Topic A:
Chechnya’s struggle for independence and its impact on Russia
Topic B:
The rights of self-determination in Kashmir
Table of Contents
Introduction to the Committee ........................................................................................................ 2
Introduction to the Committee Director .......................................................................................... 3
Introduction to the Assistant Committee Director ........................................................................... 4
Tips for Preparation ....................................................................................................................... 5
Country Preparation ....................................................................................................................... 5
Chechnya’s struggle for independence and its impact on Russia .................................................. 6
Background ................................................................................................................................... 6
Chechnya Conflict - The Bone of contention .................................................................................. 7
Chechnya: Things You Need to Know ........................................................................................... 7
Chechnya and the disintegration of the USSR ................................................................................ 8
Chechnya Conflict in the Contemporary Era .................................................................................. 9
Chechnya Conflict and the Rest of the World ............................................................................... 11
Possible BLOC positions: ............................................................................................................ 12
Questions to be considered by the Committee: ............................................................................. 12
Background Sources .................................................................................................................... 12
The rights of self-determination in Kashmir ................................................................................ 13
Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 13
Proposed options for resolution of dispute.................................................................................... 16
UN Resolutions: The Plebiscite Option .................................................................................... 16
The UN Trusteeship Option ..................................................................................................... 17
The Partition Option ................................................................................................................ 17
The Independence Option ........................................................................................................ 17
The Irish Model ....................................................................................................................... 18
Past United Nations Actions / International Involvement.............................................................. 18
Bloc Positions.............................................................................................................................. 18
African Bloc ............................................................................................................................ 18
Asian Bloc ............................................................................................................................... 18
Latin American Bloc ................................................................................................................ 19
Middle-Eastern Bloc ................................................................................................................ 19
European Bloc ......................................................................................................................... 19
Western Bloc ........................................................................................................................... 19
Key Questions: ............................................................................................................................ 19
Bibliography................................................................................................................................ 20
1
Introduction to the Committee
The 4th Main Committee of the General Assembly (Special Political and Decolonization
Committee) deals with a variety of political subjects not dealt with by the First Committee, as
well as with decolonization. The committee came into being in its present recognizable form
in 1993.
Its origins can, however, be traced to the Special Political Committee that was formed as an
ad-hoc committee in 1947 to deal specifically with issues of international politics and
security.
The General Assembly maintained SPECPOL as an ad-hoc committee until 1978, when it
replaced the Trusteeship Committee as the Fourth Committee. Ten years later, the United
Nations declared the 1990s to be the “International Decade for the Eradication of
Colonialism.” In furtherance of this goal, the United Nations moved to modify SPECPOL,
turning it into the Special Political and Decolonization Committee, with a mandate to oversee
decolonization. As of 2005, the United Nations recognizes 15 Non-Self-Governing
Territories. This number, of course, is highly disputed as some territories have had
referendums where the people have rejected self-governance. SPECPOL is primarily an
advisory committee, recommending courses of action to the Security Council, specialized
agencies of the United Nations, governments of member states, international organizations
and non- governmental organizations (NGOs). It does not have the power to take military
action nor pass a binding resolution. During this conference, however, there will be no
plenary session; therefore, all resolutions passed during the committee session will be
deemed binding.
2
Introduction to the Committee Director
Hello delegates, my name is MishkaMusabbeha and I’m currently in my final years of
medical college, aspiring to further specialize in clinical medicine with a focus on global
health, and health policy. With a passion for debates and a great love for MUNS, I believe
MUNs are a great learning experience to hone not only public speaking skills, but also build
problem solving and leadership skills, and in turn learn the art of diplomacy.
Being Pakistani’s politics and heated discussions are part of our blood stream, but learning
how to mainstream those ideas, onto a platform of debate, negotiate, and formulate opinions
and policies is what constitutes good diplomacy. As Chair SPECPOL, I aim to bring these
ideas to light, and in turn hope to achieve a great round of debates.
Alongside, hectic medical school studies, I also enjoy writing, hiking and good food.
As a MUIMUN scholar 2013, with prior chairing experience and several oratory awards, I’ve
been involved with MUNS since the past six years, and hope to provide you with a series of
challenging, yet stimulating debates!
This guide is really only a starting point: be sure to research your country’s policy in depth
and study some of the resolutions that are mentioned in order to gain a better understanding
of the issues at hand. The bloc positions have been kept short intentionally to encourage you
to learn more about your country’s respective policies. The bibliographies should also help
you all in terms of locating pertinent information. I am very excited to be working with you
all, and I hope that all of you come out of NMUN, with a greater understanding and
appreciation for international diplomacy through our interactions.
