C O N TE M PO R A R Y C H IN A PA PERS
T a lk in g w ith C h in a : T h e
A u s tra lia n L a b o r P a rty v isit
a n d P e k in g ’s fo re ig n p o licy
S tep h en F itzG erald
This book was published by ANU Press between 1965–1991.
This republication is part of the digitisation project being carried
out by Scholarly Information Services/Library and ANU Press.
This project aims to make past scholarly works published
by The Australian National University available to
a global audience under its open-access policy.
ERRATA
Page 1, Line 2:
1971 should read 1970
Page 29, Line 14:
Chi: should read Pai:
S te p h e n F itz G e ra ld w as fo rm erly a C h in a specialist in the
A u stralian foreign service, w ith w h ich he had served in H ong
K o n g and on th e C h in a desk in C an b e rra , and from w hich he
resigned because h e disagreed w ith A u stralia’s C h in a and Asia
policies. H e is now a F ellow in F a r E aste rn H isto ry at T h e
A u stralian N atio n a l U n iv e rsity an d D e p u ty H ead o f th e U n i­
v ersity ’s C o n te m p o ra ry C h in a C en tre.
H e has v isited C h in a on th re e occasions, th e last being as
adviser and in te rp re te r to th e A u stralian L a b o r P a rty delegation
in 1971.
D r F itz G e ra ld , w hose research in terests are concerned mainly
w ith C h in ese foreign policy an d th e relations b etw een C hina and
S o u th -E a st A sia, is a u th o r o f C hina and the Overseas Chinese
(C am b rid g e, 1972).
In 1971 th e A u stralian L a b o r P a rty so u g h t and received an
in v itatio n to v isit th e P e o p le ’s R ep u b lic o f C hin a, a co u n try it
has long b een A .L .P . policy to recognise. T h e p u rp o se of the
visit w as to explore m a tte rs o f com m on interest.
T h is p a p e r does m o re th a n reco rd th e A .L .P .’s v isit and the
discussions in Peking. I t sets th e visit in th e context o f A u stralia’s
policy to w ard s C h in a (an issue in d om estic politics since 1949)
and of C h in a ’s foreign policy and th e aim s and co n d u c t o f C hinese
diplom acy.
R arely has th e re b een in tellig en t d eb ate in A u stralia on foreign
policy, p a rtic u la rly vis-a -vis C hin a, a c o u n try a b o u t w hich m any
A u stralian s are ill-in fo rm ed . T h is tim ely p a p e r is a serious
co n trib u tio n to an im p o rta n t and controversial debate. I t will
arouse w id esp read in terest.
C o n t e m p o r a r y C h in a P a p e r s N o . 4
G en era l Editor S tep h en F itzG erald
O ther Papers
1 Leong Sow -Theng, Sino-Soviet Relations. The first phase
1917-1920. 1971
2 R obert O ’Neill, Peking-Hanoi Relations in 1970. 1971
3 A udrey D onnithorne, The Budget and the Plan in China:
Central-local economic relations. 1972
CO N TE M PO R A R Y C H IN A PA PERS N O . 4
T a lk in g w ith C h in a : T h e
A u s tra lia n L a b o r P a rty v isit
a n d P e k in g ’s fo re ig n p o licy
S tephen F itzG erald
AU STRALIAN N A T IO N A L U N IV ER SIT Y PRESS CANBERRA 1 9 7 2
© Stephen FitzG erald 1972
T his book is copyright. A part from any fair
dealing for the purposes of private study,
research, criticism, or review, as perm itted
under the C opyright Act, no part m ay be
reproduced by any process w ithout written
perm ission. Inquiries should be m ade to the
publisher
L ibrary of Congress Catalog no. 72-78487
National Library of Australia card no. and
ISBN o 7081 0221 2
T ex t set in 10 pt M onofilm Im print by
M onotrade Pty L td and
printed by Southwood Press, Sydney. Designed
by David W alker, A .N .U . G raphic Designer.
Registered at the General Post Office,
Sydney, for transm ission by post as a book
T h e parad e of g o v ern m en ts recognising P eking w h ich followed from the
C anadian recognition in O cto b er 1971 has te n d e d to take on the character
of a collective m an ifestatio n of a new w orld tre n d w hich centres around the
N ixon initiative, th e U n ite d N atio n s vote in 1971, and th e shifting balance
betw een th e w o rld ’s m o st pow erful states. It is tru e th a t the su d denness
w ith w hich g o v ern m en ts have been seeking out C hin ese representatives in
th ird countries does ap p ear to be in hasty response to a new tren d in ‘w orld
o p in io n ’, and th a t successive acts o f recognition have them selves influenced
o th e r gov ern m en ts to m odify th e ir o stracism of th e g o v ern m en t in Peking,
or resulted in w h at is know n p o p u larly as th e ‘b a n d w ag o n ’ effect. B ut
b e n eath th e general tre n d and th e eu p h o ria, or desp air, su rro u n d in g it,
th ere lie im p o rta n t and m o re specific q u estio n s w h ich concern C h in a ’s
b ilateral relatio n sh ip s and th e a ttitu d e s and policies tow ards C hina of
individual countries.*
F irst, th ere is the q u estio n of how C h in a ’s new co n tacts w ith the now
d isin teg ratin g in tern atio n al a n ti-C h in a lobby are w ork ing out in p ractice;
w h at im pression are th e C hin ese m aking and w h at responses and initiatives
are they m eeting? T o w h at ex ten t is th e re in te ra c tio n and real co m m u n i­
cation? T h is, after all, is w h at th e o p p o n e n ts of th e D ullesian policy of
excom m unicatio n long argued sh o u ld be one of th e m ost im p o rtan t fruits
* T his paper is an interpretation of events concerning A ustralia’s relations w ith China, and
is not in any way an official record of the China policy, or of the 1971 visit to China, of the
Australian L abor Party. T h e facts may be verified, b u t the interpretation is my own.— S.F.
I
S T E PH E N FITZGERALD
of d ire c t contact w ith th e C h in ese G o v e rn m e n t. S econdly, th ere is the
q u estio n of w hat C h in a in te n d s tow ards and expects of the w o rld ’s less
pow erful states, p articu larly those in its m o re im m ediate vicinity, so m u ch
a central issue in d eb ate on C h in a ’s real and su p p o sed role in w orld affairs
in recen t years. T h ird ly , th e re is th e im p act on those states of th e events
of th e p ast eighteen m o n th s. T h is is not sim p ly a m a tte r of policies tow ards
C h in a or the g ran tin g or w ith h o ld in g of recognition. It is a m a tte r of the
im pact on th eir foreign policies as a w hole, and even on th eir dom estic
p o litics; the C hina issue has had a visible effect on politics in Jap an , for
exam ple, and it was even claim ed as one factor ju stify in g th e suspension
of parliam en tary g o v ern m en t in T h a ila n d in N o v em b er 1971.
A ustralia is one co u n try on w hich this im p act will be p ro fo u n d , and the
A ustralian situation m ay serve as a case stu d y , p erh ap s a lesson by negative
exam ple, of th e effect of C h in a on co u n tries in the A sian and Pacific region
w hich subscrib ed to th e D ullesian view o f C h in a and fram ed th eir policies
accordingly.
T h e im m ediate su b ject of this p ap er is a record of an episode in one
c o u n try ’s relations w ith C h in a, th e visit to C h in a in Ju ly 1971 of the
A u stralian L ab o r P arty (A .L .P .) delegation, w hich I accom panied as
adviser. It offers one p ersp ectiv e on th e first of th e above questions. P'rom
an A u stralian p o in t o f view, it is also useful at this tim e to place on open
record as m u ch as possible of A u stra lia ’s contacts w ith C h in a and the
th in k in g of political leaders, in o rd e r th a t th e developing pu b lic d ebate on
the place of C hina in A u stralian foreign policy m ay be at least inform ed.
O f all th e m ajor issues on w hich th e L ib e ra l-C o u n try P arty C oalition
G o v ern m e n t has kept its ow n counsel in th e p ast tw o decades, the question
of C h in a stands o u t as one on w hich th e C oalition has m ost consistently
claim ed a su p erio r know ledge b u t m ost p e rsisten tly refused to ju stify in
any d e p th the basis for its policies.
W hile the A .L .P . experience has a p a rtic u la r im p o rtan ce from an
A ustralian po in t of view, as one of a series of new d ev elo p m en ts in C h in a ’s
foreign relations, it is also o f in terest to people w hose concern is w ith C hina
ra th e r th an A ustralia. S ince it m eans little in isolation, I have prefaced the
accou n t w ith an outlin e of th e A u stralian b ack g ro u n d , and in Parts III and
IV I have discussed briefly th e p resen t d irectio n of C hinese foreign policy
and som e of the repercussions on, and im p lications for A ustralia.
I
A u s tr a lia ’s C h in e s e th rea t
In th e com m ents on th e A .L .P . visit by L a b o r’s political o pponents, there
2
T A L K IN G W IT H C H IN A
w as an u n d e rly in g im plication th a t th e u ltim ate reason w hy th e d eleg atio n ’s
p erfo rm an ce sh o u ld stan d co n d e m n e d b y ‘loyal an d h o n o ra b le ’ A ustralian s
w as because it w as som ehow n eg o tiatin g w ith ‘th e en e m y ’. T o agree p u blicly
w ith the C hinese P rim e M in iste r, even on th e basis of w ell-publicised
L a b o r policies, w as a betray al, alm o st an act of treason. T h u s , P rim e
M in iste r M c M a h o n accused O p p o sitio n L e a d e r W h itla m o f b ein g ‘a total
advocate for th e policy o f a foreign p ow er— th e g reatest C o m m u n ist po w er
in A sia’,1 an ap p ro ach also taken b y th e leader of th e rig h t w ing D em o cratic
L a b o r P arty , S e n a to r G a ir, w ho said th a t W h itla m had been ‘p re-selected
by a C hinese to ta lita ria n P rim e M in is te r’ an d h ad b ecom e ‘C h o u ’s black ­
m ail g h o st-w rite r’.2
T h e reason w hy th e P rim e M in iste r and o th ers felt able to invoke im ages
of national betrayal, b elieving th a t th is w o u ld strik e a resp o n siv e ch o rd in
th e electorate d esp ite th e G o v e rn m e n t’s ow n a tte m p ts to establish co m ­
m u n icatio n w ith P eking, lies p a rtly in th e fact th a t th e A .L .P . visit took
place against a b a ck g ro u n d of tw e n ty years o f a foreign policy in w hich th e
C h in a issue had played a cen tral p a rt. T h e u n fo rtu n a te h isto ry o f A u stralia’s
relations w ith C h in a since 1949 has b een reco rd ed elsew here,3 b u t th ere
are certain p o in ts w h ich m ig h t usefully be recalled, p artic u la rly as th ey
concern the effect w hich changes in C h in a ’s in te rn a tio n al p o sitio n in 1971
have had on co u n tries su c h as A u stralia.
T h e re are som e sim ilarities b etw een th e C h in a p ro b lem in A u stralia and
in the U n ite d S tates and Ja p a n , in th a t b ey o n d th e strictly foreign policy
issues th ere have also b een d o m estic ram ifications. C h in a w as b o th a
pivotal p o in t of A u stra lia ’s foreign policy and a live, and som etim es em o ­
tional, election issue revolving aro u n d p u re ly dom estic aspects o f A u stralian
politics.
T h e L ib e ra l-C o u n try P a rty C oalitio n did n o t at first su b scrib e to th e
m o re antag o n istic view s of C h in a c u rre n t in th e U n ite d S tates at th e
b eg in n in g of th e 1950s, and w as in fact c o n te m p la tin g recognition in th e first
m o n th s after it cam e to p ow er in D e c e m b e r 1949. B u t as A u stra lia ’s foreign
policy in terests sh ifted from B ritain and th e ‘E m p ire ’ to A sia and th e
Pacific, and th e secu rin g of an alliance w ith th e U n ite d S tates becam e a
forem ost objective o f foreign policy, so also d id th e G o v e rn m e n t’s view of
C hina, pu b licly at least, u n d e rg o a change. T h e tu rn in g p o in t w as sy m ­
bolised by A u stra lia ’s vote for th e U n ite d N a tio n s resolution o f F e b ru a ry
1951 con d em n in g C h in a as th e aggressor in K orea. A u stralia voted against
its b e tte r ju d g m e n t, and su b se q u e n tly o p p o sed a tte m p ts to w id en th e w ar,
b u t it voted o u t of deferen ce to th e w ishes o f th e U n ite d S tates, w ith w hom
th e alliance had yet to be co n clu d ed . T h is o bjective w as realised in th e
3
STE PH E N FITZGERALD
A N Z U S Pact, signed in S e p te m b e r 1951, and u n d erlin ed by A u stralian
and A m erican p a rtic ip a tio n in S E A T O th re e years later.
D u rin g the g reater p a rt o f th e 1950s, how ever, the A u stralian G o v e rn ­
m en t was still less en th u siastic th an th e U n ited S tates in d e n o u n c in g the
beh av io u r of th e C hinese C o m m u n ist P arty as in ternally evil and externally
aggressive, and F oreign M in iste r C asey held stro n g ly to th e view, w hich
he expressed to th e U n ite d S tates, th a t C hina should be recognised. It is
an in stru ctiv e illu stratio n of th e influence of the U n ited S tates on A ustralia
th a t C asey did n o t tran slate his belief into policy. In term s of policy,
A u stralia accepted th e idea of th e ‘C hinese th r e a t’, and this, to g eth er w ith
the exigencies o f the U .S . alliance, exercised an increasingly d o m in a n t
influence on A u stra lia ’s policies tow ard s o th e r A sian co u n tries, and led
A ustralia to en d o rse th e policy of isolation and co n tain m en t of C hina,
su p p o rt for C h ian g K ai-sh ek , and exclusion of C hina from the U n ited
N atio n s.
T h e ‘C hinese th r e a t’ and th e U .S . alliance w ere m u tu a lly rein fo rcin g ;
the closer the G o v e rn m e n t cam e to th e U n ited S tates th e m ore infected
it w as by th e U .S . view of C h in a, and th e m ore it believed in the th re a t the
m o re closely it so u g h t to align w ith th e U n ite d States. By th e early 1960s,
A u stralia had becom e one of th e m o re a rd e n t and vocal advocates of the
‘h ard lin e ’ on C hina. T h is was th e resu lt p artly of the retirem en t of Casey,
and an increasingly conservative tre n d of th in k in g in th e G o v ern m en t,
w hich believed it found ju stificatio n for its views of C h in a in the O ffshore
Island s crisis o f 1958, th e U .S . and In d ian versions of th e up risin g in
T ib e t and In d ia ’s C h in a w ar, and In d o n e sia ’s C o n fro n tatio n of M alaysia.
T h e A u stralian G o v e rn m e n t w as also one of th e last to realise the im plica­
tions of the ru p tu re in S in o -S o v iet relations.
C h in a was now p re se n te d to th e electorate in term s w hich echoed the
C old W a r rh eto ric o f the 1950s. H aving opposed th e inscription of C hinese
rep resen tatio n on th e agenda of th e U .N . G en eral A ssem bly th ro u g h o u t the
1950s, in 1961 A u stralia began to take a m o re leading role in keeping C hina
out, co -sp o n so rin g th e ‘Im p o rta n t Q u e stio n ’ resolution and lobbying
vigorously for its su p p o rt. A u stralian tro o p s w ere com m itted to V ietnam
on th e g ro u n d s th a t th e w ar was an act o f C hinese expansionism w hich had
to be sto p p ed at all costs.4 In 1966, after th e re tire m e n t of P rim e M in ister
M enzies, th e G o v e rn m e n t estab lish ed an em bassy in T aiw an , a m ove
ju stified as recip ro catin g th e lo n g -estab lish ed K u o m in tan g m ission in
C an b e rra , b u t w h ich M en zies h im self had resisted and w hich even con ser­
vative politician s and n ew sp ap ers fo u n d som ew hat inexplicable. A lth o u g h
A ustralian s escaped th e w o rst h o rro rs o f M c C arth y ite w itc h -h u n tin g , the
4
TA LK I N G W I T H CH IN A
q u estion of w here one stood on C h in a, and on V ietn am , becam e at tim es,
in polem ical contexts, a to u ch sto n e of loyalty. W ith th e first stirrin g s of
change in th e U n ite d S tates in 1966, it becam e a p p a ren t th at the C hina
issue in A u stralia had acq u ired an em otional reality of its ow n.
T h e G o v e rn m e n t’s case against C h in a co n tain ed little serious analysis
of the pro b lem . It w ould be possible to m ake a m o re sophisticated case
th an it ever atte m p te d , b u t its reluctance to d eb ate its C h ina policy suggests
th a t it had only th e m ost superficial know ledge of C hina, w hich it p resen ted
in sim ple polem ical term s. W h a t ap pears to have h ap p en ed w as p artly a
process of self-in d o ctrin atio n , b u ttre sse d at the end o f the 1960s by the
G o v e rn m e n t’s desire to convince the U n ite d S tates there was genuine
cause for it n o t to w ith d raw from Asia or ab an d o n its allies, including
A ustralia.
J u s t as th e idea of th e ‘C hinese th re a t’ was stre n g th e n e d by th e G o v e rn ­
m e n t’s ap p ro ach to th e U .S . alliance, so also was it reinforced by a m ore
cynical m an o eu v re in d o m estic politics, know n in A u stralian parlance as
‘kicking th e co m m u n ist c a n ’. T h e L ib e ra l-C o u n try P arty C oalition found it
electorally useful in th e a tm o sp h ere of C old W a r a ttitu d es tow ards co m ­
m u n ism to suggest th a t th e re was a stro n g c o m m u n ist influence on the
L a b o r P arty. W h ile this was an u n real p ro p o sitio n and a straig h t electoral
ploy, the G o v e rn m e n t’s charge was n o t w ith o u t effect because of its appeal
to an ti-c o m m u n ist sen tim e n t, and p artly because in A u stralia trad e unions
are affiliated w ith the L a b o r P arty and certain tra d e unions have had a
co m m u n ist-d o m in a te d leadersh ip . C o m m u n ist-le d strikes in th e late 1940s
w ere used against the L a b o r P arty in th e election cam paign of 1949, and
alth o u g h it w as unreal to suggest th a t L a b o r was in any way a co m m u n ist
fro n t or otherw ise d o m in ated or contro lled by co m m unists, charges of a
co m m u n ist hold on th e P a rty w ere still being m ade in 1971. In addition
to th e union q u estio n , th e G o v e rn m e n t also so u g h t to p ersu ad e the elec­
to rate th at socialist policies in th e L ab o r p latfo rm , and L a b o r’s attitu d es
to w ard s co m m u n ist c o u n tries, w ere evidence o f c o m m u n ist influence and
a w arn in g th a t L a b o r in office w ould n o t be its ow n m aster.
C h in a has n o t always been a m ajor factor in electoral tactics, b u t it has
b een invoked increasingly since th e early 1960s and p articu larly after the
c o m m itm en t of A u stralian tro o p s to V ietnam . In the election cam paign of
1966, the electorate was tre a te d to aw esom e p ictu res of red arrow s leaping
o u t of south C h in a to w ard s A u stralia. It m ig h t be argued th at this kind of
p u b licity was in justificatio n o f the G o v e rn m e n t’s policies ra th e r than an
attack on L ab o r, b u t G o v e rn m e n t m em b ers co n triv ed to b lu r the d istinction
a n d some w en t out of th e ir w ay to m ake th e alleged co nnection w ith L ab o r
5
STE PH E N FITZGERALD
q u ite specific. A m ong the general p u b lic, th is appeal to A u stralian p reju d ices
and fears helped to foster th e im pression o f C h in a as ‘the e n e m y ’. A nd
alth o u g h it is generally held th a t foreign policy has not been a decisive
factor in A u stralian elections, because o f th e p u rely d om estic issue the
G o v e rn m e n t was able to play the C h in a q u estio n to som e effect; and by
h in tin g at conspiratorial co n n ectio n s b etw een co m m u n ism ab road and at
hom e it sought to tu rn th e C h in a q u estio n against th e L ab o r P arty.
T h e G o v e rn m e n t’s use of C h in a as a cynical ploy in the service of p a rty
political in terests is b est expressed in a recen t frank adm ission by P rim e
M in iste r M cM ah o n , th e first occasion on w hich a m e m b e r of th e G o v e rn ­
m en t has confessed th a t its ap p ro ach to C h in a has been a n y th in g o th e r than
in th e national interest. T h e day after th e A .L .P . delegation left C h in a
and th e day before the a n n o u n c e m e n t th a t D r H e n ry K issin g er had been
in Peking to arrange for a visit by P re sid e n t N ixon, M c M a h o n told a
m eetin g of the T a sm a n ia n S tate C ouncil of th e L ib eral P arty th a t C h in a
had been a ‘political asset’ to th e L ib eral P a rty in the p ast and was likely
to rem ain one in th e fu tu re .5 T h re e days earlier, the sam e M r M cM ah o n
had accused the L a b o r P a rty of going to C h in a to play politics w ith w heat. 6
T h e re is a certain irony in th e G o v e rn m e n t’s efforts to use C h in a against
th e L a b o r P arty, in th a t L a b o r was by no m eans always as vociferous in
its op position to th e G o v e rn m e n t’s C h in a p olicy as it becam e in the
m id-1960s. In th e p eriod betw een th e p ro clam atio n of the P eo p le’s R epublic
of C hina in O cto b er 1949 and L a b o r’s d efeat at th e election in D ecem ber,
the L a b o r G o v e rn m e n t had been p re p a rin g to recognise th e new C hinese
G o v ern m e n t, b u t had held back because o f th e c o m m u n ist issue in the
election and because o f th e u n c e rta in ty of th e p o sitio n s of B ritain and the
U n ite d S tates. B ut su b se q u e n tly , u n d e r th e influence of th e C old W ar
and th e rig h t w ing of th e P arty , L a b o r policy seem ed for a tim e to m ove in
the directio n of W a sh in g to n ’s C h in a policy, and th ere w ere tim es w hen
L ab o r politicians vied w ith th e ir o p p o n e n ts in criticising th e C hinese
G o v ern m e n t. T h is tre n d was n e ith e r officially en d o rsed n o r u n anim ously
su p p o rte d , and in 1955, after th e rig h t w ing had broken aw ay to form w hat
was to becom e th e D em o cratic L a b o r P arty , recognition of C hina was
inscribed in th e official L a b o r p latfo rm . D esp ite th e official policy, L ab o r
still did n o t p u sh th e case very h ard . A L a b o r delegation w en t to C hina
in 1957, b u t the P arty was still sensitive to th e a n ti-c o m m u n ist electoral
tactics of its o p p o n en ts, w hich received a co n sid erab le bo o st from the
vehem en tly an ti-c o m m u n ist D em o cratic L a b o r P arty. T h e re w ere also
elem ents w ithin th e P arty w ho believed in th e C old W ar im ages of C hina,
and as late as 1965 p ro m in e n t L a b o r p o liticians expressed agreem ent
6
T A LK IN G W I T H CH IN A
w ith th e U n ite d S tates and A u stralian rationalisatio ns for th eir in te r­
v en tio n in V ietnam .
V ietnam , and the accession to th e lead ersh ip of the L ab o r Party of
G o u g h W h itlam , w ho had first called for recognition of C h in a in 1954,
before this was L ab o r policy, b ro u g h t increased a tten tio n to the question of
C h in a and m o re sustained and fre q u e n t criticism of go v ern m en t policy.
By 1971, th erefo re, w hen the A .L .P . decided to send a delegation to C hina,
it did so on th e basis of the 1955 decision and against a recent background
of h alf a decade of stro n g vocal o pposition to th e G o v e rn m e n t’s policy,
u n d e r a p arlia m e n ta ry leader w ho had long been pub licly com m itted to
solving th e p ro b lem of A u stra lia ’s relations w ith C hina.
T h e re are, of course, m ore su b tleties to A u stra lia ’s C h in a problem than
are p resen ted above, b u t th is is th e essential lo n g -term background against
w h ich th e A .L .P . visit took place: a foreign policy, fu n d am en tal to w hich
w as an assu m p tio n th a t C h in a was aggressive, a m enace to w orld peace, and
a th re a t to th e secu rity of ‘A sia’ and th u s u ltim ately to A ustralia, and a
d o m estic situ atio n in w hich opinion on C h in a was increasingly divided, in
w hich political d eb ate ab o u t C h in a ’s in tern atio n al role was b oth heated
and o b fu scated by d iv ersio n ary arg u m en ts a b o u t the influence of co m ­
m u n ism on th e n o n -co n serv ativ e political forces in A ustralia.
I t w as n o t su rp risin g , th en , th a t the A u stralian G o v ern m en t, im bued
w ith th e idea of th e ‘C h in ese th re a t’ and believing as M cM ah o n said th at
C h in a w as a political asset, so u g h t to p e rsu a d e th e A u stralian people th at
th e A .L .P . should be co n d em n ed as d ish o n o rab le for its dealings w ith
‘th e en em y ’. It was in this sp irit th a t M cM a h o n , co m m en tin g on a telegram
W h itlam had sen t him from P eking con cern in g th e Paris peace talks,
d en o u n ced W h itlam as ‘a spokesm an for those against w hom we are
lig h tin g ’ in V ietn am .' A nd it was in th e sam e sp irit th a t form er M in ister
for D efence, M alcolm F raser, asserted th a t W h itlam had concluded a
secret pact w ith C h in a .8
II
T h e A.L.P. Visit
T h e im m ediate co n tex t of th e A .L .P . visit was th e gradual onset of a crisis
in A u stra lia ’s foreign policy, signalled by th e new d ev elopm ents in C h in a ’s
relatio n s w ith th e w orld at large and P re sid e n t N ix o n ’s d ism an tlin g of his
p red e cesso rs’ C h in a policy in p re p a ra tio n for th e m ajor initiative of 1971.
