher quality
of democracy, measured by the level of women’s representation, political equality, voter
turn-out, public satisfaction, and degree of concordance between government policies and
public opinion8.
This evidence points to the need for a rather fundamental shift in our thinking.
Instead of getting worried about the imagined dangers of “hung” Parliaments, we should
embrace the advantages of “balanced” Parliaments, in which no one party is ever again
able to recklessly insist on its own way. We should reconsider how we use the words
“strong”, “stable” and “effective”, and think of them not in terms of a single party being
able to dominate Parliament in order to achieve its manifesto, but in terms of an on-going
public conversation aimed at the long-term public interest. Parties will have an incentive
to participate in this conservation because they will be forced to take a longer view of
7
8
Lijphart, “Patterns of Democracy”, Yale, 1999. pp. 258-274.
Lijphart, “Patterns of Democracy”, Yale, 1999. pp. 275-300.
their own interests; they cannot hope to “win” by appealing to the interests of just one
section of the population – that might get them some seats, but they will not get into or
hold onto government office unless they can co-operate over time with coalition partners.
One of the imagined advantages of the current system is that it at least provides
the opportunity to “throw the rascals out”. First Past the Post is supposed to offer the
electorate a direct choice between the Government and Opposition, with a consequently
clear line of accountability. This is not, in fact, the case. In a consensual democracy
based on proportional representation, governments are easier to remove from office than
in majoritarian systems. In 2005 Labour managed to hold onto office with a majority of
seats in the House of Commons based on 35% of the votes cast, or little more than onefourth of the total available votes, once turn-out is taken into account. It can be very
difficult to throw out a Government under such circumstances: so long as the opposition
is divided (that is, so long as the people have any more meaningful say than a simple
either/or choice), a Government can cling to 100% of the power on a tiny fragment of the
votes. With proportional representation, the 2005 general election, based on the same
distribution of votes, would have been likely to have resulted in a Conservative-Liberal
coalition, resulting in the removal from office of Tony Blair. This is mere speculation, not
least because proportional representation changes the way people vote (there is less need
for tactical voting) as well as changing the way votes are transformed into seats, but it
does at least show that the myth of First-Past-the-Post accountability lacks foundation in
fact. With proportional representation, we would be more able to throw the rascals out.
“All very well in theory, but what about Italy? Doesn’t it show that proportional
representation is a recipe for disaster?” This is the most common response made to any
rational argument in favour of proportional representation. Proportional representation
is not just an Italian phenomenon, however. One could just as well say, “What about the
Netherlands?”, “What about Sweden, or Germany, or Denmark, or any other well-governed
and prosperous European country?”. Closer to home, “What about Ireland, or Scotland, or
Wales?”. We must remember that Italy is a rather unique case, an outlier, and not a good
example of the consequences of proportional representation. It is true that Italy in the
post-war era was unusually corrupt, unstable and ineffective, but these problems did not
come from proportional representation; they came from a combination of cultural and
constitutional factors specific to Italy9. Since the 1990s Italy has moved towards a sort
9
See: Adams & Barile, “The Government of Republican Italy”, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1966.
Also: Spotts & Weiser, “Italy: A Difficult Democracy”, Cambridge University Press, 1986.
of two-party system, first abolishing proportional representation and then returning to a
sort of reinforced-PR with high “thresholds” encouraging the formation of disciplined leftright blocks. Italian governments are more “stable”, in as much as one person remains in
office as Prime Minister for a longer time, but are they any more effective? Are they any
better at serving the public good? Some of the evidence seems to indicate that this has
not been the case, and that abandoning the protection of proportional representation has
made for a more authoritarian, more populist, less democratic and less accountable form
of politics 10. If the Italian experience of proportional representation teaches us anything,
it is that it can help to preserve liberal-democracy, even in unfavourable circumstances.
Now that electoral reform is on the agenda, the major parties are considering the
Alternative Vote Plus (AV+) system as a replacement for First Past the Post. Most seats
would be determined on the basis of a constituency vote, in which voters would rank
candidates in order of preference. To be elected, it is necessary to win a majority of the
first preference votes. If no candidate wins a majority of first preference votes, then the
votes are redistributed to second and subsequent preferences. Meanwhile, a second vote
can be cast for a party list, which determines the allocation of top-up seats (about a fifth
or a quarter of the total number of seats) according to proportional representation. While
this is, perhaps, to be welcomed as a step in the right direction, AV+ is not a proportional
system. It does not guarantee to each party a share of the seats proportional to the share
of votes cast. In fact, it can raise the barriers to entry, making it even harder for small
parties to gain a constituency seat. In order to achieve a proportional result, it would be
necessary for the list element to constitute around half of the total seats. AV+ offers only
a small number of “top-up seats”, and still guarantees a built-in majority for large parties.
There are many forms of proportional representation available. None is perfect.
In the United Kingdom, three are already in use: the Mixed Member Proportional system,
used for elections to the Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly, and London Assembly; the
Single Transferable Vote system, used for the Northern Ireland Assembly and for local
Councils in Scotland and Northern Ireland; and the Closed Regional List system, used for
elections to the European Parliament. Of these, the Closed Regional List system is the
worst, and ought to be avoided, as it increases the power of party machines and gives
guaranteed safe seats to those at the top of the list, just like First Past the Post gives safe
states to those in certain constituencies. Single Transferable Vote, as used in Ireland and
10
Bobbio & Viroli, “The Idea of the Republic” (Alan Cameron, Trans.), Polity Press, 2003. pp. 66100.
for the Australian Senate, has long been regarded as the “best” practical system, both by
independent experts such as the Electoral Reform Society and by the pro-PR parties such
as the Liberal-Democrats and the Scottish National Party. It maintains a constituency
link through larger, multi-member constituencies, and it gives voters a choice within, as
well as between, parties.
A strong case could be made for Single Transferable Vote, but on balance we
propose that a future UK Constitution should adopt the Mixed Member Proportional
(MMP) system for elections to the House of Commons. This is not because the MMP it is
the “best”, in any abstract sense, but because it is already familiar to many people in the
United Kingdom, it achieves a proportional result, and it maintains the local singlemember constituencies which seem to be valuable to many people.
Under the MMP system, the UK would be divided into about 200 single-member
constituencies (which would, consequently, be rather larger than those used as present,
but smaller than those necessary under Single Transferable Vote), each of which would
elect one member. Assuming a House of Commons of 400 members, which would be more
than sufficient for a federal UK, the other 200 members would be chosen from regional
lists, probably using the same regions as are currently used for elections to the European
Parliament. Each voter would have two votes. Their first vote would be a party vote for
their preferred party, the second vote a personal vote for their preferred local MP. The
seats would be tallied on a regional basis, with each party receiving a total number of
seats (both constituency and list) in proportion to the number of list votes received. The
crucial element of this system is that the list seats are compensatory; the number of list
seats distributed to a party will vary according to the number of constituency seats won.
A simple hypothetical example will illustrate this. Imagine a region returning a
total of twenty members: ten constituency members, ten list members. There are four
parties contesting each constituency and the regional list. By percentage of the regional
votes cast (calculated on the D’Hondt formula, which is familiar to us from European
Parliament elections11), Party A might, say, be entitled to a total of 8 seats, party B to 6
seats, Party C to 4 seats, and party D to 2 seats. Now imagine that, because of the
reputations of the local candidates, or for other particular reasons, Party A happens to
win 4 constituencies, Party B 5 constituencies, and Party C one constituency.
This
means that Party A will be entitled to 4 list seats (8 minus 4), Party B will be entitled to 1
11
There is no need here to go into the arithmetic, but it is worth noting that the D’Hondt method has the
advantage of slightly favouring the larger parties; it produces a broadly proportional result whilst avoiding
excessive fragmentation.
list seat (6 minus 5), Party C will be entitled to 3 list seats (4 minus 1), and Party D to 2
list seats (2 minus 0).
One frequent complaint against this system is that it creates two classes of
member – constituency members and list members – and that it distributes these classes
unequally between the parties (in this example, 50% of Party A’s parliamentary cohort
will be list members, compared with 100% of Party D’s cohort), apparently giving those
with a large number of list members a lesser station than those able to win constituency
seats. This need not, however, be a matter of much importance, since the two classes of
representative are members of one body, and neither one class nor the other can better
claim to represent the people. Provided that the constituency members are not allowed to
monopolise the constituency workload, and provided that a candidate may stand for both
the constituency and the regional list seat, this assumption of superiority by constituency
members will pass in time. In any case, in a working Parliament, with strong committees
and a more powerful policy-making voice, there will be less need to focus on constituency
work (which would in most cases be better left to local authorities or to the Ombudsman).
The more members are returned from a region, the more proportional the result
can be; it is harder for a party to win an extra seat in a 5-member region than in a 10member region. On the other hand, there is a disadvantage to large regions, in terms of
reduced proximity between the voter and his or her representative (this may, however, be
offset by the existence of a local constituency member). Proportionality may also be
affected by the imposition of an artificial threshold – a minimum percentage of votes
which a party must receive in order to participate in the distribution of seats.
A
threshold of three to five percent can be effective at preventing the over-fragmentation of
the party system, preventing the rise of a plethora of very small parties; a larger
threshold, of up to 10% in some countries, can be a significant barrier to entry and can
have the effect of severely limiting effective freedom of voter choice. We propose a 5%
regional threshold, meaning that a party must win 5% of the votes in a region in order to
be included in the distribution of that region’s list seats. A 5% UK-wide threshold, on the
other hand, would unjustly punish Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish regional parties.