Best of luck in your preparation for the committee, and looking forward to meeting you all in
April!
3
Introduction to the Assistant Committee Director
Dear delegates, It is my immense pleasure to welcome all of you to Special Political and
Decolonization Committee at NUML Model United Nations 2014. My name is Gibran Bin
Tahir, and I am privileged to serve as your Assistant Committee Director. This conference
will be my second MUN at NUML, and I am looking forward to sharing my experience with
all of you on this committee. I am an Under-Grad at NUML. I have been involved in all sorts
of extra-curricular activities, specially have a keen interest in politics and journalism. NMUN
2014 would be my first experience as an Assistant Committee Director of committee.
Personally what I think is, MUN’s always most certainly been something through which you
can ventilate your thoughts without pulling your hair out. Do your extensive research, plan
out your strategies and if you have any questions or need any help, please email me anytime
and I’ll be glad to help you throughout. Can’t wait to have three awesome days of diplomatic
debates and brain-storming sessions. Let’s make this Committee a role model for every
individual participating in NUML Model United Nation 2014
See you all in April!
Email – [email protected]
4
Tips for Preparation
Like any activity or sport, Model UN takes practice and skill. We hope that you will have the
opportunity to improve your Model UN skills both before and during your committee at
NMUN. If this is your first conference, not to worry!
Many of our delegates are first timers to Model UN and this study guide is your first resource
to build the skills necessary to prepare and debate effectively. During committee, your
committee director is trained to answer any questions you may have. Please do not hesitate to
ask any of the committee dais staff or Secretariat about any questions about procedure, your
topic area. Committee director e-mails will be listed on their respective committee page.
Students should familiarize themselves with the rules of formal debate, parliamentary
procedure, and the proper format for a resolution. Our study guides are posted, and help both
experienced and first-time delegates learn about the goals, accomplishments, limits, and
powers of the UN and the international system.
Thorough preparation is essential to making NMUN an excellent educational experience. Preconference research about your topics, country and committee makes conference more fun
and rewarding, as delegates can then immerse themselves in their roles as high-ranking
diplomats.
Country Preparation
Delegates should learn as much as possible about the country they will be representing – both
in general and in relation to the topics they will be discussing. You should stick to the foreign
policy of the country you are representing. While our study guides include an analysis of bloc
positions on topic areas, students should also learn about the specific positions of their
respective nations.
5
Topic A – By Gibran Bin Tahir
Chechnya’s struggle for independence and its impact on
Russia
“Freedom is nothing but a chance to be better.”
-Albert Camus
Background:
The conflict in Chechnya has attracted global attention. The Chechens are a nation in a region
of many nations. Moscow views Chechen independence as a geopolitical “domino”
threatening Russia’s disintegration which Chechens call for national self-determination and
Islamic revival. The conflict pits the warriors of a small but proud and warlike nation against
the regular troops and paramilitary formations of a great state struggling to redefine itself
after seven decades of Communism. At the heart of the struggle remain Russia’s relations
with those nations brought into the Tsarist Empire by force and subjected to totalitarian
repression. Hostilities continue as the Chechens cannot expel the Russians and the Russians
cannot prevent Chechen raids and terrorist actions.
Following a long tradition, the Russian government has defined the conflict as a struggle
against banditry and terrorism—much as it did in Central Asia in the 1920s and early 1930s,
and in Afghanistan in the late 1970s and 1980s. This legitimizes Russia’s course of actions,
however ruthless the means, as a police function in the name of public order. The Chechens,
meanwhile, refer to their war as a “struggle for national and political liberation” and an
Islamic holy war, or jihad. Neither side sees the conflict as a civil war. Russia will not honor
the Chechens with that political legitimacy, and Chechens refuse to accept the idea that they
were ever voluntarily a part of the Russian Empire, Soviet state, or Russian Federation.
Like most of the peoples of the Caucasus other than the Georgians and Armenians, the
Chechens converted to Islam by the eighteenth century. Islamic faith linked Chechen culture
to a greater identity, and provided the basis for alliances with other Islamic peoples of the
region in their struggle with Orthodox Russia.
Clan life in a Chechen mountain village revolved around raising sheep and raiding. The clans
practiced the blood-vendetta where no offense against clan honour could go unpunished, and
feuds could go on for generations. To supplement their meagre existence, Chechen warriors
6
frequently raided north of the Terek, carrying off goods, animals, and slaves from Cossack
settlements.