C an ad ian recognition was infinitely m o re significant than it was perceived
to be in A ustralia at th e tim e. By estab lish in g a position on th e question
of T a iw a n acceptable to b o th Peking and O ttaw a, it encouraged oth ers to
7
STE PH E N FITZGERAI.D
follow suit, and recognition by seven o th e r g o v e rn m e n ts had been
announced by the end of M a rc h 1971.9 M o re significant in term s of
A u stra lia ’s Asian policies w ere changes in the attitudes of Asian countries.
T h e restoration of good relations betw een C h in a and B u rm a did not
excite m u c h interest in Australia. B ut by m i d - 1971, the M alaysian G o v e r n ­
m e n t was moving seriously, if slowly, tow ards recognition, T h a ila n d had
initiated tentative contacts w ith C hina, pressures for recognition were
m o u n tin g in Japan, and India was looking hopefully for signs th a t C hina
m ig h t respond to signals for an im p ro v e m e n t in relations. Indonesia was
m ore reticent, b u t there had been cautious sta te m e nts from D jakarta
suggesting an intention to restore relations w ith Peking, and even the
Philippines was openly c onte m pla ting the possibility of reversing its
policy tow ards China.
T h e U .N . vote in 1970, in w hich the substantive resolution calling for
the admission of C hina gained a simple m ajority for the first time, indicated
that the line against C h in a was unlikely to hold for very m u c h longer. At
the same time, C hina was signalling that it was p re p a re d to respond to
overtures from almost any ruling governm ent, b o th in private conversations
and by public acts at an unofficial level, such as the table tennis invitations,
designed in part to p r o m p t non-recognising g o v e rn m e n ts into establishing
contact at an official level. T h e implication of these events for Australia
was th a t the idea of the ‘C hinese th r e a t’, and the A ustralian strategy for
m eeting the threat, were u n d e r serious challenge, and that an Asian policy
based on this idea and this strategy m ig h t soon becom e unacceptable to a
m ajority of Asian governm ents, and therefore unw orkable.
M o st critical for the A ustralian G o v e rn m e n t, however, were the moves
by the U n ite d States. T h e overt initiatives w hich began in July 1969 were
not in themselves so im p o rta n t, since they involved only the relaxation
of restrictions on trade and travel, w hich the A ustralian G o v e r n m e n t itself
had never imposed. In so far as it was referring only to these relaxations,
the G o v e r n m e n t was quite correct in claiming th a t the Nixon moves had
b r o u g h t U .S. policy into line with A ustralian policy. But this claim was
also a political subterfuge, in that it a tte m p te d to include the whole of U .S.
C h in a policy, whereas in fact, in m o re substantial m atters, the U .S. was
already m oving ahead of Australia. Even before the a n n o u n c e m e n t of
P resident N ix o n ’s im pe nding visit, the U .S. was know n to have em barked
on m ore private contacts with C hina, neither the substance nor the ultimate
intention of which was revealed to foreign governm ents.
Public reaction to these dev e lo p m e n ts was slow, and it is not even certain
th a t the G o v e rn m e n t was fully alert to their im port, or, if it was, that it
8
T A L K I N G W I T H CH IN A
considered th em sufficient cause fo r an ticip atin g events by recasting its
own policies. H ead in g a p arlia m e n ta ry delegation to C anada w hen C anada
was n eg o tiatin g w ith C hina, the M in iste r for th e In te rio r, P eter N ixon,
w arned th e C an ad ian s n o t to be ‘too idealistic’ and advised th em to insist
on Peking recognising T aiw an u n d e r th e K M T as an in d e p e n d e n t n a tio n .10
W hen Italian recognition was an n o u n ced in N o v em b er 1970, M cM ah o n
described it as ‘u n fo rtu n a te ’.11 A review of C h in a policy by th e D e p a rtm e n t
o f Foreign A ffairs was o rd ered by M cM ah o n in 1970. T o th e ex ten t th a t
this review posed alternative policies w hich m ig h t lead tow ards n o rm alisa­
tion o f relations w ith C hina, it was ap p aren tly u n accep table. T h e G o v e rn ­
m ent took no action, and it was also keeping very quiet ab o u t one issue,
w hich su d d en ly b u rs t into th e head lin es early in 1971, b rin g in g th e q u estion
of C h in a ’s foreign relations m u ch closer to hom e.
A ustralia had been selling w heat to C hina since i960, a trad e w hich was
earning over 8100 m illion annually. A co n tract had been signed in D ecem ­
b er 1969 for delivery up to O c to b e r 1970, b u t w hen th e W h e a t B oard
so u g h t to neg o tiate a new co n tract in 1970, it had re tu rn e d e m p ty -h a n d e d ,
and had n o t su b seq u en tly been able to secure a co ntract. W h en this
in form ation was disclosed, public discussion w idened to the w hole q u estion
of A u stralia’s relations w ith C h in a ; it was n o t really u n til this p o in t th a t
th e im p o rt of d ev elo p m en ts in C h in a ’s foreign relations becam e a live pu b lic
issue in A ustralia.
T h e G o v e rn m e n t’s first reaction w as to assert th a t its C h in a policy had
n o th in g to do w ith C h in a ’s failure to b u y A u stralian w heat, suggesting
th a t this policy was still basically so u n d and th a t b o th C h in a and A u stralia
m ain tain ed the position of th e sep aratio n of tra d e and politics. T h is latter
p ro p o sitio n was q u estio n ed at the tim e, and it w as th e sta rtin g p o in t for
the p u b lic controversy w hich follow ed. Q u estio n ed on w h eth er th e w heat
p ro b lem m ig h t lead the G o v e rn m e n t to recognise C hina, D o u g A n th o n y ,
th en M in iste r for P rim ary In d u stry , rep lied : ‘I w o u ld n ’t recognise R ed
C h in a ju st to sell w heat, I w o u ld n ’t sell m y foreign policies o r m y p h il­
osophies ju s t to try to do a trad e d e a l’, and ‘I w o u ld n ’t sell m y soul ju s t
to benefit tra d e ’. 12 In A pril it was disclosed th a t C hinese officials had
objected to these statem en ts and had co m m u n icated th e ir objection th ro u g h
a B ritish dip lo m atic source in P e k in g .1,1 T h e w h eat issue is discussed
fu rth e r below , b u t it should be p o in ted o u t th a t th e critics w ere q u ite
w rong in suggesting th a t th e A n th o n y sta te m e n t was itself responsible for
the loss of w h eat sales. T h e C h in ese m essage, on the o th er h an d , was
clearly in ten d ed to inform th e G o v e rn m e n t th a t C h in a had taken note of
previous statem en ts of this kind, th a t it w as n o t p rep ared to d isregard
9
STE PH EN FITZGERALD
politics in trad e w ith A u stralia, and th at th is had influenced its decision
n o t to b u y w heat.
T h e G o v e rn m e n t m ig h t have succeeded in rid in g o u t th e w h eat issue
had it n o t been for th re e su b se q u e n t d ev elo p m en ts: th e A .L .P . decision to
visit C h in a, P re sid e n t N ix o n ’s a n n o u n c e m e n t, and the U .N . vote in
O cto b er 1971. U n til th e first o f these events, it had given no p u b lic
indication of possible changes in policy.
In A pril 1971 th e F ed eral E xecutive o f th e A .L .P . m et in A delaide,
w hen p u b lic discussion a b o u t w heat sales was still ru n n in g high, and also
am id renew ed in tern atio n al a tte n tio n to C h in a ’s foreign relations and
d iplom atic objectives w h ich follow ed from th e invitations to th e table
tennis team s. T h e P a rty ’s F ed eral S ecretary , M ick Y oung, w ho had sp en t
th ree m o n th s in C h in a in 1957 and w ho had long been u rging th e im p o rtan ce
of C h in a to A ustralia and th e p ressin g need for n o rm alisatio n of relations,
propo sed th a t a delegation should be sent to C hina. T h e E xecutive agreed
to the p roposal and on 14 A p ril W h itlam cabled the C hinese P rim e M in ister,
C hou E n-lai, asking if C h in a w ould receive a delegation from th e A .L .P .
A lth o u g h the E x ecu tiv e’s decision was u n an im o u s, th ere was som e su b se ­
q u e n t p u b lic d isp u te a b o u t th e objectives of th e m ission by n o n -E x ecu tiv e
m em b ers, p artly because th e c u rre n t issue, w heat sales, had ten d ed initially
to overshadow th e w id er im plicatio n s of th e p ro sp ect of official discussions
betw een C hina and rep resen tativ es of th e A u stralian O p p o sitio n . In o th e r
circum stances, the initiative m ig h t have fo u n d ered on objections from
those w ho believed th a t C h in a w as n o t a first-ran k in g p rio rity and was too
sensitive an issue for th e A .L .P . to risk a v e n tu re from w hich th e P arty m ig h t
suffer electorally. B ut th e loss of th e w heat co n tracts was regarded as a
q u estio n o f national co n cern b o th by th e press and by sections o f the
co m m u n ity o th er th an th e ru ral e lecto rate; it was an issue w hich no
national p arty w ith p re te n sio n s to political p ow er could ignore. In term s of
th e national in terest, th e re was an o p p o rtu n ity to explore, if n o t necessarily
to correct, w hat had gone w rong w ith th e w heat sales, w ith the political
risks to a large ex ten t n eu tralised . T h e issue could also be tu rn e d back
against th e L iberal and C o u n try p arties by focusing on th e inconsistency
of th e ir approach to C h in a, on th e two stra n d s of policy, trad e and politics,
w hich they had tried to keep w idely a p a rt in the m in d s of th e public b u t
w hich had been b ro u g h t sh arp ly to g e th e r by a decision o f the C hinese
G o v ern m en t. A ccordingly, before th e E xecutive voted on th e proposal,
W h itlam co ntacted th e P a rty ’s spokesm an on rural affairs, D r Rex P atterson,
w ho agreed to go to C h in a if an in v itatio n was forthcom ing. P atterso n was
th e only p erson n am ed at th e tim e.
10
TA LK I N G W I T H CH IN A
T h e decision em erged publicly, therefo re, as a response to the w heat
p roblem , and to som e m em b ers of th e L a b o r P arty this was all it had been
in ten d ed to be. B ut even for those w ho co n tem p lated w ider possibilities
for th e visit, it was still a useful p ro tectiv e m an o eu v re in the dom estic
political contex t. P arty spokesm en did n o t at this stage stren u o u sly reject
th e idea th a t th e initiative was co ncerned p rim arily w ith w heat, and it was
n o t u n til the in v itation arrived from C h in a th a t W h itlam him self decided
to go.
F ro m the ou tset, how ever, W h itlam , Y oung, and certain o th er m em bers
o f the P arty had been co n sid erin g th e possibility of a m uch w ider initiative.
A p a rt from th e fact th a t recognition of C h in a was established A .L .P . policy,
they had b een follow ing closely th e new d ev elo p m en ts in C h in a ’s foreign
relations, and w ere co ncerned a b o u t th e im p o rt of these developm ents for
A ustralia, p articu larly in relation to th e C h in a policy of the A ustralian
G o v e rn m en t. As early as 1967 W h itlam h im self had d raw n atten tio n to the
first signs of a m ore flexible U .S . ap p ro ach to C h in a, and to the ap p aren t
differences b etw een C a n b e rra and W ash in g to n reflected in U .S . su p p o rt
for th e 1966 U .N . stu d y co m m ittee proposal, w hich A ustralia opposed.
By early 1971 he was convinced th a t A ustralia, having passed up the
o p p o rtu n ity created by C an ad ian recognition, was at an increasingly
serious d ip lom atic d isadvantage, n o t only in d irect relations w ith C hina b u t
also in relation to A u stra lia ’s frien d s, allies and spheres of in terest; he was
concern ed th a t A ustralia was beco m in g isolated on th e C hina question and
th a t it stood in d an g er of being left b eh in d even by th e U n ited States.
W h itla m ’s telegram to C h o u E n-lai, th erefo re, m ad e no m ention of
w heat, n o r did it nam e D r P atterso n . It stated only th a t the A .L .P . was
anxious to send a delegation ‘to discuss th e term s on w hich your co untry
is in terested in having d ip lo m atic and tra d e relations w ith A u stralia’.
F o r th e E xecutive to have an n o u n ced its decision in A pril, w ith o u t any
assurance th a t C hina w ould agree, was th o u g h t by som e observers, and
m em b ers of th e L ab o r P arty , to have been unw ise. T h e next m ove was
entirely at the d iscretion of the C h in ese G o v e rn m e n t, w hich has consistently
refused to be p u sh ed on such m a tte rs, to allow o th ers to set the pace, or
th e p riorities, of its new co n tacts w ith n o n -reco g n isin g countries. In the
event, th e C hinese G o v e rn m e n t took only fo u r w eeks to reply to the A .L .P ,
w hich by com parison w ith th e response to sim ilar req u ests from o th er
c o u n tries was q u ite p ro m p t. B ut th e L a b o r P arty , having m ade a headlinecatching an n o u n cem en t, w as w o rried th a t a p rolonged failure to respond
w ould cause it to lose th e initiative it had gained or, w orse, th at a totally
negative response w ould dam age its electoral credibility. T h e A ustralian
ST E PH EN FITZGERALD
G o v e rn m e n t was h o p in g th a t th e req u est w ould be refused, and tow ards
the end of th e four w eeks m e m b e rs of th e G o v ern m en t w ere confidently
assertin g th a t the w hole affair had been a dism al m iscalculation. L a b o r P arty
circles also discussed th e p o ssib ility th a t if th e C hinese G o v e rn m e n t w ere
to solicit an opinion from th e C h airm an of the C o m m u n ist P a rty of
A ustralia (M a rx ist-L e n in ist), E. F. H ill, it w ould receive stro n g objections
to a visit b y the A .L .P . T h e em erging tre n d of C hinese dip lo m acy m ade
this unlikely on th e p a rt o f Peking, and to th e ex ten t th a t C h a irm a n H ill
w ished to keep in line w ith C h in a ’s d ip lo m atic aim s he could only have
endorsed th e proposal. B u t th e fact th a t th ere was no im m ed iate reply
from C h in a, and th e G o v e rn m e n t’s jibes, w ere cause en o u g h for a little
anxiety on th e p a rt o f tho se resp o n sib le for arranging th e visit.
As th e days passed, W h itla m ’s staff began to contact people w ho w ere
know n to have lines into th e C h in ese G o v e rn m en t, w ith th e in ten tio n of
p ressin g th e seriousness o f th e P a rty ’s p u rp o se. D r P atte rso n also co m ­
m u n icated w ith official C h in ese tra d e representatives. M o st of those
contacted by W h itla m ’s staff felt th a t political changes in P eking d u rin g
the C u ltu ra l R evolution m ad e it u n c e rta in w h eth er th eir rep resen tatio n s
w ould be effective. T h e exception w as an A ustralian academ ic at H arv ard
U n iv ersity , D r Ross T e rrill, w ho passed m essages th ro u g h H o n g K ong
and th ro u g h a C hinese in C an ad a w ho m ain tain s close liaison w ith the
C hinese G o v e rn m e n t. H e also w ro te to th e F re n c h A m b assad o r in Peking,
M . E tien n e M a n a c ’h, w ho raised th e m a tte r w ith C h o u E n-lai, and
received a positive response. A cabled invitation to the A .L .P . to send a
delegation ‘for d iscussions on q u estio n s co n cerning the relations betw een
o u r two c o u n trie s’ arrived on 11 M ay. It was never m ad e clear to the
delegation in C h in a w h e th e r the visit w ould have been arran g ed w ith o u t
these ex tra rep resen tatio n s. T h e general p a tte rn of C h in a ’s diplom acy
suggests th a t th ere was a reasonable chance th at it w ould, alth o u g h from
enq u iries th e delegation received from C hinese officials ab o u t requests
from o th e r co u n tries it does seem th a t th e C hinese G o v e rn m e n t m ay have
been initially u n d ecid ed a b o u t the A .L .P . and th at these rep resen tatio n s
served b o th to decide its response and to hasten its invitation.
In retro sp ect, the fo u r w eeks’ delay w orked to L a b o r’s advantage. T h e
idea of L a b o r send in g a delegation to C h in a had m ore tim e to becom e
acceptable, taking th e edge off s h o rt-te rm criticism by th e G o v ern m en t,
and, w hen th e invitation did arrive on th e heels of G o v e rn m e n t pred ictio n s
th a t it w ould not, m aking it seem th a t it was th e G o v e rn m e n t rath er than
the A .L .P . w hich had m iscalculated. F u r th e r dev elo p m en ts in the period
served to increase p u b lic acceptance o f th e idea. D esp ite G o v ern m en t
12
T A L K I N G W I T H CH IN A
assurance th a t w heat p u rch ases w ould be resum ed, th ere was still no sign
that C h in a w as in terested . T h e reasons w ere only p artly econom ic. C hina
had h a d exceptionally good h arv ests and, for th e first tim e, had accum ulated
a sm all b u t significant grain reserve. B ut late in 1970, w hen A ustralia had
failed to w in a new co n tract, a co n tract had been signed by C anada, w orth
S i 54 m illion. A n im proved grain situ atio n at hom e had p rovided C hina
w ith th e lu x u ry of choosing its w h eat tra d in g p a rtn e r.
T w o revelations by D r P a tte rso n served fu rth e r to em barrass the
G o v e rn m e n t on this po in t. O ne was th a t in 1967 the A ustralian S ecurity
In tellig en ce O rgan isatio n had a tte m p te d to have m em bers of th e W h eat
B oard place m icro p h o n es in th e Bank of C h in a in H o ng K ong. T h e o th er
was th a t, in 1967 also, the G o v e rn m e n t had in stru cted th e W h eat B oard
to inform th e C hinese th a t A u stralia m ig h t su sp en d w heat sales if C hina
did n o t call off th e riots in H o n g K o n g .14 T h is was an in terestin g reflection
on th e G o v e rn m e n t’s p ro te sta tio n s ab o u t sep aratin g trad e from politics;
it w as also ra th e r curio u s, given th a t th e B ritish au th o rities in H o n g K ong
m ain tain ed th a t the riots w ere locally gen erated and n ot controlled from
Peking.
In tern atio n a lly , th e thaw in relations w ith C h in a had been g athering
m o m en tu m . In A pril, th e U .S . G o v e rn m e n t an n o u n ced fu rth e r relaxations
of th e trad e em bargo, th e m o st significant up to th a t point. T w o m ore
g o v ern m en ts an n o u n ced recognition of Peking, and b o th M alaysia and the
P h ilip p in es w ere sen d in g tra d e delegations to C hina. T h e w orldw ide
p u b licity w hich su rro u n d e d th e visit to C h in a of th e A m erican table tennis
team was follow ed by a w ide coverage of th e to u r by th e A ustralian team ,
w hich was acco m p an ied by th re e jo u rn a lists rep resen tin g leading A ustralian
daily new spapers. A u stralian s could n o t rem ain in ignorance of w h at was
h ap p en in g , and th ere was a grow ing feeling th a t so m ething had to be done
ab o u t relations w ith C hina.
P erh ap s m o st significant in th e A u stralian co n tex t was th a t th e initiative
itself p ro d u ced tw o im m ed iate resu lts in term s of the A .L .P . objectives:
it stim u lated p u b lic d eb ate on C h in a, and it forced the G o v e rn m e n t first
to expose its C h in a policies to p u b lic scru tin y and th en to a tte m p t the first
step s tow ard s an official relatio n sh ip w ith th e C hinese G o v ern m en t.
C learly concerned a b o u t p u b lic d o u b ts ab o u t its C h in a policy, the G o v e rn ­
m e n t could no longer p o stp o n e a m ajo r sta te m e n t on the su b ject of C hina.
It was m ade on 15 A p ril, th e day after th e A .L .P . telegram to C hou E n-lai,
in an add ress by P rim e M in iste r M c M a h o n to th e N ational Press C lu b .1'’
T h e essence of this sta te m e n t was, in fact, a defence of the correctness of
existing policy and a reassertion o f th e su ren ess of th e G o v e rn m e n t’s
13
STE PH EN FITZG ERA LD
vision; th e G o v e rn m e n t was b est qualified to handle the C h in a issue in
the natio n al in terest, and th e first p rio rity w as still th e p reserv atio n of the
in d ep en d en ce and secu rity o f C h ian g K a i-sh e k ’s rule in T aiw an . U sing
the term P e o p le ’s R ep u b lic of C h in a for th e first tim e, M c M a h o n su b se ­
q u en tly lost som e of his in te n d e d im p act b y u sing a confused variety of
term s to refer to b o th sides of th e C h in a disp ute. H e declared th a t th e
G o v e rn m e n t believed it was necessary to seek accom m odation w ith
‘C o n tin e n ta l C h in a ’, w hich was no m ore th a n the G o v e rn m e n t had said
for m an y years, and was v irtu ally m eaningless w hen set against th e qualifi­
cation o f S ir Paul H asluck, w ho, w hen M in iste r for E x ternal A ffairs, had
said th a t th is could n o t be w orked o u t ‘even m o st optim istically in less than
25 y ears’.16 B ut M c M a h o n ’s speech can be in te rp re te d as co n taining the
first seeds o f w h at was later to becom e a species of ‘T w o -C h in a s ’ policy.
F ollow ing th e receip t o f th e C h in ese invitation to the A .L .P ., th e
G o v e rn m e n t so u g h t to regain the in itiativ e later on th e sam e day, w ith a
press release by M cM a h o n an n o u n cin g th a t his g o v ern m en t w ould ‘now
explore th e possibilities o f estab lish in g a dialogue w ith th e P eo p le’s
R e p u b lic ’.17 T h e term s of th e dialogue w ere n o t elaborated ap art from the
general p o sitio n th a t ‘w h atev er we do will be w ith o u t preju d ice to th e rights
of the R ep u b lic of C h in a in T a iw a n ’. B ut th e G o v e rn m e n t’s aim is know n
to have been to a tte m p t to ‘n o rm a lise ’ relatio n s th ro u g h trade, sp o rtin g and
cultu ral relations, leaving aside o th e r m o re im p o rtan t issues, a position
u n accep tab le to th e C hinese G o v e rn m e n t and p ro b ab ly m ad e m ore
u n accep tab le by statem en ts such as ‘it [the P e o p le’s R epublic of C hina] is
in de facto co n tro l of C o n tin e n ta l C h in a ’.18 B ut even from th e release
itself, o b serv ers of C h in a did n o t rate very highly th e chances of success
of th e dialogue. If it w ere n o t en o u g h to declare su p p o rt for T aiw an,
ruling o u t any possibility of su b stan tiv e pro g ress, M cM ah o n seem ed alm ost
to be u n d e rm in in g in advance w h at little n eg o tiating position he appeared
to have and to be invitin g a cool reception from C hina by his declaration th at
W e m u st b ear in m ind th a t a m ajo r obstacle to the d ev elo p m en t of form al relations
w ith th e P eo p le’s R epublic of C h in a has been th a t G o v e rn m e n t’s su p p o rt for
insurgency and subversion in co u n tries of th e region w ith w h ich we as an A ustralian
G o v ern m en t have close relations and m u tu a l strateg ic interests.
T h a t th e G o v e rn m e n t held this view was well know n. T o have repeated it
in this a n n o u n c e m e n t seem s inexplicable except in term s of M c M a h o n ’s
ap p a re n t belief, w hich he later asserted pub licly , th a t C hina does not pay
m uch a tte n tio n to statem en ts m ade by ‘o th e r p e o p le’.
T h e fo rtu n a te tim in g o f th e A .L .P . F ed eral E x ecu tiv e’s decision was
H
TA L K I N G W I T H CH IN A
not e n tirely a m a tte r of coincidence. It m ay have been luck th at H en ry
K issin g er arrived in Peking after the A .L .P . delegation, or, indeed, th at
he w en t to P eking at all in 1971. B ut th e A .L .P . m ove was g ro u n d ed on
a policy w hich had been d eb ated and en dorsed by th e P arty, and a concern
a b o u t th e im p licatio n s of new tre n d s in th e C h in a policies of a n u m b e r of
A sian co u n tries and o f th e LTn ited States. H ad th is n o t been th e case, the
A .L .P . w ould n o t have been in C h in a in Ju ly 1971 and w ould not, therefore,
have been in a po sitio n to derive any benefit from ap p earin g to have an tici­
p ated events.
T h e delegation as originally an n o u n ced on 13 M ay and finally confirm ed
after som e jock ey in g for positions consisted of W h itlam as leader, P atterson,
th e P a rty ’s F ed eral P re sid e n t T o m B urns, and M ick Y oung, to g eth er w ith
W h itla m ’s Press S ecretary , G ra h a m F re u d e n b e rg , as secretary, and m yself
as adviser and in te rp re te r. T h e m ain p roblem had been to keep the delega­
tion to m anageable size, since it was rep resen tin g an o pposition p arty and, as
W h itla m p o in ted o u t on several occasions, it was n o t in a position to
n egotiate or reach form al agreem ents. T h e re was a lim it to w hat could be
discussed in d e p th or detail. P a tte rso n had been in from the start, and this
m ad e sense in term s o f S in o -A u stralian tra d e relations. B ut it was obvious,
from th e view p o in ts of b o th C h in a and A ustralia, th a t W h itlam should go,
as leader of th e O p p o sitio n and P a rty spokesm an on foreign affairs. As an
o rg an isatio n in itiative, as d istin c t from a p a rlia m e n ta ry one, it was logical
to include re p re se n ta tio n from th e o rg an isatio n ’s F ed eral E xecutive, of
w hich W h itlam is a m e m b e r b u t in his capacity as F ed eral parliam en tary
leader.
T h e com position o f the delegation signified a m u ch b ro ad er pu rp o se
for th e delegation th a n had been suggested at th e tim e of th e E x ecu tiv e’s
decision in A p ril, alth o u g h th e im pression still lingered in som e q u arters
th a t the delegation wras n o t only concern ed solely w ith w heat, b u t th a t it
w as actually h o p in g to b rin g back a new w heat contract. W h itlam was at
p ains to correct th is im pression, p o in tin g o u t th a t w heat was only one
su b ject the delegation w ished to discuss, b u t th a t w h eat co n tracts w ere a
m a tte r for th e W h e a t B oard and th e re could be no q u estion of the A .L .P .
delegation re tu rn in g w ith c o n tracts of any kind. T o em phasise the p o in t
in his press co n feren ce before his d e p a rtu re from Sydney, W hitlam ch arac­
terised the p u rp o se o f the m ission in term s of one general objective, to see
how far the people o f C h in a and th e people o f A ustralia w ere able to talk
to each o th e r and to u n d e rsta n d each o ther.
