Ethnic Identities in East-Central Europe: The Results of the Census 2011 in
Comparative Perspective
Paper presented at workshop “Whither Eastern Europe? Changing Political Science
Perspectives on the Region”
Gainesville, FL, January 9-11, 2014
Dr. Christoph Schnellbach (Andrássy University Budapest/ LMU München)
Email: [email protected]
Abstract
This article reviews the results of the EU-wide census 2011 in a comparative perspective. The
author focuses on Hungary, Slovakia and Romania – EU Member States, which have been
prone to bilateral conflicts on national minorities. Census results are very illuminating for
those Central and Eastern European states, having significant ethnic and national minority
populations, including an increasing number of Roma. The article reflects upon the way in
which census data has informed both research and politics since 1989. The author draws on
Brubaker’s ‘triadic nexus’ to explore the interactions of several ‘nationalisms’ (national
minorities, nationalizing states, external national homelands) in post-socialist Europe. The
methodological discrepancies between states reflect political preoccupations among a
multitude of actors, (scientific) interests and the legal implications by anti-discrimination
policies, minority rights and data protection. However, census results provide for an analytical
starting point and empirical tool for further research. The author argues that the data does not
stand for itself but needs to be supplemented by other research methods to fully understand
the evolution and impact of ethnicity in East-Central European societies.
Keywords: census, data collection, Roma, East Central Europe, ethnicity
Introduction
Minority research is based on censuses – they provide an indispensable source for empirical
studies, surveys, ethnographies and other research methodologies. Censuses were carried out
in Central and Eastern Europe in the years 1990/91 and 2001/02 and were used to reorient
policies on minorities. However, the results only partially reflected the actual demographic
situation. Although the censuses covered criteria such as nationality, language or cultural
identity, many people did not use these options in the surveys. Thus, the estimated numbers of
minorities provided by nongovernmental and international organizations were much larger
than the official data collected.
1
The EU-wide census of 2011 underlines this discrepancy in numbers and reaffirms the
necessity to put the censuses in East-Central Europe in a comparative perspective. This article
examines the question of how nationality is conceptualized and categorized. Likewise, when
we compare the practice in the different countries two essential questions are raised: What
kind of questions on ethnicity are included in questionnaires? Is there an obligation (and
willingness) to provide information on nationality and mother tongue?
The results of the 2011 census were posted in spring 2013. These data sets provide for a longterm view of the demographic trends in the post-socialist area. Special attention in the
academic literature has been given to two minority groups recently: the Hungarian minorities
living outside Hungary’s borders in the Carpathian basin and the ‘transnational’ Roma
minority across Europe. The first case led to a considerable political dispute, as the relations
between Hungarians and the majority populations in Slovakia and Romania in the past two
decades have frequently been a major issue in bilateral affairs. The figures provided by the
census will affect both internal policies on minorities and the external national politics
(nemzetpolitika) of Hungary. Since the early 1990s, the number of Hungarians in Slovakia
and Romania has been gradually decreasing. Hungary, for its part, sometimes resorts to
unilateral action to promote its own minorities abroad, such as the “Status Law” of 2001. The
Roma, on the other hand, have been one of the most vulnerable groups during the recent
economic crisis and are still subject to widespread marginalization and discrimination.
This article interprets the results of the EU-wide census 2011 in light of the research
perspective of the “triadic nexus”.1 The three elements of Brubaker’s triadic nexus (national
minorities, nationalizing states, external national “homelands”) should be treated not as
finished entities but as dynamic, interconnected concepts. These three forms of nationalism
intertwine and interact. In addition, there is a fourth dimension, which can be described as
Europeanization or EU-ization. The influence of the European Union on the minority policies
in the Central and Eastern European countries can be seen as an indicator of a “quadratic
nexus” which emphasizes the role of international organizations.2
Censuses in the European Union
At the national and at the subnational (NUTS 1 and NUTS 2) levels, censuses gather
information on education and employment – but not on ethnicity or religion.3 However, in the
2
states of East Central Europe (CEE), the question of nationality or ethnicity is usually
requested in the census forms. Comparing the censuses in CEE, the design of the
questionnaires is very different. The census forms of Hungary, Slovakia and Romania were
examined for the following features:
1. the importance of ethnicity as judged by the placement of the subject on the form;
2. the relation of ethnicity to other topics;
3. the number of issues related to ethnicity;
4. mandatory information on confession and ethnicity;
5. the terminology in the questionnaires used to identify ethnic origin;
6. the language of the questionnaires.