A slight problem emerges when a party wins more constituency seats than its
share of the list vote would entitle it to. In this case, the easiest solution is to let the
party keep those additional seats, thereby creating an “overhang”; this may somewhat
detract from overall proportionality, but usually the effect is too slight to be significant.
Proportional representation, although necessary, is insufficient to reform the
workings of Parliament. It is also necessary to change the relationship between the
Crown (that is, in practical terms, the Government) and Parliament, so as to achieve a
better balance and distribution of power. The first major reform in this area, now under
consideration by the major parties, is to move from a system in which the Prime Minister
can call elections at will, to a system of fixed term Parliaments. The effect of this would
be strengthen Parliament, enabling Parliament to express its own view and hold the
executive to account without risking dissolution. A term of four years would be better
than the current maximum of five years, since in general, and within reason, a shorter
term makes members of Parliament more dependent on, and accountable to, the people.
However, to adopt a strictly fixed term, as in Norway, could potentially be
problematic. There needs to be some flexibility. What if a government could not be
formed? What if a crisis, like the one we have recently experienced, were to occur, and
popular clamour for a premature dissolution were to rise? In these cases, a premature
dissolution should be possible, but it should not be up to the Prime Minister to decide.
These are matters on which the Head of State should act not on the advice of the Prime
Minister, but on that of the Speaker of the House of Commons. The Constitution should
permit the Head of State, on the advice of the Speaker, to dissolve the House of Commons
in two circumstances: firstly, if a Prime Minister cannot be appointed within thirty days
after a general election, or within thirty days after the death or resignation of the former
incumbent; secondly, if two-thirds of the members petition the Speaker for a premature
dissolution in order to resolve a crisis. In the latter case, the need for a two-third
majority, the need for the discretionary approval of the Speaker, and a requirement
preventing the use of this procedure in two successive Parliaments, will be sufficient to
protect against its abuse. Similar rules currently apply, without any mishap, in Scotland.
The second reform is to change how Parliament conducts its business. This must
largely be a matter for Parliament itself to determine, through its rules of procedure, but
there are some matters which require constitutional stipulations, in order to protect the
rights of the opposition and minorities, and to prevent the abuse of power by those who
happen to be in the majority. Parliament should determine its own order of business –
with due regard for the needs of both Government and other parties – acting through a
modern Parliamentary Bureau. This would replace both the Whips offices and the Leader
and Shadow Leader of the House. One-third of the members of either House should be
able to call Parliament into a special session, even without the Government’s approval.
The Speaker of the House of Commons (and President of the Senate), should be chosen by
their peers after each general election, meaning that the current situation, in which an
aged Speaker hangs on to office until retirement, would be no more. Certain important
and sensitive decisions, such as expelling a member for gross misbehaviour, or refusing
to seat a member due to a dispute over their eligibility, must be decided by a two-thirds
majority vote. Parliamentary committees should have full powers of investigation; this
would end the pointless charade in which the Opposition clamours for a public enquiry
and the Government refuses to comply. The proposed Constitution includes all these
reforms and several others, all quite minor in themselves, but adding up to a more open,
accountable and deliberative way of doing business. The aim should be to put an end to
the horrid bear-pit of Westminster, where over-grown schoolboys trade amusing quips as
if they were on QI or I’m Sorry I Haven’t A Clue, and instead to create a “working”
Parliament, a sort of Rikstag-on-Thames, where informed and serious debate reigns. One
element of this reform not mentioned in the proposed Constitution, but long overdue, is to
bring in the carpenters, rip out the old benches, and create a horseshoe shaped chamber.
Section Five - The Second Chamber
Since 1911, when the powers of the House of Lords were emasculated, the UK
Parliament has operated, in effect, as a unicameral assembly. The House of Lords can
criticise and debate. It gives the Prime Minister a useful pool of talent from which to
draw Ministers, and a vat of patronage from which to buy support. Sometimes it makes a
useful technical amendment, and occasionally even manages to delay a non-money bill.
Yet the House of Lords does not do the one thing that a second chamber ought to do –
namely, providing a check on the power of the Government based in the House of
Commons. It does not have the ability to restrain what Thomas Paine called “the wild
impulses of arbitrary power”, nor to check the Government; it cannot prevent the rash,
narrow and partisan manipulation of law by the Government majority. One example of
this arose during the nationalisation of Northern Rock bank in 2008: the Government, for
reasons of obvious self-interest, wished to exempt Northern Rock from the requirements
of the Freedom of Information Act; the Lords objected, with some fine and principled
arguments, that the use of public money demanded public scrutiny. The Lords, however,
had no power to insist on their amendments, and so the Government’s view prevailed.
If Parliament is to work properly as a means of scrutinising and checking the
government, it must be re-cast as a truly bicameral system, with both Houses having
substantial powers. Power, in this case, is a function of competence and composition:
competence, in the sense of possessing legal capacity to act, and composition, in the sense
of having the moral and political authority to make use of that capacity. Even within the
limits of its weak competence, the Lords lacks the legitimacy act as an effective restraint
on the Government because it is hamstrung by its composition: although many are highly
talented and accomplished individuals, its members are appointed by the Government, and
the House of Lords could at any time be swamped by a new batch of servile political
appointees. A new second chamber needs greater competence, and the authority to use it.
In a federal United Kingdom, the obvious role of a second chamber, as well as
serving as a body of advice, review and restraint, is to act as a representative of the
several Regions. The Liberal-Democrats advocate a directly elected upper House. In an
otherwise unreformed system, only a directly elected second chamber – chosen by a
different electoral system – would have the power to stand up to the House of Commons
and its government majority. However, in a reformed, federalised system, this would be a
mistake; if both Houses were chosen by proportional representation, each would be a
mirror of the other, and there would be no difference between them. Instead, the Senate
(it is as good a name as any) of a federal United Kingdom ought to be composed of
members indirectly elected by the Regional Assemblies. This could produce a stronger
and more effective chamber than one chosen by direct popular election, because it would
be likely to have a different party composition, and thus have the incentive to flex its
muscles. It is also likely to contain a different type of member – perhaps those who are
less concerned with aspiring to federal Ministerial office, and who see themselves as
commissioners of their regions rather than front-line national politicians. Moreover, to
eliminate the appointed element entirely would be a mistake, since then all members
would be party politicians of one sort or another. A small fraction – perhaps one-fifth of
the total – could be appointed on merit, provided that their numbers are limited so as not
to swamp the voting power of those elected by the regions. Such a second chamber, in
composition, would resemble that of France from 1875 to 1884, or that of South Africa
from 1910 to 1961. It would result in an effective, balanced, and august second chamber.
The Senate’s powers should be somewhat greater than those of the present House
of Lords. If it opposes a bill, the Senate should have the power to compel the Government
(which we may assume to have a working majority in the House of Commons), either to
compromise with the opposition, or to appeal to the people in a referendum, or to
withdraw the bill. In the proposed Constitution, the Senate may reject bills (other than
money bills) passed by the House of Commons; if the Commons re-passes the bill by a twothirds majority – that is, if the Government is able to compromise with the opposition –
then the Senate’s veto shall be overturned, and the bill presented for Royal Assent. If the
bill is not passed by a two-thirds majority vote – that is, if the Government is unable or
unwilling to reach a compromise with the opposition parties - then the Government may,
by means of a simple majority vote of the House of Commons, put the question to the
people in a referendum. By these means, genuine bicameralism will be restored and the
Senate will act as an effective check against the abuse of power by a government majority
in the House of Commons - but the genuine will of the people, as is expressed through a
two-thirds majority of their representatives, or the people themselves in a referendum,
shall always prevail in ordinary legislative business. The Senate does not oppose the
people; it may, however, oppose a majority of their representatives, to the advantage of a
larger majority, to that of the people themselves. This is a very fine “republican balance”.
In some matters, such as constitutional amendments, and the ratification of
treaties and declarations of war, the Senate should have an absolute veto and should be a
co-equal partner with the House of Commons – a necessary check against domination by
the Government. Nevertheless, the overall superiority of the House of Commons, a valued
principle to many people, is assured: only the House of Commons can appoint and dismiss
the government, and the House of Commons has complete liberty of action on the budget.
Section Six - The Executive
Executive power should be vested in a Cabinet government which is accountable
to the House of Commons. Thus the parliamentary form of government, in which a ruling
party or coalition controls both the popular branch of the legislature and the executive, is
retained in the proposed UK Constitution. However, the mechanisms for appointing and
dismissing a government need major reform. The customary practice of “commanding a
majority”, based on the implicit approval of the House of Commons, should be abolished.
Instead, the Prime Minister should be explicitly designated by a resolution of the House of
Commons, and should continues in office until the next general election, unless removed
by a constructive vote of no-confidence. A constructive vote of no-confidence entails the
designation of another Prime Minister, and thereby prevents the House of Commons from
dismissing a Government by means of a purely “negative” coalition which cannot agree on
a replacement. This device not only ensures greater Cabinet stability under a system of
proportional representation, it also results in a partial separation of the executive from
the legislative power, in as much as the Cabinet may be defeated in Parliament on a piece
of legislation without necessarily having to resign. There will be less need for whipping
and rigid discipline, since the survival of the Government will not depend on every vote.