T h e delegation sp e n t tw elve days in C h in a, from 2 to 14 Ju ly ; apart
from a visit to S h an g h ai and tw o days in C an to n , on arrival and d ep artu re,
15
STE PH EN FITZGERALD
the greater p art of this tim e w as sp e n t in Peking. A lm ost seventy jo u rn alists
had applied to the C hinese G o v e rn m e n t to cover th e visit, and of these ten
w ere given visas.19 A fter W h itla m ’s d e p a rtu re , M ick Y oung, m yself, and
two of the jo u rn alists stayed in C h in a for a fu rth e r five days, to g eth er w ith
D r T e rrill, w ho was v isiting C h in a at th e sam e tim e as th e A .L .P . delegation
and accom panied it as a co rre sp o n d e n t for several A m erican publications.
D is c u s s io n s in P e k in g
C h i n a , A ustralia ,
and the in te r n a t io n a l situa tio n
T h e invitation to the A .L .P . cam e not from C hou E n-lai b ut from the
C hinese P eo p le’s In stitu te of F oreign A ffairs, th e first appearance of this
organisation since th e C u ltu ra l R evolution. B efore th e C u ltu ral R evolution,
its functio n had been to h an d le certain typ es o f c o n tact w ith non-recognising
countries, b u t its p re se n t fu n ctio n seem s a little bro ad er, since it has also
been dealing w ith official visitors from p a rlia m en tary opposition parties
from recognising countries. It ap pears to be an organisational m eans by
w hich the C hinese G o v e rn m e n t d istin g u ish es betw een tw o types of
d iplom atic in terco u rse: b etw een g o v e rn m e n t-to -g o v e rn m e n t contact w ith
co u n tries w ith w hich C h in a has form al d ip lo m atic relations,, and o th e r
contacts w hich have official statu s w hich re q u ire a tten tio n by senior
officials and m em b ers of th e C hinese G o v e rn m e n t b u t w hich are not
dip lo m atic in the sense o f co m m u n icatio n b etw een ruling governm ents.
In practical term s, the d istin c tio n ap p ears to m ean th at visitors in the
form er category m ay have a som ew hat w id er access to C hinese officials,
b u t only according to th e n a tu re of the relations betw een th e two g o v ern ­
m ents or the specific n eg o tiatin g p u rp o se of th e m ission.
In term s of th e A .L .P .’s experience in C h in a, th ere was no substantial
difference betw een a visit u n d e r th e auspices of the In stitu te and one
sponsored by, say, th e F oreign M in iste r o r the P rim e M inister. T h e
officials w ho arranged th e visit and accom panied the delegation th ro u g h o u t
w ere dip lo m atic and o th e r p erso n n el from th e F oreign M in istry , doubling
as m em b ers of th e In stitu te in m o st cases. T h e exception was the host to
the delegation, C h an g H si-jo, an octo g en arian scholar and form er M in ister
for E d u catio n , w ho as P re sid e n t of th e In stitu te h olds m inisterial rank. T h e
delegation was en tertain ed on arrival in C an to n by an alternate m em b er
of the C entral C o m m ittee o f th e C h in ese C o m m u n ist P arty. In Peking, it
had lengthy discussions w ith P re m ie r C h o u E n-lai, T ra d e M in ister Pai
H siang -k u o , and A cting F oreig n M in iste r C hi P eng-fei, w ho sub seq u en tly
was confirm ed as Foreign M in iste r after th e d eath in Ja n u a ry 1972 of the
16
T A LK IN G W I T H CH IN A
ailing Foreig n M in iste r C h ’en Yi. F ollo w -u p discussions w ere held w ith
senior officials of th e F'oreign M in istry , and D r P a tte rso n m et separately
w ith officials of th e m in istries of F oreig n T ra d e and A griculture. In o th er
w ords, the C hinese w en t o u t of th e ir way to p rovide everything th a t was
essential to the success of th e visit, in th e A .L .P .’s term s as m uch as th eir
ow n, and at a level a p p ro p ria te to the estab lish m en t of a w orking relatio n ­
ship w ith the altern ativ e A u stralian G o v e rn m e n t and P rim e M inister.
W h a t reasons, th en , did C h in a have for inv itin g a delegation from the
A u stralian O pposition? A t no tim e did C hinese rep resen tatives specify th eir
objectives, ap art from in general term s of im p ro v in g relations betw een
C hina and A ustralia. T h is was p a rt of C h in a ’s overall d ip lom atic stance,
in w hich the esta b lish m e n t of relations w ith sm all and m iddle pow ers is
essential to th e o p eratio n of its c u rre n t foreign policy, w hich is discussed
m ore fully below. In th e case o f n o n -reco g n isin g co u n tries, C h in a ’s in terest
ex tends across a w hole range of g ro u p s and con tacts, in clu d in g p arliam en ­
tary opposition parties. T h e re has been, th erefo re, renew ed atten tio n to
social dem o cratic p arties, such as th e Jap an ese K o m eito w hich sent a
delegation to C h in a sh o rtly before th e A .L .P ., as against political parties
w hich m ig h t seem to have an ideological affinity w ith Peking b u t w hich are
n o t necessarily in a position to influence im m ediately the official policies
of th e ir co u n tries tow ard s C hina.
T o the ex ten t th a t A ustralia m a tte rs to C h in a, th e C hinese w ere well
aw are of the A u stralian G o v e rn m e n t’s position, in dicated in th e ir d is­
cussions w ith th e A .L .P . delegation by reference to G o v ern m en t statem en ts
on C hina. Even b efore th e G o v e rn m e n t’s dialogue began in Ju n e, C h in a
had pro b ab ly estim ated th a t th ere was little hope of p rogress, p articu larly
given M c M a h o n ’s stro n g reaffirm ation of su p p o rt for C hiang K ai-shek in
A pril and the c o n te n t of his press release an n o u n cin g th e decision to seek
a dialogue. C h in a was p re p a re d , n evertheless, to m eet w ith A ustralian
officials in case th e re had been advances in th e G o v e rn m e n t’s th in k in g not
reflected in p u b lic statem en ts, and in o rd er to state the C hinese case directly.
A t th e sam e tim e, th e C hinese a p p ear to have calculated th a t the A .L .P .
stood a reasonable chance o f success at the 1972 federal election, and it was
obviously p artly w ith this in m in d th a t they explored w ith th e delegation
qu estio n s relating to th e A .L .P .’s p latfo rm and th e m ajor political issues in
A ustralia. Failing an A .L .P . v ictory, th ere was still th e fact th a t th e A .L .P .,
as th e largest p a rty in A u stralia and the O p p o sitio n in th e federal p arliam ent,
w as in a position to influence p u b lic opinion on th e q u estion of relations
w ith C hina, and, consequently, p erh ap s also th e th in k in g of th e L iberal
and C o u n try p arties. In eith er event, C h in a ap p aren tly considered th at an
STE PH E N FITZGERALD
exchange of views w ould be useful to b o th sides in estab lish in g areas of
agreem en t and disag reem en t.
A t no tim e did th e C h in ese suggest th a t A u stralia itself w as of m ajor
im p ortan ce in th e ir foreign policy. It is th e general p a tte rn w hich is of
im portan ce, and as th e n u m b e r of recognising cou n tries increases, the
absence of relations w ith ind iv id u al sm all and m id d le pow ers such as
A ustralia becom es less im p o rta n t. In m id - 1971, how ever, th ere w ere still
som e m a tte rs on w hich C h in a had a p a rtic u la r in terest in A u stralia, qu ite
ap art from the A .L .P ., and in th e course o f the d eleg atio n ’s discussions it
was possible to id entify som e of these general areas of in terest, m ost of
w hich concerned the foreign policies o f A u stralia. T h e se in clu d ed the
A u stralian G o v e rn m e n t’s p o sitio n on recognition and su p p o rt for C hiang
K ai-shek, A u stralia’s alliances, and its relatio n sh ip w ith Jap an . T h e last
of these is discussed sep arately in th e co n text of the interview w ith
C hou E n-lai.
Recognition. W hile C h in a does n o t sue for recognition, this is one obvious
general p o in t of in terest in A ustralia. A u stralia having been one of the least
flexible of foreign g o v ern m en ts in its a ttitu d e tow ards Peking, it is possible
th a t recognition by A u stralia m ig h t h^ve a sim ilar effect on som e of th e
o th er ‘d ie -h a rd s’ as C an ad ian recognition had on those g o v ern m en ts less
w edded to th e a n ti-C h in a policy. In 1971, th e flow -on from C anadian
recognition had still n o t resu lted in any ad d itio n to the n u m b e r of Asian
gov ern m en ts recognising C h in a, an im p o rta n t objective of c u rre n t C hinese
policy; and so long as th e re is a su b sta n tia l n u m b e r of g o v ern m en ts w ith ­
holdin g recognition, this m ay well be one o f th e few reasons th e C hinese
G o v ern m e n t has for co n tin u in g to in te re st itself in A u stralian G o v ern m en t
overtu res. T h is is n o t to say th a t in th e ir discussions w ith th e A .L .P . the
C hinese at any tim e im plied th a t th e ir in te re st stem m ed from an assessm ent
th at A u stralia has a special influence in Asia, or, for th a t m atte r, in W ash in g ­
to n ; they did not. R ath er, it m eans th a t A u stralia is one of th e points on
th e last line of resistance, a n d it is w o rth encouraging recognition, on
C h in a ’s term s, from any of these p o in ts; M alaysia could be equally, if not
m ore, significant.
T h e re is also a m ore negative in terest. A u stra lia ’s refusal to recognise
has n o t been passive. By lo bbying to hold th e line against recognition of
Peking and its adm ission to th e U n ite d N atio n s, the A ustralian G o v ern m en t
placed itself in the position o f o b stru c tin g im p o rta n t, and p u rely diplom atic,
objectives of C hinese foreign policy in 1971, w hich had n o th in g to do w ith
w ar or revolution b u t w h ich are critical to th e successful operation of
C h in a ’s new diplom acy. If A u stralia is am ong the last h an d fu l of countries
18
TA LK I N G W I T H CH IN A
to decide to recognise, C h in a will see little reason to respond w ith alacrity
or to acco m m o d ate to an A u stralian b arg ain in g position as it did w ith
C an ad a over th e T aiw an form ula. A nd A u stralian s will, in any event, have
to face th e fact th a t, for C h in a, relations w ith th e U n ite d S tates are of
g reater im p o rta n c e th an relations w ith A ustralia, and th a t w hat C h in a is
p re p a re d to concede to th e U .S ., w hich m eans effective norm alisation of
relations w ith o u t, in th e sh o rt term , de jure recognition, is unlikely to be
g ra n te d to A u stralia.
T h e q u estio n o f recognition w as raised on the first m o rn in g in Peking,
in th e discussio n s w ith C hi Peng-fei. T h e position w hich the delegation
p u t to him w as th a t th e A .L .P . w ould p ro p o se to recognise the C hinese
G o v e rn m e n t on term s w hich w ere in essence identical to those on w hich
C an ad a had recognised ; th a t w hile taking no te of th e C h inese G o v e rn m e n t’s
claim to sovereig n ty over T a iw a n , th e A .L .P . regarded th is as an internal
m a tte r and a claim w hich A u stralia could n e ith e r challenge nor endorse,
since it was n o t for A u stralia to im pose solutions to th e intern al affairs of
o th e r co u n tries. B u t th e ad d itio n al p ro b lem for A u stralia is th at, unlike
C anada, it has an em bassy in T aiw an . T h e C hinese w ere well aw are of
th is fact, and w hile C hi accepted th e A .L .P .’s general position, he did not
at first give an u nequivocal assurance th a t C h in a saw no fu rth e r obstacles
to reco g n itio n on th e term s p ro p o sed . In th e aftern o o n session w ith F oreign
M in istry officials led by C h o u C h ’iu-yeh, th e C h in ese side retu rn ed to this
p o in t and q u estio n ed W h itlam specifically on th e em bassy in T aiw an and
th e A .L .P .’s a ttitu d e to the expulsion of C h ian g K ai-shek from th e U n ited
N atio n s. W h itla m rep eated th a t th e A .L .P . had a o n e-C h in a policy, th at
it w ould n o t s u p p o rt ‘tw o -C h in a s’ in th e U .N . or elsew here, and added
th a t th e logic o f th is position fu rth e r d ictated th a t an A .L .P . g overnm ent
w ould s u p p o rt an A lb a n ian -ty p e resolution in th e U .N . and w ithdraw the
em bassy from T aiw an . C hinese ag reem en t was endo rsed th e follow ing day
by th e M in iste r of F oreig n T ra d e , w ho told th e d eleg ation: ‘W e approve
of th e A .L .P . policy tow ard s C h in a ’. A nd w hen C h o u E n-lai referred to
th e A .L .P . visit as a tu rn in g p o in t in S in o -A u stralian relations and said
he w ould w elcom e a visit by a L a b o r P rim e M in iste r, he did so on the
basis of th e policy th e A .L .P . had p u t forw ard and on the u n d e rsta n d in g
th a t an A .L .P . g o v ern m en t w ould recognise in the sam e term s as the
C an ad ian form ula.
I t w as a p p a re n tly in reference to this fo rm u la and th e w ithdraw al of the
em bassy th a t it w as claim ed in A u stralia th a t W h itlam ‘gave away in
advance every b arg ain in g c o u n te r th a t A u stralia has in fu tu re negotiations
w ith C h in a ’, an allegation o f su rp risin g naivety. T h e C hinese G o v e rn m e n t’s
19
STEPHEN FITZGERALD
position is well know n ; on th e q u estio n o f T aiw an th ere can be no b arg ain ­
ing. T h e C anadians had ex tracted the m ax im u m concession on this point,
and th e A .L .P . had secured eq u iv alen t term s for A ustralia. In th e opinion
of all close observers o f C h in a, th e C h in ese position is likely to harden
ra th e r th an relax. P ro testatio n s a b o u t th e em bassy w ere unreal. Its w ith ­
draw al w ould, o f course, involve A u stralia in a m ore positive act th an the
C anad ian s had had to m ake. B ut given a policy of reco g n itio n of Peking
and n o n -in terferen ce in C h in a ’s in tern al affairs by any a tte m p t to create
a ‘tw o -C h in a s’ situ atio n , th e em bassy accredited to the C h in ese N ationalists
as th e g o v ern m en t o f the w hole o f C h in a w ould have to be w ith d raw n ,
even in th e event th a t reserv atio n s w ere held a b o u t th e p re se n t or fu tu re
status of th e island. C o n tra ry to the assertion of the th en F o reig n M inister,
L eslie B ury, th a t C h in a d em an d s th a t co u n tries estab lish in g diplom atic
relations should stop tra d in g w ith T aiw an (‘T h is is one price w e are not
p rep ared to p a y ’),20 th e fo rm u la does n o t p reclu d e trad e relations w ith
T aiw an or visits by A u stralian s, as the C an ad ian experience has d em o n ­
strated . N o r, in th e highly unlikely event th a t the C hinese p arties involved
in the civil w ar and the d isp u te over T aiw an w ere to agree to a separate
statu s for T aiw an , does it p reclu d e a relationship w ith a sep arate T aiw an.
B ut th e solution lies w ith th e p arties them selves and n o t w ith A ustralia.
G o v e rn m e n t M in isters in A ustralia also charged th a t W hitlam had
deliberately tied th e estab lish m en t o f relations to an A .L .P . G ov ern m en t.
T h is ex trao rd in ary allegation arose n o t from the exchange w ith C hi b u t
from an a tte m p t to read co n sp irato rial m eaning into rem arks m ade by
C hou E n-lai. W h itlam had said to C hou th a t had the A .L .P . n o t been out
of office, A ustralian tro o p s w ould n o t have been in V ietnam , to w hich C hou
rep lied : ‘W h at is past is p ast and we look forw ard to w hen you can take
office and p u t into effect y o u r p ro m ise s’. W h itlam said th a t if th e A .L .P .
w ere to w in the next elections th e re w ould be th e first visit by an A ustralian
P rim e M in ister to the P e o p le ’s R ep u b lic o f C hina, and C h o u rep lied : ‘You
are w elcom e. All th in g s develop from sm all beginnings. A fter these tw enty
years or m ore o f struggle we believe you will sh ortly be able to rise up
ag ain ’. T h e p rom ises to w hich C h o u referred related to A .L .P . policy on
V ietnam , and even if C h o u was th in k in g also of recognition, this in no
way rep resen ted an exclusive c o m m itm e n t to the A .L .P . N o r did the fact
th a t he exten d ed a w elcom e to a visit by an A ustralian P rim e M inister. T o
those w ho w ere p re se n t at th e interview it was clearly a p p a re n t th at an
A .L .P . victory w ould n o t be an event o f e a rth -sh a tte rin g significance to
C hina. If th ere was an y th in g to be read into C h o u ’s rem arks it was n ot
an en d o rsem en t of the A .L .P ., b u t an indicatio n , the clearest th e delegation
20
TA LK I N G W I T H CH IN A
had received, th a t C h in a was n o t at th a t stage a n ticip atin g su b stan tial
p rogress tow ard s n o rm alisatio n of relations w ith th e L ib e ra l-C o u n try
P arty G o v ern m e n t.
T h e p o in t is th a t the C h in ese G o v e rn m e n t w ould n ot be so foolish as
to tie its ow n h an d s to one possible eventuality, and at no stage in the
p riv ate discussions did th e C h in ese say th a t th ey w ould, n o r did the
delegation d em an d it. In th e m eetin g w ith C hi P eng-fei, m oreover, C hi
stressed th a t C h in a was m ore th a n p re p a re d to n orm alise relations w ith the
L ib e ra l-C o u n try P a rty G o v e rn m e n t. H e said th a t ‘relations can be e sta b ­
lished w hen the q u estio n of T aiw an is so lv ed ’, and w hen asked w h eth er
C hina believed th is could be achieved w ith th e ru lin g parties in A ustralia,
he replied, ‘th a t d e p e n d s on th e a ttitu d e of th e p resen t A ustralian G o v e rn ­
m e n t’. B ut as far as C h in a was co ncerned, ‘C h in a ’s policy is clear, th e door
is o p e n ’. W h itlam , in tu rn , said th a t if norm alisatio n could be achieved
u n d e r the p re se n t g o v ern m en t, th e A .L .P . w ould ap p lau d and su p p o rt it.
W ith o u t any know ledge of th is exchange and w ith o u t fo u n d atio n in any
of the p u b lish ed rep o rts o f th e visit, W h itla m ’s critics later accused him
of sabotaging th e G o v e rn m e n t’s dialogue w ith C h in a, w hich, ap art from
being u n fo u n d e d w as also an ab su rd p ro p o sitio n , because it ignored C h in a ’s
ow n stand on th e questio n of T aiw an and im plied th a t A ustralia could
extract from th e C h in ese G o v e rn m e n t co n d itio n s for recognition w hich it
had accorded to no o th e r c o u n try . C hi P eng-fei had stated q u ite explicitly
th a t
the present state of relations between our two countries is due to the parties in power
in Australia, not China . . . T h e Australian G overnm ent has opposed the seating
of China in the U nited N ations, they support Chiang Kai-shek . . . .
S peaking in the H o u se o f R ep resen tativ es on 17 A ug u st, M cM ah o n alleged
th a t W h itlam ‘co m p ro m ised th e first m oves we w ere m aking th ro u g h
d iplom atic ch an n els to open u p a dialogue w ith C h in a ’.21 B ut on 27 M ay
M cM ah o n had said th a t he did n o t believe th a t the A .L .P . visit w ould
harm the G o v e rn m e n t’s in itiatives and th a t ‘they m ay, perh ap s, be able to
do some g o o d ’.22 A nd on 4 Ju ly , referrin g to th e only two m eetings th a t had
taken place b etw een C h in ese and A u stralian d ip lo m ats in Paris, before
th e A .L .P . had even left for C h in a, M c M a h o n had said th a t ‘we have not
been able to get any com m on sense o u t o f th e m [the C h in e se ]’. ' A nd
on 28 July, two w eeks after W h itlam had left C h in a, M cM ah o n claim ed
th a t there had been ‘p ro g re ss’ in th e dialogue and th a t the C hinese G o v e rn ­
m en t was ‘p ositively in terested in estab lish in g d ip lo m atic relations w ith
th e A ustralian G o v e rn m e n t’.24 T h e re was, at th e very least, a certain
21
STE PH EN FITZGERALD
inconsistency in this series o f statem en ts, and d espite M c M a h o n ’s claim
in th e H o u se on 17 A ugust, th e dialogue did in fact co n tin u e, alth o u g h it
co n tin u ed to fo u n d er on th e q u estio n of T aiw an .
Regional alliances. A second p o in t of C h in ese in terest is A u stra lia ’s
m ilitary and defence a g reem en ts: A N Z U S , S E A T O , and th e recen t Five
Pow er arran g em en t covering M alaysia and Singapore. G iven th e political
co n tex t in w hich the first o f these tw o alliances was created, it is n ot
u nreaso n ab le for th e C hinese G o v e rn m e n t to regard th em as b eing at least
in p a rt directed against C h in a and p o ten tially offensive ra th e r th an d e fe n ­
sive. T h e d espatch of A u stralian troops to K orea, M alaya and V ietnam ,
and A ustralian p articip atio n in th e Five P ow er agreem ent, m ig h t seem to
suggest a ten d en cy on the p a rt of A u stralia to ap proach relations w ith Asia
p rim arily in m ilitary term s. A u stralia m ay n o t be the pivot of such a rra n g e ­
m en ts, b u t it does have a close relatio n sh ip w ith the U n ited S tates, and the
C hinese are aw are of the secret U .S . bases in A u stralia and th e p u b lic
deb ate as to th eir p u rp o se. F ro m a C hin ese p o in t of view, th erefo re,
A ustralia is very m u ch linked w ith th e old c o n ta in m en t policy and appears
as a strategic o u tp o st of th e U .S . in th e event th a t the U .S . sh o u ld launch
offensive action against C hina.
A u stra lia ’s defence agreem ents w ere also discussed in the first m eetin g
w ith C hi Peng-fei, and w ere th e su b ject of one of th e m ost in terestin g
co n fro n tatio n s of th e visit. A fter an o p en in g exchange on V ietnam , W h itlam
p u t the view th at A u stra lia ’s form al alliances w ere regarded as defensive.
C hi objected th at ‘you are n o t carry in g o u t defence treaties by sending
troops to o th er co u n tries, you are in terferin g in o th e r c o u n trie s’ affairs
u n d e r th e guise of assistan ce’. H e m ain tain ed a basic objection to th e antiC h in a origins and p u rp o se of S E A T O : the A u stralian G o v e rn m e n t
jo in ed m any treaties th a t are against o r u n frien d ly to C hin a, for instance, S E A T O .
S E A T O is a m ilitary treaty and was used as a spearhead against C hin a, so th ere
cannot be good relations.
W hen pressed, how ever, he agreed th a t S E A T O was ‘n ot effective’ and
had ‘fallen a p a rt’, and it was clear th a t it is no longer regarded w ith serious
concern in Peking. W h itlam was n o t p re p a re d , how ever, to dism iss A N Z U S
in the sam e way, having ju s t com e from th e biennial conference of the
A .L .P . at w hich su p p o rt for A N Z U S had been reaffirm ed and em phasis
given to c o n tin u in g close relations w ith th e A m erican people. H e argued
persuasively w ith C hi th a t A ustralian s, n o t sim ply the L ab o r P arty , in
no way regarded A N Z U S as an offensive alliance b u t as one w hich was
p u rely defensive. A nd w'hile th e L a b o r P a rty disagrees w ith th e statio n in g
22
TA LK I N G W I T H CH IN A
of troops in M alaysia and S ingapore, he argued w ith sim ilar effect about
th e Five P ow er arran g em en t.
T h e q u estio n of alliances was to arise again in th e interview w ith C hou
E n-lai, b u t in th e discussion w ith C hi tw o highly significant p oints em erged.
T h e first was th a t W h itlam m ade an im p o rta n t b re a k th ro u g h in co m m u n i­
cation in p resen tin g the case for A ustralia, and his arg u m en ts appear to
have im pressed. C hi began w ith a position of specific opposition to
A u stra lia ’s p articip atio n in m ilitary alliances. H e th en m oved to a m ore
general p o sitio n , th a t regional arran g em en ts are stip u lated by the U n ited
S tates or th e U n ite d K in g d o m and th a t C h in a was n o t in favour of them
because th ey ‘affect th e sovereignty of these co u n tries by big pow er c o n tro l’.
In response to W h itla m ’s arg u m en ts, C hi conceded fu rth e r th a t C hina
w ould n o t oppose all defence a rran g em en ts and th at bilateral defence
treaties w ould be ap p ro ach ed according to the m erits of each and the
p a rtic u la r circum stances. O n th e specific q u estio n o f A N Z U S , C hi said
it d ep en d ed p artly on th e b ack g ro u n d , b u t th a t C h ina ‘W ill consider it
and decide o u r a ttitu d e according to th e n a tu re and the aim s of the
a rra n g e m e n t’. T h is rep resen ted a concession to W h itla m ’s arg u m en t of
p o ten tial significance for A ustralia, and it was p ossibly as a result of this
exchange th a t C hou E n -lai was later to a d o p t a som ew hat different tack,
argu ing in term s o f the effect o f the U .S . alliance on A ustralia itself. T h e
second p o in t was th a t th e C hin ese side was o p e n -m in d ed on an issue of vital
concern to A ustralia. T h e w hole exchange w as a strik ing illustration of the
value of d ire c t con tact and of th e com pelling need for th e estab lish m en t of
relations w ith th e C hinese G o v e rn m e n t.
