PROFILE OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT :
AFGHANISTAN
Compilation of the information available in the Global IDP
Database of the Norwegian Refugee Council
(as of 1 July, 2003)
Also available at http://www.idpproject.org
Users of this document are welcome to credit the Global IDP Database for the collection of information.
The opinions expressed here are those of the sources and are not necessarily shared by the Global IDP
Project or NRC
Norwegian Refugee Council/Global IDP Project
Chemin Moïse Duboule, 59
1209 Geneva - Switzerland
Tel: + 41 22 799 07 00
Fax: + 41 22 799 07 01
E-mail : [email protected]
CONTENTS
CONTENTS
1
PROFILE SUMMARY
9
INSECURITY AND LACK OF ASSISTANCE ARE MAJOR CONSTRAINTS TO IDP RETURN
9
CAUSES AND BACKGROUND OF DISPLACEMENT
15
GENERAL
15
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF LAND AND PEOPLE
15
SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE OF AFGHANISTAN (OCTOBER 2001)
15
DROUGHT AND ECONOMIC DISRUPTION IN THE NORTHEAST (DECEMBER 2000)
17
THE CIVIL WAR
18
A HISTORY OF CONFLICT
18
OVERVIEW OF MAIN DISPLACEMENTS (1992-2000)
19
CONFLICT -INDUCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2000
20
CONFLICT -INDUCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2001
21
P EACE EFFORTS DURING 2001
22
MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS DURING 2001
24
OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE IN AFGHANISTAN BY NEIGHBOURING STATES (DECEMBER 2000)
24
THE U.S. - AFGHANISTAN WAR
26
US ASK TALEBAN TO HAND OVER BEN LADEN OR FACE MILITARY CONSEQUENCES (OCTOBER
2001)
26
US POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN IS LARGELY A FUNCTION OF OIL (OCTOBER 2001)
27
P EOPLE FLEE MAJOR CIT IES TO RURAL AREAS IN FEAR OF U.S. ATTACKS (OCTOBER 2001)
28
DISPLACEMENT HAS INCREASED SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR (JANUARY 2002)
30
THE POST-TALEBAN ERA
30
ANTI-PASHTUN VIOLENCE CAMPAIGN DISPLACES THOUSANDS IN THE NORTH (MARCH 2002) 30
ABUSES BY ARMED MILITIAS, LACK OF FOOD AND EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE FORCE PEOPLE TO
FLEE IN WESTERN AFGHANISTAN (APRIL 2002)
32
CLUSTER BOMBS CONTRIBUTE TO THE CYCLE OF DISPLACEMENT (DECEMBER 2002)
33
HUMAN RIGHTS, PUBLIC SECURITY AND THE RULE OF LAW STILL NOT UPHELD (DECEMBER 2002)
33
FORCED RECRUITMENT, PERSECUTION IN THE NORTH CAUSES DISPLACEMENT AND HAMPER
RETURN (APRIL 2003)
35
CONTINUED FIGHTING AND INSECURITY ARE THE MOST SERIOUS CHALLENGE TO PEACE AND
RETURN (JUNE 2003)
36
SOME REFUGEES RETURNING HOME ARE FORCED INTO INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT (JUNE 2003) 39
NATURAL DISASTERS
39
ALARMING REGULARITY OF NATURAL DISASTERS IN AFGHANISTAN (1998-2001)
39
LOCUST INFESTATION IN NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN (MAY 2002)
DROUGHT IN ITS FOURTH YEAR IN A ROW (MAY 2002)
41
43
POPULATION PROFILE AND FIGURES
44
GENERAL
WHO ARE THE IDP S IN AFGHANISTAN ? (JUNE 2003)
GLOBAL FIGURES
BETWEEN 221,000 AND 600,000 IDPS AS OF JUNE 2003
TOTAL NUMBER OF IDPS AS OF MID -OCTOBER 2001 AND PROJECTED DISPLACEMENT
TOTAL NUMBER OF IDPS AS OF APRIL 2001: 300,000-400,000
TOTAL NUMBER OF IDPS AT THE END OF 1999: 500,000-700,000
TOTAL NUMBER OF IDPS AT THE END OF 1998: 540,000-1,000,000
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION
EASTERN REGION OVERVIEW (OCTOBER 2002)
SOUTHERN REGION OVERVIEW (APRIL 2003)
WESTERN REGION OVERVIEW (AUGUST 2002)
CENTRAL REGION OVERVIEW (OCTOBER 2002)
VULNERABLE GROUPS
KUCHIS IDPS, THE LARGEST OF AFGHANISTAN'S DISPLACED POPULATION, NEED ALTERNATE
SOLUTIONS (JUNE 2003)
DISPLACED WOMEN ARE EXTREMELY VULNERABLE (JUNE 2003)
44
44
45
45
49
51
52
53
54
54
55
56
57
58
PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT
61
58
59
GENERAL
61
P ASHTUNS FLEEING THE ETHNIC TENSIONS IN THE NORTH AND KUCHIS FLEEING THE DROUGHT
END UP AS DISPLACED IN THE SOUTH (OCTOBER 2002)
61
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND LACK OF FOOD DISTRIBUTION FORCE PEOPLE TO FLEE IN THE WEST
TO HERAT (APRIL 2002)
61
P EOPLE FLEE THE MAIN CITIES TO SEEK REFUGE IN RURAL AREAS IN FEAR OF U.S. BOMBING
(OCTOBER 2001)
62
THE PATTERN OF DISPLACEMENT FOLLOWS THE PATTERN OF FIGHTING (SEPTEMBER 2001)
63
FOUR MAJOR PATTERNS OF DISPACEMENT (OCTOBER 1999)
64
PHYSICAL SECURITY & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
65
GENERAL
65
P ROTECTION IS LARGELY DEPENDENT ON SOCIAL NETWORKS (MARCH 2003)
65
GOVERNMENT'S MAIN PROTECTION ISSUES FOR RETURNEES (MARCH 2003)
66
U.S. "WARLORD STRATEGY" SHOWS PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IS NOT A PRIORITY
(DECEMBER 2002)
66
AI CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROTECTION NEEDS OF IDPS STRANDED AT THE CHAMAN BORDER
(JULY 2002)
68
REPORTS OF INCREASING PROBLEMS OF INSECURITY UNDERSCORE NEED TO RAISE AWARENESS
OF THE NEEDS OF IDP S (MARCH 2002)
69
PHYSICAL SECURITY
70
2
IDPS RETURNING SUBJECT TO ILLEGAL TAXATION AND PRECARIOUS SECURITY CONDITIONS
(JUNE 2003)
IDPS IN CAMPS IN THE NORTH SUBJECTED TO FORCIBLE RELOCATIONS, COMPULSORY
PERFORMANCE OF MILIT ARY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS, AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE (JUNE 2002)
SURVEY REVEALS P ASHTUN HOUSEHOLDS IN WESTERN AFGHANISTAN ARE 2-5 TIMES MORE
EXPOSED TO ABUSES THAN OTHER ETHNIC GROUPS (APRIL 2002)
P OPULATION MOVEMENTS TO RURAL AREAS INCREASE MINE THREATS (OCTOBER 2001)
SUBSISTENCE NEEDS (HEALTH NUTRITION AND SHELTER)
70
71
72
73
74
GENERAL
74
GENERAL HUMANITARIAN SITUATION STILL EXTREMELY PRECARIOUS (JULY 2002)
74
DROUGHT, WAR AND ECONOMIC COLLAPSE HAVE CAUSED WIDESPREAD VULNERABILITY AMONG
THE POPULATION (MAY 2002)
75
CONCENTRATION OF HEALTH FACILITIES IN URBAN AREAS (APRIL 2002)
76
ETHNICITY, TRIBALISM AND SURVIVAL (SEPTEMBER 2001)
77
HEALTH
77
P SYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH OF DISPLACED PERSONS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS URGENT AS
PHYSICAL HEALTH PROBLEMS (MAY 2003)
77
MALNUTRITION AND MORT ALITY RATES SURPRISINGLY LOW IN ACUTELY FOOD INSECURE SAR-EP OL (JULY 2002)
79
SURVEY OF MASLAKH CAMP SHOWS ALARMING LEVELS OF MORTALITY (JULY 2002)
80
WHO REPORTS A SIGNIFICANT MORTALITY RATE DROP IN MASLAKH CAMP (MARCH 2002)
82
APPROXIMATELY 2 DOCTORS FOR EVERY 10,000 PERSONS IN AFGHANISTAN (JANUARY 2002) 82
FOOD
83
ENDING OF FOOD DISTRIBUTION IN CAMPS PUT THE MOST VULNERABLE AT RISK (JUNE 2003) 83
GENERAL FOOD SECURITY IMPROVEMENT DURING 2002, EXCEPT IN THE SOUTH (APRIL 2003) 84
6 MILLION PEOPLE REMAIN VULNERABLE TO FOOD INSECURITY (AUGUST 2002)
85
NUTRITION SURVEYS IN THE SHOMALI P LAINS AND P ANJSHEER VALLEY SHOWS HIGH LEVELS OF
MALNUTRITION AMONG MOTHERS (JULY 2002)
85
NUTRITION SITUATION IN MAZAR IS UNDER CONTROL (JULY 2002)
86
SHELTER AND NON-FOOD ITEMS
87
P ROJECTED NEED OF 100,000 SHELTER DURING 2003 (APRIL 2003)
87
RETURNEES IN MAZAR-I-SHARIF ARE IN DIRE NEED OF ACCOMODATION (MARCH 2003)
88
IDPS IN CAMPS IN KABUL NEED HOUSING, CLOTHING AND HEATING FACILITIES (JANUARY 2003)
89
SURVEY SHOWS SOME 140,000 PEOPLE IN KABUL ARE IN NEED OF SHELTER AND RELIEF
ASSISTANCE (AUGUST 2002)
89
WATER AND SANITATION
92
ONLY 20 PERCENT OF AFGHANS HAVE ACCESS TO SAFE DRINKING WATER (JUNE 2003)
92
ACCESS TO WATER FOR IRRIGATION SOMETIMES DETERMINED BY POLITICAL ALLEGIANCE (MAY
2002)
93
NEEDS OF IDPS BY GEOGRAPHICAL LO CATION
93
IDPS IN ZHARE DASHT CAMP LACK INCOME-GENERATING ACTIVITIES (FEBRUARY 2003)
93
SITUATION IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS CONTINUE TO BE OF GREAT CONCERN (JULY 2002)
94
LIMITED HEALTH, SHELTER AND SANITATION FACILITIES IN SPIN BOLDAK IDP CAMPS (MARCH
2002)
95
RETURNEES AND IDPS PUT PRESSURE ON THE OVERSTRETCHED RESOURCES OF KABUL (JULY
2002)
96
3
30,000 IDP STRANDED AT CHAMAN BORDER IN DIRE CONDITION AWAIT ASSISTANCE (JULY 2002)
96
ACCESS TO EDUCATION
99
GENERAL
99
MANY RETURNING IDP CHILDREN CANNORT AFFORD TO ATTEND SCHOOL AS THEY HAVE TO
PROVIDE FOR THEIR FAMILY (JUNE 2003)
99
70% OF THE EDUCATION INFRASTRUCTURE HAS BEEN DESTROYED (SEPTEMBER 2002)
99
CLOSE TO 3 MILLION CHILDREN HAVE BEEN ENROLLED IN SCHOOL SINCE MARCH 2002 (AUGUST
2002)
102
RI ADVOCATES FOR ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF EDUCATION TO REACH MORE CHILDREN (MARCH
2002)
103
EDUCATION FOR IDP CHILDREN IS VIRTUALLY NON-EXISTENT IN MOST AREAS (SEPTEMBER 2001)
104
ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
106
SELF RELIANCE
106
OVERCROWDED JOB MARKET AND LACK OF CULTIVATED LAND MAKE RETUNR UNSUSTAINABLE
(JUNE 2003)
106
FEW JOB OPPORTUNITES AND INCREASING NUMBER OF JOB SEEKERS LIMIT WAGES AND
PURCHASING POWER (MAY 2002)
106
IDPS FIND IT DIFFICULT TO BORROW MONEY OR TO PURCHASE GOODS ON CREDIT (MAY 2002) 107
DOCUMENTATION NEEDS AND CITIZENSHIP
109
GENERAL
109
GOVERNMENT PLANS TO ISSUE NEW ID CARDS AS SOON AS FINANCES ARE AVAILABLE (MARCH
2003)
109
ISSUES OF FAMILY UNITY, IDENTITY AND CULTURE
110
GENERAL
110
75% OF ORPHANS SURVEYED IN THE WEST EXPRESS THEIR PREFERENCE FOR STAYING WITH
FAMILY INSTEAD OF BEING PLACED IN INSTITUTIONS (JUNE 2003)
110
PROPERTY ISSUES
111
GENERAL
111
P ROPERTY RESTITUTION IS A KEY PROBLEM FACING RETURNING IDPS, REFUGEES AND THE LOCAL
POPULATION (JUNE 2003)
111
DISPUTES OVER LAND AND PROPERTY OWNERSHIP PROLIFERATE AFFECTING MANY RETURNEES
(JUNE 2003)
111
PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT
113
4
RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT MOVEMENTS
113
25,000 IDPS HAVE RETURNED SINCE JANUARY 2003 BUT MANY REMAIN DISPLACED AFTER
RETURNING (JUNE 2003)
113
CLOSE TO 100,000 IDPS HAVE RETURNED WITH ASSISTANCE IN THE WESTERN PROVINCES
BETWEEN FEBRUARY AND OCTOBER 2002
114
SOME 200,000 IDPS EXPECTED TO RETURN BETWEEN JUNE AND DECEMBER 2002 (OCTOBER
2002)
115
MORE THAN 70,000 IDPS HAVE LEFT HERAT CAMPS BETWEEN MARCH AND JULY TO RETURN
HOME (JULY 2002)
117
UNHCR COMPLETES THE REPATRIATION OF THE 10,000 IDPS STRANDED AT THE AFGHAN-TAJIK
BORDER (APRIL 2002)
117
RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMMES
118
CHAMAN CAMP SET CLOSE, IDPS TO BE RELOCATED (JUNE 2003)
118
MSF CONCERNED ABOUT THE RELOCATION OF 12,000 IDPS FROM SHAIDAYEE TO MASLAKH
CAMP (JUNE 2003)
121
300,000 IDPS EXPECTED TO RETURN DURING 2003 (JANUARY 2003)
121
MAHKAKI AND MILE-46 IDP CAMP TO BE CLOSED IN APRIL TO ALLOW FOR THE REPATRIATION
OF THE 10,000 IDPS (MARCH 2002)
122
5 MAIN GEOGRAPHIC AREAS EXPECTED TO BE HIGH-RETURN AREAS DURING 2002 (JANUARY
2002)
123
IDP REINTEGRATION PROGRAMMES
123
GOVERNMENT FORESEES A GRADUAL INCREASE OF OPERATIONAL FOCUS FROM REPATRIATION TO
REINTEGRATION DURING 2003 (MARCH 2003)
123
RURAL INTEGRATION (MARCH 2003)
125
URBAN REINTEGRATION (APRIL 2003)
126
OBSTACLES TO RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT
127
MAJOR RETURNS TO NORTHEAST BUT FEW RETURNS TO NORTWEST DUE TO PERSISTENT TENSION,
LACK OF LONG -TERM ASSISTANCE (JUNE 2003)
127
URBAN AREAS' ABSORPTION CAPACITY REACHING ITS LIMIT (JUNE 2003)
130
LANDLESSNESS LEADS TO RENEWED DISPLACEMENT UPON RETURN (JUNE 2003)
131
NO IMMEDIATE RETURN SOLUTION FOR KUCHI IDP S (JUNE 2003)
132
LACK OF FUNDING AND INSECURITY IN THE NORTH CONSTRAIN IOM' S REPATRIATION ACTIVITIES
(APRIL 2003)
134
IDPS RESETTLING IN MAZAR-I-SHARIF CANNOT DO SO UNLESS THEY ORIGINATE FROM THE AREA
(MARCH 2003)
136
ABSENCE OF SOCIAL NETWORK MAKES IT DIFFICULT FOR RETURNEES TO SETTLE IN AREAS OTHER
THAN THEIR AREA OF ORIGIN (MARCH 2003)
136
LANDMINES IN AFGHANISTAN (AUGUST 2002)
137
DROUGHT-INDUCED IDPS' NEEDS DIFFER FROM THOSE OF CONFLICT -INDUCED IDPS IN THE
RETURN PHASE (MARCH 2002)
138
MANY RETURNEES LIKELY TO SETTLE IN URBAN CENTERS INSTEAD OF RETURNING TO THEIR
VILLAGE OF ORIGIN (MARCH 2002)
140
HUMANITARIAN ACCESS
141
GENERAL
141
VOLATILE SECURITY SITUATION HAMPERS ACCESS TO IDPS AND CONSTRAINS RELIEF AND
DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES (JUNE 2003)
141
DISTRIBUTION OF AID BY THE MILITARY MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO ASSERT THAT HUMANITARIAN
AID IS NON-POLITICAL AND IMPART IAL (JANUARY 2003)
143
5
INTERNATIONAL HUMANIT ARIAN NGO S IN THE NORTH FACE VIOLENT ATTACKS (AUGUST 2002)
146
UN AND INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES ABLE TO ACCESS 80-85 PERCENT OF THE COUNTRY (MAY
2002)
148
FACTIONAL FIGHTING AND HEAVY SNOWFALLS LIMIT HUMANITARIAN ACCESS (MARCH 2002) 149
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES
151
NATIONAL RESPONSE
151
GOVERNMENT COOPERATES WITH DONORS AND THE UN THROUGH THE CONSULTATIVE GROUP
ON RETURNEE AND IDP P ROGRAMME (APRIL 2003)
151
HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS ADVISORY GROUP (APRIL 2003)
152
NEW GOVERNMENT ENTITY ESTABLISHED TO EXTEND ITS ENFORCEMENT CAPACITY (APRIL 2003)
153
RETURN COMMISSION FOR T HE NORTH SET UP TO FACILITATE THE RETURN OF REFUGEES AND
IDPS TO THE NORTHERN PROVINCES (MARCH 2003)
154
RURAL POPULATION IS THE MAIN ACTOR IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SHELTER (APRIL 2003) 155
INSTITUTIONAL AND P OLICY FRAMEWORK OF THE GOVERNEMENT'S RETURN AND
REINTEGRATION STRATEGY (MARCH 2003)
156
GOVERNMENT TO USE THE GPID AS A PRINCIPLE TO GUIDE ITS ACTIONS TOWARDS IDPS (MARCH
2003)
158
AFGHAN MINISTRY OF REFUGEES AND REPATRIATION WILL LEAD THE NATIONAL RESPONSE TO
IDPS WITH ASSISTANCE FROM UN (JANUARY 2003)
159
AFGHAN ASSISTANCE COORDINATION AUTHORITY (AACA) RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OVERALL
MANAGEMENT OF ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN (JULY 2002)
160
NDF ENVISAGES A DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH TO ENABLE IDPS TO RETURN AND REINTEGRATE (APRIL 2002)
161
INTERNATIONAL RESPONS E
162
INTER-AGENCY MISSION ASSESSES THE IDP SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN (MAY 2003)
162
AREU TO UNDERTAKE RESEARCH ON RETURN & REINTEGRATION CONDIT IONS (MAY 2003) 163
THE OGATA INTIATIVE FOCUSES ASSISTANCE ON KANDAHAR IN THE SOUTH, JALALABAD IN THE
EAST , AND MAZAR-I-SHARIF IN NORTH (MAY 2003)
163
US STATE DEPARTMENT HAS CONTRIBUTED 174 MIO TO REFUGEE AND IDP PROGRAMS SINCE
SEPT. 2001 (MARCH 2003)
164
WORKSHOP HELD IN KABUL TO IDENTIFY BEST STRATEGY TO OVERCOME MALNUTRITION
(FEBRUARY 2002)
165
IOM' S ACTIVITIES ON BEHALF OF IDP S DURING 2002 (MAY 2002)
166
IDP INFORMATION CAMPAIGN IN BAGHLAN PROVINCE AIMS AT INFORMING IDPS OF THEIR
RIGHTS AND OPTIONS (MAY 2002)
168
SENIOR INTER-AGENCY NETWORK ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT VISITS AFGHANISTAN TO
ASSESS IDP SITUATION (APRIL 2001)
168
REFERENCE TO THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT
169
KNOWN REFERENCE TO THE GUIDING P RINCIPLES ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT AS OF JUNE 2003
169
COORDINATION
170
UNHCR IN CHARGE OF COORDINATING THE DELIVERY OF ASSISTANCE TO IDPS AS WELL AS
SUPERVISING THE PROTECTION ACTIVITIES (JULY 2002)
171
IOM HANDS OVER IDP CAMP COORDINATION TO PARTNER AGENCIES BECAUSE OF LACK OF
FUNDING AND AN INCREASING ROLE GIVEN TO PROTECTION (SEPTEMBER 2002)
173
NGO COORDINATION ARRANGEMENTS (APRIL 2002)
174
6
IDP UNIT SUPPORTS UNHCR' S LEAD ROLE IN THE IDP SECTOR (MARCH 2002)
175
TEMPORARY COORDINATION ARRANGEMENTS FOR ASSISTANCE TO IDP S (JANUARY 2002)
176
OVERALL COORDINATION MECHANISMS OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (OCTOBER 2001)
177
REGIONAL COORDINATION MECHANISMS (OCTOBER 2001)
178
SELECTED UN ACTIVITIES
180
UN-HABITAT PROVIDES SHELTER TO THE DISPLACED IN THE SHOMALI REGION AND IN
JALALABAD (JUNE 2003)
180
WFP TO FOCUS ON RECOVERY ACTIVITIES THROUGH FOOD FOR WORK AND FOOD FOR
EDUCATION ACTIVITIES (MARCH 2003)
181
UNICEF PROVIDES BASIC EDUCATION, HEALTH CARE SERVICES AND WATER AND SANITATION
FACILITIES TO IDP S (MARCH 2003)
182
UNDP AND UNHCR TO ENSURE SMOOTH TRANSITION FROM RELIEF TO DEVELOPMENT
(JANUARY 2003)
184
OVERVIEW OF UNHCR' S PLANNED ACTIVITIES FOR 2003 (DECEMBER 2002)
184
REVIEW OF UNHCR'S ASSISTANCE TO IDP S DURING 2002 (SEPTEMBER 2002)
186
UNFPA WORKS ON IMPROVING HEALTH CARE AND EDUCATION OF THE AFGHAN WOMEN
(SEPTEMBER 2002)
187
SELECTED NGO ACTIVITIES
189
SWEDISH COMMITTEE FOR AFGHANISTAN SUPPORTS HEALTH CARE CLINICS (MARCH 2003) 189
ACTED PROVIDES HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO IDPS IN BAGHLAN AND TAKHAR PROVINCE
(JANUARY 2003)
189
LIST OF PARTICIPATING AGENCIES BY SECTOR (OCTOBER 2002)
191
SAVE THE CHILDREN FUND'S ACTIVITIES ON BEHALF OF IDP S (MARCH 2002)
197
UNITED NATIONS RESPONSE TO THE HUMAN ITARIAN CRISIS
198
THE ROLE OF THE UN IN THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD (OCTOBER 2002)
198
ITAP PROJECTS MERGED INTO THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK (JULY 2002)
200
COORDINATION OF UN ASSISTANCE (JANUARY 2002)
203
ASSISTANCE GAPS
204
FINDING DURABLE SOLUTIONS FOR IDPS NOT HIGH ON THE LOCAL AND PROVINCIAL
AUTHORITIES' AGENDA (JUNE 2003)
204
LACK OF OBJECTIVE, ACCURATE AND NEUTRAL INFORMATION ON CONDITIONS IN AREAS OF
RETURN LEAD TO RENEWED DISPLACEM ENT (JUNE 2003)
205
AFGHAN AUTHORITIES NEGLECTING SOUTHERN IDPS, INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES NEED TO
ADDRESS THEIR LONG-TERM NEEDS (APRIL 2003)
205
UN'S STRATEGY NOT EFFECTIVE IN ADDRESSING THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION (DECEMBER
2002)
206
DATA COLLECTED ON IDPS LACKS UNIFORMITY AND QUALITY (JULY 2002)
208
FOOD INSECURITY PERSISTS AS A RESULT OF THE GAP BETWEEN HUMANITARIAN ASPIRATIONS
AND RELIEF REALITIES (MAY 2002)
209
RELIEF OPERATIONS TOO OFTEN LIMITED TO URBAN AREAS AND NEAR ROADS NETWORKS (MAY
2002)
211
NGO S COMPLAIN ON THE LACK OF CLARITY OF THE COORDINATION STRUCTURE (APRIL 2002) 211
CLOSE LINKS BETWEEN UNAMA AND THE AFGHAN INTERIM AUTHORITY MAY REDUCE THE
HUMANITARIAN SPACE (APRIL 2002)
212
IOM CRITICIZED FOR ITS M ISMANAGEMENT OF THE IDP SITUATION IN HERAT (APRIL 2002) 213
NEED FOR A COMMON STRATEGY ON PROVIDING ASSISTANCE AND PROTECTION TO IDPS(MARCH
2002)
214
LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT PLANS SHOULD BE DRAWN BEFORE RETURN TAKES PLACE
(FEBRUARY 2002)
215
RECOMMENDATIONS
216
7
INTER-AGENCY MISSION RECOMMENDS THAT UNDP TAKE THE LEAD IN FINDING DURABLE
SOLUTIONS FOR THE NON-PROTECTION RESIDUAL IDP S (JUNE 2003)
216
INTER-AGENCY MISSION RECOMMENDS ESTABLISHMENT OF A SMALL TASK FORCE TO ASSIST THE
GOV. DEVELOP A POLICY AND OPERATIONAL STRATEGY FOR DURABLE SOLUTIONS FOR ALL IDPS
(JUNE 2003)
217
NEED TO BETTER INTEGRATE EXISTING INFORMATION ON IDP S (JUNE 2003)
218
GOVERNMENT AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SH OULD ADDRESS THE LONG-TERM NEEDS OF
THE DISPLACED (JUNE 2003)
219
CONDITIONS IN AREAS OF RETURN SHOULD BE BETTER MONITORED AND IDPS SHOULD BE
BETTER INFORMED (JUNE 2003)
220
UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND UNAMA SHOULD CLARIFY THEIR STRATEGIES ON HUMAN RIGHTS
AND AID CONDITIONALITIES (AUGUST 2002)
221
IDPS UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO RETURN HAVE SPECIFIC PROTECTION NEEDS (JULY 2002)
222
GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE ON BEHALF OF IDPS NEED TO BE STRENGTHENED (JULY 2002)
223
OCHA'S IDP UNIT VISITS AFGHANISTAN TO ASSESS THE THE IDP SITUATION :
RECOMMENDATIONS (MARCH 2002)
224
HRW CALLS FOR A INDEPENDENT MONITORING OF HUMAN RIGHTS PRIOR TO THE RETURN
PROCESS (JANUARY 2002)
227
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
229
LIST OF SOURCES USED
232
8
PROFILE SUMMARY
Insecurity and lack of assistance are major constraints to IDP return
Insecurity and lack of assistance are major constraints to IDP return. Continued instability, poor economic
progress and harsh living conditions have meant the huge wave of IDPs returning home in 2002 has not
been sustained in the first half of this year. And although officially the number of IDPs in the country has
more than halved in the last six months, there has been a significant level of repeated displacement for
those attempting to return to their homes. Some 400,000 IDPs returned home in 2002, the majority without
any assistance. So far this year, close to 25,000 IDPs have returned with the help of UN agencies and
NGOs, mainly from the west and to the north. Upon return many refugees and IDPs found that their homes
were either destroyed or occupied by others. The lack of jobs and the general instability in both rural and
urban areas means that for many conditions do not satisfy requirements of return in safety and dignity. As
a consequence, many have been forced into renewed displacement. Some have been luckier to return to
their home areas and have managed to secure some level of sustainable livelihood. UNHCR estimates the
current number of IDPs to be around 221,000, most of them nomadic Kuchis and ethnic Pashtuns displaced
in the south and west who are unable to return. However, the inability of many returnees to sustain their
return in their area of origin and the renewed displacement of both refugees and IDPs in urban and rural
areas, may indicate the number of people falling under the definition of an IDP could be much higher than
the official figure of 221,000, and closer to 600,000.
Insecurity hampers humanitarian assistance and causes further displacement
Persistent insecurity throughout the country, the weakness or inexistence of a criminal justice system and
the absence of any national entity capable of enforcing the rule of law have been major causes of concern
for the Afghan people and for the aid agencies since the fall of the Taliban at the end of 2001. In recent
months, aid workers have found themselves increasingly the target of attacks by unidentified armed groups,
mainly in the south where the brunt of the displaced are located and where most aid is urgently needed. UN
and NGO staff pulled out and programs were suspended following the murder of an ICRC staff member in
spring 2003 (BAAG April 2003, p.4). Large areas of the southeast are off-limits and the impossibility of
gaining access to these areas for assessment and monitoring activities constrain planning and project
development. In addition, it reduces the extent of assistance and protection provided to the displaced.
The absence of any national or international force capable of enforcing the rule of law outside of Kabul is
and will remain a major impediment for the return of the remaining IDPs, the protection of human rights,
agency activities and humanitarian access. The U.S. “warlord strategy”, effective in winning the war
against the Taliban, has been a failure to date in providing a secure environment outside of the capital
(HRW 5 December 2002). As NATO prepares to take over peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan,
instability and insecurity in many parts of the country has prompted as many as 80 humanitarian, human
rights and conflict prevention agencies to make a joint statement in June, calling for the expansion of the
security forces throughout the country (IRIN 18 June 2003).
The U.S. has been deploying Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) teams in the major cities of the
country since the beginning of 2003 and will soon establish a presence in the north, near Mazar-i-Sharif
(UNAMA 19 June 2003). These PRTs consist of small numbers of combat troops, civil affairs soldiers and
civilian US government officials and are designed to “strengthen the presence of the central government,
improve security, and facilitate the delivery of reconstruction assistance” (USAID 13 March 2003, p. 1).
CARE International has expressed its concern that the PRT strategy was not a substitute for efficient
security measures and that the involvement of military forces into the reconstruction process was putting
9
the aid workers at risk by blurring the line between NGOs and military personnel (OCHA 14 January
2003).
Factional fighting in the north between rival warlords and human rights violations by local commanders
against ethnic Pashtuns, starting after the fall of the Taliban at the end of 2001, has continued during 2002
and 2003, causing many to flee to the south. The ethnic Pashtuns are targeted for their real or perceived
association with the former Taliban, or more often for the control of scarce resources. UNHCR estimates
that some 60,000 Pashtuns have fled the north since 2001 (IRIN 18 June 2003).
“Active” IDP caseload vs. “Passive” IDP caseload ?
According to UN statistics the number of IDPs officially on their books more than halved in the first six
months of this year. At the end of December 2002, the number of people displaced inside Afghanistan was
estimated by UNHCR to stand at 724,000, with the following breakdown : 413,000 in the south, 51,000 in
the north, 124,000 in the center, 70,000 in the east and 66,000 in the west (UNHCR 3 January 2003). Five
months later, the UN refugee agency, while stating that only some 25,000 IDPs had been assisted to return
during 2003, estimated that their “active” IDP caseload included 300,000 persons who remain displaced
throughout the country (Inter-Agency Mission, 19 June 2003, p. 1). In early July, after re-registation and
profiling exercices, the figure was even reduced to 221,000. 43,000 in the north, 115,000 in the south,
5,000 in the east, 38,000 in the west and 16,000 in the central region (UNHCR 1 July 2003). The main
areas of concentration of IDPs are in Zhare Dasht, Panjwai and other settlements in the south, Maslakh and
Shaidayee camps in the west, and a number of smaller camps in the north (TISA March 2003, p. 3).
While it appears rather surprising that over 400,000 IDPs disappeared in the last 6 months, the new figure is
explained by the UN by the fact that previous figures were largely inflated and did not quite reflect the
reality. Also, UNHCR's "active" IDP caseload now focuses on protection cases and destitute victims of
drought/conflict in IDP camps and settlements and excludes those who have returned or live in conditions
similar to the general population. The report of the Inter-Agency Mission, which took place at the end of
May 2003, sheds some light on the issue by stating that “Those who have returned or locally integrated are
considered to have attained at least minimal level of self-sufficiency” (Inter-Agency Mission, 19 June 2003,
p. 2)1 . It is clear that the UN and the Government work on the very optimistic assumption that once
returned, all IDPs reintegrate easily, and the problem is solved.
This clearly runs contrary to evidence and information gathered by Amnesty International in their latest
report “Out of sight, out of minds: The fate of the Afghan returnees” where AI emphasizes the importance
of and raises concern about the sustainability of the return, both of refugees and IDPs, which is hindered by
persistent instability, land disputes and insufficient aid and reconstruction assistance resulting in poor selfsufficiency prospects. Many refugees and IDPs claim that they were not given enough accurate information
before returning. Those who could afford to travel have sometimes turned around and left the country once
again, while many have ended up in situation of internal displacement. Given the current situation of
Afghanistan, the exact number and IDPs and the scope of the renewed displacement is difficult to ascertain
with any accuracy, but the figure cited by AI –600,000 IDPs- is likely to better reflect the reality of the
situation than the UNHCR figure of 300,000 (AI 23 June 2003).
Nomadic Kuchis and ethnic Pashtuns need alternative solutions to return
The nomadic pastoralist Kuchi currently constitute the single largest IDP group in Afghanistan. They
represent some eighty percent of the total “active” IDP caseload as defined by UNHCR. Most of them were
displaced from and are located in the southern Pashtun area of Kandahar and Helmand province, while
some were displaced from the north and northwest and are in the western camps of Herat (Inter-Agency
Mission, 19 June 2003, p. 2) The first group was displaced by drought and the loss of their livestock while
10
the second fled harassment and human rights violations. Both are facing major problems in returning.
Drought is still continuing in the south and security conditions in the north are still not conducive for
return. So far assistance has been limited to immediate care and maintenance and local authorities have
shown little interest in finding more durable solutions for them, preferring them to return home (UNAMA 7
April 2003).
Ethnic Pashtuns displaced from the north by human rights violations, harassment and forced recruitment
constitute the second main group of displaced. They fled to the west and south where they are
accommodated in IDP camps. UNHCR estimates that some 60,000 Pashtuns have fled the north since
December 2001. Many have returned since, mainly to the northeast, while few have returned to the
northwest where continued instability is not providing enough security guarantees to the displaced Pashtuns
(IRIN 18 June 2003). A Return Commission for the North2 which was set up to look into the human rights
abuses and to promote returns, has completed some initial assessments and identified abuses by local
commanders. But efforts are still needed to redress these problems and persuade the Pashtun IDPs that
conditions are conducive for return (IRIN 5 March 2003).
In camps and soon deprived of assistance
Most of the remaining and easily identifiable IDPs are accommodated in camps, the majority in the south,
Zhare Dasht and Panjwai camps, and in the west around Herat, Maslakh and Shaidayee camps. Shaidayee
camp hosts some 16,000 IDPs while Maslakh camp has close to 30,000 persons (AlertNet 28 May 2003).
In 2002, HRW documented widespread abuses against IDPs in camps in the north, including forcible
relocations, compulsory performance of military support functions, and sexual violence (HRW June 2002,
pp. 4-6). While the protection aspects for IDPs in camps seem to have improved since 2002, IDPs in camps
are now faced with other threats to their survival.
The national authorities and the international community, mainly UNHCR and WFP, in charge of assisting
the IDPs in camp s are now slowly phasing out the assistance and have in some camps already stopped the
distribution of food. In both IDP camps near Herat, Shaidayee and Maslakh, WFP has stopped its food
distribution since April 2003. As a first step, IDPs in Shaidayee camp, which is to be closed in a few
months, are being evacuated to Maslakh camp, which will eventually also be closed to force people to
return home (AI 23 June 2003, p. 15). MSF has expressed concern that the relocation from Shaidayee to
Maslakh camp, which is located further away from Herat, would disrupt the already limited livelihood and
employment activities developed by the displaced. The relocation is also likely to affect the mental wellbeing of IDPs by adding new stress. MSF reported a shift among IDPs in camps near Herat from posttraumatic stress to more chronic mental stress issues (AlertNet 28 May 2003).
While this exit strategy may be justifiable to avoid creating long-term dependency for those who are able to
return home and engage in self-reliant activities, there is a risk that the most vulnerable, female-headed
households, unaccompanied children, elderly and the disabled will go hungry and left on their own.
Amnesty International further reported that the lack of employment opportunities is forcing IDP families to
rely on their children for their daily survival. Other coping mechanisms of IDPs in camps include selling
the daughters into marriage at a very young age or even selling their child to survive a bit longer (AI 23
June 2003, p. 15-23).
In the south, the Government in close cooperation with UNHCR and on the request of the Pakistan
authorities, has in August 2002 established a new camp, Zahre Dasht west of Kandahar, in an effort to
empty the Chaman camp on the border, also known as the “waiting area” because of the security threats
posed by the presence of so many people near the Pakistani border. The close to 20,000 residents of
Chaman camp are offered the choice between repatriation to Afghanistan, either to Spin Boldak camp of
Zahre Dasht, or seeking refuge across the border (UNHCR 20 May 2003). Many are reluctant to move to
11
the new camp where employment opportunities and water supplies are scarce. In Spin Boldak, MSF and
UNICEF are offering assistance, but health problems are reportedly increasing and schools have closed
down, leaving the children with no education (IRIN 19 February 2003).
Returned but still displaced
Since the take over of the country by the U.S. led coalition and the demise of the Taliban in late 2001, close
to 2 million refugees and over 400,000 IDPs have returned home at a pace that took everyone by surprise
(OCHA 3 June 2003). In a country devastated by 20 years of civil war and a massive bombing campaign in
autumn 2001, the return of such a high number of people placed an enormous strain on overburdened
infrastructures and scarce resources. The slow recovery of an economy, highly dependent on farming and
livestock raising and affected by years of drought, and the generalized instability in up to two-thirds of the
country is posing a major challenge to the sustainability of returns. Although food security improved during
2002, compared to 2001, especially in the northwest, life-saving food aid is still needed in the south where
the drought has continued and is limiting labour opportunities (RNIS 41 April 2003, p. 41).
According to the head of UNHCR in Mazar-i-Sharif, many people returning have found that their homes
were occupied by others. In order to establish a home in rural areas, people need to get permission from the
village council or a guarantee to prove ownership of the land and only people originating from the area will
get the permission. This means that returnees, refugees or IDPs, cannot freely resettle in areas other than
their areas of origin (DIS March 2003, p. 42).
Landlessness and the loss of land and housing during the absence is often a major obstacle to the
sustainability of returns and a cause of renewed displacement. To benefit from the assistance of shelter
projects, the returnee must either possess a title to land or get his community to vouch for him. In 2002,
UNHCR stated that close to 75% of the returnees did not have farmland to which they could return (AI 23
June 2003, p. 26).
Land disputes are rife in Afghanistan today. The absence of any judicial system to settle land disputes
means that the most vulnerable, in particular unaccompanied women and those without networks in the
community are often left powerless. Social networks are crucial to get protection but also to access land.
In some cases IDPs have been forced into renewed displacement because they could not reach their homes
areas because of insecurity on the roads or the physical state of the roads. For those who make it to their
home areas, they also may face illegal taxation by local commanders depriving the IDPs of their return
package, making their return a little less sustainable. The presence of some 5 to 10 million landmines is
another obstacle to return. In rural areas, some 200 people are reportedly killed every month by the
explosion of landmines (AI 23 June 2003, pp. 22-23).
Absorption capacity of urban areas reaching its limits
Most of those who returned to Afghanistan during 2002 headed for Kabul and the main cities. It can be
assumed that the destination of many IDPs was not very different. The absorption capacity of urban areas,
in particular Kabul is reaching its limits. Between November 2001 and November 2002, the population of
Kabul has reportedly doubled in size (Washington Post 24 November 2002). The issue of property
restitution is also posing a key challenge in urban areas. Some fifty percent of Kabul’s population is living
in informal settlements or has no supporting documentation and rights of tenure (Inter-Agency Mission, 19
June 2003, p. 14).
As in any post-conflict situation, inevitable trends of urban migration are likely to exacerbate the problems
and increase the pressure on the urban infrastructures and the provision of basic services. Donors are
reportedly reluctant to fund assistance activities in urban areas to avoid attracting too many people to the
12
cities. But the reality of urban migration and the absence of economic opportunities in rural areas mean that
people are likely to continue returning to the cities. This will require substantial reconstruction efforts, in
particular shelter, as well as an expansion of the provision of basic services, like water and health care. A
survey conducted last year in Kabul showed that twenty percent of the returnees lived in informal shelters
or abandoned buildings and that at least 140,000 persons were in dire need of shelter and relief assistance
(BAAG 31 August 2002).
Assistance to IDPs
The government of Afghanistan has adopted a National Return, Displacement and Reintegration Strategy
for the year 1382 (2003), based on four core principles to address the IDP issue, (i) respect for the Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement, (ii) support to the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation to enable it to
take progressively more responsibility, (iii) the pursuit of solutions to internal displacement, and (iv)
improved inter-agency coordination and cooperation (TISA March 2003, p. 7). The Ministry of Refugees
and Repatriation (MoRR) has the overall responsibility for the returnee and IDP programme. It chairs the
Consultative Group on Refugees and IDPs with support from UNHCR as Secretariat. The main attributions
of the CG are to support the MoRR in co-ordinating and facilitating the work related to the return and
initial re-integration of Returnees and IDPs (AACA April 2003). Other ministries involved include the
Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) and the Ministry of Urban Development and
Housing (MUDH), who assume responsibility for the reintegration of IDPs within their respective
geographic and programme areas (TISA March 2003, p. 4).
The UN Inter-Agency mission that visited Afghanistan during May and June 2003 pointed out that the
central government was to be commended for making important efforts to assist the IDPs. The local
authorities, on the other hand, were often described as reluctant to engage in discussions that would involve
long-term thinking about alternate solutions to return. This was especially true when the option to return
was not possible in the foreseeable future as is the case for most of the displaced Kuchis and the ethnic
Pashtuns (Inter-Agency Mission 19 June 2003, p. 5). Given the lack of capacity and will of the Afghan
authorities to place the interest of these IDPs before their political or economic interest, the international
community has a responsibility to make sure that this gap is properly addressed (UNAMA 7 April 2003).
UNHCR, the UN agency which has been in charge of coordinating the return and reintegration of refugees
and IDPs for the past 16 months, estimated at the beginning of the year that some 300,000 IDPs would
return during 2003. However, so far only 25,000 IDPs have returned in the first five months of 2003 and it
is difficult to envisage that as many as 275,000 IDPs would return in the second half of the year. Upon
returning home, IDPs are entitled to the same assistance package as refugees. It includes food, non-food
items and transport 3 . Other UN agencies involved in assisting the IDPs in Afghanistan include among
others WFP, UNICEF, UN-HABITAT, UNDP and UNFPA. Many of their programs are implemented
through international and local NGOs.
Updated 1 July 2003
1)While noting that other various estimates on the number of IDPs exists and that the question of when displacement
ends is an “highly complex”issue that clearly needs to be addressed in order to determine the real number of IDPs, the
recent Inter-Agency mission which visited the country in May-June 2003 opted for the UNHCR figure.
2) The Return Commission is coordinated by the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation and includes representatives
from the civilian authorities in the North, representatives of the different factions, a representative of the Afghan
Human Rights Commission and representatives of UNHCR and UNAMA.
13
3)The quantity of food varies depending on family size. 150 kg average per family of 5 persons (3 months ration). Nonfood items include 2 m² of hygienic cloth, 2 plastic sheets, and 1 kg of soap per family of 3- 4 persons. Transport is
provided for IDPs groups.
14
CAUSES AND BACKGROUND OF DISPLACEMENT
General
General characteristics of land and people
•
Afghanistan has a long history of internal strife due its geographical and ethnic fragmentation
"[F]or decades, Islamic movements, communists and tribal warriors have struggled for control of a nation
that is geographically and ethnically fragmented. Afghanistan is still largely a tribal society, divided into
many tribes, clans and smaller groups. Considerable variation in the types of terrain, and obstacles imposed
by high mountains and deserts, account for the country's marked ethnic and cultural differences. Muslims
comprise 99 per cent of the population of Afghanistan, approximately 80 per cent of them Sunni and the
remainder Shi’a followers. The Shi’a minority is concentrated in central and western Afghanistan.
The Pashtuns (also called Pathans) are the largest single ethnic group constituting some 40% of the
population of Afghanistan. They are predominantly Sunni Muslims and live mainly in the center, south and
east of the country. The British-drawn Duran Line of 1893 demarcated the border of modern-day Pakistan
and Afghanistan with little or no thought to the Pashtun people who lived on either side.
The Tajiks are the second largest group, whose language is Persian. Most of them are Sunni Muslims, but
Shi’a Muslim Tajiks are also found in the West of the country (around and in the city of Herat), and in
Kabul.
The Hazaras are of Eastern Turkic origin and followers of the Shi’a Muslim confession using Farsi as their
lingua franca.
The Uzbeks and Turkomans are followers of the Sunni Muslim tradition and are ethnically and
linguistically Turkic.
Other Afghan Turkic groups include the Kypchak, Kazakh, Aimaq, Wakhi and Kirghiz. The Nuristanis live
in the middle of the Hindu Kush mountain range in four valleys, with each valley having its own district
language/dialect - Kati, Waigali, Ashkun and Parsun. The Baluchis and Brahuis practise Sunni Islam and
their languages are Brahui and Baluchi." (FAS September 1998)
Socio-economic profile of Afghanistan (October 2001)
•
Afghanistan ranks among the most destitute countries in the world in terms of human development
•
Economic decline has exacerbated the level of poverty and economic hardship throughout the country
"With an average life expectancy of about 40 years, a staggering mortality rate of 25.7 percent for children
under five years old, and an illiteracy rate of 64 percent, Afghanistan ranks among the most destitute, warweary countries in the world in terms of human development.
Seventy percent of the Afghan population are estimated to be under-nourished, and only 13 percent have
access to improved water sources.
15
"In most aspects, Afghanistan is worse off than almost any country in the world. The country's social and
economic indicators are comparable, or lower than the indicators for sub-Saharan Africa," said Sakiko
Fukuda-Parr, Director of the Human Development Report Office at the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP).
Among 187 countries, only seven have lower life expectancy than Afghanistan, including Sierra Leone and
Zambia - countries ravaged by HIV/AIDS or armed conflict. One of every four children born alive in
Afghanistan will not survive until their fifth birthday.
Only three of the 191 countries surveyed have higher levels of mortality for children under five years:
Angola, Niger and Sierra Leone.
Nearly two-thirds of Afghani adults are illiterate, almost 15 percent higher than the average level for least
developed countries. Only five countries of 171 surveyed have lower literacy rates than Afghanistan - all
are in sub-Saharan Africa.
With less than one-third of children enrolled in schools in 1999, Afghanistan lags catastrophically behind
other countries and regions. Only 14 of 172 countries surveyed have lower school enrolment than
Afghanistan, which is the only country in the world that bars girls from attending school.
Due to a lack of available estimate of income per capita, Afghanistan has not appeared in UNDP's Human
Development Index since 1996. It then ranked as number 169 of a total of 174 countries. The HDI is an
annual index produced by UNDP's Human Development Report Office, and is based on indicators for
health, education and income." (UNDP 8 October 2001)
"Despite efforts on a number of fronts, political resolution of the conflict remains elusive. Under these
circumstances the ailing Afghan economy continues to deteriorate and foster poverty and unemployment.
There are few formal-sector employment possibilities, no major rehabilitation or development projects and
no major private sector investment to support income. Transit trade with neighbouring countries remains a
key sector of the "legitimate" economy. Cross-border trade through Iran and Turkmenistan has expanded as
Afghanistan adjusted to the suspension of flights and border restrictions with Pakistan. Trade in narcotics
and, presumably, arms constitute the mainstay of the "criminalised" economy.
The recent Taliban reorganisation of the public sector has worsened urban poverty. Several central
ministries have downsized - the Ministry of Higher Education by 6,000 employees and the Ministry of
Education by 12,000. Female teachers who were no longer allowed to work but were still on the payroll
have now lost their incomes. While the redundancies have been implemented, the announced pay increases
have not materialised, and the precarious state of public finances has meant that politically weak ministries
are in arrears in salary payments.
After relative stability in exchange rates in 1999, the Afghani depreciated more rapidly in 2000. The
economy remains open and prices rapidly adjust to exchange rate movements. However, public sector
workers with salaries fixed in Afghanis, and rural workers with employment contracts that include a fixed
cash element, are highly vulnerable to this instability.
The regional drought has emerged as the dominating factor affecting the socio-economic situation in the
medium term. It comes at a time when much of the population is already highly vulnerable. Some,
particularly in the Central Highlands, have had to sell their assets or go into debt to cope with reduced crop
production in 1999 and 2000. Moreover, in the centre and north of the country people have faced conflict
and displacement that compound the drought and related problems. Lack of assets and the high level of
dependence on agriculture and livestock raising mean that many families have nothing to fall back on. The
migration of people from drought-affected areas to urban areas, particularly to Herat, is resulting in fewer
and fewer job opportunities." (OCHA 17 November 2000)
16
"The ongoing conflict continues to affect all aspects of civilian and economic life in many parts of
Afghanistan. Significant economic resources are diverted for the continuation of the war at the expense of
civilians. Military employment offers an opportunity of economic survival to many young men and their
families. At the same time, the absence of effective and legitimate institutions of governance allows the
development of large-scale criminalised economic activities, linked in particular to narcotics production
and marketing.
The nation’s transportation and communication systems, heavy and small-scale industries, education, and
agricultural infrastructure are the most seriously damaged sectors. This economic decline has exacerbated
the level of poverty and economic hardship throughout the country. Largely dependent on subsistence
agriculture, the country has witnessed diminishing income levels , declining food security, and reduced
access to essential services. In addition, a wide range of disparities exists between different regions and
within each region.
The value of the Afghan currency continued to fall, having severe repercussions on individual purchasing
power. Those unfortunate enough to be on fixed salaries and those households lacking male labour power
are particularly affected. In addition, due to the 16 percent reduction in the cereal harvest for 1999 the
overall food security situation in Afghanistan is expected to deteriorate." (UNOCHA, UNRCO November
1999, pp. 16-17)
Drought and economic disruption in the northeast (December 2000)
"Drought
As throughout the country, the drought had widespread though varied effects. As the north-east is food
deficit and, on a regional level, dependent on external imports, on a sub-regional level dependent on
internal redistribution of surpluses (eg. Faizabad on Rustaq and Taloqan), and on a local level generally
dependent on neighbouring areas or small scale imports, any reduction in production inevitably has farreaching ramifications. Rainfed cereal crops, which traditionally provide the majority of the region’s
cereals, were almost totally lost throughout the area. In many areas harvests of autumn wheat produced zero
yields (ie. harvesting the same as was sown) or sub-zero yields (ie. harvesting less than was sown). In some
areas (eg. parts of northern Takhar) farmers did not attempt to harvest perhaps a third of the cultivated area
(a widespread pattern developed of animals being grazed on failed wheat). Spring wheat was a total failure.
Whilst respectable yields were obtained from some irrigated areas, many areas experienced reductions in
yields of up to two-thirds. Both lowland areas irrigated by main canals, specifically those at the end of
water courses, and small upland irrigated areas were similarly affected with many areas having only
received a fraction of the required water.
The livestock sector was also badly affected. Pasture at low and moderate elevations was totally burnt and,
contrary to initial expectations, high altitude pasture was also affected with only 50-60% of the previous
year’s growth. The seasonal nomads or kuchis, which traditionally move from the four north-eastern
provinces to the Shiwa “ailoqs” or pastures in NE Badakhshan, moved around one month earlier and with
much larger numbers of animals than normal (70-80% more than usual) ie. animals entrusted to them by
non-kuchis who did not normally send animals to summer pastures but whose lowland pasture had dried
out. With reduced growth and increased numbers of animals the carrying capacity of the pastures was
quickly exceeded. Kuchis consequently returned to lowland areas, themselves pasture deficient, earlier in
the autumn than was normal (many of their areas of origin were also badly affected by the autumn conflict).
See the latest WFP map showing drought-affected areas in Afghanistan, 5 October 2001 [66kb, jpg]
Economic disruption
17
The regional economy witnessed considerable contraction during the period as a result of a number of
factors. Internal production was obviously reduced as a result of the drought, whilst both external import as
well as internal trade were severely reduced as a result of the conflict. Additionally, local and extra-local
employment opportunities were severely reduced as a result of both the conflict and the drought.
The region depends primarily on two import routes – from Mazar through Taloqan, and from Tajikistan
through Ai Khanoum in Takhar (the Ishkashim crossing is insignificant). Both have been badly affected by
the conflict. Transportation of food, medicine, fuel, etc. from Taloqan is now blocked, whilst the import of
foodstuffs and fuel from Tajikistan was interrupted due to autumn conflict with a resultant increase in basic
prices (diesel tripled in price in one month).
Of major concern was the serious reduction in the casual labour market, at district, provincial and regional
level, throughout the region, starting at the harvest season which should have been the busiest time of year.
Casual labour, both agricultural and non-agricultural, has traditionally compensated for production
shortfalls amongst agricultural communities, and has traditionally sustained many chronically food deficit
areas (eg Darwaz). Its absence deprived the region of its principal economic safety net. Additionally, the
lack of a dynamic urban economy anywhere in the region, its under-developed external trade links, and its
physical isolation (movement out of the region is quite restricted) further compounded its vulnerability and
further limited its capacity to cope with the impact of the drought and the war." (UNOCHA December
2000)
The Civil War
A history of conflict
"Although its history is marked by international wars and internal conflict, Afghanistan was a united and
relatively peaceful country until 1973. Governed by a constitutional monarchy, post-World War II
Afghanistan, while among the world’s poorest nations, was the site of large projects funded by the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID), Soviet foreign aid assistance, and other
development projects that seemed to be propelling the country slowly forward. By the early 1970s, a small
middle class of largely Western-educated intellectuals and professionals emerged to assume leadership
positions and push for social and political change. The influence of this segment of Afghan society was,
however, confined primarily to the capital, Kabul.
This period ended in 1973 when Mohammed Daoud Khan, a cousin of Afghan ruler Zaher Shah, overthrew
the monarchy and created a national republic. The rise of Daoud Khan’s government in 1973 marked the
end of the post-War era of stability and the beginning of almost three decades of violence.
The Republic survived only five years. In 1978, a small group of Marxists seized power, but its ideology
was not well received in Afghanistan, particularly among tribal leaders and the Islamic clergy. Armed
resistance erupted in many rural areas as local traditional leaders rejected the Marxist call for such changes
as land reform and the emancipation of women.
By 1979, much of Afghanistan was in open revolt and the collapse of the Marxist government appeared
imminent. But in late December 1979, the Soviet army entered Afghanistan to support the government.
Afghanistan exploded in revolt. What had been a civil war became a war against foreign occupation. From
1980 to 1989, Afghanistan was plunged into a full-scale resistance war against some 100,000 Soviet troops.
The resistance was led by various fundamentalist Islamic organisations based in Pakistan and generously
financed by Islamic nations and the West, including the United States.
During this period, over five million Afghans fled to Pakistan or Iran, creating the largest refugee
population in the world at that time. These refugees included pastoral nomads, peasant farmers and much of
18
the new middle class. Over one million men were killed in the fighting, creating a large population of
widows and female-headed households.
When the Marxist government fell in 1992, the Islamic resistance groups swept triumphantly into Kabul
and other major cities. They attempted to create a national government in Kabul based on a loose and
unworkable pact among the resistance parties. Afghanistan was ruled for one year by a compromise
president, Sheikh Mujadidi, a progressive but ineffectual resistance leader. In 1993, Professor Burhanuddin
Rabbani was selected to lead the country in what was supposed to be a revolving presidency among the
various militia commanders. The presidency, however, never revolved; Professor Rabbani, a Tajik, ruled
until the Taliban threw him out in 1996. President Rabbani’s control of Afghanistan was tenuous and at
times did not even include all of the capital itself, let alone the rest of the country.
Outside of Kabul, militia warlords carved much of Afghanistan into private fiefdoms based largely on
traditional ethnic and tribal divisions. The militias that had fought together against the Soviet army now
turned on each other. Pushtun commanders threatened Kabul from the south; Hazara resistance groups held
parts of Kabul itself, including the area around the university; and Kabul was bombed more than once by
Uzbek groups in the north. The country was again mired in sectarian conflict.
Refugees began returning to Afghanistan from Pakistan and Iran in 1992. Both asylum countries exerted
strong pressure on the refugees to return since, as far as they were concerned, the war that had created the
refugees was over. In addition, a change in government in Pakistan led to increased pressure on Islamabad
to end the ‘refugee problem’ in Pakistan. Pakistan closed camps, offered incentives to the Afghan refugees
to return to Afghanistan, and tried several times to close the border to Afghans seeking entry into Pakistan.
But since fighting erupted again, repatriation was largely unsuccessful; many of those who tried to return
were forced to leave again as the fighting intensified.
By the mid-1990s, a large internally displaced population had developed. Relief agencies opened several
camps for the displaced in the Jalalabad area. Other camps were opened in the area around Mazar-i-Sharif
in the north and in Herat in the west, near the Iranian border. These camps housed over 400,000 displaced
persons.
Out of this political chaos, a new ultraconservative Islamic movement began to assert control. Called the
Taliban, meaning religious students, a group of madrasa (Islamic school) teachers and their students seized
the southern city of Kandahar and the surrounding provinces in October 1994 (Rubin, 1999). The Taliban
appeared to offer Afghanistan a new Islamic movement, free of the corruption and infighting found in the
so-called Islamic government at that time. But their un-stated goal was to return Afghanistan to Pushtun
rule: most of the Taliban leaders are Pushtun and their movement received much of its support from
Pushtun leaders in the Pakistani government.
In the beginning, most non-Pushtun areas of the country resisted the Taliban movement; but by 1998, the
Taliban had gained control of most of Afghanistan, including Kabul, and seized control of the government.
In the Taliban’s push to power, thousands of combatants and civilians were killed. Only small areas in the
north and the central mountains remained outside of Taliban control in late 2000." (Farr, G. 1 September
2001 pp. 120-123)
Overview of main displacements (1992-2000)
Number of Displaced by Year, Reason for Displacement, Place and Origin
Period of Displace-ment
1992-1993
Reason
for Number of
Displacement
Displaced
Fear of reprisal from 400,000
DisplacePlace of Origin
ment site
Mazar-i-Sharif and Kabul
19
1992-1993
1995
1997
1998
Summer 1999
Fall 1999
Fall 1999
Fall 1999
Winter 2000
Summer 2000
Summer 2000
Islamic militias
Combat
200,000
Flight
from
the 180,000
Taliban
Fighting
in
the 600,000
provinces near Kabul
and in the north.
Fighting in and around 50,000
Mazar-i-Sharif
Fighting north of
Kabul in the Shomali
Plain
Fighting
in
the
Shomali Plain
Fighting
in
the
Panjshir Valley
Fighting
around
Talaqan in Takhar
Province (a Tajik
stronghold)
Fighting
in
the
Hazarajat
Fighting in Panjshir
Valley and Shomali
Plain
Fighting
around
Talaqan in Takhar
Province
100,000
12,995
100,000
16,000
60,000
50,000
15,000
Jalalabad
Kabul
surround-ing
provinces
Kabul and northern southern areas
Afghanistan
Kabul and Mazar-i- Areas near Kabul
Sharif
and in the northern
provinces
Mountainous areas Uzbeks
and
in the north
Hazaras living in
Mazar-i-Sharif
Panjshir Valley
Tajiks
from
Shomali Plain
Kabul,
ex-Soviet Tajiks
from
embassy compound Shomali Plain
Northern provinces Tajiks
from
Panjshir Valley
Areas
around Tajiks from the
Faizabad
Talaqan area.
Near Behsud or Puli-Khumri
Kabul and Panjshir
Valley
Badakhsan area
Hazaras and Tajiks
from Bamiyan area
Tajiks from the
Shomali Plain and
the Panjshir Valley
Tajiks
from
Talaqan area.
Sources: United States Committee for Refugees (USCR), June 2000; United Nations Resident Coordinator
Office (UNRCO), March 2000; Bashir/Agence France-Presse (AFP), 7 Aug 2000.
Conflict-induced displacement in 2000
•
Displacement occurred from Nahrin and Burqa (Baghlan province) and from Iskhamish (Takhar
province) to southern Baghlan and southern Takhar following a Taliban assault.
•
More displacement took place around Taloqan with surrounding villagers moving into the town to
escape fighting.
•
Displacement also occurred northward and to Badakshan. Additional displacement include movements
from Takhar and Kunduz to Dashti-i-Qala, Rustaq and Khoja Bahauddin.
•
More people fled to Khoja Bahauddin and Dashti-i-Qala following Taloqan's capature by the Taliban
on 5 September 2000 while some others fled to Kalafgan, Farkhar and Keshem (Badakshan)
•
Following the capture by the Taliban of the town of Sang Charak and the Valley of Gosfandi in Sara-ePol province in January 2000, 20,000 IDPs evacuated the town and have to rely on local food charity
with sub-zero temperatures.
20
"In northern region/Mazar, there are over 100,000 civilians displaced by drought and/or conflict. This
number includes at least 8,900 families (over 53,000 people) displaced by conflict in Kunduz and Baghlan
Provinces. Accurate assessments are proving difficult given shifting front lines, as well as old IDP
caseloads in the area from 1999. Recent assessments in Faryab indicate that coping mechanisms in some
districts are exhausted, and that child mortality is at 5.2 per 10,000." (Office of the UN Co-ordinator for
Afghanistan, 19 January 2001)
"A slow but steady influx of families from Shamali to Kabul has been reported in the past few weeks. This
influx appears to be much higher than usual in autumn, probably the result of the latest shift of military
alliances in Shamali and alarming rumours about new fighting, but also because food is becoming scarcer
in the plains." (IASC, 1 December 2000, 34)
"The first movements of internally displaced persons (IDPs) of the summer occurred in early August after a
Taliban assault on Nahrain and Burqa (Baghlan Province) and Ishkamish (Takhar Province) in late July.
Populations moved primarily into the upland areas of southern Baghlan (e.g. Khost wa Fereng, Andarab)
and southern Takhar, as well as some towards Taloqan.
Displacement continued as the Taliban moved eastwards towards Taloqan, when populations from areas
west (e.g. Bangi) and immediately north of the city (e.g. Baharak) moved either into the city or northwards.
At this stage the first movements of IDPs from Taloqan into Badakhshan (to Keshem and Faizabad)
occurred, though numbers were moderate. A higher level of displacement occurred from Archi (Kunduz
Province) and Khoja Ghar (Takhar Province), eastwards across the Kokcha River to Dasht-i-Qala, Khoja
Bahauddin and Rustaq (Takhar) as conflict spread.
A second large wave north and east from the Taloqan area - into Kalafgan and Farkhar (Takhar) and
Keshem (Badakhshan) and to a lesser degree Faizabad - occurred following the final capture of Taloqan on
5 September following over a month's fighting. Many of the IDPs subsequently mo ved further afield,
including some which looped round into Taliban-controlled Taloqan. After the fall of Tangi Farkhar around
1 October the majority of IDPs moved out of Keshem. Further eastwards, increased displacement occurred
across the Kokcha River as conflict spread within Khoja Ghar (Takhar), emptying the district. Many of
these IDPs, and the host population, subsequently moved within Dasht-i-Qala and into Khoja Bahauddin
districts. With few public buildings, the districts of Khoja Bahauddin and Dasht-i-Qala quickly became
saturated and large numbers of IDPs consequently remained under soft shelter outside." (OCHA, 17
October 2000)
"Taleban forces in Afghanistan have made further gains in their fighting against the opposition forces of
Ahmad Shah Massood. The Taleban took the town of Sang Charak and the valley of Gosfandi in Sara-e Pol
province after several days of fighting, and Mr Massoods' forces also conceded they had lost further ground
elsewhere. Meanwhile, a senior opposition commander, Ustad Mohammad Mohaqiq has appealed to the
international community to send urgently needed aid to people forced to flee their homes in Sang Charak.
He said about twenty-thousand people were homeless, many living out in the open in conditions made
awful by the winter weather." (BBC, 28 January 2000)
Conflict-induced displacement in 2001
•
60,000 people displaced in March by conflict in Yakawlang District, in the Hazarajat area.
•
In the first three months of 2001, displacement has occurred from parts of Ragh and Shar-i-Buzurg to
North Takhar, Kunduz and Pakistan
"There have been repeated denials of humanitarian access to communities in need of assistance, in
particular in Hazarajat. Fighting has resulted in the displacement of upwards of 60,000 people and further
re-cent displacement of most of the population of Yakawlang District." (OCHA 24 May 2001)
21
"Northeastern Afghanistan currently has about 100,000 people displaced by fighting in various locations.
Over the last three months, displacement due to conflict or drought has occurred from parts of Ragh and
Shar-i Buzurg to north Takhar, Kunduz and Pakistan. Those areas where it was possible to continue food
for work (FFW) activities throughout the winter produced relatively small numbers of internally displaced
persons (IDPs)." (OCHA 9 April 2001)
"Over two thousand families from Yakawlang have fled their homes [in March 2001] - due to the unstable
security conditions - to safer places in the central region insofar, reports informed. These displaced families
have sought refuge in Sartarnuk, Bukak, Jarda, Sia-Dara, Yarbalaq, Rustam, Andar, Zardrang, Suleimani,
Ziarat, Sia-Boomak and Bedak areas.
While surveys are ongoing to identify the displaced households, the current figure comes after earlier
reports, estimating the IDP toll up to 1500.
Similarly, scores of other families have poured in Yakawlang from the district’s surrounding villages, while
the conditions of those who stayed behind in Yakawlang has been noted ‘appalling’.
Furthermore, other eleven locations for the displaced families from Yakawlang have been identified inside
the district itself." (Information & Communication Unit of the Hunger Belt Programme 26 March 2001)
Peace efforts during 2001
"1. Contacts with the Afghan warring sides
2. In the last four months, my Personal Representative and Head of the Special Mission to Afghanistan,
Francesc Vendrell, has been in frequent contact with the two warring sides. On the Taliban side, he has
held five meetings in either Kabul or Kandahar, with the Minis ter for Foreign Affairs, Wakil Ahmad
Mutawakkil. In addition, he has held separate discussions with other Taliban authorities, including the
Governor of Kandahar, Mullah Hassan Rahmani, the Minister of Education, Amir Khan Muttaqi, the
Deputy Justice Minis ter, Jalaluddin Shinwari, and Deputy Foreign Ministers Abdul Rahman Zahed and
Mullah Abdul Jalil, as well as provincial dignitaries in Jalalabad and Herat, cities that my Personal
Representative visited in May.
3. On the United Front side, my Personal Representative travelled to Faizabad on 24 May for a meeting
with Burhanuddin Rabbani, President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan (ISA). He has also met in
Dushanbe, on 23 April and 27 July, the ISA Vice-President and Minister of Defence, Ahmad Shah
Massoud, and held talks with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Abdullah, in Brussels on
15 May and in Berlin on 19 July.
4. The extensive discussions with both sides covered a wide range of issues, such as the military situation
on the ground, prospects for a ceasefire and a political settlement, the role of the United Nations in future
negotiations, the status of UNSMA in the areas under their control, human rights-related issues, the
relations of the two warring sides with neighbouring and other countries, the sanctions adopted by the
Security Council, their respective political programmes and their vision of how the Afghan conflict might
be settled, their reaction to proposals for the convening of an extraordinary loya jirga and the role of the
former King and contacts with non-warring Afghan groups abroad. In addition, in his talks with the Taliban
Foreign Minister, Mr. Vendrell has repeatedly raised the continued presence of Osama bin Laden in
Afghanistan and persistent reports of the existence in Taliban-controlled territory of camps where
international terrorists are trained as well as issues related to United Nations activities.
5. No talks, direct or indirect, have taken place between the two sides during the period under review. The
Taliban have persisted in their refusal to carry out the written agreement of 2 November 2000 to start a
22
process of dialogue with the United Front, citing what they consider the United Nations lack of impartiality
in the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 1333 (2000) of 19 December 2000. The Taliban also
refused an invitation by the Government of Japan for the two warring sides to visit Tokyo in May on the
grounds that the United Nations would be represented at that meeting.