Thus freed from the danger of being unseated at every turn, the Government may
adopt a more give-and-take relationship with Parliament, and will be able to suffer defeats
on particular bills while confident in the knowledge that it will not be thrown out of office.
More private members’ bills and backbench or opposition amendments will be passed,
removing the bias in favour of the Government’s self-interest, and resulting in a much
improved quality of legislation.
A further important reform to the executive branch is that up to half of the
members of the Cabinet should be appointed from outside Parliament, being brought into
executive office on the basis of their previous qualifications and experience. This would
help to improve the quality of government, and raise the standard of administration above
the amateurism of many existing Ministers. As a consequence, reliance on Civil Servants
for policy advice will decrease – which should result in some long overdue improvements.
Section Seven - The Judiciary
The most important judicial reform is the creation of a proper Supreme Court with
genuine constitutional jurisdiction. This includes the right to annul Acts of Parliament
which are found to be unconstitutional. Without this, neither the Constitution, nor the
liberties of the people guaranteed by it, nor the autonomy of the nations and regions of
the United Kingdom, can be assured.
An independent Judicial Council, party chosen by incumbent judges and partly by
both Houses of Parliament, should be responsible for judicial appointments. This would
reduce the scope of political patronage, and strike the right balance between ultimate
public control and judicial independence. The Judicial Council would also advise the head
of State on the granting of pardons. Judges must enjoy security of tenure; they should be
subject only to the Constitution and the laws, and removable only by impeachment.
Section Eight - Autonomous Regional Governments
The words “United Kingdom” contain within them a political concept which is so
engrained in our consciousness that we rarely even notice it: we live not in a nation-state,
founded on the unity of its people, but in a dynastic state founded on conquest. We forget
this distinction at our peril. The Union – meaning the political Union between England,
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland – is now being actively challenged by nationalist
parties such as the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru. These parties wish to
replace the large, dynastic, post-imperial UK State (which is, to be honest, an unlovely
and inelegant thing even at the best of times) with small, modern, nation-states. As we
are in the process of designing a new Constitution for the UK, we might take a moment to
consider the question of what the United Kingdom’s dynastic state is actually for. Why
should the UK continue to exist? This is not an easy question to answer, since most of
the traditional roles of the United Kingdom are now better served by NATO and the EU.
The rational case for the Union (as opposed to the emotive, historical case) is increasingly
difficult to make. The United Kingdom has lost an Empire, and has in the process lost is
very purpose. There is also a strong argument which says that the United Kingdom is a
State in terminal decline; it has reached the natural end of its life, and needs to be put out
of its misery so that new, energetic and flourishing States – a Scottish Republic, or a
Commonwealth of England, perhaps – may arise in its place. The authors have much
sympathy for this view, but we recognise that this is a minority position in the United
Kingdom as a whole, and that no decision on the independence of any part of the United
Kingdom can be made without the consent of the people expressed through referendums.
The proposed Constitution therefore retains, for the time being, the dynastic unity
of the United Kingdom, as one State with one Parliament and one Government, but it
remodels the UK as a federalized State with strong regional governments. This is longstanding Liberal-Democrat policy, but one which has not been seriously advocated since
devolution “parked” the “Celtic Question” in the eyes of the London-based parties. Now is
the time for it to be reconsidered by all the parties as part of a general trend towards the
localisation of power.
The Constitution preserves the devolved institutions of Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland as the basis for regional autonomy, and these are complemented by the
establishment of Regional Assemblies in England. Crucially, these institutions would be
formally entrenched by the Constitution; thus the defining principle of a devolved State,
which is that “What has been given may be taken back” should be replaced by the
principle of a State of Autonomies, in which home-rule institutions have a constitutional
vitality of their own and cannot be encroached upon by any unilateral act of Westminster.
For a variety of cultural, legal, historical and economic reasons, a federal solution
for Britain must adopt a “variable geometry” approach, with different parts of the UK
possessing different degrees of autonomy. The “federal” UK Parliament should exercise
some powers over England and Wales, and some – lesser – powers over England, Wales,
Scotland, and Northern Ireland. The infamous “West Lothian” question, in this complex
system, is not so much solved as dissipated: with of the four constituent countries having
its own scheme of autonomy, the problem of “Scottish MPs” voting on “English matters”
will be replaced by the simple fact of “federal” MPs voting on “federal” matters, acting as
a “federal” legislature, while regional assemblies look to their own affairs. Spain copes
with this sort of arrangement, and there is no reason why we could not do so too.
This level of federalised autonomy might not be enough to satisfy the reasonable
demands of the Scots and Welsh to throw off the dynastic state and to establish nationstates of their own. The important consideration, in that case, is not to foolishly cling on
to the United Kingdom until it tears apart, but to put in place a simple procedure by which
the umbilical chord can be surgically cut; to avoid wars, struggles, and uncertainty, a new
UK Constitution should, contain a mechanism for allowing Scotland, Wales and Northern
Ireland to determine their own national futures, and to become independent if they wish.
Section Nine - Democratic Integrity, Miscellaneous Provisions, and Amendments
The failures of the British State, from its creeping authoritarianism to its relatively poor
standards of health, education and so forth, are not the fault of this government or that
government, nor of this party or that party; they are the fault of a system which is
broken, a system which concentrates powers – without accountability or effective
restraint – in too few hands. The problems of the British State are, in effect, the
problems which necessarily flow from giving too much power to too few.
Through
enabling the Government to take what the tabloids call “bold, decisive action”, without
having to compromise with other parties, without having to defer to local communities,
without having to fear that its laws will be declared unconstitutional, and without having
to go before the people in a referendum, we have enabled the State to act rashly,
impetuously, and without careful deliberation or the building of consensus; and we have,
as a result, alienated the people from the State. Is there any wonder that so many of our
citizens are disenchanted with democracy, when the quality of our democracy is so low?
A new UK Constitution should make an effort to improve the quality of democracy
in the United Kingdom, to ensure openness and accountability, and to protect the citizens
against misrule. This means that Governments, and parliamentary majorities, must be
reigned-in, and constitutionally prevented from acting in a manner which is arbitrary,
corrupt, or unjust. In the words of Bruce Ackerman, we must move towards a form of
“constrained”, as opposed to “unconstrained” parliamentarism12. In his essay, “The New
Separation of the Powers”, Ackerman advocates constitutional institutions which, placed
alongside a traditional parliamentary system, will ensure openness and accountability,
promote integrity, and prevent manipulation of the system by those in high office. These
institutions, which Ackerman refers to as the “Democracy Branch” and the “Integrity
Branch”, would not overshadow the executive, legislative, or judicial powers of the State,
nor share in the business of administration, legislation, or justice, but they would ensure
that those powers are exercised in an appropriate, lawful, non-arbitrary manner.
In practical terms, Ackerman’s “Democracy Branch” may be realised through an
independent and non-partisan Electoral Commission, which would be responsible for the
overseeing the conduct of elections and referendums. His “Integrity Branch” would be
embodied in an Auditor-General and an Ombudsman: the Auditor-General would ensure
fiscal integrity, and the Ombudsman would ensure the integrity of the administration by
protecting the rights of citizens. In order to be effective, these independent “branches”
would have to be non-partisan, and protected against undue interference or dismissal.
The independence of the BBC as a public-service broadcaster, separate from the
State and from the government, is another instance of a desire to promote high quality
democracy, since access to non-partisan news sources, and to open criticism of the
government, is essential for the democratic education and civic spirit of the people (the
Board of Governors, or “Trustees” as they are now called, should not be appointed by the
Government, but elected by the Senate on a non-partisan basis). This would not prevent
the Regions from establishing their own public service broadcasting networks, however.
The ethical standards proclaimed by the 1995 Nolan (Standards in Public Life)
Report would also be incorporated into the Constitution, with a clear direction that
anyone who is found to have acted against the Nolan Principles should be expected to
resign. This will not be a magic wand, nor an instant cure against corruption, but the
unambiguous statement of what is expected of those in public life can only help to create
the right ethical climate of principled public service on which true freedom always rests.
Freedom of information is also necessary, for without proper knowledge of the
government’s actions it is difficult to hold the government to account: the present (and
rather weak) freedom of information Act is therefore strengthened and placed upon a
constitutional basis, where it can not easily be overturned by the governing majority.
12
Bruce Ackerman, “The New Separation of the Powers”, Harvard Law Review, 2000.
The proposed Constitution makes provision for referendums. Referendums would
be mandatory in the questions of sovereignty: constitutional amendments and treaties
which delegate powers to an international body. A referendum would also be required for
laws concerning increases in parliamentary salaries and allowances, and would be needed
if the House of Commons wished to overturn the Senate’s veto by appealing to the people.
A referendum on other issues may be called by the Parliament, by a Regional Assembly,
or by a local council, on any other matter within its authority; these discretionary
referendums would be merely consultative.
Having a written Constitution as a supreme law means that some mechanism of
amendment must be included. The basic options are super-majority provisions (requiring,
say, a two-thirds majority in both Houses), democratic provisions (requiring a popular
referendum), or both. Reflecting both the federal and the democratic nature of the new
United Kingdom, the proposed Constitution opts for both. This provision protects the
Constitution, and the rights of the people, from frivolous amendments, while retaining the
necessary degree of flexibility to prevent the Constitution from being fossilised in time.