Vietnam . In the discussion o f th e o p eratio n of A u stra lia ’s alliances,
V ietnam wras a som ew hat d ifferent issue, since b o th sides w ere in basic
ag reem ent, and, since 1966, th e re had nev er been any question of a
b ip artisan A ustralian policy. L a b o r’s opp o sitio n to the w ar was a m atter
of open record, and at th e recen t F ed eral C onferen ce it had affirm ed its
o p position to th e statio n in g of A u stralian tro o p s abroad. ‘O n this p o in t’,
said C hi, ‘w e hold th e sam e opinion and w elcom e this s ta n d .’ H e accused
th e A u stralian G o v e rn m e n t of bein g an ‘acco m p lice’ o f th e U .S . in V ietnam ,
b u t from th e d eleg atio n ’s discussions and p articu larly from the interview
w ith C hou E n-lai, it was a p p a re n t th a t C h in a regards th e A ustralian
in v olvem en t in V ietnam , if n o t w ith indulgence, at least w ith a degree of
u n d e rsta n d in g , on th e g ro u n d th a t th e A u stralian co m m itm en t was an
inevitable conseq u en ce of th e G o v e rn m e n t’s relations w ith W ashington.
T h e re w as, for exam ple, discussion of th e references to A ustralia in the
P en tag o n P apers, and C h o u E n-lai referred to th e N ixon d o ctrin e and
23
S T E PH E N FITZGERALD
th e policy o f ‘using A u strasian s to fight A u stra sian s’. T h e fu rth e r im plica­
tion of th is a ttitu d e is th at, w hile th e C hinese G o v e rn m e n t does not like
w h at the A ustralian G o v e rn m e n t has done and feels stro n g ly ab o u t som e
of th e positions it co n tin u es to hold, such as su p p o rt for C h ian g K ai-shek,
th e re is no special hostility o r en m ity tow ard s A ustralia as such, a fact
w hich m an y A ustralians do n o t u n d e rsta n d and find difficult to accept. It
w as interesting, nevertheless, th a t Chi F eng-fei m oved stra ig h t into the
q u estio n of V ietnam at th e b eg in n in g o f th e interview , and th a t C hou
E n -lai did the sam e. T h e inference to be d raw n from this is n o t sim ply th at
C h in a w an ted to know precisely w here th e A .L .P . stood, b u t th a t it was
concern ed to m ake absolutely certain th a t C h in a ’s w illingness to deal w ith
th e U .S . and its allies in V ietnam did n o t m ean th a t this issue could be
sw ept u n d e r the table.
A fter th e delegation had left C h in a, w ide p u b licity was given to w hat
th e C hinese side had said co n cern in g p articip atio n in a reconvened G eneva
C onferen ce. F ollow ing th e K issin g er visit and notes of concern sounded in
H anoi, su b se q u e n t C hinese statem en ts rejected any such in ten tio n on th eir
p a rt, b u t W h itlam cam e away w ith the stro n g im pression th at, w ith certain
critical qualifications, this m ig h t n o t be th e case. H e did so on the basis
of a d ire c t answ er to a q u estio n he p u t to C h o u E n-lai. A fter the conclusion
of th e interview , C h o u w alked w ith the delegation to the o u tsid e entrance
o f the reception hall, and th e co nversation betw een him and W hitlam
to u ch ed briefly on th e ir respective ages, th e B an dung C onference, and the
1954 G en ev a C onference. A t this poin t, W h itlam asked C h o u :
‘D oes C hina still su p p o rt th e p rin cip les of th e G eneva C o n ference? W ould you
atte n d a reconvened G eneva C o n feren ce?’
C h o u : ‘Y es’.
W h itlam : ‘H ow ab o u t B andung? Is C h in a p resen tly in terested in a new B andung
C o n feren ce?’
C h o u : 'I t w ould not be in B andung. P resid en t S oekarno is no longer th ere. Perhaps
it will be in Phnom P e n h ’.
C h o u d id n o t elaborate on w h at he m e a n t by his co m m en t on the G eneva
C on feren ce or on th e term s on w hich he m ig h t go, b u t it was obviously
in ten d e d , and it was ‘on th e re c o rd ’ to an ex tent th a t p arts of this final
exchange w ere being reco rd ed by A u stralian p ressm en . W hitlam was
su rp rise d at th e rem ark, and th e fact th a t C h o u ’s response had been so
positive and u n h esitatin g p ro m p te d him to p u rsu e the q u estion w ith the
F ren ch A m bassador, M a n a c ’h, at a d in n e r given by th e am bassador for
th e delegation two days later. M a n a c ’h, w ho is know n to be on very good
term s w ith C hou E n-lai, gave it as his ow n opinion th a t C h inese interest
24
TA L K I N G W I T H C H IN A
in any V ietn am peace co nference w ould d ep en d on w h eth er it w as initiated
or agreed to by th e aggrieved p arties in In d o -C h in a , th a t th e C hinese
w ould n o t agree to any conferen ce in w hich th e leading and p re d o m in a n t
p a rticip an ts w ere E u ro p ean , as had been th e case at G eneva, b u t th a t it
w ould have to be in a m o re A sian fram ew ork. It was at this sam e d in n e r
th at M a n a c ’h discussed th e new sev en -p o in t proposal of the P rovisional
G o v e rn m e n t of S o u th V ietn am , and the fact th a t C h in a had su p p o rte d th e
p roposal, w hich rep resen ted a m o re positive a ttitu d e to th e P aris peace
talks th an had p reviously been th e case. It was on th e basis of this c o n v er­
sation th a t W h itlam cabled th e A u stralian P rim e M in ister suggesting th a t
he m ig h t urge on th e U n ite d S tates th e seriousness of the proposals and
the fact th a t th ey p resen ted an h o n o rab le o p p o rtu n ity for the U n ite d S tates
to w ith d raw . A nd it was on th e basis of this cable th a t M cM ah o n d escribed
W h itlam as the spokesm an for those against w hom A ustralia was fighting
in V ietn am . M a n a c ’h enjoys a con sid erab le re p u ta tio n for being well
inform ed. M c M a h o n , after W h itlam had disclosed th e source of th e
info rm atio n , co m m en ted th a t ‘As a resu lt of som e cocktail gossip w ith a
foreign rep resen tativ e in C h in a, he [W hitlam ] caused m ore havoc th an
any m an could have caused eith er in A u stralia or in any o th e r p a rt o f th e
w o rld ’ , 20 reflecting not only c o n te m p t for a highly skilled d ip lo m at b u t
also a som ew h at L illip u tian view of w h at co n stitu te s havoc in this w orld.
W h itla m ’s statem en ts ab o u t a reconvened G en ev a C onference in his press
conferences in H o n g K ong and T o k y o seem ed co n trad icted by later C hinese
statem en ts on th e subject, b u t he did n o t m isre p re se n t C hou, since C hinese
p articip atio n in a reconvened conference was th e m in im u m in te rp re ta tio n
w hich could be placed on C h o u ’s o therw ise u n elab o rated rem ark. W hitlam
had p u t th e questio n to C h o u directly and C hou had replied Yes, and his
in te rp re ta tio n was reinforced by th e opinion th a t w h at M a n a c ’h had said
reflected in fo rm atio n o b tain ed directly from C hinese sources. Since th e general
p rin cip les o u tlin ed by M a n a c ’h w ould n o t be in co n sisten t w ith any know n
C hinese p o sitio n , and since th ere have been su b se q u e n t suggestions from a
variety of sources th a t C h in a m ay at least be giving som e th o u g h t to a new peace
conference, it ap p ears th a t C h o u m ay have been th in k in g of so m eth in g
o th er th an a reconvened G en ev a C on feren ce, b u t using G en ev a as a
sh o rth an d , w hich has becom e com m on p ractice in o th e r co u n tries in recent
years. W h itla m also used it in this sense, or w ith th e necessary qualifica­
tions, in his su b se q u e n t statem en ts. T h e force o f C h in a ’s later denials
appears to be explained by th e fact th a t consid erab le speculation had arisen
over W h itla m ’s rem arks and over th e first visit of D r K issinger to Peking,
and th a t C h in a w as co n cern ed to reassure its V ietnam ese allies th a t w h at25
STE PH E N FITZG ERA LD
ever views it held ab o u t a peace co n ference it was n ot going to b etray the
V ietnam ese by secret deals b e h in d th e ir backs. In fact, C hi P eng-fei had
said qu ite u n eq u iv o cally th a t C h in a did n o t th in k th ere w ere co n d itio n s for
a conferen ce ‘w hilst th e U .S . co n tin u es th e w ar and has its tro o p s in
V ie tn a m ’.
O ne q u estio n o f d ire c t co n cern in A u stra lia -C h in a relations raised by
the delegation in th e m eetin g w ith C hi co n cern ed the p ro -P ek in g C o m ­
m u n ist P a rty of A ustralia. T h is p arty and its relationship w ith C h in a is n o t
a political issue in A u stralia and it certainly has no connection w ith th e
L a b o r P arty . B u t it is c o m m itted to revolution in A ustralia, it is closely
aligned ideologically w ith P eking and, since th e latter p eriod of th e C u ltu ral
R evolution, it ap p eared to have been m ak in g decisions on applications to
visit C h in a, to have assum ed an alm ost q u asi-co n su lar function. W h itlam
asked w h at C h in a ’s a ttitu d e tow ards this p a rty was, and p articu larly w h at
it w ould be a fte r the esta b lish m e n t of relations, and C hi replied th a t th e
existence o f th is ‘p arty w ill n o t affect th e relationship betw een o u r tw o
countries. Y o u r dom estic p ro b le m s are for you to solve yourselves and we
will n o t in te rfe re in y o u r in tern al affairs’.
T h e talks w ith C hi, and later w ith M in istry officials, covered a w ide
range of in te rn a tio n a l issues. In response to questions, C hi explained at
som e len g th th e in te re stin g p rin cip les on w h ich C h in a bases its econom ic
and tech n ical assistance to foreign co u n tries,26 and in talking ab o u t the
U .N ., he said C h in a w as ‘n o t o p tim istic ’ a b o u t being ad m itted in 1971, or
even in 1972. T h e delegation was in terested also in C h in a ’s relations w ith
Indonesia, on w h ich p o in t C hi replied th a t if P resid en t S u h a rto ‘gives up
the policy of o p p o sin g C h in a it is n o t im possible th a t we could re-establish
relatio n s’. A nd W h itla m w as in trig u ed by th e fact th a t in C h in a ’s arg u m en t
ab o u t Ja p a n th e re was no indicatio n of w h e th e r C hina m ig h t respond if
Jap an did, in fact, em b ark on m ilitary ad v e n tu re s abroad, and C hi answ ered
his q u estio n by saying th a t C h in a ‘w ould n o t lightly send tro o p s to foreign
c o u n trie s’. W ith D r K issin g er a b o u t to arrive in Peking, C hi was ready to
agree th a t th e U n ite d S tates was m o re passive in its a ttitu d e tow ards C hina,
b u t cau tio n ed th a t it could be expected to ‘co n tin u e to play tric k s’. F o r
those o f us w ho w ere still in C h in a w hen th e an n o u n cem en t of K issin g er’s
visit w as m ade, th e re w ere o p p o rtu n itie s to explore the responses of
C hinese people. A lth o u g h som e w ere p re p a re d to express stro n g views about
P re sid e n t N ix o n , m o st people we q u estio n ed replied th a t if P rem ier C hou
had invited N ix o n to C h in a this m u st ultim ately serve th e in terests of S inoU .S . relatio n s and w orld peace. F oreig n M in istry officials seem ed to expect
26
T A L K I N G W I T H CH IN A
th at th e a n n o u n c e m e n t w ould silence the criticism in A u stralia of the
A .L .P . visit to C hina.
O n som e of th e in tern atio n al issues th ere w ere basic disagreem ents
betw een the two sides, b u t as W h itlam said later in th e interview w ith
C hou E n-lai, ‘n e ith e r of y o u r M in iste rs and n o n e of y o u r officials questioned
our rig h t to have d ifferen t assessm ents from tho se of th e C hinese G o v e rn ­
m en t . . . w hen th e re w ere differences they w ere u n d e rsto o d and resp ected ’.
O ne exam ple was V ietn am , on w h ich th e A .L .P ., w hile sy m p ath isin g w ith
the C h inese position on w ith d raw al of foreign troops, stro n g ly su p p o rts a
negotiated settlem en t or a peace conference if eith er w ould brin g an
im m ediate halt to th e carnage and p ro d u ce a se ttle m en t acceptable to the
V ietnam ese people. A n o th e r con cern ed n u clear w eapons, on w hich the
A .L .P . su p p o rts w h atev er p artial m easures have already been taken for
control, b u t on w hich C hina, bein g a p rin cip al ta rg e t of b o th the U n ited
S tates and the Soviet U n io n , argues th a t it m u st develop its ow n credible
d e te rre n t, th a t th e m easu res ad o p ted so far serve only to g u aran tee super
pow er do m in atio n of th e w orld by th e U .S . and th e U .S .S .R ., w hich are
them selves still engaged in an arm s race, and th a t th e only realistic solution,
proposed by C h in a in 1963, is an ag reem en t by a H ead s of S tate conference
of all n atio n s on th e total p ro h ib itio n and d e stru c tio n of all n u clear w eapons.
O ne of the m o re in te re stin g exchanges con cern ed B angla D esh. Like
m o st A ustralian s, W h itlam w as appalled at w h a t had h ap p en ed in the
eastern p a rt of P akistan. C h in a had su p p o rte d th e P akistan G o v ern m en t,
p artly because of th e lo n g -sta n d in g frien d sh ip b etw een th e tw o go v ern ­
m en ts and the co n fro n tatio n w ith In d ia and th e Soviet U n io n , and this
su p p o rt was reg ard ed by som e foreigners as a cynical act of betrayal.
C h in a ’s m otives, w hich deserve g reater atten tio n th a n they have received,
are explored m o re fully in P a rt I I I of this pap er. B ut in th e discussion w ith
C hi Peng-fei, th e A .L .P . delegation had w h a t was possibly the earliest
indication of C h in a ’s d ilem m a and of its real feelings on th e actions of the
P akistan G o v e rn m e n t. W h itla m had raised th e su b ject and his opinion
was n ot lost on th e C h in ese side. In th e careful language of C hinese
diplom acy, C hi resp o n d ed th a t C h in a ‘hop ed th a t th e P akistan G o v ern m en t
w ould ad o p t good policies to solve th e refugee p ro b lem , b u t this is a
dom estic pro b lem and we do n o t in terfere in in tern al affairs’. T h e im plica­
tion was th a t, w h ile sta n d in g b y its relatio n sh ip w ith th e P akistan G o v e rn ­
m ent, C hin a did n o t ap p ro v e of w h at had taken place, and it appears
su b seq u en tly to have expressed its views q u ite stro n g ly to representatives
of Pakistan.
Sino-A ustra lia n trade. D iscu ssio n s w ith th e M in iste r of F oreign T rad e,
27
STE PH E N FITZG ERA LD
Pai H sian g -k u o , covered a w ide variety o f subjects. B ut as b o th sides
acknow ledged, th e A .L .P . delegation was n o t in P eking in a negotiating
capacity, w hich m e a n t th a t ap a rt from soliciting C hinese views on p ro b lem s
in S in o -A u stralian trad e and ex tractin g in fo rm atio n on fu tu re trad e policies,
on w hich few g o v ern m en ts w ould be p re p a re d to give an open co m m itm en t,
it was n o t possible to p u rsu e individual m a tte rs very far. T h e C hinese
have a rep u tatio n for b u sin ess acum en, b u y in g w here prices are best, and
th ey are seldom p re p a re d to co m m it them selves to fu tu re pu rch ases of
individu al co m m o d ities; on lesser com m o d ities, actual details are negotiated
by the state tra d in g co rp o ratio n s in accordance w ith C h in a ’s c u rre n t needs,
usually, in th e case of A ustralia, w ith p riv ate b usinessm en. T h e C hinese
position, th erefo re, was th a t m o st o f th e general issues raised could be
p u rsu e d fu rth e r after n o rm alisatio n of relations— an exam ple of the basic
n eg o tiatin g position of C h in a w hich th e A u stralian G o v e rn m e n t at th a t
stage had still failed to u n d e rsta n d , and also possibly an in d u cem en t
to speedy recognition.
B eginning w ith a sta te m e n t of th e p rin cip les on w hich C hina based its
foreign tra d e ,2' Pai w en t on to say th a t th e A ustralian G o v ern m en t had
consisten tly p u rsu e d a policy of h o stility tow ards C hina, th a t econom ics
and tra d e could n o t be sep arated from p o litics, and th a t trad e ‘could only
be con tin u ed and developed u n d e r a situ atio n of norm al relations betw een
o u r tw o c o u n trie s’. H e said th a t th e policies o f th e A ustralian G o v ern m en t
in follow ing U .S . im perialism and in its h o stility tow ards C hina, and
p articu la rly its relations w ith C h ian g K ai-shek and its opposition to the
restoratio n of C h in a ’s legal rig h ts in th e U .N ., ‘can n o t b u t affect’ norm al
trad e relations b etw een C h in a and A ustralia. In this respect, C h in a had
m ade g reat efforts, b u t th e difficulties w ere n o t on the C hinese side.
T h e discussion then m oved to th e su b ject of w heat. T h e disadvantage
of th e A u stralian position had already been u n d erlin ed on th e day the
A .L .P . delegation arrived in C h in a, by th e release of a jo in t co m m u n iq u e
on th e visit to C h in a of th e C an ad ian T ra d e M in ister, M . P epin, in w hich
it was stated th a t ‘in accordance w ith C a n a d a ’s w ishes C h in a w ould
co n tin u e to co n sid er C an ad a first as a source of w heat as im p o rt needs
arose ’ .28 T h e w o rd ‘c o n tin u e ’ confirm ed th e A .L .P .’s suppositions ab o u t
C h in a ’s reasons for su sp e n d in g w h eat p u rch ases from A ustralia, and m ade
nonsen se of th e A u stralian G o v e rn m e n t’s later claim s th a t W h itla m ’s
‘visit co m p ro m ised d iscussions w hich th e A u stralian W h eat Board was ju st
a b o u t to begin w ith the C h in ese w hen he first announced his in ten tio n to
go to C h in a ’.2i> T h e u n u su al assurance given to C anada on fu tu re purchases
also seem ed calculated to u n d e rlin e th e political significance of C h in a ’s
28
TA LK I N G W I T H CH IN A
w heat trade. F u r th e r confirmation was obtained from Pai H siang-kuo. H e
told the delegation w h a t was already familiar to observers of China, that
C hina had had nine successive years of good harvests, that the 1971 su m m e r
crop was ‘com paratively’ good, and that C hina was now self-sufficient in
food grains and also had some grain reserves. H e also said that C hina had
a surplus for export, b u t that it im ported w heat and o th e r grains because
it w anted certain particular varieties and also ‘to m eet the needs of tr a d e ’.
H e said that w hile the a m o u n t varied from year to year, C hina always
im porte d a certain quantity.
Pai c o n tin u e d : ‘T h e A ustralian G o v er n m e n t’s h ostile p o licy tow ards C hina,
fo llo w in g U .S . im perialism , created certain ob stacles in C h in a ’s w h eat trade w ith
A u stralia.’
P atterson: ‘W h at ob sta cles? ’
C h i: ‘It still has d ip lom atic relations w ith C h ian g K ai-shek, a political m u m m y,
and has opp osed C h in a in th e U n ite d N a tio n s .’
Offering an incidental c o m m e n t on the Chinese view of the Australian
G o v e r n m e n t’s negotiating position in the dialogue, he said that this
‘tw o-C hina s policy’ was an interference in C h in a ’s internal affairs, and it
was in this context that he said that C hina approved of the A .L .P .’s policy.
U n d e rlin in g his earlier sta te m e nt that trade could only be continued and
developed if relations were normalised, Pai a d d e d :
'Trade in w h eat can be carried ou t sm o o th ly on ly if norm al political relation sh ip s
app ly b etw een our tw o cou n tries. W e regard th e political relationship as the fu n d a­
m ental q u estion . . . b ecau se o f the h ostility o f the A ustralian G overn m en t it follow s
that su ch an attitude can n ot bu t affect our trade relations.
W h e n Patterson raised the subject of the recent c o m m u n iq u e with Canada,
and questioned how this affected long-term prospects for purchases from
Australia, Pai re plied: ‘If the Australian G o v e r n m e n t changes its policy
tow ards C hina, we will give you the same consideration as we have given
to C a n a d a .’
l he circum stances in w hich C hina had b o u g h t A ustralian w heat before
1970 had been largely ones of C h in a ’s economic need. But in 1970, not
only had an im proved agricultural situation allowed C hina the luxury of
political choice, b u t an international climate changing rapidly in C h in a ’s
favour tended to m ake the A ustralian attitude m u c h m ore obtrusive than
it had been in the past. ’Phis is not to say that Pai flatly ruled out any
rem ote p rospect of buying w heat from a non-recognising Australian
G o v e r n m e n t; b u t the fact that he did not do so was m ore an illustration of
th e Chinese practice of not closing the door against the exigencies of a
29
STEPHEN FITZGERALD
radically ch anged situ atio n , such as a m assive ag ricu ltu ral setback, than any
real p ro sp e c t th a t p u rch ases m ig h t be resu m ed w hile A u stralian policy
rem ains u n c h an g ed . A n d th e fact th a t th e A u stralian G o v e rn m e n t has set
itself so m u c h at o d d s w ith C h in a w h en th e rest o f th e w orld is m oving in
th e op p o site d irectio n m ean s th a t even if C h in a needed m ore w heat and
C an ad a was u n ab le to su p p ly all its needs, it is u nlikely now to com prom ise
its p rin cip le o f tra d e an d p olitics as it d id b efo re 1970; it w ould certainly
explore o th e r so urces an d altern ativ e so lu tio n s b efo re even considering
A u stralia ; an d , from all indicatio n s, it w ould p ro b ab ly decide to p u t
political c o n sid eratio n s b efo re econom ic benefit. T h e only foreseeable
circu m stan ces in w h ich it w ould b u y w h eat from th e p re se n t governm ent
before no rm alisatio n w ould b e in th e face of an econom ic crisis o f disastrous
p ro p o rtio n s, o r on th e basis o f a p riv ate g u a ra n tee th a t recognition had
been decided on, on C h in a ’s term s, an d w o u ld follow w ith in a specified
p erio d o f tim e.
C h in a ’s o bjections to w h eat p u rch ases d o n o t, o f course, extend to o ther
co m m odities. T h e reason ap p ears to be p a rtly th a t C hina regards the
W h e a t B oard as being, in effect if n o t technically, a g o v ern m en t in stru m e n ­
tality, and w ith th is in m in d P a tte rso n u rg ed th a t C h in a co nsider the effect
on th e w h eat farm ers ra th e r th a n on th e A u stralian G o v ern m en t. T h e re is
also th e fact th a t th e w h eat sales w ere th e m o st im p o rta n t elem ent of
n atio n al significance in relatio n s b etw een th e tw o co u n tries, and had often
been referred to b y th e L ib e ra l an d C o u n try p a rties as th e o u tstan d in g
evidence o f th e success of th e ir policy o f u p h o ld in g the political qu aran tin e
o f C h in a w hile en co u rag in g th e d ev elo p m en t o f trad e. T h e C hinese are
aw are o f th e political aspects o f th e w h eat tra d e in A ustralia, and o f the
statem en ts m ad e b y G o v e rn m e n t m in isters. M c M a h o n , for exam ple,
ig noring his ow n G o v e rn m e n t’s d ab b lin g in p olitics th ro u g h th e W heat
B oard, charg ed th a t W h itla m ‘played th e C h in ese gam e by in tro d u cin g
politics in to w heat. W e th in k o u r b est in te re sts w ill be served by leaving
it to th e W h e a t B oard and keeping it o u t o f p o litic s’.30 T h e C hinese do not
regard th is as an h o n est sta te m e n t o f th e G o v e rn m e n t’s position. C hina
sees no reason to d e n y itself o p p o rtu n itie s to tra d e w ith priv ate com panies,
b u t it is no lo n g er p re p a re d to engage in a tra d e from w hich p a rt of the
benefit accrues to a h o stile A u stralian g o v ern m en t.
Pai H sian g -k u o assured th e delegation th a t C h in a believed th ere were
o p p o rtu n itie s for increased tra d e b etw een th e tw o co u n tries, and th a t there
w ould be no p ro b le m in d iscu ssin g th e p a rtic u la rs once relations had been
norm alised . P a tte rso n raised th e su b jects of w ool, in w hich the C hinese
are n o t p a rtic u la rly in te re ste d at p re se n t, an d sugar, w hich Pai said C hina
30
TA LK I N G W I T H C H IN A
m ig h t co n sid er in th e fu tu re if th e re w as any p o ssibility of increased
im ports, b u t p o in te d o u t th a t C h in a ’s ow n p ro d u c tio n w as in th e m ain
self-sufficient an d th a t su g ar w as alread y im p o rte d from C u b a ‘in the
in terests o f tw o-w ay tra d e ’. O n th ese m a tte rs, as o n m in eral and in d u strial
p ro d u cts, th e d iscussions w ere n ecessarily lim ited by th e fact th a t the
A .L .P . was n e ith e r an official g o v e rn m e n t delegation n o r a p riv ate com pany
w ith specific prop o sals to discuss. T h e q u e stio n o f lan d in g rig h ts for
Q A N T A S was no m o re th a n a rem o te possib ility , w hich Pai said C h in a
w ould be w illing to d iscuss ‘w h en th e situ atio n arises’. B ut for A ustralians,
it was in te re stin g th a t on th is p o in t also th e C an ad ian s w ere so far ahead
o f A ustralia th a t M . P ep in h ad ju s t o b ta in e d C h o u E n -la i’s ap proval for a
C anadian air service to C h in a, o n ly th e second w estern co u n try to have
done so an d th e first co u n try to have secu red a ro u te linking C h in a w ith
N o rth A m erica. W h itla m le a rn t in C h in a th a t som e years previously the
G o v ern m e n t had vetoed a visit to C h in a b y a Q A N T A S official.