In 2011, the European Commission published methodically detailed explanations for censuses
with the aim of increasing the value of the results and to improve comparability of data (1980,
1990 and 2001). Recent developments on the EU side (enlargement to the East, the Eurozone
crisis, Treaty of Lisbon) gave impetus to a desire for more detailed and comparable data at
European level.
Interestingly, there are very few EU guidelines on the subject of ethnicity. The position of the
European Union is characterized by the policy of non-discrimination in questions of ethnic
identity. This attitude is also reflected by two principles. First, the EU rejects the transmission
of confidential information for reasons of data protection. 4 Second, the EU Regulation on
censuses (Regulation No 519/2010) allows Member States, in some cases, to make decisions
about the wording of topics or specific sub-categories.5
Hungary
The demographic situation in Hungary reflects tendencies that have been ongoing since the
political turn in 1989. Whereas the total population has only diminished slightly (from
10,374,823 in 1990 to 9,937,628 in 2011), the number of people who declare themselves
ethnic Hungarians decreased significantly. Many respondents did not tick the “nationality”
box in the latest census in 2011.6 At the same time, the Roma population increased from
142,683 in 1990 to 308,957 in 2011. This number is still beneath the estimates of international
organizations and NGOs (see table 4). Nevertheless, there seems to be a new readiness from
3
Roma minority members to identify with their ethnic group. This can also be seen among
Germans, whose number rose from 30,824 in 1990 to 131,951 in 2011. Likewise, Slovaks,
Croats and Romanians are increasingly willing to declare their nationality in the population
census.
Table 1: Demographic Situation in Hungary7
Total
population
Hungarians
Roma
Germans
Slovaks
Croats
Romanians
Ukrainians
Serbs
Slovenes
Poles
Greeks
Bulgarians
Ruthenians
Armenians
1990
10,374,823
2001
10,198,315
2011
9,937,628
Nationality Mother
tongue
10,142,072 10,222,529
(97.8%)
(98.5 %)
142,683
48,072
(1.4 %)
(0.46 %)
30,824
37,511
(0.3 %)
(0.36 %)
10,459
12,745
(0.1 %)
(0.1 %)
13,570
17,577
(0.1 %)
(0.17 %)
10,740
8,730
(0.1 %)
n/a
n/a
2,905
2,953
1,930
2,627
n/a
3,788
n/a
1,640
n/a
1,370
n/a
674
n/a
37
Nationality Mother
tongue
9,416,045 9,546,374
(92.3 %)
(93.6 %)
190,046
48,685
(1.9 %)
(0.48 %)
62,233
33,792
(0.6 %)
(0.33 %)
17,693
11,817
(0.17 %)
(0.01 %)
15,620
14,345
(0.15 %)
(0.01 %)
7,995
8,482
Nationality Mother
tongue
8,314,029 8,409,049
(83.7 %)
(84.6 %)
308,957
54,339
(3.1 %)
(0.5 %)
131,951
38,248
(1.3 %)
(0.4 %)
29,647
9,888
(0.3 %)
(0.1 %)
23,561
13,716
(0.2 %)
(0.1 %)
26,345
13,886
5,070
3,816
3,040
2,962
2,509
1,358
1,098
620
5,633
7,210
2,385
5,730
3,916
3,556
3,323
3,293
4,885
3,388
3,187
2,580
1,921
1,299
1,113
294
3,384
3,708
1,723
3,049
1,872
2,899
999
444
In the census questionnaires, the subject of ethnicity came up in in the second part. This
means ethnicity is not the most prominent issue. The Hungarian questionnaire presented the
topic of citizenship in the first part and ethnicity almost at the end. Nevertheless, the subject is
placed in a separate block, introduced by the note – “Answering the following questions is not
compulsory!” – underlining the voluntary nature of giving information on ethnicity and
religion.
4
In all Hungarian census forms since 1990, questions on ethnicity are followed by questions on
religion. This indicates a very close relationship between ethnicity and religion, as both
characterize community cohesion of a nation, a national or ethnic group or a (religious)
minority.8 Past censuses support the strong correlation of ethnic, linguistic and religious
characteristics.
