Europe: Early Modern and Modern
theorists. Moreover, the struggle with the Habsburgs
forced the French to reverse their emphasis on one or
two armies and to fight on multiple fronts, which cost
considerably more. The larger scale of warfare meant
that the French financial system could not afford the
increased costs and had to shift the burden to aristocratic army officers, both in recruitment and to maintain units at tolerable strength. Consequently, the
government did not dare to alienate the military elite
through too careful supervision and control. Largely
unprepared for the new scale of conflict, the government fought the war through desperate, makeshift,
decentralized efforts. In the end, the cardinal narrowly
avoided defeat in an overly ambitious war.
Parrott's work is significant because it places Richelieu within the context of two interrelated debates:
the nature of Richelieu's regime, and the argument
over state modernization. Traditional accounts have
accepted Richelieu's words at face value when he said
that he pursued a dual policy of curbing powerful
subjects while successfully prosecuting a foreign war
asserting France's position in Europe. Even when
revisionists (such as Joseph Bergin) have emphasized
the pragmatism of Richelieu's regime and its operation
within networks of clientage and patronage, historians
have too often accepted Richelieu's own self-promotional myths of strengthening royal authority and
crushing aristocratic opposition. In addition, most
historians continue to accept the idea of Max Weber
that there was a direct correlation between the growth
of the state and the demands of warfare. Beginning
with Michael Robert's "military revolution" thesis in
the 1950s, numerous historians have argued that as the
state needed to recruit and supply ever larger armies to
fight enemies, this forced changes both in military and
civilian administration. States increasingly employed
commissioned officials, such as intendants, with sweeping powers, who curbed the power of the aristocratic
officer class. Parrott vigorously challenges these assumptions, utilizing arguments of recent critics of
absolutism who argue that Louis XIII's successor,
Louis XIV, employed tactics of continuity and cooperation with aristocrats, buttressed by patronage,
rather than seeking confrontation and change. Expediency rather than centralized bureaucratic control,
Parrott argues, characterized Richelieu's ministry.
This book has a number of important strengths.
Parrott's work rcminds us that the best history relies
heavily on archival work. He has closely examined not
only the records in the war archives at Vincennes but
also the largely underutilized military correspondence
in the foreign affairs archives. The book also demonstrates an imprcssive range and breadth of secondary
sources, including works in French, German, and to a
lesser extent Spanish and Italian. The result adds
enormously to our knowledge of the working of the
French army. For example, although Parrott acknowledges thc work of his mentor, Richard Bonney, the
section on military finance is outstanding, clearly laying out the principal themes of the complexity and
AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW
1299
confusion in France's finances and the difficulty in
financing a war. Parrott is also exceptional in his
description of the weaknesses of military administration, arguing that there was no evolution of authority
in war secretaries from Richelieu to the Le Tellier
family and demonstrating the weakness of army intendants and other commissioners in asserting governmental authority during this troubled period.
Several questions remain to be resolved. What precisely was thc role of the king in the war effort?
Although Parrott admits that Richelieu was not a "free
agent" (p. 10) able to do as he willed and that the king
had a strong interest in the army, the role of the king
remains unclear. While some contemporaries, as Parrott reminds us, believed that the king's wishes were
not paramount, still the role of this ever-suspicious
monarch needs further examination, particularly during the last years of the king's reign when Richelieu's
position was more open to challenge. Similarly, while
Parrott claims that overlapping jurisdictions and
poorly designed spheres of authority at the topinvolving the surintendant of finance, the secretaries of
state for war and foreign affairs, the chancellor, and
traditional military offices-prevented close coordination of the war effort, nonetheless Parrott's repeated
use of "the ministry" or "the ministers" throughout the
text implies a greater coordination of ministcrial strategy than the author argues. Finally, in explaining why
the French army did not collapse, Parrott argues that
the "most important factor," the effective use of
clientage (p. 552), staved off defeat, but there is no
discussion of othcr factors that might also have played
a role.
These are minor points. This massive study will
remain a standard work on military administration for
some years to come.
DOUGLAS CLARK BAXTER
Ohio University
PHILIP F. RILEY. A Lust for Virtue: Louis XW's Attack
on Sin in Seventeenth-Century France. (Contributions
to the Study of World History.) Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood. 2001. Pp. xvi, 203. $69.95.
Some authors are criticized for rushing their Ph.D.
dissertation to print without thorough editing to remove those parts of the scholarly apparatus demanded
by doctoral convention. Others are criticized for not
including works published during the years they have
taken to revise their dissertation for publication. Neither criticism is valid in the case of Philip F. Riley's
book. Thirty years have passed since Riley defended
the first version of his conclusions about Louis XIV's
interest in the morality of his subjects. Between 1973
and 1990 he published four articles related to this
subject. He now presents the fully developed version of
what he calls "Louis XlV's attack on sin in seventeenth-century France," based on his dissertation, the
articles, and continuing research.
