Johannes Huinink, Institute for Sociology and Demography, University of Rostock
The Macro-Micro-Link in Demography – Explanations of Demographic Change
Presentation at the EuroConference „The Second Demographic Transition in Europe”,
23-28 June 2001 in Bad Herrenalb, Germany
1.
Introduction
The concept of the second demographic transition is well on the way to gain the prominence
of its precursor – the model of the first demographic transition – in regard to describe
demographic change in developed countries during the last 35 years and the near future
(Lesthaeghe 1995; van de Kaa 1987, 1997). As its precursor this approach is a genuine
macro-level approach – that is why I also see weaknesses in regard to the explanation of
fertility trends.
In his discussion of theories of social change Raymond Boudon from my point of view
convincingly argued that macro-level theories fail by principle (Boudon 1986). By and large
they underestimate the variety and heterogeneity in demographic change in the past and will
do so for the future. Counter examples to their models are easy to find. Coale and others were
very successful in showing this studying the first demographic transition in the Princeton
fertility project (Coale et al 1986). Others show in their analyses of European fertility in the
last decades that rough trends can be assured but it is hard to see a concise European pattern
of family development (Dorbritz 2000, Kuijsten 1996).
Not to say that there is no irreversible societal change underlying the demographic change.
Not to say that we experience a decline of fertility by mean in developed countries under the
level of reproduction. Not to say that the age at family formation is increasing by mean. Not
to say that is seems unlikely that in developed countries we can expect a return to fertility on
the reproduction level. However, we saw a rise of fertility in previous low fertility countries
during certain time periods. We see very low fertility in countries like Italy, Spain that do not
meet essential characteristic features of a country at the outset of the second demographic
transition. In some countries looking at average levels of fertility makes no sense because of
polarization phenomena.
In the latest conceptual reconstruction of the idea of the second demographic transition van
de Kaa or Lesthaeghe and Willems proposed a three-phase model (Lesthaeghe/ Willems
1999: 227; van de Kaa 1997). In the first phase one can regard a general decline in fertility
over all ages – just a further restriction of the number of children in the families in
continuation of the first demographic transition (Cliquet 1991). The second, the intermediate
phase is characterized by an ongoing delay of the entry into parenthood during the life course
– due to gains in female education and employment. In the cross-sectional perspective this
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leads to considerably low fertility rates. In the third phase the delay of family formation
comes to an end and one can expect an incomplete recuperation of fertility in the life course
and therefore considerably lower cohort fertility. Looking at the CFR, the completed fertility
rate for different cohorts born between 1955 and 1965 in different European countries
Lesthaeghe and Willems indeed can show a decline, even though a quite small one in most
countries.
Where will it end? What is the rationale regarding the current change? Lesthaeghe and
Willems only assume that in Europe, in contrast to the US fertility, will remain well below
the replacement level. The driving forces of the development are „female education, female
labor force participation, ideational changes, and patterns of union formation and especially
union instability” (Lesthaeghe/ Willems 1999: 226). This, however, is not theoretically
elaborated.
Recently Ron Lesthaeghe discussed explanations of the trends of the second demographic
transition by integrating some well known theories in the field of family formation – the
approaches of Becker and Easterlin and what he calls the theory of ideational shifts
(Lesthaeghe 1998). As far as fertility is concerned “... compatible with Becker’s thesis is that
fertility during the 1970s and much of the 1980s was strongly inversely related to female
employment. This continues to be so in many countries. Evidently, opportunity cost weight
heavily in the cost-benefit calculus. But this evidence is equally compatible with Easterlin’s
position in which female employment has become essential to compensate for the weaker
earning position of men and to safeguard the material standards of living. With further
increasing consumption aspirations, dual earners are far better able to satisfy their material
needs. In this fashion the competition between consumption and children continues. But the
link between fertility and female employment is equally compatible with that the third
theory, that of ideational shift” (Lesthaeghe 1998: 7).