The Hungarian questionnaire addressed these issues in three different ways:
A. Direct questions about the ethnicity of the respondent, commitment to membership in a
particular ethnic group;
B. Direct questions on mother tongue;
C. Specific questions on ethnicity.
Direct questions on membership of a particular ethnic group seem to be simple. However, to
respond to a direct question on ethnicity in Central and Eastern Europe is not always an easy
task as the answers reflect subjective feelings, hopes and fears, which may be independent of
country and native language of the respondent.
Even responses to the mother tongue can be considered as a relatively subjective criterion.
This is an indirect method of defining ethnicity as it is about the origin and the context in
which that language has been learned – at least in the case of a predominant language in the
population. Many minority rights are associated with the use of the mother tongue. The right
to mother-tongue education, the right to use the minority language in newspapers, television,
etc. only applies to those who consider a particular language as their mother tongue. It is
possible in some cases to define mother tongue based on objective criteria: it is not a matter of
choice for the individual, since it is the first language to be transmitted and learned as a child.
However, in other cases a child might have learned two or more languages and can later
hardly distinguish which one was the first.
Native language is often not the only language that is used by respondents from an ethnic
minority, as they are usually bilingual. This is why questionnaires include other languages to
get a better understanding of the situation of the ethnic group in a country. Thus, the
Hungarian questionnaire contains more specific questions about ethnicity. Referring to
5
language, question 36 asks: “What is your mother tongue?” (A maximum of two answers).
Question 37 follows up on this topic: “Which language do you usually speak with family
members or friends?” (A maximum of two answers). In addition to the languages of
recognized minorities such as Bulgarian, Gypsy (Roma), Greek, Croatian, Polish, German,
Armenian, Romanian, Ruthenian, Serbian, Slovak, Slovenian and Ukrainian, Further
languages including Arabic, Chinese, Russian and Vietnamese, i.e. languages spoken by the
largest migrant groups in Hungary, complete the list.9
The notion of ethnicity in the questionnaire does not refer to the term “minority”, but literally
“nationality” (nemzetiség). In the 2001 census, the question was: “Which of these nationalities
do you feel you belong to?” (Here were a maximum of three to tick or to fill in a text box).
However, the 2011 census asked: “What nationality do you feel you belong to?” (Question
34) and “Do you think you belong to any other nationality in addition to what you marked
above?” (Question 35). As selection options, Hungarian as well as all recognized ethnic
minorities are listed, but also Arabic, Chinese, Russian and Vietnamese. This implies to
Hungarian citizens that they “should” commit to a major ethnic identity.
Finally, the language of the questionnaire has to be taken into account. Providing the census
forms in many languages can encourage people belonging to minorities to fill in the
questionnaire. First, this promotes compliance directly by linguistic clarity. Second, it does so
indirectly as a concession of the state towards its minorities regarding language use. In
Hungary, questionnaires were traditionally provided in all state-recognized minority
languages.
Slovakia
The demographic situation in Slovakia is starkly different from Hungary. Whereas the total
population is relatively stable, there is a significant decrease in minority populations such as
Hungarians (567,296 in 1991, 458,467 in 2011), Bohemians and Germans. On the other hand,
there is slight increase of the Roma population from 75,802 in 1991 to 105,738 in 2011 –
which only reflects a fraction of the real numbers.