2. Contacts with non-belligerent Afghans
6. My Personal Representative has maintained an intensive dialogue with relevant Afghan personalities and
non-belligerent groups outside Afghanistan that support the convening of a special loya jirga and has
repeatedly urged them to coordinate their efforts in pursuit of a peaceful political settlement in Afghanistan.
On 16 May, he met in Rome with the former King, Mohammad Zahir Shah, and with members of the Rome
Process Executive Committee. On 19 May he held talks in London with representatives of the Cyprus
Movement for Implementation of Peace in Afghanistan and has also met representatives of the Council for
Peace and National Unity in Afghanistan (the so called “Bonn Process”), the National Islamic
Front of Afghanistan, as well as other groups and former mujahedin commanders in Peshawar and
elsewhere. Most of those groups consider that only a loya jirga convened by the former King would have
the necessary credibility and support inside Afghanistan.
3. Contacts with concerned Governments
7. In the past few months, my Personal Representative has discussed the situation in Afghanistan with
senior Pakistani government officials, including two meetings with the Director-General of Pakistan’s
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Mahmud Ahmed, and on various occasions with Foreign Secretary Inam
ul-Haque, and Additional Secretaries Aziz Ahmad Khan and Riaz Khan.
8. On 11 April, Mr. Vendrell briefed the Governing Council of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Vienna on developments in Afghanistan and their implications for the
situation in Central Asia.
9. My Personal Representative visited Kazakhstan from 18 to 20 April for discussions with the President of
the Republic of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, and Foreign Minister Erlan Idrissov and Kyrgyzstan on
7 and 8 May for talks with President Askar Akayev and the Presidential Adviser for International Affairs,
Askar Aitmatov. Both Governments expressed their concern about the negative repercussions that the
situation in Afghanistan had for their security and reiterated their willingness to be of assistance in the
discharge of my good offices and to host intra-Afghan talks under United Nations auspices. In Almaty, the
Government of Kazakhstan reiterated its proposal that a special session of the Security Council dedicated to
the question of Afghanistan and Central Asia be held in New York at an appropriate time following
adequate preparation.
10. Between 13 and 18 June, my Personal Representative paid visits to Turkmenistan and the Islamic
Republic of Iran. In Ashgabat, he discussed at length the Afghan issue with President Saparmurat Niazov
and with the then Foreign Minister Batyr Berdiyev. In Tehran, he met Foreign Minister Kamal
Kharrazi, Deputy Foreign Minister Mohsen Aminzadeh and other senior officials.
11. On 1 June, my Personal Representative held talks in Washington, D.C., with the newly appointed
Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, Christina Rocca, as well as with other senior officials in the
State Department and in the National Security Council. A brainstorming session on Afghanistan organized
by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Weston Park provided
an opportunity for further discussions with participants from the “six plus two” group and other interested
Governments, in particular with senior British officials.
12. Mr. Vendrell also discussed the need for a comprehensive approach to the Afghanistan conflict with the
Foreign Ministers of France, Hubert Vedrine, and of Germany, Joschka Fischer. (UNSG 17 August 2001)
For previous peace efforts see:
23
"The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security", 19 April 2001,
20 November 2000, 18 September 2000, 16 June 2000, 10 March 2000.
Military developments during 2001
•
Intensified fighting since May but no significant territorial gains on either side.
"Fighting between the Taliban and the United Front has intensified since the beginning of May, with neither
party yet scoring meaningful territorial gains. The focus remains on Takhar as both warring sides continue
to reinforce the main confrontation lines in that strategic north-eastern province. Fighting has also spread to
other areas of the country with the return of some commanders once ousted by the Taliban.
In early May, fighting broke out in the Farkhar Gorge, east of Taloqan, the provincial capital of Takhar,
with the Taliban forces launching a major offensive on the Chal district and in the Gorge at the beginning
of June. The United Front, for its part, launched an unsuccessful attack in late June from Khwajaghar
towards Taloqan. The fighting subsided during the first two weeks of July, allowing both sides needed time
for regrouping and reinforcement. Fighting resumed south of Taloqan on 19 July but after two days it
declined again. The middle and southern part of the confrontation line has also been very tense during the
period under review.
[…]
The forces under General Dostum, who returned to Afghanistan in April, are based in Sar-e Pul Province.
After launching an unsuccessful attack in Balkh Province, they are now concentrating their military
activities in the northern provinces of Badghis and Faryab, so far without much success. The former
Governor of Herat, Ismail Khan, arrived in the western province of Ghor in the middle of May and has
successfully strengthened his position in that province, cutting off the roads to the provincial capital of
Chaghcharan.
The forces of the Hezb-e Wahdat leader, Karim Khalili, have remained active in the central province of
Bamyan and kept Yakawlang, the second largest city in the province, which has changed hands several
times in recent months, under their control since 11 June. The Taliban have taken up defensive positions
east of Bamyan city." (UNSG 17 August 2001 32-36)
For information on the military developments during 2000, see the previous reports by the Secretary
General:
"The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security", 19 April 2001,
20 November 2000, 18 September 2000, 16 June 2000, 10 March 2000.
Outside interference in Afghanistan by neighbouring states (December 2000)
•
Pakistan provides fighters and logistical support to Taliban. Other "friendly" states include Saudi
Arabia and United Arab Emirates.
•
Russia and Iran provide arms and logistical support to UF via Tajikistan.
•
Inter-governmental agreements on the ban of arm supply to Afghan warring parties not equipped with
efficient enforcement mechanisms
•
Interference by neighbouring states is the main factor driving ongoing conflict and displacement
24
"Human Rights Watch has undertaken extensive research into the support provided to the two major forces
who, as of December 2000, were fighting for control of the country: the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
(IEA), established by the Taliban movement, and the Islamic State of Afghanistan, headed by the National
Islamic United Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (the "United Front"). By late 2000, the IEA
controlled some 90-95 percent of Afghanistan's territory, with resistance continuing in the far northeast and
other pockets throughout the north.
Human Rights Watch research in Afghanistan and adjacent countries has identified the major transit routes
used to move arms and other equipment, the suppliers, the role of state and non-state actors, and the
response of the international community. This memorandum summarizes these findings, setting out basic
information concerning the provision of arms, munitions, training, and military advisory assistance-and the
systemic violation of the laws of wars by all those receiving this assistance. This is presented as the basis
for Human Rights Watch's recommendations to the United Nations and states who have influence in
Afghanistan to stop the arms flow and other military assistance to all parties to the conflict there.
The principal supplier of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is Pakistan. Its official denials
notwithstanding, Pakistan has assisted the Taliban forces by facilitating the recruitment of fighters, offering
military training, and planning pivotal military operations, while allowing arms for the Taliban to transit its
territory. The extent of this support, particularly during the Taliban's offensive in the north in late 2000, was
criticized implicitly by the U.N. Secretary General in a report to the General Assembly in November. In the
report, he expressed his distress that "a significant number of non-Afghan personnel, largely from Pakistani
madrassahs, are…taking active part in the fighting, most, if not all, on the side of the Taliban," and that
"there also appears to be outside involvement in the planning and logistical support of [the Taliban's]
military operations."
Diplomatic observers interviewed by Human Rights Watch in Afghanistan and Pakistan in July and
October 2000 have also reported that Pakistani aircraft assisted with troop rotations for Taliban forces
during combat operations in late 2000, and senior members of its intelligence agency and army were
involved in planning military operations. Private and semi-private agencies in Pakistan, including political
parties, religious institutions and business cartels, have provided enormous support to the Taliban with the
full knowledge of government officials even when their actions violated Pakistani law. Finally, the
Pakistani army has facilitated the recruitment of Pakistani madrasa (religious school) students, including
children, to fight with the Taliban.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have also provided financial support to the Taliban. At least
until 1998, Saudi Arabia provided funds and heavily subsidized fuel to the Taliban through Pakistan.
Through their relationship with traders in the UAE and in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan and the
Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), the Taliban are also linked with local and provincial administrators
and with officials in the UAE who benefit from the vast smuggling networks that link the three countries.
The parties that comprise the United Front obtain arms primarily from Iran and Russia. Iran has provided
rockets, ammunition, and mines. Iran has also provided military training to United Front forces. The
Russian Federation has enabled the transportation of Iranian aid, while providing considerable direct
assistance itself, including crucial support services and, reportedly, helicopters recently. Tajikistan is the
principal country through which assistance from Iran and Russia to the United Front transits, including
through the joint Russian-Tajik military base at Kulab.
Though there have been numerous agreements by Afghanistan's neighbors and other states involved in the
conflict to end arms supplies as part of a larger peace process, none of these agreements has been backed by
any enforcement mechanism. On July 21, 1999, at a meeting in Tashkent of the Group of Six-plus-Two,
comprising the countries bordering Afghanistan plus the U.S. and Russia, the delegates signed an
agreement subsequently known as the Tashkent declaration in which they "agreed not to provide military
support to any Afghan party and to prevent the use of our territories for such purposes," and called upon
"the international community to take identical measures to prevent delivery of weapons to Afghanistan."
Action by the United Nations to bar military support to all parties to the conflict could make effective the
25
measures agreed previously by some of the states principally responsible for the ongoing flow of training
and advisory support, weapons, and other military assistance." (HRW, 15 December 2000)
"The main cause of internal displacement in Afghanistan has been war. At present the principal factor
driving ongoing conflict is interference by neighbouring states, most significantly in the form of Pakistani
backing for the Taliban. Even if the Taliban were to control all major urban centres in Afghanistan, this
would be unlikely to spell the end of conflict: indeed, it could be the signal for a change in the nature of the
conflict. From an intra-elite struggle involving perhaps 100,000 armed fighters to a mass ethnic conflict
with fighting at a local level between groups of differing ethnic identities. As long as outside interference in
Afghanistan continues, the phenomenon of internal displacement and the burdens it places on donors will
persist." (William Maley, 1998, p. 158)
For more detailed information on external military support to the Taleban and the United Front see
"Fueling Afghanistan's war", HRW, 15 December 2000
The U.S. - Afghanistan war
US ask Taleban to hand over Ben Laden or face military consequences (October 2001)
•
Osama Ben Laden prime suspect of September 11 terrorist attacks.
•
USA demand that Ben Laden be extradited from Afghanistan or threaten to bomb the country.
•
Taleban refuse to hand over Ben Laden but open to negotiation if solid proof is provided.
•
USA refuse to negotiate and to follow normal standard in extradition proceedings.
"The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon of 11th September resulted in an
immediate charge by the USA that Osama bin Laden was responsible for the attacks. The USA demanded
that the Taliban hand over Osama bin Laden, adding that those regarded to be harbouring terrorists would
be targeted by any US military action. The Taliban have indicated their willingness to negotiate on a
possible handover, if they are provided with solid evidence of his implication in the attacks. The
governments of other Islamic countries have stated that a key factor in any consideration of what support, if
any, they would be prepared to lend to the efforts of the USA to respond to the attacks is whether the
normal standard of proof that is required in any extradition proceedings is also applied in relation to the
request to the Taliban. The US government has stated that it will provide evidence of Osama bin Laden's
involvement but, at the same time, is saying that, in order to protect its sources, it is constrained in the
information that it can make publicly available. This is placing the various Islamic governments whose
support is being sought in a difficult position. They know that they depend on moderate opinion within
their populations to support any assistance they may opt to give to the USA and that such moderate opinion
could easily be radicalised if people felt that their own government was party to hostile military action by
the USA against another Islamic state. Similar considerations apply in Afghanistan where the Taliban could
assert that the USA had opted not to comply with the normal requirements of extradition proceedings and
had, instead, resorted to force. This would place them in a very strong position to recruit volunteers to fight
for them and to enforce conscription. The question of what evidence is provided and whether this is felt to
be convincing by moderate opinion within Afghanistan and the wider Islamic world is thus crucial to the
outcome of the current tensions between the US, and its allies, and the Taliban." (BAAG 4 October 2001)
26
US policy in Afghanistan is largely a function of oil (October 2001)
•
Control and export of the region's vast oil and gas reserves central in the Afghanistan geo-political
equation.
•
Afghanistan's geographical position as a potential transit route for oil and gas exports from central Asia
to the Arabian sea makes it an important player.
•
This oil is non-OPEC, lies in the non-Arab world the population although Muslim is heavily
secularised.
•
Afghanistan's route is seen as being advantageous as it is close to the Asian markets.
"As the war in Afghanistan unfolds, there is frantic diplomatic activity to ensure that any post-Taliban
government will be both democratic and pro-west. Hidden in this explosive geo-political equation is the
sensitive issue of securing control and export of the region's vast oil and gas reserves.
The Soviets estimated Afghanistan's proven and probable natural gas reserves at 5 trillion cubic feet enough for the UK's requirement for two years - but this remains largely untapped because of the country's
civil war and poor pipeline infrastructure.
More importantly, according to the US government, "Afghanistan's significance from an energy standpoint
stems from its geographical position as a potential transit route for oil and natural gas exports from central
Asia to the Arabian Sea".
To the north of Afghanistan lies the Caspian and central Asian region, one of the world's last great frontiers
for the oil industry due to its tremendous untapped reserves. The US government believes that total oil
reserves could be 270bn barrels. Total gas reserves could be 576 trillion cubic feet. These dwarf the UK's
proven reserves of 5bn barrels of oil and 27 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.
The reason oil is so attractive to the US - which imports half of its oil - and the west, is for three reasons.
"Firstly it is non-Opec oil," says James Marriott, an oil expert from Platform, an environmental NGO.
"Opec has been the bête-noire of the west since its inception in 1960. Secondly, these states are not within
the Arab world and thirdly, although they are Muslim, they are heavily secularised."
The presence of these oil reserves and the possibility of their export raises new strategic concerns for the
US and other western industrial powers. "As oil companies build oil pipelines from the Caucasus and
central Asia to supply Japan and the west, these strategic concerns gain military implications,"argued an
article in the Military Review, the Journal of the US army, earlier in the year.
Despite this, host governments and western oil companies have been rushing to get in on the act.
Kazakhstan, it is believed, could earn $700bn (£486bn) from offshore oil and gas fields over the next 40
years. Both American and British oil companies have struck black gold. In April 1993, Chevron concluded
a $20bn joint venture to develop the Tengiz oil field, with 6-9bn barrels of estimated oil reserves in
Kazakhstan alone. The following year, in what was described as "the deal of the century", AIOC, an
international consortium of companies led by BP, signed an $8bn deal to exploit reserves estimated at 35bn barrels in Azerbaijan.
The oil industry has long been trying to find a way to bring the oil and gas to market. This frustration was
evident in the submission by oil company Unocal's vice-president John Maresca, before the US House of
Representatives in 1998. "Central Asia is isolated. Their natural resources are landlocked, both
geographically and politically. Each of the countries in the Caucasus and central Asia faces difficult
political challenges. Some have unsettled wars or latent conflicts."
27
The industry has been looking at different routes. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) route is 1,000
miles west from Tengiz in Kazakhstan to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiisk and came on stream
last week. Oil will go by tanker through the Bosporus to the Mediterranean. Another route being considered
by AIOC goes from Baku through Tbilisi in Georgia to Ceyhan in Turkey. However, parts of the route are
seen as politically unstable as it goes through the Kurdistan region of Turkey and its $3bn price tag is
prohibitively expensive.
But even if these pipelines are built, they would not be enough to exploit the region's vast oil and gas
reserves. Nor crucially would they have the capacity to move oil to where it is really needed, the growing
markets of Asia. Other export pipelines must therefore be built. One option is to go east across China, but at
3,000km it is seen as too long. Another option is through Iran, but US companies are banned due to
American sanctions. The only other possible route is through Afghanistan to Pakistan. This is seen as being
advantageous as it is close to the Asian markets.
Unocal, the US company with a controversial history of investment in Burma, has been trying to secure the
Afghan route. To be viable Unocal has made it clear that "construction of the pipeline cannot begin until a
recognised government is in place in Kabul that has the confidence of governments, lenders, and our
company."
This, it can be argued, is precisely what Washington is now trying to do. 'Washington's attitude towards the
Taliban has been, in large part, a function of oil,' argues Steve Kretzmann, from the Institute for Policy
Studies in the US. 'Before 1997, Washington refused to criticise and isolate the Taliban because Kabul
seemed to favour Unocal, to build a proposed natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan
to the Pakistan coast.'
In 1997, the Taliban signed an agreement that would allow a proposed 890-mile, $2bn natural gas pipeline
project called Centgas led by Unocal to proceed. However by December 1998, Unocal had pulled out citing
turmoil in Afghanistan making the project too risky.
To secure stability for the Afghan pipeline route, the US State Department and Pakistan's intelligence
service funnelled arms to the Taliban, argues Ahmed Rashid in his book: Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and
Fundamentalism in Central Asia, the book Tony Blair has been reportedly reading since the conflict started.
Rashid called the struggle for control of post-Soviet central Asia "the new Great Game".
Critics of the industry argue that so long as this game is dependent on fossil fuels the region will remain
impoverished due to the effects of the oil industry, which is, says Kretzmann, 'essentially a neo-colonial
set-up that extracts wealth from a region. The industry is sowing the seeds of poverty and terrorism. True
security, for all of us, can only be achieved by reducing our dependence on oil.' " (The Guardian 24
October 2001)
See also: " Pakistan seeks Central Asia gas", BBC, 7 November 2000,
"Afghan Pipeline: A New Great Game", BBC, 4 November 1997 and "Taleban in Texas for talks on gas
pipeline", BBC, 5 December 1997
People flee major cities to rural areas in fear of U.S. attacks (October 2001)
•
An estimated 1 million people were already displaced within the country prior to the U.S. attacks, with
400,000 living in overcrowded camps. A additional 4 million were already internally stuck or stranded.
•
Aid should reach those unable to flee to prevent further displacement.
•
1/4 of Kabul's population and 1/2 of Kandahar's population has fled in fear of U.S. strikes. Many have
reportedly returned.
•
UNHCR estimated that up to 2.2 million people could be internally displaced by March 2002
28
•
Taleban have reportedly prevented people from leaving Afghanistan
•
Some 20,000 people stranded at the closed Pakistan border have either crossed into Pakistan or
dispersed into other areas in Afghanistan
"Even before the threat of reprisals following the terrorist attacks on the US, hundreds of thousands of
people had already left their villages for camps outside major cities, where they had heard that food was
available. It is estimated that there are more than one million internally displaced and more than four
million internally stranded people within Afghanistan already. An estimated 400,000 people were living in
these camps, in squalid conditions with little water, shelter or sanitation. In August, Medecins Sans
Frontiers estimated that already 20-40 people were dying each day. Some reports now state that people are
beginning to leave this camp and are heading for the Iranian border, in the hope of finding better provision
there.
Near the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif, some 200,000 people are thought to be living in camps outside the
city. Because of fighting between the Taliban and opposition forces, it is difficult for aid agencies to reach
them. It is thought that many will start to head for the borders of neighbouring countries.
(…)
At greater risk however, are those Afghans who remain in their isolated villages, watching their food run
out. They have already eaten the grain they had put aside for next year's planting. Many of them will then
have no choice but to sit and wait, in the hope that somehow outside aid will reach them.
At this point it is critical to try to enable people to stay in their villages, many of which are completely cut
off by snow during the winter. People will therefore only stay if they are sure they have enough food to last
through the winter. If they do not stay, there will be a massive exodus of people to the camps, and the
humanitarian situation will become much graver.
If people move to camps, it becomes a huge task for them to return to their villages. Their houses may have
been damaged or destroyed, no crops will have been planted in their fields, there will be little food around
to help them re-establish themselves. Movement to the camps prolongs the effects of the drought, making it
even more important that people be enabled to remain in their villages." (ACT 12 October 2001)
"Displacement of Afghans since 11 September 2001:
Initially, the threat of a US-led military strike on Afghanistan and increased Taleban repression caused
hundreds of thousands of people to flee their homes, particularly in major cities. A quarter of the population
of Kabul and half the population of the southern Afghan province of Kandahar, the headquarters of the
Taleban, were said to have evacuated. Prior to the threat, large numbers of people were not fleeing these
cities. The already large number of internally displaced persons was estimated to have grown to a total of
1.1 million, which the UNHCR predicted could rise to 2.2 million internally displaced persons by March
2002. While reports indicated that many of those who had left cities have been returning, the huge number
of Afghans who were displaced prior to the events of 11 September remain displaced and in great need of
assistance.
Reports have indicated that the Taleban have been preventing some refugees from leaving Afghanistan or
from mo ving towards the borders. In one incident, the Taleban reportedly stopped 30 to 40 Afghan families
from Herat on their way towards Iran and prevented the men in the families from continuing, saying that
they had to join the Taleban forces and fight. It was reported that the women and children in these families
turned back as well because they did not want to be separated from their male family members.
Following the most recent displacement of Afghans, Pakistan authorities have strengthened their efforts to
prevent new Afghan refugees from entering Pakistan, citing security concerns and their inability to support
additional refugees. On 18 September, Pakistan closed its border with Afghanistan, amid reports that the
border closure may have in part been due to a US request; the authorities are reportedly allowing only
vehicles with Afghan transit goods and Pakistani nationals to enter. It was reported that a group of over
20,000 displaced Afghans who had been waiting at the border with Pakistan near the city of Quetta, despite
29
reported attempts by the Taleban to stop people from leaving Afghanistan, have either found alternative
routes into Pakistan or have moved and dispersed into other areas of Afghanistan.
Despite prior indications that borders would be opened to fleeing refugees in the event of US-led strikes
against Afghanistan, President Pervez Musharraf announced on 8 October that the border with Afghanistan
would not be opened and that only the sick or infirm would be allowed to enter Pakistan. However,
UNHCR is preparing for 1 million additional Afghan refugees in Pakistan.
UNHCR has reported that those crossing into Pakistan are mostly women and children and that refugees
have said that men are either staying in Afghanistan or returning immediately after accompanying their
families to look after livestock, crops, and property." (AI 9 October 2001)
Displacement has increased since the beginning of the war (January 2002)
•
Out of the 1.2 million Afghans estimated to be displaced at the beginning of 2002, the half is believed
to have fled after September 11, mainly in Central, South and East regions as a result of the recent
conflict.
"[...]
Currently, almost 1.2 million Afghans are displaced inside Afghanistan with the north and west of the
country accounting for over 60% of total IDPs. Significant numbers of IDPs do not reside in camps, but are
hosted by already vulnerable communities. Camp populations tend to be located near cities. Two camp
populations (Spin Boldak in the South, and Makaki/Mile 46 in the West) comprise asylum seekers, who
were thwarted by neighbouring countries when they closed their borders.
The reasons for displacement are complex, recalling that prior to events in September significant numbers
of IDPs were accommodated throughout Afghanistan. Around one-half of the current caseload is believed
to have fled for reasons of drought, or food insecurity , prior to September. Internal displacement increased
in Central, South and East regions as a result of the recent conflict. Subsequently, with growing food
shortages, more people have left their homes, particularly from Badhis and Ghor. These IDPs are not
expected to return home before the second quarter of 2002, in time for the agricultural season, although
food assistance to areas facing current shortages may encourage some to return earlier." (UN 21 January
2002, p. 43)
The post-Taleban era
Anti-Pashtun violence campaign displaces thousands in the North (March 2002)
•
Since the fall of the Taliban and the re-emergence of warlords, the pashtuns are subject to murder,
beating and looting in northern Afghanistan.
•
The intimidation campaign has forced at least 20,000 to flee their villages.
•
Three political factions active in the north are the Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami, Jamiat-e Islami, and Hizb-i
Wahdat, drawn largely from the Uzbek, Tajik, and Hazara ethnic groups respectively.
•
Since the fall of the Taliban, each group has targeted the Pashtun community in areas under its control,
partly in reprisal for these communities' real or perceived association with the predominantly Pashtun
Taliban movement, and partly as a result of political competition in northern Afghanistan.
30
"For ethnic Pashtuns in northern Afghanistan, it is payback time. They are paying for the sins of the
Taliban, simply because most of the Taliban leadership were also ethnic Pashtuns. In the past month,
Human Rights Watch has visited dozens of Pashtun communities in northern Afghanistan, personally
documenting the devastation. We visited village after village that had been stripped bare by ethnic militias
who had sometimes even taken the window frames. We found case after case of beatings, looting, murders,
extortion and sexual violence against Pashtun communities.
[...]
Parts of Afghanistan today are beginning to look a bit like they did in the 1992-96 period when warlords
carved up the country and brutally abused the civilian population. That era gave rise to the Taliban. Some
of those same warlords are back in power in northern Afghanistan, and their forces are responsible for most
of the abuses against Pashtun civilians in the north. Our research implicated all three major factions -- the
ethnic Uzbek Junbish party, the ethnic Tajik Jamiat party, and the ethnic Hazara Hizb-i-Wahdat party -- in
the offenses against Pashtun civilians. " (HRW 20 March 2002)
"Armed political factions in northern Afghanistan are subjecting ethnic Pashtuns to murder, beatings,
sexual violence, abductions, looting, and extortion, Human Rights Watch said today. The ongoing
campaign of violence and intimidation is forcing thousands of Pashtuns to leave their villages.
Over the last four weeks, teams from Human Rights Watch have visited over two dozen villages and
communities across northern Afghanistan, from Faryab province in the northwest to Baghlan in the north
central mountains. They have documented over 150 separate incidents of violence and looting over the last
three months, some of them as recent as this week. The testimony of Pashtuns across this large area was
consistent in its depiction of violence, looting, and intimidation at the hands of local commanders.
(...)
The three political factions active in the north are the Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami, Jamiat-e Islami, and Hizb-i
Wahdat, drawn largely from the Uzbek, Tajik, and Hazara ethnic groups respectively. Since the fall of the
Taliban, each group has targeted the Pashtun community in areas under its control, partly in reprisal for
these communities' real or perceived association with the predominantly Pashtun Taliban movement, and
partly as a result of political competition in northern Afghanistan. The abuses have also occurred in a
broader context of violence by armed groups, in which Pashtuns -- lacking political and military power in
the north -- are acutely vulnerable.
[...]
Human Rights Watch also received testimony about widely prevalent sexual violence and abduction of
women in northern Afghanistan. The testimony was especially striking because of social taboos against
discussing such issues. While many women were subject to violence due to the general insecurity in the
north, Pashtun women seemed especially singled out for attacks. In central Balkh province, Wahdat and
Junbish factions targeted Pashtun women for sexual violence, after women in their own communities
suffered similar attacks in the past." (HRW 3 March 2002)
"After suffering more than two decades of war in their troubled country, ethnic minorities in northern
Afghanistan are now fleeing persecution.
Some 20,000 people, mostly Pashtuns, have been forced to flee northern Afghanistan under threat of
persecution in the past few days, a UN official said on Wednesday.
'We are concerned about minorities in the north who have been forced to flee, particularly from Kunduz,
Baghlan, Takhar, and other areas in the north, predominantly Pashtuns, who are minorities in those areas,'
said UN official Yussuf Hassan.
While Pashtuns are the majority in the country overall, in northern Afghanistan they are a minority in the
mostly ethnic Uzbek and Tajik areas.
'In the last few days we have seen thousands of people fleeing southwards, stranded, I would say, on the
Afghan-Pakistani border, nearly 20,000 of them,' he said.
31
These latest victims of the turbulent situation in Afghanistan have fled persecution and violence as old
ethnic rivalries return to the surface.
'The story they tell us is that they have been forced from their land, their houses have been looted and the
women have been mistreated,' he said." (AFP 21 February 2002)
Abuses by armed militias, lack of food and emergency assistance force people to flee
in Western Afghanistan (April 2002)
•
Findings of this report indicate that local Afghan forces of Uzbek ethnic origin appear to have
systematically abused ethnic Pashtuns particularly in western districts that are primarily Pashtun
villages.
•
The primary reason people are fleeing their homes and seeking humanitarian assistance in the
Shaidayee camp for internally displaced persons (IDP), is that food and emergency aid were not
available in their home villages.
•
A study conducted by Physicians for Human Rights in Shaidayee Camp in Herat revealed that Pashtun
families were two to five times as likely to be victims of human rights violations as non-Pashtuns.
•
Abuses against civilians in both the Northern and Western regions include rape, harassment, extortion,
land seizure, killings, disappearances, beatings, looting and intimidation.
•
The Afghan Interim Government appointed an independent commission to investigate alleged
ethnically-based abuses against Pashtuns in Northern Afghanistan, however the capacity of the
commission has been limited by the power and influence of the local commanders in these areas
"The collapse of the Taliban regime in November 2001 gave the people of Afghanistan hope that after 23
years of war, the international isolation and human rights abuses that they suffered would come to an end.
The Bonn agreement, the installation of the Interim Government, the future prospect of democratic reforms
and the deployment of international security forces in Kabul, heralded a new Afghanistan and a promise of
international support and cooperation. Yet, armed factional groups have continued to commit human rights
abuses against civilian ethnic groups, especially in areas where there is little presence of international or
local security. The findings of this report indicate that local Afghan forces of Uzbek ethnic origin appear to
have systematically abused ethnic Pashtuns particularly in western districts that are primarily Pashtun
villages. The study also shows that the primary reason people are fleeing their homes and seeking
humanitarian assistance in the Shaidayee camp for internally displaced persons (IDP), is that food and
emergency aid were not available in their home villages.
In April 2002, Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) surveyed 509 IDP households in Shaidayee Camp in
Herat, Afghanistan. The study revealed that Pashtun families were two to five times as likely to be victims
of human rights violations as non-Pashtuns. While it is not clear how many of the abuses were directly
ordered by local commanders, violations against ethnic Pashtuns were pervasive enough that commanders
and local authorities are likely to be aware of them. Nonetheless, little has been done to insist upon order or
to end persecution of the Pashtun. Predominantly Pashtun Afghans associated with the Taliban regime were
guilty of many abuses against men, women, and children from minority ethnic groups, and in particular the
Uzbeks and Hazaras. It appears now to be the case that some individuals as well as military figures are
acting against Pashtun civilians by way of reprisal. Alternatively, some abuses may simply be opportunistic
attacks to steal or look for the weakest within a community. Whatever the motivation of the perpetrators,
however, the crimes against unarmed ethnic Pashtun families are human rights abuses that set the stage for
further ethnic tension within Afghanistan - a development the country can ill afford.
[...]
Civilians in both the Northern and Western regions of Afghanistan have reported human rights abuses in
their districts of origin to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and United Nations offices. These
32
abuses include rape, harassment, extortion, land seizure, killings, disappearances, beatings, looting and
intimidation. Many of these violations have been reported by civilians as reprisals against Pashtuns, the
Afghan ethnic group most commonly associated with the Taliban regime.
Recently, the Afghan Interim Government appointed an independent commission to investigate alleged
ethnically-based abuses against Pashtuns in Northern Afghanistan, which had been documented by Human
Rights Watch. However, the capacity of this commission to effectively address violence against Pashtuns in
Northern and Western Afghanistan has been limited by the power and influence of the local commanders in
these areas. Even with the removal of the commanders who are reportedly implicated in the abuses against
Pashtuns in their communities, especially in Faryab, the violations continue under the watch of other
commanders who were placed to protect Pashtun villages from such acts.
Despite measures to protect civilian populations, over the last three months a large influx of long-term
internally displaced persons (IDPs) have fled to the Herat province in Western Afghanistan from Ghor,
Baghdis, Faryab, Farah, and Balkh provinces, and have settled in Shaidayee IDP camp on the outskirts of
Herat city. According to UNHCR, many of the IDPs reported that they fled their home villages due to lack
of food distribution and the need for emergency assistance. Others, especially Pashtuns, also reported that
abuses had occurred in Pashtun villages in many Provinces in the Western Region.
" (PHR April 2002)
See also:
All Our Hopes Are Crushed: Violence and Repression in Western Afghanistan, HRW, 5 November 2002
Cluster bombs contribute to the cycle of displacement (December 2002)
•
Cluster bombs and unexploded ordnances hinder return of IDPs
•
IDPs are exposed to these bombs are they contribute to a cycle of displacement.
"Cluster bomblets also hinder the return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). [...]
Bomblets and other unexploded ordnance can contribute to delays in organized returns. UNHCR's
guidelines require the agency to look at the safety of roads and return areas before sending inhabitants back
to their homes. The guidelines focus on the threats from landmines, but because of their similar effect,
unexploded BLUs must be treated the same way. UNHCR is also required to discourage spontaneous
repatriation in unsafe circumstances. "The need for return `in safety and dignity' means that UNHCR
cannot promote the voluntary repatriation of refugees in patently dangerous situations with the risk of
injury or death." By necessitating such precautions, cluster bombs can slow a country's economic recovery
and its people's return to normalcy.
[...]
Unexploded bomblets also endanger transients unfamiliar with a region's hazards. Two people from the
Mazlach IDP camp encountered cluster bomblets while passing through the field west of Ishaq Suleiman;
the 61-year-old father died and his 8-year-old son was injured. Although the earlier deaths of two shepherds
kept locals away, the victims had no reason to know of the incident. The deadly bomblets not only harm
returning refugees but also contribute to a cycle of displacement, forcing those who find their villages too
dangerous to join Afghanistan's large number of IDPs." (HRW December 2002, pp. 28-29)
Human rights, public security and the rule of law still not upheld (December 2002)
33
•
Representatives of various factions met in Bonn in December 2001 and agreed on an interim power
sharing agreement, creation of new constitution and elections in 2004.
•
Despite the agreement, Afghanistan remains a country where violence and the use of force had become
the first resort to settle disputes and resolve conflicting claims to power.
•
Because of the conscious choices made by key actors, notably Afghan military leaders and the United
States, the processes set in motion by the Bonn Agreement are now faltering in key areas such as
human rights, public security, the rule of law, and economic reconstruction
"A few weeks after the United States and its coalition partners toppled the Taliban in late 2001,
representatives of various Afghan factions met in Bonn, Germany under the auspices of the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan to map out Afghanistan’s future.
After laborious negotiations between Afghan military commanders, representatives of Afghanistan’s
different ethnic groups, expatriate Afghans, and representatives of the exiled monarch––and under
substantial pressure from the United States and other external powers to reach an agreement––the Bonn
Agreement was signed on December 5, 2001.
The delegates to the Bonn conference, some of whom had been bitter enemies during the last two decades,
made surprising progress. They agreed on an interim power sharing arrangement, the creation of a new
constitution, and elections in 2004. Through the Bonn Agreement they set out a schematic roadmap and
timetable for establishing peace and security, reconstructing the country, reestablishing some key
institutions, and protecting human rights.
Though it was not a comprehensive peace agreement and did not include key provisions, such as formal
commitments by Afghanistan’s neighbors to respect the country’s neutrality (and end outside support to
different military factions), most Afghans believed that the Bonn Agreement represented the best chance
possible for establishing peace, security, and protection of human rights in Afghanistan. With the
participation of so many Afghan factions and the promise of political and economic support from the
world’s major powers, the agreement offered hope to some of the world’s most repressed and abused
people. Afghans could finally dream of an end to
violence, better living conditions, and a future for their children.
But this hope was tempered by the immense challenges that lay ahead. Virtually all the institutions of a
functioning civil society had been destroyed, including the parliament, the courts, much of the civil service,
and most of the educational and health systems. Under the Taliban the majority of the population—
females—had been denied the right to education and work. The
country was littered with landmines. Much of its infrastructure had been destroyed by the shelling,
shooting, and neglect that had become the staple of everyday life.
It was beyond the capacity of the Bonn Agreement or any other agreement to provide a short-term remedy
for all these problems. At best, reconstruction will take years. It will also take time to develop and nurture a
new political culture in which civilian authority will be supreme, national interests will prevail over
regional or sectarian ones, and disputes will be resolved peacefully. Even with the formal signing of the
Bonn Agreement, Afghanistan remained a country where violence and the use of force had become the first
resort to settle disputes and resolve conflicting claims to power.
In spite of the inevitable and predictable obstacles, there was still much that could have, and still can be,
achieved, even if at times only in the form of incremental progress. But, because of the conscious choices
made by key actors, notably Afghan military leaders and the United States, the
processes set in motion by the Bonn Agreement are now faltering in key areas such as human rights, public
security, the rule of law, and economic reconstruction." (HRW 5 December 2002, p. 1)
See also:
34
Final report on the Afghan Interim Authority Fund, UNDP, 20 April 2003
The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, Report of the
Secretary-General, 18 March 2003
The Afghan Transitional Administration: Prospects and Perils, International Crisis Group (ICG), 30
July 2002
Forced recruitment, persecution in the north causes displacement and hamper return
(April 2003)
•
UNHCR report continued arrival of Pashtuns IDPs in the south as a result of harassment and insecurity
in the north
•
Most IDPs are in the south (350,000) in 6 displacement settlements. 15% of them are Pashtuns
•
Psychosocial effect of persecution means that IDPs will reluctant to go back to the north for a while
•
Forced recruitment by factional leaders in the north force people to flee.
•
There is concenrn that IDPs returning from the western areas will be exposed to forced recruitment
"The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) maintains that arrivals of
internally displaced persons (IDPs) - mostly ethnic Pashtuns - in the south of the country as a result of
harassment and insecurity in the north are continuing.
’We do have protection cases, human rights cases of Pashtuns coming from the north, still in small
numbers, but continuing,’ Maki Shinohara, a spokeswoman for UNHCR, told IRIN in the Afghan capital,
Kabul.
There are hundreds of thousands of IDPs throughout Afghanistan today, about 350,000 of whom are in the
south, most of them in six displacement settlements in Kandahar and Helmand provinces.
’What is notable is that there are still people arriving at these settlements, fleeing harassment and insecurity
from the northern provinces of Faryab, Jowzjan and Badghis,’ Shinohara said, noting that in the second half
of March, 45 families had arrived at the livestock market in Kandahar, joining some 100 displaced families
already there.
According to UNHCR some 15 percent of IDPs in the south are Pashtuns from the north, who might not be
able to return in the near future.
’In some specific provinces of the north where there is factional fighting going on, there are some local
commanders who have been confiscating land illegally, not only from Pashtuns - there have been others
affected too - but mainly Pashtuns,’ Shinohara said, noting that the working group of the Return
Commission in the north, composed of local authorities and the Afghan Human Rights Commission, was
trying to make headway in identifying areas for possible return, and would then visit the displaced Pashtuns
in the south with concrete proposals.
'Objectively, even if the situation might be OK for the people to come back, having the experience of being
harassed out of their homes or the experience of fleeing from them, does take some time for the people
themselves to be convinced and confident enough to go back,' Shinohara said, adding that UNHCR was
encouraging dialogue between the villagers as well as with the authorities in the north. 'It's basically up to
the authorities to regain the trust of their people and to work on solving the problems which are displacing
people,' she said." (IRIN 15 April 2003)
35
"The senior human rights advisor and the political advisor of UNAMA said that forced recruitment is
currently taking place in the northern areas of Afghanistan.
An international source advised that the extent of forced recruitment is on the increase and should be seen
in the context of the tension between the various factions in the northern region. The source has received
reports indicating that the forced recruitment during the months of August of September 2002 took place
particularly in the provinces of Sar-e-Pul, Jowjzan, Balkh and
Samangan.
According to the source, forced recruitment is carried out in different ways. Firstly, it was reported, in late
August young men were picked up from the street in Sar-e-Pul. Many of these were working for national
NGOs. According to the source, forced recruitment is carried out by both sides - by the
Junbesh as well as by the Jamiat forces. It is said that Atta has ordered 1000 new recruits to be found for
the forces in the Balkh province, while Junbesh are recruiting especially in Samangan and Jowjzan. Other
forms of forced recruitment consist of the commandant going to the villages where
he negotiates a sum of money in exchange for men. Amounts as high as 10-20 million. Afghani per person
have been reported, (approximately between USD 220 and 445 per person). In some instances higher
amounts have been mentioned. If the families are unable to pay, the young men are picked up. There are
also reports of physical violence in the form of beatings of families.
According to the source, the local community often helps the family to pay. There are also examples of
some families in an IDP-camp in the Samangan province having recently been asked to supply 20 recruits,
but they only supplied three and sent the rest of the young men in the camp away
from the area to another IDP-camp in the Kandahar region (Spin Boldak). There are rumours that forced
recruitment involves people as young as 12-13 years, but according to reports, verified by the source, it was
actually young men aged between 18 and 20 years.
The source also said that in May 2002, a decree was issued by the president about military service, which
according to this decree, must take place voluntarily. However, according to the source it seems unclear
whether this decree has come into force, and how it is to be implemented in practice.
Finally, the source expressed concern, that the Pashtuns currently returning from western countries might
become a primary target for forced recruitment in the northern regions. The source emphasized that there
have not as yet been any examples of this happening, but that it is an issue, which gives cause for general
concern.
According to CCA, forced recruitment to the Jamiat forces in Takhar province is also currently taking
place. According to the source, these are forces belonging to the commandant Daoud, who is based in
Kunduz. CCA has received reports that families, who refuse to supply a recruit, instead
must pay 4 million Afghani (about USD 85)." (DIS March 2003, pp. 27-28)
Continued fighting and insecurity are the most serious challenge to peace and return
(June 2003)
•
AI contends that Afghanistan is a country to which most refugee and IDP returns should be considered
unsustainable, mainly because levels of security are not adequate, access to shelter, water and
employment are very limited and the absence of rule of law puts human rights at risk .
•
Insecurity is as prevalent in the urban centres of Afghanistan as it is in the countryside
•
Landmines kill 200 people avery month in rural areas.
•
Afghans in many parts of the country remain unprotected by legitimate State security structures.
•
Rivalries between factional leaders worsened in the west during 2002.
36
•
In early 2003, there has been increased activity by elements hostile to the Government and to the
international community in Afghanistan
•
Insecurity severely threatens the fragile peace in the country, increases the possibility of more people
being displaced, prevents returns of the population to their areas of origin, and undermines the
authority of the new government.
•
Delivery of aid is threatened by rising insecurity in many areas, which has resulted in increases in
direct attacks on humanitarian aid workers and Afghan civilians
"Amnesty International believes that Afghanistan is not a country that has crossed over into a post-conflict
situation, and therefore is one to which most refugee and IDP returns should be considered unsustainable.
At a basic minimum, a post-conflict situation would be characterized by adequate levels of security in the
majority of the country, access to adequate shelter, access to food and potable water, access to employment,
the rule of law and due regard for the human rights of all persons, including in particular those of
vulnerable groups. In contemporary Afghanistan, these conditions are not being met for the vast majority of
Afghans, including refugees returning to their country of origin who are especially vulnerable, having been
uprooted for protracted periods of time.
The security situation in Afghanistan has steadily deteriorated in 2003. Attacks targeted at foreigners, such
as the murder of an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) staff member in Uruzgan province in
March 2003, have led to a withdrawal of NGO and UN staff, in particular international staff, from aid
projects throughout the south of the country. Humanitarian aid workers and de-mining teams have also
been the target of attacks in other parts of the country. Growing insecurity over the last months has meant
that up to twothirds of the country is not readily accessible to international aid agencies to conduct relief
and monitoring exercises. UN agencies in the south have recently had to request armed escorts in order to
be able to travel with some measure of security. This insecurity is as prevalent in the urban centres of
Afghanistan as it is in the countryside. As the pace of reconstruction in Afghanistan slows, and the living
conditions of most ordinary Afghans fails to improve, many are turning to extremist forces, such as a
revitalized Taleban now active in the south-east and east, to express their disappointment in the present
administration and its foreign backers. US-led military action along Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan has
been the cause of further deaths and consequent resentment of the presence of foreigners. On 9 April,
eleven civilians, including seven women, were killed when a US bomb hit their house on the outskirts of
Shikin, Paktika province. In Kabul there has been a sharp decrease in the level of security experienced by
Afghans and members of the international community.
There has also been an upsurge in factional fighting amongst rival regional and local commanders across
Afghanistan. In early April, fighting between the forces of Abdul Rashid Dostum and Ustad Atta
Mohammed in Maimana city, Faryab province, kille d up to eight civilians. In Imamsahib district of
Kunduz, a group of Uzbek returnees from Pakistan complained that local Turkmen militia allied to the
Jamiat-e-Islami faction had kidnapped eight people, including five women, in order to force the community
to give up their land. Processes of disarmament and demobilization have to date been largely ineffectual.
Between 5 and 10 million landmines and unexploded ordinances continue to litter the countryside, killing
an estimated 200 persons every month. The Special Representative of the Secretary General in Afghanistan
noted recently that “The issue of security in Afghanistan cast a long shadow over the whole peace process
there and, indeed, over the whole future of the country.” Furthermore, public confidence in the police,
including in Kabul, is very low, with the police being responsible for human rights abuses including torture
and arbitrary detention." (AI 23 June 2003, pp. 21-22)
"20. Security remains the most serious challenge facing the peace process in Afghanistan. Security must be
improved to allow the re-establishment of the rule of law, ensure the protection of human rights, promote
the reconstruction effort and facilitate the success of the complex political processes, including the
development of the new constitution and the holding of free and fair elections. Afghans in many parts of
37
the country remain unprotected by legitimate State security structures. Criminal activity by armed groups
has of late been particularly evident in the north, east and south, and in many areas confrontation between
local commanders continues to contribute to instability.
21. During the reporting period, rivalries between factional leaders worsened in the west when the forces of
Herat’s Governor, Ismael Khan, clashed with those of a local commander, Amanullah Khan, in Shindand in
late 2002. In January 2003, fighting broke out in the province of Badghis between forces loyal to Ismael
Khan and the local Governor, Gul Mohammad.
22. In Kandahar, rivalries over local power and tribal dominance came to a head when forces belonging to
the Governor, Gul Agha, from the Barakzay tribe, tried to disarm police under the command of General
Akram, from the Alokozai tribe. The dispute over responsibility for law and order in the city was resolved
after the intervention of tribal leaders.
23. Sporadic acts of terror continue to occur all too frequently. The worst of these in recent months was on
31 January, when a bus drove over an improvised mine near Kandahar, killing 12 passengers. In late
December 2002, in Kabul, an explosive device was thrown into a car carrying two United States plainclothed soldiers and their interpreter, injuring them. In a separate incident, also in Kabul, two Afghans were
killed and two foreign aid workers were injured when a grenade was thrown into a crowd of people outside
an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) base. An ISAF national interpreter was killed on 7
March while on patrol, when an improvised, remote-controlled explosive device detonated as his vehicle
passed.
24. Reports from several sources in the first months of 2003 point to increased activity by elements hostile
to the Government and to the international community in Afghanistan. There were signs that remnant
Taliban groups and factions loyal to Gulbuddin Hikmatyar were trying to reorganize in the south-eastern
and eastern border areas. There has also been an increase in the number of attacks against the personnel and
assets of international and non-governmental organizations, particularly in the border provinces of
Nangahar, Khost, Kunar, Paktya, Paktika, Kandahar and Helmand. In December 2002, two grenades were
thrown into the compound of the Gardez office of UNAMA, and in February 2003 an explosive device
detonated outside the office in Kandahar of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and another was thrown into the office compound of the International Organization of
Migration (IOM) in Kunduz. Over the reporting period there has also been a series of unexplained
explosions in Jalalabad that resulted in no casualties. Attacks against coalition forces continued to occur,
resulting in numerous injuries and one fatality.
25. UNAMA and United Nations agencies are taking precautionary measures to ensure the security of staff,
such as limiting non-essential movements around the country. Although travel or activities have been
suspended for two or three days in specific cases and places, security has not yet deteriorated to a level that
would require a cessation of local operations. Security assessments will be made on an area-by-area basis,
and should operations in any one area have to be curtailed, those in other areas of Afghanistan should not
necessarily be affected." (UN Secretary-General 18 March 2003, pp. 7-8)
See also:
"Afghanistan: Aid organisations call for strenghtened security", IRIN, 18 June 2003
"Afghanistan: NATO to take over command of ISAF", OCHA, 17 April 2003
On the Precipice: Insecurity in Northern Afghanistan, Human Rights Watch (HRW), June 2002
38
Some refugees returning home are forced into internal displacement (June 2003)
•
Many of the remaining 600,000 IDPs are unwilling or unable to return.
•
Many refugees have become internally displaced upon return to Afghanistan and are still looking for
durable solutions.
•
Some refugees returning form Pakistan have found that their homes were occupied by a rival ethnic
group and they have been forced to set up informal settlements.
•
Less than 10 percent of Afghanistan’s road infrastructure is paved and some IDPs have ended up in
situation of renewed displacement because they could not reached their homes areas.
"For many of the estimated 600,000 IDPs in Afghanistan, return to their homes or places of origin remains
a distant dream. IDPs in Kabul city, in the north and in the west of the country are either unable or
unwilling to return. In addition, there are large groups of, mainly Pashtun and Kutchi IDPs in southern
provinces that are similarly unable to return to their homes in the north. UNHCR has noted that “many of
the reasons that have caused people to become internally displaced in Afghanistan are similar to those that
have resulted in them seeking refuge abroad. In the same vein, many of the solutions to internal
displacement are similar to those for refugees.” To this could be added the fact that many refugee returnees
have been forced into a situation of internal displacement upon their return to Afghanistan and, therefore,
are still in search of a durable solution to their displacement. Amnesty International interviewed a group of
Ismaili IDPs originally from Doshi district, Baghlan province, who had returned from Pakistan in 2002
only to find their land occupied by people from a rival ethnic group. Having been prevented by threats of
violence from reclaiming their land, the Ismailis have been forced to set up informal settlements on
government-owned land in Pul-i-Khumri.
[...]
The security situation encountered by many returnees on the road to their place of origin or preferred
destination is very precarious. Less than 10 percent of Afghanistan’s road infrastructure is paved, which has
meant that much of the road system is prone to flooding and often impassable during periods of rain. Much
of Ghor province in the west of the country was unreachable for this reason during early 2003, and there
were frequent reports of fatalities involving vehicles carrying returning refugees and IDPs being washed off
the dirt track roads.
Amnesty International has also received reports of IDPs ending up in renewed displacement because of
their inability to reach their villages/places of origin. In one case, a group of IDPs were forced to remain
displaced within an informal settlement in Chaghcharan city, a main urban centre in Ghor province. They
had been transported up to this point by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) but had then
been unable to make their way to their villages due to the terrible road conditions." (AI 23 June 2003, pp.
13-14)
Natural disasters
Alarming regularity of natural disasters in Afghanistan (1998-2001)
•
A severe drought has hit Afghanistan in 2000, affecting mainly the southwest but also other parts of
the country.
•
Between June 2000 and June 2001, it is estimated that half of the population will be affected, 3-4
million severly and 8-12 million moderatly.
•
The local authorities have assisted in the displacement of population away from the drought-affected
areas.
•
As the drought continues, it is likely that people will start to migrate to urban centres.
39
•
On June 12, 1999 a forest fire in the Kunar province displaced 3,000 persons.
•
On 11 February 1999, an earthquake struck the provinces of Wardak and Logar, affecting about 18,600
families.
•
Following an earthquake on 30 May 1998, affecting the districts of Rustaq, Chah-Ab and Shar-eBuzurg, some 4,000 persons were killed, 17,000 families affected and 16,000 homes damaged or
destroyed.
•
On 4 February 1998, the Rustaq district in Takhar Province was struck by an earthquake that affected
24 villages, killing about 2,300 persons and destroying around 8,000 houses.
Natural disasters occur with alarming regularity in Afghanistan. During the last three years, the country
has been affected by three major earthquakes and one forest fire. The country is currently experiencing
its worst drought since 1971.
"About 12 million Afghans are affected by drought, three to four million severely. The extremely low level
of precipitation has destroyed almost all the rain-fed crops and decimated the livestock. The cereal deficit
has exceeded 2.3 million tons, more than double that of the previous year. As the next harvest is not
expected before May 2001, emergency food will be required to assist people who are dependant on rain-fed
agriculture as well as other vulnerable populations. Failure to assist these people will result in large scale
internal migration as well as to neighbouring countries" (OCHA 17 November 2000)
"Afghanistan is currently in the grip of the worst drought since 1971. The winter 1999-2000 witnessed
much less snowfall than 1998-1999, which was itself a drought year. With both rain and snowfall down,
less water is available in the rivers and in the water table. In particular, those areas at the end of water
chains will be most severely affected. Unlike Pakistan, Afghanistan does not receive summer rains. It is
thus probable that there will be no rain until late 2000 (if the rains do not fail again). The next chance for a
normal crop from rain-fed areas will not be until 2001 because the vast majority of the cultivated land
produces only one crop per year.
While initial assessments showed southwest Afghanistan to be the most affected area, it is now confirmed
that the whole country has been severely affected. Long-term intervention will be required by the
international community to alleviate the effects of the drought on the most vulnerable population groups.
Preliminary results of the WFP/FAO crop assessment survey show that rain-fed crops in the north failed
almost completely. The Central Highlands are also seriously affected.
The people most affected are rain-fed wheat producers whose crop, normally harvested between May and
July 2000, has almost totally failed. These include 2.5 million rain-fed wheat farmers in northern
Afghanistan. A preliminary estimate suggests that between now and June 2001 at least half of the
population of Afghanistan may be affected by drought, three to four million people severely and
another eight to twelve million moderately. Livestock owners, especially kochis, are the second most
affected group.
The water table has been decreasing and continues to drop in all urban areas in the country because the
aquifers have not been sufficiently recharged. Urban residents across the country rely largely on shallow
hand dug wells for drinking water. These are increasingly going dry. Although some of the cities have
piped water supply schemes, which tap into deeper aquifers, most systems have fallen into disrepair and do
not cover large segments of the population. Where they have the means, people are deepening their wells.
Those unable to afford this are relying on neighbours and public wells often at considerable distances from
their homes. This problem is worse in rural areas, where distances to safe drinking water are long. While
serious all around the country, the problem varies in intensity in different districts.
(...)
[Regarding population movements related to this drought] it should be borne in mind that kochis, as
nomads, migrate every year along traditional routes. At issue during this drought stricken year is the nature
40
of those movements, which have in some cases occurred earlier than usual, and which, due to the
widespread area of the drought, may cause more economic stress or fuel conflict among both kochi and
non-kochi families. The local authorities in southern Afghanistan have assisted in the evacuation of several
thousand families from the Registan areas by truck over the last four months. While benign in intention,
this movement may have interrupted traditional coping mechanisms. As the situation stands, several
hundred of those families have taken refuge around Kandahar City. There is also the likelihood of
migration of non-kochi families. In May, there have been reports of two to three trucks of displaced people
daily leaving severely drought-affected districts such as Dai Kundi and Sharistan. In particular, people who
have experienced total crop failure and who have no alternative income are selling remaining household
goods and leaving rural areas. They intend to migrate to the towns in search of work or to reach
neighbouring Pakistan or Iran. Already, migration of people from drought affected areas is exacerbating
employment problems in the southwest.
(...)
Clearly, as the drought deepens and the number of families left without assistance increases, there is a risk
of population movements towards the urban centres despite the strategy to try to keep families where they
are. If this occurs, it may be necessary to set up facilities to provide assistance especially in Kandahar,
Mazar, Jalalabad, and Kabul. Food, shelter, and potable water will be needed for such drought-related
IDPs." (UNOCHA, 1 June 2000)
A forest fire, which erupted on June 12, 1999 in the forests of the Sholake Valley in the Kunar province and
was reported extinguished on 6 July , affected around 12 villages and displaced about 3,000 people.
(Deutsche Presse Agentur 19 June 1999; UNOCHA 6 July 1999)
On 11 February 1999, an earthquake struck the provinces of Wardak and Logar, affecting about 18,600
families and causing massive destruction of rural homes and infrastructure over a wide area. (UNOCHA 25
February 1999)
Following an earthquake on 30 May 1998, affecting the districts of Rustaq, Chah-Ab and Shar-e-Buzurg,
some 4,000 persons were killed, 17,000 families affected and 16,000 homes damaged or destroyed. The
situation of the affected population was further exacerbated by the lack of appropriate shelter, water
sanitation and health facilities. (UNOCHA 24 July 1998)
"In February 1998, an earthquake shook the province of Takhar in northeastern Afghanistan. Killing almost
5000 people and leaving 20,000 homeless, this was one of the most severe natural calamities to have hit
Afghanistan in recent years. The situation of the survivors is exarcerbated by the winter climate and remote
location; and Afghanistan's civil war. Although the area of the earthquake has been largely spared the
consequence of the 18-year conflict, there is no national structure left to render assistance. Supplies have
been brought accross front lines and accross the border from neighboring countries Tajikistan. Before the
earthquake, Takhar was controlled by the northern coalition opposed to the Taliban government. A
temporary cease-fire enabled access for some aid agencies but it is unlikely that this will hold. Thus,
victims of this natural disaster find their fate tied to the civil war, with assistance and protection
compromised." (William Maley, 1998, p. 158)
Locust infestation in northern Afghanistan (May 2002)
•
Most affected provinces are Baghlan, Samangan and Qunduz
•
Severe drought has fostered locust infestation in northern Afghanistan destroying thousands of hectares
of land.
•
More than half of the agricultural land infested in some provinces.
41
•
110,586 hectares covered by the WFP food-for-work programme to eliminate locusts in the Baghlan,
Samangan and Kunduz provinces.
•
Problem to be worse next year, with fears of about 70 percent of land in Baghlan becoming infested.
"Farmers in Northern Afghanistan are fighting a silent enemy. Afghanistan's bread basket, hit hard by three
years of drought and many years of war, is finally blooming with crops and relative peace - but is
threatened by hundreds of millions of locusts marching across fields and mountain slopes.
More than 200,000 hectares of farm land have been infested, with up to 70 percent of crop production and
the livelihoods of some four million people at risk. Together with farmers, national plant protection experts,
non-governmental organizations and international agencies FAO has launched a US$1 million campaign to
combat the worst locust plague to hit Afghanistan in the last 30 years. Out of the nine provinces, three are
most seriously affected (Baghlan, Samangan and Qunduz)." (FAO May 2002)
"Locust infestation in northern Afghanistan has been "particularly bad" this year due to the ongoing severe
drought, the worst in 30 years, UN officials told IRIN. "Thousands of hectares of land were destroyed,
leaving many farmers without food for the next few months," Ghulam Hassan, WFP's senior assistant in the
northern city of Mazar-e Sharif said. He added that the locust problem had always existed, but efforts by
international agencies had been diverted to aid distribution, in response to huge food shortages in the wartorn region. UN officials said the perennial problem had been exacerbated by the dry weather, and the
response had not been quick enough. The WFP regional public affairs officer, Khaled Mansour, told IRIN
that "the programme was a little late, but we could not put resources in at the time".
The insects usually confine themselves to desert land between Kunduz and Baghlan, but the dry weather at
the start of the year prompted them to migrate into the northern provinces in search of food. Billions of
eggs hatched in March, and the locusts stayed in the area to feed off the fields. According to aid workers,
more than half the agricultural land was infested in some provinces. To make matters worse this year, due
to lack of seed and water brought about by the three-year drought, farmers had only planted half the land
they would normally have cultivated. Moreover, many of them had enhanced their vulnerability by
extending the boundaries of the land they cultivated to the edge of the desert areas already infested by
locusts, Hassan said.
In March, with the help of national and international NGOs, WFP carried out a food-for-work programme
to eliminate locusts in the northern region. Some 8,000 Afghan labourers worked in fields for a month,
collecting locusts and burying them in ditches. This labour-intensive method was chosen as an alternative
to spraying crops with chemicals, which were potentially harmful to the population. A total of 110,586
hectares were covered by the programme in the Baghlan, Samangan and Kunduz provinces, and five
kilogrammes of wheat were distributed to the workers for each hectare cleared.
"There is lots of manpower, so this was the best option," Mansour said. He maintained that WFP's aim was
to employ the local community in the interest of the farmers. "Afghanistan is not a country where farmers
can be left to their own devices; they can't do it alone," he said, adding that they were hoping to repeat the
programme next year to avert "a serious disaster" for the farming community.
However, WFP said the problem was far from over. "There are still pockets of locusts. It is impossible to
get rid of them all," Hassan explained. This was evident in Baghlan, where only 40 percent of the locusts
had been destroyed, leaving many farmers short of food. It has been predicted that the problem will be even
worse next year, with fears of about 70 percent of land in Baghlan becoming infested. Hassan said billions
of eggs had been laid, which were due to hatch next March, threatening to bring about an even more
disastrous harvest in the summer. WFP officials say locusts lay pods, each containing about 50 eggs, and
that 450 pods were found on every square metre of land this year. Hassan said it was easier to kill locusts
soon after hatching when they were still wingless and unable to move fast." (IRIN-CA 28 June 2001)
42
Drought in its fourth year in a row (May 2002)
•
Despite some rains in the nortn and the west, the drought will not be over at least until the Spring of
2003.
•
Even though, it will take years of rain and assistance before Afghanistan fully recovers from the
drought.
•
The continuing threat of drought poses a serious risk for rural-urban drought displacement.
"In the summer of 2001, the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) described the three years of
drought in Afghanistan as the 'worst in decades' (WFP 2001: 2). Sharp decreases in rainfall threatened
Afghanistan’s rain-fed agriculture sector (lalmi), prompted widespread losses in livestock
holdings and reduced water available for irrigated agriculture (daimi). Meat, dairy, poultry, fruit and
vegetable products have generally disappeared from the Afghan diet because of the drought, seriously
exacerbating underlying vulnerability to micronutrient deficiencies, such as scurvy.
[…]
Despite encouraging spring rains in the north and the west, the drought in Afghanistan is not over and will
not be at least until the spring of 2003. Even as this historical drought cycle breaks, it will take years (if not
decades) of good rains and continued assistance before individuals, households and communities fully
recover from the drought. In the meantime, the continuing threat of drought poses a serious risk for ruralurban drought displacement, especially in the coming summer months. Throughout Afghanistan,
households have not only lost their farms and gardens, but also their ancestral orchards and vineyards, their
livestock assets (cows and goats for milk, sheep and goats for wool, camels, donkeys and horses for
transportation, oxen for animal traction), their savings and their wealth. Some possessions are gone forever,
such as the heirlooms passed from one generation to the next, but sold in recent years because of desperate
needs for cash. Families have also lost a multitude of daughters given prematurely into marriage.
Winter precipitation patterns in Afghanistan are divided into two seasons. The first season (chellah kalan)
of gentle rains and heavy snows is believed to be the most important for replenishing aquifers and
underground water catchments. This season failed in key areas of Afghanistan, most notably the mountains
of the Hazarajat. This region should be snowbound from November-April in years of average snowfall.
Due to the failure of the snows, roads and mountain passes (e.g., O-Nay Pass in Wardak) remained open
and accessible all winter, including to 2WD taxis and mini-buses. In a 27 March interview, the Bamyan
Municipality reported that the snow pack on Baba Mountain should be ten meters at key passes. This year
the snows reached only twenty centimeters.
[…]
The second season of winter precipitation (chellah khord) is believed to consist of harder rains with a high
degree of run off. This season produced reasonable amounts of precipitation in the north, west and select
other areas, prompting widespread speculation by farmers (and some relief and development workers) that
the drought had broken. Farmers in the north in particular have done all they can in order to plant wheat,
including going even further into debt in order to finance the planting season. Where farmers were able to
obtain seeds, either through relief programs or from the market, animal traction was the most important
constraint on the areas sown. For example, in Sar-e-Pul only 30% of the land was reported planted despite
encouraging spring rains because of a lack of adequate animal traction. Because of the lack of snow fall in
the mountains it is premature to predict the end of the drought anywhere in Afghanistan." (Feinstein
International Famine Center May 2002, pp. 29-32)
43
POPULATION PROFILE AND FIGURES
General
Who are the IDPs in Afghanistan ? (June 2003)
•
Due to the continued drought, the nomadic pastoralist Kuchi currently represent the single largest IDP
group, most of them located in the southern Pashtuns areas of Kandahar and Helmand province. Some
Kuchis have been displaced due to human rights violations in the north and northwest and are
accomodated in camps in Hirat.
•
Most of the other IDPs are Pashtuns displaced by human rights violations and fear of persecution due
to their real or perceived association with the former Taliban.
•
Some 50,000 IDPs are considered to live in Kabul, but it is difficult to distinguish IDPs from urban
poor, economic migrants and refugee returnees who have settled in Kabul and other large towns in
search of employment.
•
A distinction is made between principal internal displacement and secondary internal displacement in
Afghanistan. The second category includes pastoral nomads, repatriated Afghans and those displaced
by natural disasters.
•
In defining the IDPs, it should be taken into account that some IDPs have resettled with friends or
families but that they are still as vulnerable as other IDPs. Furthermore, the mobile nature of the
Afghan society adds to the problem of defining who is an IDP. Nomads, for instance could sometimes
be included in the IDP category.
"While the majority of drought-affected IDPs in the north and west were able to return when adequate
rainfall was experienced last year and excellent rains occurred this year, in the south and southeast drought
conditions continue to prevail and drought-affected IDPs, consisting predominantly of the nomadic
pastoralist Kuchi, currently constitute the single largest IDP group. The largest displaced Kuchi population
is currently located in the southern Pashtun areas of Kandahar and Helmand provinces. A sizable number
of Kuchi are also displaced from the north and northwest and are in the Hirat camps, however, they were
not displaced by drought but due to human rights violations. The remaining non-Kuchi IDPs are all
protection cases, most but not all being Pashtun, who are unwilling to return to their homes in the north and
northwest for fear of retribution for alleged Taliban association and/or due to human rights violations
because of their ethnicity. There have been significant IDP returns in the northeast but protection problems
remain in the Kunduz area.
The displaced population residing in urban areas has been difficult to define and to address their protection
and assistance needs. In the greater Kabul area it is estimates there are around 50,000 persons that can be
considered as IDPs. However, a considerable number have returned to Hazarjat and the Shomali plains and
UNHCR’s current ‘active’ caseload is estimated at around 15,000. It is difficult to distinguish IDPs from
urban poor, economic migrants and refugee returnees who have settled in Kabul and other large towns in
search of employment. In order to better understand this phenomenon an analysis of the different waves of
displacement into and out of Kabul over the past two and a half decades of conflict would be helpful. While
a significant number of IDPs have found at least minimal livelihoods outside of camp -like situations and
survive at levels similar to the rest of the urban poor, it should be emphasized that this recent spontaneous
local integration remains fragile and many urban IDPs remain vulnerable to further displacement from loss
of livelihoods."(Inter-Agency Missions 19 June 2003, p. 2)
44
"In defining internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Afghanistan, a distinction is made between principal
internal displacement and secondary internal displacement (NRC 1998):
Principal internal displacement - victims of conflict who chose to remain in Afghanistan rather than flee
to neighbouring countries.(…) It also includes people displaced due to blockades that have prohibited free
movement and the flow of goods. The resulting economic insecurity has forced many of these people to
leave their homes. This group faces the loss of property rights, access to land and livelihoods.
Secondary internal displacement - this includes other groups, such as:
pastoral nomads, estimated in 1979 to number 800,000. Nomads normally fall outside the definition of
IDPs and some nomadic groups, such as the Zala Khan Khel, opted for external exile. Others remained in
Afghanistan but were prevented by land-mines and other war-related factors from exploiting traditional
pastures. Some nomads have relocated to the lands and property of other displaced groups, complicating
and even prohibiting the return of those with traditional rights;
repatriating Afghan refugees who returned from Pakistan and Iran between 1992 and 1993, and who have
been prevented by ongoing conflict from returning to their homes; and
those displaced by natural disasters: for example, two earthquakes devastated areas in the provinces of
Wardak and Logar in February 1999 destroying the homes of an estimated 100,000 people.
[...]
[But] problems arise in defining the displaced due to the following:
The difficulty in determining at what stage a person should no longer be classified as displaced.
Resettlement in Kabul or with friends or relatives does not mean that coping mechanisms and self-reliance
have been re-established and that the physical and psychological effects of displacement have disappeared.
The need to determine why people become displaced. A number of people leave because of the protracted
nature of the conflict and their inability to feed their families. This situation is exacerbated due to the
mobile nature of Afghan society discussed below. Since these people sometimes do not go far, leave in
small numbers and stay with friends, they are not considered to be displaced.
Forcing a distinction between different groups such as nomads and other displaced groups. Nomads face a
disruption in their means of livelihood and are not always able to resume their lives. Arbitrarily excluding
nomads is rather simplistic. (WFP, October 1999)
Global figures
Between 221,000 and 600,000 IDPs as of June 2003
•
As of June 2003, UNHCR figures show an "active" IDP caseload estimated at 221,000 IDPs
countrywide. 38,000 in the west, 43,000 in the north, 16,000 in greater Kabul, 5,000 in the east and
115,000 in the south
•
Amnesty International estimated that there are 650,000 IDPs left in the country as of June 2003.
•
There is a clear need for more accurate IDP figures. One of the main problem is identifying those who
have returned to urban areas and are still vulnerable.
•
1/3 of the displaced are in collective settlements or camps.