A few symbolic changes also need to be made. “Rule Britannia” is proposed as the
anthem of the United Kingdom, because of its associations with the cause of liberty; “God
Save The Queen” is not abolished, but is relegated to the status of a “royal anthem”, to be
used only when the head of State is present.
Section Ten – Concluding Remarks
Writing a Constitution is a difficult task. One must aim to be complete, clear and
unambiguous, leaving as little room as possible for one’s words to be twisted, whilst at the
same time producing a document which is reasonably compact and can be easily read and
understood by the average educated citizen. With this in mind, the raw text of the 1946
Constitution of Japan was used as a basis or framework for drafting, although relatively
little of it survives intact. The Japanese Constitution might seem an unlikely choice for a
country like Britain, aspiring to become a “normal” European democracy, but it has some
definite advantages. The Japanese Constitution was written by the Americans, who of all
English-speaking nations have the longest experience of written Constitutions and widest
constitutional literacy; yet, unlike American constitutions, the Japanese Constitution is
symbolically monarchical in form and resolutely parliamentary in function. It combines
much of what is best in post-WWII European-style constitutions, but without the verbiage.
Using this framework as a basis, the authors were able to produce a comprehensive and
complete Constitution which amounts to a little over 8,000 words, and which keeps some,
although unfortunately not all, of the stark beauty and Zen simplicity of the original text.
Nothing in the proposed Constitution is untried or untested, thanks to the great
European laboratory of democratic constitutionalism. The mechanism for constructive
votes of no-confidence is borrowed from Spain, Germany and Hungary. The narrowly
specified constitutional role of the head of State, shorn not only of the practical reality
but also of the theoretical shadow of governing power, is modelled on Spain and Sweden.
The Mixed Member Proportional electoral system for the House of Commons and the
balance of power between the two Houses are based on German precedents, whilst the
indirect election of the Senate by Regional Assemblies draws on the example of Austria.
The system of autonomous regional governments is inspired by that of Spain. Indeed, the
1978 Constitution of Spain, although it has not been slavishly followed in every detail,
has been the authors’ constant inspiration: like this proposed Constitution for the United
Kingdom, the Spanish Constitution is “quasi-republican” and “quasi-federal”, achieving the
practical benefits of transforming the country into a liberal-democratic and parliamentary
federal republic, without enraging long-lingering conservative and monarchist sentiments.
This wide borrowing of constitutional mechanisms from other countries does not
mean that the resulting Constitution is a hotchpotch of incompatibilities. Rather, these
tried and tested elements have been carefully blended into a unified and workable whole,
which is firmly grounded in the mainstream of contemporary European liberal-democracy.
The Constitution is radical, in as much as it attacks problems at their root, and is
not afraid to cut away at the historical deadwood to get there; but it is not revolutionary
nor utopian. It builds on all that is good in the British liberal tradition whilst fearlessly
replacing all that is rotten or decayed. This draws on the legacy of Thomas Paine – the
only Englishman ever to have truly understood the nature of the problems which have
afflicted us since the unfortunate events of 1660. Thomas Paine – not Karl Marx, nor
Jesus Christ – is the spiritual and ideological father of British radicalism. It is to be
hoped that the Liberal Democrats, who have recently re-discovered good old-fashioned
liberalism, will also discover this radical hero in their political heritage. Paine’s scorn
was directed against all those who reduced politics to a “trade” carried on for their own
profit; against those who manipulated and corrupted the House of Commons with their
bribery, party whips and patronage; and against those who used the might of the Crown
to mask their own unaccountable power – all excellent targets for today’s reformers. A
staunch republican by principle, Paine was willing to endorse the 1791 Constitution of
France on the ground that, despite its monarchical trappings, it was republican at the
core. Most of all, Paine saw through the unreality of the so-called “British Constitution”.
He discovered that we have no Constitution worthy of the name, and that “Government
without Constitution is Power without Right”. In other words, we not citizens, but slaves.
Unless this fundamental problem is rectified, Britain will be finished. The Scots,
for one, will not put up with this much longer. If Britain cannot transform itself into a
modern liberal-democracy then Scotland, quite rightly, and with the full support of many
European liberals, must go its own way. Do people not realise that Britain has become the
laughing-stock of Europe, whatever conciliatory noises Mr Brown may make? We have an
absurdly stratified neo-medieval society, full of arcane ceremonies for the toffs at the top,
crippling school fees and volatile house-prices for those in the middle, and chronic bad
housing, bad food, and bad health, for those at the bottom. British society is sick to its
“olde worlde” core, and a day-trip to the Faerey Cottage Tea Room and Gifte Shoppe on
Lord Hardgrind’s estate will not put it right. A new Constitution is not a panacea for the
social and cultural ills of sentimental romanticism, deference and “mustn’t grumble”, but
it has become abundantly clear to the authors that a new Constitution is a prerequisite of
any meaningful improvement. Britain’s failure to have a good house-clearing revolution
in 1789, 1848 or 1918 – and arguably our failure to get liberated by America in 1945 –
has left us with cobwebbed gothic institutions instead of a modern European culture of
equality, democracy and human rights. A new Constitution can, at least in part, redress
this historical failing. If this modest proposal can convince the reader of the practicality
of reform, and can show how our governing institutions could be improved, based on the
best of the British and the European liberal traditions, then the authors shall be content.
CHAPTER ONE – FOUNDATIONS
Article 1 – The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom is a parliamentary liberal-democracy. It is a federation of twelve
self-governing Regions: nine English Regions, plus Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.
Article 2 – Constitutional Supremacy
This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the land. No Act of Parliament, ordinance,
regulation, Act of a Regional Assembly, or other act of government, or part thereof, which
is contrary to the provisions of this Constitution, shall have legal force or validity.
Article 3 – Constitutional Oath
The King (or Queen) or the Regent, as well as Ministers of State, members of Parliament
and of Regional Assemblies, the judges, and all other public officials, have the obligation to
defend and uphold this Constitution, and shall take an oath to this effect on appointment.
CHAPTER TWO – THE HEAD OF STATE
Article 4 – Representative of the State
The King (or Queen) shall be the symbol of the State and of the unity and liberty of its
people, deriving his or her position from the constitutional will of the sovereign people.
Article 5 – Succession
The Crown shall be hereditary in accordance with the Act of Settlement, 1701, and such
other Acts of Succession, Regency, or Exclusion, as are hereafter enacted by Parliament.
Article 6 – Functions and Duties
The King (or Queen), acting with the advice and consent of the responsible constitutional
bodies as herein specified, shall perform the following official acts on behalf of the people:
1. Appointing and dismissing the Prime Minister in accordance with Articles 59 and 60.
2. Ordering the dissolution of the House of Commons in accordance with Article 43.
3. Granting Royal Assent to Acts of Parliament in accordance with Article 54.
4. Appointing the Justices of the Supreme Court in accordance with Article 69.
5. Granting amnesties, pardons and reprieves on the advice of the Judicial Council.
6. Awarding public honours on the advice of a Parliamentary Honours Committee.
7. Appointing the First Ministers of Regions in accordance with Article 75.
8. Accrediting and receiving ambassadors on the advice of the Cabinet.
10. Performance of representative, ceremonial, civic and charitable functions.
11. Promulgation of Constitutional Amendments in accordance with Article 91.
Article 7 – Regency and Delegation of Functions
When a Regency is established by law, during the minority or incapacity of the King (or
Queen), the Regent shall perform acts of state in the name of the King (or Queen). The
King (or Queen) may delegate the performance of his or her duties as provided by law.
Article 8 – Royal Finance and Household
1. The King (or Queen) shall be paid a reasonable salary from the public treasury as
determined by law, from which the expenses of the royal household shall be defrayed.
2. The King (or Queen) shall appoint the Lord Chamberlain, who shall be responsible for
the management of the royal household and for submitting royal accounts to Parliament.
CHAPTER THREE – RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE PEOPLE
Article 9 – Citizenship
The conditions for being a citizen of the United Kingdom shall be determined by law.
Article 10 – Equality under the Law
All of the citizens are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in their
political, economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or origin.
Article 11 – Political Liberties
1. The people have the inalienable right to choose their public officials in accordance with
this Constitution, and to dismiss them, through free, fair and regular elections.
2. All public officials are servants of the whole community and not of any group thereof.
3. Universal adult suffrage is guaranteed with regard to the election of public officials.
4. Secrecy of the ballot shall not be violated. A voter shall not be answerable, publicly or
privately, for the choice he has made.
Article 12 – Rights of Petition
Every person shall have the right of peaceful petition for the redress of grievances, for
the removal of public officials, for the enactment, repeal or amendment of laws, and for
other matters; nor shall any person be in any way discriminated against for sponsoring
such a petition.
Article 13 – Right to Sue for Redress
Every person may sue for redress as provided by law from the State or a public entity, in
case he has suffered damage through illegal act of any public official.
Article 14 – Freedom from Slavery
No person shall be held in bondage or slavery of any kind. Involuntary servitude, except
as punishment for crime, is prohibited.
Article 15 – Freedom from Arbitrary Conscription
1. In times of peace, no person shall be conscripted or impressed into the Armed Forces.
2. In the event of a major war, or imminent threat of invasion, or other such emergency,
conscription into the Armed Forces may be imposed by an Act of Parliament passed by a
two-thirds majority vote in both Houses; provided, that conscientious objection be allowed.