6
Table 2: Demographic Situation in Slovakia10
1991
5,274,335
Nationality
2001
5,379,455
Nationality
Moravians /
Silesians
Croats
Poles
4,519,328
(85.7 %)
567,296
(10.8 %)
75,802 (1.4
%)
52,884 (1.0
%)
17,197 (0.3
%)
13,281 (0.3
%)
5,414 (0.2
%)
6,442 (0.1
%)
n/a
2,659
4,614,854
(85.8 %)
520,528 (9.7
%)
89,920 (1.7
%)
44,620 (0.8
%)
24,201 (0.4
%)
10,814 (0.2
%)
5,405 (0.1
%)
2,348
Russians12
Bulgarians
n/a
1,400
1,590
1,179
Total population
Slovaks
Hungarians
Roma11
Bohemians
Ruthenians
Ukrainians
Germans
890
2,602
Mother
tongue
4,512,217
(83.9 %)
572,929
(10.7 %)
99,448 (1.8
%)
48,201 (0.9
%)
54,907 (1.0
%)
7,879 (0.2
%)
6,343 (0.1
%)
n/a
988
3,119 (0.1
%)
1,004
2011
5,397,036
Nationality
4,352,775
(80.7 %)
458,467
(8.5 %)
105,738
(2.0 %)
30,367 (0.6
%)
33,482 (0.6
%)
7,430 (0.1
%)
4,690 (0.1
%)
3,286 (0.1
%)
1,022
3,084 (0.1
%)
1,997
1,051
Mother
tongue
4,240,453
(78.6 %)
508,714
(9.4 %)
122,518
(2.3 %)
35,216
(0.7 %)
55,469
(1.0 %)
5,689 (0.1
%)
5,186 (0.1
%)
n/a
1,234
2,731 (0.1
%)
132
The Slovakian questionnaire used a pre-coded list and asked for information on nationality
(národnosť), mother tongue (materinský jazyk) and religion (náboženské vyznanie).13 In the
2001 census, only six options were available for either question. Furthermore, there was a
place to fill in, if the nationality or mother tongue was not Slovakian, Hungarian, Czech,
Roma, Russian or Ukrainian. In the 2011 form, other options were available, such as German,
Polish, Croat or Bulgarian. In contrast to the Hungarian version of 2011, respondents are
supposed to tick only one option. Yet another difference from the 2001 form, the 2011
questionnaire asks for most frequently used language (najčastejšie používaný jazyk) in public
and at home. Regarding the placement of the questions, they were “downgraded” from
number 10-12 in 2001 to number 20-23 in 2011.
7
Romania
Table 3: Demographic Situation in Romania14
Total population
Romanians
Hungarians
Roma
Ukrainians
Germans
1992
22,810,035
Nationality
20,408,542 (89.5
%)
1,624,959 (7.1
%)
401,087 (1.75
%)
65,472 (0.28 %)
2002
21,680,974
Nationality
19,409,400 (89.5
%)
1,434,377 (6.60
%)
535,250 (2.46
%)
61,091 (0.28 %)
2011
20,121,641
Nationality
16,792,868 (83.5
%)
1,227,623 (6.50
%)
621,573 (3.29
%)
50,920 (0.27 %)
119,462 (0.52
%)
60,088 (0.28 %)
36,042 (0.19 %)
In Romania, the demographic development since the early 1990s is quite dramatic: The total
population decreased from 22,810,035 in 1992 to 20,121,641 in 2011. The collected number
of ethnic Romanians shrank to only 16.792.868 in 2011, due to massive emigration. At the
same time, the number of persons belonging to the Hungarian minority dropped from
1,624,959 in 1992 to 1,227,623 in 2011. Likewise, the Germans in 2011 were only on third of
their population in 1992 (119,462), due to a massive emigration to Germany after the fall of
the Iron Curtain. The number of Roma increased steadily to 621,573 in 2011.
In Romania, the 2001 census collected information on citizenship, nationality and mother
tongue with a binary choice ‘Romanian’ and ‘other’, religion with a binary choice ‘Orthodox’
and ‘other’. In 2011, the census form had an open-ended question, leaving respondents to
indicate their origin or ethnic affiliation. The form asks in question 23: “What ethnic group
does the person consider he/she belongs to?” Question 24 then asks: “What is the person’s
mother tongue?” Unlike the Hungarian and Slovak questionnaires, one has to fill in a box
with an abbreviation of the ethnicity or language that needs to be looked up in an appendix to
the form. In addition, it is only possible to fill in one answer, multiple answers about ethnic
identity or native language are not allowed. The recent census questionnaire was somewhat
more inclusive; the forms were distributed both in Romanian and Hungarian.
8
Roma
An estimated population of 9-12 million Roma live in Europe, over half a million each in at
least five EU countries respectively (Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and Spain). With
the accession of 10 CEECs in 2004 and 2007, the Roma became the largest ethnic minority in
the EU. The absence of a titular state and the socio-economic discrimination they face in
many countries makes them one of the most vulnerable ethnic minority groups in Europe.