Chechnya Conflict - The Bone of contention
Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1992, Chechnya declared independence.
Russia viewed Chechnya as an integral part of Russia, and there was a significant minority of
Russians within Chechnya. Chechnya and Russia went to war over the issue of Chechnya's
independence from Russia.
Chechens view themselves as distinct from Russians. They believe they have a right to selfdetermination. However, Russians believe they must protect the Russian minority in
Chechnya. Russian officials believe that if they let Chechnya become independent, other
ethnic groups in Russia will rebel as well getting motivation from this. This laid the basis of
the Chechnya conflict
Chechnya: Things You Need to Know
Chechnya is one of six Russian provinces located in the Caucasus Mountains which stretch
between the Black Sea to the west and the Caspian Sea to the east. All six Russian Caucasian
provinces, which in addition to Chechnya include Kabardino-Balkaria, KaracheyevoCherkessia, North Ossetia, Ingushetia, and Dagestan, are part of the independent Russian
Federation, commonly known as Russia, which came into being when the USSR dissolved at
the end of 1991. These Caucasian provinces were previously formed into autonomous regions
of the USSR. The Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, comprising
Chechnya and Ingushetia, was established within the USSR in 1936. It was a somewhat
artificial arrangement as the Chechens were at the time more closely allied with the tribes of
Dagestan, and appeared to be designed to prevent either Chechnya or Dagestan from
becoming a political threat to Soviet power.
With the dissolution of the USSR, the borders of the Caucasus territories were reformed. The
three Soviet republics of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan became fully independent
countries. The former so-called autonomous regions were kept with Russia and reformed into
provinces. When Chechnya declared its independence from this newly formed Russian
Federation, it was arguably taking advantage of the opportunity presented by the Soviet
Union's collapse. This opportunistic declaration was, however, what the newly formed
Russian Federation feared the most—ethnic groups splintering from the whole and taking
with them valuable resources needed by the struggling federation. If they did not prevent
7
Chechnya from becoming fully independent, then how were they to prevent other regions
from following suit? To date, Chechnya's declaration of independence and its secession from
Russia have not been recognized by either the United Nations or by Russia. The Russian
government continues to claim sovereignty over the territory under international law, and the
rest of the world considers Chechnya a part of the Russian Federation.
Chechnya and the disintegration of the USSR
The USSR continued to struggle to hold itself together until August 1991, when hard-line
Soviet generals and leaders attempted an abortive coup against Mikhail Gorbachev. Boris
Yeltsin, leader of the Soviet Russian Republic, successfully rallied forces that defended the
central government in Moscow, earning tremendous popularity. When the coup collapsed, the
remnants of the Soviet Union collapsed with it; Gorbachev returned to Moscow to negotiate
the breakup of the USSR into fifteen independent republics. During the coup, some Chechens
(including current separatist leader ShamilBasayev) went to Moscow to aid in Yeltsin's
defense of the White House (the Russian Parliament building) even though in Chechnya
itself, the communist leaders of the Chechen-Ingush Republic supported the coup. With
Yeltsin's blessing, DzhokharDudayev, a Chechen and a former Soviet air force officer,
organized a coup against the local communist leaders, ousted the pro-Moscow political
forces, and declared independence for the republic. Dudayev called for immediate elections
to establish a democratic government in Chechnya. Those elections were held in October
1991, although only in those parts of Chechnya controlled by Dudayev's forces. The
significant territory that was under the control either of pro-communist or pro-Yeltsin forces
did not support the move for independence and did not participate in the elections. The
elections resulted in Dudayev's movement winning control of the parliament, and Dudayev
himself being proclaimed president.
The Russian government in Moscow seemed willing to let the issue stand through 1992. But
in March 1993, the Russian government encouraged dissention among the leadership of the
Chechen-Ingush Republic. The result was a political division between the Chechen and
Ingush portions of the republic. In Ingushetia (the newly-created entity to the west of
Chechnya), General RuslanAushev, who was initially appointed by Moscow, won elections
and became president of the Ingush republic within Russia, leaving Chechnya as a separate
autonomous province under the leadership of Dudayev.
8
Chechnya Conflict in the Contemporary Era
If we look at the most recent round of fighting was sparked by the events of August 1999.