Lesthaeghe argues to bring these theories together in a “multi-causal theory with strong
contextual variations”. This means that explaining fertility decline – and other trends of the
second demographic transition – by a big deal can be brought about by linking them all
together. However, there is room for each theory special explanation of the (same) proposed
trends in different social contexts. “When combined, they argue in favor of a stabilization of
the features of the second demographic transition, and against a cyclical return to the patterns
of family formation and dissolution that the West experienced until the 1960s” (Leasthaghe
1998: 10). “Working” together they serve for an proposed, irreversible trend of family
change. Each theory takes its special part in that or one effects proposed by one are assumed
to trigger effects proposed by the other.
Here I will step in and discuss some aspects of current and future fertility trends on the basis
of a multilevel approach of explanation the second demographic transition theory is rather
quite about. I will proceed in four steps.
2
In the first step, very briefly a multi-level approach as proposed by Boudon, Coleman,
Lindenberg, and particularly for demography by de Bruijn, and others is presented. This
serves for a theoretic basis to start with when explaining individual decision and behavior in
regard to fertility.
In the second step, I will discuss a (pre) assumption concerning individual preferences
regarding fertility. I assume that there is an ongoing, but „modern” motivation to have
children, which probably is not changing to that degree as the observed results do. Over
more, it can be argued that the pretentiousness and the felt responsibility towards children
and parenthood increased. This leads to a change of the scope of the focus from asking „Why
having no children anymore?” to „Why and under which conditions having one or more
children?”.
In my third and fourth step I try to show some differentiated views on the fertility change
connecting two macro-level aspects with micro-level behavior orientations. In the third step I
will refer to a macro level condition of fertility behavior, which today from my point of view
is the most crucial one: the question of compatibility of family and non-family activities. In
the fourth step I address the relevance of the anticipated material conditions of young people
facing family formation. The requirements to be fulfilled before people feel ready for
parenthood and the engagement in a long term and costly commitment of raising a child
increase and the same is true for the felt pretentiousness and responsibilities as a parent.
The hypothesis of Ron Lesthaeghe and Dirk van de Kaa that the step from the first to the
second demographic transition meant a shift from altruism to individualism as the driving
force of fertility change can be questioned as well as Lesthaeghe´s particular approach of the
multi-causal theory thou.
In my conclusions I will consider some consequences for methodological innovations needed
to get a sound basis of empirical research.
2.
Theoretical concept of a dynamic multi-level-schema
Fertility has to be seen as a change in the living arrangement, or more general, in the
biographical status of individuals as a consequence of fertility related action. This kind of
action by actor A is related to action in other life domains Y. It is also strongly related to the
behavior of another actor B. These actions again are embedded in a differentiated structure of
conditions of different kinds (restrictions and opportunities). There many concepts proposed
you all know (Coleman 1990, Esser 1993, de Bruijn 2000). Please regard figure 1 for this.
Figure 1: A multi-level model of social change
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Actor A and B act pursuing preferred goals – at the end serving for subjective optimal living
conditions in different life domains: Final goals might be physical and psychic well-being,
social approval, personal security etc. (Lindenberg 1989; Nauck 2000)
People act in a way that from their subjective perspective is most instrumental for these goals
taking into account the conditions of relatively scarce resources to spend and calculating the
probability of the materialization of the expected consequences. Regarding the consequences
of their action, they take into account not only the immediate consequences for their life
course, but also more and more the medium and long-term future effects. This is very
important.
There are many concepts proposing different dimensions of a general incentive/ disincentive
structure regarding fertility (Nauck/ Kohlmann 1999). Mainly the following dimensions are
emphasized, which can be considered regarding the choice of living arrangements in general.
As far as the incentives are concerned:
„psychic and emotional benefits”
„socio-normative benefits”
„economic benefits“
„assurance benefits“
As far as the disincentives are concerned:
„investment (direct) cost“
„opportunity cost”
„cost of social control“
„negative externalities from the action of the partner and/or children”.
„separation cost“
The specific incentive / disincentive structure of a particular actor is molded by three
dimensions of conditions of action.