While many Roma share the same cultural and ethnic roots, there is a debate over whether
they share a collective identity. Some scholars argue that Roma have never been a cohesive
transnational minority, whereas others argue that the Roma share the same interests due to
their common identity as an oppressed, persecuted and marginalized group.15 The
‘construction’ of an ethnic group identity among Roma in Europe is further complicated by
their wide geographic dispersion and the absence of any universally accepted organization or
set of leaders.
The example of the Roma shows that they are stuck in an identity conflict: They do not
emphasize their ethnic minority in censuses, as the following graph shows on the examples
for Romania, Hungary and Slovakia. There are two reasons for this. First, the Roma often do
not acknowledge their ethnic origin because of fear of discrimination and marginalization.
Identification as Roma is often correlated with social stigma.16 Second, Roma often have no
identity papers and therefore are not registered with the central statistical office.
Consequently, such Roma are effectively “stateless” and thus are not recorded in the census
data.
Table 4: Roma in East Central Europe17
Romania
Hungary
Slovak Republic
Total population
Roma: official number
Roma: average estimate
20,121,641
9,937,628
5,397,036
621,573
308,957
105,738
1,850,000
750,000
490,000
9
Brubaker revisited
Brubaker developed his theory of the triadic nexus since 1993 in a series of essays, which
were republished (1997) in the book Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National
Question in the New Europe. His starting point was the examination of the contention that
Europe would enter “post-nationalist era” after the Cold War. Brubaker instead argued for a
resurgence of the nation state and the national idea in the first half of the 1990s. For Brubaker,
the year 1992 is symbolic of the expected “transcendence” of the nation-state. However,
nationalisms prevailed in Europe as the idea of institutionalized supranationalization in
Western Europe itself was confronted with the realities, e.g. the outbreak of the war in the
former Yugoslavia. In the new states of Central and Eastern Europe, the national question was
not been solved, but reappeared in a form that resembled the early 20th Century (reframing of
nationalism).
Brubaker identifies the three interactive components of the triadic nexus.
First, the “nationalizing” state claims the role of a core or titular nation, defined by ethnic and
cultural characteristics of the majority population, which sees itself as the legitimate “owner
of the state”. Second, a national minority is not simply a group which is determined by ethnic
criteria, but a dynamic political entity that is characterized by a number of features. These
include: (a) the public claim to membership in another nation as the state of residence, (b) the
demand for state recognition of ethnic otherness, and (c) the assertion of certain collective
rights in regard to their own political and cultural nationality. Third, there is an “external
national homeland”, which engages for “their” ethnic minorities and support its demands for
collective rights.
In Brubaker’s conception, the three elements of the triadic nexus should not be regarded as
isolated entities, but as dynamic, interconnected components of nationalism that intertwine
and interact. In his opening chapter “Rethinking Nationhood”, Brubaker challenges the longstanding view of nations as real entities, as substantial, enduring collectivities. The problem
with this “substantialist treatment of nations”, he argues, is that it adopts categories of practice
as categories of analysis. The reality of groups, he notes, has been called into question by a
number of developments in social theory: the flourishing of network theory and of theories of
rational action with their relentless methodological individualism; the shift away from
10
structuralism towards a variety of more “constructivist” theoretical stances; and “an emergent
postmodernist theoretical sensibility which emphasises the fragmentary, the ephemeral, as
well as the erosion of fixed forms and clear boundaries”.18
Brubaker’s own analysis treats the nation “not as substance but as institutionalised form; not
as collectivity but as practical category; not as entity but as contingent event”.19 Thus,
“nationhood is pervasively institutionalised in the practice of states and the state system. It is
a world in which nation is widely, if unevenly available and resonant as a category of social
vision and division. It is a world in which nationness may suddenly, and powerfully `happen`.