45
There seems to be some disagreements about the remaining number of IDPs in the country as of mid2003. Various sources give various estimations ranging from 221,000 to 600,000.
Information gathered by an Inter-Agency mission conducted in Afghanistan during May and June seem
to suggest that UNHCR -the UN agency in charge of coordinating the return and reintegration of
refugees and IDPs for the past 16 months- is now considering a working figure of an 221,000 "active"
IDP caseload. It isn't quite clear what the term "active" means, but it is assumed that this category only
includes those in camp-like situations and excludes the many IDPs unable to return and who live in
precarious conditions in the cities, namely Kabul where large number of IDPs are reportedly stuck
without any solution in sight. Amnesty International in their latest report underscored the problem of
sustainability of the return that occurred in 2002 and in the second half of 2003, both for returning
refugees and IDPs, and stated that some 600,000 persons remained displaced.
Click here to see a UNHCR map, dated June 2003, showing the IDP caseload by district and region (pdf
440 kb) and also the related statistics on the number and location of IDPs.
"Due to the situation in contemporary Afghanistan, it has been difficult to obtain accurate numbers of
returns to Afghanistan. What is clear, however, is that in stark contrast to the sizeable return from
neighbouring states in 2002, the numbers of people returning to Afghanistan during spring 2003 were
significantly lower, due in no small part to the conviction of many refugees that they would be unable to
return in conditions of safety and dignity. UNHCR announced on 6 June 2003 that around 158,000 Afghan
refugees had so far been assisted to return to their country of origin during the first five months of 2003. Of
these 115,000 had returned from Pakistan, while 43,000 had come back from Iran. In the same period in
2002, UNHCR had assisted in the return of over 815,000 people. The overwhelming majority of these
returns were from Pakistan and Iran, which in total continue to host over 3 million Afghan refugees. An
estimated 650,000 IDPs remain displaced inside Afghanistan. Around 25,000 IDPs returned to their places
of or igin in the first five months of 2003. By the end of June 2002, in comparison, around 400,000 IDPs
had returned to their places of origin." (AI 23 June 2003, p. 6)
"The current IDP population is estimated by UNHCR at around 300,000 of which some 200,000 remain
dependent upon WFP food distribution. Of this total, approximately 50,000 are located in the west, some
40,000 in the north, around 50,000 in the greater Kabul area, and the balance of 160,000 in the south.
These numbers have been substantially reduced from a peak of around one million at the time of the
Taliban’s ouster. Return movements are continuing, albeit at diminishing rates, from the Hirat camps and
within the north. Those that have returned or locally integrated are considered to have attained at least a
minimal level of self-sufficiency." (Inter-Agency Missions 19 June 2003, pp. 1-2)
"The displaced population in the south of Afghanistan, at 350,000, remains extremely high. Most of these
are in the provinces of Kandahar and Helmand, where the capacity of the aid community to assist has been
severely curtailed by the adverse security situation. Pushtuns are continuing to arrive in the south, fleeing
harassment and violence at the hands of the other ethnic groups in the northern provinces of Faryab, Jozjan
and Badghis. This displaced Pushtun population represents about 15% of the total IDP population in the
south. The balance are nomadic Kuchis displaced by the drought.
The total IDP population in Afghanistan now stands at 600,000, a reduction of over half a million as
compared with 2002. This reduction largely arises from an easing of the drought. Thus, around 10,000 IDPs
left Maslakh and other camps near Herat in February and March for their areas of origin. However, many
IDPs have indicated in recent surveys that they wish to remain in and around urban areas because of the
better income-earning opportunities available." (BAAG April 2003, p. 7)
46
"There are an estimated 600,000 internally displaced people throughout Afghanistan, half of whom are in
the southern provinces. About 220,000 of the displaced population are in collective settlements or camps
throughout the country. Their main reasons of flight are drought, but there are also those who cannot return
because of insecurity and/or harassment." (UNAMA 30 March 2003)
"There are approximately 480,000 internally displaced persons in Afghanistan, most of them in the south.
Families generally feel compelled to move because of discrimination, extortion, taxation, drought
conditions, and purely economic motives. Although the internally displaced person situation has stabilized
somewhat, families are still moving from the north and other already displaced families continue to move
in search of assistance. The return of internally displaced persons to their home communities will depend
on an improvement in the drought-affected areas, the resolution of land disputes and political developments
in the north." (UN Secretary General 18 March 2003, p. 14)
"During 1381/2002 most attention has understandably been focused on the huge scale of refugee return
from the neighbouring countries. This however, substantial IDP returns have also occurred in the northern,
central, western and eastern parts of the country. Concentrations of IDPs totalling in the region of 600,000
continue to be found scattered across much of southern Afghanistan, around Herat in the west, and in parts
of the north.
[...]
The main areas of concentration of IDPs are in Zhare Dasht, Panjwai and other settlements in the south,
Maslakh and Shaidayee camps in the west, and a number of smaller camps in the north." (TISA March
2003, p. 3/8)
Number of IDPs at the end of 2002
"[...] there are still some 700,000 IDPs throughout the country. The displacement problem is particularly
acute in southern provinces, where an estimated 400,000 people are scattered after leaving their
communities due mainly to the severe drought as well as ethnic tension in the north.
Regional breakdown of IDPs
North
South
Centre
East
West
Estimated total
51,000
413,000
124,000
70,000
66,000
724,000
" (UNHCR 3 January 2003)
"It is variously estimated that around five million Afghans remain displaced, either internally (some 1
million) or as refugees in neighbouring countries and elsewhere (nearly 4 million). These numbers have
been generated over the past two decades in three basic phases. Whereas in the 1980s, large displacements
resulted from the Soviet invasion and the ensuing war, internecine conflict was the main cause during the
1990s. Over the past four years, displacement has been a consequence of the effects of a prolonged and
severe drought, that was most acute in the western and northern regions, and continuing internal conflict
between Taliban and Northern Alliance forces along the north-eastern frontline and in various pockets in
the central and highlands regions.
47
Prior to September 11, 2001, the number of IDPs was estimated by UNOCHA at some 900,000, with
particularly heavy concentrations of newly displaced persons in the north and west. Their number is
believed to have risen as a result of the conflict during October and November 2001 to around 1.2 million –
much of the increase being experienced in the central and southeastern regions and along the Pakistan
border. However, given the fluidity of the situation over the past six months, and the protracted absence of
international observers, these numbers are but crude and largely unverifiable estimates.
Attempts are now underway to ascertain more reliable statistics on IDPs through registrations conducted by
IOM and UNHCR and their partner NGOs. The present paucity of detailed/verifiable information on IDPs
continues to constrain the planning and response capacity of humanitarian actors supporting return
movements and/or proving in-situ assistance to the displaced. Furthermore, it hampers the capacity of
agencies to provide timely and objective information to IDPs concerning conditions in areas of potential
return.
Rapid assessment exercises and the production of detailed district profiles are currently ongoing in potential
areas of return using standardized survey instruments. When completed, these assessments will generate
much of the urgently required information at regional, provincial and district levels, including such data as:
population numbers, places of origin, time/length of displacement, ethnic group, conditions of
vulnerability, assistance needs in areas of displacement and prospects and expectations for return.
However, the exercise appears to be carried out at varying intensities and sometimes with diverse
methodologies and/or actors in each region." (IDP Unit-OCHA 28 March 2002, pp. 2-3)
Characteristics of displacement
"The distinction between ‘conflict-induced’ and ‘drought-induced’ IDPs is an oversimplification of
Afghanistan’s complex internal displacement problem. Many drought-induced IDPs may not have become
displaced had conflict not undermined their normal support capacities. Moreover, the overall national
food-security crisis has created widespread levels of acute vulnerability where the only survival strategy is
to become ‘local’ IDPs at or near internationally assisted IDP camps. Indeed, one of the overriding
concerns expressed by almost all humanitarian actors is the dilemma they face in providing even the most
basic levels of assistance to IDPs in the knowledge that such assistance will likely create new IDPs drawn
from among local vulnerable populations. This situation is compounded by the fact that in many areas IDPs
are living with host families who are equally destitute and in need of assistance. Moreover, in many cases,
IDPs living with host families are not included in registrations and, by extension, in food and NFI
distributions.
Notwithstanding the above, an important distinction must be made between those able to return to areas of
displacement caused by conflict (where mines are one of the primary constraints to return) and those that
were displaced by drought (where the availability of agricultural inputs and the vagaries of climate are the
primary constraint). Hence, in much of the south, southeast and central regions, returnees require a basic
provision of shelter kits and mine action in their villages in order to re-establish themselves, while in the
north and west, return is a much more uncertain and precarious challenge given the risk that ameliorated
drought conditions may only be a temporary phenomena." (IDP Unit-OCHA 28 March 2002, p. 3)
Afghanistan Information Management Unit (AIMS)
Monitoring IDP movements and numbers in Afghanistan has proven extremely difficult for obvious
reasons. The absence of systematic and complete information about IDP populations compromises the
effectiveness of the assistance to IDPs. In the context of an improved UN response, the Afghanistan
Information Management Service has recently been established.
48
"The Afghanistan Information Management Service (AIMS) is a joint venture between UNOCHA and
UNDP, reporting directly to the UN Coordinator for Afghanistan. It is comprised of two components, the
Humanitarian Information Center for Afghanistan (HICFA) and the Project Management Information
System (ProMIS). The primary objectives of AIMS in 2002 are to support the humanitarian intervention in
Afghanistan; to provide guidance to operational and strategic decisionmaking; and to mainstream effective
information management practices into the reconstruction and development work of future Afghan
administration and the international community." (UN 21 January 2002, p. 60)
The following documents are available on AIMS website and are updated on a regular basis:
-Raw IDP data (Excell 400 kb), click here to download the sheet (last updated in Feb 2002)
-Map showing known IDP concentrations (161 kb pdf)
-Map showing IDP population aggregated to district (149 kb pdf)
-Map showing IDP aggregated at Province level (150 kb pdf)
"Note: The information held on the AIMS database is compiled from the best available sources and is
updated daily. However the database includes ONLY known point locations of IDPs that have been verified
in the field and geocoded.The accuracy of this information obviously depends on the participation of
partner organizations.The database does NOT include estimated positions and numbers of IDPs.As a result
the database is accurate but incomplete." (AIMS)
Total number of IDPs as of mid-October 2001 and projected displacement
According to OCHA up to 1,000,000 people were displaced either by conflict or drought before the
September 11 events in the U.S.
Kabul :100,000 IDPs
Herat and the West: 200,000 IDPs
Kandahar and the South: 200,000 IDPs
Mazar-I-Sharif and the North: 500,000 IDPs
At the end of September the threat of the U.S. attacks had started to trigger population movements away
from most urban areas towards remote villages and border regions. Eastern and central regions have
been particularly affected (OCHA 3 October 2001). As of October 19, the total number of IDPs (dislaced
by conflict and/or drought) is estimated at 1,160,000 (DFID 19 October 2001)
The military campaign started on October 7 has created new population movements of uncertain scale so
far. Recent reports have described increasing number of people fleeing the military strikes and arriving
at Iran or Pakistan borders that only the women, children and elderly are allowed to cross. A number of
camps have been set up along the borders but within Afghanistan territory to accommodate the
displaced.
(Click the map below for a full scale U.S. Governement map showing the IDP situation as of 29 October
2001. (pdf 296 kb))
49
With the borders with all neighbouring countries being closed it is projected that over 1,000,000 persons
will be further displaced bringing the total displaced population to an estimated 2,250,000 (see
"Projected Displacement in and around Afghanistan - Planning figures", UNDP, 28 September 2001)
The total number of vulnerable people in need of humanitarian assistance and protection inside and
outside of Afghanistan is estimated at 7,500,000 people
Populations in need of humanitarian assistance/protection
(All figures should be treated with caution)
Refugees in Iran pre-11 September
1,500,000
Refugees in Pakistan pre-11 September
2,000,000
Refugees elsewhere in region pre-11 September
195,000
New refugees in Iran since 11 September
No estimates available
New refugees in Pakistan since 11 September
20,000
New refugees elsewhere in region since 11 September 1,000
Current estimated Internally Displaced (IDPs)
1,160,000
Current estimated Internally Stranded (ISPs)
4,150,00
Subtotal
5,331,000
UN projected further IDPs/ISPs
2,200,000
Projected Vulnerable Total
7,500,000 (rounded)
Source: Department for International Development (UK), 19 October 2001
50
Source: WFP 1 October 2001
Total number of IDPs as of April 2001: 300,000-400,000
•
As of April 2001, the total number of conflict-induced IDPs is estimated to range between 300,000 and
400,000
•
UNHCR estimates that 16,000 IDPs are sheltered in the ex-Soviet Embassy, another 55,000 to 60,000
spread over Kabul and approximately 50,000 IDPs in the Panjshir Valley.
The UN estimates that the total number of people displaced at the end of 2000 ranges between 600,000
and 800,000 persons and includes displacement caused by drought and conflict, (IRIN 5 March 2001 /
UNOCHA 6 April 2001). The total number of conflict-induced IDPs at the end of 2000 was estimated to
range between 300,000 and 400,000. (UNICEF 8 March 2001; USCR 2 February 2001; IRIN 8
February 2001). Included in the conflict-induced figures are an estimated 100,000 people displaced
since 1999 such as those in Kabul, the Panjshir valley or northern Hazarajat (Office of the UN
Coordinator for Afghanistan 19 January 2001)
It should be noted exact figures have been very difficult to obtain due to several reasons. Distinguishing
between drought and conflict-induced displacement has not been easy especially in regions such as
Mazar-e-Sharif or Kabul where both groups of victims are mixed together. Internally displaced are
51
integrated with host populations making identification difficult to the extent that some members of the
local population have also been known to masquerade as IDPs in order to obtain assistance. The
frequent movement of IDPs has also complicated estimates. (OCHA 17 October 2000)
Finally ongoing displacement and limited access to needy populations in several regions of Afghanistan
(i.e. Dar-e-Suf), due to bad weather or volatile security conditions, further complicate the task of getting
a comprehensive picture of the situation in terms of figures.
Total number of conflict-related IDPs in Afghanistan by region as of February 2001
Takhar and Badakshan province : 84,000 + 10,000 (Tajik-Afghan border)
Mazar-e-Sharif : 53,000
Panjsheer Valley : 75,000 + 10,400 (new arrivals Takhar)
Kabul: 16,000 + 60,000
Jalalabad : 2,600
Hazarajat: 5,000
Total: 316,000 IDPs
(USCR 2 February 2001)
(Office for the UN co-ordinator for Afghanistan 19 January 2001)
(WFP 4 August 2000, 25 August 2000)
(UNHCR, 14 July 2000)
(IASC 1 December 2000)
(IRIN 8 February 2001)
"(...)straight addition shows that about 470,000 people have left their homes, the preponderance of whom
are internally displaced inside Afghanistan. In addition, the totals represent only new IDPs and do not
include at least 100,000 old IDPs from 1999, such as those in Kabul, Panjshir, or northern Hazarajat, or the
many layers of displaced people over the years who have sought safety in Kabul. Moreover, these totals do
not take into account all displacement that is likely to have occurred, such as within remote districts to
other remote districts (e.g. Ghor); into urban centres but outside of camps (e.g. Herat); or into Iran.
Therefore, this total number of IDPs/refugees should be assumed to be reasonably accurate for now, and if
anything, on the low side." (Office of the UN co-ordinator for Afghanistan 19 January 2001)
According to UNHCR figures, the number of IDPs at the beginning of July stands as follows:
16,000 IDPs staying in the ex-Soviet Embassy compound in Kabul
55,000 to 60,000 registered IDPs in Kabul, spread out in the city, staying with relatives, etc.
Approximately 50,000 IDPs (7,568 families) in the Panjshir Valley.These figures exclude IDPs in the areas
of Gulbahar, Jabulsaraj and Char-I-Kar (UNHCR, 14 July 2000)
Total number of IDPs at the end of 1999: 500,000-700,000
•
According to USCR's estimates, the number of IDPs at the end of 1999 ranged from 500,000 to
750,000.
•
UNHCR estimates that some 259,000 newly displaced persons in 1999 were still in need of aid and
protection at the end of the year.
•
OCHA estimates the total number of IDPs to be around 1,200,000 at the end of November.
52
"The number of internally displaced Afghans is unknown. In recent years, Taliban offensives in northern
Afghanistan have displaced hundreds of thousands of people. Many are thought to have returned home as
the lines of battle shifted from their home areas to new ones. Camps for displaced persons in Jalalabad that
once housed more than 120,000 people are now closed. Yet most of Kabul's present population is
displaced. A survey of Kabul's population carried out by the ICRC found that 83 percent of those
interviewed had been displaced from their homes at one time or another.
During the year, more than 350,000 people were newly displaced, particularly from Bamiyan and other
areas of Hazarajat (115,000), Darae Souf near Mazar-i-Sharif (50,000), the Shomali Plains north of Kabul
(170,000), and Taloqan (16,000). Many of those who fled, perhaps as many as 150,000, later returned
home, but some 200,000 remained displaced. Based on the number newly displaced in 1999 who were still
displaced at year's end and on the number displaced in Kabul and other areas from previous years, USCR
estimates the number of internally displaced persons to be 500,000 to 750,000." (USCR, June 2000)
According to UNHCR's figures, some 259,000 newly displaced persons in 1999 were still in need of aid
and protection at the end of the year. (UNHCR, June 2000)
"[I]n addition to the existing concentration of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in urban areas - which are
estimated at over one million - the fighting in 1999 has resulted in a further wave of displacement. Civilians
have often been the direct targets of conflict and have had no option but to flee. This has meant that more
than 200,000 additional people have lost their livelihoods and are reliant on either international assistance
or help from fellow Afghans for their survival." (UNOCHA, UNRCO November 1999, p. 17)
Total number of IDPs at the end of 1998: 540,000-1,000,000
•
The main displacement during the year occurred following fighting due to significant Taliban advances
into the northern provinces.
•
Based on an estimated 60,000 people outside Kabul, 360,000 people displaced in Kabul, and an
estimated 120,000 displaced people living at Sar Shahi camp, USCR estimates the total number of
IDPs between 540,000 and 1,000,000
•
In a report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan to the Commission on Human Rights on its
55th, it was stated that there were more than 2,000 000 internally displaced persons in the end of 1998
During 1998, the Taliban forces made significant advances into the northern provinces of Afghanistan.
"Informed observers estimate that hundreds of thousand of Afghans besides those at Sar Shahi are
internally displaced, but no reliable statistics regarding them exists. […]
The U.S. State Department's estimate of the number of displaced persons in Afghanistan was 300,000 in
1998, but other sources believed the number could be a million or more. The International Committee of
the Red Cross provided relief assistance to approximately 60,000 people outside Kabul, and reported that
there were about 360,000 people displaced in Kabul.
If the above 420,000 people are added to the 120,000 displaced people living at Sar Shahi camp, the
minimum number of internally displaced persons in Afghanistan would be 540,000. USCR therefore
estimates that the total number of internally displaced Afghans in 1998 was no less than 540,000 and as
high as 1 million." (USCR 1999, p. 123)
In the report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan to the Commission on Human Rights on its
55th session by Mr. Kamal Hossain, Special Rapporteur, it was stated that there were more than 2,000 000
internally displaced persons in the end of 1998. (Commission on Human Rights 24 March 1999, para 17)
53
For further information on the Massacre in Mazar-I-Sharif in August 1998, see Human Rights Watch,
Afghanistan: The Massacre in Mazar-I-Sharif [External link]
Geographical distribution
Eastern region overview (October 2002)
•
68,000 IDPs registered in the eastern region, most of them in Nangarhar region.
•
Majority of IDPs are returning.
•
Some 5,000 IDP families still living in Hisashahi camp as of March 2002.
•
Although UNHCR has started a voluntary repatriation program, many are not able to return due to
security problems in the area of origin.
•
Some 3,000 registered IDPs are living in Jalalabad with an additional 42,000 unregistered IDPs
"There are some 68,000 registered IDPs in the eastern region, of whom 62,000 are in the province of
Nangarhar, 4,000 in Konar and 1,800 in Laghman. Aid workers say the IDPs are keen to return to their
places of origin. "The IDP situation is improving in the eastern region as the trends show that the majority
of people are returning," Tennant said.
Hisarshahi camp, the biggest in the eastern region, used to host up to 100,000 IDPs (15,000 families) when
it was first established in 1994, following fighting between Mujahidin groups in and around the Afghan
capital, Kabul. UNHCR along with international NGOs such as the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan,
the Islamic Relief Agency and a local NGO, Hewad, have been assisting dis placed Afghans at the camp.
In March 2002, UNHCR carried out a population survey at the camp, finding that there were nearly 5,000
families left there, of whom more than half wanted to return home. Most of them were of Pashtun ethnic
origin from Kabul, Nangarhar, Laghman and Takhar.
In response to the IDPs' wish to return to their home regions, UNHCR started a voluntary repatriation
programme, under which they were provided with transport, wheat and plastic sheeting. However, between
30 and 50 families were arriving at the camp every week up until May. They were from Takhar, Konduz
and Baghlan provinces, where ethnic Tajiks predominate.
Although there have reportedly been some improvements in the situation for Pashtuns in these provinces,
following intervention by a commission formed by Karzai's government, and international criticism, it is
likely to be some time before these families feel that the situation is sufficiently secure for them to return if ever - according to aid workers.
There are now some 247 new families registered at the camp, with another 34 unregistered. 'Our strategy is
to give them emergency assistance, but it will be limited, as this cannot continue forever,' said Tennant.
She added that her counterparts in the northern city of Mazar-e Sharif were identifying the problems in
Takhar, because the displaced families said they did want to return if security improved. 'A proposal for a
return commission to be set up in the north has been put forward to ensure returnees' safety,' she said.
In addition to the IDPs at the camp, there are 3,000 registered IDP families living in Jalalabad city, who
fled their homes over the past few years due to factional fighting and the drought. However, there are an
estimated 42,000 additional unregistered IDP families in the city, of whom some 18,000 would return,
according to UNHCR. The refugee agency also plans to assist these people in returning to their home
provinces." (IRIN October 2002)
54
Southern region overview (April 2003)
•
An estimated 350,000 IDPs are spread over six camps in Kandahar and Helmand province.
•
IDPs are still arriving in the south due to insecurity in the north.
•
Almost one half of Afghanistan’s IDPs live in Southern Afghanistan.
•
Many of the IDPs and returnees are concentrated in camp s in the south of Kandahar province.
•
The Iranian government finally closed the two IDP camps of Mekaki and Mile 46 in Nimruz province
on 8 May 2002.
"There are an estimated 350,000 internally displaced persons in southern Afghanistan, most of them in six
settlements in Kandahar and Helmand provinces. People are still arriving in these settlements after fleeing
harassment and insecurity in the north - from Faryab, Jawzjan and Badghis provinces." (UNHCR 17 April
2003)
"Almost one half of Afghanistan’s IDPs live in Southern Afghanistan, with the majority being drought
displaced. A large proportion of these come from the Ethnic Kuchi population, traditionally nomadic
pastoralists whose livelihoods have been decimated by the drought and conflict. Many of the IDPs and
returnees are concentrated in camps in the south of Kandahar province. This includes about 40,000 people
waiting in the Chaman ‘no man’s land’ area, hoping to cross into Pakistan. They have been refused entry
and it is hoped that they will be relocated to about 10 community-based settlements in Kandahar province
(WFP 31/05/02). There are also estimated to be about 44,000 IDPs in five camps at Spin Boldak. The
situation in the Spin Boldak camps is currently uncertain due to the withdrawal of the main NGOs from the
camp. The UNHCR has stepped in for a period but suffers from its own funding constraints. The hope is
that many of the camp residents will return to their areas of origin but many feel currently unable to do so
as a result of continuing insecurity and loss of livelihoods. It has also been noted that there is considerable
persecution of ethnic Pashtuns, which make up the majority of the IDPs in the south, and they are unlikely
to return until it is clear that they are able to do so safely (UNHCR 26&06/02). The RNIS has not received
any recent nutritional reports on the area but the nutrition situation is thought to be precarious.
The Iranian government finally closed the two IDP camps of Mekaki and Mile 46 in Nimruz province on 8
May 2002. The camps had been just one kilometre inside the border with Iran and were established because
Iran would not open its borders to Afghans seeking refugee status. At their height, the camps housed
approximately 10,500 people. The IDPs have since returned to their places of origin." (RNIS No. 38 July
2002, p. 46)
"[There are] about 7,300 families, or some 65,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Spin Boldak's five
makeshift camps. The first is run by the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY). The other four are:
Sheikh Abdul Rashid Al Makhdum, Islamic International Relief Organisation, Al Akhter and Al Rashid all named after various Arab charities and individuals who are managing the camps, because the hardline
Taliban rulers did not allow the UN and Western aid agencies to manage the crisis, keeping it away from
the eyes of the world until their fall in mid-December.
Most of the IDPs living in these camps are Pashtun nomads and farmers from the southern Afghan
provinces of Kandahar, Zabol and Nimruz, who, along with most of their counterparts throughout the
country, are victims of the severe central Asian drought - well into its fourth year now. There are also IDPs
in the camps from western and northern Afghanistan - places as far away as Konduz in the north." (IRIN 13
March 2002)
55
Western region overview (August 2002)
•
It is estimated that as of August 2002, some 100,000 IDPs might be staying in 5 camps in and around
Herat.
•
IDPs remained inadequately informed about the voluntary nature of the return
•
Taliban recruitment efforts in Herat and around have caused movements of population (among them
IDPs) out of Herat.
•
Severe drought has caused massive displacementin western Afghanistan in western Afghanistan, with
people moving mainly to Herat where 90,000 IDPs are sheltered in 6 camps.
•
2000 IDPs arrive in Herat on a weekly basis and this flow is expected to increase with the melting of
snow.
"Although the total number of IDPs in the [western] region is hard to determine, some estimate that more
than 100,000 might be staying in the five camps in and around Herat after more than 80,000 of them
returned to their villages - mostly in the three provinces of Herat, Badghis and Ghowr - in an International
Organisation for Migration (IOM) assisted return programme over the past four months.
IOM now believes that the total number of displaced people in Maslakh, the largest displacement camp in
western Afghanistan has halved from the estimated 118,000 registered in February. Earlier the population
estimates there ranged from 200,000 to 300,000. IOM manages all the camps in Herat.
Shaidayee, a smaller camp, housed more than 20,000 people in early July, while the Minaret camp in the
centre of Herat city accommodated up to 400 families. With Rawzabagh officially closed, some IDPs
continue to live in the Rawashan and city transit camps.
Conditions in the camps are not encouraging. While most of the camps have mud houses instead of tents,
the stench of human faeces permeates the air. Diarrhoea and respiratory diseases are common in the
crowded environment. But Maslakh, named after the once functional slaughterhouse near the camp, has
always been a symbol of Afghan suffering - long before 11 September 2001.
"The overall situation has improved in the last few months, comp ared to the beginning of the year,"
Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) country manager for the western and southern regions in Afghanistan,
Stefano Savi, told IRIN.
"At the beginning of the year corruption, discrimination, violence and food distribution undermined
security and protection of the population, especially in the Maslakh camp," he added.
Raising further concerns, Savi said that although security improved after the changes to the management of
the security and a decrease in the number of displaced, IDPs remained inadequately informed about the
voluntary nature of the return. "They don't know much about their areas of origin, where enough assistance
is not being provided," he said." (IRIN 16 August 2002)
"Shaidayee camp was originally established by UNHCR in October 1996 and as of March 27, 2002, had
4,588 registered families (25,149 individuals).5 At the time of the study (March 29, 2002), 551 families
were registered as "New Arrivals" (having arrived within the last three months) in Shaidayee camp. A
section of the camp was opened for new arrivals on February 10, 2002 due to overcrowding of the more
established IDP camps in the area including Mazlack and Rawza Bagh camps.
The camp, directly off of the main road going to the eastern districts of Karuch, Obeh, and Chesht-e-Sharif
of Herat Province, is in the midst of a dry desert basin without any natural water source. Water is
adequately supplied to the camp by chlorinated, hand pumped ground wells. Traditional pit latrines are
used by adults, however, the children continue to defecate around the camp in some of the pits made by the
removal of dirt for traditional housing. The International Organization of Migration (IOM) served as camp
56
administrator. Médecins sans Frontières (Holland) assists on initial health screening of all new arrivals and
health care for the camp population. Security is provided by the local commander Ismael Khan's militia,
primarily at checkpoints at the beginning and end of the main road in front of the camp.
The older IDP section consists of traditional shelters made of sun-dried mud bricks. New arrivals have been
given large IOM standard, white tents that have a zippered opening in both the front and back. All
domiciles (mud huts or tents) are placed in a grid system and are well organized and mapped. Distribution
centers for food and non-food items are scattered through the camp and easily accessed by dirt roads. The
main road in front of the camp has a bus stop for buses coming and going to other provinces as well as into
Herat city. A bazaar has been established along this road by some of the IDPs where fruits, vegetables,
candy, music cassettes, clothes, and other various items are sold." (PHR April 2002)
For more detailed information at the district level, see UNHCR Sub-Office Western Region District
Profiles for the following provinces: Badghis, Farah, Hirat
Central region overview (October 2002)
•
No IDP camps in central Afghanistan, most are in urban areas, mainly Kabul.
•
170,000 left in the central region according to UNHCR
"In central Afghanistan, there are no longer any camps for IDPs, most are now squatting wherever they can
find a desolate building in urban areas like the capital, Kabul. […]
The two main camp in the region now stand empty. IDPs voluntarily left them - one in the Panjshir valley
and the other at the former Soviet compound in Kabul - to return to their places of origin, according to
UNHCR.
According to the refugee agency, in the central region there was now a trend for IDPs and refugees to
return to their areas of origin, unless their homes were located in insecure places or drought-affected areas.
However, aid workers say displacement could continue. 'If there is continuing displacement, it will be
towards the end of the year when people run out of food in areas where the harvest and crop was bad,'
Felipe Camargo, head of the UNHCR central region sub-office in Kabul, told IRIN.
UNHCR carried out a survey in the central region at the start of 2001 to determine the amount of food
assistance needed for IDPs, and established that there were about 347,000 IDPs, most of them in Kabul. Of
these some 242,000 were expected to go home, Camargo said. Following the most recent count, UNHCR
concluded there were around 170,000 IDPs left in the central region. Camargo said there were still serious
concerns over the conditions the IDPs were living in. 'Water and sanitation are our key concerns,' he said,
noting that many IDPs were occupying houses in Kabul demolished during fighting and unfit for habitation.
Raising the point that large numbers of refugees were returning to the central region, he said there could be
further displacement if more houses were not built. 'The population of Kabul is expected to double in the
next year or so, and there is an urgent need for the international community to realise this,' he said. 'Without
proper housing Kabul will be full of slums in a very high earthquake-prone area.' Shelter, he said, was the
number-one priority. 'Only after providing shelter can we think about giving them access to education and
health.' " (IRIN October 2002)
For more detailed information at the district level, see UNHCR Sub-Office Central Region District
Profiles for the following provinces: Bamyan, Ghazni, Kabul, Kapisa, Logar, Parwan, Wardak
57
Vulnerable groups
Kuchis IDPs, the largest of Afghanistan's displaced population, need alternate
solutions (June 2003)
•
Kuchis represent some 80% of the current displaced population, most to them were displaced by
drought and loss of livelihood..
•
Return of the displaced Kuchis to the desert is very unlikely in the near future.
•
Their nomadic livestyle raises the question of where they have their "area of origin".
•
Any return movements would first require rebuilding their herds.
•
Drought has turned nomads or Kuchis into beggars and IDPs.
•
Early 1980's Afghanistan's nomadic population was estimated to be 2.5 million, scattered across the
country in almost all the provinces.
•
Drought and insecurity have disrupted the migration routes, destroyed pasture and decimated livestock
herds, leaving the Kuchi not just without livelihoods but bringing to an end a traditional way of life,
with the majority being forced to settle in makeshift camps along major highways.
"The displaced pastoralists, and others displaced by drought and loss of livelihoods, are by far the largest of
Afghanistan’s displaced population, constituting about eighty percent of the current IDP population. There
are two Kuchi groups who have been most affected. The first migrate in and around the Registan desert in
the southern part of Kandahar and Helmand provinces while the second migrate between the mountainous
areas of the interior during the summer and the lower valleys during the winter. The first group are the
largest and most vulnerable group as their potential return to the desert is, for the majority, unlikely in the
foreseeable future. In addition, they are not regarded by either the local authorities or local populations as
part of the communities among which they are currently displaced. Indeed, some authorities claim that
many of the Registan Kuchi have closer ties to Pakistan and thus should seek assistance on the other side of
the border. Such claims highlight the question of where do nomadic pastoralists have their ‘areas of
origin’.
Given that the greater majority of the displaced Kuchi have lost all their livestock, and that their traditional
livelihoods were wholly dependent upon these animals, any return movements would first require
rebuilding their herds. While return to normal rainfall conditions, the replenishment of water tables and the
rehabilitation of wells will be important precondition for a return to pastoral livelihoods in the south, any
major re-stocking programme would be a very expensive undertaking. It might also be a technical problem
as some experts suggest that there would not be enough healthy female animals in the region. Thus, unless
support and services can be provided to rebuild their traditional livelihoods and return to a nomadic
existence, alternate solutions will need to found so that a large majority of Kuchi not remain ‘internally
stuck’ at their present locations." (Inter-Agency Missions 19 June 2003, p. 10)
"Afghan nomads or Kuchis, once a proud community of herd raisers and merchants, have been turned into
destitute farmers, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and beggars by the ongoing drought in the region.
[...]
Habibullah Rafi, director of the Afghanistan Cultural Centre in Pakistan's northwestern city of Peshawar
told IRIN that nomads were an important part of Afghanistan's ethnic patchwork. 'These livestock raisers
have a considerable share in shaping the history and society of the country. These sturdy have their areas of
origin but they move, chasing pastures and water in different weathers,' he said.
58
In the early 1980's Afghanistan's nomadic population was estimated to be 2.5 million, scattered across the
country in almost all the provinces. Hundreds of thousands of them are desperately trying to preserve their
way of life during the fourth year of the worst regional drought in living memory.
Many fail and end up trying to get work as labourers in areas such as Helmand and Kandahar where
irrigation allows crops to grow. Those without work beg on the dusty streets of the region's towns.
Traditionally nomads depend on livestock raising but they also engage in trade along ancient migratory
caravan trails east and north of the central Hindu Kush mountains." (IRIN 20 March 2002)
"A minority group that has generated considerable concern is the Kuchi, traditional traditional nomads who
follow traditional livestock migration routes in search of grazing. The drought and insecurity have
disrupted the migration routes, destroyed pasture and decimated livestock herds, leaving the Kuchi not just
without livelihoods but bringing to an end a traditional way of life, with the majority being forced to settle
in makeshift camps along major highways." (ACC/SCN July 2001 pp. 42-43)
Displaced women are extremely vulnerable (June 2003)
•
Unaccompanied women and female-headed households have found it particularly hard to eke out a
living upon their return
•
Displaced women without shelter are more vulnerable to the severe Taliban restrictions on freedom
and rights of women.
•
Since women are defined by their relationship to a male member of their family, displaced females
who have no male relative present are particularly vulnerable.
•
Close male relative offer protection to displaced women by marrying them.
•
Displaced women tend to form groups to survive but traditional Afghan society views unattached
women, especially those living together, as sinful.
"Unaccompanied women and female-headed households have found it particularly hard to eke out a living
upon their return. Farah returned to Mazar-i-Sharif in February 2003 along with her four children. Her
husband was dead, and she was finding it very hard to support her children with the little money she got
from doing odd jobs such as sewing. A group of Hazara women living as IDPs on the outskirts of Mazar-iSharif stated that their husbands had very insecure access to wage labour in the city, as a consequence of
which they were unsure whether they would have enough money to buy food for the family from one day
to the next. Situations of vulnerability are heightened when, as is the case with several families in
contemporary Afghanistan, one man is the sole supporter of up to five female –headed households. These
are usually female relatives whose husbands have either died or gone missing (most of the latter have lost
contact with their families after having gone in search of employment). The access of one man to
employment, therefore, in many cases has a direct bearing on the security and well being of several women
and their children." (AI 23 June 2003, pp. 24-25)
"The Taliban government has imposed a strict version of Sharia, Islamic law, on the country, prohibiting a
wide range of public activities. Many of these prohibitions are particularly designed to restrict the freedoms
and rights of women. Under this interpretation of Islamic law, women are prohibited from most jobs, often
from going to school and, in some cases, from leaving the home. Women who violate these restrictions can
be punished severely and their families held responsible for their behaviour. Women mu st be veiled in
public and must restrict their movements outside their homes. Displaced women who have no shelter in
which to maintain their privacy are doubly disadvantaged.
59
Even before Sharia was imposed, the patriarchal society of Afghanistan required that women depended on
close male relatives to survive. Now, women are not allowed to appear in public with men who are not
close relatives. This restriction has created particularly severe problems for widows who have no male
family members to help or protect them. Since women are defined by their relationship to a male member
of their family, displaced females who have no male relative present, either because the men stayed behind,
were arrested, or were killed are particularly vulnerable. A widow’s brother or close male relative of her
deceased husband will often protect her by marrying her, as men are permitted four wives under Islamic
law. This form of protection has increased among the displaced population and among Afghan refugees,
though it is by no means a complete solution to women’s considerable problems.
The Taliban also interpret Islamic Law to forbid unrelated men and women from being in close proximity.
This has led to problems with males trying to help displaced women. In 1998, three women and their three
children, all suffering severe malnutrition, were attempting to drive to a feeding centre where they could
receive food. Their van was stopped at a Taliban checkpoint and the male driver was taken and badly
beaten for having allowed one of the mothers to sit in the front seat. The mothers and their children were
forced from the vehicle. They never reached the feeding centre (Shorish-Shamley, 2001).
In an effort to help themselves, women gather informally in groups, or cooperatives. These groups are
modeled on the traditional living arrangements in Afghan society, where women live much of their lives
apart from men in groups related by birth or marriage. In the traditional household compounds, sisters,
sisters-in-law, mothers, grandmothers, daughters, and, in some cases, multiple wives form tight bonds and
develop informal networks outside the home.
Displaced women in desperate situations form similar bonds. In these groups of unrelated women, food and
other resources are shared and labour is divided: some women look after children while other women
search, or beg, for food. Since women beyond their childbearing years are somewhat freer to move around
in public, they represent the group in society. Some groups number only a few women; others can include
more than two dozen people, including children.
These groupings can, however, be the source of new problems: traditional Afghan society views unattached
women, especially those living together, as sinful. They are assumed to be prostitutes. Why else, the
traditional thinking goes, would they have no men with them? While there have been reports of prostitution
among displaced women, evidence suggests that it is a rare occurrence." (Farr, G. 1 September 2001 pp.
132-135)
60
PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT
General
Pashtuns fleeing the ethnic tensions in the north and Kuchis fleeing the drought end
up as displaced in the south (October 2002)
•
Half of the 60,000 IDPs living around the town of Chaman fled the drought and the warfare in the
south, most of them are Kuchis, while the other half fled ethnic tensions in ther north and are Pashtuns.
•
A few tens of thousands managed to get through to Pakistan where they were hosted in refugee camps
•
Some 25,000 could not cross the border and were stuck in a no man's land, on the border but on the
Pakistani side.
•
Another 35,000 are dispersed over 5 camps around Spin Boldak and are IDPs.
"Since October 2001, over 60,000 Afghans have been living around the town of Chaman on the southern
Pakistan-Afghan border. Half of them fled because of the drought and the warfare in the south. Many of
these are Kutchis. The other half comes from the north. These are Pashtuns, trying to escape the ethnic
tensions that erupted shortly after the war against terrorism began. Uzbeks and Tajiks took revenge on the
local Pashtuns because they suspected them of supporting the Taliban. The Pashtuns fled towards the south,
where their tribe is in the majority, and ended up in the border area along with the Kutchis; looking for help
and protection.
The first group, a few ten thousand, were lucky. Though Pakistan had officially closed the border it was
still allowing a lot of Afghans through. These were taken to various official refugee camps on the Pakistani
side of the border, where they received the help they were entitled to. MSF runs health programs in two of
these camps: Rhogani and Lande Karez.
Another group of around 25,000 Afghans were less fortunate when they attempted to cross the border at
Chaman in February 2002. They were stopped and since then have been stuck in a piece of no man's land,
practically on the border but just on the Pakistani side. They have been living in a chaotic camp where it
took a long time to organize assistance. MSF was present there from the very start to provide the people
with medical support (vaccinations, basic healthcare) and to tackle malnutrition among the children.
Then, there is a third group of some 35,000 Afghans on the Afghan side of the border, dispersed over five
camps around Spin Boldak, near Chaman. As they are still inside Afghanistan, they are not official refugees
but internally displaced persons. MSF runs a health clinic in Spin Boldak." (MSF 7 October 2002)
See also:
"AFGHANISTAN: IDPs continue arriving in the south", IRIN, 15 April 2003
"AFGHANISTAN: Special report on displaced people in the south", IRIN, 19 February 2003
Human rights abuses and lack of food distribution force people to flee in the west to
Herat (April 2002)
•
Since January 2002 a large influx of long-term IDPs have fled to the Herat province in Western
Afghanistan from Ghor, Baghdis, Faryab, Farah, and Balkh provinces.
61
•
Most recent IDPs have fled their home villages due to lack of food distribution and the need for
emergency assistance, while others -especially Pashtuns- have fled abuses and persecution.
"Despite measures to protect civilian populations, over the last three months a large influx of long-term
internally displaced persons (IDPs) have fled to the Herat province in Western Afghanistan from Ghor,
Baghdis, Faryab, Farah, and Balkh provinces, and have settled in Shaidayee IDP camp on the outskirts of
Herat city. According to UNHCR, many of the IDPs reported that they fled their home villages due to lack
of food distribution and the need for emergency assistance. Others, especially Pashtuns, also reported that
abuses had occurred in Pashtun villages in many Provinces in the Western Region." (PHR April 2002)
People flee the main cities to seek refuge in rural areas in fear of U.S. bombing
(October 2001)
•
Unknown number of people have fled the main cities in fear of U.S. reprisals.
•
UNHCR estimated that up to 2.2 million people could be displaced inside Afghanistan by March 2002
"Population flows outside of Afghanistan are still limited in numbers. Many reports indicate that a growing
number of people are moving towards rural areas, but the UN does not have confirmed figures at this time"
(OCHA 10 October 2001)
"During the first half of 2001, IDP camps sprang up in the vicinity of almost every bigger city of
Afghanistan. Hardest hit were Herat, Kabul and Mazar, but even smaller centres started having IDP camps,
places where hungry families hoped to be more visible and accessible by aid agencies. Estimates go up to
2,000,000 IDPs uprooted from rural areas all over Afghanistan. It is also known that impoverished urban
dwellers resorted to shift their homes from urban slums to IDP camps in order to obtain food.
In the first days and weeks after the 11th of September, there are speculations that many of these IDP
camps were left by a part of their inhabitants. There was great initial fear of being too close to urban targets
of an American military attack, but there was also little reason to stay in IDP camps with aid agencies
having sharply reduced or even stopped their food distribution. In September, UNOCHA's compiled data
indicated 1,160,000 internally displaced. The events of the last days may have triggered further movements
from urban to rural areas.
All internal movements are very difficult to predict. If, on one hand, the fear for the air-strikes is pushing
people towards rural areas, on the other hand, the effects of widespread hunger may also cause short
distance movements of weak village people in the opposite direction, hoping to find access to food in
nearby towns.
Completely unpredictable are movements caused by fighting between opposition and Taliban troops and by
the notorious habit of looting once combatants are leaving or taking over cities and villages. There is fear
that disintegrating Taliban militias will also be increasingly out of control of Taliban commanders."
(Intersos 10 October 2001)
"Initially, the threat of a US-led military strike on Afghanistan and increased Taleban repression caused
hundreds of thousands of people to flee their homes, particularly in major cities. A quarter of the population
of Kabul and half the population of the southern Afghan province of Kandahar, the headquarters of the
Taleban, were said to have evacuated. Prior to the threat, large numbers of people were not fleeing these
cities. The already large number of internally displaced persons was estimated to have grown to a total of
1.1 million, which the UNHCR predicted could rise to 2.2 million internally displaced persons by March
2002. While reports indicated that many of those who had left cities have been returning, the huge number
62
of Afghans who were displaced prior to the events of 11 September remain displaced and in great need of
assistance." (AI 9 October 2001)
The pattern of displacement follows the pattern of fighting (September 2001)
•
Early 1990s many fled Kabul in fear of reprisal and settled around Mazar-i-Sharif and Jalalabad while
others fled the provinces to Kabul for the same reasons.
•
Mid-1990s, people moved north to flee Taleban advances.
•
In 1996 Taleban captured Jalalabad and Kabul and people, mostly non Pushtun, fled both cities to seek
refuge around Mazar-i-Sharif.
•
July 1998 Taleban captured Mazar-i-Sharif and massacred civilians and displaced from the Hazara
ethnic group.
"The pattern of displacement follows the pattern of fighting. In the early 1990s, after the marxist
government fell and the resistance militias returned to Afghanistan, those who feared reprisal from these
groups, largely because of complicity or suspicion of complicity with the Marxist government, fled the
capital. With the Pakistani border closed, many who were displaced from Kabul went north to the area
around Mazar-i-Sharif or south to Jalalabad, where large camps were set up for the displaced. During this
period, many people from the provinces who feared retribution flooded into Kabul.
By the mid-1990s, when the Taliban movement began to expand out of the Kandahar area, displaced people
moved north, fleeing the Taliban advance. As the Taliban approached Kabul in 1995, people again fled the
capital, only to return shortly thereafter when the Taliban forces were temporarily defeated. But in
September 1996, the Taliban captured Jalalabad, a principal city and the site of two large camps for the
displaced. Most of these people were forced to move again. In the following weeks, the Taliban pushed into
Kabul. The capital, and thus the government of Afghanistan, fell to Taliban control on 27 September 1996
and a mass exodus out of the capital ensued.
Those who fled Kabul in the autumn of 1996 were largely non-Pushtun minorities who feared retribution
from the Pushtun-based Taliban. With the southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan under Taliabn control,
many of those fleeing Kabul moved north into the Tajik areas or to the Uzbek area around the northern city
of Mazar-i-Sharif.
After capturing Kabul, the Taliban forces continued to press north creating another wave of displacement.
Displaced persons, now mostly Tajiks, were forced to continue to flee north, although some sought refuge
in Kabul itself. By July 1998, the Taliban forces took the city of Mazar-i-Sharif.
The capture of Mazar-i-Sharif had great strategic and symbolic importance. The city had become the
headquarters of the Taliban opposition and was an important stronghold for nun-Pushtun groups. Its capture
meant that Taliban forces controlled almost all of Afghanistan. After Mazar-i-Sharif was captuerd, Taliban
forces massacred thousands of civilians including many displaced persons, who were members of the
Hazara ethnic groups.
The displaced populations in Afghanistan now have very few options. The main escape routes to the south
and east are under Taliban control and the borders into Pakistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are closed.
Although some have fled west to the city of Herat, that city is also under Taliban control. Some have
voluntarily moved to Kabul to live with relatives; others have been forcibly relocated by the Taliban, to
compounds in the capital. The few areas not under Taliban control are the Tajik areas in the north-east and
in the high central mountains of the Hazarajat. Yet even in these areas, the Taliban are slowly gaining
control." (Farr, G. 1 September 2001 pp. 123-126)
63
Four major patterns of dispacement (October 1999)
•
The momentum of displacement increases with the fear and terror that follows each fighting.
•
Collective fear, fear of reprisal, house-to-house search, checking operations, recruitment of young
conscripts cause people to move.
•
Recently, in the Panjshir Valley, evacuation preceded the attacks.
•
The areas most affected by displacement are the strategically important ones
•
Over the last 20 years, 4 major patterns of displacement have emerged: movement towards the
mountains nearest to the area abandoned; refuge to major cities; refuge in Pakistan and refuge in Iran
"By tradition Afghans are a highly mobile people. The current patterns of displacement accentuate the
normal patterns of movement and as a consequence there is now continuous movement in and out of the
Panjshir Valley, both northeast towards Pakistan and southwards. Even within the context of the mobile
Afghan society, the major population shifts experienced over the past 20 years represent a significant state
of disruption. Though the events resulting in mass movements of people may differ from place to place, the
root cause of displacement is conflict. During the Soviet occupation the most immediate and obvious cause
was the bombing of villages and the destruction of harvests, livestock and, of course, people. Although
often people do not flee at first, the momentum of mass movement increases with the fear and terror that
follows each event. In some cases it is collective fear which causes people to move, fear of reprisals
following a resistance operation, house-to-house searches, checking operations, recruitment of young
conscripts, punitive operations conducted by both sides, and the taking of young girls. In the most recent
offensives in the Panjshir Valley, a repeat of 15 years ago, village evacuation, sometimes forced, precedes
bombardment or attack. The areas most affected are strategically significant: towns, lines of
communication and military strongholds where entire valleys (the Panjshir) or mountain areas (the central
mountains of the Hazaradjat) are affected.
During the 20 years of displacement, four major patterns of internal movement have developed: movement
towards the mountains nearest to the area abandoned; refuge to major cities such as Kabul, Jalalabad and
Herat to regions in the southeast; refuge in Pakistan; and, for populations in the southwest, refuge in Iran."
(WFP, October 1999)
64
PHYSICAL SECURITY & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
General
Protection is largely dependent on social networks (March 2003)
•
Fundamental protection is dependent on personal and social networks.
•
Generally speaking, it is necessary for Afghans to have relatives in the area where they wish to settle.
•
Women are unable to move without having male relatives, also they have no protection
•
Irrespective of their ethnicity, if a person lacks personal or social networks, he/she is at risk of being
assaulted or harassed
•
No responsible governement to which the IDPs can appeal for protection.
•
IDPs to rely on hiding or fleeing or seeking protection with resistance commanders.
"UNHCR, Kabul said that fundamental protection is dependent on personal and social networks.
The source advised that the availability of networks in the form of relatives is vital for a person's ability to
live in a given area. The source said that Pashtuns from northern Afghanistan had tried to settle in Pashtun
villages in other areas of the country, but that they had not been accepted by the
local population. The villages are closed units, and no outsiders can settle in the rural areas, whereas the
situation in the town is different. In larger cities the need for relatives in the area where people wish to live
is not quite as strong. But the source stressed that generally speaking, it is necessary for Afghans to have
relatives in the area where they wish to settle. This is even more so for women. Women are unable to move
without having male relatives. Even the UNHCR cannot move locally employed women from other areas to
better positions in Kabul, unless they have male relatives in Kabul with whom they can live.
The source believed that it might be possible for large families with a number of males to move to places,
where they do not already have relatives or clan members. For families, where the head of the family is
female, this option does not exist.
An international source said that the old patterns, enabling families to protect each other, have been upset,
because so many people have been displaced and because of the economic situation, which makes it
impossible for them to provide protection due to poverty. This means that the families with a female sole
provider - widows - or children living alone, now have no protection.
In the towns a network in the neighbourhood is necessary in order to get protection. As regards personal
networks in the town, many of the people who have returned - and who do not have a network - are
especially at risk of being raped and assaulted. But it is even worse in the rural areas particularly for women. The source mentioned that there are particularly vulnerable groups who are the
subject of injustices irrespective of their ethnicity, but where the actual reason appears to be the person's
lack of network. In this connection the source pointed out that it is a misconception that there has been a
change in this situation just because the Taliban has been defeated.
Concerning the importance of networks, DACAAR said that persons/families without networks are
extremely vulnerable and exposed. There is no judicial or police protection in the country, only personal
networks. Even though many people have fled Afghanistan, there are still networks. Even a network spread
over several countries - where a person has male relatives in other countries - may be effective and provide
65
protection against e.g. harassment and arranged marriages, if it is known that there are male family
members who, although living abroad, are able to exert influence in such situations." (DIS March 2003, pp.
39-40)
"In the last 25 years of fighting, over two million people have been killed in Afghanistan, most of them
civilians. There are few sources of protection for displaced persons. There is no responsible government to
which the displaced can appeal and the presence of international agencies is limited. Those agencies that
have been able to operate in Kabul have called upon the Taliban government to protect internally displaced
persons, but those calls have, in general, been poorly received. The Taliban are not the only threat to
security, however. Guerrilla groups have also been involved in killing and harassing Afghan citizens.
Since the displaced are largely unarmed civilians, they must either rely on hiding or fleeing, or seek
protection with sympathetic resistance commanders. By agreeing to side with either the Taliban
government or one of the various resistance groups, the displaced can win some measure of protection. To
some degree, a displaced person’s choice of protective political group depends on his ethnic background.
The Pushtun have generally sided with the Taliban, and the non-Pushtun groups--the Tajik, Uzbeks, and
Hazara--have sided with groups hostile to the Taliban. Many non-Pushtun groups have also joined the
Taliban, but it is unclear whether this choice was made freely or not." (Farr, G. 1 September 2001 pp. 131132)
Government's main protection issues for returnees (March 2003)
"Protection of returnees is the primary responsibility of TISA, with MoRR playing a major role in this area.
The development of national protection capacities is a priority concern, so assistance will focus on
strengthening local capacity and structures for the development and implementation of national legislation.
To do so, the Government will rely on UNHCR’s expertise and international protection mandate.
Main protection issues:
(a) the right to return to places of returnee and IDP choice, without prejudice to their ethnic origin, religion
or political affiliation;
(b) the unity of the family;
(c) the transfer and or recovery of personal assets;
(d) special assistance and protection measures for vulnerable returnees;
(e) mine awareness;
(f) non forceful military recruitment; and
(g) the respect of the rule of law (amnesties, recuperation of land ownership, personal documentation,
detention cases, etc)." (TISA March 2003, p. 8)
U.S. "warlord strategy" shows protection of human rights is not a priority (December
2002)
•
Continuing power of warlords put human rights at risk
•
US has implemented a "warlord strategy" to relieve it from its security and human rights
responsibilities.
•
Local and regional military commanders and their troops regularly abuse the human rights of those
Afghans living in areas under their control
•
Beyond Kabul poor security, generalized criminality, and limited regard for basic human rights have
marked the year since the signing of the Bonn Agreement.
66
•
Vulnerable women and minorities, displaced persons, Afghans who stand up to abusive warlords have
virtually no one to turn to.
•
US blocked proposals by Afghan leaders, including President Hamid Karzai, and the United Nations,
for an expanded ISAF to patrol the countryside
"In the area of human rights (as in many other areas), the primary problem is the continuing power of
Afghanistan’s warlords. When the U.S. confirmed its commitment to the future of Afghanistan, it spoke
about the primacy of democratization and human rights. Yet its actions have shown this commitment to be
shallow. After the overthrow of the Taliban, it employed a
“warlord strategy” in order to relieve it of its security and human rights responsibilities.
Although the Taliban had effectively unified the military command of most of the country, and thereby
undermined the country’s endemic military feudalism, the United States and others helped to reestablish
this system as part of their strategy for removing the Taliban from power, while Afghanistan’s neighbors,
particularly Iran, strengthened their local proxies. These regional and local military commanders, many of
whom still receive arms, money, and political support from the United States and some of Afghanistan’s
neighbors, filled the vacuum created by the overthrow of the Taliban. In the past year, most of these
warlords have become more, not less,
entrenched in power.
Warlords now represent the primary threat to peace and stability in the country. As Human Rights Watch
and other groups have documented throughout the year since the signing of the Bonn Agreement, local and
regional military commanders and their troops regularly abuse the
human rights of those Afghans living in areas under their control. This is no surprise, since many are the
same men who helped perpetuate war in Afghanistan for more than twenty years, systematically violating
the human rights of millions of Afghans in the process.
In Kabul, the security and human rights situation has improved markedly, largely because of the
introduction of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the heavy international presence in
the capital. But beyond Kabul poor security, generalized criminality, and limited regard for basic human
rights have marked the year since the signing of the Bonn Agreement.
Each of these factors has in turn negatively affected reconstruction efforts and the delivery of humanitarian
assistance. Travel on many roads remains unsafe from extortion by local soldiers or criminals (often one
and the same). Outside Kabul, U.N. officials often have little ability to protect persons at risk of human
rights abuses. Vulnerable women and minorities, displaced
persons, Afghans who stand up to abusive warlords, and even Afghan government officials have virtually
no one to turn to when their lives or safety are threatened.
The power of the warlords has made it impossible for the Afghan Transitional Administration to establish
its authority much beyond Kabul. It has also hindered any discernible progress in making the transition
from a militarized to a genuinely civilian government. In this environment, even U.N. officials monitoring
human rights violations, compliance with the Bonn Agreement,
and disarmament of local military forces, have had serious difficulties carrying out their duties.
Nations that promised to assist in strengthening stability and security in Afghanistan—chief among them
the United States, but including the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Turkey, Germany, the
Netherlands, and Italy—have not adequately addressed the security and human
rights problems caused by the continued dominance of Afghanistan’s warlords. The United States blocked
proposals by Afghan leaders, including President Hamid Karzai, and the United Nations, for an expanded
ISAF to patrol the countryside and act as a deterrent to renewed fighting and human rights abuses by
warlords and their subordinates. The solution offered by the U.S., to have warlords provide security outside
of Kabul while the international community trains a future Afghan army, has proven to be a failure.
67
The protection of human rights and the creation of a secure environment for Afghans should be part of a
mutually reinforcing effort to rebuild Afghanistan. Yet some have conflated security with political stability,
and framed political stability and human rights as competing goals —a
zero sum game. This is wrong. While there are occasional short-term tradeoffs, experience and lessons
learned elsewhere have made it clear that sustainable improvements in security and human rights are
mutually reinforcing.
Confronting the warlords is a major challenge. It requires a strong international commitment and a variety
of sophisticated strategies. Efforts need to be made to sever the patron-client relationships that create
loyalty to local––instead of national––leaders and institutions. For example, Afghan leaders and donors
need to devise training and job programs (which could be
part of the national reconstruction effort) that will be more attractive to young men than life as a soldier in
the army of a warlord.
Yet there is little apparent commitment within the international community to engage in these efforts. The
Afghan Transitional Administration is not powerful enough to confront the warlords on its own. It needs
the sustained and genuine commitment of the United States and others to do take on the warlords. This will
require a substantial, if necessarily phased, expansion of the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF), many more U.N. human rights monitors, and the assistance of U.S. and other external armed forces
inside Afghanistan." (HRW 5 December 2002, pp. 1-3)
AI concerned about the protection needs of IDPs stranded at the Chaman border (July
2002)
•
AI is concerned about the lack of opportunity for IDPs in Chaman and Spin Boldak camps to seek
international protection.
•
AI contends that return of refugees and IDPs to places other than their previous homes because their
homes remain insecure leads to problems relating to reintegration, sustainability and security.
"In early May 2002, elders representing some of the communities at the Chaman border reportedly agreed
to return to Afghanistan, either to their home villages or to an IDP camp near Kandahar, after meeting with
a tripartite task force from the Afghan Interim Administration, the Pakistan Commissionerate for Afghan
Refugees and UNHCR. Shortly after this, UNHCR began assisting IDPs from Spin Boldak, near Chaman,
to return to home villages near Kandahar and helped approximately 150 refugees return to Afghanistan
from the Chaman border camp. Although UNHCR is advising returning IDPs and refugees on the
conditions for return to home areas in Afghanistan, Amnesty International is concerned about the lack of
opportunity for individuals in these makeshift border camps to seek international protection. It is not
sufficient to provide them only with the option of return to home areas within Afghanistan or transfer to
IDP camps without a proper interview process to establish if protection needs are being met and providing
the possibility of refugee status.
Amnesty International considers that return to a place which is not the previous home of the refugee or IDP
must be based on a free and informed choice, should not arise from obstacles to return to the place of
origin, is sustainable and does not interfere with the rights of others. Return of refugees and IDPs to places
other than their previous homes because their homes remain insecure leads to problems relating to
reintegration, sustainability and security. Property disputes can ensue, as well as rapid and unsustainable
urbanization. Meaningful prospects for earning a livelihood can be limited and political instability can be
exacerbated." (AI July 2002, pp. 9-10)
68
Reports of increasing problems of insecurity underscore need to raise awareness of
the needs of IDPs (March 2002)
•
The underlying causes of displacement are still at play with reports of increasing insecurity throughout
the country.
•
Pashtuns minorities and Uzbek minorities have reportedly been harrassed and have fled their villages.
•
There is a risk of upsurge of ethnic tensions that might eventually spread to minorities throughout the
country.
•
Minorities may become apprehensive about returning to areas dominated by other ethnic groups.
•
IDP Unit proposes that UNAMA establishes and sustains a capacity to monitor, document and map all
local conflicts, tensions and human rights violations as a prerequisite for preventing displacement and
ensuring rapid remedial response.
•
Focus of the humanitarian intervention in Afghanis tan should be on helping the return of IDPs and
refugees in safety and dignity.
•
•
"Whereas the current environment in Afghanistan, including the commitment to peace and democracy by
the Interim Administration and the international community’s support to this process, provides the
foundations for an end to displacement and exile, some of the underlying causes of displacement have yet
to vanish completely, whilst others remain latent or are even at risk of re-emerging. Hence, there is still a
need to promo te among national, regional and local authorities a basic understanding of the Guiding
Principles on IDPs in order to raise awareness of the special needs and human rights of IDPs.
During the past three months there have been reports of increasing problems of insecurity in several areas
which has resulted in looting, diversion of assistance in camps to non-beneficiaries, rapes, and other forms
of serious human rights violations. In particular, ethnic Pashtun minorities in the northern and western
provinces have been singled out. This has resulted in scores of Pashtun families fleeing their villages and
seeking protection in Pashtun majority areas in southern and central Afghanistan or even attempting to
cross into Pakistan. There are also recent reports of some Uzbek being harassed in Pashtun areas.
These incidents have produced a significant wave of fresh displacements during the tenure of the Interim
Administration, and, as such, are a cause for much concern. What may be interpreted by some as ominous
yet isolated acts of revenge for perceived past violations under the Taliban, are now at risk of triggering an
upsurge of ethnic tensions that might eventually spread to minorities throughout the country. Consequently,
unless immediate and forceful preventive and remedial measures are applied, minorities may become
apprehensive about returning to areas dominated by other ethnic groups.
It is encouraging, therefore, that the Interim Administration is addressing the matter through the
establishment of a high level commission to investigate and resolve these incidents. Moreover, the Mission
supports the call made by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights during her recent visit to
Afghanistan, for the deployment of ISAF troops beyond Kabul, and in particular to areas of ethnic tension
and/or potential internecine conflict, as a deterrent measure to prevent further displacement.
It is noteworthy that in most peace-building and reconstruction operations, demobilisation, disarmament
and reintegration (DDR) is an integral part of recovery and building trust and reconciliation within war-torn
communities. It is recommended, therefore, that high priority be given to the formulation and
implementation of a DDR programme as this will strengthen the will of people to return to a secure
environment.
69
Furthermore, it is necessary that a capacity be created to monitor, document and map all local conflicts,
tensions and human rights violations as a prerequisite for preventing displacement and ensuring rapid
remedial response. It is, therefore, proposed that UNAMA, in support of the national human rights
commission for and in collaboration with all UN agencies with protection interests and expertise,
establishes and sustains such a capacity. In this regard, it is also important that IDPs be also supported in
gaining a political voice in local and regional affairs and especially to ensure that they are adequately
represented on the Loya Jirga.
Return is also seriously constrained by the levels of destruction of homes; the widespread distribution of
mines and other unexploded ordinances, as well as on-going localized military operations. In addition,
some provinces from where thousands of refugees and IDPs originate are still labelled by the UN as no-go
‘red zones’ for security reasons. Therefore, agencies are unable to conduct neither needs assessments nor
initiate preparations on the ground for returns in safety and dignity. In order to facilitate the voluntary
return of displaced people and refugees, it is critical that main areas of return are prioritized under the
security agenda.
Despite these constraints, the Mission supports the vision, generalised amongst the UN and partner
agencies that the focus of the humanitarian intervention in Afghanistan should be on helping the return of
IDPs and refugees in safety and dignity. This, however, does not pre-empt the need for ongoing continued
contingency planning, as well as maintaining adequate protection to those IDPs who decide to remain in
their host communities for the time being." (IDP Unit-OCHA 28 March 2002, pp. 5-6)
Physical security
IDPs returning subject to illegal taxation and precarious security conditions (June
2003)
•
Instability and deteriorating security situation has made returns of refugees and IDPs unsustainable and
forced some into renewed displacement.
•
Returnees are subject to illegal taxation by local commanders in their village of origin.
•
Forced recruitment in the north and protection concerns is causing new displacement.
•
Some IDP families were forced to sell their daughters into marriage or sell their kid to survive.
"Most returnees and IDPs interviewed by Amnesty International had been negatively affected by the
deteriorating security situation, which has drastically reduced the sustainability of return, and in some cases
has caused renewed displacement. As the fighting continues and escalates, more people are leaving their
homes in search of security, either within Afghanistan or to neighbouring countries. In Archi district in
Kunduz, 12 returnee families had returned to Pakistan in February 2003, complaining about the policies of
exploitation of local commanders.
Returnees are also subject to illegal taxation by local commanders upon their return to their villages of
origin. This is now rife in many areas of the north, where such taxation often takes the form of a proportion
of the UNHCR reintegration package.
The precarious security situation had a far reaching impact on the protection concerns of returnees,
furthering affecting the sustainability of return. In the north of the country, local commanders are forcibly
recruiting men and boys to participate in the internecine fighting. The local representative of the Ministry
of Refugees and Repatriation in Jawzjan province alleged that as many as 2000 families had left
Afghanistan in recent months following attempts by the rival Jamiat-e Islami and Jonbesh-e Melli Islami
70
factions to forcibly recruit men and boys. Other families had been compelled to send their sons away, most
often to Iran and Pakistan, to escape forced recruitment. Still others have been forced to sell their houses in
order to pay the local commander not to recruit their sons.
Another protection concern is the prevalence of forced and premature marriages of girls in order to receive
dowry. In Badakshaukat IDP camp outside Kunduz city, Amnesty International was told of two families
that were forced to sell their daughters, aged 4 and 7 years, into marriage. One returnee in Kabul also told
Amnesty International of having to sell one child in the last months of 2002 in order for the rest of the
family to survive through the winter." (AI 23 June 2003, p. 23)
IDPs in camps in the north subjected to forcible relocations, compulsory performance
of military support functions, and sexual violence (June 2002)
•
Competition between Jamiat and Junbish and the establishment of their military posts within or in
close proximity to IDP camps has resulted in abuses against IDPs. Among them, forcible relocations,
compulsory performance of military support functions, and sexual violence.
•
In Camp 65 the establishment of Junbish military camp forced IDPs settled close to it, to relocate in
less convenient areas to the outskirt of the camp. Male residents of the camp were ordered to serve as
night watchmen and dig trenches—in both cases without payment.
•
Sakhi camp was described by local residents and humanitarian aid workers as being dominated by men
affiliated with Jamiat. Pashtuns living in the camp faced widespread sexual violence and looting by
Jamiat and Junbish militiamen and many of the Pashtun residents subsequently fled the camp.
The competition between Jamiat and Junbish and the establishment of their military posts within or in close
proximity to IDP camps has had dire consequences for the security of camp residents. Among the abuses
against civilians reported to Human Rights Watch have been forcible relocations, compulsory performance
of military support functions, and sexual violence. Two large camps with which these abuses have been
associated are Camp 65, in Chimtal district, west of Mazar, and Sakhi camp, located east of the city.
Camp 65
Junbish forces partially reoccupied Camp 65, a former military base, amid a heavy buildup of troops and
military hardware by the rival parties in and around Mazar in late April and early May. Internally displaced
persons whose settlements lay close to the newly established Junbish base were forcibly evicted and their
dwellings bulldozed, according to humanitarian aid workers and camp residents; the remains of their
demolished homes were clearly visible when Human Rights Watch visited the camp in early June. Most of
those who had been evicted—largely ethnic Arabs and Tajiks from Shiram in Sar-e Pul province—
relocated on their own to the outskirts of the camp, at a site without easy access to water resources.
When confronted with the order to move, the Shiram population first sought help from the local Junbish
commanders. 'Some of the elders went to the commanders and asked them not to make us move,' said A, a
camp resident. 'They [the commanders] said we should seek assistance from aid organizations, who might
point us in the direction we need to go.' No offer was made by the commanders themselves to assist in the
relocation, he said. The eviction itself was abrupt. 'The bulldozer came at about noon,' A said. 'In less than
one hour they had destroyed the homes.' Another, older man reported, 'They didn’t give us time to remove
our mattresses or blankets.'