First, there are the objective structural conditions of action („external” opportunity structure): cultural, social, political, economic and ecological conditions that favor or disfavor a
certain kind of action (opportunities and restrictions) in the sense that it has different effects
on incentives resp. disincentive from the point of view of the actor.
Second, we have to regard the resources the individuals have access to or control: economic
capital, human/cultural capital, psychic capital, biological/genetic capital and achieved
biographical status.
Third, there are the individual psycho-social dispositions that could be seen as an „inner”
opportunity structure with elements that are differently stable in time: expectations,
orientations, and emotions. Beliefs, convictions, values, subjective needs establish a
preference structure of individual goals saying what is important and what is unimportant for
a person from the subjective perspective.
4
On the background of my schema now three aspects are discussed, which are most important
for explaining today’s stability and change in fertility trends.
3
Motivation to parenthood
The second demographic transition approach is correct, traditional social and cultural factors
determining fertility lose relevance. We also have to deal with a fundamental change in
gender roles. People have got efficient technical means to plan and conduct family formation
and development beyond traditional patterns of behavior. However, does this inevitably lead
to a steady decline of cohort fertility – which means no or only small recuperation in
Lesthaeghe’s model not to talk about a possible reversal of the age at family formation?
The family can be conceptualized as an action system of purposeful actors A, B, and so on. It
is characterized by a joint production of goods, for example raising children and giving
emotional satisfaction. Following Coleman’s model, the family is an action system of a
particular kind. The elements of families are persons and not positions like in modern
purposeful corporate actors building the purposeful social structure (Coleman 1990). During
the process of modernization many kinds of activities moved from the family to the
pusposeful social structure (production, education, care and nurturing etc.). Also the amount
of time actors spend together in the family shrank. The male and to an increasing extent the
female adults engage more and more in the purposeful social structure. Coleman argues that
the motivation to uphold family relations decreases and family specific social capital
disappears (Coleman 1990: 590ff). Children are no more private goods, but public ones.
Coleman’s description of the consequences of modernization on the family is correct and
quite instructive. However his conclusion with regard to the family are not convincing. We
realize a specialization of inner family relations as a source of particular psychic and
emotional satisfaction. The kind of social capital the family provided changed during the
process of modernization. It is not serving for skill and material oriented support anymore
but psychological and identity sustaining support.
The relationship between parents and children now can be expected to be more and more
characterized by „dialogical”, i.e. non-strategical communication and personal exchange.
Getting children means creating a social relation or social capital of a particular kind with
advantages for the parents, which cannot be purchased. There is no substitution for this in the
market. Schoen and his co-authors discuss parenthood in this respect also using the concept
of social capital (Schoen et al. 1997). Using data of the NSFH they investigated fertility
intentions. They conclude:
„Most significantly, we found strong support for the hypothesis that persons for whom
relationships created by children are important considerations in childbearing decisions are
more likely to intend to have a (another) child. The ‘social capital’ effect is strong across
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parity, union status, gender, and race. The theoretical and empirical evidence presented here
provides strong justification in social resource value of children as a prime motivator of
childbearing in low-fertility countries” (Schoen et al. 1997: 349).
Economic factors (employment career and economic costs) play a less prominent role. They
find this, even though the operationalization of the „social capital”- or „social resource”hypothesis is far from ideal, because it combines instrumental and non-instrumental aspects.
Following the VOC-theory, one can propose non-material benefits, such as, emotional
satisfaction, stimulation and fun, the ”expansion of ones’ self” and social identity. It is
argued that a mere list of potential benefits of parenthood, as in the VOC theory, is of
dubious value (Friedman/ Hechter/ Kanazawa 1994: 380). As long as no theoretical reason is
provided for the relevance of those benefits, this criticism is correct. That is why I tried to
derive the need for the specific benefit of dialogical relations from a short reflection on a
theory of the self in modern societies (Huinink 1995). I do not argue that it is the only one
which meets the requirements of dialogical interaction, however it is a privileged one
because there are good reasons to suppose additional psychological benefits of parenting.