But none of this implies a world of nations – of substantial, enduring collectivities”.20 Rather
than asking the question “what is a nation?”, we should instead ask “how is nationhood as a
political and cultural form institutionalised within and among states? How does nation work
as practical category, as classificatory scheme, as cognitive frame? What makes the nationevoking, nation-invoking efforts of political entrepreneurs more or less likely to succeed?”.21
This approach is very useful for interpreting the census results of 2011. Population statistics
not only aim to provide knowledge about demographic dynamics or a benchmark for public
debates and policies. Censuses also play a key role in nation building and the (re)production
of national identity.22 Interpreting census data therefore includes dealing with a multiplicity of
actors who struggle “over that most basic of powers, the power to name, to categorize, and
thus to create social reality”.23
Hungary is an example for both, the volatility and stability of the concept of the nation. While
the incumbent FIDESZ-government uses identity politics both inside and outside Hungary’s
borders, reinvigorating even dreams of “Greater Hungary”, there is – on the other hand – an
increasing number of Hungarians unwilling to give information on their nationality in the
census results. The reasons for this are not necessarily overtly political. It could be caused by
sheer indifference.
Reservations based on historical grievances could also play a role here. Regarding censuses in
the twentieth century, demographers came to the conclusion that the census results based on
self-identification do not correspond to the actual situation.24 Such discrepancies are rarely a
consequence of errors in data collection, but rather a caused by external, social and political
factors. For example, after the territorial and political changes after the end of the First World
11
War, a significant part of the population where either afraid on giving ethnic date due to state
persecution or did not believe that the declaration of ethnicity carried the same obligation as
providing other personal data – such as age or family status.
The evidence presented here on the Roma are also illustrative. While mainstream society
certainly identifies the “Roma” and attaches certain attributes to them, their self-identification
remains embryonic. According to estimates, only one in four Roma is willing to associate
with a Roma ethnicity in the census questionnaires. This again brings us back to Brubaker’s
conception and the difficulties to define ethnicity in objective terms. Not only can no
agreement be found in social science upon a generally accepted definition of ethnicity, but its
conversion into a simple question on a census form seems to be a great challenge. One can
conclude that “heterogeneity is still the dominant feature of the statistical landscape at the
beginning of the twenty-first century”,25 even for a rather confined region such as East Central
Europe.
After all, the census results can be taken as an indicator of demographic developments.
However, the data needs to be interpreted cautiously and should be supplemented by other
empirical findings, e.g. from ethnography.26 Surveys and censuses often assume that
respondents had mutually exclusive, rather than overlapping, complementary or even
reinforcing notions of homeland and ethnicity. This is a problematic assumption as could be
seen in the case studies. Quantitative analyses therefore have only limited explanatory power.
Qualitative interpretation of the historical, political and social situation, in which the censuses
take place, can lead to valid results. The analysis of the importance of ethnicity by the
placement of the subject, the style and the terminology in the questionnaires regarding ethnic
origin sheds some light on discrepancies in the social construction of ethnic attributions and
self-attributions in East Central Europe. However, a combination of methods – including the
use of history, demography, surveys, primary source materials, content analysis and discourse
analysis – has to be applied to fully comprehend the dynamics of ethnic identity.27
12
Notes
R. Brubaker, Nationalism reframed: nationhood and the national question in the new Europe (Cambridge:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997)
2 D. Smith “Framing the Nationalities Question in Central and Eastern Europe: A Quadratic Nexus?”, Global
Review of Ethnopolitics, September 2002,
http://www.ethnopolitics.org/ethnopolitics/archive/volume_II/issue_1/smith.pdf (accessed 1 December
2013).
3 The EU Regulation 763/2008 of 9 July 2008 obliged Member States of the European Union to collect data
according to a fixed catalogue of features for the 2011 census. The goal was that the results should be
comparable across the EU. It was up to the Member States on how the data should be collected. For
definitions of the administrative units, the EU uses the systems Nomenclature of Territorial Units for
Statistics (NUTS) and Local Administrative Unit (LAU). Moreover, there was a distinction between derived
and non-derived topics in the list of items for the population and dwelling section.
4 This is linked to data protection laws within the EU, which define ethnic and racial origin as ‘sensitive
data’ and thus ban their collection, see J. Ringelheim and O. de Schutter Ethnic Monitoring. The Processing
of Racial and Ethnic Data in Anti-Discrimination Policies: Reconciling the Promotion of Equality
with Privacy Rights (Brussels: Bruylant, 2010).
5 European Commission, EU Legislation on the 2011 Population and Housing Censuses — Explanatory Notes
(Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2011).