Article 16 – Freedom of Thought and Conscience
Freedom of thought and conscience shall not be violated.
Article 17 – Freedom of Religion
1. Freedom of religious belief, worship and practice is guaranteed to all, provided this
liberty is not abused to disturb public order, defraud others, or commit acts of violence.
2. No person shall ever be compelled to take part in any religious act, celebration, rite or
practice, nor suffer any discrimination of the basis of his or her religion, or lack thereof.
3. There shall be no established Church: the position of the King (or Queen) as Supreme
Governor of the Church of England, and all Crown rights in relation to church livings and
administration, shall cease. Church Measures need no longer be approved by Parliament.
4. No religious organization shall receive any privileges from the State, and no public
money shall be appropriated for the use, benefit or maintenance of any religious body.
Article 18 – Freedom of Assembly and Association
The right of the people to peacefully assemble, whether in public or in private, and to
freely associate for any lawful purpose, shall not be infringed.
Article 19 – Freedom of Expression and Communication
1. Freedom of speech, the press, and all other forms of expression, are guaranteed, so
long as this liberty is not abused to cause a breach of the peace or to provoke violence.
2. No censorship shall be maintained, except for such laws as may be required to prevent
the public display, or the exposure to minors, of obscene, violent or disturbing materials.
3. The secrecy of any means of private or personal communication shall not be violated.
Article 20 – Freedom of Movement
1. Every person shall have freedom of movement, and the right to leave and return to the
United Kingdom at will, without having to give account of their actions.
2. Freedom of all persons to move to a foreign country and to divest themselves of their
nationality shall be inviolate.
3. The rights guaranteed by this Article may be suspended by a lawful order of a Court in
the case of persons who are released on bail or parole, or who are subject to a Restraining
Order or an Anti-Social Behaviour Order, or who are subject to a criminal investigation.
Article 21 – Academic Freedom
1. The freedom of academic teaching and research shall not be infringed.
2. Public universities shall be autonomous and independent of the State.
Article 22 – Marriage Rights
1. Marriage shall be based only on the mutual consent of both sexes and it shall be
maintained by mutual cooperation with the equal rights of husband and wife as a basis.
2. With regard to choice of spouse, property rights, inheritance, choice of domicile,
divorce and other matters pertaining to marriage and the family, laws shall be enacted
from the standpoint of individual dignity and the essential equality of the two sexes.
3. Homosexual couples shall have the same marriage rights as heterosexuals.
Article 23 – Education Rights
1. All people shall have the right to receive an education correspondent to their ability.
2. All people shall be obligated to have all boys and girls under their protection receive
adequate education as provided for by law; but this shall not prohibit home schooling.
Article 24 – Working Rights
1. All people shall have the right and the obligation to work.
2. Standards for wages, hours, rest and other working conditions may be fixed by law.
3. The right of workers to organize and to bargain and act collectively is guaranteed.
Article 25 – Property Rights
1. The right to own or to hold property is inviolable.
2. Property rights shall be defined by law, in conformity with the public welfare.
3. Private property may be taken for public use only on payment of just compensation.
Article 26 – Due Process
1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, nor shall any other criminal
penalty be imposed, except according to procedure established by law.
2. No person shall be denied the right of access to the courts.
Article 27 – Freedom from Arbitrary Arrest and Detention
1. Except if apprehended in flagrante delicto, no person shall be arrested other than on
the authority of a warrant, issued on probable cause by a competent judicial officer.
2. No person shall be detained without due cause and lawful authority, nor shall anyone
be arrested or detained without being at once informed of the charges against him or her.
3. No person shall be held incommunicado: a person who is arrested or detained shall
have immediate privilege of counsel and the right to inform their next of kin, or other
close relative or friend, of their arrest or detention, and of the charges against them.
Article 28 – Freedom from Arbitrary Search and Seizure
1. The right of all persons to be secure in their homes, papers and effects against entries,
searches and seizures shall not be impaired except upon warrant issued for adequate
cause and particularly describing the place to be searched and things to be seized.
2. General warrants shall not be issued: each search or seizure shall be made upon
separate warrant issued by a competent judicial officer.
3. The application of this Article to ports and airports, and other points of entry to the
United Kingdom, may be restricted by law in the interests of public safety.
Article 29 – Prohibition of Torture and Death Penalty
1. The infliction of torture, the death penalty, and cruel punishments are forbidden.
2. No citizen may be extradited or removed to any jurisdiction in which they may be
subjected to torture, the death penalty, or cruel punishments.
Article 30 – Right to a Fair Trial
1. In all criminal cases the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and fair trial by an
impartial tribunal.
2. The accused shall be permitted full opportunity to examine all witnesses, and shall
have the right of compulsory process for obtaining witnesses on his or her behalf.
3. At all times the accused shall have the assistance of competent legal counsel.
4. If the accused is unable to provide competent legal counsel, such counsel shall be
assigned to him or her by the Court at public expense.
Article 31 – Trial by Jury
The right to trial by jury, as it was enjoyed in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern
Ireland immediately before the ratification of this Constitution, shall be preserved; and no
Act of Parliament or other law may abolish or restrict this right.
Article 32 – Public Trials
1. All civil and criminal trials shall be conducted and judgment declared publicly.
2. Where a court unanimously determines publicity to be dangerous to public order or to
the interests of justice, a trial may be conducted privately; provided, that trials of political
offences, or cases wherein the constitutional rights of people are in question, shall always
be conducted in public.
Article 33 – No Self-Incrimination
1. No person shall be compelled to testify against himself or herself.
2. Confession made under compulsion, torture or threat, or after prolonged arrest or
detention shall not be admitted in evidence.
3. No person shall be convicted or punished in cases where the only proof is his or her
own confession.
Article 34 – No Retro-Active Laws or Double Jeopardy
No person shall be held criminally liable for an act which was lawful at the time it was
committed, or of which he has been acquitted, nor shall he be placed in double jeopardy.
Article 35 – Additional Rights under European Law
The rights and freedoms contained in this Chapter are additional to, and not destructive
of, any further rights and freedoms guaranteed by the European Convention on Human
Rights (1950) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000).
Article 36 – Civic Duties
1. Each citizen of the United Kingdom shall have a moral duty to treat all people with due
respect, courtesy, tolerance and compassion, to respect the fundamental principles of
parliamentary democracy and the rule of law, to defend the Constitution and the laws,
and resist those who attempt to violate the Constitution through force or fraud, and to
participate in public life through elections, referendums, and any other lawful means.
2. These duties shall not be legally enforceable, but may be encouraged by the State.
Article 37 – State of Emergency
1. A State of Emergency may be declared by the Cabinet in the event of a major war,
invasion, terrorist attack, disaster, violent unrest, or other emergency, which threatens
the peace and safety of the United Kingdom and its people.
2. A State of Emergency shall not last for more than seven days unless Parliament, by a
two-thirds majority vote in both Houses, decides to prolong the State of Emergency for a
stated period of up to ninety days; any further extension time shall require another vote
of both Houses. Parliament shall meet continuously during the State of Emergency.
3. During a State of Emergency the Cabinet may issue any Orders, having the force of
law, necessary for the peace and safety of the United Kingdom and its people. Orders
may, exclusively, suspend the application of Articles 18, 19, 20, 27, 28 and 31 of this
Constitution. The other Articles of the Constitution shall not be suspended or limited.
4. Orders issued under Section (3) must not be more restrictive than is necessary in a
free society for the protection of the public; they shall be subject to judicial review, and
shall cease to have effect immediately upon the termination of the State of Emergency.
CHAPTER FOUR – THE PARLIAMENT
Article 38 – Role of Parliament
1. Parliament shall be the federal legislative, representative and deliberative assembly.
2. Parliament shall have the authority to enact, amend and repeal all laws for the peace,
order and good government, of the United Kingdom, with respect to the following matters:
(i) Succession to the Crown.
(ii) Foreign affairs; relations with the Commonwealth and European Union.
(iii) Defence and security, and the military and naval forces of the Kingdom.
(iv) Nationality and citizenship laws.
(v) Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories.
(vi) Trade and commerce with other countries, and among the Regions.
(vii) Postal, telephonic, internet, and other like services.
(viii) Lighthouses, lightships, beacons and buoys.
(ix) Astronomical and meteorological observations.
(x) Quarantine, immigration, and border security.
(xi) Currency, coinage, and legal tender; bills of exchange and promissory notes.
(xii) Banking, the incorporation of banks, and the issue of paper money.
(xiii) Weights and measures.
(xiv) Bankruptcy and insolvency.
(xv) Copyrights, patents of inventions and designs, and trade marks.
(xvi) Foreign corporations, and trading or financial corporations formed within
the limits of the United Kingdom, within the limits of European Law.
(xvii) Air traffic control and associated services.
(xviii) Space exploration, and support to scientific research.
(xix) Aid to Regional authorities for the purposes of disaster relief.
(xx) The acquisition of property on just terms from person for any purpose in
respect of which the Parliament has power to make laws.
(xxi) All other matters incidental to the execution of any power vested by this
Constitution in the Parliament or in either House thereof, or in the Cabinet of the
United Kingdom, or in any department or officer of the United Kingdom.
3. Parliament shall have the authority to enact, amend and repeal all laws for the peace,
order and good government of England and Wales, with respect to the following matters:
(i) Civil law and procedure.
(ii) Criminal law and procedure.