Now one can argue that particularly in advanced modern societies people need this kind of
social settings with closed network structure characterized by trustful and „authentic” social
relations. There is a motivation for setting up those relations (Huinink 1995, Schoen et al.
1997). Coleman does not stress this – as it is not the case in the second demographic
transition theory. It proposes that the incentive to have children should become weaker
during this development (Coleman 1990: 585), arguing with the shift from altruism to
individualism.
Studies of the desire for children show remarkably stable patterns over time and between
different age groups. Empirical evidences come from Bongaarts and others. Bongaarts argues
that the gap between the desired family size and period fertility is caused by the ongoing
delay of family formation and an effect of demographic translation (Bongaarts 1998). This is
a demographic reason but by no means substantial. Results from the FFS show that the
expected number of children in nearly all European countries is well above 2 and that it is not
very different between different educational groups. See for this also figures 2 and 3. The
data are taken from standard tables of country report of the FFS (comp. Bongaarts 1999).
Figure 2: Average number of children ultimately wanted in different European countries
(Age Group 35-39).
In higher age groups the expected number is somewhat more realistic and decreasing,
probably counteracting a positive cohort effect. In figure 3, a younger age group is chosen.
The latter makes some difference, but in most countries these differences are not too large.
Also the ranking of the countries changed quite a bit.
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Figure 3: Average number of children ultimately wanted in different European countries
(Age Group 20-24).
How weak these indicators ever might be – we need much more research on the intention
issues – they show a fairly high level of fertility intentions and with only a small percentage
of women expecting to stay childless over time. As we know, the realized number of children
will be well below the expected ones for the cohorts presented here. Contrary to the realized
figures expected family size presumably does not differ very much between different groups
in the populations.
To summarize: There is a particular „modern” or even „postmodern” motivation for children
and parenthood. Therefore the very low birthrate in many Western societies might be an
expression of an unintended adaptation to the structural recklessness of societal conditions
with respect to the family (Kaufmann 1994: 169) – by delaying and often as a consequence
of this by giving up further fertility.
4
Explaining fertility from a multi-level perspective
In many European countries becoming parents today biographically is not an unconditional
task anymore. It has to fit into other dimensions of the life course to a sufficient level in the
long-term perspective. I argued elsewhere that particularly three „problems” have to be
solved before young people feel ready for a family: gaining certainty about the personal
biographical future, gaining certainty about the long-term economic affordability of a family
tasks and the question of compatibility of family with non-family activities.
Then fertility is a matter of autonomous decision-making in the life course perspective and
competing with other life goals. Increasing autonomy in planning and conducting life means
that structural factors gain relevance as well as individual characteristics. Only studying the
individual level logic of family formation in advanced modern societies helps to identify the
(subjectively) relevant macro dimensions of societal conditions of fertility behavior.
Let us look at two of these problems. We consider two macro-micro links explaining fertility
behavior and showing remarkable deviations from a macro-level based trend hypothesis of
the kind the second demographic transition theory proposes. They can be connected to two of
the three theories Lesthaeghe uses to support his approach: Becker’s theory of the effects of
improved prospects of women in the labor market and Easterlin’s theory of the effects of
relative income deprivation on fertility behavior (Becker 1991, Easterlin 1980). Both are
multi-level theories because they connect macro conditions with individual decision-making.
Both are quite different and I will argue that Lesthaeghe´s concept to combine them with the
theory of ideational shifts for the theoretical basis for the second demographic transition
(multi-causal theory with strong contextual variations) can be questioned, because important
aspects are not considered enough.
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4.1
The compatibility question and polarization in family formation
Referring to Becker’s conclusions and the assumed ideational change, Ron Lesthaeghe
writes: „ This joint occurrence constitutes a major interaction term with considerable
predictive power: as long as we have equal education standards for both sexes and as long as
the highly educated also form a cultural elite in tandem with being an economic one, chances
are that fertility will remain below replacement level and that the other outcomes of the
second demographic transition will continue” (Lesthaeghe 1998: 9). I will discuss that in my
third step.