Concurrently with the establishment of the Junbish presence, male residents of the camp were ordered to
serve as night watchmen and dig trenches—in both cases without payment. M, who estimated his age as
being between 55 and 60, and S, a man of about 30, went to the base to complain on behalf of the camp
population. Both were severely beaten by Junbish troops for
71
their efforts.
[...]
Sakhi camp
Sakhi camp is a planned community of clay and wood homes that was originally built to house refugees
from Tajikistan during that country’s 1992-97 civil war. Its population is now entirely Afghan, of diverse
ethnic origins. Although not militarized to the extent of Camp 65, Sakhi camp was described by local
residents and humanitarian aid workers as being dominated by men affiliated with Jamiat, including the de
facto leader of the camp, Lal Mohammad.
Many ethnic Pashtuns in Sakhi camp were targeted by the newly victorious Northern Alliance forces,
initially including both Jamiat and Junbish troops, who established a presence in the camp following the
collapse of Taliban rule in Mazar. According to residents and aid workers interviewed by Human Rights
Watch, Pashtuns living in the camp faced widespread sexual violence and looting by Jamiat and Junbish
militiamen. An entire section of the camp housing an estimated 400 Pashtun families was destroyed, and
lay in ruins at the time of Human Rights Watch’s visit to the camp in early June. Many of the Pashtun
residents subsequently fled the camp, with some reportedly heading toward the largely Pashtun town of
Balkh.
Pashtun women remaining in the camp who were interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that cases of
sexual violence had diminished since the immediate post-Taliban period, largely due to the reduced
presence of armed men in the camp. But all spoke of a continued fear of sexual assault.
[...]
According to the representative of a group of Pashtun families in the camp, sexual violence by armed men
continues to take place. Several residents said that camp 'leaders' associated with the armed forces that had
committed abuses against Pashtuns, including cases of sexual violence, remained in the camp and
continued to act as representatives of groups of families there." (HRW June 2002, pp. 4-6)
Survey reveals Pashtun households in Western Afghanistan are 2-5 times more
expose d to abuses than other ethnic groups (April 2002)
•
Findings of the PHR study reveal that abuses were committed on a widespread basis among Pashtun
households in Western Afghanistan. Armed militias (primarily Uzbek forces) have used intimidation,
extortion and committed abuses against civilians, primarily ethnic Pashtuns, including killings,
beatings, shootings, disappearances, and gang rape.
•
The abuses among Pashtuns were ~2-5 times the number of reported abuses among other ethnic groups
in Shaidayee camp
"The findings of this study indicate that abuses were committed on a widespread basis among Pashtun
households in Western Afghanistan. Armed militias (primarily Uzbek forces) have used intimidation,
extortion and committed abuses against civilians, primarily ethnic Pashtuns, including killings, beatings,
shootings, disappearances, and gang rape. The findings also indicate that despite increased international
assistance and humanitarian aid, lack of food distribution and the need for emergency assistance were the
main reasons that people in Western Afghanistan left their home villages to go to Shaidayee IDP camp. In a
time when reconstruction is the priority in Afghanistan, basic needs such as food, clean water, shelter, and
health care services, and security cannot be ignored, without placing many Afghans at further risk for dire
health consequences.
The respondents in this study reported that at least one or more abuses had occurred in 8% of all
households, 3% of Tajik households and 14% of Pashtun households. Abuses occurred in home villages in
10 districts in Ghor, Baghdis, and Faryab provinces. Sixty-eight percent of the abuses were attributed to
72
Uzbek forces. The abuses among Pashtuns were ~2-5 times the number of reported abuses among other
ethnic groups in Shaidayee camp. It is clear that in several instances the abusers were known to the
respondents and that the abusers were primarily of Uzbek ethnicity. In one case, an Uzbek commander was
involved in extortion from a Pashtun household, creating a question of whether or not other Uzbek
commanders are complicit in these abuses." (PHR April 2002)
Population movements to rural areas increase mine threats (October 2001)
•
People fleeing the urban areas towards rural areas are more exposed to mine threats as they attempt to
cross mine-infected fields.
•
2,812 mine/UXO casualties were recorded between March 1998 and December 2000.
•
Affected land consist of 61% grazing land, 26% agricultural land, 7% roads, 4% residential areas, and
1% irrigation systems
"(...) As thousands of Afghans reportedly flee from urban areas to the countryside or toward the nation's
borders, the ICRC is concerned that this could result in soaring numbers of mine casualties.
'Since the current crisis began, we have received no data on casualties', said Laurence Desvignes, head of
the ICRC's mine-awareness unit. 'But large numbers of people are now attempting to cross mine-infested
borders and the risks are definitely growing.' Past conflicts such as Bosnia and Kosovo had shown that
landmines were a huge threat, she went on, when large numbers of people were on the move, especially off
the roads.
From March 1998 to December 2000, the ICRC delegation in Afghanistan recorded 2,812 mine/UXO
casualties, half of whom were children. Last year, about one quarter of the country's mine victims were
people on the move, either because they were fleeing war or drought or because of a nomadic life style."
(ICRC 4 October 2001)
"Landmine Problem
A total of about 717 square kilometers of land remains contaminated by mines and UXO. This includes 337
square kilometers of affected land classified as high priority. A major socio-economic impact study
conducted by the Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA) under the auspices of the Mine Action
Programme in Afghanistan (MAPA), and published in December 1999, revealed that affected land
consisted of 61% grazing land, 26% agricultural land, 7% roads, 4% residential areas, and 1% irrigation
systems. The survey was conducted in eighteen out of Afghanistan's twenty-nine provinces and covered a
total number of 3,656 minefields and 20,645 villages. It indicated about 1,600 villages were affected by
mines and UXO.
Refugees and internally displaced persons are still reluctant to return home, in part due to fear of mines. A
total of 12,216 families were repatriated in 1999, including 72,098 individuals.
See Landmine Monitor Report 1999 for a list of fifty antipersonnel mines found in Afghanistan and their
countries of origin. Two more antipersonnel mines have since been added to the list: the YM -I mine from
Iran and the RAP-2 mine from Rhodesia/Zimbabwe." (HRW August 2000)
See also : "Landmine use in Afghanistan", HRW Backgrounder, October 2001 and "Study of the Socioeconomic Impact of Mine Action in Afghanistan (SIMAA)", Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan
(MAPA), 30 June 2001
73
SUBSISTENCE NEEDS (HEALTH NUTRITION AND SHELTER)
General
General humanitarian situation still extremely precarious (July 2002)
•
Many people in Afghanistan have all but exhausted traditional coping mechanisms and are relying on
non-sustainable coping strategies and on external assistance to meet the most basic of subsistence
needs.
•
Humanitarian needs are expected to remain extremely high over the coming months.
•
The degree of under-funding and the projected pipeline breaks have worrying implications for the
future of some programmes such as the Food for Asset Creation (FoodAC), Food For Work (FFW) and
Food for Education.
•
The much greater than expected rate of return of IDPs and of refugees from neighbouring countries has
placed enormous strain on the already stretched resources .
•
There is considerable concern over what will happen to people returning to areas with very little in the
way of resources, infrastructure and essential livelihood opportunities, who will remain heavily
dependent on external assistance.
"The humanitarian situation in Afghanistan continues to be extremely precarious. The effects of years of
conflict and the recent three years of drought have resulted in the destruction of the country’s infrastructure
and economy and have destroyed the livelihoods of much of the population. As a direct result, much of the
population suffers from impoverishment and reports from across the country indicate that emergency needs
remain extremely high. It is clear that many people have all but exhausted traditional coping mechanisms
and are relying on non-sustainable coping strategies and on external assistance to meet the most basic of
subsistence needs.
Humanitarian needs are expected to remain extremely high over the coming months and it has been
suggested that the drought crisis could continue for a further 12-18 months (Feinstein 05/02), requiring
continued humanitarian efforts. The period from April to July is seen as particularly critical as it is the preharvest hunger season when food stocks are normally at their lowest point, which is particularly concerning
given the poor harvests of the past few years. As a result, the overall emergency food needs are at their
highest during this period, with an estimated nine million people requiring assistance (WFP 03/05/02). The
humanitarian response to these needs has been considerable, however it is worrying to note that the
humanitarian appeal remains considerably under funded. WFP have estimated that they will require
544,000 MT of food for their current nine month operation from April to December 2002 and have recently
reported that they face a shortfall of 175,000 MT, or 102 million US dollars (WFP 28/06/02). This has
already resulted in some of WFP’s sub offices reporting pipeline breaks since early May 2002. The degree
of under-funding and the projected pipeline breaks have worrying implications for the future of some
programmes such as the Food for Asset Creation (FoodAC), Food For Work (FFW) and Food for
Education. It is also concerning to note that the funding shortfalls are likely to affect key programmes
designed to help with the reintegration of newly returned Afghans.
The situation has been made more difficult for the humanitarian community by the much greater than
expected rate of return of IDPs and of refugees from neighbouring countries. Original planning figures
estimated that up to 800,000 refugees would return during 2002, however this number was superseded in
the first 15 weeks of the programme. At the end of June 2002, UNHCR estimated that 1,109,394 refugees
had returned from neighbouring countries and it is now estimated that up to 2 million may return during the
74
year (UNHCR 29/06/02). It is also estimated that there are still approximately 920,000 IDPs in various
parts of the country. This is placing enormous strain on the already stretched resources and it has been
suggested that rations, which make up a part of the essential return package for returnees, will be cut by up
to a third of the intended amount (WFP 30/06/02). As a result, there is considerable concern over what will
happen to people returning to areas with very little in the way of resources, infrastructure and essential
livelihood opportunities, who will remain heavily dependent on external assistance." (RNIS No. 38 July
2002, pp. 41-42)
The following maps shows the combined vulnerability (Landmines & UXO, health and food) of Afghanistan
as of 1 May 2002:
Source: AIMS, 1 May 2002, (GIF 50 kb)
Drought, war and economic collapse have caused widespread vulnerability among the
population (May 2002)
•
The drought has resulted in the following paradox: more people need to access markets to achieve food
security than ever before yet fewer people have the cash resources necessary to buy goods on the
market.
•
The drought and recent change of administration have introduced new forms of economic risk and
related vulnerabilities in addition to those generated by more than two decades of conflict
•
Over the past two years, the numbers of respondents who can be classified as secure with respect to
diet, debt, asset bases and water have fallen between 65% and 85%
"Afghanistan is currently experiencing a third or, in some places, a fourth year of severe drought. Droughtrelated losses of income have accelerated war-related vulnerabilities to poverty while also increasing the
demand for cash at the household level. The result is a paradox of purchasing power: more people need to
access markets to achieve food security than ever before yet fewer people have the cash resources
necessary to buy goods on the market.
Since the fall of the Taliban, the national currency, the Afghani, has strengthened markedly. While the
appreciation of the Afghani has been matched by equal declines in the nominal price of food items on
markets throughout Afghanistan, falling food prices have not adequately off-set deeper economic
vulnerabilities. The institutions of credit are stressed and failing. Instability in the currency markets has led
to widespread decapitalization, particularly among the trading classes, and a deepening of household debt
burdens. The combination of bad debts and currency-related capital losses has created an unusual class of
vulnerable citizens: shopkeepers. Protracted conflict has further weakened Afghanistan’s marketing
infrastructure (transportation, communication, finance, actors, physical markets, etc.) Exploited men,
women and children in the work force have few viable labor alternatives because of high prevailing rates of
under- and unemployment and their own fairly desperate needs for wage income.
Vulnerability to food insecurity is directly linked to Afghanistan’s various subeconomies. Historical legacy
has defined three distinct economies:
1) An economy of violent war and illegitimate trade of narcotics, weapons and legitimate commodities;
2) An artificial economy of external assistance that is highly variable and unpredictable;
3) A struggling economy of legitimate (if often exploitative) enterprises that includes agriculture, livestock
production, and small-scale enterprise (such as carpet weaving).
The parameters of these often competing economies define the options of supply and demand available to
households. These economies also govern the ability of households to use institutions that help manage risk
75
over time (especially credit), and to build resilience against shocks (such as drought, attacks or
unemployment) through the accumulation of wealth or surpluses.
Throughout Afghanistan, there are crises of purchasing power, production and credit that continue to
directly threaten household food security. Drought-induced agriculture and livestock production losses are
responsible for sharp declines in farm income. The resulting “cash famine” coincides with increasing
reliance by both rural and urban households on the market for food products, water and fuel. In pre-drought
years, these commodities were supplied through self-sufficient production from farms, livestock, orchards
and kitchen gardens.
The drought and recent change of administration have introduced new forms of economic risk and related
vulnerabilities in addition to those generated by more than two decades of conflict. Those who were
previously self-sufficient, such as farmers and pastoralist Koochi herders, have been particularly hard hit by
the shift from production to exchange entitlements. Likewise, Afghan traders are unable to export used
household goods because of the closure of the Turkham border in Pakistan. This has depressed prices,
lowering the returns to families engaging in distress sales of household assets. Other small industries and
enterprises that have been negatively affected by the drought, war and a historical lack of development
investment include textiles and carpet weaving, mulberry, cotton, silk and cinnamon oil production, as well
as coal mining, livestock herding, and horticulture.
As in all protracted complex emergencies, there are those that have retained or increased their wealth while
others have fallen deeply into poverty. Again, as is typical, the losers (i.e., those not secure) currently
outnumber the winners in Afghanistan by more than 6:1, according to the survey results. In the analysis of
the survey results, a minority of respondents (ranging from 9% - 15%) can be classified currently as secure
with respect to debt, diet, assets and/or agriculture water availability. This should be compared to the 41% 59% of the survey population that was secure two years ago, in the first year of the drought. Over the past
two years, the numbers of respondents who can be classified as secure with respect to diet, debt, asset bases
and water have fallen between 65% and 85%, as Table I indicates. The sharpest rates of decline in
household security occurred after the first year of the drought. The current relief efforts commenced well
after the majority of respondents had been forced by circumstance to tap into their survival strategies,
reducing food intake, selling of key assets and going deeply into debt." (Feinstein International Famine
Center May 2002, pp. 9-11)
Concentration of health facilities in urban areas (April 2002)
•
Health services need to be expanded to rural areas.
•
Kabul has 12% of the population but nearly half of all hospital beds in the country.
•
Poor distribution of health workers throughout the country.
"Equitable distribution of health care will require expansion of health services to Afghanistan's rural areas.
Currently, there is a concentration of health facilities in urban areas. Kabul, for example, has 12% of the
population but nearly half of all the hospital beds in the country. The mission recommends that no new
hospital beds be built in Kabul or other major cities. There is also a poor distribution of health workers
throughout the country. In Kabul, there is one doctor per 1,000 people. In the central province of Bamyan
there is just one doctor per 100,000 people.
76
Improving access to essential health services will eventually require the construction of about 1,000 new
health facilities and the rehabilitation of existing health care facilities throughout the country. ." (WHO 5
April 2002)
The following maps shows health vulnerability in Afghanistan as of 1 May 2002:
Source: AIMS, 1 May 2002, (GIF 50 kb)
Ethnicity, Tribalism and Survival (September 2001)
•
IDPs have better chance of good treatment if displaced within area with similar ethnic groups.
•
Ethnic groups with kin-based tribal structures, like the Pushtuns, more apt to asssist fellow tribesmen.
•
Northern ethnic groups (Uzbeks, Tajiks, or Hazara) have land-based social and economic systems and
are less likely to identify with and help fellow ethnic IDPs from other regions.
•
People flee as clan groups
"When people are displaced within their ethnic homelands, such as displaced Tajiks in the Panjshir Valley,
or displaced Hazara in the Hazarajat, they are more apt to receive aid and assistance, or at least sympathy,
from the local population. In contrast, those who are displaced in regions of other, especially antagonistic,
ethnic groups are often not well received and certainly not offered assistance or comfort. This is true of the
displaced in Kabul, both those in the former Soviet embassy compound and those dispersed around the city.
They are mostly Tajiks and Hazara in a city that is predominantly Pushtun, and they are not treated well.
In addition, different ethnic groups have different social structures and therefore differing abilities to
support ethnic solidarity. The groups that are organised into kin-based tribal structures are more apt to
identify with and assist fellow tribesmen because of tribal codes of hospitality and stronger ethnic bonds.
These are largely the Pushtun, who have been, and in some cases still are, pastoral nomads.
Other ethnic groups, particularly the northern groups, live in semi-feudal, land-based social and economic
systems. These societies form primary allegiances around land or location, as opposed to kin relations, and
are therefore less likely to identify with and aid others of the same ethnicity who might be from another
region. These groups include the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazara who live as settled farmers. For example,
Tajik farmers have only a weak notion of being part of a larger Tajik nation, but identify themselves by
their local sub-region. As a result, displaced Tajiks in other parts of the Tajik ethnic area may not be
welcomed because they are seen as people from another valley or region.
People seldom flee as individuals or as nuclear family units; rather, they often flee in clan groups or as
whole villages. The decision to leave their homes is usually made by village or tribal elders, who may be in
contact with local commanders. This fact is often lost on relief agency officials who are unaware that
displaced individuals do not make decisions outside of their traditional social network." (Farr, G. 1
September 2001 p. 129)
Health
Psychological health of displaced persons should be considered as urgent as
physical health problems (May 2003)
77
•
Shift from posttraumatic stress to more chronic mental health problems among IDPs in Shaidayee
camp
•
WHO reports that 30% of the refugees in Pakistan who seek medical assistance may suffer from
psychological problems.
•
Psychosocial health should be considered as urgent as physical health problems.
•
Humanitarian relief agencies are slowly integrating psychological support into operations that provide
food, water, shelter, and physical care.
•
Killing, executions, massive persecution, forced internal displacement, fear associated with living in
mined areas, and the latest escalation of violence have left an indelible mark on the population.
"Shelter, water and sanitation [in Shaidayee camp] are covered, and basic services such as the distribution
of food and non-food aid and health services also function well. But what is often neglected are the
psychological effects. Try to picture living in a camp. Shelter is very basic, with no furniture. There is only
one blanket for every five people in a country where temperatures regularly drop below freezing at nights.
You are dependent on strangers for your basic needs, for food, for soap. Imagine being a war widow with
your children running around shoeless and unable to attend school. Nobody would accept living like that if
they had a choice. We have found that there has been a shift from posttraumatic stress to more chronic
mental health issues. A large amount of people still complain about acute back pains and headaches for
example. We think that, for many of them, the symptoms are connected to stress, anxiety and despair."
(AlertNet 28 May 2003)
"While headlines declare that initial redevelopment efforts in Afghanistan are now getting under way,
humanitarian-focused websites highlight reports about an almost hidden medical crisis – psychosocial
distress. This is a critical time to focus on psychosocial, or mental health concerns in Central Asia and
remember the lessons learned in Kosovo. Early and adequate mental health responses carried out in a
holistic and culturally sensitive manner are one of the most important investments the international
community can make in the recovery of Afghanistan and other humanitarian crisis situations.
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), 'currently 1.8 billion people live in conflict zones, in
transition or in situations of permanent instability. Of these, 10% are traumatized, and 10% will develop
dysfunctional behavior. That’s 360 million human beings in desperate need of support.' Afghanistan, like
Angola, Cambodia, Somalia, Burundi, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, and Chechnya is an example of
prolonged human destabilization and psychosocial distress caused by traumatic events.
In Afghanistan alone, it has been suggested that some five million people may be affected by psychosocial
distress. A WHO fact-finding mission to Pakistan recently found that 30% of the Afghan refugees who seek
medical assistance at local health care facilities are presenting psychosomatic complaints resulting from
psychological problems. Traumatic experiences such as killings, material losses, torture and sexual
violence, harsh detention and uprooting, all affect people’s behavior for generations. 'The international
community must consider psychosocial health as urgent as physical health problems,' says Mary Petevi, a
psychosocial specialist at WHO’s Emergency and Humanitarian Action Department.
Nonetheless, raising the topic of mental health concerns often poses an important question: should we
provide psychological support where life itself is at risk? Or as Mary Petevi asks, 'What good is
psychotherapy to a mother who has nothing to feed her ten children?'
These unanswerable questions as well as concerns about the lack of funding have historically prevented
psychological support from being considered as anything other than complementary aid. But humanitarian
relief agencies are slowly integrating psychological support into operations that provide food, water,
shelter, and physical care. 'Psychological support aims at helping people to help themselves. A society
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needs active survivors, not passive victims!' says Lise Simonsen, the psychological support officer at the
International Federation of the Red Cross.
The need for psychological support is clearly indicated by recent reports on Afghanistan and surrounding
countries. Life in overcrowded camps, killing and violence, deprivations and material losses, uncertainty
over the future, disruption of community and social support are well-recognized. In a November 2001
WHO special report, Dr. Leena Kaartinen of the NGO Healthnet International, said that she first started
treating patients in this isolated region in 1985. She reports that the greatest health problem facing the
people she works with is psychosocial distress.
She explains that 'twenty-three years of war have ravaged the mental health and psychosocial functioning
of the people of Afghanistan. Killing, executions, massive persecution, forced internal displacement, fear
associated with living in mined areas, and the latest escalation of violence have left an indelible mark on
the population. In addition, the psychological impact of living in uncertainty affects at least three million
Afghan refugees.'
A recent Agence France Presse report cited that 'refugees, often in tears, recount how they have found sons
shot dead by the Taliban and had sons and husbands forcibly conscripted to fight a war they do not want to
fight. Scores more tell of homes destroyed by U.S. bombs, children, husbands, wives, mothers and fathers
killed during the campaign.' Refugees’ reactions are normal reactions to abnormal situations, but the
cognitive, emotional and socio-economic burden imposed on individuals, the family, and the community,
are enormous." (RI 8 January 2002)
Malnutrition and mortality rates surprisingly low in acutely food insecure Sar-e-Pol
(July 2002)
•
The drought has forced many families of Sar-e-Pol to sell all part of their assets to survive. Their
ability to cope is stretched to the very maximum.
•
Many have been forced to move from their areas of origin in order to meet their subsistence needs.
•
The situation has been exacerbated by recent reports of violence and factional fighting that has
continued to displace people and has prevented others from returning.
•
Recent nutrition surveys have indicated a poor nutritional situation in the area.
•
In March 2002, ACF conducted a further survey in Sang Charak district of Sar-e-Pol that showed
suprisingly low levels of acute malnutrition.
•
It is likely that the poor food security of the area and the inevitable summer increase in malnutrition
will lead to an increase in malnutrition rates over the summer.
"The population of Sar-e-Pol is regarded as acutely food insecure as a result of drought. This has resulted in
many families being forced to turn to ever more extreme methods of coping with the lack of food and
employment opportunities. Access to cash for food purchase has become increasingly necessary and
increasingly difficult and has led to families selling all or part of their assets to survive. In general the
coping mechanisms in the area appear to be very strong and have allowed many to “cope”, albeit at the very
edge of their ability. However, people’s ability to cope is stretched to the very maximum. Many have
traditionally relied on systems of charity and borrowing but, as the entire population now feels the effects
of the past years, access to this traditional redistribution network is also becoming more and more difficult.
As a last resort many have been forced to move from their areas of origin in order to meet their subsistence
needs.
The situation has been exacerbated by recent reports of violence and factional fighting that has continued to
displace people and has prevented others from returning. It is certainly difficult to see how the situation can
improve without considerable long-term input to rebuild people’s livelihoods and to ensure that the security
79
situation remains stable. Recent nutrition surveys have indicated a poor nutritional situation in the area. In
March 2002, ACF conducted a further survey in Sang Charak district of Sar-e-Pol that showed an estimated
prevalence of malnutrition of 3.6 % (W/Ht <-2 Z scores and/or oedema), including 0.6 % of severe
malnutrition (W/Ht <-3 Z scores and/ or oedema) (ACF 30/03/02). The low levels of acute malnutrition are
surprising given the extent of the food crisis in the area, the dependency on food aid and the findings of
previous surveys and assessments in the area. However, the results appear to be born out by the mortality
rates from the survey, which estimated CMR as 0.55/10,000/ day and under-five mortality as
1.31/10,000/day. These both remain below emergency thresholds. The survey points to a number of factors
including the very strong coping strategies practised in the area. The survey also points out that the last full
nutrition survey, showing a poor situation, was conducted in August 2001, during the period when
diarrhoeal morbidity is at its highest. There is a large seasonal variation in nutrition rates strongly linked to
diarrhoea. It is likely that the poor food security of the area and the inevitable summer increase in
malnutrition will lead to an increase in malnutrition rates over the summer." (RNIS No. 38 July 2002, p.
45)
Survey of Maslakh camp shows alarming levels of mortality (July 2002)
•
Maslakh is the largest IDP camp in Asia and Europe.
•
Low prevalence of malnutrition, nut significantly different from the standard reference population.
•
Mortality figures are extremely alarming as they are above emergency thresholds and, in the case of
the under five mortality, very greatly so.
•
MSF says levels of severe malnutrition are unacceptable in Maslakh camp. The survey showed a
global malnutrition rate of 26.4 percent and a severe acute malnutrition of 6.6 percent compared to a
global malnutrition of less than 10 percent among new arrivals.
•
The findings of the survey demonstrate that unequal access to food is the underlying cause of the
increasing malnutrition.
•
MSF recommends that international aid response focuses on meeting immediate humanitarian needs
next to the attention for state building and reconstruction.
•
Poor water and sanitation may be responsible for the 3% death rate recorded in July/August
"The situation in Western Afghanistan remains extremely precarious largely as a result of drought and
insecurity. Many of the small-scale farmers in the area have been particularly badly affected and the
emergency needs of both non-displaced and displaced populations are high. UNICEF and CDC recently
conducted a nutrition survey in Maslakh camp, near Hirat, which has seen unprecedented numbers of
people seeking shelter and assistance over the past few years. This number has grown enormously over the
past year and today Maslakh is the largest IDP camp in Asia and Europe (UNICEF/CDC 04/02). The
survey indicated that the estimated prevalence of acute malnutrition (W/Ht <-2 Z scores and/or oedema)
was 2.9 % including 1.2 % of severe malnutrition (W/Ht <-3 Z scores and/or oedema). These prevalences
are extremely low, particularly given the current situation, and in fact are not significantly different from
the standard reference population (UNICEF/CDC 04/02). The survey also measured mortality and found
that the crude mortality rate over the previous four months was 1.5/10,000/day and the under-five mortality
was 6.1/10,000/day. The mortality figures are extremely alarming as they are above emergency thresholds
and, in the case of the under five mortality, very greatly so. The main causes of death were determined to
be watery diarrhoea and pneumonia, with malnutrition reported to be an aggravating factor among 51.4 %
of the total deaths and 46.9 % of the under-five mortality (UNICEF/CDC 04/02).
The very high under-five mortality rate could be masking a more serious nutritional crisis in the under-five
population, however other information on the nutritional situation in the camp would seem to indicate that
malnutrition is not a widespread problem. The prevalence of micronutrient deficiencies was deemed not to
be a problem of public health importance and the prevalence in women of reproductive age was also not
seen to be greatly elevated. The main cause of both morbidity and mortality seems to be preventable
80
communicable diseases, which would indicate that the camp suffers from an extremely poor public health
environment (UNICEF/CDC 04/02). This is particularly concerning given the upcoming diarrhoeal
season." (RNIS No. 38 July 2002, p. 46)
Click here to see the full nutrition and mortality survey conducted by UNICEF and CDC in April 2002
See also: "Afghanistan:
IDPs unhappy at bread instead of wheat ", IRIN, 29 July 2002
"A nutritional survey conducted by the international medical aid organization Doctors Without
Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in Mazlakh camp, near the Western Afghan city of Herat, shows
a severe increase in malnutrition among thousands of internally displaced Afghans living in the camp.
The survey, conducted with a representative sample of 1,869 children throughout the camp, shows a global
malnutrition rate of 26.4 percent and a severe acute malnutrition of 6.6 percent. These findings show an
unacceptable rise compared to the global malnutrition of less than 10 percent among new arrivals looking
for humanitarian assistance in Mazlakh. 'Here you have the absurd situation that the longer people stay in
the camp, the more malnourished they get,' says Stefano Savi, head of the MSF project in Herat. 'It is very
clear that being in Mazlakh presents a serious risk of malnutrition and hence of disease and death.'
The camp hosts an estimated 160,000 people fleeing drought and insecurity. Since food for up to 300,000
people is being distributed to the camp, the findings of the survey demonstrate that unequal access to food
is the underlying cause of the increasing malnutrition. Crime, corruption and ethnic tensions inside the
camp result in an ineffective food distribution as well as fear among big parts of the population to seek any
kind of assistance. This is the main reason only 80 children attend the special feeding centers of MSF,
which have a capacity to treat up to 200 children. Based upon this latest survey out of 1,869 children,
hundreds would meet the criteria for admission to these centers. Current efforts by the involved parties to
reorganize the camp in order to get the situation under control need to be further improved. 'All these
factors still make it really difficult for us to reach the vast majority of the malnourished population, who are
in desperate need of assistance,' concludes Savi.
The displaced have fled their homes seeking protection and assistance. The international community is
struggling to assist the most needy. MSF demands that the International Organization of Migration (IOM),
UN agencies, and local authorities redouble their efforts to install effective systems to help the population
of Mazlakh. With the alarming growing numbers of malnourished people, the focus should first and
foremost be on solving the protection problems inside the camp to enable the set up of the planned
equitable food distribution system which will reach the whole population.
The example of Mazlakh clearly shows that despite international optimism and the millions of US dollars
of aid being promised for reconstruction of Afghanistan, the people are still facing huge problems in terms
of immediate humanitarian needs. The international aid response must focus on meeting these immediate
needs next to the attention for state building and reconstruction." (MSF 6 February 2002)
See also : "Afghanistan: Maslakh nutritional survey draws criticism", IRIN, 18 February 2002
"Two supplementary feeding centres in Maslakh camp in Herat are providing extra rations for more than
2,000 children every day, and Médecins sans Frontières, which runs one of the centres plus therapeutic
feeding centres in the camp and in the city’s hospital, reports 'unacceptable' levels of severe malnutrition,
given the existence of a general food distribution. The centre saw a 3% death rate in July and August.
One factor is the high rates of diarrhoea prompted by poor water and sanitation services which have been
the subject of a massive effort in construction over recent months. But the picture is complicated by the
81
reluctance of mothers to take children to the therapeutic feeding centres, possibly because they cannot be
away from the rest of their family all day.
MSF is about to duplicate both the supplementary and the therapeutic feeding centre to cope with the
numbers." (WHO 14 September 2001)
WHO reports a significant mortality rate drop in Maslakh camp (March 2002)
•
WHO report a significant decrease in mortality rates at the Maslakh camp outside Herat.
•
The crude mortality rate has dropped from 0.47 per 10,000 people in December 2001 (50 deaths
/week) to 0.2 per 10,000 (25 deaths/week)
•
Major causes of death are acute respiratory infections, especially in winter. In summer, diarroheal
disease is the main killer.
•
WHO attributes this decrease to a series of steps taken by the international community, beginning with
the establishment of more clinics inside the camp.
"World Health Organization officials are reporting a significant decrease in mortality rates at the Maslakh
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camp outside Herat. The camp has been the site of international
concern over dire health conditions during the crisis. Mortality rates in February are now reported to be
substantially lower than in December.
An estimated 180,000 displaced persons, mostly from Ghor and Badghis provinces, have been living in
Maslakh camp since September, 2000. By December, 2001, the crude mortality rate was 0.47 per 10,000
people. This represents a death rate of approximately 50 persons per week.
Since February, this figure has dropped to 0.2 per ten thousand, representing a death rate that is currently
oscillating around 25 persons per week. This figure is considered low for refugee and IDPs conditions. The
major causes of death are acute respiratory infections, especially in winter. In summer, diarroheal disease is
the main killer.
WHO attributes this decrease to a series of steps taken by the international community, beginning with the
establishment of more clinics inside the camp. Night health services, improvement of the provision of nonfood items, including clothing and better shelter, and the establishment of nutrition centers for
malnourished children are also contributing factors.
WHO plays a crucial role in coordinating amongst agencies involved in IDP health services in Maslakh
camp. In addition, WHO offers health assistance to IDPs by providing essential medical supplies to clinics
within the camps. WHO also makes available guidelines, health education material, training and IDP health
statistics data to local health authorities." (WHO 5 March 2002)
Approximately 2 doctors for every 10,000 persons in Afghanistan (January 2002)
•
Medical staff are deployed unevenly relative to the population’s geographical distribution; about 25%
of all doctors are in Kabul serving 7% of the population.
•
Existing staff need significant skill upgrading/refresher training to deliver essential services package.
"There are about 17,500 public sector health staff in Afghanistan: 3,900 doctors or roughly 2 doctors for
every 10,000; 2,500 midlevel staff; 5,000 nurses and technicians; and 6,100 community health workers and
traditional birth attendants. The majority were on the public payroll and about 30-40% are being paid by
NGOs. Staff are deployed unevenly relative to the population’s geographical distribution; about 25% of all
doctors are in Kabul serving 7% of the population (about 1 doctor per 1,700). In addition to inadequate
82
numbers, the composition of staff does not match the need. More nurses, midlevel staff, and midwives are
needed, and female staff are lacking at all levels of the health system. Existing staff need significant skill
upgrading/refresher training to deliver essential services package." (UNDP 15 January 2002)
Food
Ending of food distribution in camps put the most vulnerable at risk (June 2003)
•
Shaidayee camp near Herat is set to close in a few months. Those who cannot return home are being
evacuated to Maslakh camp.
•
Many who have returned have done so because the food distribution was stopped in Shaidayee camp as
part of an exit strategy aimed at emptying the camp whihc is located on land owned by the provincial
government.
•
Food distribution were stopped in both Shaidayee and Maslakh camp in April forcing mamy to leave
the camp in order to survive.
•
AI is concerned that the use of food to force people to return violates the basic right to adequate food
and is leading to forcible return to areas where return is not sustainable.
•
Food rations to IDPs in both camps were stopped before an accurate vulnerability assessment could
identify those individuals, such as female headed households, unaccompanied minors, the elderly and
the ill, that were unable to fend for themselves.
"Shaidayee IDP camp outside Herat city will close in the next few months, and the government and
international agencies are organizing the evacuation of the camp. Residents of that camp who continue to
be in need of protection and cannot return to their places of origin have been “encouraged” to move to
Maslakh IDP camp some kilometers further away. At the time of Amnesty International’s visit, residents
of Shaidayee that had “decided” to return to their home villages stated that the main reason for this decision
was the fact that the distribution of food rations in the camps had been halted. This withdrawal of food
assistance was part of an “exit strategy” being developed by the World Food Programme (WFP) and
UNHCR in collaboration with the local Ministry for Refugees and Repatriation. The land on which
Shaidayee camp was built is allegedly owned by the provincial government, which wants the land back. As
part of the exit strategy, IDPs in both camps were told that the food rations would be stopped by the end of
March 2003, and IDPs in Shaidayee were told that they would have to leave the camp a month later. Food
rations in both Shaidayee and Maslakh were halted as of 1 April 2003, although WFP carried out one
further distribution of only half the standard ration in mid-April. Abdur Raouf, who used to be a
sharecropper in Faryab province, stated that his family had no other choice but to go back to try to find
work. He claimed that if he stayed in Shaidayee for even another ten days his five children would die of
starvation.
Amnesty International has serious concerns about the way in which this exit strategy has been put into
operation and, more fundamentally, about the lack of sufficient attention to the human rights of the
individuals affected by such a strategy. There is a dubious morality, not to mention legality, involved in
using food as the means to “induce” people to return to their places of origin. By violating the basic right to
adequate food, the international agencies, including WFP and UNHCR, involved in this exit strategy
effectively become responsible for causing the forcible return of IDPs from Shaidayee and Maslakh camps.
In addition, the blanket withdrawal of food assistance constitutes a blunt instrument, which
disproportionately affects vulnerable individuals. Amnesty International has learned that food rations to
IDPs in both camps were stopped before an accurate vulnerability assessment could identify those
individuals, such as female headed households, unaccompanied minors, the elderly and the ill, that were
83
unable to fend for themselves. Abrushan, a widow living in Shaidayee camp, told Amnesty International
that she couldn’t go back to her village in Herat province because she had no house there. Yet, she said, she
was “so hungry; they have stopped our food and I don’t know how to find a job.”
Maslakh camp still shelters large numbers of Pashtuns from Faryab province as well as IDPs from
provinces such as Uruzgan that are unable to return to their home villages for protection reasons. Other
vulnerable populations in the camp, such as unaccompanied women, the disabled and the elderly will also
not in the foreseeable future be able to return to their homes in conditions of safety and dignity. There is, in
addition, no durable solution in sight for most of the camps’ large Kutchi populations, many of whom have
lost their livestock and ability to their regain their former nomadic lifestyle. While some inhabitants of
Maslakh camp are able to earn a living in Herat city, Amnesty International urges the authors of an exit
strategy for both Maslakh and Shaidayee to be mindful of the continuing protection and assistance needs of
sections of the camp population. For instance, the camp is located an hour’s drive away from the city, and
IDPs are often unable to pay truck operators to transport them. This is compounded by the fact that much of
the “work” found by IDPs in Herat is confined to begging on the streets, the income from which is
extremely unpredictable.
An exit strategy is only acceptable if it is primarily aimed at achieving the sustainable and rights respecting
return of the camp population to their home or preferred destination. Forcing the movement of persons,
whether to their home provinces, urban centers or to another IDP camp for reasons of political expedience,
to free the land for commercial use or due to donor pressure will ensure that returns are unsustainable, and
is in contravention of international human rights standards." (AI 23 June 2003, pp. 15-16)
General food security improvement during 2002, except in the south (April 2003)
•
According to a WFP food needs assessment, food security improved in 2002, compared to 2001,
mostly in the nortwest, but little improvement in the south, due to the continued drought.
•
The 2002 cultivation of land in the northern rainfed belt was only 10-30% of the pre-drought years
•
Emergency food aid still needed in the south but in other areas food aid will promote long-term
security
"WFP and partners conducted a food needs assessment of the rural settled population (WFP/ VA M, 20022003). Food security improved in 2002 compared to 2001, especially in the northwest of the country, whilst
little improvement and even in some cases a deterioration has been experienced in the south (see map).
Food through own production has increased in many districts, except in the south where drought has
continued.
Many districts however remains moderately to highly food insecure, especially in the south. Drought and
war still have very negative effects on food security. Due to the loss of seeds, tools, and traction animals, it
is estimated that the 2002 cultivation of land in the northern rainfed
belt was only 10-30% of the pre-drought years. Underground aquifers are also still not replenished; this has
hampered irrigated culture, which also suffers from infrastructural damage. It is hoped that the
improvement of pasture conditions in the north, west, and central Afghanistan, and the increase in livestock
market prices will allow beginning of restocking. Labour opportunities in the agricultural sector are scarce
as a consequence of the drought. Moreover, the closing of the borders with Iran and Pakistan will limit the
traditional economic migration.
Whilst in the south and in some pockets throughout the country food aid is still needed for saving lives, in
other parts of the country food aid will promote long-term food security by helping people rebuild their
livelihoods." (RNIS 41 April 2003, p. 41)
84
6 million people remain vulnerable to food insecurity (August 2002)
•
FAO's report concludes that an estimated 6 million people will remain highly vulnerable to food
insecurity and will continue to need relief food assistance over the next year.
•
Household food security has not shown a significant improvement in western Afghanistan due to
indebtedness and other factors, including a 40% increase in the price of fuel.
•
The shrinking labour market arising from the major influx of returnees from Pakistan, combined with
68,000 IDPs, has also resulted in increased livelihood insecurity in in eastern Afghanistan and rising
food prices have added to the hardship experienced.
•
Water for consumption is also a major problem in the Kabul area because of the lowering of the water
table.
"The Food and Agriculture Organisation and the World Food Programme have reported on their annual
food assessment. This indicates that agricultural production overall has improved considerably, manifesting
an increase of 82% over the 2001 figure. In spite of this, the report concludes that an estimated 6 million
people will remain highly vulnerable to food insecurity and will continue to need relief food assistance over
the next year. The report notes that livestock numbers have fallen by as much as 60% due to the effect of
the drought on range vegetation as well as on the availability of feed from grain and crop residues,
especially in rain-fed areas. This has had a particularly serious impact on the nomadic Kuchi population.
Additional reports from the UN make it clear that the impact of the drought continues to be felt. Household
food security has not shown a significant improvement in western Afghanistan due to indebtedness and
other factors, including a 40% increase in the price of fuel. In southern Afghanistan, severe drought
conditions persist, with the water table reportedly 2-3 metres lower this year than last. The UN anticipates
that this will lead to further displacement, with an increased number of people moving to the urban areas. In
certain drought-affected districts of eastern Afghanistan, the provision of drinking water is representing a
major problem because the water table is now too low to meet normal levels of demand. The shrinking
labour market arising from the major influx of returnees from Pakistan, combined with 68,000 IDPs, has
also resulted in increased livelihood insecurity in this part of the country and rising food prices have added
to the hardship experienced. Water for consumption is also a major problem in the Kabul area because of
the lowering of the water table. In Maidan Shah, the provincial capital of Wardak to the south-east of
Kabul, only two wells are now operational." (BAAG 31 August 2002)
See also: Qaht-e-Pol "A Cash Famine", Food Insecurity
Feinstein International Famine Center, May 2002 [pdf 400 kb]
in Afghanistan 1999-2002,
The following maps shows food vulnerability in Afghanistan as of 1 May 2002:
Source: AIMS, 1 May 2002,(GIF 50 kb)
Nutrition surveys in the Shomali Plains and Panjsheer Valley shows high levels of
malnutrition among mothers (July 2002)
•
High levels of destruction and the presence of large number of landmines in the Shomali plains and the
Panjsheer Valley prevents access to some of the fertile farming lands and result in large number of
families finding it difficult to meet their needs.
•
The ACF survey conducted in March and April 2002 showed that a significant proportion of mothers
are at risk of acute malnutrition to the degree that they may not be adequately nourished to support a
healthy pregnancy. 50.9 % of mothers surveyed were observed to have visible signs of goitre,
indicative of Iodine Deficiency Disorder (IDD).
85
•
Results of the survey indicate that that there has been little change in nutritional status since March
2001 but, whilst prevalences are not alarming, they are close to emergency thresholds and will require
careful surveillance.
"The Shomali Plains and Panjsheer Valley have been at the centre of some of the fiercest fighting in
Afghanistan. The area was, for a long time, a front line area between the Taliban and Northern Alliance and
the various offensives resulted in the displacement of vast numbers of people. The conflict and
displacement severely affected what was once a highly fertile area of the country, however the presence of
large numbers of land mines continues to prevent access to some of the fertile farming land. The area is
much more accessible than previously and it now takes two hours to reach Kabul, whereas before it took at
least 12 hours.
The area is less drought-affected than other regions but the level of destruction and the large amount of land
mines mean that many families find it difficult to meet their basic needs. ACF conducted a nutrition survey
in the area during March and April 2002. The survey followed standard cluster survey methodology to
measure children under the age of five years and found an estimated prevalence of acute malnutrition
(W/Ht <-2 Z scores and/or oedema) of 10.5 %, including 1.6 % of severe malnutrition (W/Ht <-3 Z scores
and/or oedema) (see table below).
The survey also measured maternal malnutrition and showed that a significant proportion of mothers are at
risk of acute malnutrition to the degree that they may not be adequately nourished to support a healthy
pregnancy (ACF 04/02). In particular, the survey noted 50.9 % of mothers surveyed were observed to have
visible signs of goitre, indicative of Iodine Deficiency Disorder (IDD). This is extremely worrying as IDD
has very severe implications for maternal health and for fetal development and it is noted with concern that
the prevalence amongst the surveyed population indicates a problem of very significant public health
concern (ACF 04/02). The survey also measured mortality rates and estimated that the Crude Mortality
Rate (CMR) was 0.43/10,000/day and the under-five mortality was 1.1/10,000/day. The results of the
survey indicate that that there has been little change in nutritional status since March 2001 but, whilst
prevalences are not alarming, they are close to emergency thresholds and will require careful surveillance,
particularly as the survey linked high rates of childhood illness to malnutrition. It was noted with some
concern that rates of diarrhoea are likely to increase over the summer period and with it rates of
malnutrition." (RNIS No. 38 July 2002, p. 44)
Nutrition situation in Mazar is under control (July 2002)
•
There is a substantial IDP community in and around Mazar.
•
ACF undertook a nutrition survey in March 2002 which showed relatively low level of malnutrition as
well as mortality levels well within emergency thresholds.
•
As the survey took place before the summer, higer levels of malnutrition could be expected during the
summer.
86
"Mazar is the main city in northern Afghanistan and the second largest city in the country. The city has
been target of much in-migration from surrounding areas hit hard by conflict and drought. As a result, there
is a substantial IDP community in and around Mazar that began arriving from February 2001. The last
survey to be conducted in the town was in November 2000 (see RNIS 32 and 33), which showed low levels
of acute malnutrition. Access to the city had been difficult until earlier this year when ACF undertook a
nutrition survey in March 2002. The survey indicated a prevalence of acute malnutrition (W/Ht <-2 Z
scores and/or oedema) of 2.9 % including 0.4 % of severe malnutrition (W/Ht <-3 Z scores and/or oedema).
The results indicate that the nutrition situation is under control with levels being well below emergency cutoffs. The results are similar to those of November 2000 (ACF 03/02). The survey also measured mo rtality
and estimated that the CMR was 0.2/10,000/day and the under-five mortality was 0.7/10,000/day. The
mortality is also well within emergency thresholds and indicates that the overall health situation is under
control. Given the poor food security outlook for many in the area and the dependency on humanitarian
assistance, the low levels of acute malnutrition are surprising. However, the city has received a great deal of
assistance and there is an increase in the number and variety of imported goods in the city, indicating an
improvement in the overall economy. It is important to note that the survey took place before the summer,
which is associated with a seasonal rise in diarrhoea and malnutrition, and it can be expected that rates of
malnutrition will increase during the summer period." (RNIS No. 38 July 2002, p. 45)
Shelter and non-food items
Projected need of 100,000 shelter during 2003 (April 2003)
•
Conflict and displacement has caused the destruction and deterioration of housing throughout the
country.
•
No systematic and comprehensive assessment undertaken to determine the number and level of
housing destruction in the country.
•
Over 500,000 homes are estimated to have been either partially or totally destroyed.
•
60,000 of the most vulnerable families throughout the country received shelter assistance during 2002.
•
Projected target for 2003 is 100,000 shelters
"One of the main effects of conflict and displacement has been the destruction and deterioration of housing
through out the country. There is no systematic and comprehensive assessment undertaken to determine
the number and level of housing destruction in the country. However, some indicators (previous returnee
monitoring, analysis of displacement statistics, cursory visits by donor community, some interviews, some
result of district profile, etc.) provides an estimate of over 500,000 homes having been either partially or
totally destroyed. This could be a ground base for continuing intervention in the shelter sector but does not
imply that all 500,000 families require assistance.
1381/2002 Status
During 2002, approximately 380,000 families have returned to their areas of origin (IDPs and Refugees).
This year, with support from the international community, approximately 60,000 of the most vulnerable
families throughout the country received shelter assistance (approx. 40,000 of which from UNHCR and the
rest a combined contribution from other agencies). The initial target for this year was 100,000 shelters.
1382/2003 projected needs
For 2003, using the present planning figure of 1.5 million returns (estimated 267,000 families), it is
foreseen that approximately 160,000 families will return to rural areas. The projected target (not based on
87
overall needs assessment) including the required balance from 2002 is 100,000 shelters. Against this
number an initial commitment for 60,000 shelters has been planned by UNHCR for 2003. It is not yet
known how many shelters will be covered by other agencies." (TISA
Returnees in Mazar-i-Sharif are in dire need of accomodation (March 2003)
•
Returnees in Mazar-i-Sharif need accomodation as many have found their houses demolished.
•
Impossibility of settling in their villages of origin means that many of the 45,000 IDPs returning are
heading for the cities, living in difficult conditions.
•
500,000 people in the region have no food, water or accommodation, and they are heading for the
cities.
•
Total requirement for new accommodation in Mazar-i-Sharif is 100,000.
•
Families without males are unable to have their homes built without the assistance of family members
or the local community.
"The Chief of the Department for Repatriation in Mazar-i-Sharif said that there is a serious need for
accommodation for the many people, who have returned. Also, there are no jobs for the large number of
people, arriving in the town. Many have returned and found that their houses have been
demolished. The 45,000 internally displaced persons, who have recently returned, will be suffering this
winter. Some people have received two bags of grain from UNHCR, but that is not enough.
The 45,000 internally displaced people are unable to settle in their villages of origin, and are therefore
arriving in the cities. They are living in ruins and on building sites, and children are dying from diarrhoea,
dysentery and viral diseases. In the rural districts, people are also suffering from the drought.
The Head of the UNHCR office in Mazar-i-Sharif said that there was a serious shortage of basic resources:
housing, water and food. There are 500,000 people in the region who have no food, water or
accommodation, and they are heading for the cities. This in turn means that they will be unable to settle
down before the winter sets in. UNHCR expects to have completed 8,000 homes by the end of November
2002. That is a small number compared to the estimated total requirement for new accommodation, which
is 100,000 in Mazar-i-Sharif. The source further said that UNHCR is unable to provide accommodation and
water for everybody, but is trying to assist the most
vulnerable groups, typically the internally displaced who were unable to flee the country and instead were
driven away to the "neighbouring village". Accordingly, UNHCR tries to make women their first priority.
Most of the people are returning as "extended families" - i.e. 2-3 families together, although there are also
tribes and small families.
Accommodation, water, land - and in the towns jobs - are the vital survival requirements, which must be
met. There are also a large number of families with a female breadwinner. They are at the top of the
UNHCR list of priorities. However, these families without males are unable to have their homes built
without the assistance of family members or the local community.
The source feared that many repatriated people would resort to robbery and crime against the civilian
population unless jobs are created by means of reconstruction projects.
The source said that UNHCR is cooperating with the Ministry for repatriation and the Ministry for
reconstruction of the rural districts, but according to recent experiences, the administration is only just
functioning, and certainly not at a level where the administration takes on sole responsibility for
part of the work, and there is no coordination of activities by the administration." (DIS March 2003, pp. 4142)
88
IDPs in camps in Kabul need housing, clothing and heating facilities (January 2003)
•
Among the returnees, some 4,000 IDPs face difficult conditions in Kabul, with many lacking food and
shelter.
•
In Chaman Huzuri, one of the 10 IDP camps established in the city in the last 8 months, housing has
become a critical issue. Other problems include lack of winter clothing, fuel, drinking water and access
to health care.
•
Assistance has not been regular as UNHCR's strategy is to focus on rural areas in order to prevent too
many people from heading to the cities in search of assistance.
"As winter temperatures drop, conditions for some 4,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) within the
Afghan capital, Kabul, remain bleak. The city has seen a major influx of returnees, many of whom lack
adequate shelter and food.
[...]
Chaman Huzuri, is one 10 IDP camps established in the city over the past eight months and, according to
Mohammad Halim, an inhabitant of the camp, the number of displaced families arriving there has been
rising; housing has become a critical issue for most Kabul residents.
[…]
Asked what their main problem areas were within the camps, most families interviewed by IRIN pointed to
a severe lack of winter clothing, fuel, drinking water and access to health care.
'There has been very little assistance from aid agencies,' Halim said, noting that whatever help had arrived
had been very irregular. "We have not received any regular assistance so far."
Like many residents, Halim complained that the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) had neglected them, an accusation the agency denied to IRIN on 23 January.
While recognising that conditions within the camp were adverse and unsuited to coping with winter
conditions, a UNHCR spokeswoman, Maki Shinohara, told IRIN that UNHCR was working with a number
of agencies in the provision of assistance to help affected families get through the winter.
She emphasised, however, that UNHCR wanted these people to return to their places of origin. 'Once we
start giving out a lot of aid, it will undermine the whole purpose,' she said, adding that some people in the
camps were trying to seem more visible to attract attention for assistance. She reaffirmed that UNHCR’s
strategy was to try and focus assistance on rural communities where possible, with a view to curbing the
flow of IDPs into the city.
Shinohara noted that over the past year Kabul Province alone had seen an influx of some 650,000 returnees
- the vast majority from neighbouring Pakistan.
Meanwhile, Zubair Omari, a programme officer for the UK-based NGO, Islamic Relief-UK (IRUK), told
IRIN the 4,000 or so people inhabiting the 10 camps in Kabul were in urgent need of non-food related
items such as clothing and heating facilities. 'Their condition is worsening as the weather gets colder,'
Omari asserted, adding that IRUK had begun distributing winter clothing to the families last week." (IRIN
27 January 2003)
Survey shows some 140,000 people in Kabul are in need of shelter and relief
assistance (August 2002)
89
•
An estimated 20% of the 500,000 refugees who have returned to Kabul are living in abandoned or
destroyed buildings or in open space without protection from the elements and with limited access to
water and with poor hygiene.
•
A survey of destitute people showd that around 20,500 families (approximately 143,500 people) would
need major assistance with shelter and relief packages to help them over the winter.
•
As more and more Afghans return each day to restart their lives in a country devastated by more than
two decades of war - and with donors increasingly slow to react to immediate needs - the problem of
shelter looks set only to worsen.
•
Further exacerbating the problem is the threat of eviction from the buildings, many of which are state
owned properties.
•
A plan devised by by the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements - Habitat includes the
identification of 17,000 plots around the city as possible sites for new homes.
•
UNHCR plans to provide 50,000 shelter kits, consisting of 30 wooden poles, a door, two window
frames, nails and tools will be distributed in devastated areas, including the Shomali plains of Kabul
province, and elsewhere throughout the country.
•
Finding enough NGOs with the staff necessary to evaluate shelter needs in many areas of devastated
Afghanistan remains a challenge.
"The UN reports that over 500,000 refugees have returned to Kabul. It notes that, while most of the
returning population have been able to find accommodation with relatives or other residents or have
returned to their areas of origin, an estimated 20% are living in abandoned or destroyed buildings or in
open space without protection from the elements and with limited access to water and with poor hygiene. A
survey of destitute people carried out by the municipality, in conjunction with UN HABITAT, found that
around 20,500 families (approximately 143,500 people) would need major assistance with shelter and relief
packages to help them over the winter. It was noted that this number might eventually increase when more
information on the conditions of the housing of the poorest resident population had been collected and
analysed. Account would thus be taken of the fact that those who have found accommodation with others
would place strains on the already limited income of their hosts. Account would also be taken of threats to
health arising from overcrowding and heavy pressure on water supplies." (BAAG 31 August 2002)
"Providing shelter to millions of returning refugees or displaced persons throughout Afghanistan remains a
key challenge for the international humanitarian community, in spite of ongoing efforts. As winter fast
approaches, this challenge is going to increase, particularly in the Afghan capital, Kabul - a city which is
experiencing a major influx of returnees.
[…]
But in this city of two million, such misery among the ruins serves only to highlight what is already well
known within the aid community. Afghanistan faces a desperate need for shelter. As more and mo re
Afghans return each day to restart their lives in a country devastated by more than two decades of war - and
with donors increasingly slow to react to immediate needs - the problem of shelter looks set only to worsen.
'The population of Kabul is expected to double in the next year or so,' UNHCR central region head Felipe
Camargo told IRIN. 'There is an urgent need for the international community to realise this. Without proper
housing Kabul will be full of slums in a very high earthquake-prone area.'
His concern was echoed by others in the aid community. 'We are conducting a survey on how many people
are without shelter in the city,' area coordinator for the central region of the United Nations Assistance
Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), Jens Tranum-Kristensen, told IRIN. 'There are thousands of people
living in squalor,' he claimed.
[…]
Further exacerbating the problem is the threat of eviction from the buildings, many of which are state
owned properties. Additionally, many of the thousands of widow-head households, who had taken up
90
residence in dilapidated and abandoned buildings after their owners had fled to Pakistan and Iran, now face
eviction as their owners return.
'Winter is approaching and these people should have some shelter, otherwise there could be some fatal
consequences,' Tranum-Kristensen said.
The Afghan ministry for refugees and repatriation has also expressed concern over the extra burden facing
cities such as Kabul and has reiterated its call to the international community to deliver on billions of
dollars worth of pledges made in Tokyo earlier this year.
But with each passing day, the situation in the capital is increasingly getting worse. So far half a million
Afghans have returned to Kabul, with most originating from the Panjsheer Valley, some 100 km from the
city and from the Shomali Plains, 20 km from the capital.
Recognising the needs of returnees, a proposal to re-house them has been put forward by the United
Nations Centre for Human Settlements - Habitat. The plan includes the identification of 17,000 plots
around the city as possible sites for new homes. 'This project will cost a huge amount of money and they
are still awaiting funding,' Tranum-Kristensen explained.
Funding aside, however, it is increasingly clear that the clock is ticking - not just in Kabul, but throughout
the country. With just three months to go before the onset of winter weather, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is rushing to provide shelter for hundreds of thousands of returnees
in rural Afghanistan.
'Winter is certainly on the minds of the more and than one and a half million Afghans we've so far helped
home,' agency spokesman Ron Redmond said in a statement on Friday. 'We're working to provide shelter
for 400,000 people this year, and with so much of Afghanistan in ruins, they need all the help they can get.'
According to the announcement, 50,000 shelter kits, consisting of 30 wooden poles, a door, two window
frames, nails and tools will be distributed in devastated areas, including the Shomali plains of Kabul
province, and elsewhere throughout the country. Areas around Mazar-e Sharif in the north, Herat in the
west, Kandahar in the south and central Ghazni are also expected to receive contributions.
In addition to shelter kits, tents have also been handed out to families in the Shomali plains and central
highlands areas like Bamyan that were particularly hard hit after years of fighting - enabling them to
provide temporary shelter while they rebuild their homes. All refugees going home under the UNHCRassisted voluntary repatriation programme also receive two plastic tarpaulins as part of their assistance
package.
To date, UNHCR has made agreements with 15 NGO partners to identify needy families and distribute
more than 41,000 of the 50,000 planned shelter kits - the objective being that the families make the
necessary mud bricks themselves. Once their homes have been rebuilt to about shoulder height, the
agency's NGOs will hand over the kits so that the returnees can construct the roof and the necessary support
beams.
As part of its US $35 million shelter programme, UNHCR has shipped 240 mt of nails to distribution points
throughout Afghanistan, along with 240,000 door hinges and a similar number of tool kits - each containing
a hammer, shovel and pick axe. The agency has also purchased 40,000 cubic metres of timber (beams and
lintels), and is seeking regional suppliers to provide 263,000 more beams. Moreover, it's funding local
carpentry workshops in which Afghan craftsmen build doors and windows needed for the shelter kits.
But given the gravity of the situation, the task is a daunting one. Finding enough NGOs with the staff
necessary to evaluate shelter needs in many areas of devastated Afghanistan remains a challenge.
91
Ironically, as more and more Afghans return to their homeland with their belongings, the agency is finding
it's competing with returnees for trucks to ensure that its supplies get delivered throughout the country.
'It's a real race against time to ensure that needy Afghans have the shelter they need to get through the
winter,' Redmond said.
UNHCR, which faces a US $42 million funding shortfall in Afghanistan, had originally planned to provide
97,000 shelter kits this year. However, according to Friday's statement, that objective had to be halved to
ensure adequate funds to provide travel assistance for the number of returnees, already far exceeding earlier
expectations. " (IRIN 5 August 2002)
Water and Sanitation
Only 20 percent of Afghans have access to safe drinking water (June 2003)
•
According to UNEP a major part of Afghanistan is experiencing water scarcity, in urban as well as in
rural areas.
•
Government says only 20 percent of Afghans nationwide had access to safe drinking water in both
cities and rural areas.
•
Water is often a source a conflict
"As the world marks Environment and Water Day on Thursday, the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP) in Afghanistan has announced that a major part of the country is experiencing water
scarcity.
'Water is a major problem in rural and urban areas due to water scarcity, mismanagement and damaged
water systems,' Pekka Haavisto, the chairman of the UNEP Afghanistan Task Force, told IRIN in the
capital, Kabul.
According to the UNEP Post-Conflict Environment Assessment report on Afghanistan, whereas the country
as a whole uses less than one-third of its potential 75,000 million cubic metres of water resources, regional
differences in supply, inefficient use and wastage mean that a major part of the country experiences
scarcity.
'Water quality, quantity, and its guaranteed availability to all people regardless of income or social status is
one of the most pressing challenges facing not only Afghanistan but also the world community today,'
Haavisto remarked. He described it as a major issue requiring the attention of all.
Government officials have also expressed concern. 'The water issue is becoming a serious problem, and the
last four years of drought added to an already big issue,' Yusuf Nuristani, the Afghan minister of irrigation,
water resources and environment, told IRIN at the World Environment and Water Day ceremony in Kabul.
He stated that only 20 percent of Afghans nationwide had access to safe drinking water in both cities and
rural areas. The minister said water mismanagement was widely practised in the country, and that as a
result of prolonged conflict most water channels and other systems had suffered greatly.
'Restoration of water resources is one of the priorities of the government,' said Nuristani, noting that his
ministry was now working out a strategy to bring about the improved management of water resources.
92
UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan Lakhdar Brahimi said the water issue
was more than an environmental problem in the country.
'Water is, perhaps, the most precious resource in Afghanistan, and so it can be a source of conflict,' Brahimi
told IRIN, observing that much of the conflict in the country was the result of land disputes. 'Land rights do
not mean much without water rights,' he said, stressing that one of the most important tasks facing the
country was to impose order and the rule of law over land and water rights." (IRIN 5 June 2003)
Access to water for irrigation sometimes determined by political allegiance (May 2002)
•
The connections among food security, ethnicity and political allegiance are important, especially at
local levels.
•
While connections to local level commanders and authorities bring benefits linked to increased food
security, lack of influence over these same actors increases vulnerability and heightens risk.
•
The landowner’s political connections to those in power may increase his food security, while
members of the displaced communities lack the political allegiances or power needed to ensure
protection and maintain access to the services provided in the IDP camp
"The connections among food security, ethnicity and political allegiance are important, especially at local
levels. The collapse of the Taliban regime brought a sudden shift in power relations, increasing stability in
some areas while contributing to upheaval in others. The populations once favored politically under the
Taliban, such as the Koochi pastoralists and other Pashtun communities in the north, are facing renewed
threats that have direct implications for food security. One example is access to water for irrigation, which
is determined not only by wealth and geography but also by political allegiance. In contrast, those who
were persecuted under the Taliban regime, such as Tajik and Uzbek supporters of the Northern Alliance,
are once again receiving benefits due to ethnic and/or affiliations with local and national power structures.
Last year’s political transition brought a rapid change in land tenure and access to water in many areas, as
communities abandoned or reclaimed areas from which they had been forcibly uprooted during earlier
conflicts. In irrigated areas in the north, for instance, Tajik and Uzbek groups have recently returned to land
lost under the Taliban, and have since denied downstream communities access to irrigation water, saying
'This was done to the us in the past, so why shouldn’t we the same to others now?' While connections to
local level commanders and authorities bring benefits linked to increased food security, lack of influence
over these same actors increases vulnerability and heightens risk. For example, one landowner in Sar-e-Pul
has used his political connections to lobby the local authorities for access to his fields where and IDP camp
has been established. As a result, the governor and local commanders have been adamant in 'encouraging'
the IDPs to return to their home areas, many of which have no source of drinking water. The landowner’s
political connections to those in power may increase his food security, while members of the displaced
communities lack the political allegiances or power needed to ensure protection and maintain access to the
services provided in the IDP camp." (Feinstein International Famine Center May 2002, pp. 25-26)
Needs of IDPs by geographical location
IDPs in Zhare Dasht camp lack income -generating activities (February 2003)
•
Some 27,000 IDPs hosted in Zhare Dasht camp.
•
Most of the displaced face difficulties in finding work in the camp.
93
•
Conditions in the camps near Spin Boldak are also difficult although many prefer to stay there instead
of moving to Zhare Dasht because employment opportunities seem better.
•
Health and education are considered as problems in Spin Boldak camp.
"Six months after the controversial site [Zhare Dasht camp] was opened, the camp is home to nearly 27,000
IDPs, with most having no option but to stay in the harsh desert environment. For some, drought means
they have nowhere to shift to, but for many the main barrier to moving on is the insecurity elsewhere in the
country.
People like Nasruddin were desperate to get away from their homes. He is one of thousands of ethnic
Pashtuns who fled northern Afghanistan a year ago. They claim they were harassed, robbed and threatened
by Uzbeks and Tajiks who wanted revenge after five years of war with the Pashtun-dominated Taliban.
[…]
"Even with the problems here, at least we are safe, thank God," he told IRIN. However, he said finding
work was very hard. "At the moment we have no hopes, because there is no peace in our homes. If there is
peace we will see. If it stays like this, with fighting, we will never go back," he said standing outside his
UNHCR-donated tent. In a sign that he is settling in for the long term, Sahib has been making mud bricks
to build a semi-permanent house.
Back near the border with Pakistan at Spin Buldak camp, conditions remain bleak for the 30,000-odd
inmates. Some are there because of the four-year drought, some are Kuchi nomad IDPs who have no
chance of resuming their wandering lifestyle.
Despite the hardships, many IDPs are reluctant to move from Spin Buldak, as it is seen as a better location
for employment opportunities, and UNHCR’s Shinohara maintained that movement from the Spin Buldak
camps remained voluntary. "The government doesn't want people there, but a lot of the people can't go
home at the moment," she said. A spell of extremely bad weather in December had ironically seen people
staying at Spin Buldak because more aid was being distributed there.
Despite clinics being run by Medecins Sans Frontieres, (MSF) and supplementary feeding programmes
from the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), health was becoming more of a problem, and schools
had closed down, leaving children with no access to education." (IRIN 19 February 2003)
Situation in the central highlands continue to be of great concern (July 2002)
•
Food insecurity is prevalent in many areas of the central highlands and reliance on external assistance
is extremely high.
•
The drought and conflict have resulted in the wide scale loss of harvests, livestock and essential assets
and as a result most families now rely heavily on the need for cash to meet subsistence needs.
•
The security situation has been relatively stable but there have been various incidences of attacks on
NGOs over the past three months and this has hampered the delivery of assistance in some instances.
"The situation in the central highlands continues to be of great concern. A series of WFP rapid assessments
have indicated that food insecurity is prevalent in many areas and reliance on external assistance is
extremely high. The assessments indicate that people in many of the central regions have traditionally
relied on their own agriculture and livestock as their main mode of livelihood. Surplus production was
often sold, as were traditional handicrafts. The drought and conflict have resulted in the wide scale loss of
harvests, livestock and essential assets and as a result most families now rely heavily on the need for cash
to meet subsistence needs. Most income is now generated through labour and many men have left the area
94
in search of work in order to provide for their families. This has left many landless and femaleheaded
households who appear particularly vulnerable to further livelihood insecurity (AFSU/VAM 05/05/02).
Humanitarian organisations have been implementing various emergency programmes in the area, including
the distribution of emergency rations. The period between April and July is particularly critical as it lies in
the hunger season prior to the harvest in August. In general the security situation has been relatively stable
but there have been various incidences of attacks on NGOs over the past three months and this has
hampered the delivery of assistance in some instances (UNAMA 30/04/02)." (RNIS No. 38 July 2002, p.
43)
Limited health, shelter and sanitation facilities in Spin Boldak IDP camps (March 2002)
•
7,300 families, or some 65,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Spin Boldak's five makeshift
camps.
•
Education is a luxury that few can afford in the camps
•
Only one latrine available for 10 families
•
Only skilled people like watchmakers, masons and electricians could get some work.
•
The approaching hot summer will turn the tents into ovens.
"[There are] about 7,300 families, or some 65,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Spin Boldak's five
makeshift camps. The first is run by the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY). The other four are:
Sheikh Abdul Rashid Al Makhdum, Islamic International Relief Organisation, Al Akhter and Al Rashid all named after various Arab charities and individuals who are managing the camps, because the hardline
Taliban rulers did not allow the UN and Western aid agencies to manage the crisis, keeping it away from
the eyes of the world until their fall in mid-December.
Most of the IDPs living in these camps are Pashtun nomads and farmers from the southern Afghan
provinces of Kandahar, Zabol and Nimruz, who, along with most of their counterparts throughout the
country, are victims of the severe central Asian drought - well into its fourth year now. There are also IDPs
in the camps from western and northern Afghanistan - places as far away as Konduz in the north.
'We have facilities only to treat a limited number of diseases,' Miraj Din, the doctor at WAMY camp said.
He added that respiratory diseases and diarrhoea were rising among the children. 'We had two cholera cases
in another camp recently. Pregnant women can get very little maternity services,' he explained. Camp
residents said that in some cases they had to shift pregnant women to hospitals as far as Quetta in Pakistan's
southern Baluchistan Province, some 200 km from Spin Boldak.