Armed Islamist groups based in Chechnya and led by ShamilBasayev, moved into
neighbouring Dagestan which was still part of Russia. Their intent was to defend Dagestani
Muslims from perceived Russian aggression and to establish a larger Islamic state among
area Muslims. Basayev's forces were driven back into Chechnya by Russian troops after a
few weeks, although the Russian army was unable to keep them from escaping as it claimed
it would. A month later in September, a series of deadly explosions in apartment buildings in
Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Volgodonsk killed a total of three hundred civilians. The attacks
came without warning and no group claimed responsibility, but the Russian government laid
the blame explicitly on Chechen extremists.
Using the incursions, bombings, and increasing lawlessness within Chechnya as justification,
Russian forces moved across the Chechen border on October 2, 1999. Their initially stated
aim was to take a portion of territory in northern Chechnya in order to prevent further attacks
like Basayev's incursion, and to protect Russians living on the northern plains of Chechnya.
Over the next few months, however, the emphasis shifted to taking more Chechen territory,
and then eventually to recapturing Chechnya altogether, despite previous pledges both to
avoid using force and to seek a negotiated solution to the question of Chechnya's future
status. On December 25, Russian forces begin a new full-scale assault on Grozny, which
included extensive artillery shelling, and aircraft assault and was backed by some 80,000
Russian military troops. By the end of 1999, Russians and Chechens appeared to be fighting
exactly the same war they had fought three years earlier.
Militarily, this second Chechen war has looked remarkably like the first. By early February
2000, most of Grozny had been recaptured by Russian armed forces, but pockets of resistance
remained in the city. By mid-February, Russian armed forces had ordered the city evacuated
and its buildings destroyed in an attempt to root out the last rebel forces. As before, the
Russians face an additional eight thousand to ten thousand rebel forces in the southern
mountains.
Despite similarities, there are important differences between the first and second Chechen
wars. The second war in Chechnya has been far more devastating than the first. The Russian
offensive has created a new wave of refugees; by the end of 1999 some two hundred fifty
thousand Chechens (about twenty-five percent of the population) have been driven from their
9
homes to towns or camps across the border in Ingushetia. An unknown number—estimates
are around forty thousand—remain in Grozny, unwilling or unable to leave despite massive
Russian bombardment of the city.
For the Russians, this second war has garnered more public support than the previous. An
opinion poll taken in November 1999 found that sixty-six percent of Russian respondents
thought the war was "successful." The increase is due partly to the genuine fear aroused by
the apartment bombings of September and partly to the increased government control of the
media, which has resulted in a tempered view of the war. Similarly, although the war is
expensive for Russia—by the end of 1999 it had already cost over one and a half billion
dollars—it comes at a time when, because of high oil prices, the Russian government has
more revenue and more economic stability. However, the indiscriminate bombardment of
Grozny and Russia's apparent lack of concern for civilians in the war zone has cost the
Russian government some foreign aid. In December 1999, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) put scheduled loan payments on hold, and a number of European countries have
threatened sanctions if the war continues. Still, Russia appears both more willing and more
able to prosecute the war this time, although it is unclear whether they will be any more
successful on the battlefield.
The outcome of this Chechen-Russian conflict is currently unclear. Russia appears to be
incapable of controlling Chechnya by force as was demonstrated during the first war. But,
given increased domestic political and financial support, it may take the Chechen separatists a
long time to convince the Russian government to stop trying. In addition, the factionalism
that characterizes the current Chechen leadership (demonstrated by the independent actions
of President Maskhadov and rebel leader Basayev) make it difficult for Russia to find a
negotiating partner who can deliver peace—a fact which the government in Moscow uses to
justify its lack of negotiation efforts.
In the long term, there are three possible solutions for Chechnya. One possible outcome is a
return to the way Chechnya was governed in the nineteenth century with Russia in nominal
control of the region but facing ongoing resistance at a variety of levels. This is probably not
a viable long-term situation for Russia unless its economy recovers on more than just
temporarily increased oil revenues. Another possibility is full Chechen independence. As this
would require a near-total collapse of Russian power or a serious crisis in Russia that forces
them to redirect their resources elsewhere, this solution is also unlikely. The third, and most
10
probable, alternative is some form of autonomy within the Russian Federation that provides
for substantial local government. This would maintain Moscow's titular control over the
region and help it to resist secessionist pressures elsewhere, while satisfying at least some
Chechen demands for self-government. Were such an agreement to be created in the next five
years, it would probably include a clause on leaving the possibility of future independence
open. If, over time, autonomy within Russia is beneficial to the Chechens, particularly if
Russian money helps rebuild Grozny, demands for independence may fade. For this solution
to last, however, a future Chechen government will have to devise better strategies for
dealing with crime and armed opposition within its own government, both of which
Maskhadov's government failed to do between 1997 and 1999.