6 The strong deviation of the results in this category compared to 2001 reflects the fact that in 2011
altogether 1,455,883 respondents did not (wish to) answer, compared to 570,537 in 2001. This can also
be observed to a lesser extent for the category “mother tongue”.
7 Data compiled from Hungary 1st Report “Report Submitted by Hungary Pursuant to Article 25,
Paragraph 1 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities”. ACFC/SR(1999)010
Straßburg, 21 May 1999; Hungary 3rd Report “Third Report Submitted by Hungary Pursuant to Article 25,
Paragraph 1 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities”.
ACFC/SR/III(2009)007. Straßburg, 4 June 2009, Központi Statisztikai Hivatal: “2011. Évi Népszámlálás”,
Budapest. http://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/idoszaki/nepsz2011/nepsz_orsz_2011.pdf, (accessed 1
December 2013).
8 See Anna Grzymala-Busse’s contribution on religion and politics in East Central Europe in this issue.
9 Official minorities as defined by the Minority Act of 1993 have lived on the territory of Hungary for at
least one century. Only those groups are recognized, whose members hold Hungarian citizenship and have
at least 1,000 citizens identifying with the group. The Act does not name any new immigrant minorities
and deliberately excludes any recent immigrant groups from coverage under this law due to its criteria of
at least 100 years of residence, see A. Krizsan, “Group self-determination, individual rights,
or social inclusion? Competing frames for ethnic counting in Hungary”, Ethnic and Racial
Studies, 35:8, (2011), p. 1396, accessed 9 September 2014, doi: 10.1080/01419870.2011.607501.
10 Data compiled from Slovakia 2nd Report (2005): “Second Report Submitted by the Slovak Republic
Pursuant to Article 25, Paragraph 1 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities”. ACFC/SR/II(2005)001. Straßburg, 3 January 2005; Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic
(Štatistický úrad Slovenskej republiky), http://portal.statistics.sk/showdoc.do?docid=50553 (accessed 1
December 2013).
11 At the 1991 census “Roma” was an ethnic option for the first time in Slovakia. However, apparently only
reluctant use of this option was made – just the same at the 2001 census. The actual number of Roma is
probably many times higher and is estimated by the Slovak government in 2001 to 380,000; cf. Slovakia
2nd Report, 2005, p. 60.
12 The Russian minority was officially recognized in 2003.
13 The Slovak Constitution distinguishes between national minorities and ethnic groups. A commentary on
the 1997 Constitution states that the legal system of the Slovak Republic makes no definition of those
terms.
14 National Institute of Statistics (INSSE): PRESS RELEASE No. 159 of July 4th, 2013 on the final results of
Population and Housing Census– 2011 (demographic characteristics of population).
1
13
http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/statistici/comunicate/RPL/RPL%20_rezultate%20definitive_e.pdf,
(accessed 1 December 2013)
15 A. McGarry, Who Speaks for Roma? Political Representation of a Transnational Minority Community, (New
York: Continuum, 2010), p. 158.
16 Roma are neither politically nor socially united due to their linguistic and communal diversity: there are
countless Roma subgroups like the Boyash, Lovari or Sinti.
17
Data from Council of Europe, http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/romatravellers/default_en.asp (accessed 9 April 2014)
Brubaker, 1997, p. 13.
19 Ibid., p. 16.
20 Ibid., p. 21.
21 Ibid., p. 16.
22 P. Simon, “Collecting ethnic statistics in Europe: a review” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 35:8 (2011):1368,
accessed 9 September 2014, doi: 10.1080/01419870.2011.607507.
23 Kertzer, D. I. and Arel, D. (eds) Census and Identity: The Politics of Race,
Ethnicity and Language in National Censuses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 36.
24 I. Hoóz, “Population census and nationality” Minorities Research 3
http://www.hhrf.org/kisebbsegkutatas/mr_03/cikk.php?id=1229, (accessed 1 December 2013)
25 P. Simon, “Collecting ethnic statistics in Europe: a review”, p. 1376.
26 See Eleanor Knott’s contribution to this volume.
27 H. E. Brady and C. S. Kaplan “Conceptualizing and Measuring Ethnic Identity”, in: Measuring Identity: A
Guide for Social Scientists, eds. R. Abdelal, Y. M. Herrera, A. I. Johnston, and R. McDermott 33-71,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
18
14