Education is a luxury that few can afford in the camps. Only one of the five camps has a primary school,
where more than 350 boys and girls are crowded into the tents that function as classrooms. No wonder that
the ages of the students vary from five to 14 in the two grades they are offered in the school.
Abdul Hameed, a monitoring officer with the British charity Islamic Relief, told IRIN that since early
November, when these camps emerged, they had been assisting the people with food items such as flour,
sugar, tea, oil, lentils and dates. 'At least we saved people from starving to death,' he said. The World Food
Programme (WFP) is now distributing most of the food donated to the camps.
Most of the camps have water tanks, but the supply depends on tankers, which bring fresh water from a
nearby tube well. 'We have [only] one latrine available for [every] 10 families,' said Din.
Every family has a tent, but in some cases there is more than one tent in a compound, the others being made
out of torn plastic and jute bags, housing close relatives. 'We were unable to plant on our land because of
95
the drought, and then the war started and we moved here,' said Khan Mohammad, a young farmer whose
village is just 10 km from the camp.
He added that only skilled people like watchmakers, masons and electricians could get some work in the
nearby Wesh market - the large contraband market full of second-hand electronics and cars brought from
Dubai and sold mainly to Pakistani consumers across the border. 'Most of the able-bodied men have
nothing to do but rest,' he said, as he showed IRIN his tent, where eight members of his family were living.
One major concern of the displaced families is the approaching hot summer and sandstorms. 'These tents
will turn into ovens in a few weeks,' one resident said and others nodded in agreement. Every afternoon the
place was filled with dust as the wind blew." (IRIN 13 March 2002)
Returnees and IDPs put pressure on the overstretched resources of Kabul (July 2002)
•
Kabul remains heavily affected by years of war within the country and suffers from an economy that
lies in ruins.
•
Security in the city and its surrounding area has been tense, with reports of various attacks on the city
itself.
•
Industry is non-existent and much of the population remains unemployed.
•
The enormous number of displaced and returnees are also serving to put additional pressure on the
city’s already over stretched resources. In particular, the issue of water has been highlighted as being
especially important, with much of the city suffering from vastly inadequate access to potable water.
"Since the ousting of the Taliban regime, Kabul has been the hub of humanitarian activities within
Afghanistan. However, it remains heavily affected by years of war within the country and suffers from an
economy that lies in ruins. The southern and western quarters of the city have been particularly affected and
lie largely in ruins. The establishment of the new Afghan government is an encouraging step in the
rebuilding of both the city and the country at large. Security in the city and its surrounding area has been
tense, with reports of various attacks on the city itself, possibly by parties attempting to destabilise the
fledgling administration and government. One of the greatest challenges ahead is the regeneration of the
economy, which has been reduced to small traders and scattered market stalls. Industry is non-existent and
much of the population remains unemployed. The enormous number of displaced and returnees are also
serving to put additional pressure on the city’s already over stretched resources. In particular, the issue of
water has been highlighted as being especially important, with much of the city suffering from vastly
inadequate access to potable water. This is particularly concerning as past data has clearly demonstrated a
clear correlation between diarrhoea, particularly during the summer months, and an increase in malnutrition
(ACF 30/04/02). The RNIS does not have any recent nutrition surveys from the city but the situation is
assumed to be poor and a rise in malnutrition over the summer period can be expected." (RNIS No. 38 July
2002, pp. 43-44)
30,000 IDP stranded at Chaman border in dire condition await assistance (July 2002)
•
UN refugee agency and the Afghan authorities are exploring the possibility of gradually relocating
some of the refugees from the makeshift encampment at Chaman to new settlements in Zarey Dasht, in
the Kandahar province of Afghanistan.
•
Living conditions in Chaman, with dust storms and scorching temperatures of over 40°C, are harsh
•
For the last two months up to 30,000 Afghans, mainly ethnic Pashtuns, have been stuck in the "waiting
area" on no-man's-land close to Pakistan's official border crossing with Afghanistan at Chaman, a
small town in the southwestern Pakistani province of Baluchistan.
96
•
The situation is even worse than at Spin Boldak, some 10 km across the border in Afghanistan, where
more than 60,000 Afghans are existing in similar conditions.
•
The population in the three to four square km area encircled by barbed wire is a mix of Pashtuns and
other groups fleeing ethnic persecution in northern Afghanistan.
•
Conditions in the locality are appalling. Water is visibly in short supply - most of the residents are
wearing filthy clothes, having had little opportunity to wash themselves for the last two months. With a
chronic shortage of latrines, the sanitation conditions are worsening.
"A solution could be in sight for several thousands of Afghan refugees stranded in Pakistan's border area,
with more than 400 families saying they are willing to be moved to new settlements in southern
Afghanistan.
[...]
The UN refugee agency and the Afghan authorities are exploring the possibility of gradually relocating
some of the refugees from the makeshift encampment at Chaman to new settlements in Zarey Dasht, in the
Kandahar province of Afghanistan.
[...]
Living conditions in Chaman, with dust storms and scorching temperatures of over 40°C, are harsh.
Pakistan allowed UNHCR to provide tents to the most desperate refugees only in June. All water must be
trucked in, and the supply still does not meet the minimum requirement.
[...]
Aid agencies are struggling to cope with the situation, while providing basic facilities to the refugees. Apart
from food distribution, relief workers also oversee water, health, sanitation and community services."
(UNHCR July 2002)
"With the incidence of infectious diseases soaring, aid workers along the Pakistani Afghan border at
Chaman fear a possible outbreak of epidemic diseases if basic living standards are not improved soon.
About 30,000 Afghan refugees have been languishing on the windswept site for months in a bid to enter
Pakistan.
[…]
For the last two months up to 30,000 Afghans, mainly ethnic Pashtuns, have been stuck in the "waiting
area" on no-man's-land close to Pakistan's official border crossing with Afghanistan at Chaman, a small
town in the southwestern Pakistani province of Baluchistan. The situation is even worse than at Spin
Boldak, some 10 km across the border in Afghanistan, where more than 60,000 Afghans are existing in
similar conditions. The population in the three to four square km area encircled by barbed wire is a mix of
Pashtuns and other groups fleeing ethnic persecution in northern Afghanistan. Also present are farmers and
nomads, or kuchis, from the southern provinces, whose farming and livestock were devastated by the
ongoing drought in the region. The Pakistani authorities are reluctant to allow them into the country, while
the refugees have little to return to in their areas of origin. Security is another major fear.
Conditions in the locality are appalling. Water is visibly in short supply - most of the residents are wearing
filthy clothes, having had little opportunity to wash themselves for the last two months. With a chronic
shortage of latrines, the sanitation conditions are worsening. Swarms of flies and mosquitoes are
everywhere. With the increasing heat, summer epidemics threaten the population.
[…]
MSF project coordinator in Chaman, Vicky Hawkins, told IRIN that incidences of diseases, especially
diarrhoea, were increasing. 'We are concerned about the possible outbreak of epidemics if conditions don't
improve,' she said, adding that MSF was preparing for a possible outbreak of cholera in the crowded
conditions. 'Any long-term solution to the problem must take into account the differential needs of the
population in the camp,' Hawkins maintained.
[…]
Jack Frenquin, a UNHCR emergency officer in Chaman, said that as an immediate solution they were
drawing up a repatriation plan for these refugees and establishing a displacement camp in Kandahar, where
97
people from Spin Boldak and the 'waiting area' camp could be relocated. 'It is for refugees to decide, but we
know that for many of them the return is not possible,' he said." (IRIN 7 May 2002)
"While 47,000 new Afghan refugees have been admitted into Pakistan this year by Islamabad at the
Chaman border crossing in the country's southwest Baluchistan province, more than 30,000 Afghans are
still awaiting a solution to their plight at the edge of UNHCR's Killi Faizo camp, a squalid frontier site, just
inside the border.
[…]
Describing circumstances as poor, MSF head of mission, Andrew Cunningham argued an inadequate
provision of basic services such as water, distribution of food and the provision of medical care had been
made. 'Minimal standards have not been provided for those in no man's land,' he told IRIN from the
southern city of Quetta, adding those with a legitimate claim for seeking asylum should be allowed in.
Highlighting the reasons for their coming, in addition to a lack of assistance inside the country, some of the
largely Pastun refugees complained of ethnic persecution in the north. Others, notably the nomadic Kutchis,
cited drought as the main motivating factor. Ek noted, however, that approximately one third of those
present said they were willing to return to Afghanistan if more assistance was available. 'Our problem now
is to find a solution for the two thirds that don't want to return,' she exclaimed.
UNHCR's main concern is to get those stuck at the border adequate assistance, including food, sanitation
and shelter. Many of the arrivals are living in crowded makeshift tents and shelters. 'Conditions are not as
good as they would be in established camps inside the country,' Ek maintained, adding ongoing
negotiations with the Pakistani authorities were underway to reach a solution to the issue. 'We are
optimistic that a solution can be found for those who are genuine refugees and cannot return home for the
time being,' she said." (IRIN 28 March 2002)
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ACCESS TO EDUCATION
General
Many returning IDP children cannort afford to attend school as they have to provide
for their family (June 2003)
•
Education is often not available for IDP in informal settlements.
•
Children are often denied access to education because they are required to supplement the meager
income of their family through employment.
•
Insecurity also limits education
"Lack of access to education constitutes a serious obstacle to sustainable return. Several of the returnee
children interviewed by Amnesty International had only limited access to education. While some
informally settled families have been able to secure educational opportunities for their children, not one
child in an informal tented settlement in Kabul comprised of 75 families was receiving formal education.
Children are often denied access to education because they are required to supplement the meager income
of their family through employment. Mirza Ahmed’s eight children, who live with him in Kabul city
following their return from Quetta, do not go to school. Instead they wash cars, sell plastic bags and trinkets
in the street or work as manual labourers to earn money for their family.
Secondary schools for girls are limited, especially in rural areas. Girls living with their families in a ruined
building in western Kabul were unable to continue the education they had started to receive while in exile .
Saida’s two teenage daughters, living in their newly rebuilt house in the Shomali valley after their return
from Iran, told us that they could not go to school, as their father believed that it was unsafe for them to
walk to the nearest secondary school some kilometers away.
Ironically, the desire to ensure an education for their children is cited as one of the main reasons for many
refugees to return to Afghanistan from Iran." (AI 23 June 2003, p. 27)
70% of the education infrastructure has been destroyed (September 2002)
•
General data indicate that close to 70% of the education infrstructure has been destroyed by years of
war.
•
Current curriculum is not unified or equitable but varies from school to school.
•
During 2002, only 3 million children out of a total of 4,5 million eligible children were able to be
registered and absorbed in the schools.
•
Existing schools can only cover 1 million students but the other 2 million are attending school with
inadequate facilities.
•
Many children returning in their villages gace non-existence of educational opportunities.
•
Some 30,000 teachers need to be recruited.
"Years of war, foreign interference, an unstable political situation and a disintegrated fabric of society have
been the factors that have demolished our economical and social infrastructure. Children and youth have
been deprived from reaping the important benefits of education. A great number of children fled their home
99
country, Afghanistan. General data indicates that 70% of the education infrastructure has been destroyed,
and that the majority of teachers have been martyred or detained, or immigrated to other countries.
Due to the years of turmoil in the country, the infrastructure of the educational system has largely
disappeared and as a consequence, curriculum development and all pedagogical progresses largely lag
behind the rest of the world today.
[…]
Situational Analysis of the Existing Conditions of Education
The fundamental development of education and other socio-economic and political fields has been
disrupted and scattered apart. Education in the capital in comparison to the provinces has not been
functioning equitably. The current curriculum is not unified or equitable but varies from school to school,
not following a uniform standard. There isn't equitable delivery of educational opportunities in the schools
of the provinces; they are functional but have the lowest level standards. The last 5 years' ban on girls
schools by the Taliban had severely affected girls education, and the effects may remain a problem for
some time to come. Due to the effects of the last years of war, conflict and continuous strife most schools
have been demolished, and teachers were deprived of higher education. Most schools have been operative
since before the provision of quality programming. Teachers are confined only to their school environment
with very limited resources. There is no lab equipment in any schools. In the year 1381 (2002) there were
4.5 million children eligible for school enrollment in the country. However, over 3 million children were
able to be registered and absorbed in the schools. Thus, a total of 1.5 million children have been deprived of
their basic rights of education due to non-existence of schooling facilities. The existing schools can only
cover 1 million students but the other 2 million are attending school with inadequate facilities. The 2
million children lack basic learning materials and necessary supplies.
Moreover, hundreds of Afghan refugee children return from foreign countries daily, but they can't resume
their learning in Afghan schools due to non-existence of educational opportunities in their villages.
Most school buildings in the country have been completely or partially destroyed. Some need minor repair
work. It is estimated that there is an immediate need for 2500 schools to be newly constructed. The targeted
number of students reached to 4.5 million. A total of 93,466 teachers are to be employed to keep the
schools operative. However, out of the total of the above number, we need to recruit a total of 28,615 more
teachers. Most of the schools' teachers being currently employed need more teacher training skills. They are
unable to attend teacher-training programs even under the in-service option. Most schools do not have
adequate classroom furniture, flooring mats, blackboards, lab equipment or textbooks. Many students need
dormitory accommodations. None of the schools in the country have library facilities. All these shortages
mentioned above are to addressed in this compiled booklet.
Problems in Education and Their Solutions
The Problem of School Facilities
There are a total of 5063 existing erected school buildings in the country. It is estimated that for 3 million
students the need will increase to 7563. Therefore a total of 2500 school buildings will need to be built. Out
of the existing schools, 3525 buildings need major repairs, while 873 buildings need moderate repair and
665 schools require minor repairs. To erect and reconstruct new school buildings, the communities'
contribution in terms of schools' plots, limited construction materials and manpower will be possible;
however the lack of cash-resources constitutes the major impediment in school repair and construction.
The lack of potable drinking water in many schools along with lack of sanitation is also a major problem.
Solutions to Overcome the Problems of Schools Facilities
100
1. The buildings that need repair, safe water and safe latrines should be repaired within the next 6 months.
According to the long-term plan of the Department of the Construction, construction of new school
buildings will be completed within 16 months.
2. Until the comp letion of the repair and construction of the schools, there will be a need for tents or other
alternative classrooms to be provided within one to two months.
3. Schools be used in rotations of two to three shifts per day.
4. The number of students in classrooms should be increased in order to avoid deprivation of classes to any
students. Temporary learning spaces should be used for teaching purposes.
The Problems of Teachers
For the 3 million students currently enrolled in schools, 93, 466 teachers are needed. Currently,
Afghanistan has 64,850 teachers. 28,610 additional teachers are needed.
Major problems related to teachers can be broken down into three components:
a. Educational qualifications and professional skills in teaching
b. Living conditions
c. Shortage of teachers as a whole
Solutions to the Problems of Teacher Qualification
1. Upgrading the professional skills and knowledge of teachers through seminars and courses
2. Compulsory higher education for teachers graduated from grade 12
3. Upgrading the qualifications of those teachers who have not completed grade 12, through winter and
summer courses
4. Using fellowships and scholarships for teacher training
The Problems of Poor Living Conditions of Teachers
Teachers in Afghanistan for years have been in the most deprived segment of our society. In comparison to
other employees in our society, teachers earn the lowest incomes, even though they must shoulder great
social responsibilities. Teachers, by any standard, have been neglected by our system of education.
Presently the average salary of a teacher, including all benefits, is 1,700,000 Afs ($43) per month. This
monthly earning can cover only a very small portion of a family's needs and is never sufficient to cover
monthly expenses. Most teachers under current circumstances don't receive their salary regularly at the end
of the month, with salaries sometimes being delayed three to five months, making it very difficult for
teachers to organize their lives.
Most teachers do not own their own homes, because with the money they receive, they will never be able to
afford to build or buy their own home. Most teachers must rent a house. The minimum monthly rental cost
for a 4 room house is 3,000,000 Afs. One may ask, how should a teacher use the small amount of salary
they receive, for having a place to live, or for other expenses? Schools are also not providing transportation
for teachers. A teacher spends at least 10,000 Afs. per day for his transportation. The average total monthly
expenses for a 6-member family will be about 4,000,000. With these expenses, but with a salary of only
1,700,000 Afs, one can imagine the difficulty these teachers must face. The only worthwhile additional
support provided to teachers is food rations, but even these are not always provided regularly.
Solutions to the Problems of Teachers' Living Conditions
1. Salary and coupons rations should be provided regularly
2. Teachers should be paid transportation costs
3. Teacher cooperatives should be created
4. Free medical care should be provided for teachers and their families through an education health
department program
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5. As in the past, payment for the cost of lunch for teachers should include the holidays as well
6. Construct residences for teachers in the capital and provinces
7. Incentives should be paid to teachers according to rules and regulations
8. In view of the minimum living conditions of teachers, teacher salaries should be increased
Solutions to the Problems of Teacher Shortage
1. Development of teacher training program in the capital and provinces
2. Increase the enrollment of students in pre-service courses
3. Recruitment of graduates of Pedagogical Institute to go into teaching (in the short-term)
4. Rehabilitation of the teacher training colleges in the capital and provinces (long-term)
5. Recruitment of former teachers currently working in other government ministries or departments to
return to teaching
The Problems of Students
According available data, there are 3 million students attending schools. However, 4.5 million students are
eligible for school, but due to the limited capacity of the educational system, 1.5 million children have not
been able to attend. The major problems facing students are:
1. Shortage of teachers
2. Lack of school buildings and facilities
3. Shortage of textbooks
4. Shortage of desks, chairs and other teaching materials
Solutions to the Problems of Students
1. When the need for buildings, teachers and teaching materials and facilities is fulfilled, the problems of
students will also be solved.
2. Be prepared to meet the needs of both out-of-school children and those children who will enroll in school
next year, since at least 1 million more students will attend school next year.
3. Problems of those children who enroll who were born in foreign countries and have grown up with a
different culture and have been educated in non-national languages. These children require a school with a
more international curriculum taught in a foreign language." (MOE September 2002, pp. 3-7)
Close to 3 million children have been enrolled in school since March 2002 (August
2002)
•
A total of 2,906,000 children (42% in the central region, 25% in the north, 12% in the west, 11% in the
east, 6% in the south, and 4% in the northeast) have been enrolled in 6,784 schools (formal and nonformal) since the reopening of the school year on 23 March and following the first phase of the Backto-School campaign.
•
Basic supplies and teaching and learning materials have been distributed to 2.3 millions students and
30,000 teachers, along with 6,000 school tents, 8 million textbooks and 1.8 million supplementary
teaching materials.
•
An assessment revealed that less than half of schools have access to water and only one-fourth has to
sanitation facilities.
•
More funds are urgently needed to provide appropriate and permanent learning structures to
accommodate over three million children and 73,000 teachers in schools.
"Preliminary provincial summary reports of a nationwide rapid education assessment of learning spaces,
undertaken by the Ministry of Education with the support of UNICEF, have been compiled on a number of
key indicators. A total of 2,906,000 children (42% in the central region, 25% in the north, 12% in the west,
102
11% in the east, 6% in the south, and 4% in the northeast) have been enrolled in 6,784 schools (formal and
non-formal) since the reopening of the school year on 23 March and following the first phase of the Backto-School campaign. Thirty per cent of the children enrolled were girls, with geographical variation from
45% in Kabul City to 2-3% in a few districts in the southern region. Nearly half of the primary school
students are enrolled in grade one, which will have major implications for the rehabilitation of the
educational system. The distribution plan for educational supplies is being adjusted based on these
statistics. So far, basic supplies and teaching and learning materials have been distributed to 2.3 millions
students and 30,000 teachers, along with 6,000 school tents, 8 million textbooks and 1.8 million
supplementary teaching materials. Preparation for the distribution of educational materials for the second
phase of the Back-to-School campaign, expected to be launched officially in late August/early September
2002, is ongoing for 1.2 million students, 25,000 teachers and 3,000 schools. However, donor commitments
have not yet been forthcoming to support the printing of textbooks for 1.2 million students.
The earlier mentioned assessment by the Ministry of Education also found more than 73,000 teachers (28
% women) in schools. Some 40,000 of them have so far participated in teacher orientation workshops
during the first phase of the Back-to-School campaign, with workshops completed in 28 out of the
country’s 32 provinces. Focus group discussions are currently being organised to obtain participants'
feedback on the orientation to identify future training needs. The findings will contribute to the
development of the teacher training programme by the Ministry of Education, with UNICEF’s assistance.
Afghanistan’s education infrastructure is in a poor state, with a large number of schools destroyed or
inaccessible and with poor water and sanitation conditions. The assessment revealed that less than half of
schools have access to water and only one-fourth has to sanitation facilities. UNICEF plans to support the
rehabilitation of 180 primary schools, including water and sanitation facilities. Support is already being
extended to 68 schools, benefiting 160,000 children. More funds are urgently needed to provide appropriate
and permanent learning structures to accommodate over three million children and 73,000 teachers in
schools." (UNICEF 15 August 2002)
RI advocates for alternative forms of education to reach more children (March 2002)
•
Despite NGO efforts over the past five years there is an estimated shortage of 100,000 teachers.
•
RI fears that the UNICEF-Ministry of Education "Back to School" Campaign will not be sufficiently
inclusive to recognize all the schools that have been functioning as autonomous units for the past ten
years.
•
A 2000 UNICEF report estimates literacy rates in urban areas to be 30% for men and 10% for women.
In rural areas the percentages are lower with 26% of men and 3% of women able to read and write.
•
An estimated 19 out of 20 girls have never set foot in a school.
•
Because of geographic and cultural limitations, formal education may not be the most appropriate
means of reaching the majority of Afghan students.
•
RI suggests that The Ministry of Education, NGOs, and UN agencies support alternative forms of
education, such as home schools, adult education, vocational training, and distance education, in order
to allow widespread access to learning opportunities.
"By March 23, the government, through UNICEF’s Back To School Campaign, hopes to welcome all
children who care to attend school when the new school year starts in March. No one knows how many
children will come, but UNICEF has procured books and supplies for 1.5 million children. This is an
enormous task given that the entire education system has to be restarted. Despite NGO efforts over the past
five years and an expectation that some teachers, including women, will return to work in their home
villages, there is an estimated shortage of 100,000 teachers. Many school buildings, especially in rural
areas, have been damaged or destroyed. There is an urgent need for uniform guidelines and policies. Some
worry however that current guidelines are not sufficiently inclusive to recognize all the schools that have
103
been functioning as autonomous units for the past ten years. In addition, some NGOs are concerned that the
Ministry of Education is not soliciting their input in the formulation of policies or making space for them to
continue to contribute to education programs as has been the case in the past.
Even if the government is able to accomplish its goal of opening new schools, it will still face numerous
challenges. Afghanistan has one of the lowest literacy rates in the world. A 2000 UNICEF report estimates
literacy rates in urban areas to be 30% for men and 10% for women. In rural areas the percentages are
lower with 26% of men and 3% of women able to read and write. In 1999, UNICEF estimated that 69% of
all children between the ages of 5 and 12 had never attended any sort of school. As a result of the Taliban’s
prohibitions on girls’ education, as well as traditional beliefs, an estimated 19 out of 20 girls have never set
foot in a school. These statistics underscore the massive educational needs throughout the country and the
challenges that the government will face in making education accessible to Afghan children.
Part of the strategy for success will depend on support for culturally appropriate and flexibly delivered
education programs. Because of geographic and cultural limitations, formal education may not be the most
appropriate means of reaching the majority of Afghan students. This is especially true for girls, for whom
traveling to a distant or co-educational school may be difficult. The Ministry of Education, NGOs, and UN
agencies will need to support alternative forms of education, such as home schools, adult education,
vocational training, and distance education, in order to allow widespread access to learning opportunities.
An Afghan education expert explained, 'Formal education was introduced as an external phenomena,
especially under the Russians, and many educated people dressed and looked differently from the people
living in villages. Now education, in many cases, has been culturally adapted—through home schools,
segregated education, and so on.' As a result, parents are increasingly willing to send their children to
school.
Formal education in Afghanistan has received a big push through the Back To School Campaign. Nonformal education, particularly vocational training, and accelerated, “catch-up” programs have not yet
received the same attention. A large percentage of school-aged children will fall through the cracks of the
formal system—especially older children who are starting school for the first time. NGOs are aware of the
importance of creating condensed curriculums for older students and training teachers in how to use them.
Anecdotal evidence suggests also that juvenile crime in Kabul is on the rise. If youth are not given an
alternative, crime is likely to increase further." (RI 6 March 2002)
Education for IDP children is virtually non-existent in most areas (September 2001)
•
Education opportunities virtually non-existent for dipslaced children
•
Since July 2000, UNICEF and Save the Children provide primary school level education for 2,500 IDP
children in the former Soviet Embassy in Kabul.
•
In much of Afghanistan education not centered around formal structures but provided by extended
family or local Islamic clergy and based on oral traditions and surviving skills.
•
Displaced children often separated from extended family and not receiving any education not even
traditional.
•
If education available for displaced children often only the youngest is able to attend as the older kids
are expected to contribute to the survival of the family.
"Even before the recent fighting, the education system in Afghanistan was a shambles. Kabul University
has been closed for almost a decade and most of secondary elementary schools were closed for most of the
1990s. Those schools that operate do so on a very limited basis, teaching mostly Islamic subjects and
serving mostly men. Various international relief agencies have tried to re-introduce schools into the
country, including education for girls, but with limited success. Educational opportunities for displaced
children are virtually non-existent in most areas.
104
The one exception has been the introduction of a school programme for displaced children in the former
Soviet Embassy compound. In July 2000, UNICEF and Save the Children introduced a primary school for
displaced children there. Over 2,500 children, 40 percent of them girls, attend the school. The school was
created and is run with the permission of the Taliban government, which insists on approving the teachers
and the curriculum. The Taliban allow girls to attend school under certain conditions: that they are prepubescent; that the curriculum is censored to exclude material that could be offensive to strict Moslems;
that the teachers are only women; and that the girls and boys are separated. Besides providing a much
needed education, school imposes a welcome structure on the displaced children's days.
It is not true, however, that the absence of formal schooling means that the displaced children receive no
education. Even before they became displaced, these children probably did not attend school. In much of
Afghanistan, education is still provided by the extended family and the local Islamic clergy, village priests
who teach the children to recite the Koran. Although this traditional education is mostly experiential, or, in
the case of religious training, a product of rote memory, and much more limited in scope than the schoolbased education, it does teach each new generation the basic skills and information it needs to survive, In
the traditional village, grand-parents often teach young children the family genealogy, local customs and
traditions, and traditional legends and folklore. Girls learn to sew and cook and boys learn the art of
farming and tending flocks.
Since displaced children are often separated from their extended families and from the male members of the
family, even such traditional education is not available. As a result, a generation of Afghan youth has
grown up without even a traditional education. The results are seen among the youth who roam the major
cities, working in menial jobs or begging, many at very young ages. Without an extended family to care for
them, they join militias or young teenagers with submachine guns manning checkpoints for government or
opposition groups.
The displaced have few options for educating their young. Even when public education is available, the
displaced can usually only send the youngest children. After children reach the age of ten years or so, they
are expected to contribute to the survival of the family. Girls care for the sick or the younger children; boys
go out to find food by begging or taking menial jobs. Some boys join militia groups as soon as they are old
enough, not because they are eager to fight but because they may receive food and protection and, in some
cases, a small amount of money that they then use to help their family." (Farr, G. 1 September 2001 pp.
135-136)
For more detailed information on the school programme for IDP children in the former Sovier Embassy,
see: "Review of the Former Soviet Embassy Compound IDP Camp", Save the Children-US/UNICEF,
October 2001
105
ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
Self reliance
Overcrowded job market and lack of cultivated land make retunr unsustainable (June
2003)
•
Lack of access to employment opportunities due to an overcrowded job market is making returns
unsustainable.
•
Lack of land to work on in rural areas means that many returnees end up in IDP camps or in urban
areas
"Another very common obstacle to sustainable return is the lack of access to employment for the vast
majority of returnees. Most of the returnees interviewed by Amnesty International asserted that they had
been unable to find jobs in an overcrowded job market. Akim, crippled in his right arm, explained that he
had been unable to find a job since returning from Pakistan in the summer of 2002. Others spoke of having
been forced to take jobs that were not commensurate with their skills level. Abdul Maram, who was
employed as a driver in Pakistan, is engaged in manual labour as this is the only job he can find to feed his
family in Kabul.
Sharecroppers returning to the land on which they had worked previously have found that the landlord had
employed other labourers in their absence. Due to the fact that there is less land being cultivated in
Afghanistan at the moment, on account of the drought as well as persistent insecurity, returnee
sharecroppers have in many cases been forced to move to IDP camps or to urban centres in search of
alternative employment." (AI 23 June 2003, p. 24)
Few job opportunites and increasing number of job seekers limit wages and
purchasing power (May 2002)
•
Purchasing power is falling in some areas in part because wages are falling faster than prices. Wages
are falling because of the increasing number of job seekers, including returnees who seek jons in urban
areas rather than traveling home in rural areas.
"Purchasing power is falling in the areas under review in part because wages are falling faster than prices.
Wages are falling because of the increased numbers of job seekers, including farmers who have realized
that their winter crops would fail, women who are returning to the workplace after restrictions imposed by
the Taliban were lifted, and children who are increasingly being relied upon to contribute – at times
substantially – to household income. In addition, many refugees returning from neighboring countries are
seeking jobs in urban areas rather than traveling directly to homes in rural areas.
Wages also are falling because of the loss of jobs due to the continued effects of the drought and because of
some losses of wealth associated with the change of administration. Under the Taliban, for example, there
were limited opportunities in the construction and transportation sectors because the Taliban demanded
these types of services and had the means to pay for it. The departure of a wealthy class of largely Arab
nationals has dampened these sectors (as well as weakened the financial underpinnings of systems of
Islamic charity, such as zakat) while new investment in construction due to the combined demands of the
humanitarian, development, business and media communities still lags behind expectations.
106
De-capitalization among the trading classes as well as bankruptcy has been a problem over the past several
months. For example, of sixty domestic grain traders operating in Qandahar last summer, only four have
survived the economic changes associated with the change of administration. In Shirbirghan, Jowzjan
Province more than two-thirds of stalls in the market have closed since last fall. Traders blame a collapse of
prices due to food aid. In addition, the bankruptcies were likely due to the combined result of ethnic
tensions (many of the merchants who left were Pashtun), currency losses and debt burdens.
Many civil servants lost their jobs under the Taliban (e.g. women, university professors, skilled technicians,
members of the militias). Those that retained employment were not often regularly paid. The interim
government has been unable to pay civil servant salaries, and this has contributed to food insecurity among
Afghanistan’s traditional middle classes. As of late April, civil servants in most of the provinces visited had
yet to be paid, despite expectations raised by the international community’s pledges of support to the
United Nations. Like many others, civil servants are trying to augment their income with wage labor and
have increased reliance on their children to provide income and food for the household." (Feinstein
International Famine Center May 2002, p. 18)
IDPs find it difficult to borrow money or to purchase goods on credit (May 2002)
•
Drought, war and political changes have increased risks over time, with predictable but damaging
implications for both the availability and cost of credit.
•
Internally Displaced Populations (IDPs) and Pashtun pastoralist (Koochi) populations are charged
higher interest rates than settled populations as a result of both the particular risk to lenders and
outright discrimination.
"Drought, war and political changes have increased risks over time, with predictable but damaging
implications for both the availability and cost of credit. Mounting debt burdens at the household and
shopkeeper level not only limit access to new credit but also serve as a crippling source of shame. In many
interviews, men reported being unable to leave their household compounds for fear of encountering their
moneylenders. In one focus group interview in Qandahar, a military man said, 'I have more debt than
hairs on my head. Anyone I see, I think that is someone to whom I owe money. I can’t face anyone
anymore.' Others, especially widows, Internally Displaced Persons, ethnic minorities living among other
ethnic majorities and deeply impoverished families complained that no one would lend them money any
more.
[…]
The availability of credit has decreased and interest rates (at times quite high) are being applied with
increasing frequency. For the households in the surveys who were unable to obtain credit, the primary
cause was a lack of money available for lending within extended family or neighborhood networks.
Shopkeepers in the north and central regions of Afghanistan, for example, routinely charge 100% interest
on goods bought on credit. Internally Displaced Populations (IDPs) and Pashtun pastoralist (Koochi)
populations are charged higher interest rates than settled populations as a result of both the particular risk to
lenders and outright discrimination." (Feinstein International Famine Center May 2002, pp. 13-14)
The following map shows debt insecurity in Afghanistan 2001-2002 (click to expand):
"As Chart I indicates, the percentage of debt secure households in the survey dramatically decreased
between the first and second years of the drought while households vulnerable to both insecurity and
extreme insecurity increased. Approximately 80% of the households in the survey are facing serious levels
107
of debt insecurity, including over 60% of the households that are classified as extremely
insecure."(Feinstein International Famine Center May 2002, p. 15)
Source for both map and graph: Feinstein International Famine Center, May 2002
108
DOCUMENTATION NEEDS AND CITIZENSHIP
General
Government plans to issue new ID cards as soon as finances are available (March
2003)
•
Birth certificate are issued by the hospital where the person is born.
•
ID cards are issued when the person turns 7 and replaced when he/she turns 18.
•
In Kabul, ID cards are only issued by Ministry of Interior and in the provinces this is done at the
governor's office.
•
There are reportedly plans to introduce a new system for the issue of national IDcards as soon as
finance permits.
"The Minister of the Interior said that a normal birth certificate is issued by the hospital where the person is
born. As regards ID-cards (tazkara), such a card with photo attached will be issued when the person turns 7
years. This is because such a card is required in order to be able to start school.
The ID-card will be replaced when the holder turns 18.
If a person does not have a birth certificate, an ID-card can be issued if persons certify before the
authorities the identity of the person in question.
In Kabul ID-cards are only issued by the Ministry of the Interior. In the provinces, this is done at the
governor's office. In the districts, they are issued by the "District Commissioner". ID-cards can also be
issued by Afghan embassies abroad.
The ID-cards look the same everywhere in the country. The Ministry of the Interior finally said that the
issuing authorities have used up all previous ID-forms. This has been the case since the end of the Taliban
period. This is why the authorities are now issuing a form instead of the actual ID-card.
A copy of all ID-cards issued in places other than Kabul must be sent to the Ministry of the Interior in
Kabul.
An ID-card must be presented in the following situations:
- when a person is caught breaking Afghan laws
- when applying for a passport
- when a person has problems with authorities
- when a person is applying for a job.
The Minister also said that there are plans to introduce a new system for the issue of national IDcards.
However, this system cannot be implemented until the necessary finances are available." (DIS March 2003,
p.p. 54-55)
109
ISSUES OF FAMILY UNITY, IDENTITY AND CULTURE
General
75% of orphans surveyed in the west express their preference for staying with family
instead of being placed in institutions (June 2003)
•
Coping mechanisms of the extended family have weakened and an increasing number of children who
have lost one or both parents have been placed in institutions.
•
75% of the children claim they would rather be reunited with their families if they were given
economic support.
"War Child UK has carried out a survey of institutions for children deprived of parental care in western
Afghanistan at the request of UNICEF. After two decades of war, the coping mechanisms of the extended
family have weakened and an increasing number of children who have lost one or both parents have been
placed in institutions. Primarily, children are placed in these institutions because of economic reasons,
better education and food provision. It is, however, crucial for the healthy development of children and
adolescents not to be separated from their families and 75% of the children claim they would rather be
reunited with their families if they were given economic support. On the basis of the survey, War Child UK
has made recommendations to UNICEF that these institutions be transformed into tracing and counselling
centres or transition centres where the children remain for a short period of time before being re-integrated
with their families or placed with foster families. Additionally, income generation projects should be
developed so that the women are able to support their children financially." (War Child 18 June 2003)
110
PROPERTY ISSUES
General
Property restitution is a key problem facing returning IDPs, refugees and the local
population (June 2003)
•
Near complete breakdown of the land registration system, together with multiple layers of alleged
ownership for many plots of land make the issue of property restitution a key problem for returning
IDPs, refugees and the local population.
•
Lack of access to land remains a formidable obstacle to refugees returning to the country.
•
UN Habitat estimates fifty percent of Kabul’s population is living in informal settlements or has no
supporting documentation and rights of tenure.
"Authorities in Kabul, as in most other larger towns, object to the large rural to urban migration in search of
livelihoods and in some instances have evicted squatters from abandoned and derelict buildings. A key
problem facing IDPs returning to urban areas of origin, as well as returning refugees and the local
population, is that of property restitution. The near complete breakdown of the land registration system,
together with multiple layers of alleged ownership for many plots of land, will require difficult negotiations
and substantial resources to redress.
[...]
As in any post-conflict setting, access to land and property restitution are extremely important yet complex
areas for the Government to address. A sizable proportion of the Afghan population is landless, not just the
displaced. Indeed, lack of access to land remains a formidable obstacle to refugees returning to the country.
While access to land and property restitution issues cannot be comprehensively addressed in the short-term,
the Government should consider stopgap measures in the interim that would allow IDPs and other landless
access to land. UN Habitat estimates fifty percent of Kabul’s population is living in informal settlements or
has no supporting documentation and rights of tenure. Similarly, many displaced persons are ineligible for
basic livelihood-supporting assistance due to their lack of access to land. Thus, resolution to the land and
property rights issue is a crucial step towards durable solutions for the displaced." (Inter-Agency Missions
19 June 2003, p. 2)
Disputes over land and property ownership proliferate affecting many returnees (June
2003)
•
Disputes over land and property ownership proliferate in Afghanistan today, and returnees tend
disproportionately to be affected.
•
Process of resolving land and housing disputes is skeletal at best and those without ties to the
community are left powerless.
•
Unaccompanied women, in particular, often find themselves unable to access their land upon their
return.
•
Women are often denied access to traditional leaders, or even formal justice mechanisms
"Lack of access to adequate housing is a serious obstacle to sustainable return. Disputes over land and
property ownership proliferate in Afghanistan today, and returnees tend disproportionately to be affected.
Many returnees Amnesty International spoke to have arrived back at their places of origin to find their land
111
and/or houses occupied by other families, often with the backing of powerful local commanders. Others
have been unable to raise the capital required in order to rebuild houses on their land.
While some returnees Amnesty International spoke with have taken their disputes to the courts, it is also
apparent that the process of resolving such disputes is skeletal at best. The rule of law remains elusive, and
dispute settlement mechanisms are cumbersome and slow, leaving returnees in a position of heightened
vulnerability, as in many cases their ties to the local community have weakened as a result of their absence.
Unaccompanied women, in particular, often find themselves unable to access their land upon their return.
UNHCR has documented at least one case of a widow returning to Afghanistan and, despite being in
possession of documents of ownership, being denied access to her land by the traditional leadership of her
village. Women are often denied access to traditional leaders, or even formal justice mechanisms, and can
be severely disadvantaged in the absence of a male family member who is willing to plead the case on
behalf of the female relative.
Access to adequate shelter is often a key element in sustainable return. Amnesty International was told by
some returnees that the main reason they had returned was to ensure they did not miss out on shelter
rebuilding projects. Kokogul and her husband Rahim Khan returned from Karachi to the Shomali Valley in
August 2002 when they heard that an international NGO would help them rebuild a house on their land.
Similarly, Mohammed Azim came back from Pakistan to Jawzjan province when he heard that UNHCR
would help him rebuild his house. However, even these “success stories” demonstrate the interdependence
of the rights which are all essential to sustainable return. Kokogul’s husband is unemployed and the family
is finding it very difficult to survive economically. There is only one hospital in the valley, and most people
have only sporadic access to healthcare. In Jawzjan, Mohammed Azim’s relatives had had to send their son
back to Pakistan to protect him from forced recruitment." (AI 23 June 2003, pp. 25-26)
112
PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT
Return and resettlement movements
25,000 IDPs have returned since January 2003 but many remain displaced after
returning (June 2003)
•
Returns during first months of 2003 have been considerably lower than last year, 650,00 remain
displaced inside Afghanistan.
•
Low returns might indicate that many previous returns have not been sustainable due to the actual
material and security conditions.
•
Many returnees and IDPs have reportedly been displaced after being unable to return home
•
UNHCR has assisted some 25,000 IDPs returning between January and May 2003.
•
Returns take place mainly from the west and in the north.
•
250,000 IDPs were assisted by UNHCR in returning during 2002
"Due to the situation in contemporary Afghanistan, it has been difficult to obtain accurate numb ers of
returns to Afghanistan. What is clear, however, is that in stark contrast to the sizeable return from
neighbouring states in 2002, the numbers of people returning to Afghanistan during spring 2003 were
significantly lower, due in no small part to the conviction of many refugees that they would be unable to
return in conditions of safety and dignity. UNHCR announced on 6 June 2003 that around 158,000 Afghan
refugees had so far been assisted to return to their country of origin during the first five mo nths of 2003. Of
these 115,000 had returned from Pakistan, while 43,000 had come back from Iran. In the same period in
2002, UNHCR had assisted in the return of over 815,000 people. The overwhelming majority of these
returns were from Pakistan and Iran, which in total continue to host over 3 million Afghan refugees. An
estimated 650,000 IDPs remain displaced inside Afghanistan. Around 25,000 IDPs returned to their places
of origin in the first five months of 2003. By the end of June 2002, in comparison, around 400,000 IDPs
had returned to their places of origin.
While the fact of lower returns so far this year has placed less strain on Afghanistan’s already overburdened
infrastructure, it also indicates that the sustainability of the large-scale returns of last year continues to be
seriously open to question. Amnesty International collected testimony from many returnees who repeatedly
reported that while they had made a “voluntary” decision to return, had they been aware of the actual
material and security conditions to which they were returning, their decision would have been different. As
a UNHCR spokeswoman noted recently, 'Returning refugees say that more Afghan families will return if
security is improved, especially in the southern provinces, and if there are more job prospects and
reconstruction inside Afghanistan.' This is further underlined by Amnesty International’s research and other
reports, both in 2002 as well as this year, of scores of people who have either turned around and left
Afghanistan again once confronted with an unsustainable return or, for similar reasons, ended up in
situations of internal displacement. Reports of continued displacement of refugee returnees in 2003
emanated from Kabul city as well as rural areas in the rest of the country. IDPs, too, have been forced into a
seemingly endless search for refuge, having been unable to return to their places of origin." (AI 23 June
2003, pp. 5-6)
"In addition to returning Afghan refugees, UNHCR this year has assisted over 25,000 internally displaced
people to return to their homes. The returns are taking place mainly from the west and in the north, but also
113
Tajik returns to Bamyan have started this month. UNHCR assisted over 250,000 internally displaced people
to return to their villages in 2002, but many more have returned on their own. The estimated number of
internally displaced people in Afghanistan is about 600,000 -- more than half of them are in the southern
provinces." (UNAMA 22 May 2003)
Close to 100,000 IDPs have returned with assistance in the western provinces
between February and October 2002
The following table and map show the number of assisted IDP returns to the western provinces of
Badghis, Farah, Ghor and Hirat occurring between February 25 and October 6, 2002.
Province
Badghis
District
Ab Kamari
Dara-I-Boom
Ghurmach
Jawand
Muqur
Murghab
Qadis
Qalay-I-Naw
Sang Atish
Farah
No. of IDPs
55324
494
2901
7321
3249
7227
11535
3782
16189
2626
405
Anar Dara
Bakwa
Bala Buluk
Farah
Gulistan
Khaki Safed
Lash Wa Juwayn
Pur Chaman
Pusht Rod
Qalay-I-Kah
Shib Koh
Ghor
Chaghcharan
Dolaina
Lal wa Sarjangal
Pasaband
Saghar
Shahrak
Taywara
Tulak
Hirat
Adraskan
Chishti Sharif
12
149
67
177
23712
16926
1758
113
385
4088
208
208
11974
1088
346
114
Farsi
Ghoryan
Gulran
Guzara
Hirat
Injil
Karukh
Kohsan
Kushk
Kushki Kuhna
Obe
Pashtun Zarghun
Rabat Sangi
Shindand
Zinda Jan
Grand Total
87
982
57
102
1
7811
1017
262
30
187
4
91415
Source: AIMS, 8 October 2002
Afghanistan Western Area IDPs Returnee by district Based on IOM-UNHCR Consolidation (25
February - 06 October)
(Click to expand)
Source: AIMS, 8 October 2002
Some 200,000 IDPs expected to return between June and December 2002 (October
2002)
•
People are not returning to their home but to urban centers such as Kabul, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif,
Kunduz or Jalalabad, mainly because of insecurity and lack of economic opportunities in their home
villages.
•
Within the first six months of 2002, almost 200,000 IDPs went home with assistance from the
international community, with a further 200,000 going home of their own accord.
•
Some 200,000 more IDPs are expected to return between September and December 2002, but may be
unable to do so because of persistent insecurity or lack of resources.
"NGO representatives said people were not returning to their original homes but to urban centres such as
Kabul, Herat in the west, Mazar-i-Sharif or Kunduz in the north and Jalalabad in the east.
According to White, returning refugees and internally displaced people had increased Kabul's population,
normally about two million, by between 450,000 and 600,000.
'People have decided either before returning or once they've arrived at their place of origin that economic
opportunities and security might be better in urban areas,' he said. 'They either went directly to Kabul, or
tried to make it in their area of origin and it just didn't work out.'
White said international agencies had not been prepared to provide assistance in urban settings. 'Now that
winter planning has begun, it's an oversight that needs to be corrected.' " (Alertnet 11 October 2002)
115
"Some 230,000 displaced Afghans have so far returned home from elsewhere inside the country with
assistance from UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration and other partner agencies. More
than 200,000 other IDPs have opted to return spontaneously. There are still an estimated over 920,000 IDPs
scattered throughout Afghanistan." (UNHCR 10 September 2002)
"Following the signing of the Bonn Agreement and the establishment of the Afghan Interim Administration
on 22 December 2001, large numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons began to return to their
areas of origin.
While ethnic and factional violence as well as human rights abuses against members of certain groups are
still reported in some areas, more than 1.2 million Afghans have returned from the neighbouring countries
of Iran, Pakistan, and Tajikistan since March this year, when the Afghan Interim Administration and the
United Nations launched their assisted repatriation operation.
Moreover, within the first six months of 2002, almost 200,000 IDPs went home with assistance from the
international community, with a further 200,000 going home of their own accord. More are expected to
return (see table below), but many may be unable to - at least for the time being. These include groups
fearing discrimination, retaliation and persecution, as well as nomadic Kuchis and other drought-affected
people who have lost their livelihoods, particularly those who have been displaced in the south of the
country. […]" (UNHCR 1 July 2002)
Overview of IDPs for 2002
Region
Total IDP population,
Jan 2002
Central
432,000
North
216,000
South
413,000
East
80,000
Southeast 20,000
West
171,000
Total
1,332,000
Total estimated returns,
Jan-Dec 2002
359,000
93,000
30,000
45,000
20,000
151,000
698,000*
* includes the 400,000 who had returned by 30 June.
The following map shows IDP returns assisted by UNHCR and IOM as of July 2002:
Source: UNHCR., July 2002, (GIF 80 kb)
The following maps shows IDP returns as of 10 May 2002:
Source:AIMS, 10 May 2002, (GIF 200kb each)
116
More than 70,000 IDPs have left Herat camps between March and July to return home
(July 2002)
•
The voluntary repatriation of nearly 7,000 displaced Afghans from the Rawzabagh camp in Herat in
the west has been completed.
•
Those who remained (some 65 families) did not want to return to their homes and it was still unclear
where they would resettle.
•
More than 71,000 Afghans have returned to their homes from the IDP camps in Herat in the past four
months, leaving an estimated 60,000 IDPs there.
"The voluntary repatriation of nearly 7,000 displaced Afghans from the Rawzabagh camp in Herat in the
west has been completed, says the International Organisation for Migration (IOM).
Jeff McMurdo, IOM programme co-ordinator for Afghanistan, told IRIN on Monday that only 65 families
from a total of 7,000 people remained at the camp for internally displaced people (IDPs). Those who
remained, he said, did not want to return to their homes and it was still unclear where they would resettle.
For now, however, they were still being provided with shelter and food at the camp.
Rawzabagh is one of five IOM co-ordinated IDP camps in Herat, western Afghanistan. According to an
IOM statement, more than 71,000 Afghans have returned to their homes from the camps in the past four
months - 9,000 of them since the middle of June.
Those who have opted to return to their homes in time for the autumn planting season have been given
survival kits including blankets, plastic sheets, some tools and seeds, and wheat to survive for up to three
months.
The IOM said in a statement that an estimated 60,000 IDPs remained at the camps they run in Herat.
Maslakh, the biggest IDP camp, still had 32,000 people living there, while another, Shaidayee, had 21,000,
the organisation said
UNHCR completes the repatriation of the 10,000 IDPs stranded at the Afghan-Tajik
border (April 2002)
•
UNHCR has completed the repatriation of the close to 10,000 Afghans stuck at the Afghan-Tajik
border.
•
10,000 IDPs living on two islands on the Tajik-Afghan border will be offered to return to their area of
origin with the help of UNHCR and IOM.
•
Distribution of food will be discontinued at the end of March.
"On Thursday, the UN refugee agency completed the repatriation of 8,918 Afghans who have been stuck
for a year and a half on islands and promontories of the Pyandj River, which marks the border between
Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Protection officers from UNHCR said the last 105 people left the islands for
the region of Kunduz in northeastern Afghanistan in trucks supplied by the International Organisation for
Migration." (UNHCR 19 April 2002)
"UNOCHA reports that UNHCR and IOM are preparing for the return of Afghan IDPs camped on the
"islands" between Afghanistan and Tajikistan. The return, which will be facilitated by UNHCR and IOM,
will offer the IDPs the possibility of free return back to their place of origin. Organizations that are
currently providing assistance on the islands will discontinue their activities and food distributions there
will be phased out. " (USAID 22 March 2002)
117
Refugees along the Pyandzh river:
Afghanistan-Tajikistan border
(click on the map for the expanded version)
Source: Gvt. of the United States of America, 8 February 2001, (jpeg 58 kb)
"The 10,000 Afghan refugees camped on the border with Tajikistan are set to return to their homes after the
Nouruz holiday (the vernal equinox, 21 March), Asia-Plus news agency reported on 18 February. Denied
permission to cross the border by Tajik President Imomali Rakhmonov, whose policy of admitting no
Afghan refugees into the country was harshly criticized by international aid agencies after the U.S.-led
bombing campaign began last year, Afghans have been living on islands in the Panj River that delineates
the Tajik-Afghan border. A UN High Commissioner for Refugees representative said that the refugees are
now waiting for warmer weather before returning to homes that may or may not be habitable, and that the
relief agency is working with the interim government in Kabul to construct acceptable homes, hospitals,
and schools in their villages." (RFE/RL 21 February 2002)
Return and resettlement programmes
Chaman camp set close, IDPs to be relocated (June 2003)
•
If the IDPs at the Chaman border are relocated to Zahre Dasht camp they will loose their acess to
employment.
•
Chaman camp, known as the "waiting area" is set to close at the end of July, mainly because of the
security risks posed by the proximity of the border.
•
The close to 20,000 residents will be offered rapatriation to Afghanistan, likely to be Zahre Dasht
camp near Kandahar or Spin Boldak camp, or relocation to an existing refugee camp inside Pakistan.
•
WFP's food distribution and UNHCR's provision of water will cease after July
•
Due to the presence of landmines, scarce water supplies and the lack of employment opportunities on
the new proposed site of Zhare Dasht west of Kandahar, many IDPs in Chaman and Spin Boldak are
reluctant to move there. Therefore, UNHCR had to re-schedule, from the beginning to the third week
in August, the process of relocating up to 89,693 people from the temporary settlements at Chaman
and Spin Boldak to the new site.
•
The Zhare Dasht camp was established by the UN refugee agency with the help of the Afghan
authorities as an interim solution for the tens of thousands of displaced people stranded in squalid sites
around the Pakistan border. Zhare Dasht is ready to receive 30,000 people and can be expanded to
accommodate 60,000.
•
The voluntary relocation to Zhare Dhast was requested by the governments of both Pakistan and
Afghanistan. Those who opt to relocate will receive food assistance and healthcare.
•
The Afghans at Chaman have been stranded at the arid site since February, when the Pakistan
government closed its borders.
•
Spin Boldak's displaced persons live in similarly desolate camps lacking proper sanitary facilities,
shelter, food aid and other assistance. Most of the Afghans arrived there in late 2001, fleeing
lawlessness as the Taliban regime collapsed.
"In the case of the Spin Boldak camp, and the displaced ‘stuck’ at the Chaman border, the security situation
has seriously deteriorated in recent months restricting access to these displaced by international actors. The
authorities are considering forcibly relocating these IDPs, possibly to Zahre Dasht camp, for the alleged
118
security ris ks that they are creating at the border. Should this happen, the IDPs will also loose their access
to employment associated with the flourishing border trade. Moreover, access to Zahre Dasht has also
become more restricted by growing insecurity in the province. Indeed, the deteriorating security situation if
the south in general has serious implications for the overall assistance and protection of all IDPs in the
region." (Inter-Agency Missions 19 June 2003, p. 8)
"A makeshift encampment perched on the Afghan-Pakistani border criticised for its harsh living conditions
in the months following the 2001 Afghan war is slated to close by the end of July, following an agreement
by the two governments and the UN refugee agency.
Although life in Chaman's camp, known as the "waiting area", had improved through the provision of
medical care, water and food, the continued concentration of thousands of Afghan asylum seekers in a
desolate spot right on the border had long presented what was considered an unacceptable security problem.
Under the agreement reached by the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan and UNHCR at their
Tripartite Commission meeting on May 14, the remaining 19,626 residents of the area will be offered
repatriation to Afghanistan or relocation to the existing Mohammad Kheil refugee camp inside Pakistan's
Balochistan province.
All support for the "waiting area", which now includes a stream of daily water tankers financed by UNHCR
and food supplies by the UN World Food Programme, will cease after distributions in July. The unofficial
camp will then be closed.
"This was a situation that could not be allowed to continue," said Hasim Utkan, UNHCR's Representative
in Pakistan. "We have found a solution that provides the asylum seekers with reasonable choices – we hope
most accept a package of assistance to return to Afghanistan while those with continuing security concerns
can move to an existing refugee camp inside Pakistan."
Some details remain to be decided, but residents will first be offered a chance to move back to Afghanistan.
The two most likely destinations are a camp for internally displaced Afghans located just across the border
in the Afghan town of Spin Boldak, which is becoming a permanent settlement. Others may go to the new
site at Zhare Dasht, near the city of Kandahar, that UNHCR helped develop for displaced Afghans waiting
to return home.
A package of assistance items for repatriation will be offered to the residents, who have dwindled from
more than 26,000 a year ago because of previous relocations to Zhare Dasht.
Alternatively, those Afghans who still do not want to return to their country can move to the refugee camp
of Mohammad Kheil, one of a string of camps that were opened near the border to house Afghans fleeing
the US-led war that toppled the Taliban rulers of Afghanistan in late 2001.
At the end of July, anyone remaining in the "waiting area" would no longer receive UNHCR assistance or
be considered refugees and would be treated according to normal Pakistani law." (UNHCR 20 May 2003)
"UNHCR had to re-schedule, from the beginning to the third week in August, the process of relocating up
to 89,693 people from the temporary settlements at Chaman and Spin Boldak, astride the Pakistan border to
the south of Kandahar, to the Zhare Dasht site to the west of Kandahar. Access to the new camps is through
a corridor between two mined areas and this may represent a particular risk to any Kuchis who make the
move because of their historical practice of roaming freely over a large area. It would appear, in any event,
that many of those at Chaman and Spin Boldak are reluctant to relocate because of the absence of
employment opportunities at the new site. Feedback that water supplies at the new camps are scarce is also
having an effect. These two populations are, for the most part, made up of Kuchis from southern
119
Afghanistan or Pushtuns who have fled from northern Afghanistan in response to pressures from local
power holders and inter-ethnic tensions. A UN report of 19th August indicated that further displacement of
ethnic Pushtun families was continuing from various districts of Faryab controlled by Junbesh.
Refugees and IDPs returning to Faryab are reported by the UN to have been subject to looting, extortion,
harassment and aggressive behaviour by local commanders." (BAAG 31 August 2002)
"The UN refugee agency today started moving Afghans stranded at the Pakistan border to an interim haven
in southern Afghanistan.
[…]
On Thursday, 466 Afghans who had volunteered to leave a desolate, windswept encampment at Chaman,
on Pakistan's frontier with southern Afghanistan, boarded 20 UNHCR-hired trucks and were relocated to a
recently-prepared site at Zhare Dasht, 30 km west of Kandahar.
The Zhare Dasht camp was established by the UN refugee agency with the help of the Afghan authorities as
an interim solution for the tens of thousands of displaced people stranded in squalid sites around the
Pakistan border.
'This is a temporary solution to get these people through winter with better assistance,' said UNHCR
spokeswoman Maki Shinohara at a Thursday press briefing in Kabul. 'We hope to continue with regular
movements to Zhare Dasht, and at the same time continue to assist families who wish to go home.'
There are more than 25,000 Afghans camped at Chaman's so-called "waiting area" site and at least 30,000
internally displaced persons (IDPs) in four primitive camps located around Spin Boldak, just across the
border in Afghanistan.
Khan Zada, the UNHCR field officer at Chaman, said others stranded at the waterless "waiting area" camp
showed strong interest in the move. Although most have not decided whether to join the relocation, 250
families have already asked to go to Zhare Dasht. The next group is expected to leave for the new site in the
next week.
Zhare Dasht is ready to receive 30,000 people and can be expanded to accommodate 60,000. The UN
refugee agency believes Zhare Dasht will serve as a temporary haven where the Afghans can receive
assistance away from the precarious border camps until the time comes when they can return to their home
areas.
[…]
The Afghans at Chaman have been stranded at the arid site since February, when the Pakistan government
closed its borders to Afghans fleeing the effects of drought and ethnic persecution in the north.
Spin Boldak's displaced persons live in similarly desolate camps lacking proper sanitary facilities, shelter,
food aid and other assistance. Most of the Afghans arrived there in late 2001, fleeing lawlessness as the
Taliban regime collapsed and seeking aid then being distributed by various Islamic relief agencies.
Tension and occasional security problems have hampered the work of UNHCR and other relief agencies
operating in the dusty border zone around the Afghan/Pakistan border. Several relief agencies have left
Spin Boldak in recent months, which has further worsened conditions in the sprawling IDP camps.
The voluntary relocation to Zhare Dhast was requested by the governments of both Pakistan and
Afghanistan. Those who opt to relocate will receive food assistance and healthcare. They will live in tents
while they build their own homes on 500-square-metre plots located around already drilled wells. The new
site also includes space for a community services centre where mosques, schools and markets can be built."
(UNHCR 15 August 2002)
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See also "30,000 IDP stranded at Chaman border in dire condition await assistance (July 2002)" and "MSF
concerned over relocation of Chaman asylum seekers", IRIN 7 August 2002
MSF concerned about the relocation of 12,000 IDPs from Shaidayee to Maslakh camp
(June 2003)
•
There is concern that the phasing out of food distribution is happening without a comprehensive
understanding of the IDPs ' coping mechanisms.
•
16,000 IDPs in Shaidayee camp and 29,000 IDPs in Maslakh camp.
•
Govt plans to close Shaidayee camp in the coming months.
•
MSF is worried that the relocation of 12,000 IDPs from Shaidayee to Malsakh camp will disrupt their
lives and employment.
•
MSF thinks closure of the camp will result in mantal and physical damage for the Shaidayee camp
IDPs.
"In Hirat, IDP protection in the camps has improved over the situation a year ago. Currently, however,
IDPs are facing possible forced relocation from Shaydayee camp to Maslakh camp because the governor is
‘restituting’ most of the camp lands to the military. Because Maslakh is much further from Hirat town,
such relocation runs contrary to the expressed goal of achieving durable solutions as relocated IDPs risk
loosing their already limited livelihood options and access to urban employment. At the same time food
distribution is being phased out and the mission noted that there is much concern among many of the
international community that this is occurring without a comprehensive vulnerability analysis being
completed and a fuller understanding of the existing coping mechanisms of IDPs being reached. Thus,
WFP is encouraged to revisit its plans for targeting assistance to the residual IDPs pending the completion
of a planned vulnerability assessment later this summer." (Inter-Agency Missions 19 June 2003, p. 8)
"We estimate there are 16,000 internally displaced persons in Shaidayee. Mashlak is much bigger, with
around 29,000 people living there. This is likely to change dramatically in the coming weeks when the U.N.
agencies and Afghan government relocate the population of Shaidayee to Mashlak. The government's plan
is to completely close Shaidayee in the coming months. Around 12,000 internally displaced persons are
being relocated. We are worried about this because of Mashlak's capacity to receive such a large number.
The move could potentially disrupt the lives and employment developed by people living near Shaidayee.
Once the camp closes their income will disappear.
[…]
There is an atmosphere of uncertainty and anxiety among the population. Most of them have already been
through two decades of wars and three or four years of the worst drought Central Asia has seen for 30
years. Now they are being told the cannot go home because of warfare, lack of employment and an absence
of shelter. They hear that the international community will not provide for them anymore and on top of that
they will soon lose whatever kind of life they have built in Shaidayee camp. The closure will only worsen
the precarious level of mental and physical health found in many of our patients." (AlertNet 28 May 2003)
300,000 IDPs expected to return during 2003 (January 2003)
•
Afghan government and international agencies will facilitate the return of 300,000 IDPs during 2003,
with transport assistance, food packages and non-food items.
•
Reintegration efforts will be spearheaded by the government with assistance from WFP, UNHCR,
UNICEF, FAO and UNOPS.
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•
Shelter assistance will be provided to some 75,000 returnee families and 4,000 wells will be dug in
areas of return.
•
Governement, with assistance form UNHCR, will conduct comprehensive monitoring of the return of
displaced people and their initial reintegration.
•
UNHCR will attempt to reinforce the rule of law by developing mechanisms to enhance governement's
capacity.
"Return: The Afghan Administration and international agencies intend to facilitate the return of an
estimated 1.2 million refugees and 300,000 IDPs. International legal frameworks governing refugee returns
will be finalized with the Government of Pakistan, and renewed with the Governments of Iran and other
countries of asylum. As in 2002, returnees will be provided with transport assistance, an initial food
package and non-food items by UNHCR, IOM and WFP.
Reintegration: The Afghan Government with the assistance of various UN agencies will also spearhead
intensive reintegration efforts; UNHCR will continue to support the Returnee Reintegration Unit at the
Ministry Rural Rehabilitation Development (MRRD); WFP will develop food-for-work initiatives;
UNICEF will work on safe water supply and education; FAO on crop production, and UNOPS (UN Office
for Project Services) on road repairs. Shelter, water, education, health, community services and cash-forwork initiatives, although nationwide priorities, will feature prominently in reintegration assistance in
regions with significant refugee/IDP returns. It is expected that shelter assistance will be provided for
approximately 75,000 returnee families while 4,000 wells will be dug in communities with returnee
populations. Specific attention also will be paid to vulnerable groups, including female heads-ofhouseholds, the elderly and the disabled.
Protection of Returnee Rights: Comprehensive monitoring of the return of displaced people and their
initial reintegration will be conducted by the Government, with key support from UNHCR's network of
field offices. UNHCR will also work to develop mechanisms to enhance the capacity of government and
other national institutions to reinforce the rule of law. The work of the Return Commission will continue to
be supported." (UNAMA 30 January 2003)
Mahkaki and Mile -46 IDP camp to be closed in April to allow for the repatriation of the
10,000 IDPs (March 2002)
•
Iran plans an incremental closing of Mahkaki and Mile-46 camps during April in coordinatioon with
NGOs.
•
MSF approves the plan and advocates that UNHCR play a more active role in assisting the return.
•
According to a recent MSF survey of Mahkaki residents, 15 to 20 percent were found to be vulnerable
and therefore in need of protection and special assistance
"Iranian officials confirmed to IRIN on Monday plans to close two camps for internally displaced persons
(IDPs) inside Afghanistan. Established after 11 September, and home to more than 10,000 Afghan IDPs,
the Mahkaki and Mile-46 camps in southwestern Nimruz Province, are administered by the Iranian Red
Crescent Society.
'As per our plans for repatriation in April, we will begin the process of closing these two camps during the
repatriation process,' the international affairs officer for the Iranian Bureau for Foreigners and Illegal Aliens
(BAFIA), Rostam-Ali Rostami, said from the Iranian capital, Tehran. In coordination with the office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), BAFIA hopes to repatriate some 400,000
Afghan refugees this year alone.
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Asked how the operation would proceed, Rostami said the closure would not be done immediately, but
under an incremental process, in coordination with nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) working in the
area. With reconstruction already beginning inside the country, and most of the people at the camps being
farmers, they should return to their homes and fields, he said.
The move was pragmatic, Bruno Jochum, the head of mission of the international NGO Medecins Sans
Frontiers (MSF), told IRIN from Tehran. 'Given the harsh climatic conditions - particularly sandstorms closing these two camps is a wise decision.' He added that the question now was the methodology to be
applied. 'We are advocating that UNHCR play a more active role in assisting the return of these people to
their places of origin,' he said.
Jochum went on to call on UNHCR to offer the same assistance package to the IDPs at Mahkaki and Mile46 as it would be offering the refugees to be repatriated from Iran. In this respect, according to a recent
MSF survey of Mahkaki residents, 15 to 20 percent were found to be vulnerable and therefore in need of
protection and special assistance - something UNHCR could greatly assist with, he added.
(...)
The United Nations maintains there are over two million Afghan refugees in Iran today. Fearing a major
new influx after 11 September, Tehran sealed its border with Afghanistan, and proposed establishing a
series of IDP camps inside Afghan territory where assistance would be provided instead. Mahkaki and
Mile-46, just inside the border, were the only such camps to open." (IRIN 4 March 2002)
5 main geographic areas expected to be high-return areas during 2002 (January 2002)
•
The AIA has identified five geographic areas expected to be high-return areas for refugees and
internally displaced people. These are: Shomali Plain, Hazarajat, Ghor region, Khoja Ghar, and
Kandahar
"79. Based on the experience of repatriations worldwide, the return of refugees is likely to exacerbate
increases in population in urban areas. This is due to the perception of employment opportunities (whether
accurate or not), as well as to the reality that long periods of displacement in urban areas or in urban-like
camp settings may make adaptation to rural conditions and livelihoods difficult for some refugees even if
they originated from rural areas. As an example, it is estimated that 30% of Afghan refugees in Iran are
living in greater Tehran.
80. The AIA has identified five geographic areas expected to be high-return areas for refugees and
internally displaced people. These are: Shomali Plain, Hazarajat, Ghor region, Khoja Ghar, and Kandahar.
It has also stated its concern to see that the inhabitants of Jalozai Camp can return to their places of origin.
IDP reintegration programmes
Government foresees a gradual increase of operational focus from repatriation to
reintegration during 2003 (March 2003)
•
Gradual increase of operational focus from repatriation to reintegration during 2003 with linkages to
MRRD development programmes.
•
During 2003, greater integration and coordination of present and future efforts targeting returnees and
IDPs will be sought so as to ensure a smooth transition from relief to reconstruction.
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•
Initial reintegration assistance will include: construction/repair of 100,000 rural houses and 60,000
houses in 6 main cities, provision of drinking water and related sanitation, provision of employment
activities for returnees in both rural and urban areas, provision of technical advice and agricultural
inputs to food production, ensure that returnees enjoy equal access to health and educational services
as their host communities.
"42. The 1382/2003 programme foresees a gradual increase of operational focus from repatriation to
reintegration. As per the National Development Framework (NDF), one of the main components for
national recovery and reconstruction is the sustainable reintegration of returnees.
43. As indicated under the Institutional Framework, further efforts will be required for the establishment of
regular consultations with key constituencies (donors, international agencies, NGOs) to identify and agree
upon key elements of strategy, programme design, and resourcing. Appropriate linkages with relevant
MRRD programmes, such as the National Area-based Development Programme (NABDP) supported by
UNDP, and the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) supported by the World Bank and the National
Emergency Employment Programme (NEEP) supported by ILO and several donors.
44. The prime focus for the concerned Ministries of the TISA during 1382/2003 should be to encourage
greater integration and coordination of present and future efforts targeting returnees and IDPs among
implementing agencies, so as to make sure that the transition from relief to reconstruction is carried out
smoothly.
45. Among the 2 million returnees who have come back to Afghanistan during 1381/2002 are a number of
returnees classified as persons with special needs. After so many years of destruction, there are no public,
social welfare support systems. A referral system established in the previous year will be further
strengthened during 1382/2003.