It is true that many people, well educated in particular, are reluctant to become parents
because of their improving prospects in the labor market. However one important aspect is
not taken into account in this context. If it is true that we have still high motivations for
children, these people might have problems to solve the problem of the combination of work,
engagement in other market activities and parenting. This is particularly true if we assume
that the outcomes of different life domains are not completely substitutable against each
other. I argued that this is the case for the experiences with children. Therefore we should
expect a high motivation to combine family and non-family activities.
Friedman, Hechter, and Kanazawa (1994) instead argue, ”that the impetus for parenthood is
greatest among those whose alternative pathways for reducing uncertainty are limited or
blocked” (Friedman/Hechter/ Kanazawa, 1994: 383). Missing prospects for a stable work
career, for example, should strengthen the readiness for parenthood. Good prospects should
have negative effects on the propensity to parenthood. The same is even proposed in regard
to the relation between prospects for marriage and parenthood. The core assumption of this
theory is that marriage, parenthood, and a stable work career are alternative means of
reducing uncertainty in the long run. Therefore, if following one of these perspectives is
sufficient to satisfy the need for reduction of uncertainty, the incentive to intend any of the
others should be small.
The authors do not consider that combining two tracks, say marriage and parenthood, might
be rational from the uncertainty point of view. And they do not take into account that the
benefits of one dimension cannot be substituted completely by another. The mentioned life
plans should not be real alternatives. People want to have both, a family and a gainful work
experience, because it might be rational to try to reduce uncertainty concerning the future life
course by gaining stable economic prospects of both partners and therefore being confident
in regard to the affordability of a subsequent parenthood. The motivation to invest into the
quality of the children is high. This means, labor force participation of both partners is
supportive for a family – if the compatibility problem is solved.
Then there is no relation of substitution but of complementarity!
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This is also overlooked in Becker’s theory or in the theory of second demographic transition.
Obviously the ideational change proposed by the second demographic transition theory must
not be downpushing fertility in times of changing gender roles, if it is accompanied by a
decreasing structural familialism, i.e. increasing material support of families and particularly
a support of solving compatibility problems by the state or the market (comp. Rindfuss/
Brewster 1996; Brewster/ Rindfuss 2000).
Meanwhile, the surprising result is well known that on the macro-level the correlation
between female labor force participation and fertility changed from negative to positive
values shown by Brewster and Rindfuss (1996: 278).
Figure 4: Female labor force participation and the TFR 1996 for different countries
A closer look at figure 4 shows that we roughly can distinguish several clusters of countries.
There is one with the Scandinavian countries and the Anglo-American liberal democracies.
Another cluster consists of the Southern European countries. One can see, that the overall
positive relation is mainly due to the relative position of the first and the second group of
countries. If we concentrate only on the „Other European Countries” (excluding UK, France
with a rather low LFLP because of reasons which are not relevant here – men also show a
quite low figure here – and East Germany because of it special historical situation) we see a
negative relationship between TFR and FLFP. In this group, we still have effects of
compatibility questions and traditionality.
Let me go into a little more detail on this. Let us have a look at a group of women with high
human capital and a high motivation to engage in market work: women with an academic
degree. What we find, when we estimate the distribution of these women by parity using FFS
data of a sample of countries, is surprising: in some countries, this distribution is bimodal
with a peak at parity zero and one at parity two (comp. figure 5), in other countries this is not
the case (figure 6)1.
Figure 5: Women with an academic degree by parity and country. Here: Countries with a
„polarized” pattern
In figure 5 we see the Netherlands, Switzerland, West Germany, and the US. In the first three
countries the childcare opportunities particularly for very young children were bad and still
are so. In the US this also holds for the provision of public day care, available private
childcare is not without problems thou (Rindfuss/ Brewster 1996). In figure 6, the results for
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East Germany, Finland, France, and Sweden can be interpreted as an effect of good
opportunities to combine family and work.
Poland was a country with a traditional regime of family formation as it is the case in Italy
with its well known paradox effects on family formation.