Chechnya Conflict and the Rest of the World
For the rest of the world, the Chechen conflict has two serious consequences. First, its
location puts it in the centre of efforts to bring more Caspian Sea oil to the international
market. If long-term stability can be brought to the area, more oil will flow out of the Caspian
basin, through Russia, and onto the world market. This would benefit both Russia, which
desperately needs the oil revenue (providing of course that it passes through Russian
territory), and the U.S. and European economies, where greater supply would likely lower
prices. This prospect insures that the United States and Europe will continue to be interested
in a long-term solution to the Chechen crisis.
The second consequence of the outcome of the current Chechen war is in the area of human
rights and international law. Chechnya, along with ethnic conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo,
Rwanda, and East Timor, are shaping the world's understanding of the role and limits of
international law and its ability to impose standards of conduct on particular countries.
Russia's alleged human rights abuses against people it claims as its own have been harshly
criticized by international powers, but to date, only moderately punished. If this present war
drags on for a long time, as seems likely, the amount of external pressure put on Russia to
moderate its behaviour will send a powerful signal to other countries with similar problems.
If the international community unifies its criticism of Russian tactics, and punishes the
Russian government for any abuses, it will strengthen the hand of those who seek to protect
human rights globally and increase the likelihood of world leaders using their power to
enforce international norms of behaviour.
11
Possible BLOC positions:
Russian Bloc
Armenia, Hungary Romania, Russia, Syria, and other former S
oviet states
Western Bloc
United States of America, United Kingdom, France, Turkey and other NATO states
Questions to be considered by the Committee:
What is the bone of contention of the Chechnya conflict?
Is Russia right in its actions against Chechnya?
Are the Chechnyan fighters’ right to continue pursue their struggle for independence?
Definition of a Chechnyan fighter: Terrorists or freedom fighters?
What should be the role of UN when it comes to Chechnya conflict?
What should be the role of Muslim and Neighbouring states to pacify the whole situation?
Background Sources

“Russia.” Information Please Almanac Online.
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0107909.html

“Russia.” CIA World Factbook 2002. 13 Feb. 2003
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factook/print/rs.html
12

“Profile: Chechnya” BBC News Country Profiles.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/country_profiles/2565049.stm

“Chechnya.” Wikipedia Online Encyclopedia.
http://www.wikipedia.org/w/wiki.phtml?title=Chechnya
Topic B: By MishkaMusabbeha
The rights of self-determination in Kashmir
Introduction:
According to the unrepresented nations and peoples organization, all peoples have the right to
self-determination.
Essentially, the right to self-determination is the right of a people to determine its own
destiny. In particular, the principle allows a people to choose its own political status and to
determine its own form of economic, cultural and social development. Exercise of this right
can result in a variety of different outcomes ranging from political independence to full
integration within a state. In practice, however, the possible outcome of an exercise of selfdetermination will often determine the attitude of governments towards the actual claim by a
people or nation. Thus, while claims to cultural autonomy may be more readily recognized by
states, claims to independence are more likely to be rejected by them. Nevertheless, the right
to self-determination is recognized in international law as a right of process (not of outcome)
belonging to the people and not to states or governments. –
The preferred outcome of an exercise of the right to self-determination varies greatly among
the members of the UNPO. For some, the only acceptable outcome is full political
independence. This is particularly true of occupied or colonized nations. For others, the goal
is a degree of political, cultural and economic autonomy, sometimes in the form of a federal
13
relationship. For others yet, the right to live on and manage a people's traditional lands free of
external interference and incursion is the essential aim of a struggle for self-determination.
The principle of self-determination is prominently embodied in Article I of the Charter of the
United Nations. Earlier it was explicitly embraced by US President Woodrow Wilson, by
Lenin and others, and became the guiding principle for the reconstruction of Europe
following World War I. It was incorporated into the 1941 Atlantic Charter and the
Dumbarton Oaks proposals which evolved into the UN Charter. Its inclusion marks the
universal recognition of the principle as fundamental to the maintenance of friendly relations
and peace among states. It is recognized as a right of all peoples in the first article common to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which both entered into force in 1976.