46. During 1381/2002, the existing network for returnee monitoring will continue to be reinforced and
expanded to provide accurate information on the conditions of return and the progress of reintegration
including security and assistance needs. Close collaboration with mandated agencies (e.g. ICRC and
OHCHR) and UNAMA will be essential in particular in the field of detention of returnees, family tracing,
minority issues and the monitoring of the conditions of human rights, including women’s rights, in areas of
return. Links with the newly established Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission will be sought
and consolidated.
Initial reintegration assistance
Shelter: House construction and repair for vulnerable returnees and IDPs. Nationwide a total of 100,000
rural houses are expected to be constructed or repair. MoRR is in charge of this component. In 6 main
cities, 60,000 houses will be self-built under the Urban Reconstruction Plan. MUDH and Municipalities
will coordinate.
Linkages: ECHO, UN-Habitat.
Water: To ensure that returnee areas have adequate sources of drinking water and alternative sources for
domestic purposes. Related sanitation interventions (targeting both men and women) would be carried out
under the MRRD National Water Supply Programme. In urban areas water supply will be incorporated into
the Urban Reconstruction Plan. Linkages: GTZ, UNICEF, USAID, WB
Employment Creation and Income Generation: Providing off-farm labour-intensive, fast employment
activities in returnee dense rural areas under the NEEP. Also, support for small business, micro-finance
initiatives, and employment skills training. It is expected that at least 60% of the returnees will have access
to employment opportunities both in urban and rural areas.
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Linkages: ADB, ILO, UNDP, UNOPS, WB, NEEP.
Food security: Through technical advice, agricultural inputs (crops and livestock), market support and cash
related inputs to food production would be encouraged in areas of high refugee and IDP return.
Linkages: FAO, UNDP, WB, WFP, USAID
Social support: In conjunction with line Ministries, to ensure that returnees enjoy at least equal access to
health and educational services as their host communities , support will be provided through major national
programmes with focus on both urban and rural areas.
Linkages: JICA, UNICEF, UNODC, WB, WHO." (TISA March 2003, p. 9)
Rural integration (March 2003)
•
Establishment of MRRD Reintegration Unit to facilitate the potential reintegration dimension of the 5
main programme areas designed to address rural poverty and promote recovery.
•
For the year 2003, it is expected that the first phase of reintegration programme in 3 sectors (education,
health and water) may result in unmet costs amounting to US$12 million.
•
The Inter-Ministerial Commission for Rural Development will need to address the problem of land
allocation and right property issues.
•
Government will seek to encourage private investment and the development and re-establishment of
an export farming industry.
"47. To address rural poverty and promote recovery, MRRD has set five main areas for programming,
namely (i) institutional strengthening to support sustainable rural livelihoods, (ii) macro economic
regeneration, (iii) community-based development, (iv) protection of lives and livelihoods, and (v) income
diversification. Within each programme area, emphasis is to be placed, inter alia, on reintegration
(returnees, IDPs, ex-combatants), sustainable resource management, and gender equality. Each of the five
programme areas has an important potential reintegration dimension to them, which will need to be further
detailed. The establishment of the MRRD Reintegration Unit (see paragraph 24) will facilitate this process.
48. The first phase of reintegration may result in additional costs to larger programmes. These can broadly
be accounted for in the social sectors; yet more accurate calculations need to be made by taking into
account the availability and resources of existing facilities. A rough figure of unmet costs for the
1381/2002 returnees for three sectors (education, health and water) amounts to approximately US$ 4.5
million. For 1382/2003, this figure could reach up to US$12 million.
49. To plan appropriate food security interventions, it will be necessary to determine the number of
returnee families who own or have access to sufficient land to grow their own food. Also, it is necessary to
quantify the number of families who will be able to meet some of their food needs through share cropping
and casual labour, and to seek off-farm employment to purchase their food requirements. Investment
choices will have to be made between encouraging on-farm livelihood systems (crops and livestock) and
other non-farm economic opportunities (labour intensive works programmes); between expanding the
cultivable areas (through expanded irrigation infrastructure) or rais ing agricultural productivity and
efficiency on existing land (through extension work, input supplies, improved market access).
50. Land allocation and right property issues will also need to be addressed by the Government as soon as
possible. The Inter-Ministerial Commission for Rural Development will need to pursue this matter with all
relevant Government entities.
51. In addition, the Government will seek to encourage private investment and the development and reestablishment of an export farming industry. This will be achieved through the development and promotion
125
of markets, the establishment of agricultural credit schemes and incentives to small and medium scale
farmers for expansion of activities. Special attention will be paid to the expansion of the export market for
fruits and vegetables." (TISA March 2003, pp. 10-11)
Urban reintegration (April 2003)
•
MUDH envisages to relocate urban IDPs, in particular those in Kabul, to a location near Pul-e-Charkhi
as as short -term solution.
•
There is concern that urban areas cannot absorb the large number of poeple who have returned during
2002. These concerns have been incorporated by MUDH into the Urban Reconstruction plan.
•
In the last years, the focus of humanitarian programmes in urban areas has been on providing relief to
the vulnerable. The large number of returnees has now made their reintegration a key issue for urban
rehabilitation.
•
The degraded and inadequate state and availability of housing in the main cities of Kabul, Kandahar,
Herat, Jalalabad, Mazar-I-Sharif and Kunduz is an immediate reintegration challenge for the MUDH.
60,000 owner built units are planned.
•
It is expected to increase the capacity of the existing public networks to cover the needs of at least 50%
of the urban population.
•
MUDH expects to generate at least 50,000 jobs and provide rapid income opportunities to more than
20,000 households.
•
A household surveys of returnee dense areas will be commissioned during 2003 to gather more data
about urban returnee families, their place of former residence, and their assets.
"The Ministry of Urban Development and Housing (MUDH) has undertaken efforts to address the
immediate problems of urban IDPs, in particular those who live in public premises in Kabul. It is envisaged
to relocate these IDPs to a location near Pul-e Charkhi as a shorter-term strategy. Suggestions on longerterm solutions focus on the possibilities of land allocation by the Government or the use of land. Issues
such as the urban returns/IDPs should be streamlined in the discussions of the two concerned CG’s."
(HAAG 22 April 2003)
"52. The large number of returns to Kabul, Jalalabad, and other Afghan cities during 1381/2002 has raised
understandable concerns over unmanageable levels of migration to urban areas ill prepared to absorb rapid
population growth. As with rural programmes, a key concern for the Ministry of Housing and Urban
Development (MUDH), associated ministries, and municipalities during 1382/2003 will be building
reintegration concerns into its main programme and planning areas – housing, urban infrastructure,
community development, utilities, employment and services. To do this, MUDH has already incorporated
into the draft Urban Reconstruction Plan, key elements that address the main priorities of urban returnees
and IDPs.
53. Due to security, political, and resource constraints, there has been little rehabilitation assistance or
investment in the development of Afghanistan’s cities for many years. Even more than in rural areas, the
focus of humanitarian assistance programmes in urban areas has been on providing relief to the vulnerable
and urban poor. The rapid and large return of returnees to Kabul has made their reintegration a key short
and medium term issue for urban rehabilitation in 1381/2002 and 1382/2003.
54. In the urban sector, an immediate reintegration challenge for the MUDH is the degraded and inadequate
state and availability of housing in the main cities of Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Jalalabad, Mazar-I-Sharif and
Kunduz. The launching of a housing programme for the cities is an urgent priority. As a part of the
Reconstruction Plan 60,000 owner built units are planned plus the upgrading of social services in new and
old residential areas.
126
55. As per in rural areas a second priority in the cities is the access to safe drinking water and sanitation.
Through the urban reconstruction plan it is expected to increase the capacity of the existing public networks
to cover the needs of at least 50% of the urban population. Reliability on private deep tube wells will be
necessary for families with financial capacity. Coordination, water management, site protection, and
distribution mechanisms will be also enhanced.
56. Although the urban economies have revived in the last few months, their ability to absorb so many new
entrants onto the labour market (youth, the unemployed, returnees, ex-combatants) remains constrained.
This will be a key concern for reintegration programmes since the numbers and demography (70% of
working age) of returning refugees indicate that they will account for a large proportion of job seekers. The
MUDH through reconstruction projects including housing, public works, and city level infrastructure
expects to generate at least 50,000 jobs and provide rapid income opportunities to more than 20,000
households.
57. Another important aspect of urban reintegration is the support to establish social and cultural
reintegration networks with support from national NGOs and community groups. Particular attention will
be provided to mental health, gender equity and reintegration of children into education.
58. As with repatriation to rural areas, the generation of more data about urban returnee families, their
place of former residence, and their assets will be important. To that end, household surveys of returnee
dense areas will be commissioned during 1382/2003. The information will be collected and analysed
systematically and used to guide programme decisions. Agencies such as UNHCR will transfer by the end
of 1382/2003 their returnee monitoring capacity and district profiling exercises to the Government." (TISA
March 2003, pp. 11-12)
Obstacles to return and resettlement
Major returns to northeast but few returns to nortwest due to persistent tension, lack
of long-term assistance (June 2003)
•
20% of IDPs remaining in camps and settlements cite insecurity as the main reason for not returning,
most of them Pashtuns
•
600,000 refugees & IDPs (200,000) have returned to the northern provinces since beginning of 2003.
•
60,000 Pastuns have fled the persecution and ethnic tensions in the north since 2001.
•
Security still a major concern in the nortwest.
•
Situation has stabilised in the northeastern provinces of Takhar Baghlan and Konduz, where most of
the Pashtuns have returned, but few have returned to the northwestern provinces of Faryab, Jowzjan,
Sar-e Pol and Badghis.
•
Return commission still needs to persuade Pashtuns IDPs in the south that conditions are conducive to
return in the north.
•
Aid workers report gap between the emergency humanitarian assistance delivered and the time of
return or immediately after return.
•
Land disputes is one of the main problems facing returnees fueling local conflicts.
"An estimated twenty percent of the IDPs remaining in camps and other concentrations cite safety as their
primary reason for not returning to their areas of origin. Most prominent among them are the ethnic
Pashtuns originating from the north and northwest who have been displaced to the south, the west and
within the north. Many more, including some very recently displaced, are found throughout the country,
with those displaced within the northern provinces are of particular concern. Some IDPs feel threatened
127
simply because of their ethnicity while others were caught in the crossfire of comp eting local armed
factions. The common denominator among all of these displaced is that their areas of origin are too
insecure for them to return.
Clearly, a lasting change in the security and rule of law situation in much of Afghanistan would be
necessary to address the valid protection concerns prevailing among IDPs and the humanitarian and
development community as a whole. A certain level of instability, insecurity and human rights abuses
connected to weak governance and rule of law will remain a fact of life for many Afghans for years to
come. Therefore, activities in support of IDPs must be based on the reality of relative levels of risk and
vulnerability, as well as on informed and voluntary choices being made by the IDPs.
The principal cause of protection problems in the north is the ongoing struggle for power and land among
competing paramilitary factions and warlords. Local commanders operating in the name of larger factions
retain near-absolute control over civilian life and continue to actively engage in power struggles and armed
conflict. Ethnic and tribal cleavages fuel this competition. Such conflicts affect both the locally displaced
IDPs within the north as well as the non-displaced population and seriously threatens the process of
normalization and recovery of local communities. For those displaced to the south and west, these ongoing
conflicts remain the main impediment for return. Creative and aggressive measures by the Government are
required to address these security problems immediately while a longer-term reform process and institution
building gets underway.
In the interim, most of these displaced remain in the camps/settlements in Kandahar and Helmand
provinces (Zahre Dasht, Spin Boldak, Panjwai and Mukhtar) and to a lesser extent in Hirat province
(primarily Maslakh and Shaydayee). There are also some 20,000 displaced at the border between Spin
Boldak and Chaman who are not allowed to enter the refugee camps in Pakistan and, as such, remain in
limbo." (Inter-Agency Missions 19 June 2003, pp. 7-8)
"According to UNHCR, by the end of March, about 600,000 Afghan refugees and IDPs, had returned to
their homes in the nine northern provinces of Faryab, Jowzjan, Sar-e Pol, Badakhshan, Takhar, Baghlan,
Konduz, Samangan and Balkh. Of these, some 400,000 refugees came from Iran, Pakistan and the Central
Asian republics with UNHCR assistance. While 140,000 IDPs also returned to their villages with the
assistance of the refugee agency and other aid organisations, another 60,000 returned spontaneously or
without assistance.
[…] fighting between the Taliban and their opponents of the Northern Alliance forced hundreds of
thousands to flee northern Afghanistan. Moreover, the worst drought in living memory during the 1990s
ruined nomadic pastoralist and agrarian livelihoods and people left their villages.
Following the fall of the Taliban, ethnic Pashtuns in the north were persecuted by ethnic militias and
independent commanders and forced to flee. As many members of the Taliban came from among the
Pashtun clerics in the south, they were associated with the reclusive movement and subsequently
victimised. UNHCR estimates that 60,000 Pashtuns fled the area after the demise of the Taliban in
December 2001.
Weak civilian authority in north
Vicky Tennant, a protection officer with UNHCR in Mazar-e Sharif, told IRIN that security remained one
of their major concerns. 'In some areas, local commanders still effectively exercise the authority and
power,' she told IRIN, noting that civilian authority was weak across northern Afghanistan. The jostling for
power between the ethnic Uzbek general, Abdul Rashid Dostum, and the Tajik commander, Mohammad
Ata, had resulted in armed clashes and instability across the region.
128
She maintained that in addition to insecurity, many returnees had problems with shelter, with access to
water, they wanted more schools and demanded a clinic closer to their village. 'A majority thinks that they
will feel safe after a comprehensive disarmament campaign,' she said.
The refugee agency estimates that 24 percent, or 100,000 returnees over the past year, were Pashtuns.
Tennant explained that the process of building up trust and relationships between the Pashtun and other
communities who had remained would be a complex and long-term process.
Aid workers believe that the situation has largely stabilised in the northeastern provinces of Takhar
Baghlan and Konduz, where most of the Pashtuns have returned. However, few have returned to the
northwestern provinces of Faryab, Jowzjan, Sar-e Pol and Badghis.
Return commission to persuade Pashtuns in south to return
In March, Rudd Lubbers, head of the UNHCR, inaugurated a return commission comprising representatives
from the UN, the central government in Kabul and northern faction leaders. With thousands of Pashtuns
living in crowded and squalid displacement camps in southern and western Afghanistan, the return
commission has yet to send a working group there to persuade them to return to their ancestral homes.
Local observers felt that political rivalries in the north were hindering such initiatives.
However, Tennant maintained that the commission's working group had now completed its initial
assessments of the areas in the five northern provinces of Faryab, Samangan, Sar-e Pol, Jowzjan, and
Balkh. 'Their reports are extremely comprehensive and forthright in identifying abuses by local
commanders as a key issue which must be addressed in order to create the confidence necessary for largescale returns to the north and northwest,' she said.
Need for more assistance to make returns sustainable
In addition, they emphasised the need for ongoing assistance from the international aid community towards
securing access to shelter, water, livelihoods, health facilities and education.
Making the returns sustainable would need paced, integrated development and reconstruction. But aid
workers maintained that there was a gap between the emergency humanitarian assistance delivered and the
time of return or immediately after return. Substantial development work such as rebuilding sustainable
livelihoods through income generation, infrastructure development and institution building therefore
needed to be undertaken. 'The long-term development programmes have yet to kick off,' Tennant said.
Although donors and aid agencies have recognised the problems, and had initiated some projects, the
people have far greater needs. Over the past year, UNHCR has built shelters for some 8,000 families; 470
water wells in the communities were dug and 12 schools were establis hed. The agency also established six
clinics to improve health conditions. Last winter 100,000 returnees received blankets, stoves, fuel and tents
to survive through the harsh weather.
The government had realised such shortcomings, and President Hamid Karzai has repeatedly called for
more funding. According to Qaderi of the ministry of refugees and repatriation, the country needed to
rebuild basic infrastructure such as roads, electricity and a telephone system. But the country has a long
way to go before it rehabilitates and moves towards self-reliance.
'If there is no improvement in the situation it would certainly have a negative impact on the overall
sustainability of the return and the future stability of this country,' he warned.
Land disputes
129
Some provinces have attracted more returnees than others. Paola Emerson, the area coordinator for relief
and reconstruction for the northeast with the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), told IRIN
that the perception of Konduz being a rich province was attracting a large number of returnees. UNHCR
assisted some 110,000 refugees to return to the fertile agricultural region last year. 'We are concerned over
the land-ownership disputes, as land is scarce and there are competing claims,' she said.
In the ethnically heterogeneous north, returning refugees and IDPs find themselves entangled in land
disputes as they try to rebuild their shattered lives. 'For a significant number of returning refugees, it is one
of the most problematic issues,' Tennant explained.
A recent report by the independent Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) has found that landownership disputes are fuelling local conflicts at a time when stability is needed for reconstruction. 'The
number-one source of conflict here today is land disputes,' the AREU's director, Andrew Wilder, told IRIN
in Kabul.
Tennant added that although UNHCR was working with the traditional dispute-settlement mechanisms
such as shuras, or village councils, the rule of law remained the only long-term solution to the issue. 'This is
the primary prerequisite, and we encourage that even now by supporting the courts,' she said.
Emerson maintained that reconstruction also required decentralisation, thereby creating opportunities for
returnees. 'The provincial authorities also need capacity building,' she said, noting that besides salaries, they
did not receive any funds from Kabul. 'How can you be governor and serve the people without a budget?'
she asked.
According to Gabriel Frailich, the head of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) in Faryab,
there were still some 50,000 IDPs in the region now after the agency resettled about 150,000 in their
villages over the past year. Although the returning refugees and IDPs have similar problems, IDPs in
general are poorer. 'Survival is their main problem,' he told IRIN.
Frailich maintained that understanding the situation in depth and addressing it by removing the primary
causes of displacement remained the key to success. Recently, in Astana valley in Faryab Province, IOM
built one of the first rural water supply schemes, a school was opened with UNHCR support and repairs
were made to the access road. 'Life is reverberating in the village that was completely abandoned during the
Taliban rule two years earlier,' he said." (IRIN 18 June 2003)
See also:
"AFGHANISTAN: UN reports serious rights violations in northwest", IRIN, 28 April 2003
The Political, Security and Human Rights Situation in Afghanistan, Report on fact-finding mission to
Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghanistan and Islamabad, Pakistan, 22 September - 5 October 2002,
Danish Immigration Services (DIS), March 2003
"UN suspends IDPs repatriation to Afghanistan's volatile north", AFP, 2 July 2002
"Afghanistan: UN Refugee Chief Hopes Displaced Northern Afghans May Return Home Soon",
RFE/RL, 10 July 2002
"Afghanistan: IDP Returns Outpace Reintegration Assistance", Refugees International, 21 May 2002
Urban areas' absorption capacity reaching its limit (June 2003)
130
•
UNHCR is not monitoring and assisting returnees in urban areas where the majority of refugees
havegone during 2002.
•
Lack of access to employment, to adequate shelter, and to security for many vulnerable groups has
meant that urban centres can be as treacherous for returnees as rural areas.
•
Returnees are often forced to occupy deserted buildings and land, often living in very poor and
sometimes dangerous conditions.
•
The absorption capacity of urban centres is also reaching its limit in many areas, and particularly in
Kabul.
•
Many donors have stipulated that international agencies, including UNHCR, restrict their assistance
activities to the rural areas, at least partially to avoid a “pull factor” to the cities.
"Amnesty International is concerned about the decision taken by UNHCR, among other agencies, not to
actively monitor and, in most cases, assist returnees in urban areas. During the return movements in 2002,
UNHCR reported that the majority of returnees went back to urban areas. It is almost certain that this trend
is being repeated in the returns taking place in 2003. Despite this fact, however, UNHCR only started a
very limited post-return monitoring programme in some urban centres in spring 2003, and provides no
reintegration assistance at all. As this report has noted previously, it is not possible to substantiate the
assumption held by many that all returnees to urban centres find themselves secure and able to sustain this
return. Lack of access to employment, to adequate shelter given the depleted housing stock of many cities
including Kabul, and to security for many vulnerable groups including female headed households and
unaccompanied women, has meant that urban centres can be as treacherous for returnees as rural areas.
Returnees are often forced to occupy deserted buildings and land, often living in very poor and sometimes
dangerous conditions. Amnesty International was told of more than one case of children suffering fatal falls
from unprotected ledges in dilapidated buildings housing returnee families.
The absorption capacity of urban centres is also reaching its limit in many areas, and particularly in Kabul.
Refugees, IDPs and rejected asylum seekers are “returning” to Kabul (even though this might not have
been the place they left when forced into flight) in search of material, physical and sometimes legal
protection. Mirza, who came to Kabul from Quetta, Pakistan with his family in July 2002, originates from
Logar province in central Afghanistan.
“There is no work in the countryside”, he told Amnesty International, “I had to come to Kabul to provide
food for my family.” Agencies estimate that more than half a million returnees settled in Kabul in 2002. In
many respects this is making a ‘ticking bomb’ out of the capital, which is already seeing a rise in incidents
of crime, overcrowding and violence against women.
[…]
Many donors have stipulated that international agencies, including UNHCR, restrict their assistance
activities to the rural areas, at least partially to avoid a “pull factor” to the cities. There are, however,
obvious concerns about policies that avoid the unavoidable reality of urbanization in a country as insecure
and devastated as Afghanistan. Returnees, including the landless, that have made a rational decision to
return to urban centres in the hope of sustaining their return through access to security, employment and
shelter should not be penalized by being denied access to basic reintegration assistance and services,
including adequate monitoring by the competent agencies." (AI 23 June 2003, pp. 29-30)
Landlessness leads to renewed displacement upon return (June 2003)
•
In 2002, UNHCR stated that 74.3 percent of returnees do not have farmland to which they can return.
•
Many landless returnees being forced into situations of either destitution or internal displacement.
•
Many families unable to afford rent of houses or rooms live in dilapidated buildings or unoccupied
land, under the constant, and increasingly threatening, shadow of eviction by the landowners.
131
•
Landless returnees cannot, in addition, benefit from shelter projects run by various international
agencies, including UNHCR, which stipulate that the returnee must either own a title to the land, or be
able to get his community to vouch for his ownership of the land.
"Another problem related to return to Afghanistan is that of landlessness. In 2002, UNHCR stated that 74.3
percent of returnees do not have farmland to which they can return. A recent report noted in addition, “it
may be assumed that a ‘significant’ number of returnees did not own land, surviving as workers, tenants, or
sharecroppers in varying degrees of dependency to landowners. They left the country landless and may
return landless.” In interviews with returnees and IDPs, Amnesty International was repeatedly confronted
with evidence of landless returnees being forced into situations of either destitution or internal
displacement. One local NGO told Amnesty International that several returnees in the Bamiyan region had
been forced to move into caves in the area as they had no where else to live.
Amnesty International also spoke to returnees in Kabul city who had returned to the city as they owned no
land elsewhere in Afghanistan, and hoped to be able to earn a living in the capital. Being unable to afford to
rent a room or a house due to spiraling rent prices, however, many have been forced to move into
dilapidated buildings or unoccupied land. This was what had happened to Kamaluddin and ten members of
his family, who live in one room in the ruined Russian Cultural Centre in Kabul city. “I have no other place
to live”, he said, “we sold our land five years ago when we le ft Panjshir to seek refuge in Badakhshan.”
The majority of these families in Kabul live under the constant, and increasingly threatening, shadow of
eviction by the landowners. Of the returnees Amnesty International interviewed in Kabul, many were
squatting on government owned land and had recently been issued with eviction orders. Around 60 returnee
families who had moved into the premises of a ruined shoe factory in western Kabul have been evicted by
the authorities, forcing them to set up tents on the surrounding hillside.
Landless returnees cannot, in addition, benefit from shelter projects run by various international agencies,
including UNHCR, which stipulate that the returnee must either own a title to the land, or be able to get his
community to vouch for his ownership of the land before the agency will assist with rebuilding shelter on
this land. Obviously, such projects are of no help to the landless. This is the reason one woman, Fariba, is
unable to return to her place of origin in the Shomali valley from Kabul city, where she is living in an
informal tented settlement on government land. While many international agencies are involved in helping
returnees to rebuild their houses in Shomali, Fariba and her family, despite originating from the Shomali
valley, are unable to benefit from this assistance and thus to return “home”, as they do not own any land in
the valley on which to build a house. A group of 15 Uzbek families returned from Pakistan to Kunduz city
in August 2002. Being landless and unable to afford rents in the city, they had set up tents on government
land just outside Kunduz, but were forced to move away by villagers who claimed to own the land. They
now reside in tents 50 metres away from their original location. Amnesty International has learned that the
provincial government plans to redistribute this land to government employees, which will almost
inevitably lead to another displacement for these families." (AI 23 June 2003, p. 26)
No immediate return solution for Kuchi IDPs (June 2003)
•
Small minority of Kuchis that have retained a few animals might return to their traditional livelihoods
if the wells can be identified and repaired.
•
For those displaced from the north and northwest and whose pasturland has been confiscated by local
commanders, return will be more problematic.
•
Many Kuchis likely to opt for integration in the area of displacement.
•
Inter-Agency mission believes that more expertise is needed among both the authorities and the
international actors in order to plan any longer-term solutions for the Kuchi
•
The Kuchis is the largest vulnerable population in Afghanistan, displaced mostly by drought but also
conflict.
132
•
Presently there is no return solution for them as the drought in the south continues and their livestock is
decimated.
•
Report produced by Cordaid consultant proposes a time-phased approach (1-3 years) to rehabilitate
their herds to resume their nomadic lifestyle or to engage them in skill-training activities in view of
integration into their area of displacement.
•
A limited number of Kuchis will be able to migrate to the Reg desert again once the wells are repaired.
"The small minority of Kuchi that retain a few animals, and is able to acquire some income with which to
rebuild their herds, will likely return to traditional livelihoods, but only if wells and pastures are
rehabilitated. Moreover, the task of identifying wells to be rehabilitated is complicated by ownership issues
that risk causing conflict between different Kuchi clans. With respect to the Kuchi displaced from the north
and northwest much of their pastureland has been confiscated by local commanders that would clearly
hinder their return even if they had animals to return with.
In the mission’s numerous discussions with Kuchi, it was widely suggested that significant numbers of
Kuchi, especially women, would opt for durable solutions in settled areas where access to education,
healthcare, permanent shelter and income generating opportunities, particularly in agriculture, are perceived
to exist. Having lived at their present locations for a number of years, many have been able to access at
least minimal levels of employment and would now prefer to integrate among local communities. Others
survive from remittances received from family members working in the larger Afghan towns, who are
refugees, or who work as illegal migrants in Iran and Pakistan.
The challenge now facing the local authorities and the international community is one of how best to assist
the Kuchi in finding appropriate durable solutions. The mission believes that more expertise is needed
among both the authorities and the international actors in order to plan any longer-term solutions for the
Kuchi. Moreover, there is still a widely held conviction among many in the local authorities that the only
durable solution for the Kuchi is to return to pastoralism and that in the interim they not be provided with
anything more than basic humanitarian assistance so as not to alter their ‘nomadic-pastoralist way of life’.
It is encouraging, therefore, that a special commission has been established within MRRD Kabul to address
the Kuchi problem, albeit the commission should play a much more proactive role than hitherto. WFP’s
renewed deployment of a specialist on pastoralism to MRRD Kabul to assist it with developing a policy for
the Kuchi is therefore welcome.
If the Kuchi remain in their present settlements in the south and the west, some will likely continue to be
dependent upon at least some level of humanitarian assistance. However, were the authorities to provide
them with longer-term guaranteed access to land, even if just for housing, either in the existing camps or in
surrounding areas, local integration would become a feasible option. Once given the opportunity to settle,
the Kuchi can pursue skills training, seek local employment opportunities or develop their own income
generating activities. Investments in basic infrastructure can also be made for communities with settled
Kuchi population.
A recent study of Kuchi IDPs by CordAid/VARA proposed several creative projects for skills development
and income generation, as well as reintegration options and activities for those Kuchi who either wish to
return to the Reg or be locally integrated. Constraints to the implementation of some of these proposals are
the large number of potential beneficiaries that need to be addressed and the provision of the necessary
access to land by the local authorities. Unfortunately, the extremely fragile security situation in the south
continues to discourage much needed ‘development’ NGOs from establishing themselves in the region to
help address this problem." (Inter-Agency Missions 19 June 2003, pp. 11-12)
"This is the largest vulnerable population in Afghanistan. There are presently no “return” solutions for
Kuchi and there will not be any return until the drought is over in the south, pasture returns, the wells in the
Reg are repaired, and their limited livestock increase to a number that they can sustain themselves. All
133
these elements must exist simultaneously or Kuchi return to the Reg will not be successful. The documents
by the VARA/CordAid consultant (VC) should be used as the guide to develop projects for this vulnerable
group. They describe a time-phased approach (1-3 years) to assist a limited number of Kuchi to rehabilitate
their remaining small herds and to engage them in various skill-training activities, if they so choose, to
provide opportunities for local integration and potentially the means to obtain additional income. The
Kuchi could remain in their present camp -like situation where they are currently displaced or the authorities
could allocate land where some infrastructure can be developed and where the IDPs can pursue these skilltraining activities and limited re-stocking and animal husbandry activities as described by the VC (some of
these skill training activities have already begun in the present settlement locations, however projects for
animal husbandry and agricultural training would require land more suitable for these projects to begin).
Also described by the VC, there will be a limited number of Kuchi that have enough animals to begin
migrating to the Reg area once their wells are repaired. Every effort to develop projects to repair wells with
the close cooperation of these Kuchi families with animals needs to be taken. However, this will be a very
limited number with the difficult task of assisting them in the Reg (now summer approaching) and
identifying the limited number of wells to be rehabilitated without causing conflict between the different
and desperate Kuchi clans, and between the Pashtun and Baluch." (UNAMA 7 April 2003, p. 2)
See also:
Return of Kuchis to Registan: A Phased Approach, RDP International, April 2003
Lack of funding and insecurity in the north constrain IOM's repatriation activities
(April 2003)
•
In April 2003, IOM delayed IDP returns to Faryab province due to security concerns.
•
Additional financial contribution from the Netherlands and Finland will allow for the continuation of
the transport programme for IDPs stranded in the north, west and centre of the country.
•
Between July and September IOM was planning to help with the return of 75,000 IDPs. IOM has
already helped over 270,000 displaced people and refugees return home to towns and villagers
throughout Afghanistan since the beginning of the year.
•
In May the return operations were temporarily suspended due to funding shortfalls. In mid-June, IDP
movements were re-started in the west and the north of the country, but security concerns in the north
following factional fighting led to a second suspension of IDP movements from Mazar-e-Sharif June
27th.
•
New donor support would allow IOM to lift the suspension of its care and maintenance activities in the
IDP camps in the north and west of the country, to allow a gradual handover of the function to other
agencies in the coming months.
•
IOM has coordinated relief efforts in Maslakh and other IDP camps since the early summer of 2001.
"The International Organisation for Migration [IOM] has delayed the return of internally displaced persons
[IDPs] to the northern Afghan province of Faryab due to security concerns.
’We are holding back for the time being as all missions to the area have been suspended,’ the head of the
office for IOM operations in the north, Ghotai Ghazialam, told IRIN from the city of Mazar-e Sharif.
Some 774 IDPs registered with IOM in the northern Jowzjan Province to return to Faryab, but will remain
there, because fighting between rival factions of the Jonbesh-e Melli-ye Eslami (National Islamic
Movement) and Jamiat-e Islami (Islamic Society) erupted in Meymaneh, the provincial capital of Faryab.
Movement was restricted for aid workers as of 10 April, due to the fighting, reported to have started on 8
March, according to IOM.
134
’Although the UNAMA [United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan] has intervened to resolve the
problem, our fear is that when they [UNAMA] leave, the factions will go back to fighting,’ Ghazialam
said." (IRIN 15 April 2003)
"IOM's efforts to help hundreds of thousands of internally displaced Afghans to return to their homes
received a boost this week with new financial contributions from the Netherlands and Finland totalling E1.5
million.
The additional funding, E1.2 million from the Netherlands and E300,000 from Finland, will go towards
providing transport for IDPs stranded in the west, north and centre of the country." (IOM 23 August 2002)
"IOM will help 75,000 more dis placed Afghans to return home to their places of origin between now and
the end of September. The policy decision follows new funding pledges of over US$ 4 million from donors
including the US, Australia and New Zealand.
There are currently still an estimated 440,000 people displaced by conflict and natural disasters in camps
and cities across Afghanistan. Although some are unable to return home for security and other reasons,
others depend on help from IOM and other agencies.
IOM estimates that the total cost of cost of helping all these people to return home by year end would be in
the region of US$ 14 million - in other words, a shortfall of some US$ 10 million still exists.
IOM has already helped over 270,000 displaced people and refugees return home to towns and villagers
throughout Afghanistan over the past six months, but in May was temporarily forced to suspend return
operations due to funding shortfalls.
In mid-June, IDP movements were re-started in the west and the north of the country, but security concerns
in the north following factional fighting led to a second suspension of IDP movements from Mazar-e-Sharif
June 27th." (IOM 9 July 2002)
"IOM has been forced to suspend indefinitely its Afghan internal transport network due to lack of funding.
A major component of IOM's Afghan programme, the network provided transport for refugees from Iran
and internally displaced people returning to their homes from IDP camps.
Consultations with partners are ongoing to minimize the impact of the suspension of the network, which
has provided return transport for over 250,000 IDPs and refugees throughout the country over the past four
months.
In particular, solutions need to be found for refugees returning home from Iran via the Islamqala border
crossing point near Herat. These are crossing into Afghanistan at a rate of 2,500 a day and an estimated
480,000 are expected to return this year.
Earlier this month ITN movements of IDPs from the Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif IDP camps and camp
management activities were temporarily suspended, while IOM appealed for additional funding to cover a
shortfall created by greater than expected numbers of returning refugees and IDPs and spiralling transport
costs.
Refugee returns from the Iranian border continued, together with other IOM programmes including the
US$8 million USAID-funded Afghan Transition Initiative (ATI) community development programme, the
Return of Qualified Afghans (RQA) programme and the Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) programme for
stranded Afghan migrants abroad.
135
Several donors have responded sympathetically to IOM's appeal. But the total response has not been
sufficient to ensure the survival of the ITN programme, which would have required an immediate injection
of US$10 million and a total of US$18.7 million to continue through year end.
But new donor support will allow IOM to lift the suspension of its care and maintenance activities in the
IDP camps in the north and west of the country, to allow a gradual handover of the function to other
agencies in the coming months. IOM has coordinated relief efforts in Maslakh and other IDP camps since
the early summer of 2001.
The reason behind IOM's dramatic scaling back of its Afghan programme is that unlike many intergovernmental agencies, its operational funding is entirely project-based. Under its existing constitution, it
cannot draw on reserves or run into deficit." (IOM 31 May 2002)
IDPs resettling in Mazar-i-Sharif cannot do so unless they originate from the area
(March 2003)
•
IDPs wishing to settle in Mazar-i-Sharif cannot obtain permission to establish a home unless they can
prove ownership of the land or if they originate from the area.
•
As a consequence, there are no returnees from other regions choosing to settle in Mazar-i-Sharif.
•
Most people returning continue to live on their return package from UNHCR.
"In terms of access to land, the source [Head of UNHCR in Mazar-i-Sharif] mentioned that in order to
obtain permission to establish a home, a person needs a guarantee from the village council to prove
ownership of or permission to use the land. Only repatriated persons whose place of origin is Mazar-iSharif, will be able to obtain such permission; new arrivals who do not originally come from the area
cannot get permission. Many repatriated people never get beyond Kabul. There are no repatriated people
from other regions choosing to settle in Mazar-i-Sharif rather than in their area of origin.
According to the source, there are signs of destabilisation due to the high number of repatriated people.
However, the majority of the people, who have returned, continue to live on their "returnpackage" from
UNHCR, and at the same time there are many internally displaced people, who are unable to return to their
homes, because they have been occupied by others. The situation may therefore change with the onset of
winter, and when the assistance packages have been used up." (DIS March 2003, p. 42)
Absence of social network makes it difficult for returnees to settle in areas other than
their area of origin (March 2003)
•
Main problems faced by returnees in urban centers is the lack of employment and education
opportunities.
•
Social networks are less important when resettling in cities than in rural areas when it is not that of
origin.
•
It is very difficult for returned refugees or internally displaced people to settle in areas, other than
their areas of origin, and where they do not have a network.
•
Crucial issue in connection with resettlement is the access to resources. Widespread shortage of land
and water in the rural areas in Afghanistan often leads to fighting about the scarce resources.
•
Pashtuns IDPs trying to resetlle in Pashtun areas other than that of origin have not been accepted by the
local residents.
136
"CCA said that for people, who are returning to the towns, the social network is less important in terms of
being able to settle in towns other than the place of origin. The general problem, that everybody has to face,
is the lack of employment, the economic situation in general and the lack of
educational facilities for children. In the rural areas, people are closer. They live in extended families, and
if a person does not have a family, that person is in danger of not being able to receive any help or
assistance. There may be difficulties, however, the person is not in any real danger.
ICG mentioned that it is very difficult for returned refugees or internally displaced people to settle in areas,
other than their areas of origin, and where they do not have a network. Accordingly, it is ext remely difficult
to settle in other regions, even when (e.g. as a Pashtun) people are settling in an
area populated by a dominating ethnic group to which the person belongs. It will be impossible for Hazaras
to settle in an area dominated by Pashtuns.
[...]
The coordinator of UNAMA's Civil Affairs Branch advised that the support of the government would be
required for any resettlement of ethnic groups in areas other than their areas of origin. In this connection the
source was referring to the large group of Pashtun refugees who are currently
living in the area around Kandahar and who do not wish to return to the northern areas. The crucial issue in
connection with resettlement is the access to resources. There is widespread shortage of land and water in
the rural areas in Afghanistan, which often leads to fighting about the scarce resources.
UNHCR, Kabul, said that Pashtuns from northern Afghanistan had attempted settlement in the Pashtun
villages in other areas of the country, but that they had not been accepted by the local communities.
ICG also said, that it would be difficult to settle in an area other than a person's area of origin. This was the
same for all ethnic groups - both when settling in areas, where they were in minority and when settling in
other areas, where they belonged to the major ethnic group in that area. According
to the source, the real problem is one of access to resources, especially water. If the resources were not
scarce, there would be no fighting. The source compared the situation to that in the former Yugoslavia,
emphasizing that contrary to the situation in Yugoslavia, ethnic groups in Afghanistan
are generally more pragmatic, and they would not fight if there were sufficient resources." (DIS March
2003, p. 40; 45)
Landmines in Afghanistan (August 2002)
•
Afghanistan signed the mine Ban Treaty in July 2002.
•
Afghanistan is still believed to be one of the most severely mine- and UXO-affected countries in the
world.
•
The known mine/UXO contaminated area is estimated to total approximately 737 million square
meters of land in 206 districts of 28 provinces
"Afghanistan has experienced dramatic political, military, and humanitarian changes. The cabinet approved
Afghanistan’s accession to the Mine Ban Treaty on 29 July 2002 and the following day the Minister of
Foreign Affairs signed the instrument of accession on behalf of the Transitional Islamic State of
Afghanistan.
Mine action operations were virtually brought to a halt following 11 September 2001. The mine action
infrastructure suffered greatly during the subsequent military conflict, as some warring factions looted
offices, seized vehicles and equipment, and assaulted local staff. Four deminers and two mine detection
dogs were killed in errant U.S. air strikes. Military operations created additional threats to the population,
especially unexploded U.S. cluster bomblets and ammunition scattered from storage depots hit by air
strikes, as well as newly laid mines and booby-traps by Northern Alliance, Taliban, and Al-Qaeda fighters.
137
A funding shortfall for the mine action program in Afghanistan prior to 11 September 2001 had threatened
to again curtail mine action operations. But since October 2001, about $64 million has been pledged to
mine action in Afghanistan. By March 2002, mine clearance, mine survey, and mine risk education
operations had returned to earlier levels, and have since expanded beyond 2001 levels.
In 2001, mine action NGOs surveyed approximately 14.7 million square meters of mined areas and 80.8
million square meters of former battlefield area, and cleared nearly 15.6 million square meters of mined
area and 81.2 million square meters of former battlefields. Nearly 730,000 civilians received mine risk
education. A total of 16,147 antipersonnel mines, 1,154 antivehicle mines, and 328,398 UXO were
destroyed. In all of these activities, 95 to 99 percent of the actions were completed prior to 11 September
2001.
The ICRC recorded 1,368 new landmine and UXO casualties in Afghanistan in 2001, but that number is
not comprehensive.
[…]
The interim administration has identified mine action as a priority area for the reconstruction of
Afghanistan. Even before the latest conflict, the full extent of the landmine and unexploded ordnance
problem in Afghanistan was not determined. In addition, there is limited information available thus far
about the UXO contamination caused by the ground battles and aerial bombing (especially of ammunition
storage facilities) during the recent military activities.
Despite continued progress made by MAPA and its implementing partners over the past decade,
Afghanistan is still believed to be one of the most severely mine- and UXO-affected countries in the world.
MAPA continues to discover, at a rate of 12 to 14 million square meters per year, areas that were mined
years ago, but remained inaccessible due to armed conflict. Notably, until recently, there was no access to
100 million square meters of former Northern Alliance front lines.
The known mine/UXO contaminated area is estimated to total approximately 737 million square meters of
land in 206 districts of 28 provinces. Of this, some 360 million square meters are classified as high priority
land for clearance. The areas affected include vitally important agricultural land, irrigations systems,
residential areas, grazing land, and roads. Priority areas include those where there is a high risk of accident,
high repatriation, and the area is vital to meet the basic needs of villagers." (ICBL August 2002)
The following map shows Landmines & UXO in Afghanistan as of 1 May 2002:
Source: AIMS, 1 May 2002, (GIF 50 kb)
See also: "Returning Afghans fear mine menace", IWPR, 31 January 2003
"Afghanistan Mine Action Update", Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan, 22 April 2002
Drought-induced IDPs' needs differ from those of conflict-induced IDPs in the return
phase (March 2002)
•
Majority of IDPs in west and north are drought-induced and the preconditions for their return differ
significantly from those of the conflict-induced IDPs.
•
ICRC estimates that only 10 percent of the dryland farming areas of Badghis and Faryab provinces,
two of the three principal source areas of IDPs in Herat have been cultivated.
138
•
Until May 2003, the next opportunity to cultivate is the winter season, the drought-indiced IDPs will
require food assistance, as there are virtually no alternate sources of income.
•
No agency appears to be addressing the critical need for animal power, which was sold before people
left as IDPs.
•
Potable water is still extremely scarce in many areas as it will take several years to recharge the drained
aquifers.
•
Potential villages of return are surveyed and cleared before return takes place. However, agricultural
areas cannot be cleared rapidly and thus many potentially productive areas, such as large parts of the
fertile Shamali Plains, will remain uncultivable for some time.
•
It is essential that IDPs be provided with the same level of reintegration assistance as is being provided
to returning refugees
"The majority of IDPs in the north and west have been displaced by four years of severe drought. Their
needs and the precondition for their return differ in many respects from those of conflict-induced IDPs.
Their levels of destitution is acute and without significant reintegration assistance, the chances of
successfully re-establishing themselves and becoming self-reliant is minimal. Moreover, they remain at the
mercy of climatic vagaries and, without traditional coping mechanisms – their livestock – can readily
become IDPs again if there are inadequate rains next season.
Moreover, it is questionable whether the points of origin are able to absorb any large influx of returning
population. ICRC estimates that only 10 percent of the dryland farming areas of Badghis and Faryab
provinces, two of the three principal source areas of IDPs in Herat have been cultivated. IDPs are currently
returning at a time when the spring sowing period is ending and are thus unlikely to get much, if any, crop
into the ground for an August harvest. Hence, their next opportunity to cultivate is the winter sowing
season that will only produce a crop in May 2003. Until then, they will require food assistance, as there are
virtually no alternate sources of income.
Seed shortages remain acute. There is considerable concern among the humanitarian community about
FAO’s capacity to deliver sufficient seed to underpin a recovery of the drought-affected regions during the
next winter and spring planting seasons. An equally serious deficiency is that of animal power as most of
the animal power was sold before people left as IDPs. Drought animals are essential for cultivating rainfed
lands. However, no agency appears to be addressing this critical need. In addition, potable water is still
extremely scarce in many areas as it will take several years to recharge the drained aquifers. Detailed
community assessments are only now being undertaken in areas of return to fully ascertain such needs as
availability of potable water, community assets, seed availability, winter crops in the ground, etc.
Returnees to former conflict areas face the additional constraint of mines and unexploded ordinances.
Fortunately, there is close coordination between the mine-action groups and agencies and NGOs assisting
returnees. Potential villages of return are surveyed and cleared before return takes place. However,
agricultural areas cannot be cleared rapidly and thus many potentially productive areas, such as large parts
of the fertile Shamali Plains, will remain uncultivable for some time. Shelter is a major problem facing
returnees to former conflict areas (which is less of a problem for drought returnees) where most villages
have been completely destroyed.
Given the serious levels of impoverishment of IDPs, it is essential that they be provided with the same level
of reintegration assistance as is being provided to returning refugees. Indeed, most returning refugees are
much more likely to bring considerable assets with them and hence the risk of increasing the disparity
among the two groups of returnees unless they are treated equitably.
UNDP has yet to establish an operational field presence to facilitate and resource community programming
and livelihood promotion in the principal areas if return. The Mission was informed that in the absence of
UN development bodies, the NGO’s efforts in promoting community development have been critical.
139
Notwithstanding concerns about the pace of return expressed earlier in this report, it is highly desirable that
such ‘pulls’ to the rural areas be rapidly redressed by the development actors if the return movements are to
be sustainable." (IDP Unit-OCHA 28 March 2002, p. 7)
Many returnees likely to settle in urban centers instead of returning to their village of
origin (March 2002)
•
There are concerns that the potential areas of return have not the capacity to absorb the large number of
IDPs expected to return.
•
Some argue that no return should be assisted until a comprehensive assessment by district of the
conditions for return has taken place.
•
It should be anticipated that large numbers of returnees will target urban centers or will gravitate
around IDP camps.
"The Mission encountered considerable concern among some interlocutors about the expected rate of return
of IDPs, projected by a number of operational organisations (such as returning most of the 120,000 IDPs
from Maslakh camp near Herat). These actors question the present capacity of potential areas of return to
absorb the numbers that are being proposed. The lack of basic community infrastructure, inherent levels of
food insecurity, serious shortages of agricultural inputs and/or other means of livelihood support, all augur
a precarious future for potential returnees. It is even argued by some that no return should be assisted until
such time as district profiles are completed and a full understanding of conditions in the return areas is
acquired. These concerns are especially strong with respect to organized returns to drought areas where
there remains much doubt as to whether the drought is indeed over or whether it will be possible to sustain
returnees in points of origin until they become self-supporting.
Though it is premature to forecast patterns, the prospects of IDPs/returnees settling in urban centers should
be anticipated, at least during the early phases of the return process, since cities offer a more or less secure
environment and expectations of employment opportunities. In this connection, many humanitarian
agencies are expressing serious concern about the specter of major new concentrations of returnees, both
former IDPs and refugees, establishing themselves in the major urban centers or gravitating to existing IDP
camps. Contingency planning for such a scenario is, therefore, essential as the urban areas are ill-prepared
to absorb large influxes of population and, indeed, such influxes risk creating new sources of tension." (IDP
Unit-OCHA 28 March 2002, p. 6)
140
HUMANITARIAN ACCESS
General
Volatile security situation hampers access to IDPs and constrains relief and
development activities (June 2003)
•
Insecurity and lack of rule of law are major constraints to comprehensively addressing the needs of
most of the residual IDP population.
•
All UN activities have been suspended in Uruzgan, Zabul and northern Helmand provinces and
restrictions on movements have recently been imposed on southern Helmand and parts of Kandahar
province.
•
Insecurity impacts on most dimensions of the international community’s support to IDPs.
•
Limited access by the international community and inadequate Government mechanisms for
challenging impunity by violators means that adequate protection cannot be provided and many
violations remain unreported
•
Deteriorating security in parts of Afghanistan is hampering return programmes for refugees IDPs and
jeopardising the sustainability of past and future returns.
•
Following the murder of an ICRC staff , more than 10 international NGOs withdrew staff from the
southern province of Kandahar.
•
Large areas of southeastern Afghanistan - including the whole of Oruzgan and Zabol provinces remain off-limits.
•
There are also security problems in eastern afghanistan and Nangahar province as well as in the
northwest due to factional fighting.
"Insecurity and lack of rule of law are major constraints to general long-term development in Afghanistan
and by extension to comprehensively addressing the needs of most of the residual IDP population.
Throughout much of the country the rule of law is at best weak and at worst non-existent. Presently, all UN
activities have been suspended in Uruzgan, Zabul and northern Helmand provinces and restrictions on
movements have recently been imposed on southern Helmand and parts of Kandahar province which have
seriously reduced access to IDP camps and other informal settlements. In parts of the south and southeast,
even NGOs have significantly scaled-back their operations in recent months due to increased insecurity.
There is growing concern that international staff is being targeted by radical opposition factions in the south
and southeast. Thus, national staff is increasingly being utilized for implementing programmes. However,
even they are increasingly at risk of being targeted and their deployment to high-risk areas must therefore
be closely monitored. The dramatic growth of poppy cultivation throughout the country has added a further
dimension to insecurity and risk.
Insecurity impacts on most dimensions of the international community’s support to IDPs. Comprehensive
assessments cannot be undertaken in many areas, in turn, constraining planning and project development.
Lack of security limits the extent and effectiveness of monitoring IDP needs and providing them with
protection. Operations are frequently subject to interruptions or suspension due to security incidents or
risks thereof. The limited presence of ‘development’ actors in many regions is also attributable, at least in
part, to insecurity. Hence, both the quality and geographic coverage of support to the authorities for IDP
protection and provision of services is seriously compromised in areas of insecurity.
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Human rights violations remain widespread and often occur with impunity. Limited access by the
international community and inadequate Government mechanisms for challenging impunity by violators
means that adequate protection cannot be provided and many violations remain unreported. While
traditional conflict and dispute resolution mechanisms are still generally in place, and do indeed often
succeed in upholding a degree of rule of law, particularly with respect to competing claims for access to
land, these mechanisms are often sidelined with impunity by local commanders.
Until such time when a better trained and unified police force is in place, the judicial reform process runs
its course, the Afghan National Army is strengthened and deployed countrywide, and the disarmament and
demobilization programme becomes fully operational, it is unlikely that many of the current security
constraints will abate. To date, ISAF has not been deployed to areas of high insecurity beyond Kabul. It is
also unclear whether the deployment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) by the coalition forces
will have any significant effect on reducing insecurity." (Inter-Agency Missions 19 June 2003, pp. 3-4)
"The HAAG shares the deep concerns of the assistance community about the current security situation. The
situation is particularly bad in the South where a considerable number of NGOs had to withdraw
international staff. The UN is still reflecting about the future set up of operations. The ICRC partly
suspended activities. The NGO community fears that no remedy of the situation is in sight unless there is
sufficient public dialogue. The High Commissioner for Refugees issued a press release on 17 April
expressing serious concern over the deteriorating security situation in parts of Afghanistan, saying it was
hampering efforts to support returning refugees and internally displaced people.
The perception is that threats are mainly aimed at the international aid workers. What remains a concern is
the lack of enough background information on the level of risks, threats and the overall security situation.
Little is known about the true reasons of the ongoing conflict in the South and the measures so far taken by
Government and other security actors.
The AACA is requested by the HAAG to verify the possibility and organize a meeting of a HAAG working
group with relevant authorities (chair of the CGSC or members of the National Security Council, and/or
Coalition) in order to obtain clarity of taken measures, strategies and future action (CGSC meeting takes
place on the 24.4.03…)
To note: Without a marked improvement in the security situation by June 2003, major operational
adjustments by the assistance community are expected to be implemented." (HAAG 22 April 2003)
"In looking at the security situation in the various parts of Afghanistan, the south remains the most unstable
because of the increasingly manifest threat from radical elements. Spin Boldak has experienced, perhaps,
the greatest number of incidents arising from the determined efforts of the Taliban to gain ground and
actively challenge the coalition forces and their Afghan allies. Its proximity to the border, and the interest
of powerful trading interests in reducing the substantial US presence to the south of Kandahar are
additional factors. The Pakistani city of Quetta, to the south of this border crossing, is proving to be an
increasingly important centre of Islamic radicalism and of opposition to the US military presence in
Afghanistan.
Elsewhere in the country, Maimana, in the north, has again been an area of serious tension because of
clashes between the forces of Dostam and those of Atta Mohammed. An outbreak of conflict, from 8th
April, resulted in the deaths of 17 people. A peace agreement was brokered by UNAMA on 11th April,
following negotiations between senior commanders of the two groups, which required the departure of
armed men from the city, the removal of military posts and the collection of weapons. The UN reported on
27th April that, since the signing of the peace agreement, the political situation had continued to improve
and that the city had returned to normal. International humanitarian staff members had all returned to the
142
city. However, some reports suggest that, in spite of the efforts of UNAMA to create a neutral power
holding arrangement, Dostam’s forces now have control of Maimana.
The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission and UNAMA reported, on 27th April, on an
investigation they had carried out on a serious outbreak of violence in a village in the Bala Morghab area of
Badghis. There have been conflicting reports as to the cause of this violence which resulted in the deaths of
38 non-combattants and the execution of 26 fighters attached to a local Pushtun commander. Bala Morghab
was, prior to the Taliban takeover, the scene of intense ongoing conflict between the forces of Ismail Khan
and Rashid Dostam over many years and it is possible that this episode reflects a continuing struggle for
power between the Governor of Herat, Ismail Khan, and those who oppose his authority.
The UN has also reported on fighting in the Khulm district of Balkh , towards the end of April, and on
tensions in Gosfandi district of Sar-i-Pul province, both of which resulted in a suspension of UN missions.
UNAMA has been engaged in discussions between high level representatives of Hisb-e-Wahdat (Mohaqiq)
and Harakat-i-Islami to encourage disarmament in the Dar-i-Suf area of Samangan Province, following
recent fighting there. This area has seen periodic outbreaks of conflict for some years.
Aid workers remain vulnerable, both Afghan and international, in the light of the threats by the Taliban to
target Afghans who are closely linked with the US forces and the Afghan government. In one incident, a
car carrying three Afghan staff of the Mine Clearance Planning Agency was riddled with bullets on 22nd
April near the town of Sarobi on the Kabul-Jalalabad road. Two of the team suffered minor injuries. US
security officials were reported to have linked the attacks to the recent arrest of five men from the area in
connection with the killing of four international journalists in November 2001 and speculated that the
attackers could have been seeking to target foreigners. However, it is equally possible that the attackers saw
the vehicle as associated with the West and did not differentiate between foreigners and Afghans working
for international organisations. In a further incident, a grenade exploded in the office of UN Office of Drug
Control in Jalalabad on 24th April. There were no casualties.
More than ten international NGOs have withdrawn their staff from Kandahar since the murder of the ICRC
staff member, Ricardo Munguia, at the end of March and several other areas of Afghanistan are closed to
international aid workers because of insecurity. These include the provinces of Uruzgan and Zabul to the
north of Kandahar and the road between Kandahar and the Pakistan border." (BAAG April 2003, pp. 4-5)
See also:
"Insecurity darkens humanitarian outlook in Afghanistan", AFP, 11 June 2003
"Rocket attack against Afghan deminers", AFP, 5 June 2003
"Deminers suspend operations in southern Afghanistan", AFP, 22 May 2003
"Afghanistan: NGO say security still critical in the wake of Rumsfeld visit", IRIN, 2 May 2003
"Afghanistan: Insecurity threathening return programs, says UNHCR", 18 April 2003
"Poor security in the southeast hampers humanitarian aid", IRIN, 7 February 2003
"Afghanistan: Security concerns remain for NGOs", IRIN, 3 February 2003
"UN refugee agency warns of need for better security in Afghanistan", AFP, 13 April 2003
"Afghanistan's crisis far from over", Oxfam briefing notes, 23 January 2003
Distribution of aid by the military makes it impossible to assert that humanitarian aid
is non-political and impartial (January 2003)
•
NGO express concern that Coalition forces' engagement in reconstruction project will have a negative
impact on security level and compromises NGO's ability to work
143
•
Coalition forces are establishing Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), consisting of a modest
number of combat troops, civil affairs soldiers and civilian US government officials.
•
There is a feeling among humanitarian agencies is that humanitarian aid has been used as a cover for
military activities and a as public relations tool.
•
If forces engaged in combat also provide aid to civilians, it will be close to impossible to assert that
humanitarian aid is non-political and impartial.
•
Pentagon has no plans to stop allowing armed US soldiers in civilians cloths distributing humanitarian
assistance.
•
US-based international aid agencies urged G. Bush to change the policy, saying the practice blurred the
distinction between combatants and aid workers on the ground in Afghanistan, putting them at risk.
•
Humanitarian leaders added that it also contradicts a consensus reached after years of discussions
between American NGOs and senior American military officers on delivering humanitarian aid in
conflict or post-conflict areas where U.S. military forces are present.
"A US-based NGO working in Afghanistan raised concern on Tuesday over the Coalition forces'
engagement in reconstruction projects, saying it could have a negative impact on security levels, and that it
was ‘not a substitute for security’.
‘Our main concern is that there is a security vacuum in Afghanistan, and despite promises made, the
international community is not likely to address it in the near future,’ the advocacy coordinator for CARE
International in Afghanistan, Paul O'Brien, told IRIN from the capital, Kabul.
He referred to the US-dominated Coalition's shift in strategy, from purely hunting Taliban and Al-Qaeda
members towards aid work. The Coalition is establishing Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs),
consisting of a modest number of combat troops, civil affairs soldiers and civilian US government officials.
‘We have a number of concerns over this. Our major one is that this prematurely distracts attention from
the security situation,’ he added.
This view was supported and echoed by several large NGOs working in Afghanistan, including Mercy
Corps International.
‘We are working in areas which have had continuing security problems, and found that there is still
definitely a security vacuum, which is getting worse. This not only compromises our ability to do our job
but also the safety of staff,’ Cassandra Nelson, the senior spokeswoman for Mercy Corps-Afghanistan, told
IRIN, in the Pakistani capital, Islamabad.
Nelson added that the knowledge and expertise held by aid workers was crucial in long-term sustainable
development. ‘When we tackle reconstruction, we don't have the stigma of having carried guns,’ she noted.
She went on to point out, however, that there were areas where the military was suited to provide
assistance, primarily in large-scale projects such as bridge reconstruction. ‘There is a bridge in the south of
the country between Spin Buldak and Kandahar, which was bombed during the US-led strikes and is need
of repair, but nothing has been done about this,’ she observed.
In a report published on Tuesday, CARE International suggested that ‘the Coalition should leave the
coordination of reconstruction to the Afghan government, UN and other civilian aid agencies, and it should
take all the necessary steps to ensure that communities, policy makers and the general public do not confuse
military and civilian-implemented assistance’.
O'Brien stressed that there were security lapses throughout most of the country, which could only be
addressed by international military forces. ‘If they move into the field of reconstruction then it [security]
won't get the attention it needs,’ he argued.
144
Asked whether the PRTs would be a good way of breaking down barriers between Coalition soldiers and
local Afghans, he replied: ‘We have different reports on what the ultimate aim is of this strategy. They see
this as an indirect way to promote security by an on-the-ground presence. But if you look at the kind of
numbers they are talking about, if you evaluate it as a security strategy it doesn't add up.’
Between seven and 12 PRT teams are expected to be operational soon in up to 10 Afghan cities." (OCHA
14 January 2003)
"Never before has the role of the military in delivering humanitarian been so controversial as is the case in
Afghanistan. Since the 'foodbombs' in October, the feeling among humanitarian agencies is that
humanitarian aid has been used as a cover for military activities and a as public relations tool. The two
international forces that remain in the country, i.e. the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
peacekeeping forces and the US-led coalition forces, both have become involved in humanitarian
assistance. In fact, donor governments have made funds available in order to allow the military to carry out
so-called quick impact projects, which include activities such as the rehabilitation of schools or medical
clinics.
The coalition forces have created the coalition joint civil-military operations task force (CJCMOTK) to deal
with civil-humanitarian operations. However, no central mechanism has been set up, either by the UN or
other body, to coordinate any humanitarian activities with the military. One reason for this omission may be
that, as noted above, the role of the military in providing aid is not undisputed. Many humanitarian agencies
have pointed to the blurring of roles. Particularly if forces engaged in combat also provide aid to civilians,
it will be close to impossible to assert that humanitarian aid is non-political and impartial. In addition, there
is little reason to assume that the local population will distinguish between the international forces, part of
the ISAF forces and those that belong to the coalition. The feeling that humanitarian aid has been used as a
cover for military activities has been reinforced by the fact that humanitarian agencies have witnessed
coalition forces in civilian clothes but carrying arms going around in rural areas and villages in order to
provide aid. It is clear that these forces are more interested in gathering intelligence than delivering
humanitarian assistance.
Many NGOs have raised strong objections to this so-called 'humanitarian role' and a joint statement under
the umbrella of the NGO Forum was issued in the third week of March. However, in view of the political
forces behind this military involvement and the interests at stake, it is unlikely that NGOs will be able to
have a real impact. But, as was pointed out by one NGO staff, if we do not speak out against these
practices, nobody will. 'We must put these issues in the public domain in order to show where we stand
regarding our principles.' " (Ed Schenkenberg van Mierop 9 April 2002, pp. 15-16)
"The US military has no plans to stop allowing armed US soldiers in civilian clothes to distribute
humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan, but the policy is under review, the Pentagon said Wednesday. 'I
think there are some legitimate things that our people do where they don't have to be in uniform,' said
General Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He said, however, that US military
commanders are always reviewing the aid distribution effort and would make recommendations to Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld as appropriate.
US-based international aid agencies Tuesday urged President George W. Bush to change the policy, saying
the practice blurred the distinction between combatants and aid workers on the ground in Afghanistan,
putting them at risk. Rumsfeld defended the military's humanitarian aid efforts, saying they began at a time
when the Afghan people were starving and desperate after years of Taliban and al-Qaeda control. 'The only
reason that today humanitarian workers are back in Afghanistan is because of the US military,' he said."
(AFP 3 April 2002)
145
"In a letter to National Security Advisor Dr. Condoleezza Rice, heads of 16 leading US-based international
relief organizations engaged in Afghanistan expressed concern over U.S. military personnel conducting
humanitarian activity wearing civilian clothes, saying it increasingly puts aid workers at risk. The
humanitarian groups, all members of InterAction, sent their letter on April 2 to Dr. Rice indicating that the
policy blurs the distinction between military and humanitarian personnel in the eyes of local Afghan
populations.
Humanitarian leaders added that it also contradicts a consensus reached after years of discussions between
American NGOs and senior American military officers on delivering humanitarian aid in conflict or postconflict areas where U.S. military forces are present.
'During this period our organizations have engaged in various degrees of cooperation with the American
military without being exposed to the risks now created by this blurring of the lines between NGO and
military personnel engaged in humanitarian assistance,' the letter stated.
Leaders urgently requested that Rice review the policy of armed or unarmed military dressed in mufti
conducting humanitarian operations and the risk the practice poses for humanitarian workers." (Interaction
2 April 2002)
International humanitarian NGOs in the north face violent attacks (August 2002)
•
Since January, the UN had documented over 70 serious incidents involving aid agencies or vulnerable
groups in the north.
•
A real security void existed which leaves many Afghans feeling vulnerable and uncertain about their
own and their country's future.
•
The UN had to suspend missions to Laghman following a violent incident between local commanders.
•
International humanitarian NGOs operating in the north have faced a dramatic upsurge in violent
attacks, including cases of rape, looting, and firing on their vehicles.
"Addressing the UN Security Council on 19th July, Lakhdar Brahimi, the Special Representative of the UN
Secretary-General for Afghanistan, noted that the security situation in the north of Afghanistan had
seriously deteriorated in recent weeks. He added that, since January, the United Nations had documented
over 70 serious incidents involving aid agencies or vulnerable groups. He commented that this list did not
begin to capture the insecurity with which Afghans in certain regions of the country, who felt that they
were permanently at the mercy of armed groups, had to live under on a daily basis. He concluded that a real
security void existed which left many Afghans feeling vulnerable and uncertain about their own and their
country's future.
The assassination of Haji Qadir has created tensions between local commanders in the Jalalabad area,
resulting in violent incidents and restricting UN and aid agency movement. The UN has suspended
missions to Laghman following a violent incident between local commanders.
Tensions in the northern region have reduced somewhat over the past month, following the recent
establishment of a Security Commission representing the different factions, local government and the
United Nations.
It is, nonetheless, interesting to note the security constraints that WFP faced over the month to give an
indication of the fluidity of the situation:
On 5th July, WFP reported that insecurity continued to impact on WFP operations, particularly in the
northern region, hampering the movement of WFP staff. It added that international staff had been
146
evacuated from the Maimana office, which continued to be maintained by national staff. It also reported
that WFP offices, warehouse facilities and vehicles had been slightly damaged when an ammunitions depot
blew up at Spin Boldak in Kandahar province.
On 12th July, WFP reported that, due to bombings, all UN missions in Uruzgan province and certain
districts of Zabul province had been suspended at the beginning of the week. It added that, with the security
situation being relatively stable over the previous week in the northern region, road mission restrictions for
UN staff had been removed, permitting WFP international staff to return to Maimana.
On 19th July, WFP reported that the security situation remained tense in Bamyan province, as well as in
Hairaton and Maimana in the northern region. It added that parts of the southern region were still
considered as high risk areas.
On 26th July, WFP reported that the security situation had been relatively calm during the week, while
noting that a number of incidents had affected WFP operations in parts of the western, eastern and southern
areas.
On 2nd August, WFP noted that the security situation in the eastern area had deteriorated, particularly in
Laghman province where fighting had been reported." (BAAG, 12 August 2002)
"In recent weeks, international humanitarian NGOs operating in the north have faced a dramatic upsurge in
violent attacks, including cases of rape, looting, and firing on their vehicles. NGOs in the region believe
that the rapid rise in the number of isolated attacks is an indication of their growing vulnerability amid the
existing security vacuum. The attacks have had a chilling effect on the ability of women NGO staff, in
particular, to participate in relief and recovery operations. During a press briefing on June 25, Manoel de
Almeida e Silva, the spokesperson for the special representative of the secretary-general, reported that
many NGOs in northern Afghanistan had “removed female staff from undertaking field missions as a
temporary measure.” The withdrawal of women aid workers from field missions in turn prevents those aid
agencies from communicating effectively with Afghan women about their assistance needs.
What follows is a summary of the major reported incidents, based on information gathered by Human
Rights Watch from officials of humanitarian aid agencies in the north.
May 29: Five gunmen broke into the Mazar office of Goal, an Irish humanitarian aid organization, around
9:30 p.m. They quickly overpowered the two guards at the entrance to the compound, hitting one on the
head with a pistol and then chaining one in a basement and the other in the bathroom. The intruders appear
to have proceeded directly to the organization’s safe and carried it away. According to witnesses
interviewed after the robbery, the gunmen wore uniforms and spoke in Uzbek.
June 6: At about 2:30 a.m., armed men broke into and robbed the Mazar office of an international
humanitarian NGO. Employees of the NGO who were present in the compound during the raid were
reportedly bound and beaten. According to witness accounts, a pickup truck arrived at 4:00 a.m. to receive
the intruders and took them to an unknown destination.
June 8: An international NGO vehicle was ambushed by seven armed men ten kilometers west of Khulm, in
Balkh province. Upon stopping the vehicle, the gunmen confirmed by radio in Dari that they had seized the
147
passengers. One woman international staff member was taken from the vehicle and gang-raped, while an
Afghan employee of the NGO was badly beaten. The gunmen looted the vehicle, taking the passports of the
two international staff and a large sum of money that they were carrying, before allowing it to proceed.
Khulm is in a Jamiat-controlled area, but the political affiliation of the assailants, if any, is not known. Six
of the gunmen were believed to be ethnic Tajiks, and one Hazara.
June 14: A vehicle convoy belonging to an American NGO and carrying seven international staff was fired
on at a checkpoint in Dehdadi district, southwest of Mazar-i Sharif, while delivering bread to an IDP camp.
At least ten shots were fired at the convoy, wounding one Afghan staff member in the leg. Although the
convoy had reportedly driven past the checkpoint without stopping, some of the vehicles were clearly
marked as NGO property and all were fired upon. The NGO subsequently evacuated its international staff
and shut down its operations in northern Afghanistan.