(iii) Census and statistics.
(iv) Employment law, trade union legislation, and conciliation and arbitration for
the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes.
(v) Marriage, divorce and matrimonial causes; parental rights, and the custody
and guardianship of infants; abortion and reproductive rights.
(vi) The provision of maternity allowances, widows' pensions, child endowments,
unemployment, pharmaceutical, sickness and hospital benefits, family allowances,
and invalid and old-age pensions.
(vii) University and higher and further education.
4. Parliament shall have the authority to enact, amend and repeal all laws for the peace,
order and good government of Northern Ireland, with respect to the following matters:
(i) The protection of religious or cultural minorities in Northern Ireland.
(ii) Cross-border institutions relating to the Republic of Ireland.
(iii) Ensuring the impartiality and effectiveness of internal security and police
forces in Northern Ireland.
5. Parliament shall determine:
(i) Direct and indirect taxes in England and Wales for federal purposes.
(ii) Financial contributions from Scotland and Northern Ireland for federal
purposes, leaving the levying of taxes and duties to the Regional Assemblies.
(iii) The borrowing of money on the public credit of the United Kingdom.
6. Parliament, upon an application from one or more Regional Assemblies, may exercise
legislative and fiscal power, with the co-operation and consent of the Regions concerned,
in relation to:
(i) Transport between and amongst the Regions.
(ii) The development of transport infrastructure and essential services.
(iii) The generation and distribution of energy from renewable sources.
7. All powers not herein granted to Parliament shall be reserved to the several Regions.
Article 39 – House of Commons and Senate
Parliament shall consist of two Houses, namely the House of Commons and the Senate.
Article 40 – Composition of the House of Commons
1. The House of Commons shall consist of four hundred members: two-hundred members
shall be chosen by the people in single-member constituencies; the rest shall be chosen by
the people from regional electoral lists. Voters shall have two votes in each election: one
for the regional party list of their choice, one for the constituency member of their choice.
2. The boundaries of single-member constituencies shall be determined by law, on the
advice of an independent and non-partisan boundaries commission to be created by law.
3. As a general principle, each constituency should contain an equal number of electors.
4. The total number of members to be elected from each region should be proportional to
the population of that region, as a share of the overall UK population, at the latest census.
5. The total number of seats to be awarded to each party shall be determined by the
number of list votes received, calculated on a regional basis, using the D’Hondt formula.
6. If the number of seats to which a party is entitled, based on its share of the regional
list vote in any Region, is greater than proportion of the seats won by the individual
candidates of that party in the Region, then a number of additional members shall be
selected from the regional list of that party so as to produce a proportional result.
7. If a party wins more constituency seats in a region that the total number of seats to
which its share of the regional vote would entitle it, it shall retain the additional
constituency seats; the House may, as a result, temporarily exceed 400 members.
8. Provided, that no party shall participate in the distribution of list seats in any Region
unless that party receives at least 5% of the regional list votes in that Region, or wins at
least two constituency seats in that Region.
9. At any election, a person may stand as a candidate for a Region and any constituency
simultaneously, provided that they are resident in the constituency for which they stand,
but no person may stand simultaneously as a candidate for more than one political party.
Article 41 – Composition of the Senate
1. The Senate shall consist of members indirectly elected by the Regional Assemblies, by
secret ballot and by Single Transferable Vote: the Scottish Parliament shall elect twenty
Senators, the Welsh and Northern Irish Assemblies shall each elect twelve Senators, and
the English Regional assemblies shall each elect six.
2. In addition to the elected Senators, a number of Appointed Senators, not exceeding
one-fifth of the total membership of the Senate, may be appointed on merit by the Cabinet
in recognition of their service to the United Kingdom in high political, administrative,
diplomatic, military, or judicial office, or other outstanding contributions to public life.
Article 42 – Qualifications of Members
An enfranchised citizen who is at least twenty-five years old may be elected to the House
of Commons or Senate; but no person who holds an executive, administrative, diplomatic,
military or judicial office (other than a Ministerial Office) may be elected to either House
unless they give up that office. No-one may be a member of both Houses simultaneously.
Article 43 – Terms of Office of the House of Commons
1. The term of office for the House of Commons shall be four years. However, the House
of Commons may be prematurely dissolved by the King (or Queen), acting on the advice of
the Speaker, if a new Prime Minister cannot be appointed within thirty days following a
general election, or after the death, removal, or resignation, of the former Prime Minister.
2. The House of Commons may also be prematurely dissolved by the King (or Queen), on
the discretionary advice of the Speaker, if a two-thirds majority of members request a
dissolution in order to resolve a political crisis, or to restore credibility to the House of
Commons. This procedure shall not, however, be applied in two successive Parliaments.
Article 44 – Terms of Office of the Senate
1. The term of office for elected Senators shall be eight years. The election of half the
members from each Region shall take place quadrennially, following regional elections.
2. Appointed Senators shall serve for life, or until retirement at the age of seventy-five.
Article 45 – Payment of Members
Members of both Houses shall receive appropriate payments and allowances from the
treasury in accordance with the law. No increase in payments or allowances may exceed
the baseline annual rate of inflation, unless such increase is authorised by a referendum.
Article 46 – Privileges of Members
1. Except in cases provided by law, members of both Houses shall be exempt from arrest
while Parliament is in session, and any members apprehended before the opening of the
session shall be freed during the term of the session upon the demand of their House.
2. Members of Parliament shall not be held liable outside their House for any speeches,
debates or votes cast inside the House.
Article 47 – Sessions of Parliament
An ordinary session of Parliament shall be convoked once per year. The Cabinet may
determine to convoke extraordinary sessions of Parliament. When a quarter or more of
the total members of either House makes the demand, the Parliament must be convoked.
Article 48 – Effect of Dissolutions
1. When the House of Commons is dissolved, there must be a general election of members
of the House of Commons within forty (40) days from the date of dissolution, and the new
Parliament must be convoked within thirty (30) days from the date of the election.
2. Whenever the House of Commons is dissolved, the Senate shall not sit. However, the
Cabinet may in time of national emergency convoke the Senate in an emergency session.
Measures taken at such session shall be provisional and shall become null and void unless
agreed to by the House of Commons within a period of ten (10) days after the opening of
the next session of Parliament.
Article 49 – Disputed Elections
Each House shall judge any disputes related to the qualifications and election of its
members. However, in order to deny a seat to any member, it is necessary to pass a
resolution by a majority of two-thirds or more of the members present.
Article 50 – Quorum and Majorities
1. Business cannot be transacted in either House unless one-third or more of total
membership is present.
2. All matters shall be decided, in each House, by a majority of those present, except as
elsewhere provided in the Constitution, and in case of a tie, the Presiding Officer shall
decide the issue.
Article 51 – Deliberations and Record-Keeping
1. Deliberation in each House shall be public. However, a secret meeting may be held
where a majority of two-thirds or more of those members present passes a resolution
therefor, for the discussion of matters of national security in times of war or crisis.
2. Each House shall keep a record of proceedings; on demand of one-fifth or more of the
members present, votes of the members on any matter shall be recorded in the minutes.
Article 52 – Election of Presiding Officers, Rules of Procedure, Parliamentary Bureau
1. Each House shall, after each general election, elect its own Presiding Officer and other
officials by secret ballot: the Presiding Officer of the House of Commons shall be known as
the Speaker, and that of the Senate shall be known as the President of the Senate.
2. Each House shall establish its rules pertaining to meetings, proceedings and internal
discipline, and may punish members for disorderly conduct. However, in order to expel a
member, a majority of two-thirds or more of the members present must give their assent.
3. The legislative programme and order of business of Parliament shall be arranged by a
Parliamentary Bureau, which shall consist of (i) the Speaker of the House of Commons;
(ii) The President of the Senate; (iii) two members elected by each party caucus which
has at least eighty members of the House of Commons; and (iv) one member elected by
each party caucus or non-affiliated group which has at least ten members of that House.
4. In allocating times, the Parliamentary Bureau shall give precedence to the proposals of
the Cabinet; but at least one fourth of the legislative time during each session must be
reserved for Private Members’ and Opposition Bills. Any balance of time outstanding
from the Cabinet allocation may be devoted to Private Members’ and Opposition Bills.
Article 53 – Passage of Bills
1. Money bills must be introduced in the House of Commons. Bills concerning regional
bodies must be introduced in the Senate. Other bills may be introduced in either House.
2. Except as otherwise provided by this Constitution, a bill shall be deemed to have been
passed by Parliament if approved by a simple majority vote in both Houses of Parliament.
3. A bill which is passed by the House of Commons, and upon which the Senate makes a
decision different from that of the House of Commons, shall be adopted when passed for a
second time by the House of Commons by a majority of two-thirds or more of its members.
4. A bill which is returned to the House of Commons under Section 3 of this Article, but
which is not passed for a second time by a two-thirds majority of the members of the
House of Commons, may be put to a referendum by a simple majority vote in the House of
Commons; and if approved by a majority of votes cast in the referendum, shall be passed.
5. Upon consideration of the budget, when the Senate makes a decision different from
that of the House of Commons, and when no agreement can be reached even through a
joint committee of both Houses, or in the case of failure by the Senate to take final action
within thirty (30) days, any period of recess excluded, after receipt of the budget passed
by the House of Commons, the Commons may adopt the budget by a simple majority vote.