T w o fu rth e r political q u estio n s w ere discu ssed w ith Pai H siang-kuo.
P atterso n an d B u rn s q u estio n ed h im on allegations o f C h in ese d u m p in g in
A ustralia, a su b ject o f as m u c h con cern to A u stralian w orkers as it is to
m an u factu rers. Pai d en ied th e allegations, assertin g th a t d u m p in g w as a
form o f exploitation of o th e r c o u n trie s in th e n am e o f trad e and po in tin g
o u t th a t it w as essential to co n sid er differences in th e cost o f p ro d u ctio n
from one c o u n try to a n o th er. It is, of course, w ell know n th a t m any of
C h in a ’s ex p o rt com m o d ities are p ro d u c e d very cheaply, w h ich th e delega­
tion could verify, at least in p a rt, from its discu ssio n s w ith factory w orkers
ab o u t wages, w hich are u n ifo rm ly low b u t w h ich in th e C h in ese econom y
are sufficient n o t only to m eet th e w o rk ers’ n eeds b u t to enable them to buy
sm all ‘lu x u ry ’ item s an d still d ep o sit a su rp risin g ly large p ro p o rtio n in
savings banks. T h e re is no reason to disbelieve P a i’s claim s a b o u t his
c o u n try ’s tra d e practices, an d it is n o t su rp risin g th a t C h in ese officials
w ere sensitive a b o u t th e A u stralian G o v e rn m e n t’s im p o sitio n o f tariff
b arriers against certain C h in ese goods, w ith o u t co n su ltatio n o r w arning,
and w hich, as Pai said, ‘h ad m ad e som e tra d e im p o ssib le’.
T h e second q u e stio n co n cern ed C h in ese p u rch ases from A u stralian
subsidiaries o f foreign com panies. Pai said th a t C h in a w ould n o t b u y from
w holly-ow ned su b sid iaries o r associates o f U .S . com panies in A ustralia,
b u t th a t A u stralian firm s w ith U .S . capital w ould be con sid ered separately,
according to th e p ercen tag e o f U .S . capital. In th e case o f Jap an ese capital,
Pai said th a t C h in a w ould co n sid e r each case on its ow n m erits, b u t th a t
in general it w ould ap p ly th e sam e co n d itio n s to Japan ese su bsidiaries or
associates in A u stralia as it h ad o u tlin e d in a set o f p rin cip les covering
31
S T E P H E N FITZG ERA LD
tra d e w ith Japanese firms, the essence of w hich was that C hina would not
deal with firms involved in trade with T a iw a n or S o u th K orea or supplying
arm s and a m m u n itio n to the U .S . for use in In d o -C h in a .
Interview
with
C hou E n - lai 31
T h e m e e tin g w ith C hou was intensely interesting for w hat it revealed
a b o u t the style of C hinese diplomacy, absorbing for w hat it reflected of
the objectives of C hinese foreign policy. T h e im port for A ustralia was lost
on W h itla m ’s critics, whose intem perate attacks did little to im prove the
fortunes of the dialogue they were a tte m p tin g w ith C hina, discredited
their own claims to a serious and responsible u n d e rsta n d in g of foreign
affairs, debased the public debate on China, and threatened to reintroduce
the Cold W a r into Australian politics by way of C hina, the red menace
and, by the use of C hina -de rive d term s w hich have th e ir own emotive
history in A ustralian politics, the ‘yellow p e ril’. W h e re C h o u him self took
the m eeting seriously, the A ustralian G o v e r n m e n t did not, and so failed
to realise that the im portance of the m eeting for Australia lay not in w hat
m ig h t be extracted from it for party attacks on the leader of the O pposition
b u t in w h a t C hou was saying, w hich will be of critical im portance in the
fu tu re of Australian foreign policy. T h e m easure of the G o v e r n m e n t’s
criticisms is exemplified by M c M a h o n ’s accusation that W hitlarn had been
c o n d u c tin g an exercise in ‘instant coffee’ diplomacy.
I have discussed elsewhere the style of C h in a ’s diplom acy as the delega­
tion experienced it in action ,32 b u t some points deserve m ention here. T h e
C hinese have m ade a point of negotiating on their own ground, on their
ow n terms, allowing others to take the initiative so that C hina can have
m a n o e u v ra b ility in its response, and using the elem ent of surprise to great
advantage. T h e s e factors were all present in the circum stances of the A .L .P.
visit and w ere exemplified in the interview w ith C h o u ; they may be
described as ‘guerilla d ip lo m a c y ’, not in the sense of objectives b u t simply
in term s of tactics. T h e A .L .P . had initiated the first contact with C h in a ;
it had gone to Peking for the discussions and the level of these discussions
was decided entirely by the C hinese; it was able to have fruitful talks only
because its established position on recognition was acceptable in the term s
C h in a has d e m a n d e d from all foreign governm ents. C hina itself was
o pe ra ting on two fronts, with the A .L .P . in Peking and with Australian
G o v e r n m e n t representatives in Paris, and in its talks w ith the A .L .P . it
had been flexible while always preserving its base position by frequent
re m in d e rs th a t substantial im p ro v e m e n t in relations was contingent upon
the e stablishm ent of diplom atic relations. T h e elem ent of surprise came
32
TALKING W IT H CHINA
in th e interview w ith C h o u , w h ich was an n o u n ced at sh o rt notice and
actually held at even sh o rter notice, and in fro n t of C hinese and A ustralian
jo u rn a lists and television cam eras, w hich th e delegation had n ot an ticip ated
and realised only w hen th e press was p e rm itte d to rem ain after p h o to g rap h s
had been taken. T h is had not been th e case in p revious m eetings. W h itlam
h ad been info rm ed by C hinese officials th a t it was usual for such m eetings
to begin w ith a sh o rt form al sta te m e n t, b u t C hou m oved straig h t into th e
discussion, and th ro u g h o u t th e interview kep t b rin g in g the conversation
back to subjects w hich he w anted to discuss. T h is is n o t to say th at the
reception of th e A .L .P . delegation was u n u su al. C h o u ’s perfo rm an ce was
co n sisten t w ith his p ast p ractice, and alth o u g h th e delegation was unaw are
of it at the tim e, he had also been m aking a h a b it of h olding such interview s
in fro n t of th e press, w ith th e C anad ian s, for exam ple, and even w ith a
recen t V ietnam ese delegation. N o r does ‘guerilla d ip lo m acy ’ im ply th a t the
C hinese ap p ro ach is u n frien d ly or un acco m m o d atin g . It was, for exam ple,
a m easure o f C h in a ’s concern to m eet th e w ishes of th e delegation th at the
m eetin g w ith C hou, expected later in th e week, was arranged im m ediately
after prelim in ary discussions on th e itin erary , d u rin g w hich no tim e had
been set aside for a m eetin g and C h in ese officials sensed th at the delegation
w as w o n derin g if it w ould m eet th e P re m ie r at all. A nd as th e discussion
below indicates, C hou was p re p a re d to m ake p u b lic declarations on th e
success of th e A .L .P . visit w hich he knew th e A .L .P . could use in e stab lish ­
ing the cred ib ility of its m ission in A ustralia.
In the m eetings w hich had been held before th e interview w ith C hou,
th e delegation had already raised all the issues of d ire c t concern in A u straliaC h in a relations, and all the im p o rta n t p o in ts had been p u rsu e d at som e
length. W h itlam had taken th e initiative th ro u g h o u t the tw o and a h alf
h o u r m eetin g w ith C hi Peng-fei, b o th in p re se n tin g the A .L .P . views and
in p ressing for info rm atio n from the C hinese side, w ith the resu lt th a t at
th e end of th e m eetin g C hi asked if, in view of the fact th at th e course of
th e m o rn in g ’s discussions had been d e te rm in e d largely by W h itlam , the
delegation w ould be agreeable to fu rth e r discussions in th e afternoon. T h e
sam e was tru e of the m eetin g w ith Pai H sian g -k u o , in w hich P atterso n
acted as spokesm an. By th e tim e it cam e to th e m eeting w ith C h o u , th e re ­
fore, the delegation had not only had ex h au stiv e talks on all the m ajo r
issues and placed on record th e p o in ts on w hich it q u estioned or disagreed
w ith the C h in ese G o v e rn m e n t’s views, b u t it had reached a p o in t beyond
w hich it could n o t proceed w ith o u t m oving into a position of n eg otiating
in detail on specific points, w hich it was n o t in a position to do. As a result,
th e m eeting w ith C hou was o f a ra th e r d ifferen t character, and it was
33
STE PH E N FITZG ERA LD
app ro ach ed as such by b o th sides. W h itla m ’s m ain concern by th a t stage
was to obtain an insight into the th in k in g of th e m an u ltim ately responsible
for C hin ese foreign policy and his views on how C h in a regarded the
critical issues o f in tern atio n al politics. C h o u ap p ears to have had a n u m b e r
of objectives. O ne was to p e rsu ad e W h itlam to endorse C h in a ’s views on
Jap an and th e U n ited S tates. A second was to im press on him the C hinese
view of th e b eh av io u r o f th e su p e r pow ers and th e im plications for co u n tries
such as A ustralia. A th ird was to use the m eeting, by including th e press,
as a m eans of gaining w ide p u b licity for th e th in k in g u n d erly in g C h in a ’s
foreign policies in a form w hich m ig h t be m o re effective than th e ja rg o n ­
laden p resen tatio n s of th e official C hinese m edia.
G iven C hinese assu m p tio n s a b o u t Jap an , it is n ot difficult to see how
C h in a views A u stra lia ’s relatio n sh ip w ith Jap an or to im agine the questio n s
raised in Peking ab o u t possible roles for A u stralia in J a p a n ’s C hina policy.
Jap an was a recu rrin g th em e th ro u g h o u t th e A .L .P . visit, to an ex ten t th a t
was som ew hat su rp risin g even given th e high level of C hinese atten tio n
to Jap an at th a t tim e. O n th e last evening in Peking, th e delegation was
show n a Jap an ese-m ad e film, one o f th e m an y w hich C hina has been
criticisin g recently as exam ples of glorification by Japanese film -m akers of
Ja p a n ’s m ission in its A sian and Pacific w ar. T h is is n o t as trivial as it m ay
seem , since th e C hinese case ab o u t m ilitarist revival rests p artly on an
a rg u m e n t th a t w hat is involved is a state o f m in d , im p o rta n t if th e ‘m ilita r­
ists’ are to achieve th e ir p u rp o se.
Japan w as one o f th e first su b stan tiv e issues raised by C hou E n-lai.
H e asked W h itlam to clarify a p o in t he had m ade in th e p reced in g d is­
cussions a b o u t A N Z U S bein g regard ed as a treaty for ‘p rev en tin g re sto r­
ation of Jap an ese m ilita rism ’, and q u estio n ed w hat po in ts of th e treaty
w ere d irected specifically to this end. W h itla m ’s original rem ark had n ot
been fram ed in th e w ay C h o u p u t the qu estio n, and he explained th at
w h at he had m ean t was th a t A N Z U S had been signed at a tim e w hen
A ustralian s and N ew Z ealan d ers ‘had th e sam e fear of th e Japanese as I
believe y o u r people have n o w ’, and th a t th e A m ericans, w ho w ere m ore
anxious to sign a peace tre a ty w ith Jap an , en tered into th e obligations of
th e A N Z U S treaty to reassure th e A u stralian s and the N ew Z ealanders.
T h e d iscussion m oved from th e re to S E A T O and V ietnam , b u t C hou
retu rn e d co n stan tly to the su b ject o f Jap an , m aking fo u r m ain p o in ts in
su p p o rt o f the C hinese case. O ne was th e th eoretical pro p o sitio n th a t w hen
capitalist econom ies develop to a certain p o in t they seek to expand o u t­
w ards. A second was th a t ‘it has becom e one of the p rin cip al co m p o n en ts
of th e N ix o n d o ctrin e to tu rn Ja p a n into a vanguard in th e F ar E a s t’, th a t
34
TA LK I N G W I T H CH IN A
the ‘U n ite d S tates im perialists are train in g th e ir successors to co n tin u e to
raise p ro v o c a tio n s’, th a t ‘A m erica has step p ed up th e revival of Japanese
m ilita rism ’. C h o u also suggested th a t th e Soviet U n io n , ‘in very w arm
relations w ith th e Sato G o v e rn m e n t’, was acting in co n cert w ith th e
U n ited S tates in this p u rp o se. A th ird p o in t con cern ed w h at C hina sees
as the co ncrete evidence o f m ilita rist revival w ith in Japan. ‘T h e m ost
concrete m an ifestatio n was a jo in t statem en t by N ixon and Sato in N o v e m ­
b er 1969.’ T h is was th e sta te m e n t in w hich Sato had declared th a t T aiw an
and S o u th K orea w ere im p o rta n t to th e security o f Jap an , w hich touched
on the m o st sensitive area of C h in a ’s policy and w hich had raised questions,
not only in C h in a, ab o u t w h at m ilitary m eans Jap an m ig h t use to m ain tain
this security. C o n tin u in g on th e N ix o n -S a to statem en t, C hou said: ‘It
m eant in actu ality to prolo n g indefinitely the Jap an ese-A m erican security
treaty m ain ta in in g m ilitary o p eratio n s on O kinaw a and at th e sam e tim e
m ilitary bases and som e naval bases on Jap an p ro p e r.’ H e th en referred
to the fact th a t J a p a n ’s fo u rth defence plan of U S Si 6,000 m illion re p re ­
sented the eq u iv alen t of th e total am o u n t sp en t on th e previous th ree plans
and, re tu rn in g to th e subject later, said th a t ‘a p ro p o rtio n ’ of those in
pow er in Ja p a n , inclu d in g Sato and N akasone, w anted Jap an to have
nuclear w eapons, th a t ‘the A m erican D efence D e p a rtm e n t is considering
w h eth er to give th em tactical n u clear w eapons or so m ething m ore p o w erfu l’,
and th a t th ey w ere p lan n in g to take over th e patrols co n d u cted from
O kinaw a by th e A m erican s:
T h e radius of this air defence exten d s in th e n o rth to reach th e so u th e rn p a rt of
K orea and in th e w est to reach th e E ast C h in a Sea and th e Yellow Sea and south to
T aiw an . . . U n d e r the treaty by w h ich O kinaw a will rev ert to Jap an , Jap an will
m aintain this radius of patrol. H ow is th a t perm issible? If you are allow ed to p atro l
th ere equally, should we m ake sim ilar p atrols close to th e ir territo ry ? W o u ld n o t th a t
m ake trouble?
C h o u ’s fo u rth m ain p o in t was th a t Jap an ese m ilitarism w as already
finding expression in o u tw ard expansion, th a t ‘Econom ic expansion will
sh ortly b rin g w ith it m ilitary ex p an sio n ’, elab o ratin g th e p o in t by specific
reference to A u stralia:
T h e Japanese econom y has already exceeded satu ratio n point. T h e y are extending
th eir hands into A ustralia. T h e y sta rte d th a t long ago . . . T h e y will w an t to extend
fu rth er, and th en insist on th e ir secu rity and so-called lifeline,
w hich exten d ed from n o rth -e a st C h in a to th e S tra its of M alacca.
W h itla m : ‘B ut w hat do you th in k th e a ttitu d e o f In d o n esia and M alaysia w ould
be tow ards any Japanese m ilitary in te re st in th e S traits of M alacca?’
35
STE PH E N FITZG ERA LD
C hou : ‘W e know th ro u g h som e of th e ir friends th a t they are som ew hat tense on
this m atter. T h e y w ant to m ain tain n eu trality . T h e q uestion is w h eth er U n ited States
im perialism will allow th em to rem ain neu tral. T h a t is A sia’s question. W hen the
Japanese econom y expands o u tw ard s it will extend its h an d into those w eak places.
O nce they expand econom ically th en th e n ex t m o m en t th e re will be m ilitary
p rotection. So we see them paying p a rticu lar atten tio n to th e ir air force and n av y .’
C h o u was quite clearly seeking direct s u p p o rt for C h in a ’s views on Japan,
both th ro u g h presentation of the case itself, th ro u g h his specific references
to Australia, and also by less direct appeals to which W h itla m m ig h t easily
have agreed and thus provided the assurance C hou was seeking. W h e re
W h itla m had distinguished betw een A ustralian fears of Japan in 1951 and
C hinese fears in 1971, for example, C h o u tu rn e d this into the present
tense: ‘Both of our peoples have similar se n tim e n ts’. T o w a rd s the end of
the interview, speaking of relations betw een C hina and Australia, C h o u said :
Both have suffered from Japanese m ilitarism . . . th e peoples of o u r co u n tries d o n ’t
w ant w ar to break out again. W h en a co u n try w an ts independence, how can you m ake
it su b m it by arm ed force?
W h itla m was not pre p a re d to give this assurance. H e said
th ere is one th in g abou t Jap an th a t we do appreciate. It is th e m ost w ealthy and
developed co u n try w hich will n o t have an y th in g to do w ith nuclear w eapons. W e
think th a t is reassuring.
T o this C h o u replied sharply, in English, ‘N o ! ’. W hitlam also objected to
C h o u ’s assertion about Ja p a n acquiring tactical nuclear w eapons from the
U .S ., on the ground that this w ould be in breach of their treaties, which
C hou answ ered by reference to the Pentagon Papers and secret treaties.
In defe n d in g Japan, W hitla m was not totally disregarding the Chinese case,
since as he said after his re tu rn to Australia, ‘W e should at least have the
grace to try to un d e rsta n d the basis of C h in a ’s fears, w hen we are so
obsessed by our o w n ’.33 A nd although he believes strongly that ‘Japan will
be the first great economic pow er to break the nexus betw een economic
stre n g th and military s tr e n g th ’,34 the significance of the Chinese view
of Ja p a n was one aspect of the discussions in Peking w hich impressed
him m ost, and p ro m p te d him both in C h in a and d u rin g his su b se q u e n t
visit to Japan to follow the m a tte r up in some detail, ranging from the
recent d ispute over the Senkaku Islands back to the Yoshida L e tte r and
J a p a n ’s separate peace treaty with C hiang Kai-shek. As a result, he
form ed the opinion that one constructive role w hich Australia m ig h t
a tte m p t w ould be to seek to ameliorate the hostility between C hina and
Japan, in particular helping Japan off the hook over the question of T aiw an.
36
TA LK I N G W I T H CH IN A
T h e substance of his views was set forth in speeches m ade to the National
Press C lub in C anberra on 26th July 1971 and to the Institute of I n te r ­
national Affairs in T ow nsville on 25 S e p te m b e r 1971.
Interw oven w ith the subject of Japan in the C hou interview was the
question of A N Z U S and S E A T O , in w hich C hou sought unsuccessfully
an A .L .P. repudiation of A u stra lia ’s alliance w ith the U n ite d States. T h e
m ain line of his a rgum e nt rested on an interesting parallel betw een Australia-U .S. relations and Sino-Soviet relations, to which he added a fu rth e r
parallel betw een U .S. and Soviet policies tow ards China, w hich may have
been th ro w n in partly as a re m in d e r to the A .L .P . that the A ustralian
G o v e r n m e n t was seeking closer ties w ith Moscow.
L eading on from the opening discussion about A N Z U S , W hitlam
reiterated that
we in A ustralia regard the A N Z U S tre a ty as entirely defensive. It has never been used
as justification for operating in V ietnam . . . T h e fo rm u la th a t has been used about
V ietnam by th e A ustralian G o v e rn m e n t for o u r p articip atio n in th a t w ar is sustained
u n d e r the provisions of S E A T O . . . .
It was at this point that C hou indicated a different line from th a t which
had been taken by Chi Peng-fei in his initial position on A ustralia’s alliances,
em phasising not the a n ti-C h in a hostility underlying Australian participa­
tion b u t the dangers of d e p e n d e n c e on great powers. C hou said that
in linking up th e A N Z U S treaty w ith S E A T O we can learn th is lesson. T h a t is, b oth
of th em have th e U n ite d S tates as th e p rincipal m em b er. T h a t was th e policy of
Jo h n F o ster D ulles at th a t tim e. You m ay say it was his soul . . . Im m ediately
follow ing the conclusion of th e S E A T O treaty cam e th e so-called treaty betw een the
U n ite d S tates and C hiang K ai-sh ek for defence o f T aiw an and Q uem oy. T h a t is to
say, his policy w'as by a w hole series of alliances to encircle C h in a . . . N ow he has a
successor to the n o rth .
C hou then w ent o n :
W e too had a defensive treaty, co n clu d ed in 1950 betw een C h in a and th e Soviet U nion.
T h a t treaty was called th e S in o -S o v iet F rie n d sh ip T re a ty of A lliance and M u tu al Aid.
T h e first article of th a t treaty was th a t th e aim of this treaty was to p rev en t the
resurgence of Japanese m ilitarism . It m ay have been p u t in even m ore clear term s
than the A N Z U S treaty. It was m ad e clear in th e treaty th a t if Japanese m ilitarism
is reviving or som e o th e r natio n helps Jap an to revive m ilitarism th en th e two
co untries help each other.
C hou spoke at some length about Japan, and then said:
A nd w'hat about our so-called ally? 'They are in very w arm relations w ith the Sato
37
ST E PH E N FITZG ERA LD
G o v e rn m e n t and also engage in very w arm d iscussions w ith th e N ixon G o v ern m en t
on so-called nu clear disarm am en t w hile we, th e ir ally, are being th re a te n e d by them
together. So w e feel th at o u r ally is n o t very reliable. Is y our ally very reliable? T h a t
is a m a tte r for your consideration, a m a tte r for y o u r reference. You see they have
succeeded in dragging you into th e V ietnam b attle field. H ow is th a t defensive?
T h a t is aggression.
W h itla m then replied that, while
none of us has any d o u b t a b o u t th e seriousness o f C hinese fears to w ard s reviving
Jap an ese m ilitarism , I m u st say w ith respect th a t I see no parallel in th e S ino-S oviet
pact and the A N Z U S T re a ty . T h e re has been no sim ilar d eterio ratio n in relations
betw een A ustralia, N ew Z ealand and th e U .S . as th ere has been b etw een th e P eo p le’s
R ep u b lic o f C h in a and th e Soviet U nion.
H e also p u t a ‘qualifying a rg u m e n t on behalf of A m e ric a ’, to the effect that
the soul of D ulles was no longer alive, that the A m erican people had
broken P re side nt Johnson and w ould do the same to N ixon if he did not
c o n tin u e to w ith d ra w from V ietnam . T h e strength of W h itla m ’s sentim ent
was fo u n d e d on the A .L .P .’s opposition to the w ar and the fact that it was
not only A m erica which had been involved, b u t also ‘the A ustralian people
[who] have had a bitter experience in going “ all the way w ith L B J ” ’.
It w ould have been difficult, and dishonest, for W hitlam to have defended
the p re sid e n ts w ho had involved Australia in the war, b u t he did im press
upon C h o u that the A .L .P . still valued the relationship w ith the people
of the U nited States.
T o w a r d s the end of the interview, W h itla m tu rn e d the conversation back
to the subject of C h in a ’s relations with Australia. In response to C h o u ’s
p ersistent charges about the U .S. and Japan and their a tte m p ts to involve
o th e r c ountries in their ‘p rovoc a tions’ and the protection of their security
and lifelines, and w hat seem ed to be implied in these charges a b o u t the role
of A ustralia, W h itla m contrived to defend the Australian G o v e rn m e n t,
saying that it ‘has never had any defence arrangem ents w ith Ja p a n and
has never had any defence a rrangem ents w ith Chiang K a i-sh e k ’.
C h o u : ‘B ut you are clear th a t th e position of y o u r p resent A u stralian G o v ern m en t
is n o t friendly to C hina. T h a t you are clear abo u t. P robably because y o u r excellencies
are here the A ustralian P rim e M in iste r declared yesterday th a t th e e stab lish m en t of
d ip lo m atic relations w ith C h in a is far off now'’.
W h itla m : ‘T h e re are elections in N o v em b er n ext year. If th ere are no p ro p er
relations by th e tim e of these elections th e re will be as soon as w e can achieve it
soon a fterw ard s’.
38
T A L K IN G W IT H C H IN A
C h o u : ‘T h e y do n o t w an t to establish diplo m atic relations. H e seem s to be q u ite
confident. It is p ro b ab ly because y o u r p a rty is in C h in a .’
W h itla m : ‘T h is m ay be. I m u st say even to th e cred it of m y o p p o n en ts, th a t they
are catching u p w ith th e realities o f life on C h in a to a certain extent. T h e y know
D u lle s’ policies have failed dism ally and if P re sid e n t N ixon says he w ants to visit
C hin a, can M cM ah o n be far b e h in d ? ’
C h o u ’s lau g h te r at this p o in t m ay have been as m u ch at the fact th a t he w as
th a t week ex p ectin g D r K issinger in P eking as at th e allusion to M c M a h o n .
H e th en s a id :
In com ing here you have given voice to th e w ishes of th e A ustralian people, n o t only
th e six m em b ers of th e delegation b u t ten co rresp o n d en ts rep resen tin g n o t one b u t
d ifferent p o in ts of view. T h e y can serve as w itnesses to th e fact th a t th e C h in ese
people are w illing to be friendly to th e A u stralian people. F ro m this p o in t on, we
can say that relations betw een o u r tw o co u n tries will develop.
T h e form al interview conclu d ed w ith C h o u ’s rem ark w elcom ing a fu tu re
visit by a L a b o r P rim e M in ister.