For the Kashmiri populace, these efforts towards the rights of self-determination have seen a
struggle of 67 long tempestuous years, and thousands of deaths.
In 1947, the United Nations determined that the Kashmiri people have the right to selfdetermination and implemented a resolution exercising this right and resolving what was then
a political and military crisis between India and Pakistan over the disposition of Kashmir.
However, this resolution is yet to be implemented and the Kashmiri right to selfdetermination is as yet unrealized. India and Pakistan have continued to fight over Kashmir -a
fight that has generated several wars and many military conflicts between them; including
the Indo-Pakistani Wars of 1947, 1965 and 1999 and since 1984, the two countries have also
been involved in several skirmishes over control of the Siachen Glacier region in Kashmir.
While an inter-state dispute over Kashmir has existed between India and Pakistan since
the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 an internal conflict between Kashmiri insurgents (some
favouring Kashmiri accession to Pakistan, and some favouring Kashmir's complete
independence), and the Government of India has constituted the main conflict and source of
violence in the region since 2002.
The status of Jammu and Kashmir has been in dispute between India and Pakistan since both
became independent in 1947. A U.N. commission obtained acceptance on January 5, 1949 by
both parties of a peace plan involving a cease fire, demilitarization of the state and a
plebiscite under the supervision of a U.N. appointed administrator. The Security Council
urged that the people of Kashmir will have right of self-determination to decide the future
14
status of their homeland. The resolution was negotiated with both India and Pakistan and
accepted by all five members of the Commission, Argentina, Belgium, Columbia,
Czechoslovakia and the United States. The cease-fire took effect accordingly, but the plan
bogged down when India balked at implementing the demilitarization phase, which
envisioned a synchronized withdrawal by the forces of both India & Pakistan. The situation
lapsed into a stalemate.
Kashmiris’ claim to self-determination is exceptionally strong even without the United
Nations recognition. Kashmir has been historically independent, except in the anarchical
conditions of late 18th and the first half of 19th centuries. The territory of Kashmir is larger
in size than 121 independent countries and bigger in number than 117 nations of the world.
Certain characteristics of the situation in Kashmir distinguish it from other deplorable human
rights situations around the world. First, it prevails in what is recognized under international
law as a disputed territory.
Second, the situation in Kashmir represents a government's repression not of a secessionist or
separatist movement, but of an uprising against a foreign occupation. Kashmiri’s cannot
secede from a country to which they have never acceded to in the first place. So, Kashmiri’s
cannot be called secessionist.
Third, it is a case of the U.N. being unable to address a situation to which it has devoted a
number of resolutions and where it has established an official observer presence, though with
a limited mandate. The Military Observers Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP),
stationed in Kashmir to observe the cease-fire between India and Pakistan, is one of the
U.N.'s oldest peacekeeping operations.
The United Nations resolutions on Kashmir acquire a continuing decisive importance from
two crucial factors. One, they constitute the only international agreement freely negotiated
between India and Pakistan on the future status of Kashmir. Two, they embody the only
principle on whose basis a just and durable settlement of the problem can be achieved---the
principle of freedom of choice by the people concerned. Both India and Pakistan signed their
acceptance of the United Nations resolutions when neither was at a disadvantage or under any
kind of coercion.
15
True, sixty-seven years have passed since the resolutions were passed but as many years have
gone since the Charter of the United Nations was adopted. Lapse of time does not invalidate
international agreements. However, both Pakistan & India and the freedom-loving
Kashmiri’s must signify their willingness to consider any arrangement which conforms to the
same principle as did the United Nations resolutions, and may be more feasible in the
changed circumstances of today.
To find a solution the Kashmiri situation, the right of a people with a distinct historical and
cultural identity to decide their own future must be recognized; the sanctity of international
agreements worked out by the United Nations; a peaceful and stable subcontinent free from
the possibility of a regional nuclear exchange; and the consistent application of human rights
standards must be acknowledged. On the other hand, reluctance to undertake such an
initiative neither contributes to a long-term strategy of global peace and security, nor answers
the demands of human conscience and the principles of justice.