Article 54 – Royal Assent
1. Every bill passed by Parliament as aforesaid shall be submitted for Royal Assent.
2. The King (or Queen) shall grant Assent to all bills so presented within ten (10) days.
3. Nevertheless, if the King (or Queen) has any doubt as to the constitutionality of a bill,
he or she may refer the bill to the Supreme Court for advice. If the Supreme Court rules
that bill appears to be in accordance with the Constitution, then the King (or Queen) shall
grant Assent without delay; if not, the King (or Queen) shall return the bill to Parliament.
4. The King (or Queen) shall be obliged to refer a bill to the Supreme Court for advice on
its constitutionality if so requested by one-third of the members of either House, or, in so
far much as it relates to the powers of a Regional Assembly, by the Premier of the Region.
5. If the bill is again passed by Parliament, by a two-thirds majority vote in both Houses,
with or without amendments, the King (or Queen) must grant Royal Assent immediately.
6. Nothing in this Article shall prevent the subsequent judicial review of a resulting law.
Article 55 – Powers of Investigation
Each House, and its committees, may conduct investigations in relation to government,
and may demand the presence and testimony of witnesses, and the production of records.
Article 56 – Presence of Ministers
The Prime Minister and other Ministers of State may, at any time, appear in either House
for the purpose of speaking on bills, regardless of whether they are members of the House
or not. They must appear when their presence is required in order to give explanations.
Article 57 – Supervision of European Affairs
1. Unless otherwise determined by a referendum, the United Kingdom shall be a member
of the European Union, and shall recognise all rights and obligations of such membership.
2. Delegated legislation arising from membership of the European Union shall be subject
to scrutiny by a European Affairs Committee, consisting of an equal number of members
of each House. The European Affairs Committee may suspend any delegated legislation,
pending debate and approval of the delegated legislation by a resolution of both Houses.
3. The Cabinet must obtain the advice and approval of the European Affairs Committee
before making binding commitments in the European Council or other EU institutions.
CHAPTER FIVE – THE CABINET
Article 58 – Executive Power
Executive power of the United Kingdom shall be vested in the Cabinet.
Article 59 – Composition of the Cabinet
1. The Cabinet shall consist of the Prime Minister, who shall be its head, and other
Ministers of State, as provided for by law.
2. The Prime Minister shall be designated from amongst the members of the House of
Commons by a resolution of that House. This designation shall precede all other business.
3. The Prime Minister shall appoint the Ministers of State. A majority of their number
must be chosen from amongst the members of the House of Commons or Senate; the
remainder may be appointed from outside Parliament according to their qualifications.
4. No member of the Armed Forces, or person in Holy Orders, may be a Cabinet member.
5. The Prime Minister may remove the Ministers of State as he or she chooses, but shall
be required to remove a Minister within ten (10) days, whenever petitioned to do so by a
majority of the members of the House of Commons.
Article 60 – Responsibility to the House of Commons
1. The Cabinet shall be collectively responsible to the House of Commons.
2. If the House of Commons passes a resolution of “no-confidence” in the Cabinet, by an
absolute majority vote of all members of that House, the Cabinet shall collectively resign.
3. A resolution of “no-confidence” in the Cabinet must specify the name of a person to be
designated as the Prime Minster, who, if the resolution is passed, shall then be appointed.
Article 61 – Resignation on Vacancy of Prime Minister
Whenever there is a vacancy in the post of Prime Minister, and on the first convocation
of Parliament after a general election, the Cabinet shall collectively resign; but it shall
nevertheless continue to exercise its functions until a new Prime Minister is appointed.
Article 62 – Decision-Making in Cabinet
1. The Prime Minister presides over the Cabinet and exercises control and supervision
over the Ministries and administrative agencies so as to enforce the Cabinet’s decisions.
2. Orders, writs, grants, commissions, letters-patent, regulations, and other instruments,
shall be signed by the competent Minister and then countersigned by the Prime Minister.
3. Policies and decisions of the Cabinet, for which the Cabinet is collectively responsible,
shall be subject to a full debate and vote in the Cabinet before being adopted and put into
effect; and any member of the Cabinet who disagrees with the decision of the majority of
the Cabinet may enter his or her reasons for dissent upon the minutes of the Cabinet, but
must then either be reconciled to the majority’s decision, or submit his or her resignation.
Article 63 – Public Administration
The Cabinet shall administer the law faithfully, conduct affairs of state, administer the
civil service in accordance with standards established by law, prepare the budget and
present it to Parliament, and enact cabinet orders to execute the Constitution and laws.
Article 64 – Military Affairs
The Cabinet shall direct the Armed Forces, and shall administer the Armed Forces in the
manner prescribed by law; but no war may be declared, nor any Armed Forces deployed
outside of the United Kingdom on active service, except with the consent of both Houses.
Article 65 – Foreign Affairs
The Cabinet shall manage foreign affairs and negotiate treaties. However, all treaties and
international agreements must be approved by both Houses of Parliament before coming
into effect; and treaties or agreements which delegate governing powers to other States,
the European Union, or other international agencies, must be approved by a referendum.
CHAPTER SIX – JUDICIARY
Article 66 – Judicial Power
1. The whole judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as
are established by law.
2. No extraordinary tribunal shall be established, nor shall any organ or agency of the
executive be given final judicial power.
Article 67 – Supreme Court
1. The Supreme Court is the court of final appeal with the power to determine the
constitutionality of any Act of Parliament, order, regulation, or other official act.
2. The Privy Council is abolished: all matters which, immediately prior to the ratification
of this Constitution, would have been under the jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council, shall be transferred to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
3. Except as otherwise provided by law, the Supreme Court is vested with the rulemaking power under which it determines the rules of procedure and of court practice.
Article 68 – Judicial Council
1. There shall be a Judicial Council to ensure the independence of the judiciary.
2. The Judicial Council shall consist of twelve members: the Minister of Justice of the
United Kingdom (as President of the Council), three legally-qualified members elected by
the judiciary in the manner to be prescribed by law, and eight other members elected for
a six-year term, on a non-partisan basis, by a joint session of both Houses of Parliament.
3. The Judicial Council shall be responsible for the recruitment and training of judges,
and for their discipline and payment, in accordance with the Constitution and the law.
4. The Judicial Council shall also advise the King (or Queen) on the granting of general
amnesties, pardons, and reprieves, in accordance with the laws governing this power.
Article 69 – Appointment of Supreme Court Justices
1. The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and such number of Justices as may
be determined by law.
2. The Chief Justice and Justices of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the King (or
Queen), acting on the advice of the Judicial Council.
Article 70 – Appointment and Tenure of Other Judges
1. The judges of the inferior courts shall be appointed by the Prime Minister from a list of
persons nominated by the Judicial Council, except for judges in Scotland who shall be
appointed by the First Minister of Scotland in consultation with the Judicial Council.
2. All appellate judges shall hold office for life, or until retirement as provided by law.
3. Other inferior judges shall hold office for a term of ten (10) years, with privilege of
automatic reappointment for successive terms based on continued satisfactory conduct.
Article 71 – Judicial Independence
1. All judges shall be independent in the exercise of their conscience and shall be bound
only by this Constitution and the laws.
2. All members of the judiciary shall receive adequate compensation which shall be
determined by law, on the advice of the Judicial Council, and shall not be decreased
during their terms of office.
Article 72 – Premature Removal of Judges
1. Judges shall not be prematurely removed from office except by public impeachment in
Parliament (or in the Scottish Parliament if they are judges in Scotland), on the grounds
of incompetence, incapacity, neglect of duty, bribery, or corruption. The impeachment is
to be moved by a majority resolution of the House of Commons, and tried by the Senate.
2. The Judicial Council may suspend any member of the judiciary, on full pay, pending
the outcome of their impeachment trial; and if not impeached, they shall be re-instated.
Article 73 – Retirement of Judges
Justices of the Supreme Court and judges of all inferior Courts shall be retired upon the
attainment of the retirement age as fixed by law.
Article 74 – Special Provisions with Relation to Scotland
1. The position of the Court of Session and High Court of Justiciary in Scotland shall not
be infringed, nor shall the powers or jurisdiction of Scottish Courts be altered, except by
regional legislation (i.e. by an Act of the Scottish Parliament).
2. At least one-third of the Justices of the Supreme Court shall be trained in Scots law.
CHAPTER SEVEN – REGIONAL GOVERNMENT
Article 75 – Regional Authorities
1. Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, as well as the Regions of England, shall possess
autonomous legislative, executive and fiscal powers, acting through an elected Regional
Assembly and a Regional Executive, in accordance with the terms of this Constitution:
(i) The Regional Assembly for Scotland shall be the Scottish Parliament, as
created by the Scotland Act, 1998.
(ii) The Regional Assembly for Wales shall be the Welsh National Assembly, as
created by the Government of Wales Acts, 1998 and 2006.
(iii) The Regional Assembly for Northern Ireland shall be the Northern Ireland
Assembly, as created by the Northern Ireland Act, 1998.
(iv) The Regional Assembly for Greater London shall be the London Assembly, as
created by the Greater London Authority Act, 1999.
(v) The Regional Assemblies for all other Regions of England shall be created by
Acts of Parliament, to be passed within six months after ratification of this
Constitution. Each such Assembly shall consist of not less than fifty and not
more than one hundred members, chosen by the people, by the Mixed Member
Proportional system, for a four-year term.