In this final exchange, C h o u w as speaking w ith th e know ledge of w h at
had passed b etw een C hin ese and A u stralian officials in Paris, w hich m u st
have p ro m p te d his q u ite stro n g assertion th a t th e A u stralian G o v e rn m e n t
was n o t in tere ste d in d ip lom atic relations. H e also in d icated an ap p reciatio n
o f th e G o v e rn m e n t’s p artisan ap p ro ach to th e C h in a q u estion, th e A .L .P .
visit to C h in a having m oved th e G o v e rn m e n t to p u t itself in a position
w here it could attack th e L a b o r P arty , by d istin g u ish in g its own policy
from th e L a b o r initiative and d eclarin g th a t d ip lo m atic relations w ere far
off. A nd finally, d esp ite th e fact th a t W h itlam had refused to give the
c o m m itm en t C h o u had been seeking, C h o u was still p rep ared to declare
the visit a success and a tu rn in g p o in t in S in o -A u stralian relations. C h o u ’s
v erdict th a t th e visit had estab lish ed a basis on w hich relations could be
norm alised, from th e A u stralian v iew p o in t on A u stralia-C h in a relations,
w as pro b ab ly th e m o st significant p o in t of th e visit. A nd w hile in no way
m aking an exclusive c o m m itm e n t to W h itlam , C hou did h and W h itlam an
assurance th a t th e A .L .P . position w as acceptable to the C hinese G o v e rn ­
m en t, w hich C h o u knew W h itlam could p re se n t to the A u stralian people
as evidence th a t th e visit h ad been tim ely, a p p ro p riate to th e state of
A u stralia-C h in a relations, and had laid th e fo u n d a tio n s for dip lo m atic
relations by w h ich ev er A u stralian G o v e rn m e n t was in pow er.
M u ch has been w ritte n a b o u t C h o u in recen t m o n th s, b u t several po in ts
are w o rth em ph asisin g . H e had been extrem ely closely briefed ab o u t the
A ustralian situ atio n and th e details of th e d eleg atio n ’s discussions, and, at
39
S T E PH E N FITZG ERA LD
73, he show ed every sign of having retain ed the detail and accurately
assessed th e essentials of each p ro b lem to an extent th a t seem s to elude
m an y y o u n g er m en. T h is ability is fam iliar to those w ho know som ething
of C h o u ’s p erfo rm an ce in dom estic politics, or in relation to m ajor problem s
such as th e U n ite d S tates or th e S oviet U nion. B ut it was an im pressive
exam ple of th e m easu re of his m en tal agility th a t he was able, and interested,
to do th e sam e in relation to A ustralia, always of p erip h eral significance
in C h in a ’s foreign relations, and to the A .L .P . visit, w hich in th a t p articu lar
w eek m u st have been alm ost th e very last of C h o u ’s dom estic and external
p rio rities. A p a rt from th e K issin g er visit, th ere was an o th er irony lost on
th e delegation at th e tim e, in th a t C h o u asked T e rrill and m yself separately
if we had read and u n d e rsto o d th e im p o rtan ce of the C .C .P .’s i Ju ly press
ed itorial, w hich in retro sp ect is know n to have sounded the first m ajor
p u b lic shot in th e m ove to u n seat L in Piao. It is difficult to th in k of a
m o re accom plished sta te sm a n -d ip lo m a t in the tw entieth cen tu ry th an C hou
E n -lai, and th e m a n n e r in w hich he co n d u cted the interview was in itself
a typically ad ro it p erfo rm an ce. B ut C h o u also pressed W h itlam extrem ely
h ard , reflecting th e seriousness w ith w h ich C h in a regards th e in tern atio n al
p ro b lem s he was discussing, and a concern to im press these views strongly
on th e A u stralian and in tern atio n al au d ien ce th ro u g h the m em b ers of the
press. B ut p e rh a p s equally im p o rta n t, C hou has a fine sense of h u m o u r
and he spoke of th e p re se n t and p o ten tial th reats to C hina in hard analytical
term s b u t w ith o u t ran co u r, w hich m ay be im p o rtan t for the fu tu re of
C h in a ’s foreign relations.
A n a s s e s s m e n t o f th e v is it
F o r W h itlam , the visit to C h in a p resen ted a serious test, b o th of his own
capacity and of his political ju d g m e n t. H e was accused by M cM ah o n of
going to C h in a to play p a rty politics, yet in deciding to go him self he was
taking a political risk. If his m ain consid eratio n had been party politics,
th is m u s t have d ictated th a t he should have let P atterson m ake a low -key
visit, b u t h im self have rem ain ed in A u stralia and m ade w hat he could
o u t of th e G o v e rn m e n t’s negative policies and w hatever w as achieved by a
P atterso n visit. W hile C h in a m ig h t n o t be a v o te-w in n er in A ustralia, the
em otion al and polem ical h isto ry of th e C h in a issue in dom estic politics
m e a n t th a t it could be a vote-lo ser, and any L a b o r O pposition leader m oving
to w ard s an election, w ho p u t p a rty politics above all else, w ould n o t have
risked th e possibility th a t a visit to C h in a w ould red o u n d to his p a rty ’s
serious political disadvantage. W h itlam believed th at th e visit w as w o rth
m aking in th e in terests o f fu tu re A u stralia-C h in a relations, w hatever the risk.
40
T A L K I N G W I T H CH IN A
H is p erform an ce in the first session in Peking, w ith C hi P eng-fei, set the
p a tte rn for th e rest o f the discussions and established a fou n d atio n on w hich
the delegation was able to p u rsu e to its ow n satisfaction m o st of w hat it
had set o u t to achieve. In so far as W h itlam argued against th e C hinese on
issues of concern to A ustralia, this ap pears to have been w ith o u t d e trim en tal
effect on the C hinese ap pro ach to o th e r issues on w hich th ere was room
for m u tu al agreem ent. T h is was m o st clearly th e case in the interview w ith
C hou, particu larly since C h o u ’s p re se n ta tio n of his own case at tim es
becam e a co ncerted b arrag e by w hich he sought to m ano eu v re W hitlam
to a p o in t of agreem ent.
T h e interview w ith C h o u also u n d erlin es one ch aracteristic w hich m ig h t
m ark W h itla m ’s approach to foreign policy w hen in office— a p reference
for plain speaking. O p p o sed to ex tern al m ilitary solutions to A sian p r o b ­
lem s, and equally opposed to o th e r less-publicised essays in arm -tw istin g ,
W hitlam believes th a t ren u n ciatio n of in terv en tio n in the affairs of o th e r
cou n tries should n o t p reclu d e m aking o n e ’s position know n publicly, and
th at, even w here this is critical, it is b o th p referab le and u ltim ately m o re
co n stru ctiv e than big-stick in terv en tio n . T h e convenience of d iplom atic
co m m unicatio n afforded an in c u m b e n t foreign m in ister w ould have som e
advantages in this respect, b u t W h itlam believes th a t d irect expressions of
opinion m ay pro v id e a b e tte r basis for relatio n sh ip s in w hich th ere are also
areas of agreem en t and co -o p eratio n . H e p u t his views to the C hinese b o th
privately and in public. H e said pub licly in C a n b e rra w h at he had said
privately to th e C h in ese abo u t, for exam ple, th e recent actions of th e
Pakistan G o v ern m en t. It was in th e sam e sp irit th a t he criticised the U .S .
on th e specific q u estio n of V ietn am , w hile d efen d in g A N Z U S and
A u stralia’s relations w ith the A m erican people. A nd it was in this sp irit
also th at he referred to the su d d e n term in atio n o f Soviet aid to C hina in
i960, to the way in w h ich th e g o v ern m en t o f S ihan ouk had been o v e r­
th ro w n , and to m oves by T h a ila n d and th e P h ilip p in es to reverse th e ir
policies tow ard s C hina.
T h e m ore im m ediate resu lts o f th e visit can be p u t very sim ply. A lth o u g h
L o rd Casey, w hen M in iste r for E x tern al A ffairs, had m et privately w ith
Chou E n-lai at G en ev a in 1954, th e A .L .P . visit was th e first really signifi­
can t political co n tact b etw een C h in a and A u stralia since 1949. T h e d e le ­
gation’s discussions op en ed th e w ay for relations b etw een th e tw o countries,
although resp o n sib ility for fu rth e r action now lies w ith the ru ling A ustralian
G o v ern m en t. T h e A .L .P . received assurances, conditional u p o n n o rm alis­
ation of relations, th a t C h in a saw possibilities for expanded contacts in a
n u m b e r of areas, in clu d in g tra d e , as well as u nequivocal evidence to
41
STE PH EN FITZGERALD
su p p o rt its co n ten tio n th a t th e obstacle to im p roved relations, including
w heat sales, was th e a ttitu d e s and c o n tin u in g p ro n o u n c e m e n ts of the
A u stralian G o v ern m en t.
T h e A .L .P . also secured term s on w hich C h in a m ig h t be recognised
w ith o u t sacrificing A u stra lia ’s basic national interests. T h e im plications of
the A .L .P . position for A u stra lia ’s relations w ith C h iang K ai-shek becam e
th e su b ject of m u ch em otional, b u t u n in fo rm ed , criticism . T h e form ula
pro p o sed by the A .L .P . has been discussed above, b u t since th e question
of T aiw an is the central issue in th e G o v e rn m e n t’s case, it is w o rth som e
m en tio n here. T h e A .L .P .’s po sitio n in Peking w as not a m a tte r of sim ply
doing w h at th e C hinese d em a n d e d , b u t was taken o u t of co n sideration for
its assessm ent of the facts o f th e situ atio n , and A u stralians will have to
take m o re account of facts and less of fears and fantasies if they are to
develop a new style o f foreign policy.35 T aiw an is n o t an ‘in d ep en d en t
sm all n a tio n ’, as was claim ed in th e lobbying w hich p reced ed the U .N .
vote in 1971, b u t a p a rt o f C h in a, p o p u lated by people w ho are ethnically
and cu ltu rally C hinese. C h in a is n o t even a divid ed nation in th e sense th at
such divisions elsew here have been created by in tern atio n al agreem ent.
T h e ru lers of T aiw an do n o t d isp u te this, and th e term s on w hich they
accept recognition by th e A u stralian G o v e rn m e n t are as th e G o v e rn m e n t
of th e w hole of C h in a in clu d in g the m ain lan d , a position th e A ustralian
G o v ern m e n t, w hen q u estio n ed , has n o t d enied. T h e C hinese N ationalists
are n ot original m em b ers o f th e U .N .; th e state of C h in a is. T o argue
otherw ise is to say th a t m e m b e rsh ip belongs n o t to the co u n try b u t to the
p arty or g roup w hich h a p p e n s to be in p ow er at th e tim e of th e signing of
the U .N . C h arter. T h e C h in ese N atio n alists are n ot allies of A ustralia;
A ustralia has no alliance o bligation to th em , n o r have they ever expressed
any obligation to A ustralia in re tu rn for its in tern atio n al su p p o rt.
M o st im p o rtan t, p erh ap s, is th a t T aiw an is n o t p o p u lated by fourteen
and a half m illion people w ho fled from th e C o m m u n ists in 1949, b u t by
the in h a b ita n ts or d escen d an ts of th e 85 p e r cent of the people w ho w ere
th ere w hen C hiang K ai-sh ek arrived from th e m ain lan d , w ho are deeply
resentful of the C hinese N atio n alists, and w ho w ould like no th in g m ore
than to be rid of them . T o th e ex ten t th a t th ere is sep aratist feeling in the
island today it is in d ire c t response to th e repressive policies of C h ian g
K ai-shek and a relationship w hich began w ith a w elcom e to th e N atio n alist
forces as liberato rs from the Jap an ese b u t w h ich w as soured by the m assacre
of 1947 and its c o n tin u in g rep ercu ssio n s since then. T h is is w hy it is
difficult to believe th e sin cerity of those w ho express n ew -fo u n d concern
for th e ‘p eo p le’ of T aiw an as an arg u m en t for su p p o rtin g C h ian g K ai-shek.
42
T A L K I N G W I T H CH IN A
T h e ir voices w ere n o t raised in su p p o rt for the people before the recent
tu rn of events or in p ro te st against th e policies of C hian g K ai-shek. S u p p o rt
for th e C h in ese N atio n alists is n o t su p p o rt for the people b u t su p p o rt for
th e defeated faction in w hat is claim ed by b o th sides, and even by th e U .S .
b efore its re-en g ag em en t, as a civil war. T h e situ atio n today exists as a
d irect resu lt o f in te rv e n tio n in this civil w ar, p rim arily by th e U n ite d States,
a re -in te rv e n tio n w hich took place even before C h in a was involved in the
w ar in K orea. S u p p o rt for the C h in ese N atio n alists is n o t su p p o rt for the
‘rig h t o f sm all n a tio n s to in d e p e n d e n t ex isten ce’ b u t for th e rig h t of G re a t
Pow ers to p a rtitio n o th er co u n tries, a p rin cip le one m ig h t have th o u g h t
A ustralian s could n o t in conscience s u p p o rt n o r in th e ir ow n c o u n try accept.
D om estic critics ch arged th a t th e A .L .P ., in taking the position it did on
recognition o f th e g o v e rn m e n t in Peking as th e sole legal g o v ern m en t of
C h in a and th e w ith d raw al of th e em bassy accredited to C h iang K ai-shek
as th e sole legal g o v e rn m e n t of C hina, was a b an d o n in g a b arg aining point.
W h itlam later c o m m e n te d :
T h e only conclusion one can draw is th a t T aiw an is to be one of th e set-offs in a
h o rse-trad in g o p eratio n — and one w hich will be th e first to be given up. T h is approach
is as unreal as it is d ish o n o ra b le . 36
M cM ah o n h im se lf alleged th a t any policy th a t w ould ‘d u m p ’ or ‘a b a n d o n ’
T aiw an w ould be ‘d an g ero u s for A u stra lia ’.3, B ut if he is co m m itted to
recognising P eking at som e fu tu re p o in t, it can only be on the u n d e rsta n d in g
th a t this will m ean ab a n d o n in g su p p o rt for C hian g K ai-shek.
T h e re w ere tw o m o re general effects of th e A .L .P . visit. O ne w hich
W hitlam em p h asised was w h at he called its ‘sym bolic significance’. S p eak ­
ing after his re tu rn to A ustralia, he said he believed it was
valuable for A ustralia th a t the n ations in o u r region, as well as C h in a and th e U .S .,
should have had clear notice th a t a change in th e g o v ern m en t o f A u stralia will m ean
a clear change and new initiatives in A ustralian foreign policy. I believe th a t those
nations should know in advance w hat those changes will be . . . a L ab o r G o v ern m en t
will m ean a new foreign policy for A ustralia, p articu larly in so far as we reject alm ost
com pletely th e fo u n d atio n s o f th e p re se n t g o v e rn m e n t’s policy to w ard s S o u th -E ast
Asia. I define th a t policy in S ir R o b ert M en zies’ ow n w ords— by m ainly m ilitary
m eans, 'to resist th e d o w n w ard th ru s t of C h in a betw een th e In d ian and Pacific
O ceans’. W e reject this as a rational sta te m e n t eith er o f th e tru e situ atio n in our region
or of the ap p ro p riate policies w e should p u rsu e in th e reg io n . 38
T h e o th e r effect was the d ire c t im p act on th e political issue in A ustralia.
G iven th at th e A .L .P . was n o t in office, this was p e rh ap s the m o st im p o rtan t
43
STE PH EN FITZG ERA LD
im m ediate resu lt o f th e visit at the tim e. P u b lic d ebate was stim ulated to
a degree w hich had never existed before and p u b lic in terest has continued
on a hig h er level th an it was before th e visit. E q ually im p o rtan t, th e visit
had the effect of flushing the G o v e rn m e n t on to open g ro u n d , to a position
w here it could no longer claim to be the sole possessor of revealed tru th s,
and w here it felt com pelled to take its first h e sita n t steps tow ards a change
in C h in a policy since 1949. B ut far from ap p la u d in g th e A .L .P .’s attem p t
to break th e deadlock in w h at m ig h t have been a period of tran sitio n , the
G o v e rn m e n t seem ed p iq u e d by the fact th a t th e A .L .P . delegation had
been given a p ro d u ctiv e and high-level recep tion in Peking. B ut w ith
reservations ab o u t T aiw an , p u b lic opinion polls began to show a sw ing in
favour of recognition of Peking, and th e G o v e rn m e n t itself co ntinued its
a tte m p t to fu rth e r a dialogue w ith C hina. In term s of w hat it hoped to
achieve, th erefo re, the A .L .P . delegation co u n te d the visit a success on
alm ost all co u n ts, th e exception being th e n egative c o n trib u tio n of the
G o v e rn m e n t to p u b lic discussion on C hina.
Comm unication w ith China. A fu rth e r resu lt o f the A .L .P . m ission was
th a t it established a w orking relatio n sh ip w ith the C hinese G o v ern m en t,
w hich deserves a tte n tio n in th a t it illu strates th e w ider possibilities for
m eaning fu l co m m u n icatio n w ith C hina. I am n o t certain of precisely w hat
the in div id u al m em b ers o f th e delegation expected, b u t they w ere surp rised
at the frankness o f th e discussions. T h e re w ere few ‘ideological’ conversa­
tio n s; th ere was little jarg o n . T h e C hinese w ere open m in d ed and receptive,
they w ere w illing to talk on the d e le g a tio n ’s term s, and they w ent out of
th eir way to u n d e rsta n d A u stralian p o in ts o f view, exem plified in th eir
attitu d e to w ard s A u stra lia ’s alliances. "Phis w as th e m ore in terestin g because
the exchanges w ere n o t w orking sessions b u t a m ore general statem en t of
prin cip les and p u rp o se by b o th sides.
C hinese d ip lo m ats w ere able, ex perienced, and w ell-inform ed, and since
m ost of tho se w ith w hom we dealt w ere from th e F oreign M in istry ’s W est
E u ro p ean and N o rth A m erican Affairs D e p a rtm e n t, w hich handles A u s­
tralia, they w ere also inform ed ab o u t A ustralia. O n m o st issues relating to
A ustralia th ey had at least basic in fo rm atio n , from th e M c M a h o n -G o rto n
pow er stru g g le to th e role o f the D .L .P . T h e y questio n ed the delegation
on the L ib eral and C o u n try parties and th e ir respective pow er bases, on
rural society and the ru ral crisis, and on th e p re ss; th e m ain m etropolitan
dailies are read in Peking: indeed, som e o f us w ere asked if there was not a
n ew spap er w hich reflected an A .L .P . p o in t o f view. T h e y also talked freely
ab o u t th e ir personal b ack g ro u n d s and careers, and th e ir im pressions of
foreign c o u n trie s gained d u rin g p o stin g s abroad. T o talk ab o u t the C hinese
44
TA LK I N G W I T H CH IN A
in th is way is n o t in ten d ed as an in su lt to th e ir essential hu m an ity , b u t it
is u n fo rtu n a te ly necessary to u n d e rlin e th e p o in t th a t they have a very real
view of th e w orld, p a rtic u la rly in th e A u stralian context, w here in 1971
M r M cM ah o n could still rem ark th a t he could not get any com m on sense
o ut of the C h in ese— a rem ark w hich has political an teced en ts in the idea
th a t the C hin ese w ere som ehow o th e r-w o rld , less th an norm al by w hite
E u ro p ean sta n d a rd s, or ‘in sc ru ta b le ’, a term actually used by M cM ahon.
As W h itlam c o m m e n te d :
All I can say is th a t it is very easy to get a great deal of sense from any m en here with
w h o m one is prep ared to deal frankly and seriously . . . In specifics and details I have
fo un d the Chinese as frank and realistic as any officials I have spoken to in any
co un try in the world, and b etter inform ed about Australia than m o s t . 39
T h e p o in t is th a t th e ex perience of th e A .L .P ., and of m any recent
visitors to C h in a, d e m o n stra te s th e possibility o f significant interaction
b etw een the C h in ese G o v e rn m e n t and n o n -c o m m u n ist pow ers. Som e
d ip lom atic m issions in P eking w ould argue th a t they do n o t have as m uch
co n tact w ith C h in ese officials in m o n th s as th e A .L .P . delegation had in
d ays; noneth eless, th e w orking relatio n sh ip established by the A .L .P .
indicates th a t w here the rig h t level can be stru ck , as it was, for exam ple,
by the C anad ian T ra d e M in iste r, it is m ore than possible to have norm al
relations, w ith g en u in e co m m u n icatio n and fru itfu l exchange, w ith the
fu rth e r im plication, u n d re a m t of by m o st A ustralians, th a t it m ay be
possible to influence the attitu d e s of the C hinese G o v ern m en t. T h is has,
of course, been a p p a re n t to som e g o v ern m en ts for a long tim e. F or A ustralia,
it is the m o st com pelling arg u m e n t for the e sta b lish m en t of diplom atic
relations.
I ll
C h in a’s F o reign P o licy and the S m a ll P ow ers 111
T h e tren d of C hin ese dip lo m acy in 1971 should n o t have com e as a surprise.
It can be traced back to th e end of 1967, and by m id - 1969 it was already
possible to an ticip ate a change in S in o -U .S . relations. In late 1967 C hinese
foreign policy em erged from th e C u ltu ra l R evolution, from a period in w hich
factions w ho now stan d co n d em n ed as u ltra -le ftists had u su rp ed control of
the Foreign M in istry and spread havoc am ong C h in a ’s foreign relations and
am ong d iplo m atic m issions in Peking. C h in a ’s foreign relations had d e te r­
iorated to such an extent th a t even frien d s had been alienated, so th ere was
at the very least a necessity to m en d som e fences, a process w hich began in a
sm all way at th e end of 1967 and co n tin u ed quietly th ro u g h o u t 1968.
45
STEPHEN FITZGERALD
C hin a also faced m o re th re a te n in g pro b lem s. T h e w ar was still raging
in V ietnam , and was su b seq u en tly to be escalated into C am bodia. A nd
despite C h in a ’s belief in th e ju stice and th e u ltim ate victory o f the In d o C hinese p eo p les’ fight against the U .S ., one calculation it had to m ake was
th a t the situ atio n contained a p o ten tial th re a t to C h in a from th e U .S . In
the n o rth , C h in a ’s relations w ith the Soviet U n io n had fallen to an all-tim e
low. T h e re w ere sporadic clashes on th e b o rd er w hich in M arch 1969
eru p te d into large-scale fighting. T h e C hinese feared th at th e R ussians,
im pelled by the ‘d o ctrin e of lim ited so v ereig n ty’ w ith w hich th ey had
justified th e invasion of C zechoslovakia, w ere p lan n in g a full-scale attack
in the h ope th at this w ould p re c ip ita te a fu rth e r crisis in th e delicate
situatio n in Peking and p ro d u ce a new p ro -M o scow leadership. T h is fear
seem ed to have som e justification. It was on this score th at C h in a began
m oving som e of its in d u stry into th e h in te rla n d and began co n stru ctio n
of th e air-raid shelters w hich are now to be seen in C h in a ’s cities. In
m id -1 969, th e R ussians issued th e ir call for a new A sian collective security
agreem en t, a d ire c t challenge to C h in a ’s position in Asia and, desp ite
M oscow ’s denials, m otiv ated in p a rt by an idea o f setting up a new C h in ac o n tain m e n t policy in Asia. T o the east, C h in a w atched w ith alarm w h at
it perceived as signs of a resurgence o f Jap an ese m ilitarism , and believed
it found confirm ation of the a n ti-C h in a d irectio n of this m ilitarism in
S a to ’s N o v em b er 1969 d eclaration a b o u t T aiw an , S o u th K orea and the
security o f Japan. M o re alarm in g to P eking w ere th e signs of grow ing
co-operatio n betw een M oscow and T okyo. O n all fronts, C h in a seem ed at
a very serious disadvantage.
U n d e r th e gu id in g h and of C hou E n-lai, C h in a set o u t to extricate itself
from this extrem ely d an g ero u s position by stren g th en in g som e existing
ties and seeking to establish new ones, aim ing at the co u ntries w hich
su p p o rte d n o n -reco g n itio n and also at th e U .S . itself. C hina did n o t take
the initiative, b u t let it be know n th a t it w ould be receptive to overtu res
from o th e r co untries. T h e m ove by C an ad a was a w indfall, enabling
th e w hole process to be set in m otion. B ut C h in a was also active on o th e r
fronts, and w hen the form al chan n el o f co m m unication w ith the U .S .
was reactivated in W arsaw and then su sp en d ed by th e C hinese after the
invasion of C am bodia, talks co n tin u ed in o th e r capitals, a m ove w hich
m ay well have been calculated by th e C h in ese as a m eans of rem oving its
contacts w ith th e U .S . to m ore p rivate, and secure, settings. W hen the
general offensive began to drag, C h in a gave it a p u sh along by the table
ten n is invitations and such g estures as th e d espatch of R ed C ross relief
to M alaysia. T h e im m ed iate objective o f th is dip lo m atic activity w as to
46
TA LK I N G W I T H CH IN A
break th e U .S . circle of co n ta in m e n t and to establish a position in w hich
C hina, and n o t th e U .S ., w ould d ete rm in e the kind of relationships it
w ould have w ith th e w orld, p articu larly , b u t n o t exclusively, w ith Asia.
T h e re had, in fact, been no fu n d am en tal change in the objectives of
C hinese foreign policy, alth o u g h this was believed to be th e case, partly
because of th e c o n tra st w ith th e ex trem ism of th e C u ltu ral R evolution and
th e m o re m ilita n t tactics of th e early 1950s before the C u ltu ra l R evolution,
b u t m ainly becau se C hinese objectives had nev er been as the U n ite d States
cam p perceived th em to be. M oreover, this was n o t the first tim e C hina
had a tte m p te d su ch a demarche ; it was sim ply th a t it had failed on every
p revious occasion, largely because of th e h o stility of th e U n ited States.
O n this occasion, how ever, a large n u m b e r o f n o n -reco g n isin g countries
w ere p re p a re d to respond, in clu d in g th e U .S ., u n d e rlin in g the p o in t th at
th e real change w h ich has o ccu rred is n o t so m u ch in C hina b u t in the
a ttitu d e s to w ard s C h in a o f th e in tern atio n al a n ti-C h in a lobby.
By 1971, C h in a ’s longer term d ip lo m atic objectives had becom e clear.