Proposed options for resolution of dispute:
I. UN Resolutions: The Plebiscite Option
The UN Security Council resolutions of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949, proposed the
plebiscite option for resolving the Kashmir dispute. Broadly, the resolution of January 5,
1949, stated: ‘(a) the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India
and Pakistan, would be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial
plebiscite after the cease-fire and truce agreement provided for in the Resolution of August
13, had been carried out; (b) the Secretary General of the UN would nominate a Plebiscite
Administrator, who would be appointed by the government of Jammu and Kashmir and
given powers which he considers necessary for holding a free and impartial plebiscite; (c) on
implementation of the ceasefire and the truce agreement, the Commission and the Plebiscite
Administrator would determine, in consultation with the Government of India, the final
disposal of Indian and State Armed Forces, as well as the Forces in Azad Kashmir (in
consultation with the local authorities); (d) persons who had entered the State since August
15, 1947 would be required to leave the State, and citizens of the State who had left the State
on account of disturbances would be allowed to return.’68
Both India and Pakistan accepted the above UN Resolutions. However, later, differences
arose over the interpretation of various clauses of the resolutions, especially on the issues of
16
demilitarization and disbandment/disarming of the ‘Azad Kashmir’ forces. India gave its own
interpretation to the agreement and suggested that the Azad Kashmir forces be disbanded and
the defense and administrative responsibility of the region be given to India and Indian
Kashmiri authorities. Regarding the question of plebiscite, Pakistan was in favour of giving
complete authority to the UN for holding, organizing and supervising the plebiscite. India, on
the other hand, only wanted the non-binding advice of the UN. Various UN mediators were
appointed to resolve this issue, but no one was successful in convincing India on a
compromise.
Complications with this solution include: either country attempting to persuade voters to their
side, tampering with the voting system, and possible violence that might erupt between voters
of different opinions. If Jammu/Kashmir were to become an independent nation there would
have to be some mechanism established for its protection from other sides of the issue.
II. The UN Trusteeship Option
Generally, this option proposes that Kashmir should be placed under UN Trusteeship and
then plebiscite may be held for the final resolution of the dispute. It is argued that this will
provide a face-saving for India, and will also give Kashmiri’s, on both sides of the Line of
Control, enough time to come up with a joint option.
III. The Partition Option
Regarding the option of the partition of Jammu and Kashmir, this has largely been an
academic debate and various scholars have suggested different proposals. The first is a
division-related option for Jammu and Kashmir, based on the holding of regional plebiscites.
This proposal was first given by UN Representative, Sir Owen Dixon, in his report of 195051. Called the ‘Dixon Report’, it proposed the idea that the disputed territory be divided into
three zones and plebiscites be conducted separately for the three zones. In other words he
envisaged the division of the state of Jammu and Kashmir taking into consideration the
religious makeup of the population. The three zones were: One, the Valley plus the Muslim
areas of Jammu - Poonch, Rajori and Doda. In addition, Ladakh's two regions would be
divided, with Kargil - predominantly Muslim - being considered with the Valley; two, Jammu
with the remaining district of Ladakh, Leh; and, three, AJK plus the Northern Areas.
IV.
The Independence Option
An option gradually evolved as a result of the impasse on the Kashmir issue is that of
independence, generally known as the ‘Third Option’. Under this option, the pre-Partition
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status of the Jammu and Kashmir State is to be restored and an independent state established.
The proposal is mainly advocated by the JKLF. Its Chairman, Amanullah Khan, in one of his
articles says, ‘the future independent Kashmir is to be neutral, like Switzerland, with friendly
and trade relations with all its neighbours.’ According to Amanullah Khan’s proposal,
‘Independent Kashmir is to consist of five federating units: Kashmir Valley, Jammu province,
Ladakh, Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, each enjoying considerable internal autonomy,
having its own elected provincial government.
V. The Irish Model
Recently, various scholars have suggested the Irish model, based on the ‘Good Friday
Agreement’ signed in April 1998 between the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland, as a possible option for
resolving the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan.
Past United Nations Actions / International Involvement
There have been very many different actions the United Nations have put into action to help
solve the conflict of Kashmir between India and Pakistan. Some of the resolutions that the
Security Council has come up with have been: Security Council Resolution 47 on April 21,
1948 which is about the states of Jammu and Kashmir, Security Council Resolution 91 on
March 30, 1951 which is about the people choosing that Jammu will be a state or not,
Security Council Resolution 209 on September 6, 1965 which is about cease fire and mostly
army measures, and the Security Council Resolution 307 on December 21, 1971 which is
about safety and peace between the two nations. The UN has even instituted a Peacekeeping
operation: UNMOGIP (United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Kashmir).
Bloc Positions
African Bloc- African nations are looking towards a solution that will be quick and end the
long standing dispute through negotiations; they would be more in favor of Pakistan, however
most remain neutral.