2. The Regional institutions established under the aforesaid laws shall not be limited,
restricted or abolished by any subsequent Acts of Parliament, nor shall the provisions of
any Act relating to the establishment or operation any Regional Assembly be amended or
repealed, but on the proposal of, or with the consent of, the Regional Assembly concerned.
3. Each Regional Assembly (except for the Greater London Assembly) shall operate as a
parliamentary system. The Assembly shall nominate one of its members as First Minister
or Premier, who shall be formally appointed by the King (or Queen), to lead the regional
executive; the First Minister or Premier shall be responsible to the Regional Assembly.
Article 76 – Regional Powers
Without prejudice to the generality of the regional powers under Section 7 of Article 38,
Regional Assemblies shall have particular legislative powers with regard to the following:
(i) Municipal, County, Borough, Burgh, and other local government in the Region.
(ii) Education at pre-primary, primary, and secondary levels.
(iii) Health care, hospitals, hospices, primary care trusts, and associated services.
(iv) Transport, infrastructure and sustainable development within the Region.
(v) Culture, heritage, nature reserves, and parks, and sport and leisure services.
(vi) Agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and related matters.
(vii) Minority languages, including the promotion of Welsh, Gaelic and Scots.
(viii) The raising of money for regional purposes through taxation and charges.
(ix) Environmental protection, water supply, and renewable energy generation.
Article 77 – Independence Referendums
1. Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, shall each have the authority to declare their
independence from the United Kingdom; this shall be initiated by means of a resolution
passed by an absolute majority vote of their respective Regional Assemblies, and then
confirmed by a majority of the votes cast in a referendum held in the country concerned.
2. Following a vote in favour of independence in Scotland, Wales, or Northern Ireland, a
commission shall be appointed by the Regional Assembly concerned to negotiate terms
with the United Kingdom Government and to draft a Constitution for the independent
country: on approval of such terms, and such Constitution, in a referendum in that
country, by a simple majority of the votes cast, independence shall come into effect.
3. Except for adjustments to the composition of the Senate and such consequential
amendments as may be required, the independence of any country shall not affect the
content or continuing validity of this Constitution in other parts of the United Kingdom.
CHAPTER EIGHT – PUBLIC FINANCE
Article 78 – Imposition of Taxes
No new taxes shall be imposed, nor existing taxes increased, except as authorised by an
Act of Parliament, or by an Act of a Regional Assembly acting within its legal powers.
Article 79 – Expenditure of Funds
No money shall be expended, nor shall the State obligate itself to any debts, except as
authorized by Parliament, or by a Regional Assembly acting within its legal powers.
Article 80 – Annual Budgets
The Cabinet shall prepare and submit to Parliament for its consideration and decision a
budget for each fiscal year. Regional Executives shall do likewise for Regional budgets.
Article 81 – Discretionary Spending
1. In order to provide for unforeseen deficiencies in the budget, a Reserve Fund may be
authorized by Act of Parliament, or by an Act of the Regional Assembly, to be expended
upon the responsibility of the Cabinet, or Regional Executive, as circumstances require.
2. The Cabinet or Regional Executive must get subsequent approval of the Parliament or
Regional Assembly, as the case may be, for all payments made from the Reserve Fund.
Article 82 – Auditing and Submission of Accounts
The final accounts of public expenditures and revenues shall be audited by the National
Audit Office, and submitted to Parliament or the appropriate Regional Assembly, together
with the statement of audit, during the fiscal year immediately after the period covered.
CHAPTER NINE – DEMOCRATIC INTEGRITY
Article 83 – Electoral Commission
1. There shall be an independent and non-partisan Electoral Commission to ensure the
free and fair conduct of elections and referenda.
2. The Chairman of the Electoral Commission shall be appointed by the Supreme Court.
3. The other members of the Commission shall be elected by the Senate, by secret ballot
and proportional representation.
4. The members of the Electoral Commission must not be members of Parliament, nor of
any Regional Assembly, nor of any political party; and they shall serve for terms of five
(5) years, enjoying the same guarantees granted to judges under Articles 71 and 72.
Article 84 – British Broadcasting Corporation
1. British Broadcasting Corporation shall be an independent and non-partisan public
service broadcasting agency.
2. It shall be governed by a Board of Governors, who shall be chosen on merit by the
Senate, for renewable ten (10) year terms, and shall enjoy the guarantees granted to
judges under Articles 71 and 72.
3. This shall not prevent Regions from establishing their own public broadcasting
corporations, provided that such corporations are independent and non-partisan.
Article 85 - Ombudsman
1. There shall be an Ombudsman to investigate and rectify public complaints against the
administration, made on the grounds of incompetence, delay, arbitrariness, negligence, or
other maladministration, as provided by law.
2. The Ombudsman shall be appointed by a joint ballot of both Houses of Parliament, on
the nomination of the Speaker of the House of Commons and President of the Senate.
3. The Ombudsman shall serve for a term of five (5) years, and shall enjoy all the
guarantees granted to judges under Articles 71 and 72.
4. Provision shall be made for the establishment of Ombudsmen at Regional level, who
shall have authority as provided by law with respect to Regional and local public bodies.
Article 86 – Principles of Public Life
1. The principles of Selflessness, Integrity, Objectivity, Accountability, Openness,
Honesty, and Leadership, as specified in the Nolan (Standards in Public Life) Report,
1995, shall be morally binding on all persons in public life.
2. All public officials and elected representatives shall be instructed in these principles,
3. Any public official or elected representative who is found to have acted against these
principles shall be expected to resign.
Article 87 - Referendums
1. Binding referendums shall be held in accordance with Articles 45, 53, 65, 77 and 91.
2. Parliament, or Regional or local authorities, may also conduct referendums on any
other matter within their competence; these referendums shall not be legally binding.
3. The wording of any question to be put to a referendum must be approved by the
Electoral Commission to ensure that its is accurate, unbiased and unambiguous.
Article 88 – Freedom of Information
1. The people shall have a general right of access to all information concerning matters
of government, administration and public policy.
2. Public bodies shall have a duty to publish such information, or to provide it on request,
free of charge, and within a reasonable time.
3. Specific exceptions to the above rules may be applied by Act of Parliament in the case
of matters concerning national security or personal privacy – unless it is shown before a
court that the release of such information is, despite the exception, in the public interest.
CHAPTER TEN – MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Article 89 – Anthems and Symbols
1. The anthem of the United Kingdom shall be “Rule Britannia”. Each English Region,
Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland may each adopt their own anthems by Regional law.
2. The royal anthem, “God Save the Queen”, may also be used, in addition to the anthem
of the United Kingdom, or a Regional anthem, when the King (or Queen) is in attendance.
3. The flag of the United Kingdom shall be the Union Flag. Scotland, Wales, Northern
Ireland, and each region of England, shall have the authority to adopt its own flag by
regional law.
Article 90 – Abolition of Sinecures and Peerages
1. Sinecures and ceremonial offices, and all archaic titles and practices, shall be
abolished. Any meaningful functions belonging to such abolished offices shall be
transferred to elected representatives or other public officers as provided by law.
2. Titles of nobility shall not be granted or recognized. No special privileges shall
accompany the award of a public honour, nor shall any such honour be hereditary.
Article 91 – Constitutional Amendments
1. Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by Parliament, by means of an
Amendment Act passed by a two-thirds majority vote in both Houses. Section (3) and (4)
of Article 53 shall not apply to Amendment Acts: the Senate shall have an absolute veto.
2. No Amendment Act effecting Chapter Seven shall be passed without the prior consent
of the Regional Assemblies to be affected by the Amendment.
3. The Amendment Act shall, of necessity, be submitted to the people for ratification. If
approved by an absolute majority of those voting in the referendum, it shall be ratified.
4. Amendments when duly ratified shall be promulgated by the King (or Queen), on the
advice of the Cabinet, in the name of the people. An integrated text of the Constitution
incorporating amendments shall then be published.
Article 92 – Transitional Provisions
1. This Constitution shall be put to the people of the United Kingdom in a referendum and
shall come into force within twenty-eight days after being approved by a simple majority.
2. There shall be a six-month transitional period, from the date of its coming into force,
during which the sitting Parliament shall enact all laws necessary for the implementation
of this Constitution, including, but not limited to, laws for the establishment of English
Regional Assemblies and an electoral law for the House of Commons and for the Senate.
3. If the Regional Assemblies are not constituted before the end of the said transitional
period, or if an electoral law for the House of Commons, or Senate, is not enacted, then
the Cabinet shall have the authority, with the approval of the Supreme Court, to make
such laws, which shall be valid and binding until amended in due course by Parliament.
4. The sitting Houses of Parliament at the time of the approval of this Constitution by the
people shall continue to sit, without being dissolved or prorogued, until the new electoral
laws are in effect. The House of Commons shall then be dissolved, and a new House of
Commons shall be elected. The House of Lords shall continue, with the powers of the
Senate under this Constitution, until all Regional Assemblies have been elected; then the
House of Lords shall be abolished, and the first Senators elected under this Constitution.
5. The Ministers, members of the House of Commons, and judges in office on the date of
the coming into effect of this Constitution, and other public officials who occupy positions
corresponding to such positions as are recognized by this Constitution, shall not forfeit
their positions automatically on account of the enforcement of this Constitution unless
otherwise specified by law. However, they shall forfeit their positions in due course,
when their successors are elected or appointed under the terms of this Constitution.