Figure 6: Women with an academic degree by parity and country. Here: Countries with a
„non-polarized” pattern
How to explain this? I cannot go into the details here. My model is based on the notion of
different relations between three kinds of losses or costs people are faced with when thinking
about their life plans. The first two are different kinds of opportunity costs. First, there are
the costs of childlessness. It is hard to estimate these costs precisely, but after our assumption
and its empirical support they should be still fairly high in all these countries we study. Cash
benefits of the state also play a certain role, too. Second, we assume costs of distraction from
non-family activities – particularly from market work. Estimating these is not an easy task,
but in our group of highly educated women these also should be quite high in the countries
we look at. Third, one can introduce costs of combining family and non-family activities.
Here we have considerable differences between the countries as easily can be shown.
The countries with the bimodal pattern of the distribution by parity mainly can be
characterized by a triple high cost situation the people are faced with. Particularly women
with an academic degree can be assumed to be torn between the desire for parenthood with
investing in „high quality” children on the one and high incentives to be continuously
employed on the other hand. High costs of solving the compatibility problem push them to
one or the other alternative, whatever the individual reason might be. People then try to
optimize the output of their choice. Those who stay childless then concentrate on a career and
even stay unmarried by a particular high proportion. Those who decided in favor of a family
try to optimize the benefits from parenting. However, there is also a growing proportion of
highly educated couples who can afford the compatibility costs and realize both even in these
countries.
The nontraditional countries showing a unimodel pattern of the distribution by parity serve
for low compatibility costs and can combine both family and work or non-family activities to
a sufficient extent.
What did we learn from this example? Micro-macro links pay and there might be different
explanations needed for international differences and similarities in fertility. So second
demographic transition theory should care about these questions because these results oppose
hypotheses of linear relations between individualism and fertility and a general acceptance of
Becker’s theory, which only seems to be plausible in a low compatibility regime.
1
The calculations for these figures were done in the context of cooperative work with the MPI of Demographic
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4.2
The affordability question and roller coaster fertility
Also Easterlin’s approach is used by Ron Lesthaeghe to reason in favor of fertility decline as
a consequence of the increase of female labor force participation – starting from the
assumption that work opportunities for men are shrinking and consumption aspirations are
rising. Relative deprivation is the consequence at least in particuar parts of the population
(Lesthaeghe 1998: 9). What could be supportive for the new relevance of Easterlin from my
point of view, I will show in my forth step.
Indeed, of increasing importance for fertility decisions is the question of affordability and the
certainty about the future life course. This is not only true because the costs of children
increase, but also because the aspiration regarding the quality of children increases – again
particularly in an individualistic setting. Why?
Coleman had proposed that the incentive to invest in children to make them productive
decreased. Coleman’s hypothesis is not true concerning the specific psychic benefits parents
receive from children. We can argue that psychic and emotional satisfaction from raising
children and the social interaction with them are both positively correlated with the parents
investments in the quality of children. Therefore, if the rise of altruism has been important in
the first transition it is hard to argue that this is not the case today – the contrary might be
true.
Investment into the children optimizes the basis of „dialogical” and personally satisfying
interaction. Or take the aspect of the expansion of the parent’s self, proposed as a value of
children by the VOC-theory (Hoffman/ Hoffman 1973). According to Coleman, this can be
obtained by identification with the other or by acting to benefit the other. The second aspect
”is most evident in a parent’s identification with a child” (Coleman 1990: 518). The first
aspect means that the parent’s identification with the success the children achieve plays a
role. To be able to identify with a successful child, parents have an interest in contributing to
optimal chances of their children to be successful in the society. Finally, it makes sense to
invest in one’s children as far as the aspect of children as a source of social approval and
social status is concerned.
These are reasons for the increasing relevance of a norm on parenting. Kaufmann calls it the
norm ”responsible parenthood” (Kaufmann 1994: 42). The parental aspiration towards the
”quality” of the child rose considerably in the last 40 years.
Resaerch in Rostock. The distribution for the Netherlands I got from Aat Liefbroer. Many Thanks for that.