C o n tra ry to th e ‘in sc ru ta b le ’ th e o ry of C hinese foreign policy, C h in a ’s
view of w h at is h a p p e n in g in th e w orld coincides closely w ith the view
of m ost o th e r c o u n tries, alth o u g h C h in a differs on the in terp re ta tio n of
this situ atio n and th e p ercep tio n o f its ow n role. Seeing the em ergence of
a new global balance of pow er, in w hich th e C h in ese include Japan and
W estern E u ro p e as well as R ussia, A m erica and C hina, P eking is seeking
to establish itself in a position w h ere it can m an o eu v re w ithin th e balance,
w hich it sees a p p a re n tly as o p e ra tin g on lines som ew hat sim ilar to the
n in e te e n th c e n tu ry E u ro p ean b alance o f pow er. F o r this reason, it is
im p o rta n t to have som e kind o f de facto norm alisation of relations w ith
W ash in g to n , w h ich can act as a co u n terb alan ce to M oscow even before
th e solution of th e o u tsta n d in g p ro b lem s b etw een C hina and A m erica.
S im ilarly th e C h in ese have agreed to the resu m p tio n o f state relations w ith
the Soviet U n io n , they are stre n g th e n in g ties w ith W estern E u ro p e and
p arts of E aste rn E u ro p e, and th ey ap p ear to w an t progress tow ards n o rm a l­
isation of relatio n s w ith Jap an , if this can be m anaged.
C h in a w ould p re fe r th e balance to be o pen, th a t is excluding form al
alliances, w hich n o t only lim it freedom of action b u t on a global scale in
th e n u clear age re p re se n t too g reat an agglom eration of pow er. T h is is
one reason w hy th ey have been attack in g th e W a sh in g to n -T o k y o relatio n ­
ship and w hy th e y oppose a too cosy relatio n sh ip betw een T o k y o and
M oscow . It is also difficult to see C h in a itself en terin g into a form al alliance
w ith any one o f th e pow ers at th is stage. C h in a expects th a t th ere will be
c o m p etitio n , an d h a rb o u rs no illusions ab o u t th e U n ited S tates, b u t it
47
STE PH EN FITZG ERA LD
seem s to be th in k in g o f th e balance in term s of coexistence, and having
itself re n o u n ced any in ten tio n of being th e first to use n u clear w eapons
has called on th e U .S . and th e S oviet U n io n to do the sam e. C h in a appears
to believe th a t W e ste rn E u ro p e and the U .S . are p rep ared to op erate along
the lines p re fe rred b y C hina. It does n o t believe this to be th e case w ith
the Soviet U n io n o r Jap an , alth o u g h in th e case of Jap an , th e C hinese
ap p are n tly believe th e re is still an o p p o rtu n ity to persu ad e th e Japanese
to C h in a ’s w ay of th in k in g , and th is is p a rt o f the reason w hy so m uch of
th eir c u rre n t d ip lo m acy is con cern ed w ith Jap an .
T h e re is no d o u b t th a t th e C hinese believe in the case they are presen tin g
a b o u t Jap an , as do som e o th e r c o u n tries w hich experienced Japanese
occu p atio n . T h a t is, C h in a ’s h istorical experience reinforces its view of
th e evidence o f m ilita rist revival. B ut in term s of th e ir c u rre n t global
strategy, th e C h in ese are also d elib erately an ticip atin g a little, even in
term s of th e ir ow n firm beliefs a b o u t Jap an . In o th er w ords th e offensive
is to som e e x te n t p re-e m p tiv e , in th e h ope th a t Japanese and w orld opinion
m ig h t be m ob ilised to p re v e n t th e forces o f m ilitary revival from developing.
In th e co n tex t of th e new global balance, C h ina has im p o rta n t reasons
for seeking relatio n s w ith th e m ajo rity o f th e w o rld ’s sm all and m iddle
pow ers, and in fact this is w here th e m ain em phasis of its diplom acy lies,
ra th e r th an on th e balance itself. F irst, th e re is th e fact th a t C hina does
n o t see itself as sh arin g th e sam e in terests as th e su p er pow ers. It certainly
w ants its place in th e balance, as its p rio r insistence on th e restoration of
its rig h t to the p e rm a n e n t seat in th e S ecu rity C ouncil indicates. B ut it
identifies its ow n in terests w ith th e sm all and m iddle pow ers, and believes
th at by taking its place am ong the g reat pow ers it will be able to represent
and ch am p io n th ese in terests against th e exclusive in terests of the w o rld ’s
m ost p ow erful states. F o r exam ple, C h in a has long been arguing th a t the
U .S . and th e U .S .S .R . should n o t be p e rm itte d to m ake p rivate arran g e­
m en ts on m a tte rs w hich affect th e fu tu re of m an k in d , such as nuclear
arm s co n tro l, and then sim ply expect th e w orld to ratify them . By
ad o p tin g a g reat p o w er role, C h in a h opes to break up this kind of
arran g em en t. It is also p a rtly on this g ro u n d th a t C h in a justifies its
ow n n u c le a r p ro g ram , arg u in g th a t it will break th e nu clear m onopoly
and force M oscow and W ash in g to n to include C h in a in discussions
on n u clear arm s control, in w h ich situ atio n C h in a can use its voice
on b eh alf of th e sm aller pow ers. C onflicts have already arisen b e ­
tw een th e tw o roles— challenge to th e s u p e r pow ers w ithin the balance
and c h a m p io n sh ip o f th e sm aller po w ers— b u t C h in a argues th a t the
challenge m u st be m ad e if sm aller p ow ers are to have any in d ependence
48
T A LK IN G W I T H CH IN A
and if th e fu tu re of m an k in d is n o t to be decid ed in W ashington and
M oscow , or in the fu tu re, Jap an .
C h in a ’s second m ain reason for w an tin g state relations w ith th e small
and m id d le pow ers is th a t if th e balance is n o t to o perate by m ilitary
co n fro n tatio n , d iplom acy becom es m o re im p o rta n t, p articu larly the
e n listm en t of the co -o p eratio n o f the pow ers C h in a claim s to represent.
T h e su p p o rt of th e in tern atio n al co m m u n ity is essential if C h in a is to
achieve its pu rp o se, hence its in terest in o v ertu res from co u ntries w hich
h ith e rto have been ex trem ely an tag o n istic to w ard s C hina. C hina has
already been engaged in lobbying for a variety of p u rp o ses, notably against
Jap an , and this kind o f activity is likely to c o n tin u e to be a d o m in an t
featu re of C hinese diplom acy, d irected n o t only at rev olutionary states
o r th e co u ntries of Asia, A frica and L atin A m erica.
C h in a ’s idea of th e balance fits n eatly into th e U .N . fram ew ork, and it
is possible th a t C h in a ’s ad m ission to the U .N . m ay have a very positive
effect on th a t body, alth o u g h m u ch d ep en d s on th e co-operation of o th er
pow ers. B ut th e two su p e r pow ers now accept th a t C h in a m u st be included
in discussions on m ajor w orld pro b lem s, and if C h in a should insist th at
such discussion m u st be b ro u g h t into th e U .N ., p articu larly into the
A ssem bly, one effect of C h in a ’s presen ce could be to b rin g diplom acy
into the U .N . T h e Bangla D esh affair suggests, how ever, th at C hina still
has a long way to go before it could achieve such a p urpose.
C h in a ’s sm all pow er d iplom acy provides th e b ack g round to its in terest
in A ustralia, p artly because th is d iplom acy will n o t be at its m ost effective
u n til C h in a has established relations w ith m o st o f th e w o rld ’s countries.
B ut C hina still has to overcom e th e resistance o f those gov ern m en ts w hich
see Peking as the source of rev o lu tio n in th e ir ow n countries, w hatever
theoretical rationalisations m ay be m ad e in P ek in g ; M alaysia and T h ailan d ,
for exam ple, in th eir first con tacts w ith C hinese rep resen tativ es sought assu r­
ances th a t C hina w ould ab an d o n s u p p o rt for rev o lu tionary m ovem ents.
C h in a has been seeking, th erefo re, to drive hom e th e lesson of its d ifferen ti­
ated approach to s u p p o rt for foreign revolution. W h ere ruling governm ents
have been m o st hostile to C h in a, w hich includes su p p o rt for C hiang K aishek, C hina has been m o st p re p a re d to pro v id e p ro p ag an d a and enco u rag e­
m en t and w hatever o th e r lim ited su p p o rt seem s necessary w ithin th e broad
p rin cip les th a t revolution m u st rely on its ow n efforts and cannot sim ply be
im posed from w ith o u t, o r ex p o rted . B ut w here state relations have been
close and friendly, C h in a has d eclined to give even lim ited su p p o rt to local
revolution. T h e best exam ple in S o u th -E a st Asia was B urm a, except for the
b rief period of u ltra -le ftist co n tro l in Peking in 1967 and its afterm ath.
49
STE PH EN FITZGERALD
C hin a has been m aking this p o in t in a v ariety of ways. It restored relations
w ith B urm a, and having d o n e so called off its cam paign of su p p o rt for the
B urm ese C o m m u n ist P arty. Its su p p o rt for th e g o v ern m en t of Ceylon
against the C eylonese u p risin g , w hile entirely c o n sisten t w ith its practice
in B urm a, was so p ro m p t and so stro n g th a t it seem s to have been d elib e r­
ately calculated w ith one eye on th e possible im p act on o th e r Asian
countries, th e m ore so since it was even accom panied by sub stan tial financial
assistance to th e C eylonese G o v e rn m e n t. By in tro d u c in g the term M alaysia
into the C hinese m edia for th e first tim e, in 1971, C h in a seem ed to be
suggesting th a t it was p re p a re d to recognise th e legitim acy of M alaysia,
w ith fu rth e r im p lications in term s o f its a ttitu d e tow ards the revolution
in M alaysia if relations w ere established.
A t first C h in a seem ed to be acting on the sam e p rin cip le in its a ttitu d e
to Bangla D e sh ; th at is, th a t its s u p p o rt for th e g o v ern m en t of Pakistan
was determ in ed by a lo n g -stan d in g frien d sh ip . B ut th e situation becam e
m ore com plex, and so also did th e C hinese a ttitu d e. T h e re is no d o u b t th at
C h in a was m oved by its ow n national c o n sid eratio n s; th e strategic situation
in th e su b c o n tin e n t, th e p ro sp ects for trad e th ro u g h Pakistan to th e sea
raised by th e recen t o p en in g o f th e old silk ro u te, the fact th at Pakistan
had becom e one of C h in a ’s m o st loyal su p p o rte rs, and th e fact th a t Pakistan
was at loggerheads w ith Ind ia, th e state th a t had attacked C hina in 1962.41
B ut in its very first sta te m e n t on th e situ atio n C h in a had p resen ted a
diagnosis w ith w ider in tern atio n al ram ifications, w hich su b seq u en tly proved
correct. In voicing s u p p o rt for th e P akistan G o v ern m en t, C h in a had
w arned th a t o th e r co u n tries should n o t in terfere in the E ast for th e ir own
ends. T h is is n o t to say th a t privately C h in a ap p roved of th e actions of th e
Pakistan G o v e rn m e n t, and it ap p ears th a t C h in a su b seq u en tly p u t very
stro n g o bjections to th e P akistanis, th ro u g h d ip lo m atic channels and to
B h utto w hen he visited P eking late in 1971. W h atev er case th e In dian
G o v ern m e n t m ay have had, th e B angla D esh situation also p ro vided it
w ith an o p p o rtu n ity to realise a lo n g -ch erish ed In d ian am bition, the
d ism em b e rm e n t of the state of P akistan, and this is w hat C h in a suspected
even before th e refugee p ro b lem arose. B angla D esh, then, w as n ot as
sim ple as the situ atio n in C eylon. W ith th e stro n g backing and en co u rag e­
m en t of th e S oviet U n io n , In d ian forces achieved th e ir am bition. In so
w eakening P akistan, they w eakened th e position of C h in a in th e su b co n ­
tin e n t and stre n g th e n e d th e po sitio n of th e S oviet U n io n , th e fu rth e r
consideration w hich th e C h in ese had had in m in d from th e very beginning.
W hile th e g reat pow ers w ere all accused o f cynical m anoeuvring, th e
C hinese case deserves a little fu rth e r ex ploration. T h e crisis in the
50
T A LK IN G W I T H CH IN A
su b c o n tin e n t p ro d u c e d first th e form al alliance betw een D elhi and M oscow ,
and th en , th ro u g h th e w ar, th e ad v an cem en t o f M o sco w ’s interests in the
su b co n tin en t. T h is was the first im p o rta n t foothold M oscow had gained in
Asia since its call for an Asian collective secu rity agreem ent. G iven C h in a ’s
a p p reh en sio n s ab o u t the a n ti-C h in a ob jectiv es of th e Asian collective
secu rity idea, and its dedicatio n to p ro m o tin g th e in terests of the sm all
and m id d le pow ers, th e p ro sp e c t of M oscow advancing into th e s u b ­
c o n tin e n t w as regarded in P eking w ith consid erab le concern for w hat this
m ig h t presage in term s of fu rth e r advances into Asia. T h o se w ho rejoiced
in In d ia ’s sh o rt-te rm solution to its ow n p ro b lem s and in the su b seq u en t
p ro clam atio n of in d ep en d en ce by th e u n h a p p y people of Bangla D esh
overlooked th e fu rth e r im plications of th e shift in R u ssia’s favour. T h is is
n o t to say th a t the actions of th e P akistani m ilitary w ere n ot inexcusable
or th a t the cause of the people of Bangla D esh was n o t ju s t and w o rth y of
sy m p ath y and su p p o rt. B ut th a t does n o t m ean th a t th e m otives of the
In d ian G o v e rn m e n t w ere as p u re as the actions of th e Pakistan m ilitary
had been stain ed , or th a t th e co n seq u en t advance o f M oscow into Asia
was also cause for rejoicing. T o th e ex ten t th a t M oscow succeeds in its
p u rp o se of ex ten d in g its influence in a sim ilar m a n n e r th ro u g h o u t Asia,
this is a dev elo p m en t w hich few could w elcom e. T h e in tro d u ctio n of the
S in o -S o v iet d isp u te into S o u th , S o u th east and E ast Asia, w hich is clearly
M o sco w ’s p u rp o se, and th e b rin k m a n sh ip w ith w hich th e Soviet U nion
has been p u rsu in g its policy to w ard s C hina, can be to th e advantage n eith er
of th e states w ith in th e region, n o r to C h in a, n o r to any o th er outside
p ow er w hich is in terested in th e in d ep en d en ce of th e co u n tries in the region
and th e exclusion from it of g reat pow er conflicts. T h is idea was certainly
at the back of th e m in d s of those w ho m ake th e decisions in Peking. Finally,
th ey m ig h t also have rationalised th e ir position on th eoretical g rounds, in
term s of M a o ’s ideas on th e th e o ry of co n trad ictio n s and the application
of this th eo ry to foreign policy. T h e y m ig h t argue, alth o u g h the C hinese
have n o t them selves m ade th is case publicly , th a t th e p rin cip al c o n tra d ic ­
tion, the one w hich m u st be solved first, was n o t b etw een the people of
B angla D esh and th e P akistan G o v e rn m e n t b u t b etw een Pakistan and India,
or m ore p ro p erly betw een C h in a-P ak istan and th e S oviet U n io n -In d ia.
C hina m ig h t well argue th a t u n til th is co n trad ictio n is solved, there can be
no fu tu re for any in d ep en d en ce m o v em en t in th e eastern p a rt of Pakistan
w h atever its political coloring.
C h in a fou n d , of course, th a t th e B angla D esh p ro b lem dem o n strated
d ram atically th e difficulties o f o p eratin g its balance of pow er and small
p ow er diplom acy. B ut if C h in a ever succeeds in settin g the process in
51
STEPHEN FITZGERALD
m o tion , acco rd in g to th e rules C h in a itself w ants observed, th is could
prove to th e co n sid erab le benefit of th e sm all and m id d le pow ers. Breaking
the b ip o la r balance, or w hat the C h in ese call b reaking th e su p e r pow er
m onop o ly , offers g reat o p p o rtu n itie s for sm aller pow ers to align them selves
according to th e ir ow n interests, b u t only on issues and n o t autom atically
w ith any one pow er. O n e n otable beneficiary of the em erging balance has
been th e C eylonese G o v e rn m e n t, w hich received aid for its failing econom y
and its a n ti-in s u rg e n t p ro g ram from all corners of C h in a ’s five-point
balance. A n o th e r is R u m an ia, w here Jap anese in v estm en t has recently
been a d d ed to relatio n s w ith th e U .S . and W estern E u ro p e and S inoSoviet rivalry. A sim ilar situ atio n m ay be em erging in M alay sia; it is
already possible to see m u ch th e sam e th in g in a p o st-w ar V ietnam . So long
as the g reat pow ers are co m p etin g in n o n -m ilitary term s for influence
am ong th e sm all and m id d le pow ers, this benefit will c o n tin u e to spread to
o th er co u n tries. C h in a itself ap pears in te n t on p u rsu in g th is gam e in
diplom atic term s, and alth o u g h th e re is always a p o in t bey o n d w hich
p red ictio n becom es m eaningless, th ere is no im m ediate p ro sp ect of C hina
reso rtin g to offensive w ar as an in stru m e n t of foreign policy in th e fore­
seeable fu tu re . C h ina is p ro b ab ly also being a little too optim istic, given
the recen t actions of som e of th e o th e r g reat pow ers involved in th e balance.
IV
T he c a s e o f A u stralia
A u stra lia ’s p re d ic a m e n t typifies th e p ro b lem w hich to som e ex ten t is
facing m o st co u n tries in th e A sian and Pacific region, p articu larly Japan,
T h a ila n d and th e P h ilip p in es, w hich have been b o u n d so firm ly into the
U .S . alliance system and have follow ed closely the U .S . policy on C hina.
T h e p ro b le m is n o t sim ply th at norm alisatio n of relations w ith C hina m eans
b reakin g th e clear line w hich th e U .S . once tried to draw betw een C hina
and A sia, b u t th a t w h at has h ap p en ed since late 1970 has d estroyed m u ch
of th e ratio n ale for prev io u s foreign policies, and th e C hina q u estio n itself
has c o n fro n te d these co u n tries w ith the necessity to reth in k , not sim ply
th eir C h in a policies, b u t th e w hole range of th eir foreign policies.
G iv en th a t th e ‘C h in ese th re a t’ had been b u ilt into such a central position
in A u stra lia ’s A sian and Pacific policy, any significant change in C h in a ’s
position o r even in th e p ercep tio n of C h in a ’s foreign policy objectiv es was
likely to shake th e edifice of this policy. In p articu lar, im p ro v em en ts in
the rela tio n sh ip b etw een C h in a and th e U n ite d S tates w ould call into questio'n th e m ajo r p a rt of th e ‘th re a t alliance’ strategy as it had b een c o n ­
ceived ; and to th e ex ten t th a t such im p ro v em en t m oved tow ards m ean in g fu l
52
T A L K I N G W I T H CH IN A
and friendly relations, A u stralia w ould face a choice betw een com plete
redirection of foreign policy o r being left w ith a policy w hich m ade no
sense eith er in te rm s of its alliances or in term s of the realities of in te r­
national politics in th e A sian and Pacific region.
T h e L a b o r P arty was n o t in this position, n o t because it wras in op p o si­
tion, b u t because it rejected th e assu m p tio n of th e ‘C hinese th re a t’ central
to th e G o v e rn m e n t’s foreign policy, and because it had a rath er different
view of the relatio n sh ip w ith the U n ited S tates. W h itlam h im self had been
th in k in g for som e tim e a b o u t th e possibilities for advancing A u stralia’s
in terests and play in g a m o re positive role in w hat he could see as an
em erging w o rld b alan ce; and th e A .L .P . was opposed to sycophantic
d ep en d en ce on W ash in g to n and th e G o v e rn m e n t’s ap p aren tly fixed notion
of basing A u stralian foreign policy on a single o v errid in g relationship
w ith one great pow er. G o v e rn m e n t criticism of W h itlam for being the
‘total ad v ocate’ of C h in a and conceding ‘every single p o in t th e C hinese
m ade to h im ’,42 reflected, n o t th e tru th of w h at had taken place in Peking,
b u t the G o v e rn m e n t’s incapacity to th in k of any kind of A u stralian foreign
policy in te rm s o th e r th an th e single great pow er relationship. J u s t as the
G o v e rn m e n t did in W ash in g to n , so also m u st the A .L .P . be doing in
Peking. T h e A .L .P . believes, how ever, th a t A u stralia should n ot b ind itself
u n co n d itio n ally to any one pow er, b u t should seek to have good relations
w ith them all. A s W h itlam w ro te after he left C h in a : ‘O ne th in g is certain.
W e are n ot going to be co n fro n ted w ith a choice betw een C h in a and the
U n ite d S ta te s .’43
T h e G o v e rn m e n t was facing a collapse of its foreign policy, b u t it was
ap p aren tly u n aw are of this fact, even u p to th e tim e the A .L .P . w ent to
C hina, w hen its m ain concern was still w ith ju stify in g its own dom estic
position in relation to th e A .L .P . initiative. T h is is b est illustrated by
M c M a h o n ’s co m m en ts a b o u t W h itla m ’s interview w ith C hou, w hich
com pletely ignored the su b stan ce of th e exchange and the im p o rt of w hat
C hou had to say, and c o n c e n tra ted on attacking W h itla m : ‘I d o u b t if I
have ever read su ch a dam ag in g and irresp o n sib le series of declarations by
any political lead er in all m y tim e in politics in A u stra lia ’ ; C hou ‘co m m itted
the L ab o r lead er to a position A u stralia could nev er accept and from w hich
M r W h itlam h im self can n o t w ith d ra w ’; ‘In no tim e at all C hou E n-lai
had M r W h itla m on a hook and he played him as a fisherm an plays a
tr o u t’ ; W h itla m h ad in su lted ‘ju s t ab o u t m ost of o u r friends and allies in
Asia and th e P acific’. M c M a h o n even raised, in 1971, th e case of alleged
C hinese aggression in K orea, T ib e t and In d ia, a case w hich had been d is­
credited and largely accepted as such even by th e U n ite d S ta te s.44
53
STK PH EN FITZGERALD
In the sam e speech, M c M a h o n referred to C h o u E n -la i’s ow n com m ents
in the interview ab o u t th e U n ite d States, and d eclared, ‘W h at an im p e rtin ­
ence to the leader of th e U n ite d S tates, and it is n o t likely to be forgotten
by the A m erican A d m in istra tio n ’. T h e follow ing day it was announced
th a t D r K issinger had been in Peking to arran g e for P resid en t N ix o n ’s
visit. M cM ah o n had received half an h o u r’s n otice of the co m m unique.
W hen caught by rep o rters at M e lb o u rn e airp o rt, he p ersisted on th e party
political tack, saying th a t ‘it m akes an aw ful m o ckery of the m an [W h itlam ]’
and ‘an awful farce’ of th e A .L .P . m ission.40 L a te r in the day he held a
press conference to w hich rep o rters w ere a d m itte d only after they had
agreed n o t to ask q u e stio n s.46 W h itlam received th e new s in T okyo w ith
unconcealed satisfaction in th e vindication of his policy. T o the achieve­
m en ts of th e A .L .P . m ission in C h in a he now a d d ed an o th er, th e fact th at
as a resu lt of th e A .L .P . visit,
W hatever may be the position o f the Australian G overnm ent, Australia as a nation
looks less flatfooted, less ignorant, less obscurantist, less imitative in the light of the
U nited States initiative than she would otherwise have done.4'
In term s of A ustralian foreign policy, th ere w ere two m ain im plications
of the K issinger visit. F irst, it d e m o n stra te d th a t W a sh in g to n ’s thinking
ab o u t C h in a had changed to a g reater ex ten t th an the A ustralian G o v e rn ­
m en t had believed, th a t th e U .S . had taken a m ajo r step tow ards de facto
norm alisatio n of relations w ith C hina, by co m parison w ith w hich the
A u stralian G o v e rn m e n t h ad been stan d in g still. It was tru e th at th e LLS.
had started b eh in d A u stralia on tra d e and travel, b u t the U .S . had at least
been having an in te rm itte n t dialogue w ith C h in a since 1955, and once he
started to m ove, P re sid e n t N ixon had gone fu rth e r in two years than the
A ustralian G o v e rn m e n t had in tw en ty -tw o , d e sp ite its m ore open policy
on p riv ate contact w ith C hina. S econdly, th e visit revealed publicly th at
th e U .S . was not taking A ustralia into its confidence on the substance of
its initiatives or in ten tio n s tow ards C hina. T h e A N Z U S treaty rem ained
and m ig h t still be invoked in th e event of an external attack on A u s­
tralia. B ut in b ro a d e r term s, how m ean in g fu l was the alliance if the
LT.S. was m aking fu n d a m e n ta l changes, w ith o u t inform ing A ustralia,
on th e one issue w hich had becom e so cen tral in A u stralia’s approach
to the alliance? A nd how viable was a foreign policy based on a h ard -lin e
response to the ‘C h in ese th re a t’ and an a n ti-C h in a d e te rm in a n t in
appro ach es to relations w ith o th e r A sian co u n tries, w hen a n u m b e r of
th e ‘th re a te n e d ’ c o u n tries w ere b eg in n in g to th in k th at this m ig h t not
be the answ er to th e q u estio n of living w ith C h in a, and w hen A u stralia’s
54
TA L K I N G W I T H CH IN A
ally against th e ‘th r e a t’ was rejecting th e w hole con cept as a basis for
relations w ith its ow n allies o r for its own policy to w ards C hina?
T h e result w as a loss o f p u rp o se and d irectio n in A ustralian foreign
policy. T h e G o v e rn m e n t had been toying, for exam ple, w ith the idea of
seeking a closer relatio n sh ip w ith th e Soviet U n io n , b u t in a series of
sta tem en ts it revealed conflicting ideas ab o u t how far M oscow could be
tru ste d and how far A ustralia, could go tow ards a m o re intim ate relatio n ­
ship. It an n o u n ced w ith d raw al o f its tro o p s from V ietn am , b u t m ade no
a tte m p t to follow th is u p by efforts to assist in the search for a settlem ent.