Asian Bloc- Most Asian nations, excluding China which holds a portion of Kashmir, take a
neutral stance on the topic. Some suggest that the Line of control should become the
permanent border between the two nations while others believe in Kashmiri autonomy.
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Latin American Bloc- Most Latin American nations would agree that the conflict of
Kashmir should be solved on a bilateral level as was suggested under the Simla Agreement of
1972, and has continued to be a suggestion under various Latin American sponsors of
resolutions concerning the topic.
Middle-Eastern Bloc- Middle Eastern nations feel that peace in Kashmir might set
precedent to solving the cultural and religious territorial conflict of Israel and Palestine, and
therefore take the issue very seriously. Muslim Middle Eastern states recognize the strength
of a continuous block of potential Islamic regions extending all the way from Morocco to
Malaysia
European Bloc- Europe is very aware of the potential danger of nuclear proliferation by
these two states and should push for agreements to be made that ensure that neither India nor
Pakistan attacks each other with nuclear weapons. Europe should push for greater
cooperation between the two and the rest of the international community with regard to their
nuclear programs especially given the presence of UN Peacekeepers along the Cease Fire
Line in Kashmir. Many European countries might also favor a plebiscite The United
Kingdom should be in line with European Policy but it should be cautious on the issue of the
plebiscite since it supported the initial Instrument of Accession, although it does support
plans that would stabilize the area.
Western Bloc- Most Western nations, especially Canada and the United States, play a
major role in the conflict, and have contributed both troops and financial aid to the cause.
These nations will be looking toward a long term solution that will be lasting. Concerns from
these countries are human rights violations and how to best keep peace between the three
nations. Since they are mostly democratic nations, many of them favor the plebiscite and if
necessary would endorse Jammu/Kashmir to become an independent nation. The U.S. option
is to play a more activist mediating role by initiating a new peace process for Kashmir. This
could take the shape of a pentagonal dialogue involving the U.S., China; India, Pakistan and
Kashmir, or an appropriate use of the new mechanisms and abilities of the United Nations. In
either case the U.S. would supply the necessary catalyst for a settlement.
Key Questions:
1. The Indus and its tributaries flowing in from Kashmir comprise the primary source of
fresh water in Pakistan. As a result, control of the flow of water in these rivers
19
through dams and canals has been a very important issue for decades. Pakistan being
an agricultural country is highly dependent on this fresh water supply. According to
the possible options for Kashmir, an agreement to the distribution of water recourses
must also be reached. Therefore how will the water recourses be divided?
2. The annexation of Kashmir by Pakistan or the creation of an independent state would
create a continuous block of potential Islamic fundamentalist regions extending all the
way from Morocco to Malaysia. What impact would this have on the global strategy
on the war against terror?
3. How important is the role of third party mediators such as the US in reaching a
conclusion to the Kashmir issue?
4. What is the role of international funds to improve the economy of Kashmir?
5. How important is the geo-political significance of the Siachen Glacier in the
Karakoram Pass?- ( It is the only barrier preventing Pakistani and Chinese forces from
linking up in Kashmir )
6. Does your country support India’s or Pakistan’s claims over Kashmir?
7. Does your country believe that the land should be divided between the two countries
or should one country take it all?
8. Does the government in your country support the views of your citizens or do they
have different views? How does this war directly involve your country?
9. Has this war affected your country’s economy in any way? And if it had explains how
it has affected it.
Bibliography

Jammu and Kashmir assessment:2003, South Asia Terrorism Portal
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/index.html

Pakistan and the United Nations on Kashmir, Abdul Hamid Khan, SAAG March 2003

Pakistan
Alert
Network:
Kashmir
Demographic
Data
Kashmir
http://www.pakalert.net/articles/demodate_kashmir.asp
20

United States obsession with the Kashmir issue: An analysis, Dr. SubhashKapila,
SAAG Jan 2002

"Kashmir And The United Nations By Wajahat Ahmad." Kashmir andThe United
Nations By Wajahat Ahmad. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Sept. 2013.

"Fresh Initiative." Demilitarization of Kashmir Must for Finding a Lasting Solution of
the Dispute. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Sept. 2013.

War and Peace: An Analysis Of The Kashmir Issue And A Possible Path ToPeaceEngr297A -Prof. Bruce P. Lusignan
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Relations.
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38.
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UN
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47.
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http://news.bbc.co.uk
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http://www.armyinkashmir.org
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http://www.paktribune.com/news
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