June 16: A truck carrying a Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) team was shot at in northeastern
Takhar province, on the road from Pul-e Begon to Rustaq, at 10:45 a.m. The vehicle was stopped about
seven to eight kilometers from Rustaq by a group of people demanding a ride, at least one of whom was an
armed soldier. After the team rejected the request and began to drive away, shots were fired at the vehicle.
Two of the nine passengers sustained bullet injuries, one in his hand and the other on his shoulder.
According to SCA, the truck was rented but clearly marked as one of its vehicles.
[...]
The recent violence against international NGOs followed a series of attacks on directors of Afghan NGOs
and local employees of the United Nations earlier in the year. During February alone, more than half a
dozen such cases were recorded by international officials in Mazar-i Sharif, including attempted killings,
kidnapping, and hijacking of vehicles. " (HRW June 2002, pp. 1-4)
UN and international agencies able to access 80-85 percent of the country (May 2002)
•
The UN is now able to travel in 80-85 percent of the country.
•
Banditry is affecting access on some roads, particularly in the southwest.
•
Criminality is increasing in the North, Kandahar and Jalalabad and the outskirts of Kabul.
•
The eastern provinces of Paktia, Paktika and Khost have been no-go zones for the UN since the
coalition operation commenced and in the west, Farah Province is reported insecure. This has affected
interventions such as, for example, the return of IDPs from Hesar Shahi camp, near Jalalabad, to
Laghman Province.
•
Mine incidents, while not frequent, happen regularly and this affects logistical capability and access.
See also:
"AFGHANISTAN: Key humanitarian route expected to reopen", IRIN, 17 February 2003
"The ability of the humanitarian community to access the vulnerable has increased substantially since
October, and the UN is now able to travel in 80-85 percent of the country. However, in some areas,
instability and volatility have occasionally held up assistance due to either lack of access resulting from
military operations, inter-factional fighting, mines or general banditry. Some areas have been inaccessible
for extended periods, others on a periodic basis .
While all roads are now open for UN travel, banditry is affecting access on some roads, particularly in the
southwest. There are now additional security restrictions when travelling on the Kabul - Kandahar road and
148
the Kabul - Jalalabad road, due to terrorist threats against UN and westerners. This can be a serious
constraint to operations for agencies with a limited number of vehicles.
Criminality is increasing in the North, Kandahar and Jalalabad and the outskirts of Kabul, although the
centre of Kabul is stable due to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) presence. Additionally,
the government Poppy Eradication Programme has provoked a huge response in the south and east. The
Torkham-Jalalabad road was closed when protestors demonstrated, halting temporarily the return of
refugees from Pakistan. The road is now open but the threats of armed resistance has effectively stopped
the Poppy Eradication campaign and resulted in a stalemate.
Inter-factional fighting around Nimroz recently resulted in the suspension of aid operations in the south.
The situation has since been resolved but the Sarobi area on the Kabul - Jalalabad road and Ghazni on the
Kabul-Kandahar road are still affected by conflict. Parts of Uruzgan province have also been inaccessible
through fighting. The eastern provinces of Paktia, Paktika and Khost have been no-go zones for the UN
since the coalition operation commenced and in the west, Farah Province is reported insecure. This has
affected interventions such as, for example, the return of IDPs from Hesar Shahi camp, near Jalalabad, to
Laghman Province.
Ongoing ethnic tensions, in some parts of the country have also affected national staff. Several Afghan
humanitarian staff and their families have been relocated by NGOs or UN Agencies given their exposure to
harassment. The severity of the insecurity affecting national staff was illustrated by the murder on 12 April
of a national UN staff member in Mazar-I-Sharif. In addition, there have been instances of harassment but
the situation appears to have stabilised following the mission of SRSG Brahimi last week to Mazar, where
he spoke with senior authorities.
Mine incidents, while not frequent, happen regularly and this affects logistical capability and access. A
lorry contracted by a UN Agency hit a landmine 24 April resulting in the death of the driver and the
destruction of the vehicle and its consignment." (OCHA 2 May 2002)
Afghanistan UN security update (click to expand)
Source: AIMS, 10 June 2002
Factional fighting and heavy snowfalls limit humanitarian access (March 2002)
•
Insecurity, involving predominantly banditry and battles between rival warlords, makes it difficult to
deliver food and other items to the needy population.
•
Routes from Mazar to other locations, such as Hairaton, Jalalabad, south of Qandahar, and south of
Herat remain at high risk.
•
Security in the southern parts of the central region as well as in Kandahar has improved recently.
•
UNOCHA reported that three provinces of the eastern region—Paktia, Khost and Paktika—remained
off-limits for humanitarian workers due to insecurity.
•
Heavy snows have put remote villages in the mountainous areas out of reach or only accessible by
helicopter or donkey.
"In some areas, increasing insecurity and fear of lawlessness are making it difficult to deliver food and
other essential assistance to people. According to reports, this insecurity predominantly involves banditry
and battles between rival warlords. International staff travel is still restricted, and local staff are moving
with increased caution in many areas. While roads in Mazar and its immediate environs continue to be
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relatively safe to travel, routes from Mazar to other locations, such as Hairaton, Jalalabad, south of
Qandahar, and south of Herat remain at high risk." (SCF 20 March 2002)
"Security in the southern parts of the central region has improved recently and fighting has subsided in the
Gardez area. The situation in Gardez however is still not conducive for the return of UN staff. Access to
Logar province has been opened to international staff and national staff can now travel from Kabul to other
parts of the central region. An improved security in the Kandahar region is also bolstering relief efforts
there." (UNICEF 4 March 2002)
"Humanitarian access has been limited by factional fighting in parts of the country. UNOCHA reported that
three provinces of the eastern region—Paktia, Khost and Paktika—remained off-limits for humanitarian
workers due to insecurity. The Kabul-Jalalabad road is open and no security incidents have been reported.
Elsewhere, the road from Kandahar to Herat and the road from Herat to Bamiyan remain off limits due to
security concerns.
Heavy snows over much of Afghanistan have put humanitarian agencies to the test. Remote villages in the
mountainous areas are out of reach or only accessible by helicopter or donkey. An avalanche hit the Sailing
Pass, a vital humanitarian route in the central highlands linking Kabul with the northern region of the
country. Hundreds of people were trapped inside the tunnel, which opened a month earlier." (UNICEF 21
February 2002)
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NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES
National response
Government cooperates with donors and the UN through the Consultative Group on
Returnee and IDP Programme (April 2003)
•
Governemnt has established a Consultative Group Framework with 12 groups, corresponding to the 12
programmes of the NDF. The groups chaired by the relevant ministers are supported by donors and the
UN, which participates in the groups with focal points. Advisory Groups are also established to ensure
that the cross-cutting issues are effectively addressed.
•
The Consultative Group on Returnee and IDP Programme is responsible to support the Ministry of
Refugees and Repatriation (MoRR) in co-ordinating and facilitating the work related to the return and
initial re-integration of Returnees and IDPs.
"The Government has established a Consultative Group framework, within which the National Budget will
be planned, financed and implemented. Twelve Consultative Groups, one for each of the National
Development Programmes, will be convened by the chair Ministry (eg Ministry of Health of the Health and
Nutrition CG), supported by a donor or donor/UN agency Focal Point. Other concerned ministries will
participate, as will the major donors, UN agencies, and representative NGOs.
Advisory Groups are being established to ensure that cross-cutting issues are mainstreamed effectively in
the work of the 12 CGs and reflected in the policy framework and budget. Arrangements are being finalised
for Gender, Humanitarian Affairs, Human Rights and Environment Advisory Groups.
Click here to see a diagram of the Consultative Group
Consultative Group on Returnee and IDP Programme
The Consultative Group on Returnee and IDP Programme is responsible to support the Ministry of
Refugees and Repatriation (MoRR) in co-ordinating and facilitating the work related to the return and
initial re-integration of Returnees and IDPs. The Consultative Group will provide to MoRR at the national
and sub-national level capacity, advice and other support for policy development, assessment, programme
design, budgeting, implementation and evaluation. The CG also supports MoRR to ensure that
programmes related to return and IDPs comply with the agreed policy as set out in the principles of the
National Development Framework, the Government Returnee and IDP strategy and humanitarian
standards. The Consultative Group will provide support and mobilise other actors to ensure a sustainable
reintegration of returnees at the national and sub-national level. The Consultative Group on Returnees and
IDPs will meet regularly to ensure co-ordination, problem-solving and progress review with other CGs and
with the Cross-cutting Advisory Groups.
In line with the overall objectives stated above, the specific responsibilities of the CG will be to:
-provide advice and support for the preparation, submission and implementation of the MoRR contribution
to the national budget and ensure that projects are consistent with the principles of the National
Development Framework and linked to fiscal sustainability;
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-provide every 3 months updates of progress against output and outcome indicators (e.g. returnees provided
with return assistance, percentage of voluntary vs. involuntary return, wells provided to returnee
communities, shelter provided to vulnerable returnees)
-ensure that cross-cutting issues of gender, environment, protection, human rights and humanitarian
principles are reflected in the return and IDP policies, programmes and budgets;
-closely collaborate with the MRRD-led CG on Livelihoods and Social Protection and other relevant CGs,
to co-ordinate the re-integration returnees and to assist IDPs who choose to settle in the areas of
displacement;
mobilise resources and provide an information-sharing forum to enable the effective updating of the
existing record of assistance and technical assistance contained in the Donor Assistance Database (DAD)"
(AACA April 2003)
Humanitarian Affairs Advisory Group (April 2003)
•
Humanitarian assistance is part of a joint government – international assistance strategy, but is
independent from government interference, and will be delivered in accordance with internationally
recognized humanitarian principles.
•
HAAG will stand for a consequent and result oriented dialogue between the international and national
humanitarian community and the Government.
"The Consultative Group process seeks to ensure that all international assistance channeled into
Afghanistan is addressing the main objectives of the national reconstruction and development.
Humanitarian assistance and protection to the most vulnerable groups of the population will for the years to
come be of utmost importance and remain a prerequisite for the political and economical stabilization of the
country. A very considerable part of the assistance will continue to be implemented through humanitarian
organizations and their proper funding and decision making instruments. In this sense it is understood that
humanitarian assistance is part of a joint government – international assistance strategy, but is independent
from government interference, and will be delivered in accordance with internationally recognized
humanitarian principles.
The main focus of humanitarian strategy in Afghanistan is to build and strengthen effective social
protection mechanisms and to make them an integral part of humanitarian and social policy and the fight
against poverty.
It is recognized that there are strong humanitarian aspects within the Returnee & IDP, Health & Nutrition,
Livelihoods & Social Protection and Urban Management programmes of the National Development
Framework.
Rationale
The establishment of an advisory group for humanitarian affairs provides a significant opportunity to
improve the coherence and effectiveness of the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan, for
ongoing humanitarian operations, the protection of vulnerable groups, specific emergency operations in the
context of natural or man made disasters and the promotion of complementarity & smooth transition to
reconstruction & development, whilst preserving the integrity of humanitarian action .
In accordance with international humanitarian law and accepted principles the Government affirms the
right of Afghan people to international humanitarian assistance in the event that it is unable to provide
effective relief on its own.
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Humanitarian assistance is understood as aid provided to an affected population that seeks, as its primary
purpose, to save lives and alleviate suffering in a crisis -affected environment. This does not limit wider
interpretations defined within the legal bases of certain international organizations. Humanitarian
assistance must be provided in accordance with the basic humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality
and neutrality.
Disaster preparedness and response is understood as encompassing measures which reduce the risks of
rapid onset emergencies, mitigate the effects of natural disasters on affected populations and in case of their
occurrence provide for an efficient & effective response .
The Humanitarian Affairs Advisory Group (HAAG) will stand for a consequent and result oriented
dialogue between the international and national humanitarian community and the Government. It is
expected that its work will contribute to improved disaster preparedness, better coherence, efficiency and
timely resource mobilization of the humanitarian programs and ensure that humanitarian issues are
mainstreamed within the Consultative Group process, which will provide the overall programming
framework, whilst respecting internationally recognized humanitarian principles and the legal bases of
donor instruments. A clause is included within the Terms of Reference of each relevant CG to ensure this.
Humanitarian problems and actions are usually touching on a number of sectors such as social affairs,
protection, human rights, education, health, rural infrastructure, water and sanitation, agricultural
rehabilitation etc. Accordingly they should be considered a key concern in the development of the
respective sector policies and contribute in this way to the overall consistency and the development of the
overall humanitarian and development policy." (AACA 9 April 2003)
New government entity established to extend its enforcement capacity (April 2003)
•
In order to extend its enforcement capacity nationwide, government is conducting a number of actions
including restructuring of Ministry of Defense, expansion of new Afghan National Army and the
Disarmement, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programme.
•
To support the DDR, a new entity-the Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme (ANBP) will be
established for 3 years.
•
ANBP will provide manpower and equipment capacity and assist the commissions in developing
packages to ensure the reintegration of both officers and soldiers back into civilian life within their
communities.
"Security is the foremost challenge confronting Afghanistan today. In order to ensure successful
investment in the recovery and development of the country, the Transitional State of Afghanistan (TISA)
must extend its enforcement capacity nationwide. Underpinning this process are a number of key actions,
including the restructuring of the Ministry of Defense, and the expansion of the new Afghan National Army
(ANA), and the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) of the extensive armed forces in
Afghanistan. An estimated 100,000 former combatants are expected to join this programme.
In order to initiate the DDR process, His Excellency the Afghan President Hamid Karzai established
government commissions to oversee these issues. The Disarmament Commission, chaired by General
Baryalai, and the Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, chaired by Vice President Kahlili and
vice-chaired by Minister Pasthun of Housing and Urban Planning, will provide the strategy and direction to
their respective phases of the DDR program.
In order to assist the seminal work of the commissions, an Afghan governmental entity will be created to
support and give shape and direction to the overall DDR effort. The name of that entity is the
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Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme (ANBP). ANBP will undertake, under the direction of the
government and the international community, the implementation of DDR.
Within disarmament, the ANBP will provide manpower and equipment capacity, for example managing a
fleet of vehicles used to collect soldiers and arms as well as handling sophisticated technology for identity
verification purposes. Within demobilization and reintegration, the ANBP will assist the commissions in
developing packages to ensure the reintegration of both officers and soldiers back into civilian life within
their communities. These packages will include vocational training, employment opportunities, and access
to credit, as well as innovative approaches to entrepreneurial activities. With a program life of three years,
the ANBP will consist of a head office in Kabul and eight regional offices, and it will be staffed primarily
by Afghan personnel with a small cadre of international advisors." (UNDP 6 April 2003)
See also:
"Afghanistan: Aid organisations call for strenghtened security", IRIN, 18 June 2002
Return Commission for the North set up to facilitate the return of refugees and IDPs to
the northern provinces (March 2003)
•
The first meeting of the Return Commission was held on 28 February 2003
•
Following a fact-finding mission in IDP camps in the Kandahar region to ascertain the reasons for the
continued arrival of population (mainly Pashtuns) from the North, and a fact-finding mission in the
northern provinces, a "Return Commission for the North" wa set up in Mazar-I-Sharif ta facilitate the
return of IDPs and refugees in the northern provinces.
•
The commission will be coordinated by the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation. It will include
representatives from the civilian authorities in the North, representatives of the different factions, a
representative of the Afghan Human Rights Commission and representatives of UNHCR and
UNAMA.
•
Its tasks will be to: promote the return of refugees and IDPs in dignified and safe conditions; monitor
the situation in the districts most affected by violence; investigate complaints by refugees and IDPs;
recommend corrective action by the central and regional authorities when misbehavior by local
authorities is involved; organize initiatives aimed at communal reconciliation; and promote social and
economic reconstruction in the communities of return
"Thousands of ethnic Pashtuns displaced in Afghanistan in fear of persecution were given some hope of
being able to return to their homes in the north, following the inaugural meeting of the country’s Return
Commission, which was attended by UN High Commissioner for Refugees Ruud Lubbers, Enayatollah
Nazeri, the Afghan minister for refugees and repatriation, and Afghan commanders.
[…]
There have been reports of harassment of ethnic Pashtuns in the north by new leaders, who are ethnic
Tajiks and Uzbeks. Of the estimated 700,000 displaced people throughout the country, 400,000 are in the
south and up to 15 percent of them are thought to be Pashtuns who fled their homes in the north in fear of
persecution following the Northern Alliance offensive late in 2001.
The meeting, which was held on 28 February, was the first in a series of government-sponsored return
commissions to explore ways of helping displaced Afghans return to their communities. But continuing
ethnic tension in some parts of the country was a major impediment to return and development aid,
UNHCR warned.
[…]
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Under an accord signed by the three tribal leaders following the meeting, they agreed to broadly publicise
the ground-breaking agreement and said they would take measures against any of their local commanders
who did wrong.
With reports of security deteriorating in the north, and increased fighting in Gosfandi in Sar-e Pol Province,
leading to the suspension of the UN mission there, Lubbers admitted there were still a number of problems.
However, he maintained that he was convinced they were on the right track. 'The solution is not to
backtrack,' he said." (IRIN 5 March 2003)
"On 17 October an agreement was reached in Mazar-i-Sharif on the establishment of a "Return
Commission for the North" that will facilitate the return of refugees and internally displaced people to the
Northern provinces of Afghanistan.
The need for a special effort in this regard was highlighted by the recent arrivals of IDPs from the north to
camps in the Kandahar region. This development urged the Ministry for Refugees and Repatriation, the
Afghan Human Rights Commission, UNHCR and UNAMA to carry out a fact-finding mission to the IDP
camps in order to ascertain the reasons for this new displacement. The joint mission learned that violent
incidents and continued abuses by local commanders in the North were involved in the decision of Pashtun
families to flee their homes.
Further fact-finding in Northern provinces confirmed that while the number of displacements from the
North has dropped significantly in recent months, conditions in a number of districts are such as to deter
refugees and IDPs from coming back to their homes or even to prod further displacements. Violent acts including extortion, stealing of crops and forcible recruitment - often affect the population as a whole rather
than Pashtuns alone. While the origin of this violence is complex and involves historical factors as well as
the predatory behaviour of local commanders, bringing it under control and allowing all Afghans
irrespective of their ethnic background to live free of fear is clearly an important objective of the peace
process in Afghanistan.
The new Commission, which will start to operate shortly, will be coordinated by the Ministry of Refugees
and Repatriation. It will include representatives from the civilian authorities in the North, representatives of
the different factions, a representative of the Afghan Human Rights Commission and representatives of
UNHCR and UNAMA. Among its tasks will be that of promoting the return of refugees and IDPs in
dignified and safe conditions; monitoring the situation in the districts most affected by violence;
investigating complaints by refugees and IDPs; recommending corrective action by the central and regional
authorities when misbehavior by local authorities is involved; organizing initiatives aimed at communal
reconciliation; and promoting social and economic reconstruction in the communities of return." (UNAMA
20 October 2002)
Rural population is the main actor in the reconstruction of shelter (April 2003)
•
Government responsible for the definition of shelter strategies and policy in rural and urban areas.
UNHCR will coordinate in rural areas while UN-Habitat will coordinate the efforts in urban areas.
•
Local Governments to ensure active participation of communities in the process, ensuring participation
of women and landless families.
•
Main actor responsible for the shelter sector is the rural population themselves as they are responsible
for the construction of the houses, sanitation facilities, design , procurement of part of the material and
support to other beneficiaries in need.
155
"The Government with support from donor agencies is responsible for the definition of strategies and
policy and the prioritization of interventions. In an initial phase (1381-382) coordination is to be supported
in rural areas by UNHCR and in urban areas by UN-HABITAT.
In addition, the Government is responsible for:
Establish a policy and monitoring Steering Committee for Shelter with participation of MoRR, MRRD and
MUDH.
Securing access to the homes of returnees that have been occupied.
Identify solutions for internally displaced people and particularly to pastoralists populations.
Regularize the production and commercialization of local and imported wooden and other housing
construction materials through legislation and market regulation.
Promote production of alternative materials (metal doors and windows) through Cash For Work and
Income Generation projects.
Establish long term financial incentives or credit schemes for both urban and rural housing.
Oversee provision of Technical Advice.
5.2 Role of Local Authorities (Shuras, MoRR, District and Provincial)
The overriding role of local Governments is to ensure active participation of communities in the process,
ensuring participation of women and landless families.
Specific responsibilities include:
Support in the formation and follow up of local committees (i.e. Beneficiary Selection Committees).
Mobilization of community to support the implementation of self-help construction and supported projects.
Support to the line Ministries and the executing agencies of the UN in the monitoring and evaluation of
shelter projects.
5.3 Role of Rural Population
As indicated in the principles, the main actor responsible for this sector is the rural population themselves.
They are responsible for the construction of the houses, sanitation facilities, design (ensuring safety
standards), procurement of part of the material and support to other beneficiaries in need.
5.4 The International Community and the NGOs
The main activities of the International Community in relation to rural shelter are:
Support financially the Afghan communities in need and the efforts of the Government of Afghanistan to
provide shelter.
Assis t in the provision of technical advice.
Support co-ordination efforts lead by the Government.
UNHCR as key agency should support in the establishment of a comprehensive data base of shelter
initiatives in the country.
Provide capacity building to relevant government actors at all levels.
Support the implementation of the shelter projects ensuring respect to these general guidelines and
minimum technical and safety standards." (MRRD 13 April 2003)
Institutional and Policy framework of the Governement's return and reintegration
strategy (March 2003)
156
•
In support of the recovery and reconstruction process, UNAMA will build government capacity,
improve internal system efficiency and programme integration, and decentralise decision-making, and
cross-cutting issues of gender, environment and narcotics.
•
MoRR has the overall responsibility for the returnee and IDP programme, and is more specifically
responsible for the protection of returnees, for their individual assistance up to the place of their return
or origin, and for IDPs.
•
MoRR chairs the Consultative Group on Refugees and IDPs with support from UNHCR as Secretariat.
Main instrument for capacity development of management and administration will be a Joint Team
comprising MoRR personnel and UNHCR national staff.
•
MRRD and MUDH will assume responsibility for returnee and IDP reintegration within their
respective geographic and programme areas, cooperate closely with MoRR and liaise with other
Minsitries through the established Inter-Ministerial Commission for Rural Development.
•
MRRD has established a Reintegration Unit initially in Kabul and subsequently in key provinces of
return to establish reintegration policies, support coordination, collect and disseminate information,
supervise and monitor reintegration efforts.
"18. A top priority for the TISA is the improvement and strengthening of its governance and public
management capabilities to meet the demands of the recovery and reconstruction process of which durable
refugee and IDP return and reintegration is a major component. In support of this objective, the United
Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) has committed itself to placing greater emphasis on
building government capacity, improving internal system efficiency and programme integration, and
decentralising decision-making, and cross-cutting issues of gender, environment and narcotics.
[…]
20. The Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (MoRR) has the overall responsibility for the returnee and
IDP programme. More specifically it is tasked with the protection of returnees, for their individual
assistance up to the place of their return or origin, and for IDPs. It is also mandated to lead negotiations
with external parties on refugee related issues, especially agreements with third countries on the return of
Afghans. MoRR increasingly interacts with other government ministries (for example Public Health,
Women’s Affairs and Education) to ensure that immediate returnee concerns are addressed. But for the
longer-term task of sustainable reintegration, other institutional mechanisms are required.
21. MoRR will be chairing the Consultative Group on Refugees and IDPs with support from UNHCR as
Secretariat. In line with one of its tasks (strengthening government), UNHCR has provided substantial
material assistance to the Ministry and its provincial offices to enhance their capabilities. MoRR with
support from UNHCR and other assistance partners will work to identify the institutional, policy,
management, and administrative strengthening required in 1382/2003. The main instrument for capacity
development of management and administration will be a Joint Team comprising MoRR personnel and
UNHCR national staff.
22. Whilst formal responsibility for returnees and IDPs rests with MoRR, the complex, multi-sectoral task
of sustainable reintegration requires integrated planning and coordination among a range of government
and assistance actors. It has been decided that the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
(MRRD) and the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing (MUDH) will assume responsibility for
returnee and IDP reintegration within their respective geographic and programme areas. They will
cooperate closely with MoRR and liaise through the established Inter-Ministerial Commission for Rural
Development with other line Ministries whose responsibilities impact on returnee and IDP reintegration.
23. For this purpose, an important objective during 1382/2003 will be the consolidation of an effective
inter-ministerial coordination mechanism at central level, and parallel coordination frameworks at
provincial level. Reintegration must also be given due attention in consultative and participatory fora that
bring together the key constituencies (international agencies, NGOs, private sector and civil society.).
157
24. To establish reintegration policies, support coordination, collect and disseminate information, supervise
and monitor reintegration efforts, the MRRD has established a Reintegration Unit initially in Kabul and
subsequently in key provinces of return. The Unit, in close coordination with MoRR, will also be
responsible for the establishment of appropriate linkages with pertinent ministries and mainstreaming
reintegration issues in other MRRD National programmes. UNHCR and UNDP among others will support
the Reintegration Unit and its regional network.
25. Initial work on evaluating additional short-term requirements for areas absorbing large numbers of
refugees and IDPs has commenced. It will be supplemented by more detailed projections that take into
account local social and economic conditions, infrastructure, agro-ecological zones, and natural resource
endowments. It will also assess the assets and capital (human, physical, financial, social, natural) that the
returnees and their communities can contribute. A plan of surveys and studies will be prepared.
26. The core reintegration strategy will remain focused on improving rural livelihoods and conditions for
returnees and their communities. However, it is evident that the TISA must prepare for an increase in the
size of its urban populations, part of which will be composed of returning refugee and IDPs. For that
reason, the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing (MUDH), responsible for urban policy, planning,
development and housing coordination will also be closely associated with the strategy." (TISA March
2003, pp. 4-5)
Government to use the GPID as a principle to guide its actions towards IDPs (March
2003)
•
4 main principles to address the IDP issue: (i) respect for the Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement, (ii) support to the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation to enable it to take
progressively more responsibility, (iii) the pursuit of solutions to internal displacement, and (iv)
improved inter-agency coordination and cooperation.
•
Return Commission chaired by the Minister of Refugees and Repatriation and comprising the Afghan
Independent Human Rights Commission, UNAMA, UNHCR and the leaders of the main parties in the
North, has been established.
•
Main areas of concentration of IDPs are in Zhare Dasht, Panjwai and other settlements in the south,
Maslakh and Shaidayee camps in the west, and a number of smaller camps in the north.
•
Returning IDPs will receive a similar package of food aid and non-food items as refugees
"37. The Government of Afghanistan will adopt the four main principles agreed by the Consultative Group
on Refugees and IDPs to address the IDP issue: – (i) respect for the Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement, (ii) support to the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation to enable it to take progressively
more responsibility, (iii) the pursuit of solutions to internal displacement, and (iv) improved inter-agency
coordination and cooperation.
[…]
For those displaced by ethnically targeted violence, security is the paramount concern. To that end, a
Return Commission chaired by the Minister of Refugees and Repatriation and comprising the Afghan
Independent Human Rights Commission, UNAMA, UNHCR and the leaders of the main parties in the
North, has been established. A working group of this Commission has already made recommendations,
which were approved by the Return Commission. A Plan of Action is being prepared and will be shared
with IDPs in the South and refugees abroad and will hopefully lead to their voluntary return. The concerns
expressed by the IDPs will be communicated to the Return Commission.
[For more information on the Return Commission, see "Return Commission for the North set up to facilitate
the return of refugees and IDPs to the northern provinces (March 2003)]
158
40. The main areas of concentration of IDPs are in Zhare Dasht, Panjwai and other settlements in the south,
Maslakh and Shaidayee camps in the west, and a number of smaller camps in the north. The main required
intervention, for which MoRR expects to play a more prominent role, will be site maintenance and
coordination of assistance. Residual groups of IDPs will continue to require support and protection through
1382/2003.
41. Returning IDPs will receive a similar package of food aid and non-food items as refugees, and will be
transported to their places of origin. MoRR and UNHCR will organise this with their implementing
partners. Returning IDPs will also be eligible for the same reintegration assistance.
Average returnee and IDP return assistance packages
Food: Quantity varies depending on family size. 150 kg average per family of 5 persons (3 months ration).
Non-food items: 2 m² of hygienic cloth, 2 plastic sheets, and 1 kg of soap per family of 3- 4 persons.
Transport: Returnees from Pakistan between US$5 – 25 per person, depending on the distance. From Iran,
US$ 5 – 30, depending on distance.
Transport provided for IDPs groups" " (TISA March 2003, pp.7-8)
Afghan Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation will lead the national response to IDPs
with assistance from UN (January 2003)
•
MoRR to lead the National Return, Displacement and Reintegration Strategy with focus on 4 areas:
•
Return: 300,000 IDPs expected to return during 2003.
•
Reintegration: shelter assistance to be provided for approximately 75,000 returnee families while 4,000
wells will be dug in communities with returnee populations.
•
Protection of returnees rights: governement will conduct monitoring of the return of displaced people
and their initial reintegration with support from UNHCR's network of field offices. Return commission
in the north to be supported.
•
Governement's capacity to be supported with focus on the 3 ministries dealing with refugee issues:
MoRR, MRRD and MoUDH
"Afghan government departments and the UN worked closely on A National Return, Displacement and
Reintegration Strategy for the Year 1382 (2003), based on the priorities established in the draft National
Development Budget. Like 2002, the MoRR will lead the activities in this sector, which will focus on four
major areas:
Return: The Afghan Administration and international agencies intend to facilitate the return of an
estimated 1.2 million refugees and 300,000 IDPs. International legal frameworks governing refugee returns
will be finalized with the Government of Pakistan, and renewed with the Governments of Iran and other
countries of asylum. As in 2002, returnees will be provided with transport assistance, an initial food
package and non-food items by UNHCR, IOM and WFP.
Reintegration: The Afghan Government with the assistance of various UN agencies will also spearhead
intensive reintegration efforts; UNHCR will continue to support the Returnee Reintegration Unit at the
Ministry Rural Rehabilitation Development (MRRD); WFP will develop food-for-work initiatives;
UNICEF will work on safe water supply and education; FAO on crop production, and UNOPS (UN Office
for Project Services) on road repairs.
159
Shelter, water, education, health, community services and cash-for-work initiatives, although nationwide
priorities, will feature prominently in reintegration assistance in regions with significant refugee/IDP
returns. It is expected that shelter assistance will be provided for approximately 75,000 returnee families
while 4,000 wells will be dug in communities with returnee populations. Specific attention also will be paid
to vulnerable groups, including female heads-of-households, the elderly and the disabled.
Protection of Returnee Rights: Comprehensive monitoring of the return of displaced people and their
initial reintegration will be conducted by the Government, with key support from UNHCR's network of
field offices. UNHCR will also work to develop mechanisms to enhance the capacity of government and
other national institutions to reinforce the rule of law. The work of the Return Commission will continue to
be supported.
Government Capacity: To meet the demands of the return and rehabilitation process, it will be imperative
to continue to support the capacity development of the government in key areas of policy-making and
operations management. Attention will focus on the three ministries dealing with refugee issues: MoRR,
MRRD and MoUDH (Ministry of Urban Development and Housing). Activities will include training and
mentoring in all phases of project management, gender analysis, and principles of refugee protection. By
the end of 2003, it is expected that a substantial amount of policy and operational responsibility will have
been transferred by international agencies to Afghan government departments.
At the same time, UNHCR and other agencies will continue to provide protection and assistance to
Afghans inside and outside the country. Particular focus will be placed on the renewed displacements to
and within the South of Afghanistan. Most of these IDPs have been displaced due to the ongoing drought
while others have moved there from the north due to ethnic tensions. They will be provided, to the extent
possible, with basic protection and assistance." (UNAMA 30 January 2003)
Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority (AACA) responsible for the overall
management of assistance to Afghanistan (July 2002)
•
The UN has developed and supported, with the government, a national coordination structure reflecting
key programme areas and national priorities outlined in the National Development Framework.
•
The operational coordination has been placed with the government line ministries supported by
programme secretariats.
•
Strategic coordination is the responsibility of the Afghanistan Assistance Coordination Authority
(AACA), supported by UNAMA.
•
The objective of the AACA is to attract international assistance and guide its effective usage.
"Since the beginning of 2002, the UN has developed and supported, with the government, a national
coordination structure reflecting key programme areas and national priorities outlined in the National
Development Framework. Since May 2002 this has placed responsibility for operational coordination in the
hands of the government line ministries, supported by programme secretariats (which are in many cases UN
Agencies). Strategic coordination is the responsibility of the Afghanistan Assistance Coordination
Authority (AACA), supported by UNAMA." (UNAMA 10 July 2002, p. 6)
The Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority (AACA) is responsible for the overall management of
assistance to Afghanistan. The objective of the AACA is to attract international assistance and guide its
effective usage.
The AACA’s primary activities shall include:
(a) Coordination of funds for humanitarian aid and development from bilateral and multilateral donors;
160
(b) Coordination of multilateral agencies, bilateral agencies and nongovernmental organizations through a
process of review and endorsement of projects and programs;
(c) Coordination of technical assis tance to build capacity in the central administration, as well as the
provinces;
(d) Development of an information system for the monitoring, evaluation and control of relief, recovery
and development investments and programs;
(e) Establishment of systems for financial control, procurement, contracting and audit to ensure
accountability, transparency and cost effectiveness;
(f) Direct management of a limited portfolio of national programs in accordance with immediate national
priorities;
The AACA’s Governing Board is composed of the Chairman of the Interim Administration, the Ministers
of Finance, Planning, Reconstruction, the AACA’s Director (Dr.Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai), the Head of
Central Bank, prestigious Afghan economist Dr Said Isaq Nadiri, prestigious Afghan engineer Juma
Mohammed Mohammedi, and three additional eminent individuals from the private and nongovernmental
sectors (appointed by the Chairman).
Within one month from the issuance of this order, the AACA’s director shall present the executive staffing
regulations to the Interim Administration. To adhere to its objectives, the AACA can take the necessary
decisions and sign contracts that pertain to its activation. The AACA’s budget shall be provided entirely
through technical assistance and will not use the general budget of the government." (IAA 1 April 2002)
NDF envisages a developmental approach to enable IDPs to return and re -integrate
(April 2002)
•
The NDF envisages a systematic approach, which considers the whole needs of the returnees,
particularly those of basic social services and livelihood creation to build up their asset base.
•
Two national programs are in preparation focusing on labor-intensive works and block grants to
communities to provide the means for reintegration of the internally displaced and the returnees.
•
10 areas have been designated as the initial focus of a program that would take a developmental
approach to enable the internally displaced to return to their places of origin in security and comfort
and to provide them with support until their livelihoods are secure.
•
It is envisaged to to establish a national command center to implement and supervise the
implementation of a nationwide program for returnees.
"The NDF envisages a systematic approach, which considers the whole needs of the returnees, particularly
those of basic social services and livelihood creation to build up their asset base. What is required is to
integrate the projects of the various UN agencies and NGOs into a program devoted to integration of the
returnees and enhancing the assets and security of livelihood of communities. Drawing on international
experience of project displaced and involuntary resettlement could be valuable, particularly approaches that
provided the returnee with a voucher that could turn her or him into a valuable resource for the recipient
community.
We are in the advanced stages of preparation of two national programs focusing on labor-intensive works
and block grants to communities to provide the means for reintegration of the internally displaced and the
returnees. Mechanisms will be established to enhance the absorption capacity of recipient communities by
systematically factoring in to ongoing or planned programs potential returnee numbers. Implementation of
these programs should assist in achieving our goal. We do, however, need an urgent reorientation of the
effort by bilateral donors, the UN organizations and NGOs to enable us to deal with the issue of absorption
of returnees in a coherent and principled manner.
161
Integration of the internally displaced and enabling them to recreate their communities is a priority of the
government. Chairman Karzai has designated 10 areas as the initial focus of a program that would take a
developmental approach to enable the internally displaced to return to their places of origin in security and
comfort and to provide them with support until their livelihoods are secure. Each of the 10 areas presents a
different challenge and requires a tailor-made approach to the realization of the vision of the government.
Each of these areas needs to be rapidly assessed and measures for short, medium and long-term support to
these people should be proposed, agreed with the government and implemented.
One option would be to establish a national command center to implement and supervise the
implementation of a nationwide program for returnees. This command center would be supported by a
network of field officers that would provide regular information on the movement and needs of the
returnees, communicate relevant information on the support programs and be able to take quick decisions in
response to an emergency." (IAA NDF April 2002)
International response
Inter-agency mission assesses the IDP situation in Afghanistan (May 2003)
•
Inter-Agency mission visited Afghanistan in late May, early June 2003 as a follow-up to the OCHA
IDP Unit mission of March 2002.
•
Objectives of the mission were:
•
to identify the gaps in the response to the IDP situation and suggest how to address them.
•
to examine the linkages between humanitarian and recovery interventions on behalf of IDPs and to
recommend how transitional activities could be strengthened, and
•
to review institutional arrangements for addressing IDP needs both within the UN system and its
partners and between it and the ATA
•
on team focused on Kandahar and Hirat and the second on Mazar-i-Sharif and Maimana.
"The Inter-agency mission was deployed at the request of UNAMA and as a follow-up of an assessment
mission by OCHA’s Internally Displacement Unit undertaken in March 2002. The purpose of the mission
was basically threefold, namely:
to review the prevailing IDP situation in order to identify outstanding gaps in the response to the needs of
IDPs and to recommend how such gaps should be addressed;
to examine the linkages between humanitarian and recovery interventions on behalf of IDPs and to
recommend how transitional activities could be strengthened; and
to review institutional arrangements for addressing IDP needs both within the UN system and its partners
and between it and the Afghanistan Transitional Administration (ATA).
The mission was composed of representatives of seven UN agencies, See Annex 1 for the mission
composition IOM and a representative from the NGO community. Following an initial three days of
consultations in Kabul, the mission split into two teams for a week - one focusing on Kandahar and Hirat
and the second on Mazar-i-Sharif and Maimana. Further consultations and debriefings were undertaken in
Kabul for three days at the conclusion of the mis sion.
This report is to the UN Country Team (UNCT) and should be shared with the ATA and the NGO
community in Afghanistan." (Inter-Agency Missions, 19 June 2003, p. 1)
162
AREU to undertake research on return & reintegration conditions (May 2003)
•
During the summer 2003, AREU is planning to undertake a follow-up research to the December 2002
"Taking refugee for a ride ?"
•
Aa anthropological perspective will be used to look into the refugee movements, livelihoods and
coping mechanisms.
"We are planning to undertake further research into the conditions being faced by the refugees upon their
return to Afghanistan.
You may be aware that the AREU Rural Livelihoods project is currently engaged in longitudinal surveying
throughout Afghanistan on livelihoods. Within that survey instrument, some data on refugee movements,
livelihoods and coping mechanisms will become apparent. However more qualitative research is needed.
Therefore AREU has determined to undertake more in-depth qualitative research in a few communities of
refugee return (between 3-6 communities). AREU believes that a more anthropological in-depth study will
provide important findings and insight into a number of critical refugee related issues.
Amongst other topics, research should examine
migration (labour/economic and seasonal),
social dynamics in refugee return communities (impact on social structures and cultural practices, dispute
resolution of returning refugees), and
livelihoods (e.g., asset bases, economic opportunities, indebtedness, land tenure issues, etc..).
A consultant is arriving next week to design and write a research proposal on refugee return and
reintegration issues. She will be meeting with key stakeholders here and travelling to the field to identify
field sites for the research. We hope to commence the research this summer." (AREU 11 May 2003)
See also:
Taking Refugees for a Ride? The politics of refugee return to Afghanistan, AREU, December 2002
The Ogata Intiative focuses assistance on Kandahar in the south, Jalalabad in the
east, and Mazar-i-Sharif in north (May 2003)
•
Following a couple of visits to Afghanistan to assess the conditions of refugees and IDPs, Ms. Ogata
suggested that Japan's assistance to select 3 regions to receive priority assistance. The regions are:
regional cities of Kandahar in the south, Jalalabad in the east, and Mazar-i-Sharif in the north.
•
Overall aims of the programme are to look for forms of development that lead to regional
reconstruction, provide a seamless transition from humanitarian assistance to recovery and
reconstruction assistance.
•
Phase 1 puts the focus on resettlement assistance for refugees and displaced persons by supplying
equipment and materials for temporary housing, improving water-supply systems, rebuilding
agriculture, distributing educational materials for children and teachers, and supplying temporary
educational facilities.
•
Phase 2 of the initiative will include emergency income-creation projects, distribution of food as
payment for labor, construction of basic infrastructure, protection of mother-child health, the
strengthening of educational implementation capacity, and anti-landmine projects in the three priority
regions
163
"Following her inspection of the actual conditions of refugees and displaced persons on the occasion of her
two visits to Afghanistan, Sadako Ogata, the prime minister's special representative, announced regional
comprehensive development assistance that offers suggestions and proposals for the direction of Japan's
assistance for Afghanistan from now on. Three regions have been selected to receive priority assistance
under this program - those regions centering on the regional cities of Kandahar in the south, Jalalabad in the
east, and Mazar-i-Sharif in the north. The aims of the program are to search for forms of comprehensive
development that lead to regional reconstruction, provide a seamless transition from humanitarian
assistance to recovery and reconstruction assistance, and achieve these targets as quickly as possible.
Furthermore, as well as just regional recovery and reconstruction, the program aims to strengthen the
capacity of the transitional administration, bolster links between the central government and regional
authorities, and promote the independence of communities.
As the first phase, the program puts the spotlight on resettlement assistance for refugees and displaced
persons. Through U.N. and other organizations, it is, among other things, supplying equipment and
materials for temporary housing, improving water-supply systems , rebuilding agriculture, distributing
educational materials for children and teachers, and supplying temporary educational facilities. Through
NGOs, it is, among other things, extending assistance for the redevelopment of communities. It is estimated
that about 1.5 million people will benefit from this program, which has been steadily implemented since its
announcement in July.
As a pillar of the package announced on October 29, Japan announced the Ogata Initiative Phase 2, a
program to provide regional comprehensive development assistance on an even larger scale. It is estimated
that 3 million people will benefit from this Phase 2, which includes emergency income-creation projects,
distribution of food as payment for labor, construction of basic infrastructure, protection of mother-child
health, the strengthening of educational implementation capacity, and anti-landmine projects in the three
priority regions. Through linkage between this program and such projects as the Kabul - Kandahar primary
road construction project described above, bilateral assistance from Japan through JICA, and regional
development projects scheduled to be implemented by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank,
Japan hopes that its program will become a model case of comprehensive regional development."
(Government of Japan 10 January 2002, pp. 4-5)
US State Department has contributed 174 mio to refugee and IDP programs since
Sept. 2001 (March 2003)
•
Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) has contributed financial assistance to refugee
and IDP programs in shelter, water & sanitation, healthcare, food & nutrition, primary education, etc.
•
Implementation partners are ICRC, UNHCR, IOM and NGOs
"The State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) issued a fact sheet on
March 6 detailing the Bureau's $174.5 million in contributions to assist Afghan refugees and internally
displaced persons (IDPs).
According to the fact sheet, PRM has obligated a total of $175.4 million since September 2001. This
assistance supports a variety of services, such as: shelter, water and sanitation, healthcare, food and
nutrition, primary education, mine education and awareness, economic assistance, and capacity building
programs. Implementing partners for this assistance are the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the
International Committee of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the International Organization for
Migration, and other U.N. agencies and non-government organizations (NGOs).
[…]
In response to the crisis , the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) has provided resources
to support Afghan refugees, returnees, internally displaced persons, and other vulnerable persons. The
164
Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration has committed or obligated a total of $175.4 million* since
the beginning of the current Afghan emergency in September 2001.
Primary implementing partners for PRM are the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent societies (IFRC), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and other UN agencies. The
Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration also provides funding to Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs) to fill critical protection and assistance gaps in Afghanistan and for Afghan refugees in
neighboring countries.
PRM's funding in Afghanistan supports the voluntary return and reintegration of refugees and IDPs to their
homes in Afghanistan. To this end, PRM supports critical activities in the sectors of shelter, water and
sanitation, primary, reproductive, maternal and child healthcare, food and nutrition, primary education,
mine education and awareness, economic assistance, and capacity building." (U.S. DOS 6 March 2003)
See also:
"U.S. Government to fund NGOs providing assistance to Afghanistan", U.S. DOS, 11 February 2003
Workshop held in Kabul to identify best strategy to overcome malnutrition (February
2002)
•
A planning workshop on how to combat malnutrition in the longer-term has been held in Kabul midFebruary.
•
High level of chronic malnutrition (stunting) in children was linked to social, reproductive health and
nutrition problems throughout the life cycle.
•
A nationwide nutrition and mortality survey is currently being prepared by the Ministry of Health, the
Ministry of Rehabilitation and Rural Development and UNICEF
"The first planning workshop on how to combat malnutrition in the longer-term was held in Kabul on 11–
14 February, with technical and financial support from UNICEF. This comes in the wake of meetings held
between the interim leadership and UNICEF, WHO, WFP and NGOs where the authorities acknowledged
that the fight to improve the deteriorating nutrition status of its population was one of the government’s top
priorities. Participants including nutritionists, medical doctors and others from the government, UN and
NGOs met to analyze the causes of malnutrition in the country, standardise methodology for surveys and
identify strategies to improve the nutrition status in Afghanistan. High level of chronic malnutrition
(stunting) in children was linked to social, reproductive health and nutrition problems throughout
the life cycle. Women have frequent pregnancies and many girls get married early, contributing to poor
women’s health and nutrition and low birth weight. Combined with inadequate infant feeding and health
care practices and widespread micronutrient deficiencies, all these have contributed to creating a generation
of stunted children. A nutritional strategy to combat chronic malnutrition must address the problem at
regular points throughout the lifecycle, starting from infancy right up to pregnancy.
A nationwide nutrition and mortality survey is currently being prepared by the Ministry of Health, the
Ministry of Rehabilitation and Rural Development and UNICEF with technical support from the Centre of
Disease Control, Atlanta and implementing partners (World Vision, Action Contre La Faim, Goal, Save the
Children US and UK, Aide Medicale Internationale and International Medical Corps). Fieldwork will take
place between 10 and 21 March." (UNICEF 21 February 2002)
165
IOM's activities on behalf of IDPs during 2002 (May 2002)
•
In addition to on-going responsibility for focal point coordination in Herat, Faryab province, and
Kunduz province, IOM during late March assumed responsibility for IDPs in Chimtal camp in
southern Balkh province.
•
IOM's support to IDP’s continues through 12 IOM offices in Northern and Western Afghanistan,
including recently established offices in Badghis.
•
IOM serves as focal point for IDP return and reintegration in the northern region.
•
In the west, IOM is the focal point agency for all five camps and coordinates the logistics and the
support of services in the sectors health, food-items and non-food-items.
•
IOM in partnership with the Ministry of Repatriation and Refugees (MRR) and UNHCR has returned
over 23,000 people in the central region between December 2001 and May 2002
•
A total of 58,856 IDPs have been assisted by IOM to return to their home villages in the North. A
further total of 149,346 IDPs have been registered by IOM to return, or are known IDPs expected to
return.
•
Up to 12th May, IOM Herat has assisted the voluntary return of 62,143 IDPs in the western region.
•
IOM will be responsible for the return of approximately 125,000 IDPs from Kabul to the Shamali
plains.
"The humanitarian support provided by donors to date has been directed to meet the most urgent shelter,
heating and non-food item needs of 60,000 IDP families in Western and Northern Afghanistan. In addition
to on-going responsibility for focal point coordination in Herat (Maslakh, Shadaiyee camps), Faryab
province (Daulat Abad and Khoja Sabz Push), and Kunduz province, (Baghe Sherkat, Amiribad, Ali Abad),
IOM during late March assumed responsibility for IDPs in Minaret 1 and 2 and Rawzabagh camps in Herat,
and Chimtal camp in southern Balkh province. IOM’s assistance to IDPs is also taking place in Badakhshan
and Takhar provinces. Support to IDP’s continues through 12 IOM offices in Northern and Western
Afghanistan, including recently established offices in Badghis.
[…]
Northern Afghanistan:
IOM serves as focal point for IDP return and reintegration in the northern region. Total estimated IDP
population in northern Afghanistan is some 200,000 people. Specific IOM responsibilities in the region,
include support to the following areas; Kunduz – 7,506 families (30,024people); Faryab – 7,975 families
(31,900 people); Total estimated camp population in the two provinces – 15,481 families (61,924).
Western Afghanistan:
The total estimated population in the five IDP camps in Herat region is approximately 200,000. Only
Maslakh IDP camp presently hosts around 100,000 people. IOM is the focal point agency for all five camps
and coordinates the logistics and the support of services in the sectors health, food-items and non-fooditems. IOM Herat is permanently present inside all the camps to monitor and to assess the needs of the
IDPs. In coordination with other service providers, IOM organizes for the supply and distribution of
food and water; water and sanitation, supply and setting up of tents, as well as construction and repair of
temporary shelter. The shelter programmes in Maslakh camp (Autumn 2001) included the provision of five
million mud bricks, construction of 1,000 mud brick shelters and the re-roofing of another 7,600 shelters.
During February IOM carried out a registration of the 117,000 inhabitants in Maslakh IDP camp. The data
of this registration provided a valuable insight into western Afghanistan’s displaced population and also
enabled IOM to plan the return and the reintegration of the IDPs. Other programmes currently ongoing in
Herat are for example the set-up of child-friendly spaces in the IDP camps and the support of UNICEFs
“Back to school” programme with the provision of nearly 2,500 IOM tents used as class rooms in Badghis
and Herat districts.
Central Region: IDP Returns
166
IOM organised the first IDP returns in the central region in late December in conjunction with French NGO
Acted, who were responsible for IDP camp management in the Panjsheer Valley. Over 6600 individuals
were returned to their places of origin on the Shamali Plain and provided with NFI packages. Since then
IOM in partnership with the Ministry of Repatriation and Refugees (MRR) and UNHCR has returned over
15,000 people from the Ex- Soviet Compound to their places of origin (of which over 95% returned to the
Shamali Plain). In addition in support of MMR and UNHCR a further 8,000 individuals were recently
returned to their villages of origin from Bamyan town. IOM has coordinated with MRR and UNHCR in
identifying and registering over 180,000 IDPs in Kabul, the first of these returns started in early May.
Return Process and IOM Internal Transportation Network (ITN)
IOM has designed and adopted procedures for IDP Returns that ensure a humanitarian based, sustainable
return for all IDP families. These Procedures are guided by the fundamental principles contained within the
“Guiding principles on internal displacement’, ‘humanitarian principles’, international human rights laws
and the Bonn Agreement. Two essential parts of the procedure are the return registration and a detailed
assessment and analysis of the community of return. These two processes involve a considerable
expenditure in time and resources to properly and responsibly complete. Thus, the pace of returns of IDPs
is governed by the time taken to carry out these processes.
Northern Region: IDP Returns
A total of 15,523 IDP families (58,856 persons) have been assisted to return to their home villages. (One
movement of 3300 families in Sari Pul were transported by local militia in an involuntary movement. IOM
later provided return packages of non-food items to assist their reintegration). A further total of 34,526 IDP
families (149,346 persons) have been registered by IOM to return, or are known IDPs expected to return.
Therefore, it is assumed that this caseload of potential IDP returnees offers a planning figure for the
Northern Region. Taking the performance of IOM and its partner agencies to date and extrapolating this
past performance to predict return rates in the coming months, it is estimated that the present caseload of
IDP families, if returned at a rate of 5,000 families per month, will take until Jan 03 to return. At 7,000
families per month it will take until October 2002 to return all IDP families in the Northern Region to their
communities of origin.
[…]
Western Region: IDP Returns
IOM Herat supports the return, resettlement and reintegration of internally displaced persons to their place
of origin and provides immediate assistance to these persons in their effort to resettle. Up to 12th May,
IOM Herat has assisted the voluntary return of 62,143 IDPs from Maslakh, Shai-dayee, and Rawzabagh
camp to their home districts in Ab Kamari, Moqor, Qadis, Qale Naw, Dara-e-Boom, Morghab, Ghormach,
Jawand, Gulran, Kushk, Kusan, Karukh, Obe and Kabul. The returning families receive a reintegration
package including an agricultural tool kit, 100 kg wheat, 50 kg seeds, 40 kg fertilizer and 30 high-energy
biscuits. To determine travel fitness IOM doctors medically screen all IDPs before departure. Returns take
place six days a week in an average rate of minimum 2,500 per day.
[…]
Central Region: IDP Returns
The Kabul IDP population is estimated at approximately 180,000 persons through a joint survey between
MMR, IOM, and UNHCR, approximately 95% of these people will return to the Shamali Plain. IOM will
be responsible for the return of approximately 125,000 persons. In addition to providing the transport, IOM
will be providing medical screening and transit centre facilities where necessary (GTZ will be providing
assistance packages on behalf of UNHCR for long distance returnees, needs assessment will be conducted
UNHCR on case by case basis for families returning to Shamali Plain)." (IOM 16 May 2002)
See also: "Lack of funding forces IOM to temporarily suspend its repatriation activities (July 2002)"
167
IDP information campaign in Baghlan province aims at informing IDPs of their rights
and options (May 2002)
•
In Baghlan province some 40 local men and women are being trained in how to register and interview
IDPs.
•
The programme, a joint initiative of UNAMA, IOM and the Afghan government aims at returning the
estimated 24,000 IDPs in the province by informing them of their rights and options for return.
•
The majority of IDPs in Baghlan fled fighting between the ousted Taliban and Northern Alliance (NA)
forces and now live in a series of miserable camps near the province's main towns.
"In a battered lecture theatre at the end of a muddy track in Pol-e Khomri, a small town in Baghlan
province in northeast Afghanistan, 40 local men and eight women are learning to how to get to grips with
some of the country's thousands of internally displaced people (IDPs). The group is being trained in how to
register and interview IDPs with a view to stimulating the return of an estimated 500,000 displaced
throughout Afghanistan.
The programme is part of a joint initiative between the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan
(UNAMA), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Afghan government to begin
returning some of the 24,000 IDPs in Baghlan province to their villages of origin. There's no one system for
returning IDPs, but the training in Pol-e Khomri is part of a provincial strategy to let the displaced know
they now have some options.
'This is all about getting to the thousands of IDPs round here and letting them know that if they want to
return they will be assisted for free,' Chris Petch IOM's operation officer in nearby Mazar-e Sharif told
IRIN. The information workers - mainly local government nominees - are being trained to identify IDP
families in the local community and then tell them what their current options are.
Although the repatriation of Afghan refugees from neighbouring Pakistan and Iran is progressing well, the
return of IDPs is only just beginning in a coordinated way across Afghanistan. The majority of IDPs in
Baghlan fled fighting between the ousted Taliban and Northern Alliance (NA) forces and now live in a
series of miserable camps near the province's main towns. Many of them are not aware of assistance
programmes and this is where the information staff come in.
'IDPs as a group are very vulnerable to exploitation,' Petch said. 'They tend to get picked on and
manipulated by people out to make money, the group we are training here will hopefully empower IDPs by
giving them proper information,' he explained. The information workers would be rapidly followed by
registration teams. Once there's accurate information about who wants to go back where, an action plan can
be formulated to get people back home." (IRIN 6 May 2002)
"UNHCR is spearheading a programme in Afghanistan aimed at assisting IDPs who are able to return to
their areas of origin. In partnership with the Ministry of Repatriation, IOM and GTZ, UNHCR plans to
assist as many as 400,000 IDPs to return to their homes this year. We are currently carrying out a countrywide exercise to register IDPs, collect information on their home areas, and organise a return programme."
(UNHCR 3 May 2002)
Senior Inter-Agency Network on Internal Displacement visits Afghanistan to assess
IDP situation (April 2001)
•
Senior Network visited Afghanistan to assess nature and magnitude of the humanitarian catastrophe
and to review the response of UN and other humanitarian actors.
168
•
Mission visited Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Baghlan and Sheberghdan province.
•
Not able to visit Northerm Alliance controled territories.
"The Senior Inter-Agency Network on Internal Displacement, led by the UN Special Co-ordinator on
Internal Displacement, together with representatives of FAO, UNHCR, UNDP, UNICEF, WHO and the
NGO community, undertook a mission to Afghanistan from 18 to 25 April, 2001. The main objectives of
the Mission were to: assess the nature and magnitude of the crisis affecting internally displaced populations
and related vulnerable populations, particularly women and children, including those at risk of being
displaced; to review the operational capacity of UN agencies and other humanitarian actors on the ground
to respond to such needs, with a view to identifying any gaps in the humanitarian response; to review
existing institutional arrangements within and between the UN agencies, the Red Cross Movement, NGOs
and the authorities, and to make recommendations to concerned agencies, organisations and the authorities
for future action.
The Mission met with local and government authorities, representatives of United Nations, the Red Cross
Movement, other international organizations, and non-governmental organisations, and members of the
diplomatic community, both in Islamabad and in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, the Mission visited Kabul,
Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Baghlan and Sheberghdan provinces. Due to logistical constraints the Mission was
unable to visit the territories under the control of the Northern Alliance." (Senior Inter-Agency Network on
Internal Displacement 3 May 2001)
Reference to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
Known reference to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement as of June 2003
•
Reference to the Guiding Principles in the national legislation
•
Other References to the Guiding Principles (in chronological order)
•
Training on the Guiding Principles (in chronological order)
Reference to the Guiding Principles in the national legislation
None so far, but: "[...] the Government has committed itself to a policy on IDPs, focussed particularly on
the search for durable solutions. The intent is that once formulated, such a policy will be implemented
through a Presidential Decree. There is urgency in achieving this objective and it is critical that the
policy is steeped in the Guiding Principles. The RSG on IDPs is expected to visit Afghanistan later this
summer and it would therefore be desirable that he strongly promotes a solutions orientated and rightsbased policy with the Government."
Sources: Inter-Agency Missions
Date: 19 June 2003
Documents:
The Internally Displaced in Afghanistan: towards durable solutions, Report of the Inter-agency Mission,
May 2003 [Internal]
Other References to the Guiding Principles (in chronological order)
None
169
Training on the Guiding Principles
Training needs: "Virtually every sector in Afghanistan has unmet training needs, including all sectors
dealing with the internally displaced. UNHCR has provided a series of training packages to national
authorities and has loaned staff in MoRR and MRRD to provide on-the-job capacitation. However, the
need for further capacitation of all authorities addressing IDPs is evident at both central and provincial
levels. Promotion of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement is important and needs to be
undertaken at the earliest opportunity.
[...]
The mission therefore recommends that a three-day workshop on the Guiding Principles on IDPs be
provided to Government authorities responsible for IDPs as soon as the Government indicates it is
prepared to assume full ownership of such a workshop. Participants should be drawn from relevant
ministries such as MoRR, MRRD, MBTA, MHUD, Ministry of Justice, etc., and should also include a
number of national programme officers drawn from key UN agencies. It is suggested that the workshop
be organized jointly by the MoRR, MRRD and UNHCR, in collaboration with OCHA’s Internal
Displacement Unit, which has extensive experience in delivering Guiding Principles based training
programmes. The Internal Displacement Unit should be requested to fund this workshop (together with
the proposed Kuchi Workshop) from the Unit’s IFP Fund. If possible this workshop should be
undertaken during the Summer 2003.
The mission also recommends that the primary objective of the above workshop is a contribution to the
formulation of a draft national policy on IDPs. It is proposed that the MoRR be tasked with
responsibility for moving this process and that UNHCR provides whatever support required. The
proposed visit of the RSG for IDPs to Afghanistan would substantially contribute to the process of
formulating such a policy. It is also suggested, that following this workshop a one-day workshop be
held for representatives of UN agencies, select NGOs and the donor community in order to define a
strategy for supporting the Government’s policy on IDPs.
With the formulation of a national policy, it will be necessary to ensure that training on the Guiding
Principles on IDPs be brought to the provinces for both local authorities, including members of the
Return Commission, and the humanitarian assistance community. It is therefore recommended that
further training workshops on the Guiding Principles be mounted at the provincial level. It is proposed
that responsibility for this be vested jointly with UNAMA’s Senior IDP Advisor and the Norwegian
Refugee Council (NRC) and that this be undertaken in collaboration with the OCHA Internal
Displacement Unit. IOM also has an interest in supporting such training.
Sources: Inter-Agency Missions
Date: 19 June 2003
Documents:
The Internally Displaced in Afghanistan: towards durable solutions, Report of the Inter-agency Mission,
May 2003, pp. 17-18) [Internal]
Coordination
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UNHCR in charge of coordinating the delivery of assistance to IDPs as well as
supervising the protection activities (July 2002)
•
In late 2001, UNCO asked UNHCR to take over co-ordination of IDP activities in the Central,
Southern and Eastern regions; and the overseeing of IDP protection activities throughout the country,
within this framework.
•
UNHCR was designated Secretariat for the Returnee and IDP Programme Group
•
UNHCR is required to co-ordinate and supervise protection activities in camps and communities
•
UNHCR has been tasked with supporting the Transitional Authority in co-ordinating the delivery of
assistance to IDPs.
This paper aims to outline the primary objectives, activities, and institutional arrangements relating to the
provision of protection and assistance to IDPs in Afghanistan. The activities, some of which are already
taking place or planned for the near future, will be subject to the availability of resources, which is not
currently assured. They will be undertaken in close cooperation by members of the Returnee and IDP
Programme Group, in support of the Islamic Transitional Authority of Afghanistan, which bears primary
responsibility for the protection and wellbeing of the citizens of the country.
[…]
Until this year, responsibility for co-ordination of IDP assistance in Afghanistan lay with the Office of the
UN Co-ordinator (UNCO) and in particular of its humanitarian branch, UNOCHA. In late 2001, UNCO
asked UNHCR to take over co-ordination of IDP activities in the Central, Southern and Eastern regions;
and the overseeing of IDP protection activities throughout the country, within this framework.
Following the establishment of the Interim Administration in Afghanistan at the end of 2001, and the
formation of UNAMA, a new assistance co-ordination structure was drawn up. This was based on
"programmes" identified in the Interim Administration's National Development Framework. Within the
framework, a range of Programme Groups have been created to support different line Ministries. Within
each Programme Group, a number of agencies work together to address issues of concern to that group.
Each Programme Group has a Secretariat - a function that is carried out by an organisation appointed by the
Administration and UNAMA. In this context, UNHCR was designated Secretariat for the Returnee and IDP
Programme Group (hereafter referred to as the Programme Group).
This arrangement was formalised in a Letter of Understanding signed on 6 June 2002 by the Minister of
Repatriation, the Director of the Afghan Assistance Co-ordination Authority, the Deputy Special
Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the UNHCR Chief of Mission in
Afghanistan.
The Letter declares that: "The main responsibility of UNHCR at the national and sub-national level will be
to assist the Ministry of Repatriation in ensuring the assistance and protection needs of all people of
concern to the programme group (returning refugees, IDPs, and communities receiving returnees) are
adequately met and that solutions to problems of displacement in Afghanistan are identified and pursued."
4. IDP-related goals and parameters for the Programme Group
The key aim is to find solutions to the problem of displacement in Afghanistan, while ensuring that material
assistance and protection needs are met in the meantime. With this in mind, the Programme Group has
agreed on a number of key points. These include the need to:
(a) Support the Ministry of Repatriation of the Islamic Transitional Authority of Afghanistan in coordinating protection and assistance to IDPs
171
(b) Pursue solutions to internal displacement: safe return home, settlement in the place of initial
displacement, or relocation to another part of the country - on a voluntary basis. The focus should,
however, be - wherever possible - on supporting the return of IDPs to areas of origin, in a manner
consistent with modalities adopted for the voluntary repatriation of refugees. Particular efforts should be
made to promote and implement innovative reconciliation projects fostering community dialogue, which
would at the same time also serve to avoid further displacement.
(c) Respect the UN "Guiding Principles of Internal Displacement" , especially those relating to the safety
and security of IDPs, their access to basic services (in camps and communities) and the fostering of
peaceful co-existence of all members of communities receiving returnees or hosting displaced persons.
(d) Coordinate cross-sectorally among all concerned actors, within the Returnee and IDP Programme
Group and with other Programme Groups.
5. Main activities of the Programme Group
In this context, a number of activities are being or will be carried out - as mentioned earlier, subject to the
availability of funds. These can be divided into three broad categories:
Assistance to voluntary return and reintegration
Prospects for IDPs to return in safety and dignity and their protection would be enhanced by the
establishment and implementation of a national legal framework, including the adoption of decrees
providing for guarantees or assurances against arrest, arbitrary detention, threat or discrimination upon
return. It will also be important to ensure that proper measures are in place for property restitution.
Enforcement of such a framework will depend, to a large extent, on capacity building. It will therefore be
important to train national and local entities, particularly via the dissemination of the UN "Guiding
Principles of Internal Displacement".
Assistance to returning IDPs should be as similar as possible to that provided to returning refugees.
Activities would include the registration of candidates opting to return. To enable IDPs to make informed
decisions as to whether or not to go home, they receive information on areas of origin (via the mass
information programme based on district profiles compiled by UNHCR and its partners). Where necessary,
confidence-building measures, such as pre-return visits by representatives of displaced communities,
should also help inform the decision-making process. Once displaced people have returned, their situation
will be monitored closely in order to address any problems in cooperation with the relevant authorities.
Efforts are made to address the needs of particularly vulnerable groups of IDPs as they return through waystations and other support structures. Direct assistance is beginning to be provided to both returnee families
and needy communities in areas of return, to promote harmonious relations.
The Programme Group will assist the Afghan authorities in promoting initial reintegration of IDPs in their
communities of origin, by providing community-based support, especially in the areas of shelter and water.
It will facilitate access to basic services and employment by acting as catalyst in attracting assistance of
other Programme Groups (such as those dealing with health and education) to areas of refugee and IDP
return.
Within the Programme Group, UNHCR will focus on the provision of legal aid, capacity building, and
training. It supports the Afghan authorities in addressing legal issues related to return, notably: criminal law
enforcement matters, property restitution, and issues of registration and documentation.
Protection in areas of displacement
There are many groups of IDPs in Afghanistan, facing different problems in different areas. The situation
and problems of the various groups will therefore be assessed, and location- and group-specific strategies
172
developed for them, including especially those who are not yet able to return to their areas of origin or for
whom other solutions are not yet in sight. Internal population movements should be monitored, also with a
view to identifying people who are particularly vulnerable and in need of special attention. Protection
networks, host community participation, and mass information should help to address protection problems.
The Programme Group aims to ensure standardised registration of IDPs by use of the UNHCR IDP
Registration Form. As Secretariat to the Programme Group, UNHCR is required to co-ordinate and
supervise protection activities in camps and communities. Such activities include undertaking security
assessments; monitoring and reporting on conditions of IDPs; interventions to address abuses, including
discrimination; facilitation of family reunion; and where necessary enhancing physical protection, including
the prevention of forceful relocation, arbitrary detention, forcible military recruitment, particularly of
children, and violence against women and children.
When protection problems are identified, local, provincial and central authorities will be approached. Their
active cooperation will be required, in particular in relation to physical protection and safety, which
humanitarian organisations will not be able to assume, let alone guarantee. The authorities may, however,
require assistance in addressing abuses through fact-finding missions, the establishment of ad hoc
commissions, etc.
The Programme Group will also support UNAMA's efforts to enhance the building of effective and
sustainable domestic institutions covering human rights and the rule of law. This will entail participating in
human rights co-ordination mechanisms at the national and area level, and supporting the recently created
Afghanistan Human Rights Commission.
Humanitarian assistance in areas of displacement
UNHCR has been tasked with supporting the Transitional Authority in co-ordinating the delivery of
assistance to IDPs. This should be, wherever possible, community-based. The aim is to support IDPs and
communities hosting them, with a view to strengthening and supporting acceptance and protective
mechanisms through host communities. Possibilities will be investigated, in consultation with the
authorities, for medium or long-term local settlement or through voluntary relocation, for IDPs who are
unable or unwilling to return to their areas of origin.
It will be important to avoid the establishment of large IDP camps. These should be of a temporary nature,
and kept small in an effort to reduce the risk of creating pull-factors and potential security problems. Camps
should be in safe locations, have access to safe and sufficient drinking water, and comply with
internationally established standards. One of the most important concerns will be the mobilisation of food
assistance. In existing camps, efforts are to be made to enhance the streamlining and co-ordination of
emergency assistance." (UNHCR 1 July 2002)
See also:
Comments on the Coordination of Affairs related to Internally Displaced Persons in Afghanistan,
UNAMA, July 2002
IOM hands over IDP camp coordination to partner agencies because of lack of funding
and an increasing role given to protection (September 2002)
•
IOM has been coordinating the relief efforts of relief agencies for the past 20 months in IDP camps in
the North and in the West.