Louis XIV firmly believed that one of his most
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2002
1300
Reviews of Books
important duties was to eradicate sin and instill virtue
in the people of France. Riley shows clearly how that
conviction, "more juridical than spiritual," developed
from Louis's childhood onward, and how it could cocxist with the other, often contradictory, elements of
Louis XIV's character. Riley argues convincingly that,
for the most part, the development of Louis's concept
of sin and virtue can be traced to his mother and his
teachers, along with Bishop Bossuet and Louis's confessors, rather than to his second wife, Madame de
Maintenon. The role of the latter was to encourage
Louis from the mid 1680s onward to increase his
efforts to combat sin and instill virtue.
Some historians consider Louis's attack on vice as a
relatively minor aspect of his efforts to build an
absolutc state inhabited by a socially disciplined populace. Others see Louis's actions as a prime example of
Catholic Reformation social policy. Riley wisely
chooses "all of the above" as his answer.
Riley's sources include political, judicial, and prison
records; administrative correspondence; and memoirs
and letters. His main argument is that Louis was "the
first king able to conceive and execute a public policy
animated by Catholic Reformation piety and focused
on instilling virtue in his subjects" (p. 1). The sources
used limit his investigation, for the most part, to Paris
and the royal court in Versailles. The first two chapters
set the scene. Chapter three, "Soldiers of Satan,"
provides interesting details about the effects of the
Catholic Reformation attitude toward women on
French life. Chapter four, "Adultery Most Royal,"
traces Louis's sexual history. Chapter five discusses the
lack of distinction made by Louis and some, at least, of
his officials between secular and spiritual offenses,
between crime and sin. Chapter six provides material
about the effect of Louis's attitudes on court life and
the Parisian theater.
The book is not without its faults. These include an
inexact use of words such as religious "order," "devot,"
and "the French Church" and misunderstanding of
liturgical details. The most surprising faults are, first,
the assertion (made twice on p. 120) that lay Huguenots were ordered by Louis XIV to receive all seven
sacraments (one of which, of course, was Holy Orders)
and, second, that the canons of the Council of Trent
stated that the sacrament of penance was "inspired"
(rather than instituted) by God. Another fault is an
occasional lack of context, for example in the discussion of the complex issues involved in the royal-papal
quarrel of the 1680s. A fuller discussion of the various
motivations involved in the revocation of the Edict of
Nantes would have been useful. A final fault flows
from nature of the sources used for this book. As
anyone who has used Old Regime administrative and
judicial documents knows, the extant records are frequently incomplete, and often the end of an interesting
or important story that has been painstakingly traced
through a long series of pages cannot be found. It is up
to the author both to make this clear to his or her
AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW
readers and also to present the material in such a way
that the readers are not jarred by the jagged narrative.
Despite its faults, this book will be very useful to
both students of history and professional historians. It
brings together in one place a significant amount of
important information about the efforts of Louis XIV
to rule France, provides important insights into that
ruler's character, presents further evidence of the
importance of religion in seventeenth-century France,
and adds to the reasons why many inhabitants of
France were ready for a change in thought, religion,
and morality after Louis XIV's death. In addition, the
author has placed all of this information into the
context of contemporary scholarship.
MICHAEL HAYDEN
Emeritus,
University of Saskatchewan
DARRIN M. McMAHON. Enemies of the Enlightenment:
The French Counter-Enlightenment and the Making of
Modernity. New York: Oxford University Press. 2001.
Pp. xii, 262.
Although the title suggests that this book examines a
variety of critical approaches to the French Enlightenment, it focuses solely on extreme Catholic opposition
to the movement and its legacy in France, from the
mid-eighteenth century until the end of the Bourbon
Restoration. Unlike authors such as Robert R. Palmer
and Isaiah Berlin, who focused on prominent writers of
the Counter-Enlightenment, Darrin M. McMahon
chooses mainly lesser authors. The examination of
their writings is intended to demonstrate the inseparability of the opposition to the Enlightenment, the
Catholic faith, opposition to the revolution, and the
political Right. The argument unfolds through five
chronologically organized chapters. The fact that illicit
books disseminated in France from the mid-eighteenth
century evoked protests from the Catholic authorities,
pamphleteers, and preachers leads McMahon to conclude that the Enlightenment in France (which he
constructs from the hostile rhetoric used by its "enemies") faced opposition from the start, and the Catholic Church was instrumental in this opposition. Thus
he challenges the revisionist thesis of Roger Chartier
that the Enlightenment was constructed retrospectively by the proponents of the French Revolution. The
Enlightenment (or rather philosophie) was viewed by
its opponents as a coherent movement long before
1789. Furthermore, opposition to the Enlightenment,
according to the author, was inseparable from opposition to the revolution; thus the revolution did not need
to invent its enemies-to justify the implementation of
terror, as Fran<;ois Furet argued-they were there
before the revolution began. The reign of terror was
merely the fulfillment of anti-philosophe prophecies of
a divine punishment for the lack of morals and respect
for authority inherent in philosophie. The aftermath of
the revolution and the Napoleonic period brought
about a consolidation of Counter-Enlightenment ide-
OCTOBER 2002