11
Anticipating this, an increasing number of potential parents want to be sufficiently sure that
they can afford fulfilling their parental aspirations in a long term perspective – without
loosing to many opportunities to satisfy needs and desires in other life domains. Young
people pay regard to the demanding requirements of parenting. And they consider the
probability that the expected benefits from parenthood in fact can be realized. They decide on
when and whether to enter parenthood to optimize its expected psychological benefits. They
might plan only to postpone the birth of a child avoiding the long-term commitment unless
they are rather sure about their future life perspectives and waiting until they think they can
afford to take the responsibility raising a child. This is the problem of affordability.
I said that low compatibility conditions in a country support the Becker approach of
explaining heterogeneity in fertility. We experience an „anti-cyclical” change or a steady
decline of period fertility caused by an ongoing postponement of family formation and the
polarization phenomena I presented (Andersson 1999). As we already saw, compatibility is
an important part of solution to the problem of affordability.
In regard to high compatibility regimes, we gain better explanations by a modified version of
Easterlin’s relative deprivation theory. We expect a pro-cyclical change of fertility (Anderson
1999). And this might lead to what the Hoems called roller-coaster fertility (Hoem/ Hoem
1996). Under good conditions of combining work and family, fertility mainly depends on the
biographical and economic prospects of the members of a society, and these prospects can
change. Fertility now should rely on the economic prospects of both partners.
Good examples for this are the cases of Sweden in the nineties, to a certain extent also East
Germany resp. other Eastern European countries. In Sweden the compatibility costs are
relatively low, even though they have been increasing. However, Sweden experienced a
considerable detoriation of the economic situation during the nineties and a drop in period
fertility. In different studies it is shown quite convincingly that indeed this could be an effect
of pro-cyclical fertility behavior in timing and quantum of fertility (Andersson 1999, Hoem
1998, Santow/ Bracher 1998). Andersson very nicely shows the strong positive correlation
between women’s income and what he called a „mood in society” with fertility. And Britta
Hoem concludes from her analyses: “Our conclusion above of the individual women’s
income and activity situation and the employment trend in her home municipality allowed us
to ‘explain’ most of the period effect except the rise in first births during the late 1980s and a
residual decline after the mid-1990s. It is possible that these remaining period effects are
related to changes in the generosity of Swedish family benefits, for they occur in years where
such benefits were changed” (Hoem 1998: 10). Andersson (1999) expects a new uprise in
period fertility in Sweden. Our theoretical considerations support this. However, we have to
wait whether it really happens.
5
Conclusions
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Two very important factors of fertility in European countries were addressed: compatibility
and affordability of the long-term commitment of having children. The theory of the second
demographic transition, however, is rather quiet about this. The reason is that it only rather
roughly addresses the individual decision processes underlying fertility intentions and its
realization. Therefore, for example, the theories of Easterlin and Becker have to be regarded
as multi-level approaches that offer relevant bridge hypotheses linking the conditions and
external opportunities with individual decision-making in a particular way. Becker and
Easterlin fit to different compatibility regimes. While Becker has more explanatory power in
a regime of low compatibility between family and work, Easterlin is able to explain the
roller-coaster fertility. The fact that economically enforced female labor participation leads to
a decline in fertility because of compatibility problems by no means is the whole and not the
decisive story Easterlin tells.
This differentiated view on fertility trends can only be gained by a multi-level perspective.
However, we are lacking adequate empirical research on that. This is by part due to the fact
that the old instruments and questions asked to the people in surveys are not sufficient
anymore. Therefore we have to ask how such a conceptual approach methodologically
should look like? We need for example more and better information on
fertility intentions. A theoretical tool and guidance for this could be the Aijzen-model.
We need to ask other questions regarding the desire for children than before and we need
time-dependent information an that. We do not have to explain why young women and
men do not want to have any children or only one child. The question is why, obviously,
women will not realize their fertility intentions. What is the logic behind this? What
makes them waiting or giving up?
considered biographical requirements, which have to be fulfilled before one feels ready
to start a family, and perceived expectations connected with parenthood to understand
more about how costs and benefits of parenthood are considered. We need this not only
in the short term but also in the long term perspective which increasingly plays a role.