It was left w ith a policy of b its and pieces, b u t seem ed in capable of striking
o u t in a new d ire c tio n . M c M a h o n ap p o in ted a new F oreign M in ister, N igel
B ow en, b u t th is d id n o t h erald a new ap p ro ach to foreign policy. O n the
c o n trary , B ow en seem ed eith e r to reject th e idea th a t th ere had been a
fu n d am en tal ch ange in th e w orld situ atio n or to believe th at it could be
taken back to th e situ atio n w hich prevailed before the K issinger visit. In
an address in th e U n ite d S tates he suggested th a t it w ould be to the ad v an ­
tage of the U .S . to s u p p o rt th e ru lin g p arties in A ustralia because A .L .P .
foreign policies w o u ld be co n trary to th e in terests of th e U n ited States.
S p eaking later in T o k y o , he said th a t C h in a did n o t m ix politics w ith
trade, an alm ost u n b eliev ab le gaucherie p articu larly in Jap an , and one w hich
p rovoked a p ro te st from C h in ese officials, w ho p o in ted o u t th a t if th at
was how A u stralia u n d e rsto o d th e situ atio n it could n o t hope to get very
far in n o rm alisin g relatio n s w ith C hina. W ith th e w heat sales still not
resum ed, and th e dialogue at a stan d still, M c M a h o n so u g h t the assistance
of p rivate b u sin e ssm e n , ap p aren tly in th e belief th a t priv ate channels
could achieve w h at d ip lo m atic co m m u n icatio n could n o t: progress on the
basis of the existin g g o v e rn m e n t position. O nce m o re d em o n stratin g th eir
tactical flexibility, th e C h in ese actually agreed to th e suggestion of the
b u sin essm an -en v o y th a t they invite to C h in a A ndrew Peacock, then
M in ister for th e A rm y . Y et even at this p o in t, A ustralia u n d e rm in e d its
ow n position by its vote in the U .N ., and th e Peacock m ission was aborted.
T h e A u stralian G o v e rn m e n t m ay have felt th a t it could draw en co urage­
m en t from th e U .S . tactics over th e U .N . vote, and from belief in its own
freq u en tly stated assertio n th a t U .S . policy had sim ply caught up w ith
A u stralian policy. ‘T h e P re s id e n t’s p u rp o se of n o rm alising relationships
w ith C h in a ’, said M c M a h o n , ‘has been the p u b licly ann o u n ced policy of
th e A ustralian G o v e rn m e n t for som e tim e . ’ 48 A u stralia n o t only c o -o rd in ­
ated its U .N . stra te g y w ith th e U n ite d S tates and voted accordingly, b u t
it also engaged in som e ra th e r u n p le a sa n t lo b b y in g in a n u m b e r of Asian
55
S T E PH E N FITZGERALD
capitals, exertin g p ressu re on b eh alf of th e U n ited S tates. W h a t it m ay
n o t have realised was th a t it was being used for a ra th e r different purpose.
W h e th e r or n o t K issin g er inform ed C h o u E n-lai in Ju ly th at this w ould
be th e strategy, w ith the certain expectation of the seating of Peking, the
lo bbyin g tactics of th e U .S . w ere so o v erb earin g th a t they w ere partly
respon sib le for the defeat of th e U .S . position, a n u m b e r of countries
reg isterin g th e ir p ro te st at W a sh in g to n ’s p ressu res by voting against the
U .S . A n d it was h ard ly a m a tte r of o v errid in g national urgency th at D r
K issin g er should h ap p en to be m aking his second visit to P eking w hen
th e C h in a d eb ate was taking place, alth o u g h it m ay have been coincidence
th a t he delayed his d e p a rtu re from Peking, w ith th e result th a t he was
th ere precisely at th e tim e th e U .N . votes w ere taken. T h e U n ite d States
had ap p eared to fulfil its obligations to C h ian g K ai-shek, b u t it did so in
such a w ay as to en su re the adm ission of P ek ing; and if K issinger had
in fo rm ed C h o u E n-lai of the strategy, th e U .S . m ay even have scored a
few p o in ts p rivately in P ek in g .49
T h e vote itself was, for A ustralia, th e sym bol of th e end of an era in
its foreign policy. A u stralia was one of only th irty -fiv e n atio n s w hich
voted against Peking in th e final su b stan tiv e resolution. R anged against
A ustralia w ere m any of its friends and allies, the m ajority of its C o m m o n ­
w ealth p a rtn e rs, and a great n u m b e r o f th e ‘th re a te n e d ’ states of Asia,
su p p o sed by th e A u stralian G o v e rn m e n t to share its views ab out C hina.
O nly th re e A sian natio n s voted w ith th e U .S . and A u stralia; even T h ailan d
and In d o n esia abstained. F oreign M in iste r Bowen claim ed th a t C h in a ’s
adm ission was an objective A u stralia h ad p ro m oted. T h is is technically
correct, alth o u g h if the fo rm u la had succeeded it w ould have ensured, as
A ustralia knew , th a t P eking stayed out. A nd w hile A ustralia genuinely
w an ted it to succeed, the U .S . ap p ears to have had different m otives.
A u stra lia ’s grow ing isolation on th e C h in a q uestion was fu rth e r illustrated
w hen th e C hinese delegation arrived in the U .N .: w here the U .S .
delegate m ad e a speech of w elcom e, A ustralia sat m u te. In view of Chi
P e n g -fe i’s rem ark to W h itlam th a t A u stra lia ’s stand in th e U .N . was one
of th e policies w hich m ad e A ustralia responsible for th e state of relations
betw een th e tw o cou n tries, th e fact th a t A u stralia w ent th ro u g h to the end
w ith C h ian g K ai-sh ek raises d o u b ts a b o u t the p ro sp ects for rapprochement,
even if th e G o v e rn m e n t w ere now to d ro p su p p o rt for C h iang K ai-shek. T h e
cancellation of th e Peacock m ission is one indication th a t C hina m ay n ot
now seriously en tertain th e idea of d ip lo m atic relations w ith the L ib eralC o u n try P a rty C oalition.
T h e p o in t is th a t C h in a ’s diplom acy and th e thaw in S in o -U .S . relations
56
T A L K I N G W I T H CH IN A
has had, and will co n tin u e to have, a p ro fo u n d effect on the w hole range of
A ustralian foreign policy and will even have rep ercu ssio n s in do m estic A u s­
tralian politics. In o th e r w ords, it is n o t ju s t th a t C h in a has ‘e m erg ed ’ or
‘taken its place in th e co m m u n ity of n a tio n s’, b u t th a t it has d o n e so w ith a
q u ite convulsive effect on w orld politics and on the politics of A sian and
Pacific co u n tries, p articu larly of those w ho m ade up th e a n ti-C h in a front.
It is p ro b a b ly as well for C h in a ’s n eig h b o u rs th a t th e events of 1971
have had this effect. F o r th e new situ atio n req u ires n ot only th a t they
should m ake technical changes in th e ir policies, such as th e act of recog­
nition of C h in a, b u t th a t they should be able to b reak o u t of th e old p attern s
of th in k in g w hich su stain ed th e old policies, and explore entirely new
approaches to th e ir foreign relations, w hich will enable th em to ad ap t to
th e new po w er politics and b o th p ro te c t th e ir ow n in terests in and c o n tri­
b u te to the o p eratio n of the em erg in g balance of pow er. A u stralian foreign
policy, for exam ple, has been shocked and severely shaken. It is now in a
som ew hat ru d d erless perio d of tra n sitio n , b u t the very fact th a t it has been
called so seriously into q u estio n and th ro w n into a state of u n certain ty
m eans th a t th e re is now an o p p o rtu n ity for re th in k in g basic assum ptions.
W h itlam has set fo rth som e of his ideas in th re e articles p u b lish ed in
th e S u n d a y A ustralian w hile he was in C h in a and in a n u m b e r of speeches,
in cluding his speech to th e N atio n al P ress C lu b on his re tu rn from C hina,
an intelligent and farsig h ted speech on foreign policy u n u su al in A ustralia
in recent years. In it he explained in g reat d etail w here A u stralia stands in
relation to th e p ro b lem s of C h in a, Jap an and th e U n ite d S tates. T h e p o in t
of d e p a rtu re for W h itla m ’s th in k in g is the o p p o rtu n itie s afforded by a
tu rn in g p o in t in history, one w hich will be b ro u g h t m ore sh arp ly into
focus if the w ar in In d o -C h in a can be b ro u g h t to an e n d : ‘W e have a chance
to avoid the m istakes m ad e in 1954; we can m ake the m ost of th e o p p o r­
tu n ities again offered after V ietn am w hich we lost after K orea . . .’ T h e
o p p o rtu n itie s are for se ttle m e n t of th e p ro b lem s o f th e A sian and Pacific
region, and th e q u estio n of C h in a ’s relations w ith the region and w ith the
great pow ers, and for w orking co-op erativ ely to p ro m o te w h atev er m easures
m ay assist these pow ers to reach acco m m o d atio n : ‘th e g reatest challenge
to w estern statesm an sh ip in o u r region . . . now involves th e relations
betw een C h in a and J a p a n ’. H is arg u m e n t is th a t A u stralia can take co n ­
stru ctiv e m easu res in try in g to m ake th e new balance o perate effectively
and peacefully, b u t, at the sam e tim e, th e fo u n d atio n for his co n cern about
global p ro b le m s is an equal co ncern to develop A u stralia’s relationships
w ith the sm aller pow ers in Asia. H e opposes th e a rg u m en t th a t great
pow ers m u st always be con ced ed a d o m in an t influence in th e A sian and
57
STE PH EN FITZGERALD
Pacific region; he objects to th e A u stralian G o v e rn m e n t’s obsession with
great pow er relationships to th e neglect of th e sm aller n e ig h b o u rs w ith
w hom it claim s to have m o re in com m on. H is em phasis is on trying to
develop w ith Asian co u n tries relatio n sh ip s of m o re reality and substance
th an exist at presen t, of m u tu a l respect and id e n tity of interests— freq u en tly
against th e in terv en tio n ist in terests of th e pow ers. H e believes it is necessary
to reject th e c u rre n t ap p ro ach to A sian co u n tries w hich rests e ith er on fear
or on an a ttitu d e of patro n ag e, and is convinced th a t A ustralia has as m uch
to learn from Asian co u n tries as it has to offer in re tu rn by w ay of tech­
nology. T o the exten t th a t it w ould be accep table to A sian countries, he
envisages relationships of equality.
O n this basis he sees a far m ore active role for A ustralia, one w hich
involves positive initiatives for th e solution o f th e w o rld ’s pro b lem s, the
use of diplom acy ra th e r th an tro o p s, and m ed iatio n rath er th an co n fro n t­
ation ; a foreign policy qualitativ ely differen t in style, co n ten t and objectives
from th e p resen t policy.
O n th e question of C hina, the difference b etw een th e g o v ern m en t parties
and th e L ab o r P arty is th a t th e fo rm er have still n ot gone beyond their
strugg le to resolve th e ir d ilem m a on the technical question of recognition
to co n tem p late w hat sort of relationship they m ig h t have w ith C hina. O n
p re se n t indications, it w ould be little m o re th an a form ality, since they still
seem u n ab le to escape th e basic a ttitu d e s of suspicion and hostility and
objection to the w hole idea of a C h in a w hich is co m m u n ist and therefore
‘th e e n e m y ’, w hich have d o m in ated th e ir th in k in g in the past.
Y et C h in a ’s foreign policy offers o p p o rtu n itie s for n o n -co m m u n ist small
and m id d le pow ers, such as A u stralia, to w ork to g eth er w ith Peking,
p artic u la rly w ith in th e U n ite d N atio n s. A u stra lia ’s in terests are by no
m eans autom atically identical w ith those of th e U n ite d S tates, o r of the
S oviet U nion or Jap an . A nd alth o u g h th ere will certainly be m any issues
on w hich A ustralia will be opposed to C h in a, w hile C h in a persists w ith
its p re se n t foreign policy th e re will also be m an y issues on w hich it will be
m o re to A u stralia’s advantage to co -o p erate w ith C h in a and even su p p o rt
and lobby for its initiatives in th e U n ite d N atio n s. W hile there is co n ­
siderab le value in having a good relatio n sh ip w ith Peking, this need not
be to th e d e trim e n t of relations w ith W a sh in g to n , w hich could be su b ­
stantially im proved by th e exercise of a little in d ep en d en ce w hich, as the
C anad ian exam ple show s, can be m o re valuable to the alliance th an an
a ttitu d e of total subservience. A nd it is, of course, ju s t as im p o rta n t for
A u stralia to co n tin u e its close relatio n sh ip s w ith W ashington and T okyo
and to stren g th en its position in M oscow , as it is to have good relations
58
TA L K I N G W I T H CH IN A
with Peking. It will take a long time for Australia to overcom e the dis­
advantage it has b ro u g h t on itself in relations with C h in a ; a change of
governm ent, still less a change in policy by the present governm ent, is
unlikely to result im m ediately in a dram atic change in the foundations of
A u stra lia -C h in a relations. But it is possible to conceive of a situation at
the end of the 1970s in w hich A ustralia m ig h t have a relationship of m utual
confidence and respect and even some w a rm th with C hina, in w hich the
two countries m ay from time to time act in concert for the p u rsu it of
com m o n goals. Australia should now be w orking tow ards such an objective.
It can always retreat if circum stances should change, b u t only by taking
this as an ultim ate aim can it hope to get any value at all out of its relations
w ith China.
59
NOTES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
I
II
12
S ta te m e n t in the H o u se of Representatives. C o m m o n ­
w ealth of Australia, P arliam entary Debates, H ouse of
Representatives, 17 A u g u st 1971, p. 23 (henceforth
C .P .D .).
The Age (M elbourne), 7 and 14 July 1971.
See the a u th o r ’s forthcom ing book on C hina and Australia
to be published by Penguin Books (Australia). See also
G re g o ry Clark, ‘A ustralia versus C h in a ’, in his In Fear
of C hina (M elbourne, 1967), and H e n ry S. Albinski,
A ustralian Policies and A ttitu d es towards China (Prince­
ton, 1965).
See statem ent by Prim e M in iste r M enzies a nnouncing the
c o m m itm e n t of Australian co m b a t troops to V ietnam in
response to the ‘dow nw ard t h r u s t ’ of C hina between the
Indian and Pacific Oceans. C .P .D ., Vol. H. of R. 45,
29 April 1965, p. 1061. See also a statem ent by M en z ie s’
successor, H arold H olt, on 8 M a r c h 1966: ‘T h is is no
civil war. It is the principal p re se n t m anifestation of the
expansionist activities of C o m m u n is t C h in a .’ Current
N otes on International A ffa irs (C anberra, D e p a rtm e n t of
External Affairs, M a rc h 1966), p. 109.
The A ustra lia n (Sydney), 16 July 1971.
A ddress to the Victorian L iberal Party, The Age, 13
July 1971Ibid.
The A ustralian, 20 A u g u st 1971.
T h e r e were su b se q u e n t variations in the recognition
formula, the m ost significant being that countries which
had not had diplom atic relations with the Chinese
N ationalists on T a iw a n m ade no m ention of T a iw a n and
simply recognised the go v e rn m e n t in Peking as the
go v e rn m e n t of the entire C hinese people. N ew terms
recently proposed by Peking call for a m ore positive
e n d o rse m e n t of C h in a ’s claim to T a iw a n from the m ore
‘hostile’ governm ents.
The A dvertiser (Adelaide), 24 J u n e 1969.
The Canberra Times, 7 N o v e m b e r 1970.
T r a n s c r ip t of television interview, on Station H S V
C hannel 7, M e lb o u rn e , 7 F e b ru a ry 1971; see also a
repetition of this sta te m e nt in The Canberra Times,
60
N O TES
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
21
22
23
24
25
9 A pril 1971.
P rim e M in iste r M c M a h o n , in reply to question by
W h itla m , C .P .D . (H. of R.), 6 April 1971, p. 1462, with
f u rth e r clarification, ibid., 7 April 1971, pp. 1549 and 1557.
Patterson raised the question of the bugging of the Bank
of C h in a in M a y (ibid., 5 M ay 1971, p. 2549), and of
the H o n g K o n g riots in April (ibid., 21 April 1971, p.
1775). H e challenged the G o v e r n m e n t to deny the claims,
w hich it has so far failed to do.
T h e new lv-appointed Foreign M inister, Leslie Bury, had
m a d e some reference to C hina in a statem ent in the H ouse
the previous week, b u t his remarks, while ‘n e u tra l’ by
G o v e r n m e n t standards, hardly constituted a m ajor
sta te m e n t on C hina policy. F o r a discussion of the b a c k ­
g ro u n d to these statem ents see Ste p h e n FitzG erald,
‘A u stra lia ’s C hina P ro b le m : S elf-Im posed Isolation’,
M eanjin Q uarterly, vol. 30, no. 2, Ju n e 1971.
The A g e , 21 Ju n e 1966.
Press Release, issued 11 M a y 1971.
S ta te m e n t by M c M a h o n in interview w ith Allan Barnes,
The A ge, 11 M a y 1971.
'The journalists were K e n n e th Randall for The A ustralian,
D avid B arnett for the Australian Associated Press, a
th r e e - m e m b e r television crew from the A ustralian B road­
casting C om m ission led by Phillip Koch, Eric W alsh for
the Financial R eview and the N a tio n a l Times, Jo h n S tu b b s
for the S yd n e y M orning H era ld , Allan Barnes for the
M e lb o u r n e Age, and L aurie Oakes for the M e lb o u rn e Sun.
D r Ross T errill, w ho was visiting C hina and w riting for
the W ashington Post and the A tla n tic M o n th ly and the
S ydney publication N a tio n , joined the press team in
Peking.
The S u n (M elb o u rn e ), 7 July 1971.
S ta te m e n t in the H ouse of R epresentatives, 17 A ugust
1971, op. cit., p. 25.
The A ge, 28 M a y 1971.
S y d n e y M orning H erald, 5 July 1971.
T e x t of address to Victorian State Council of the Liberal
Party, 28 July 1971.
S ta te m e n t in the H ouse of Representatives, 17 A ugust
61
NOTES
26
1971, op. cit., p. 25.
T h e se p rin cip les are:
‘In p ro v id in g econom ic and technical aid to o ther
countries, th e C hin ese G o v e rn m e n t strictly abides by the
follow ing eight p rin c ip le s:
‘F irst, th e C hinese G o v e rn m e n t always bases itself on the
p rin cip le of eq u ality and m u tu al benefit in providing aid
to o th e r countries. It nev er regards such aid as a kind
of u n ilateral alm s b u t as so m eth in g m u tu al.
‘Second, in p ro v id in g aid to o th e r countries, the C hinese
G o v e rn m e n t strictly respects th e sovereignty of the
recip ien t co u n tries, and nev er attaches any conditions or
asks for any privileges.
‘T h ird , C h in a p ro v id es econom ic aid in the form of
in te re st-fre e or lo w -in terest loans and extends the tim e
lim it for th e rep ay m en t w hen necessary so as to lighten
th e b u rd e n of th e recip ien t c o u n tries as far as possible.
‘F o u rth , in p ro v id in g aid to o th e r countries, th e purpose
of th e C h in ese G o v e rn m e n t is n o t to m ake the recipient
co u n tries d e p e n d e n t on C h in a b u t to help them em bark
step by step on th e road of self-reliance and in d ep en d en t
econom ic d ev elo p m en t.
‘F ifth , th e C hinese G o v e rn m e n t tries its best to help the
recip ien t co u n tries b u ild p ro jects w hich require less
in v estm en t w hile y ielding q u ick er results, so th at the
recip ien t g o v ern m en ts m ay increase th eir incom e and
accu m u late capital.
‘Sixth, th e C hin ese G o v e rn m e n t provides th e b estq u ality e q u ip m e n t and m aterial of its own m an u factu re
at in tern atio n al m ark et prices. If the e q u ip m en t and
m aterial p ro v id ed b y th e C h in ese G o v ern m en t are not
up to th e agreed specifications and quality, the C hinese
G o v e rn m e n t u n d ertak es to replace them .
‘S ev en th , in giving any p a rtic u la r technical assistance, the
C hinese G o v e rn m e n t will see to it th a t th e personnel of
th e recip ien t co u n try fully m a ste r such technique.
‘E ig h th , th e ex p erts d isp a tc h e d by C hina to help in co n ­
stru c tio n in the recip ien t c o u n tries will have the sam e
sta n d a rd of living as th e ex p erts of the recipient country.
T h e C h in ese ex p erts are n o t allow ed to m ake any special
62
N O TES
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
d e m an d s or enjoy any special a m e n ities.’
T h e s e are th a t C h in a should m ain tain its own in d e ­
p en d en ce, keep th e initiative in its ow n hands, strive to
be self-reliant and to bu ild C h in a diligently and frugally.
T h e s e are stated to be in accordance w ith the principles
of eq u ality and m u tu a l benefit, to conform w ith the
in terests of o th e r co u n tries and em b o dy respect for the
sovereignty of o th e r countries.
Jen -m in -jih -p a o [People s Daily], 3 Ju ly 1971.
M c M a h o n , s ta te m e n t in th e H o u se of R epresentatives,
17 A u g u st 1971, op. cit., p. 25.
The A ge, 13 Ju ly 1971.
T h e delegation itself did n o t take notes d u rin g the
interview . T h is acco u n t is based on tra n sc rip ts and tape
reco rd in g s m ad e by th e press and checked against m y
ow n notes m ad e after th e interview in con su ltatio n w ith
th e m em b ers o f th e delegation and th e press. T h e re w ere
significant inaccu racies in m ost o f th e accounts pu b lish ed
in th e A u stralian press.
‘Im p ressio n s o f C h in a ’s N ew D ip lo m acy : T h e A ustralian
E x p e rie n c e ’, C hina Q uarterly, no. 48, O cto b e r-D e ce m b e r
1971, and ‘T h e B o g ey -M an V an ishes’, F ar Eastern
Economic R eview , 11 S e p te m b e r 1971.
A d d ress to th e In s titu te of In te rn a tio n a l A ffairs, T o w n s ­
ville, 25 S e p te m b e r 1971.
Ib id .
F o r accounts o f th e K u o m in ta n g in T aiw an , see, for
exam ple, G eo rg e H . K err, Formosa B etrayed (L o n d o n ,
1966), M au rice M eisn er, ‘T h e D ev elo p m en t of F orm osan
N a tio n a lism ’, C hina Q uarterly, no. 15, Ju ly -S e p te m b e r
1963, and S te p h e n F itz G e ra ld ’s tw o -p art article in The
A ustralian, 16, 17 M a rc h 1967.
A d d ress to th e In s titu te of In te rn a tio n al A ffairs, T o w n s ­
ville.
The A ge, 17 Ju ly 1971.
A d d ress to th e In stitu te of In te rn a tio n a l Affairs,
T ow n sv ille.
The S u n d a y A u stra lia n , 11 Ju ly 1971.
T h is account o f C h in ese foreign policy is n o t derived
from th e A .L .P . v isit, alth o u g h th a t did p rovide invaluable
63
NOTES
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
insights. F o r an earlier account, w ritten in m id - 1970, see
S tep h en F itz G e ra ld , ‘C h in a in th e next decade: an end
to iso latio n ?’, A ustralian Jou rnal o f Politics and H isto ry,
vol. X V II, no. i, A pril 1971.
F o r reappraisals of th e In d ian version of th e In d ia-C h in a
conflict, see C lark, In Fear o f China, and N eville M axw ell,
India's C hina W ar (L o n d o n , 1971).
M c M a h o n , sta te m e n t in th e H ouse of R epresentatives,
17 A u g u st 1971, op. cit., p. 25.
The S u n d a y A ustralian, 18 Ju ly 1971.
The Age, 13 Ju ly 1971. R eappraisal of C h in a ’s past record
in foreign policy is to be fo u n d in a w ide variety of recent
literatu re, p articu larly in th e U n ited S tates, b u t for a
general d escrip tio n of th e new ‘consen su s’ on this subject
see th e article by A. D oak B arnett, ‘A N u clear C hina
and U .S . A rm s P olicy’, Foreign A ffairs, vol. 48, no. 3,
A pril 1970. T h is consensus has perm eated to recent issues
of The Reader's Digest.
S yd n ey M orning H erald, 17 July 1971.
The Age, 17 Ju ly 1971.
A ddress to th e N ational P ress C lub, 26 Ju ly 1971.
The Age, 17 Ju ly 1971.
As this p a p e r goes to press, confirm ation of this in te r­
p re ta tio n of th e N ix o n /K issin g er U .N . strategy has
ap peared in Ross T e rrill's 800,000,000. The Real China
(B oston, 1972), pp. 156-9.
64
C o n tem p o rary C hina P ap ers
T h e C ontem porary China C entre was established in T h e
A ustralian N ational U niversity in 1970. I t is an inter-disciplin­
ary body, w hich gives cohesion to the studies of m odern China
carried o u t in various disciplines w ithin th e U niversity. Its
functions include co-ordination of research and co-operation
w ith other A ustralian and overseas universities and w ith
interested persons outside th e academic w orld.
T h e work of the C entre involves three m ajor Schools of the
U niversity: G eneral Studies, Social Sciences and Pacific Studies.
Each is represented on the C entre’s Advisory Com m ittee, of
w hich Professor O. H . K. Spate, D irector, Research School of
Pacific Studies, is chairm an and M iss A udrey D onnithorne and
D r S. FitzG erald, from the same school, are, respectively, H ead
and D eputy-H ead.
M ainly the studies in the C ontem porary China Papers, w hich
will be the w ork of scholars at T h e A ustralian N ational U n i­
versity or visitors associated w ith its China program and of
m em bers of other A ustralian universities, will reflect the
C entre’s chief focus of interest: m odern C hina and its foreign
relations since 1949. T h ey will also, however, include historical
studies as well as, occasionally, studies in related fields w ritten
by non-specialists.
T h e aim of the series is to present some of the research being
carried out in A ustralia on m odern China, a subject of profound
significance in international relations and one th a t stim ulates
lively interest and debate.
Inform ation about future papers m ay be obtained from
T h e A ustralian N ational U niversity Press
Box 4, P.O .,
Canberra, A .C .T . 2600