What we need, are long-term panel studies on the transition to adulthood to study fertility as
a part of the interdependent processes and changing orientations and perspectives in young
men’s and women’s lives.
13
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15
Figure 1: A multi-level model of social change
Macro-/Mesostructural Conditions: cultural, social, economic, political („external“ opportunity structure)
Individual Resources
Individual Resources
economic capital
human capital/ cultural capital
social capital
psychic capital
biological/ genetic capital
Fertility
Actor A
(Incentives and
Disincentives)
Acting in life
domain Y
Psycho-Social Dispositions
(„inner“ opportunity structure)
Change of the living
arrangement
New Biographical Status
Status change in life
domain Y
Psycho-Social Dispositions
Physical and
Psychic Wellbeing
value orientations
emotions
preferences
Actor B
Time axis (age, historical time, sojourn times)
1,5
1
0,5
0
*** Sweden, Norway: age 38
France (1954-58)
Estonia (1954-58)
*** Sweden (1954)
Slovenia (1956-60)
Greece (1960-64)
*** Norway (1950)
Poland (1952-56)
Lithuania (1955-60)
Rep. Czech (1958-62)
Belgium (1951-56)
Finland (1950-54)
Portugal (1957-62)
Latvia (1955-60)
Italy (1956-60)
Netherlands (1953-58)
Switzerland (1955-59)
Austria (1956-61)
East-Germany (1952/53-57)
Canada (1950-54)
West-Germany (1952/53-57)
Figure 2
Average number of children ultimately wanted
Age group 35-39 (cohorts in parenthesis)
3
Source: Family and Fertility Survey
2,5
2
1
0,5
1,5
0
*** Norway, Sweden: age 23
** Norway (1965)
Estonia (1969-73)
Canada (1965-69)
** Sweden (1969)
Greece (1975-79)
Slovenia (1971-75)
Netherlands 1968-73)
Switzerland (1970-74)
France (1969-73)
Lithuania (1970-75)
Portugal (1972-77)
Italy (1971-75)
Latvia (1970-75)
Austria (1971-76)
Belgium (1966-70)
Rep. Czech (1973-77)
West-Germany (1967/68-72)
East-Germany (1967/68-72)
Poland 1967-71)
Figure 3
Average number of children ultimately wanted
Age group 20-24 (cohorts in parenthesis)
3
Source: Family and Fertility Survey
2,5
2
Figure 4
Female labour force participation and the TFR in 1996
for different countries
2,5
IS
USA
2
IRL
N
L
AUS UK
F
SF
DK
CDN
S
1,5
B
NL
CH
TFR
A
GRE
I
D
West
E
J
1
D
East
Southern
Europe
Scandinavien
Countries
0,5
Non-European
Countries
Other European
Countries
0
40
50
60
70
FLFP
80
90
100
Figure 5
Women with an Academic Degree by Parity and Country
here: Countries with a "Polarized" Pattern
(Counts in Parentheses)
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Netherlands,
Age 35-42, FFS 1993
(593)
Switzerland,
Age 35-42, FFS 1994/95
(101)
No Child
One Child
West Germany,
Age 35-39, FFS ’92
(73)
Two Children
Three Children and more
USA,
Age 35-42, FFS 1995
(688)
Figure 6
Women with an Academic Degree by Parity and Country
here: Countries with a "Non-Polarized" Pattern
(Counts in Parentheses)
60,0
50,0
40,0
30,0
20,0
10,0
0,0
East Germany,
Age 35-39,
FFS ’92
(174)
Finland,
Age 35-42,
FFS 1989/90
(109)
France,
Age 35-42,
FFS 1994
(132)
No Child
Italy,
Age35-39,
FFS 1995/96
(101)
One Child
Italy,
Age 40-45,
FFS 1995/96
(88)
Two Children
Poland,
35-42,
FFS 1991
(120)
Three Children and more
Sweden,
Age 35-39,
FFS 1992/93
(272)
Sweden,
Age 40-43,
FFS 1992/93
(255)