•
At the end of September, IOM is scheduled to hand over coordination in the camps to partner agencies,
when funding for its IDP camp -based activities will be exhausted.
•
The remaining IDPs face a variety of longer-term displacement issues, including protection against
ethnic or other reprisals, mine clearance, land disputes and security.
173
•
It is estimated that 69,000 IDPs remain in seven camps in the West (94%) and in the North (6%) while
197,000 IDPs have returned home with IOM road convoys.
"IOM has provided return transport to their homes for a further 20,000 internally displaced Afghans over
the past three weeks, nearly three quarters of them from the northern town of Mazar-e-Sharif.
The returns contribute to the ongoing emptying of the IDP camps in the West and North of the country,
where IOM has coordinated the efforts of relief agencies for the past 20 months. At the end of September,
IOM is scheduled to hand over coordination in the camps to partner agencies, when funding for its IDP
camp -based activities will be exhausted.
The hand-over of camp coordination programming reflects the increasing role of protection and longerterm displacement issues traditionally overseen by UNHCR. Those remaining in the camps face a variety of
longer-term displacement issues, including protection against ethnic or other reprisals, mine clearance, land
disputes and security.
In Herat, IOM is working with UNHCR and an NGO, the International Catholic Migration Commission
(ICMC), to ensure a smooth transition in the Maslakh, Shaidayee and Minaret camps, which now have a
combined population of 64,000 people (14,106 families). Discussions are ongoing regarding the handover
of the remaining four camps in Kunduz and Faryab. An estimated 69,000 IDPs remain in the seven camps
- 94% in the West and 6% in the North. Some 197,000 IDP's have already returned home from the camps
with IOM road convoys." (IOM 10 September 2002)
NGO coordination arrangements (April 2002)
•
The two main NGO coordination structures are the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief
(ACBAR) and the Afghan NGO's Coordinating Bureau's (ANCB's)
•
SCF-US leads a security alert system
•
UNHCR leads meetings related to contingency planning
•
ACBAR is the main NGO coordinating body
"There are at least two NGO coordination structures that have been in existence for more than a decade and
that bring together a significant part, if not the large majority, of the NGO community. ACBAR's
membership (some 60 NGOs) is composed of both international and national NGOs. The Afghan NGOs'
Coordination Bureau's (ANCB's) 140 members are all national, Afghan NGOs. In addition to these two
main structures, two others bodies are said to exist: SWABAC for NGOs working in Beluchistan, and ICC
for Islamic NGOs. However, perhaps because of their geographical scope or membership limitations, they
are not visibly present and their capacity seems to be limited. They are not further discussed here. The
relationship between ACBAR and ANCB can probably be best qualified as constructive. There is some
overlap in membership (some of ANCB's members are ACBAR's members) and as such the two bodies are
kept informed of each others' activities." (Ed Schenkenberg Van Mierop April 2002)
"Both in Islamabad (for humanitarian activities inside Afghanistan) and Peshawar (for refugees from
Afghanistan) NGO coordination bodies exist and are numerous. In Islamabad, SCF-US has taken the lead
to organize a security alert system, information exchange meetings and joint press releases (see Annex 6). It
is considered important that InterSOS participates actively in these efforts for coordination and cooperation.
Contacts with UNOCHA (Letizia Rossano) can provide and update schedule of meetings. In general there
are sectorial meetings in Islamabad and each sector has a focal point (WFP for food, UNOCHA for NFI non food items, UNICEF for nutrition, etc.). These meetings concern operations both in Afghanistan and in
Pakistan.
174
UNHCR and WFP conduct regular information sessions for NGOs in Islamabad. As these meetings seem to
be somewhat 'global' in nature, it is important to establish close professional links to individuals in the
system. For UNHCR, this could be Rita Richter (Programme Officer). Lucienne Maas of SCF-US and Kiny
Mottier of ACTED are important sources of information.
Specifically for Pakistan and NWFP there are in Peshawar similar structures in place. UNHCR is in general
leading all meetings related to contingency planning. These are sectorial and task force meetings. A good
relation was established during the mission with William Tarpai of UNHCR. The profiles and data of all
178 (!) NGOs and international agencies working in Peshawar are compiled in a compendium by ACBAR.
It will be important to gather information on local Afghan NGOs, not only through ACBAR (their
coordination body), but also through personal discussions and through information from previous donors.
For Afghanistan, beside the above mentioned sectorial meetings, there have been some regional meetings
called by UNOCHA. In each region, UNOCHA had a Regional Co-ordination Officer (RCO) that is now
"in exile". For the Northern region, the RCO was previously based in Mazar and is now in Turkmenistan,
together with all the UN agencies' representatives for the Northern region. It is advisable to get in contact
with the RCO and the other regional representatives before the implementation of any activity in the
region." (Intersos 10 October 2001)
See also:
"Afghanistan: NGO concern over new regulatory framework", IRIN, 19 March 2003
IDP Unit supports UNHCR's lead role in the IDP sector (March 2002)
•
Under the previous UNCHA structure, the RCOs retained the overall coordination responsabilities for
IDPs and designated the lead agency on the basis of comparative advantages.
•
Under UNAMA, the national authorities will by more involved in the coordination.
•
A sectoral coordination approach, under the authority of the DSRSG, is envisaged for the humanitarian
and development response.
•
Refugee and IDP return and reintegration has been identified as one such sector and it is proposed that
UNHCR and the Ministry for Repatriation and Reintegration jointly assume the coordination role.
•
The Mission strongly supports UNAMA’s decision to establish a regional coordinating structure built
on UNOCHA’s RCOs structure, thus enabling the DSRSG to perform his function to support and
oversee the coordination of all sectors.
"Under the UNOCHA structure, the RCOs retained the overall coordination responsibility for IDPs. In
some cases RCOs designated local lead agencies to assume the operational coordination in the provinces.
For example IOM was responsible IDP coordination in the Herat and Kunduz area, while IRC was
responsible for Mazar and UNHCR was responsible for the Central Region.
As the UN consolidates its presence in Afghanistan, with the establishment of UNAMA, a ‘light footprint
approach’ has been adopted to ensure the empowerment and leadership of the national authorities,
stretching also to the co-ordination of international assistance. Under this overall approach, however, it is
of the utmost importance to ensure that effective mechanisms are put in place to ensure strategic and
operational coordination of humanitarian and development efforts, particularly with regard to the internally
displaced and the returning populations.
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With the new UN structure being put in place, a sectoral coordination approach, under the authority of the
DSRSG, is envisaged for the humanitarian and development response. For each sectoral activity, a
coordinating agency and its government counterpart will be tasked with responsibility for coordination.
Refugee and IDP return and reintegration has been identified as one such sector and it is proposed that
UNHCR and the Ministry for Repatriation and Reintegration jointly assume the coordination role.
The Mission supports the decision to adopt a sectoral coordination model and agrees that UNHCR, in view
of its undisputed protection expertise and growing presence in Afghanistan, is the best placed to lead the
refugee and IDP sector. However, in assuming this responsibility it is critical that the sectoral coordinating
agency:
assume a global coordination role through a dedicated coordination capacity;
ensure that the needs of the displaced and of the returnees are addressed through the elaboration of an
overall solutions strategy and an effective division of labour among operational actors;
set and monitor the compliance of accepted standards for protection and assistance to all IDPs and
returnees;
fully integrate the capacities and experiences of other operational actors, including NGOs, currently
involved in the response to IDPs and returnees;
sustain the government’s interest/commitment to this sector through capacity building of national human
resources;
ensure cross-sectoral coordination through collaboration with UNAMA’s central and regional structures
and other sectoral coordinating agencies;
ensure that close collaboration is established and sustained with the development actors who will be
responsible for medium-term rehabilitation of community assets and consolidation of sustainable
livelihoods.
The Mission strongly supports UNAMA’s decision to establish a regional coordinating structure built on
UNOCHA’s RCOs structure, thus enabling the DSRSG to perform his function to support and oversee the
coordination of all sectors. It will then be incumbent upon the regional structure to ensure cross-sectoral
and cross-pillar coordination as well as to liaise and support the local authorities in their coordination role.
UNAMA must ensure that the regional coordination structures are provided with the required human and
financial resources, as well as coordination tools, to effectively discharge this function.
A number of interlocutors also raised the issue of donor coordination. While a plethora of consultation and
coordination bodies exist in Kabul, there continues to be a need to strengthen coordination within the donor
community, particularly to avoid duplications and gaps in the support provided." (IDP Unit 28 March 2002,
pp. 9-10)
Temporary coordination arrangements for assistance to IDPs (January 2002)
•
The RCB appoints agency focal point/s based upon comparative advantage.
•
Northern region, functions have been divided between several agencies (IRC, IOM and ACTED).
•
In the West, IOM has traditionally led in the larger camps, and is now engaged in leading the
registration process in these camps, with support from UNHCR.
•
UNHCR has assumed sectoral responsibility in South, Central and Eastern regions.
•
UNHCR is responsible for monitoring refugee flows and will coordinate any protection activities
related to IDPs closely with UNCO.
•
Protection arrangements are coordinated geographically through the RCB: if an IDP group is returning
from another region, the key point is for locally based agencies to know the group is coming and where
they are returning to.
176
"Until the establishment of new UN structures, existing coordination mechanisms through the Regional
Coordination Body [RCB] will continue. The RCB appoints agency focal point/s based upon comparative
advantage. For instance, in the Northern region, functions have been divided between several agencies
(IRC, IOM and ACTED). In the West, IOM has traditionally led in the larger camps, and is now engaged in
leading the registration process in these camps, with support from UNHCR. Smaller camps are run by a
range of NGOs under IOM’s accountability. Likewise, UNHCR has assumed sectoral responsibility in
South, Central and Eastern regions, under the coordination of the UN, providing immediate humanitarian
assistance, technical support, responding to identified gaps and regularily reporting to the RCB.
Within the overall coordination provided by the RCBs, the agencies accountable for IDPs in the various
geographic regions (UNHCR, IOM and other relevant agencies) will intervene on protection issues such as
detention, land disputes and community reintegration issues. The UN will promote the return framework
through legislative agreements with the Government of Afghanistan and will support water and shelter
initiatives to promote initial community absorption capacity and re-integration, while providing support in
other sectors as needed. UNHCR is responsible for monitoring refugee flows and will coordinate any
protection activities related to IDPs closely with UNCO.
In the period leading up to returns, the RCBs will play a critical role in ensuring the key agencies in
coordinating activities and plans, whilst avoiding duplication and gaps. Protection arrangements are
coordinated geographically through the RCB: if an IDP group is returning from another region, the key
point is for locally based agencies to know the group is coming and where they are returning to. Once they
are home, their needs would be covered as for all people in the area. The central protection group is the key
“global” mechanism to identify priorities and provide advice, training and other support; the RCB is the
mechanism to make sure its priorities are implemented." (ITAP January 2002, p. 43)
Overall coordination mechanisms of humanitarian assistance (October 2001)
•
Lahkdar Brahimi resume his role as UN Secretary-General's special Representative. He will be in
charge of the UN's overall humanitarian and political work in Afghanistan.
•
Mr. Brahimi will oversee the activities of - and be supported by - the UN Special Mission to
Afghanistan and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
•
A Regional Humanitarian Coordinator (RHC) will be responsible for coordination at the regional level
of the inter-agency response leading a team comprising the Regional Co-ordinators of UNHCR, WFP,
UNICEF, and IOM. The RHC will report to the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC).
•
Operational co-ordination for IDPs is carried out within Afghanistan through the OCHA supported
regional co-ordination mechanism which designates functional responsibilities on the basis of expertise
and capacity. The UN Coordinator's Office will strengthen its coordination and support function to
help strengthen the capacity of the assistance community to address protection concerns of critically
vulnerable groups inside Afghanistan.
"Responding to the grave humanitarian and political situation affecting Afghanistan and the surrounding
region, Secretary-General Kofi Annan today signalled his intention to reappoint Lakhdar Brahimi as his
Special Representative to that country.
In a letter to the President of the Security Council, Mr. Annan expressed his strong belief that the time has
come for Mr. Brahimi to resume his role, which had been put on hold in 1999. At that time, Mr. Annan had
reported to the Council that 'given the lack of progress achieved so far, [the Special Envoy's] activities
should be 'frozen' until circumstances change to justify his renewed intervention.'
In the letter released today, the Secretary-General said that Mr. Brahimi would be in charge of the UN's
overall humanitarian and political work in Afghanistan. "He will also initiate preparations for the
development of plans for the rehabilitation of that shattered country," the Secretary-General said.
177
The Special Representative will oversee negotiations with all concerned parties for safe and unhindered
humanitarian access to all populations in need, while advocating for the rights and protection of affected
populations.
In addition to working on the humanitarian front, Mr. Brahimi will manage peacemaking activities
involving the warring parties and others concerned, with a view to facilitating a fully representative,
multiethnic and broad-based government.
The Special Representative is also charged with ensuring that the humanitarian and human rights
dimensions of the evolving situation are central to political and security discussions.
In carrying out his work, Mr. Brahimi will oversee the activities of - and be supported by - the UN Special
Mission to Afghanistan and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance" (UNDPI 3
October 2001)
"A Regional Humanitarian Coordinator (RHC) will be responsible for coordination at the regional level of
the inter-agency response to the situation in Afghanistan and its regional implications. This includes
humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The RHC
will work closely with the governments and all other actors in the region through the respective RC/HCs on
all issues related to the international humanitarian response to the crisis, in order to ensure the security of
humanitarian personnel, and safe and unimpeded access to the populations in need. He will lead a team
comprising the Regional Co-ordinators of UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, and IOM. The RHC will report to the
Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC).
The Regional Humanitarian Co-ordinator in his capacity as UN Co-ordinator for Afghanistan will continue
to assume the prime responsibility for co-ordination of activities supporting humanitarian assistance to
Afghans inside Afghanistan. Given its mandate, UNHCR will continue to assume responsibility for
international protection of, and the co-ordination of assistance to refugees in countries in the region.
Operational co-ordination for IDPs is carried out within Afghanistan through the OCHA supported regional
co-ordination mechanism which designates functional responsibilities on the basis of expertise and
capacity. The UN Coordinator's Office will strengthen its coordination and support function to help
strengthen the capacity of the assistance community to address protection concerns of critically vulnerable
groups inside Afghanistan.
In order to ensure enhanced co-ordination capacity throughout the region, OCHA has already started the
deployment of additional co-ordination support personnel. It is envisaged that in the immediate future core
OCHA teams will be active in all of the counties neighbouring Afghanistan. They will work in support of
the RHC through the UN Resident Co-ordinators in the countries concerned. In addition, they will work
closely with the UN Country Teams on the ground and all other relevant actors." (OCHA 27 September
2001)
Regional coordination mechanisms (October 2001)
•
Each region has a Regional Coordinating Body (RCB) composed of all active national and
international agencies and NGOs. The RCB are led by Regional Coordination Officers
•
"Much of the collaboration is orchestrated through a mechanism of Regional Coordination Bodies (RCBs)
led by Regional Coordination Officers (RCOs). Each Region has an RCB that is composed of all active UN
agencies, as well as international and national NGOs. It meets regularly to exchange information, plan and
178
develop strategies to meet the needs in their areas. Under the present conditions, RCBs continue to operate
in exile, pending the implementation of the re-entry strategy." (WFP 1 October 2001 p. 6)
Central region
"The IDP/Kabul Relief Group is responsible for defining and coordinating the assistance delivered to both
Panjshir Valley and Ex Soviet Compound IDPs, as well as developing possible exit strategies." (UNOCHA
May 2000, Central Region)
In the Panjshir Valley, the UN Mission set up a base in Bazarak in September 1999 to monitor the
distribution of WFP food as well as the flux of the population. (UNOCHA 22 September 1999)
Northern region
"The formal establishment of RCB [Regional Coordination Body] and Technical Working Groups took
place during this period [January-May 2000]. A provisional meeting of the RCB was held on 2 nd February
with it being formally established, after much deliberation over the terms of reference, on 4 th March. All
main agencies in the region were involved though a number retained observer rather than participant status.
This notwithstanding all agencies participate fully and the basis of effective coordination has been
established. TWGs were established for Food Security (initial chair WFP), Emergency Preparedness and
Response (initial chair MSF), Education (initial chair IAM ) and Health (initial chair UNICEF).
North-eastern region
The formal establishment of TWGs took place during May (the UNRCO made his first visit to the area
after resuming responsibility for the area on 9 th May). Four were established, viz Agriculture & Food
Security, etc. (covering these areas plus environment, community development, rangeland/ watershed
management, etc.) (initial chair Afghanaid); Education (initial chair NAC), Health & Water Supply (initial
chair WHO), Infrastructure & Engineering (initial chair ACTED) and Women’s Projects (initial chair
Afghanaid). A coordinated drought impact assessment was conducted in both Takhar and Badakhshan and
a coordinated response strategy was under preparation by the close of the reporting period." (UNOCHA
May 2000, Northern Region)
Hazarajat region
"Coordination activities in Hazarajat are designed to cope with the complexities of programming in a
mountainous region with scattered population, non existent infrastructure, no functional administrative or
commercial center, relatively few assistance actors, seasonal barriers to access and a potentially volatile
security environment. In this context, coordination is "light". Respect for operational agency autonomy is
emphasised. Coordination meetings are kept to a minimum and the use of communications and networking
is prioritised, as against calling everyone together. There is an emphasis on "virtual" coordination and
regional presence. It is understood that the RCO should be highly mobile throughout the region, rather than
based in one centre; and should facilitate active involvement of actors from all parts of the region rather
than those who can easily access a center. In facilitating programming, the approach is similar, inasmuch as
encouragement is provided to assistance activities covering the whole region rather than being clustered in
one or two easily served areas.
[…]
In the emergency food security response, the role of the coordination structures, as facilitated by the RCO,
is (1) to coordinate information gathering on the drought and food shortages; (2) to facilitate planning for
multi-agency response; (3) to help link up donors and implementing agencies for fund raising of the
response and (4) to advocate with the authorities on behalf of the assistance programme.
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[…]
There has been a high level of cooperation between the UN RCO and ACBAR in Hazarajat coordination, to
the extent that the approach could be described as "seamless". Neither NGOs nor UN could claim exclusive
ownership over the various coordination structures. Coordination structures in Hazarajat have deliberately
been kept open to all organizations actually working in the region.
[…]
The Hazarajat Regional Coordination Body meets twice annually. The spring meeting was held on 24 th
May in UNDP Kabul, with participation of seventeen agencies, including international and national NGOs
and the UN. Minutes have been circulated. The meeting reviewed key developments in context (repatriation
and migration), took reports on and planned coordination support activities, and considered current issues
such as the need for agency institutional capacity building." (UNOCHA May 2000, Hazarajat Region)
Selected UN activities
UN-Habitat provides shelter to the displaced in the Shomali region and in Jalalabad
(June 2003)
•
Un-Habitat has implemented Government of Japan-financed housing program for returnees in
Jalalabad with the construction of 1,500 homes built by the returnees themselves.
•
Still 14,000 houses are needed in Jalalabad.
•
UN-HABITAT has begun work reconstructing 3,000 houses in the Shomali area of the country to
provide shelter for some 21,000 people.
"UN-HABITAT and Japan this month completed the construction of 1,500 homes for returning refugees in
the eastern Afghanistan city of Jalalabad. In a major post-war project financed by the Japanese government
and implemented by UN-HABITAT, the returnees were able to build their homes with a Japanese
government grant of US$ 375 to each household.
The completion of the project was marked at a ceremony on 8 June attended by Japanese and UN officials.
Designed to help refugees returning to the Jalalabad urban area, the homes were built in the settlements of
Sukrod and Nasmuljahad. While most of Sukrod's houses had been destroyed by the bombings during the
country’s years of devastating civil war, Nasmuljahad had only just started to develop when the war
interrupted its growth.
Implementation started in January 2003 and UN-HABITAT's role was one of support and advice. The
agency’s officials visited each family and provided them with the opportunity to design their future homes
while staying within the given budget.
UN-HABITAT's Chief Technical Adviser, Lalith Lankatilleke received certificates of appreciation on the
agency’s behalf. Despite the achievements that have been made, so far, the Afghan city still needs 14,000
more homes for returnees, a regular water supply and sanitation." (UN Habitat 13 June 2003)
See also:
"Afghanistan: Housing for widows", IRIN, 26 May 2003
180
"With the coming winter adding urgency to Afghanistan's need for homes, the United Nations Human
Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) has begun work reconstructing 3,000 houses in the Shomali area
of the country to provide shelter for some 21,000 people.
According to a spokesman for the UN mission in Afghanistan, HABITAT's project, begun earlier this
month in consultation with the Ministry of Rural Development and Rehabilitation, has been carefully
organized around the full participation of the local communities.
HABITAT has also set up local workshops with cash donations of $2,000 to enable craftsmen to buy
material and employ apprentice workmen, while serving their own communities. This project is able to
operate thanks to a $1.5 million grant from the Italian Government, according to the spokesman.
'There are indications that following the beginning of work, returning refugee families that were staying
with friends and relatives in Kabul have begun returning to [the Shomali] area,' spokesman Manoel de
Almeida e Silva said. 'Work is expected to take a further two months to provide shelter before the winter
sets in.'" (UN News Service, 23 September 2002)
WFP to focus on recovery activities through Food for Work and Food for Education
activities (March 2003)
•
WFP's PRRO started in April 2003 and will aim at contributing to the protection and re-establishment
of livelihoods and household food security by providing assistance to over 9.2 million beneficiaries
over two years.
•
4.3 million Afghans in rural settled areas still lack sufficient resources to meet basic food needs.
•
In urban areas, the large numbers of returnees and IDPs, some 360,000, or approximately 10 percent of
the urban population, are vulnerable and need assistance to meet their basic food needs.
•
Two-thirds of the resources will be used for recovery activities such as Food for Work and Food for
Education while only one-third of the assistance funds provided will be used for relief activities
•
During July and September 2002, WFP has provided food assistance to 260,000 IDPs in Mazar-ISharif, Fayzabad, Jalalabad, Kandahar and Herat.
"Within the framework of the United Nations Transitional Assistance Program for Afghanistan (TAPA),
and in support of the nation-building objectives of the National Development Framework and the emerging
National Strategy for Social and Livelihood Protection, WFP has formulated a Protracted Relief and
Recovery Operation (PRRO). The PRRO will commence in April 2003 and is designed to contribute to the
protection and re-establishment of livelihoods and household food security by providing assistance to over
9.2 million beneficiaries over two years. The total food requirement for the two years will be 618,989 MT
of commodities, valued at $337.5 million. According to WFP's Countrywide Food Security Assessment,
4.3 million Afghans in rural settled areas still lack sufficient resources to meet basic food needs. Food aid is
critical, particularly to carry them through the lean pre-harvest period, when stocks from previous harvests
are typically depleted and coping mechanisms exhausted. In urban areas, the large numbers of returnees
and IDPs, some 360,000, or approximately 10 percent of the urban population, are vulnerable and need
assistance to meet their basic food needs. These are the families without breadwinners, who cannot
participate in income generating activities.
Two-thirds of the resources will be used for recovery activities such as Food for Work, focusing on
community-level rehabilitation of infrastructure; and Food for Education, including non-formal education
for women, adolescent girls and ex-combatants; distribution of Indian biscuits to schoolchildren in foodinsecure communities; and support for teachers nationwide. Relief activities, which will use only one-third
of the assistance funds provided, will support returning refugees, internally displaced persons, the acutely
181
malnourished, and vulnerable households. The activities conducted under WFP's PRRO will have a
stronger emphasis on recovery activities than on relief." (UNAMA 13 March 2003)
"During the third quarter, WFP has provided food assistance to 260,700 IDPs located in Mazari Sharif
(64,000), Fayz abad (28,000), Jalal Abad (3,700), Kandahar (80,000) and Hirat (85,000). The Government
and UN agencies (UNHCR, IOM and WFP) have been in discussions regarding a strategy
to phase out IDP camps and to encourage IDPs to return to their places of origin. Four IDP camps (Sari Pul
and Saki in Mazari Sharif, and Minaret I and Minaret II in Hirat) were closed, in the third quarter." (WFP
30 September 2002, p. 14)
UNICEF provides basic education, health care services and water and sanitation
facilities to IDPs (March 2003)
•
During 2003, UNICEF's overall aim is to increase enrolment of children and preparation of teachers -particularly amongst girls and women respectively.
•
In Herat's Maslakh camp, UNICEF is providing more than 30,000 people with health assistance,
education and water & sanitation
•
In southern Afghanistan, UNICEF is involved in providing shelter and education to 6,000 families who
are moving to IDP camps around Kandahar
•
Recent contributions of US$10.8 million from the Government of Japan and US$2 million from the US
will enable UNICEF to provide basic education, health care services, and water and sanitation facilities
to over 1.25 million returnee and internally displaced children and their families.
UNICEF's education activities for 2003
"UNICEF has been entrusted by the Government of Afghanistan, the Ministry of Education and UNAMA
to play a major role in the reconstruction of the national education system.
In 2003, UNICEF will focus specific attention on the issue of quality and gender-balance in education;
supporting the Ministry of Education in its goal to increase girls' enrolment, a national reform of the
primary level curriculum, reform of the system of teacher preparation and continuing education
opportunities, strengthening capacity improved educational planning and policy development, supply and
distribution of essential learning materials, and rehabilitation of schools.
UNICEF will continue to support the lead taken by the Government of Afghanistan, working with
institutional partners to achieve a number of measurable targets in 2003, with an overall aim of increasing
enrolment of children and preparation of teachers -- particularly amongst girls and women respectively.
UNICEF has selected Afghanistan as one of 25 countries where renewed efforts are to be made in 2003 to
increase girls' enrolment, with the aim of achieving significant increases in the number of girls regularly
attending school by the year 2005. We have set a target of 500,000 additional girls attending school by
March 2004. We will accomplish our goal through a nation-wide strategy, and by focusing on the twelve
provinces with the highest overall school-age population and the lowest percentage of girls enrolled in
school." (UNICEF 22 March 2003)
"A nationwide assessment of education will report back in the coming month. Latest data indicates a higher
rate of return by pupils than anticipated. Preliminary data from the rapid assessment indicate that almost 3
million children have enrolled in school in these areas alone. Almost half of these children are in first
grade. On average, 30% of pupils are girls and an equivalent percentage of teachers are women. Teacher
numbers, however, appear to be lower than necessary to cope with the large numbers of pupils coming back
to the classroom.
182
UNICEF is supporting education for returnees and IDPs coming back to their homes. Support at this stage
includes a public information and advocacy campaign on returnee education, by disseminating printed
material and establishing an information network in UNHCR encashment centers to raise awareness on the
reintegration of refugees/returnees/IDP students and teachers in the education system and providing basic
learning material and tents to areas where returnees are resettled (e.g. Shomali Plains)." (UNICEF 11
September 2002)
UNICEF's assistance to IDPs in camps
"In the Maslakh IDP camp in Herat, UNICEF is supporting more than 30,000 people through basic health
services, including immunization and safe delivery provided by UNICEF-supported clinics. In addition,
UNICEF supports MSF and MDM clinics with essential drugs and basic medical equipment, including
supplies and equipment to the therapeutic and supplementary feeding centres. Support for schools in
Maslakh IDP camp, covering 2000 children, includes schools in a box and recreational kits, mattresses and
black board/chalk in each class. Support also for water and toilets facilities near the schools. UNICEF is
supporting 302 water points, 2,744 toilets and 750 bathhouses in Maslakh camp. Due to the increase of
diarrhoea cases in Maslakh camp, UNICEF has increased provision of Oral Rehydration Therapy.
In southern Afghanistan, UNICEF is supporting the needs of up to 6,000 families who will move to IDP
camps around Kandahar. This includes installing ten school tents, to enable the establishment of learning
spaces for internally displaced children in Zarey Dasht camp. School materials including stationery items
and classroom materials will be delivered to cater for an estimated 17,000 children coming to classes in a
few weeks time. In nearby Mukhtar Helmand camp, school tents have also been supplied and an assessment
of education needs is underway in two further IDP camps in the area.
UNICEF has also coordinated the drilling of 71 wells in Zarey Dasht to improve access to clean water.
Handpumps for each well have also been installed. UNICEF has also supported the installation of latrines,
to protect levels of sanitation and hygiene amongst the camp population.
In the area of health and nutrition, UNICEF has agreed to provide a ration of high energy food supplements
and oil to 10,800 children under the age of 5 and 3,000 pregnant mothers in Zarey Dasht, and to 3,917
children and 1,088 pregnant mothers in three other camps in the area. UNICEF has also supplied cold chain
equipment to partner NGO MSF-Holland to assist with polio and measles immunization activities in Zarey
Dasht. In Mukhtar Helmand camp, UNICEF has already ensured the vaccination of all 32,700 children
between six months and 12 years." (UNICEF 11 September 2002)
"UNICEF has been assisting UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and NGO
partners to ensure that IDPs and returnees have access to basic social services, including education, health,
nutrition, water and sanitation, and protection. More than 1.4 million Afghans have so far returned to their
homeland since the start of UNHCR-assisted voluntary repatriation in March and around 700,000 people
are still internally displaced for various reasons, including the ongoing drought and internal conflicts. The
returnee population is estimated to reach up to 2 million by the end of 2002. Recent contributions of
US$10.8 million from the Government of Japan and US$2 million from the US State Department Bureau
for Population, Refugees and Migration will enable UNICEF to provide basic education, health care
services, and water and sanitation facilities to over 1.25 million returnee and internally displaced children
and their families. However, more support is needed to ensure adequate humanitarian assistance for this
growing segment of the population." (UNICEF 15 August 2002)
See also:
"UNICEF Humanitarian Action: Afghanistan Donor Alert", UNICEF, 17 March 2003
183
UNDP and UNHCR to ensure smooth transition from relief to development (January
2003)
•
UNDP and UNHCR have agreed to collaborate closely to ensure a smooth transition from relief to
development based on the 4Rs concept and also building on the Ogata Initiative.
•
UNHCR to assist returning Afghans with a focus on shelter and water and, UNDP and other
development agencies to support the Afghan government to make the transition from post-conflict
recovery to long-term development.
"The United Nations Refugee Agency and the United Nations Development Programme signed this
morning an agreement, or a letter of understanding, in an attempt to promote a smooth transition between
relief and development activities in Afghanistan.
The agreement is based on a concept referred to as "4Rs" (repatriation, reintegration, rehabilitation and
reconstruction) or four stages through which development agencies gradually take over from the
humanitarian agencies. The agreement also builds on what is known as "Ogata Initiative" - an idea
promoted by the former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Mrs. Sadako Ogata, to pursue an integrated
approach in bridging the gap between relief and development assistance in Afghanistan
Recognizing that refugees, internally displaced and returnees are valuable resources in the recovery and
reconstruction of Afghanistan, the two agencies agreed to targeting assistance particularly to communities
or areas with high number of returns, which would also benefit the local population.
Working closely with the Afghan government and within the framework of the national strategy, other
agreed areas include: making joint efforts to mobilize resources; encouraging the participant of other
competent agencies; helping the government set up an employment database containing data on individual
skills, absorption capacity and job opportunities; and joint monitoring of progress with the government.
The challenge of this year's repatriation operation is how to allow returning Afghans to stay in their home
communities. UNHCR will continue to assist returning Afghans with a focus on shelter and water and,
along with UNDP and other development agencies, will support the Afghan government to make the
transition from post-conflict recovery to long-term development." (UNDP 23 January 2003)
For more information on the "Ogata Initiative", see:
"Japan's regional comprehensive development assistance to Afghanistan - The Ogata Initiative",
Government of Japan, 7 October 2002
Overview of UNHCR's planned activities for 2003 (December 2002)
•
UNHCR plans for some 300,000 IDPs to return during 2003.
•
Transport assistance and relief items to returnees will be provided as well as initial reintegration
assistance (prioritising shelter and water) in areas of return. UNHCR will also provide protection and
emergency assistance to the remaoning IDP caseload.
•
UNHCR will also concentrate on capacity building initiatives carried out in the three Afghan
ministries: MoRR, MRRD, MHUD.
•
During 2003, UNHCR aims to enhance protection both of returnees and of displaced people in areas of
displacement.
184
•
The 3 main objectives of the protection strategy are: to ensure that refugees and IDPs can make
informed decisions in regards to return; to ensure the rights of returnees; and to enhance the capacity of
the relevant government officials in dealing with returnees, IDPs, and displacement and migration
issues.
"In 2003, it is estimated that 1.2 million refugees will return to Afghanistan, including 600,000 from
Pakistan, 500,000 from Iran and 100,000 from other countries. In addition, it is estimated that 300,000 IDPs
will return home in 2003 out of an estimated residual caseload of 600,000 to 700,000.
As in 2002, transport assistance and relief items to returnees will be provided as well as initial reintegration
assistance (prioritising shelter and water) in areas of return. Together with other agencies, UNHCR will
also provide protection and emergency assistance to the substantial remaining IDP caseload.
Within Afghanistan, there will be increasing emphasis on reintegration, and the creation of links with
government ministries and institutions involved in rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts in accordance
with the framework of the 4 R’s (repatriation, reintegration, rehabilitation, reconstruction). Work initiated
in 2002 to make sure that all development plans factor in returnees’ presence, needs and potential to
contribute to the nation’s recovery will continue and be expanded.
The organisation will also concentrate on capacity building initiatives carried out in the three Afghan
ministries with which it cooperates most closely: primarily the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation
(MoRR) and for matters related to returnee reintegration in rural and urban areas the Ministry of Rural
Reconstruction and Development (MRRD) and the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development (MHUD).
UNHCR and other members of the Programme Group for Returnees and IDPs have worked closely with
these three ministries in the preparation of a National Return, Displacement and Reintegration Strategy for
the Year 1382 (2003). This strategy identifies critical directions for return and reintegration in 2003, which,
in turn, stem from the priorities establis hed in the government’s draft National Development Budget.
Having established and strengthened its returnee protection monitoring network in 2002, UNHCR aims to
enhance protection both of returnees and of displaced people in areas of displacement. The ultimate aim is
to help enhance the Afghan authorities’ capacity to ensure security and respect of human rights for their
citizens.
[…]
The major objectives for the protection sector are: to ensure that refugees and IDPs can make informed
decisions in regards to return; to ensure the rights of returnees; and to enhance the capacity of the relevant
government officials in dealing with returnees, IDPs, and displacement and migration issues. The first
objective will cover a mass information campaign targeted at refugees and IDPs, as well as a district
profiling exercise.
The second objective will require monitoring and interventions by UNHCR and its partners to ensure
returnees arrive safely in their places of origin or choice and are able to re-integrate in their communities.
This sector will cover monitoring, interventions at local or central government level on behalf of returnees,
and support to the Return Commission based in Mazar-i-Sharif.
The third objective will focus on strengthening local capacity for the development of national legislation
and local structures. This will enhance the implementation of the Decree on Dignified Return and other
provisions attached to the tri-partite agreements between Afghanistan, UNHCR and countries of asylum.
Finally, UNHCR will continue to provide training and structural support to strengthen the capacity of
entities involved in the protection of returnees and IDPs, including administrative bodies, the national
lawyers’ association, and professional Shura." (UNHCR 2003, pp.2; 8)
185
Review of UNHCR's assistance to IDPs during 2002 (September 2002)
•
In January 2002, UNHCR moved its operational headquarters from Islamabad to Kabul.
•
In March, UNHCR launched an assisted repatriation programme to assist 1,2 million refugees and
IDPs return home.
•
UNHCR estimates that security and living conditions are not yet conducive to return all refugees and
IDPs
•
UNHCR's strategy has been to focus assistance in areas of return to better help both returning refugees
and IDPs to reintegrate.
•
UNHCR has begun relocating stranded Afghans from the squalid Chaman border camp to a temporary
site in Zhare Dasht
•
Up to 550,000 people may be particularly exposed to hardships during the cold season in Afghanistan.
•
Some 260,000 IDPscould face grave difficulty as villages in Afghanistan's central highlands become
almost inaccessible due to heavy snow.
•
The government urgently needs to devise a returnee reintegration strategy that will better link relief
and development, as the needs of returning Afghans must be incorporated in the country's
reconstruction schemes.
"The sudden fall of the Taliban regime in late November 2001 and the establishment of the Afghan Interim
Administration under the Bonn Agreement apparently encouraged many long time refugees to go home.
UNHCR quickly responded to the new developments, moving its operational headquarters from Islamabad
back to Kabul in January and rapidly re-establishing and expanding its field presence.
In March, UNHCR and the Afghan Ministry of Repatriation launched an assisted repatriation program to
help voluntary returnees. The two agencies initially planned to help 1.2 million refugees and internally
displaced people get home this year, a figure many thought was too optimistic. In fact, the figure turned out
to be a vast underestimate.
Regardless of the strong will of the Afghans to return to their homes, UNHCR considers that security and
living conditions in Afghanistan are not yet wholly satisfactory at this time to encourage all refugees to
repatriate.
The agency currently operates 30 offices throughout Afghanistan to coordinate protection and assistance
activities. Key sub-offices are located in Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, Herat, Kandahar and Jalalabad. UNHCR
has 630 staffers in the country, of whom 540 are national staff.
[...]
UNHCR's strategy has been to focus assistance in areas of return to better help both returning refugees and
IDPs to reintegrate.
Minority communities are a concern to both the Transitional government and UNHCR. In some areas of
northern Afghanistan, Pashtuns in particular have been forced to leave their homes due to insecurity and
ethnic tensions. Around Afghanistan's southern border with Pakistan -- Spin Boldak and Chaman -- there
are now an estimated 60,000 displaced Afghans. Some are Pashtuns who fled the north, while others are
nomadic Kuchi families who lost their livestock due to conflict and drought and who are now dependent on
aid.
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Mr. Ruud Lubbers, and the Minister of Repatriation, Mr.
Enayatullah Nazari, met with the displaced people in Spin Boldak late August. They assured the displaced
Afghans that the Transitional Authority will work to improve the conditions in the north, but added that
restoring security and reversing the effects of drought takes time. In a positive development, authorities in
186
the North and the Kabul government have agreed to set up a consultation mechanism to allow eventually
the return of minority communities.
Meanwhile, in a move requested by both the Afghan and Pakistan governments, UNHCR has begun
relocating stranded Afghans from the squalid Chaman border camp to a temporary site in Zhare Dasht, west
of Kandahar, where the displaced families can be better assisted. More than 900 families have already
voluntarily moved to the new site.
Winter challenge
The race is on to ensure Afghans who may find themselves severely affected by the harsh winter season get
needed aid. Afghan government and UNHCR specialists estimate that up to 550,000 people may be
particularly exposed to hardships during the cold season in Afghanistan.
About 290,000 returnees could find themselves in desperate straits, particularly people who go home late in
the year, when access and transport in remote areas could become more difficult. Another 260,000 IDPs,
agencies estimate, could face grave difficulty as villages in Afghanistan's central highlands become almost
inaccessible due to heavy snow.
UNHCR is currently stockpiling items to prepare for winter emergency. The agency already has set aside
4,500 tents, 15,400 stoves, 116,000 blankets and 34,000 plastic sheets. Additional items are being ordered,
along with some 7,000 tons of charcoal. Other aid agencies are looking to provide food and planning to
clear access roads and assist destitute groups under the Kabul government's plans to address winter-time
needs.
Transition from relief to reconstruction
When High Commissioner Lubbers met with President Karzai in late August, both recognised the need to
strengthen ties between humanitarian relief and rehabilitation/reconstruction projects. UNHCR and other
humanitarian agencies are helping returning Afghans cope with the initial stage of reintegration, but there is
a need to better link humanitarian aid to rehabilitation assistance. Beyond their immediate needs for water
and shelter, recent returnees say they need schools, medical facilities, irrigation systems and ultimately,
jobs to sustain them back in their homeland.
In addition to its ongoing work with the Ministry of Repatriation, UNHCR has begun talks with two other
ministries -- the Ministry of Urban Planning and the Ministry of Reconstruction and Rural Development.
The government urgently needs to devise a returnee reintegration strategy that will better link relief and
development, as the needs of returning Afghans must be incorporated in the country's reconstruction
schemes. " (UNHCR 10 September 2002)
For more information on UNHCR's role in the coordination of assistance to IDPs and their protection,
see "UNHCR in charge of coordinating the delivery of assistance to IDPs as well as supervising the protection
activities (July 2002)"
UNFPA works on improving health care and education of the Afghan women
(September 2002)
•
UNFPA has opened an advanced mobile hospital in Kabul
•
UNFPA is helping the government conduct a nationwide population and housing census to yield
national results in 2005
•
UNFPA has budgeted its aid program to Afghanistan at $4.5 million
187
•
Thousands of pregnant women are among the Afghan civilians who have fled their homes
•
UNFPA is preparing to pre-position emergency relief supplies in the countries bordering Afghanistan
"The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) continues to expand health care and education
programmes in Afghanistan aimed at reducing maternal and child mortality as well as empowering women.
In Kabul, UNFPA has opened an advanced mobile hospital which can assist births 24 hours a day and is
equipped to treat patients affected by virtually any kind of trauma, including complex pregnancy and birth
comp lications.
The Fund is also supporting the government of Afghanistan in a major logistical challenge of the next three
years; undertaking a nationwide population and housing census. The last attempt to conduct such a
comprehensive survey was in 1979.
The census project consists of a massive effort to train local staff all over Afghanistan and conduct first a
rapid assessment, then a national census to better inform and guide the reconstruction and development
programmes in the country.
Preliminary results are expected in late 2003 with nationwide results scheduled for mid-2005. The timetable is ambitious, officials say, because Afghanistan's infrastructure is badly fractured and most of the
terrain is challenging, but the need for data is urgent as development speeds up in Kabul and other cities.
Enumerating the rural population is especially crucial to choose the right locations for development
activities, housing, new hospitals and other social services in this vast, rugged country." (UNFPA 16
Septemb er 2002)
"Responding to the grave health emergency now facing Afghan women, the United Nations Population
Fund (UNFPA) is mounting its largest-ever humanitarian operation. The Fund is asking international
donors for $4.5 million to support the effort.
Thousands of pregnant women are among the Afghan civilians who have fled their homes in recent days
and are massed along the country’s borders. The lack of shelter, food and medical care, and unsanitary
conditions pose a serious risk to these women and their infant children. Even before the current crisis, poor
health conditions and malnutrition made pregnancy and childbirth exceptionally dangerous for Afghan
women.
To provide displaced Afghan women with lifesaving reproductive health care services, UNFPA is
preparing to pre-position emergency relief supplies in the countries bordering Afghanistan. These are
intended both for the large anticipated influx of refugees—into Pakistan, Iran, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan—and for distribution inside Afghanistan, if possible.
'Without swift action on the part of donors and relief agencies, a terribly high number of Afghan women
and girls are likely to die from easily treatable pregnancy complications,' says UNFPA Executive Director
Thoraya Obaid. 'UNFPA’s highest priority is to ensure that women have access to a safe delivery
environment and are protected against sexually transmitted diseases, unwanted pregnancy and violence. It
will be a daunting task in the current environment.'
Fearing possible military action inside Afghanistan, civilians have fled their homes by the tens of
thousands. International staff of United Nations agencies and non-governmental relief organizations have
been withdrawn from the country, and borders are closed. Relief operations, which had been providing
food, shelter and other assistance to more than 5 million people, have all but stopped. The United Nations
estimates that when winter sets in, up to 7.5 million Afghans could require outside aid to survive.
In response, UN relief agencies yesterday appealed to donors to provide $584 million for humanitarian
assistance, both within Afghanistan and in neighbouring countries. The inter-agency plan calls for UNFPA
to provide an integrated package of reproductive health services, including essential obstetric care, basic
equipment and supplies, training and operational support.
188
Initial support would include clean delivery supplies; supplies to protect essential hygiene; support for
border area hospitals receiving referrals with pregnancy and childbirth complications; and counselling for
victims of trauma. Longer-term assistance after the emergency phase will include training for local healthcare providers and basic health education for women and young people.
With support from donor governments including the United Kingdom and Italy, UNFPA has worked for
several years inside Afghanistan, and with Afghan refugee women in Pakistan and Iran. The Fund’s efforts
seek to reduce maternal and infant mortality by strengthening basic essential obstetric care, and include
provision of training and educational materials for midwives." (UNFPA 28 september 2001)
See also:
"Hospital maternity ward reopens", UNFPA, 8 April 2003
Selected NGO activities
Swedish Committee for Afghanistan supports health care clinics (March 2003)
•
SCA suports 40 MCH clinics in rural areas in eastern, northern and south-eastern Afghanstan.
•
During 2002, SCA educated some 80,000 Afghan women in reproductive health.
•
By the end of 2003, SCA plans to increase the MCH from 40 to 67.
"To improve the health of women and children the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan currently supports
40 specialised mother and child health care (MCH) clinics in rural areas in eastern, northern and southeastern Afghanistan. During 2002, at least 18,400 women received antenatal care through the SCA health
programme, some 2,500 deliveries were attended in MCH clinics and more than 3,000 women received
postnatal care.
The clinics also offer information about family planning and general health care. Trained community health
workers visit women in their homes in the villages. During 2002, approximately 80,000 Afghan women
were educated in reproductive health by SCA.
Yet these efforts are just a fraction of what is needed to save women's lives in Afghanistan. SCA therefore
plans to increase the number of MCH clinics from 40 to 67 by the end of 2003. But more resources are
needed. On International Women's Day, March 8, we are launching a fundraising campaign for mother and
child health care." (SCA 7 March 2003)
See also: "US$ 1.4 million emergency aid program to internally displaced in Afghanistan", SCA, 29
November 2001
ACTED provides humanitarian assistance to IDPs in Baghlan and Takhar province
(January 2003)
•
ACTED intervention in on behalf of IDPs in Afghanistan has 3 main objectives:
•
manage assistance and provide relief to IDPs or returnees in Baghlan and Takhar province,
189
•
provide logistical support and humanitarian assistance to vulnerable IDPs in Baghlan in their process
of return to their places of origin and
•
build institutional capacity for local authorities and proviDE of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable
IDPs compelled to remain in Baghlan
"Objective # 1: Managing assistance and providing relief to vulnerable IDPs or returnees in Baghlan
and Takhar provinces
a) Management of a camp of 1,500 IDP families in Baghlan
The beneficiaries are IDP populations who settled in Baghlan after returning from various locations in the
Northeast, Northwest and Central Afghanistan. The number of these IDP families was first estimated at
6,200 in November 2001. Successive surveys showed a fluctuation in the number of IDP families in
Baghlan as the situation on the ground rapidly evolved.
From the original survey conducted in November 2001, 1,349 families were to be relocated to DKA camp.
These consisted of vulnerable IDPs who had requested to be relocated in October 2001. This number
increased to 1,431 IDP families as families surrounding the camp were included in the assistance provided
under this program.
b) Provision of heating materials to 10,000 returning IDP families in Takhar
The beneficiaries are conflict-related IDPs who returned to their place of origin in Khoja Ghar district of
Takhar Province following the collapse of the Taliban. Of the 20,000 families that were to return, 10,000
families were supported under this grant. Each family received 200 kgs of coal for the winter.
c) Rehabilitation of key infrastructure in areas of return of IDPs
With regards to the infrastructure rehabilitation component of this project, beneficiaries are local
communities in the districts of Yangi Qala (population: 20,000) and Chah Ab (population: 75,000). This
activity, in conjunction with funds under another OFDA grant, rehabilitated a section of the key transport
corridor that links 3 districts of northern Takhar, with each other, as well as Badakhshan and the Tajik
frontier. The works provided employment for approximately 8,000 of the most vulnerable returnees, IDPs
and members of the local population. It is benefiting the whole region through the increased flow in
transport and goods, to and through the region.
Objective # 2: Provision of logistical support and humanitarian assistance to vulnerable IDPs in
Baghlan in their process of return to their places of origin
The number of IDP families in Baghlan province was estimated at 6,397 families by a joint survey
conducted in May-June 2002 by ACTED, IOM, UNHCR and MoRR. These IDPs had settled in 24
locations in Pul-I-Khumri district and New Baghlan. It was estimated that 67% of these families were
displaced as a result of drought and 33% from conflict, though for many families, both factors would have
played a role. This survey identified and registered 5,718 IDP families of the 6,397 total, as wanting to
return to their places of origin. It was these families to whom the assistance under this objective was
intended.
Objective # 3: Institutional capacity building for local authorities and provision of humanitarian
assistance to vulnerable IDPs compelled to remain in Baghlan
From October to November 2002, an exhaustive survey was conducted to assess and identify the residual
IDP community remaining following the return process. The survey registered 1,355 IDP vulnerable
families as requiring assistance for the coming winter. In addition to the IDP community, the intended
beneficiaries of this activity were the local authorities, specifically the offices of the MoRR. This assistance
was to provide the Ministry with the institutional and technical capacities to better address the concerns of
IDPs." (ACTED January 2003, p. 7)
190
List of participating agencies by sector (October 2002)
International NGO Activities in Afghanistan Set of 4 Maps: (July 2002)
(Click to expand the maps)
Map 1 (A - D)----------------------------------------- Map 2 (D - I)
Map 3 (J - N)----------------------------------------- Map 4 (O - Z)
List of organisations by sector
Education
Organization Name: Acronym:
Agriculture & Construction Development ACD
Afghans for Civil Society ACS
ACT ACT
Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development ACTED
Adventist Development and Relief Agency ADRA
Afghans Health and Social Assistance Organization AHSAO
Afghan Institute of Learning AIL
Aide Médicale Internationale AMI
ANA ANA
ARE ARE
Agency for Rehabilitation & Energy conservation in Afghanistan AREA
ARU ARU
CARE International in Afghanistan CARE
Child Fund Afghanistan CFA
Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance CHA
Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Center - Kandahar CHLC
Children in Crisis CIC
Coordination of Afghan Relief CoAR
Catholic Relief Services CRS
Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees DACAAR
Destitute Training Centre DTC
Enfants du Monde - Droits de l Homme EMDH
Focus Humanitarian Assistance FOCUS
Deutsche Welthungerhilfe -German Agro Action GAA
Global Partners GP
Ghazni Rural Support program GRSP
Humanitarian Cargo Carriers HCC
HOPE worldwide HOPE
International Assistance Mission IAM
INTERSOS INTERSOS
Islamic Relief (United Kingdom) IR UK
International Rescue Committee IRC
ISAF CIMIC ISAF
JEN (Formerly, Japan Emergency NGOs) JEN
Japan International Cooperation Agency JICA
Medair Medair
Malteser Hilfsdienst e.V. MHD
NBR NBR
Norwegian Church Aid NCA
191
NICCO NICCO
Norwegian Project Office-Rural Rehabilitation Association for Afghanistan (NPO-RRAA
Ockenden International OI
Orphan Refugee and Aid ORA
Oxfam Oxfam
People in Need Foundation PINF
PWJ PWJ
Rehabilitation and Development Organization RDO
Relief International RI
Solidarite Afghanistan Belgium SAB
Swedish Committee for Afghanistan SCA
Save theChildren Sweden SCS
Save the Children UK SC-UK
Save the Children US SC-US
Sanayee Development Foundation SDF
Social Development And Health Care Organization SDHCO
Serving Emergency, Relief, and Vocational Enterprises SERVE
Save the Forest Animals Organization SFAO
Shelter For Life SFL
Services organization for rehabilitation, vocational, agriculture, construction
and health in Afghanistan
SORVACH
Terre des hommes Tdh
United Nations Educational Scientific and Culture Organisation UNESCO
United Nations Childrens Fund UNICEF
United Nations Office for project services UNOPS
United Nations World Food Programme WFP
World Health Organization WHO
World Vision International - Afghanistan WVI
Food Aid
Organization Name: Acronym:
Action Contre la Faim ACF
Afghan Construction & Logistics Unit ACLU
ACT ACT
Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development ACTED
Afghan Development Association ADA
Afghan - German Help Coordination Office AGHCO
Agency for Rehabilitation & Energy conservation in Afghanistan AREA
CARE International in Afghanistan CARE
Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance CHA
Counterpart International CI
Children in Crisis CIC
Coordination of Afghan Relief CoAR
Catholic Relief Services CRS
DHSA DHSA
Enfants du Monde - Droits de l Homme EMDH
Focus Humanitarian Assistance FOCUS
Deutsche Welthungerhilfe -German Agro Action GAA
GOAL GOAL
Global Partners GP
Ghazni Rural Support program GRSP
German Technical cooperation GTZ
192
Humanitarian Assistance Network and Development HAND
INTERSOS INTERSOS
Islamic Relief (United Kingdom) IR (UK)
International Rescue Committee IRC
KRA KRA
MADERA MADERA
Mercy Corps MC
Medair Medair
Norwegian Church Aid NCA
Norwegian Project Office-Rural Rehabilitation Association for Afghanistan NPO-RRAA
Ockenden International OI
Oxfam Oxfam
People in Need Foundation PINF
Pamir Reconstruction Bureau PRB
PWJ PWJ
Rehabilitation and Development Organization RDO
Relief International RI
Save the Children US SC-US
Sanayee Development Foundation SDF
Serving Emergency, Relief, and Vocational Enterprises SERVE
Save the Forest Animals Organization SFAO
Shelter For Life SFL
SOLIDARITES SOLID
Terre des hommes Tdh
UN Habitat UNHSP
Voluntary Association for Rehabilitation of Afghanistan VARA
United Nations World Food Programme WFP
ZOA Refugee Care ZOA
Health & Social Welfare
Organization Name: Acronym:
Action Contre la Faim ACF
Afghans for Civil Society ACS
Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development ACTED
Afghan - German Help Coordination Office AGHCO
Afghan Health and Development Services AHDS
Aide Médicale Internationale AMI
ARE ARE
Afghanistan Reconstruction Movement ARM
ARU ARU
CARE International in Afghanistan CARE
Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance CHA
Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Center - Kandahar CHLC
Children in Crisis CIC
Coordination of Afghan Relief CoAR
Catholic Organisation for Relief and Development AID CORDAID
The Danish Afghanistan Committee DAC
Dutch Committee for Afganistan DCA
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations FAO
Focus Humanitarian Assistance FOCUS
Deutsche Welthungerhilfe -German Agro Action GAA
GOAL GOAL
193
Ghazni Rural Support program GRSP
Handicap International HI
Health Net International HNI
HOPE worldwide HOPE
International Assistance Mission IAM
IbnSina Public Health Program for Afghanistan IbnSina
International Committee of the Red Cross ICRC
International Medical Corps IMC
INTERSOS INTERSOS
Islamic Relief (United Kingdom) IR (UK)
International Rescue Committee IRC
ISAF CIMIC ISAF
JEN (Formerly, Japan Emergency NGOs) JEN
Japan International Cooperation Agency JICA
Mercy Corps MC
Medicos Del Mundo - Spain MDM
Médecins du Monde - France MDM-F
Médicos do Mundo - Portugal MDM-P
Medair Medair
Merlin Merlin
Malteser Hilfsdienst e.V. MHD
Medical Refresher Courses for Afghans MRCA
Médecins Sans Frontières MSF
Medecin Sans Frontieres (Holland) MSF-H
MARIE STOPES INTERNATIONAL MSI
Norwegian Church Aid NCA
NICCO NICCO
Norwegian Project Office-Rural Rehabilitation Association for Afghanistan NPO-RRAA
Ockenden International OI
Orphan Refugee and Aid ORA
Oxfam Oxfam
Pamir Reconstruction Bureau PRB
Pharmacists without borders PSF
Rehabilitation and Development Organization RDO
Relief International RI
Swedish Committee for Afghanistan SCA
SCFUSA SCFUSA
Page 8 of 14 Afghanistan Information Managment Service (AIMS)
Save the Children US SC-US
Sanayee Development Foundation SDF
Social Development And Health Care Organization SDHCO
Serving Emergency, Relief, and Vocational Enterprises SERVE
Shelter For Life SFL
Sandy Galls Afghanistan Appeal SGAA
Services organization for rehabilitation, vocational, agriculture, construction
and health in Afghanistan
SORVACH
Terre des hommes Tdh
United Nations International Drug Control Programme UNDCP
UN Habitat UNHSP
United Nations Childrens Fund UNICEF
United Nations Office for project services UNOPS
United Nations World Food Programme WFP
World Health Organization WHO
194
World Vision International - Afghanistan WVI
ZOA Refugee Care ZOA
Human Rights / Rule of Law
Organization Name: Acronym:
Association of Defenders of Youth Rights ADYR
Agency for Rehabilitation & Energy conservation in Afghanistan AREA
CARE International in Afghanistan CARE
Medecin Sans Frontieres (Holland) MSF-H
Norwegian Church Aid NCA
Norwegian Project Office-Rural Rehabilitation Association for Afghanistan NPO-RRAA
Oxfam Oxfam
Rehabilitation and Development Organization RDO
Save theChildren Sweden SCS
Save the Children UK SC-UK
Services organization for rehabilitation, vocational, agriculture, construction
and health in Afghanistan
SORVACH
Terre des hommes Tdh
United Nations Office for project services UNOPS
World Health Organization WHO
Shelter & Housing
Organization Name: Acronym:
Afghan Construction & Logistics Unit ACLU
Afghans for Civil Society ACS
Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development ACTED
ALISEI ALISEI
Agency for Rehabilitation & Energy conservation in Afghanistan AREA
ARU ARU
CARE International in Afghanistan CARE
Catholic Relief Services CRS
Focus Humanitarian Assistance FOCUS
Deutsche Welthungerhilfe -German Agro Action GAA
GOAL GOAL
Ghazni Rural Support program GRSP
German Technical cooperation GTZ
Humanitarian Assistance Network and Development HAND
INTERSOS INTERSOS
International Rescue Committee IRC
JEN (Formerly, Japan Emergency NGOs) JEN
KRO KRO
Mercy Corps MC
Medair Medair
MIKE FRASTACKY MIKE FRASTACKY
Norwegian Church Aid NCA
Norwegian Project Office-Rural Rehabilitation Association for Afghanistan NPO-RRAA
Ockenden International OI
People in Need Foundation PINF
Rehabilitation and Development Organization RDO
Sanayee Development Foundation SDF
195
Serving Emergency, Relief, and Vocational Enterprises SERVE
Shelter For Life SFL
SOLIDARITES SOLID
Samaritans Purse International Relief SPIR
Terre des hommes Tdh
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR
UN Habitat UNHSP
United Nations Childrens Fund UNICEF
United Nations Office for project services UNOPS
Voluntary Association for Rehabilitation of Afghanistan VARA
United Nations World Food Programme WFP
Water & Sanitation
Organization Name: Acronym:
Action Contre la Faim ACF
Afghan Construction & Logistics Unit ACLU
Afghans for Civil Society ACS
Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development ACTED
Afghan - German Help Coordination Office AGHCO
Afghan Health and Development Services AHDS
ALISEI ALISEI
ARE ARE
Agency for Rehabilitation & Energy conservation in Afghanistan AREA
ARU ARU
CARE International in Afghanistan CARE
Cesvi Cesvi
Child Fund Afghanistan CFA
Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance CHA
Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Center - Kandahar CHLC
Coordination of Afghan Relief CoAR
COOPI-Coperazione Internazionale COOPI
Catholic Organisation for Relief and Development AID CORDAID
Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees DACAAR
DHSA DHSA
Engineering and Medical Department for Afghanistan Development EMDAD
Focus Humanitarian Assistance FOCUS
Deutsche Welthungerhilfe -German Agro Action GAA
GOAL GOAL
Global Partners GP
Ghazni Rural Support program GRSP
Humanitarian Assistance Network and Development HAND
HOPE worldwide HOPE
International Assistance Mission IAM
International Committee of the Red Cross ICRC
INTERSOS INTERSOS
International Organization for Migration IOM
Islamic Relief (United Kingdom) IR (UK)
International Rescue Committee IRC
ISAF CIMIC ISAF
KDH KDH
Mercy Corps MC
Medair Medair
196
Malteser Hilfsdienst e.V. MHD
Medecin Sans Frontieres (Holland) MSF-H
Norwegian Afghanistan Committee NAC
NBR NBR
Norwegian Church Aid NCA
Norwegian Project Office-Rural Rehabilitation Association for Afghanistan NPO-RRAA
Ockenden International OI
Oxfam Oxfam
Peshawar Medical Services (Japan) PMS
PWJ PWJ
Rehabilitation and Development Organization RDO
Relief International RI
Swedish Committee for Afghanistan SCA
SCFUSA SCFUSA
Shelter For Life SFL
SOLIDARITES SOLID
Services organization for rehabilitation, vocational, agriculture, construction
and health in Afghanistan
SORVACH
Samaritans Purse International Relief SPIR
Terre des hommes Tdh
Tearfund TF
United Nations International Drug Control Programme UNDCP
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR
UN Habitat UNHSP
United Nations Childrens Fund UNICEF
United Nations Office for project services UNOPS
Voluntary Association for Rehabilitation of Afghanistan VARA
United Nations World Food Programme WFP
World Health Organization WHO
YRO YRO
Source: AIMS, Updated 9 October 2002
Save the Children Fund's activities on behalf of IDPs (March 2002)
•
Save the children's activities include health services, food distribution, non-food distribution, child
protection and education, as well as advocacy
"Save the Children has received £2.3 million to support its work in Afghanistan, £1.3 million of it coming
from DFID and ECHO. The International Save the Children Alliance is responding to the deepening
humanitarian crisis to ensure that the survival and protection needs of Afghan children are given utmost
attention over the coming months.
Operational Alliance members include Save the Children US, Save the Children UK and Save the Children
Sweden, with Save the Children US co-ordinating the overall response. There are currently around 200
Alliance staff carrying out programme work. Other Alliance members, such as Save the Children Norway,
Save the Children New Zealand, Save the Children Japan and Save the Children Canada are contributing
with financial and other support resources.
Health
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Save the Children is running three mobile health clinics in and around Mazar for the local community and
in four IDP camps. While three of the camps have now been dismantled, the clinics still serve the local
population. Another mobile health team is working in Mingajik District of Jawzjan Province. Health and
nutrition teams have carried out assessments in several districts, including the Shiram area and Sayad
district of Sar-I-Pol Province, Mingajik, and Mardyan in Jawzjan Province.
Food distribution
Save the Children is carrying out complementary food distribution to support WFP wheat distributions in
northern Afghanistan. Save the Children has distributed this food to communities to promote stabilisation
within them and to prevent the migration of people to IDP camps.
Non-food distribution
Save the Children is distributing shelter items, quilts, children's and women's clothing, and kitchen kits
through partner organisations to displaced people and local communities in North and South Afghanistan.
Child protection and education
Save the Children is running a child protection and education programme for displaced people on Pianj
island on the border of Afghanistan and Tajikistan. A child protection team has also completed assessments
of the IDP camps of Sakhi, Chimtal and Sar-I-Pol, and is advocating for Save the Children will work with
local youth groups as part of UNICEF's 'Back to School' campaign, and will cover children's education
needs in most of the districts of Sar-I-Pol Province.
Advocacy
Save the Children continues to lobby key organisations to urge them to address the conditions present in the
three major IDP camps of Sakhi, Chimtal and Sar-I-Pol. Save the Children is advocating for education
projects, special projects aimed at children and youths, and the distribution of non-food items to families
who continue to suffer from the cold." (SCF 20 March 2002)
United Nations Response to the humanitarian crisis
The role of the UN in the transitional period (October 2002)
•
UNAMA-led UN agencies are supporting the reconstruction priorities of Afghanistan, are responding
to continuing humanitarian needs with longer-term recovery and reconstruction strategies, and are
committed to the state-building priority.
"From mine action to training in information and communication technology, from refugee and IDP
reintegration to urban reconstruction, from vulnerability analysis to agricultural recovery, from counternarcotics strategy development to education, from food aid to labour-intensive programmes, the UNAMAled UN agencies are supporting the reconstruction priorities of Afghanistan, are responding to continuing
humanitarian needs with longer-term recovery and reconstruction strategies, and are committed to the statebuilding priority that has been emphasised in this meeting. A summary of the national achievements with
which the UN assistance community has been associated is provided in background documentation
available this morning to conference participants.
198
Briefly, Mr. Chairperson, I wish to make five points, on (a) transition principles; (b) the centrality of the
national budget; (c) UN support to national co-ordination mechanisms; (d) monitoring the nature and
quality of UN assistance; and (e) the relative value – or otherwise – of channelling international assistance
to Afghanistan through the United Nations.
1. Transition principles. UNAMA, and within it, the UN assistance community in Afghanistan, has agreed
with the government on a set of transition principles which will govern co-operation in the coming mo nths.
These principles commit the UN:
First, to continued and increasing emphasis on government capacity-building, or, as we have characterised
it in this meeting, to state-building, supporting national direction and management of the reconstruction
process and leading to a progressively lighter UN footprint in the country. Already today, the United
Nations family is seconding, or supporting the costs of, some 140 national and international personnel in
government institutions.
Second, to increased integration of UN programmes to maximise their effectiveness, synergy and focus on
nationally-defined priorities.
Third, working with the government of Afghanistan and through the national budget framework, towards
increased decentralisation of capacity and resources, to support sub-national government institutions and to
flexibly respond to community-defined local reconstruction priorities. Today, UN personnel are stationed in
13 locations outside Kabul. In agreement with the government, both numbers and locations of such
personnel will increase in the coming months.
Fourth, to further internal efficiencies and cost-effectiveness in the delivery of assistance. The aim is to
minimise project support costs, and maximise resources that go directly to capacity-building or to service
delivery to the Afghan population.
The combined application of these principles represents United Nations reform in action in Afghanistan.
2. Foundation of UN assistance activities on National Budget priorities.
We have recognised in this meeting the speed with which the government has outlined its vision, as framed
in the National Budget. The UN is committed to full support of the government of Afghanistan in this
process. The programme of UN assistance co-operation for 2003, known as the Transitional Assistance
Programme for Afghanistan, or TAPA, will be derived, in the next few weeks, from this budget discussion
and from the priorities it defines. The Assistance Programme will be strategic, will emphasise transparency
and accountability, and will provide the basis for a performance-based partnership and joint monitoring of
progress. This marks a significant advance when compared with the UN appeal for the current year, or
ITAP, prepared in December 2001.
3. Supporting national coordination mechanisms.
During the first nine months of 2002, UNAMA and its constituent agencies have moved well beyond the
mechanisms for self-regulation that characterised the recent past, and now support and contribute to
government-led co-ordination mechanisms. UN agencies are providing human and financial resources to
capacity-building entities in various government departments, and in particular to Programme Secretariats,
which assist government ministries and agencies in their leadership, policy development and co-ordination
roles. We welcome the proposed functional analysis of government institutions, which will enable the UN
to further refine and focus such support, as required.
Today, the UN supports the government in its donor-tracking and information management functions. The
UN-financed Afghanistan Information Management System (AIMS) and UN Joint Logistics Cell are no
longer housed within UNAMA, but co-located with government institutions. The UN is committed to
199
Afghan ownership of data collection, survey instruments and surveillance processes, and to supporting
national analytical capacity. At sub-national levels, Regional Co-ordination Bodies, long chaired by the
UN, are being replaced by Provincial Co-ordination Bodies, led by provincial authorities, with the UN now
playing a supportive role.
4. Monitoring and recording the quality and progress of UN assistance cooperation.
In recent months, the public domain has been full of commentary on the insufficiency of assistance to
Afghanistan, the lack of progress in reconstruction, the perceived shortcomings of the UN assistance
community in the country. Of course, more could have been done. But one of the problems that has fueled
this debate has been lack of regularly updated information on the role and contributions of external actors,
including the UN to nationally-led reconstruction endeavours. The UN aims to redress this information
vacuum, not by an upsurge of self-congratulatory propaganda, but by consolidation of a clear and
transparent joint programme of co-operation with the government of Afghanistan, by regular joint progress
updates and by periodic programme reviews with national counterparts, based on commonly-agreed
performance indicators - in other words, with a return to the accepted instruments which should regulate
UN co-operation in a sovereign country. The UN also has to do a better job of explaining what resources it
is bringing to Afghanistan, over and above those provided to the UN by donors through the Appeal process.
Agencies contribute tens of millions of dollars from their core resources, both to ongoing programmes, but
also to cover their operating costs and the costs of many hundreds of UN personnel working in
Afghanistan.
5. UN assistance: additionality to, or competition with, the National Budget?
Since well before the signature of the Bonn Agreement, the UN has subscribed to the premise that there can
be only one occupant of the driving seat in Afghanistan, and that is the government. We continue to
cooperate with the government to ensure its success in that role. Likewise, we have also stated, and
continue to state, that our objective is to work ourselves out of business, as Afghans assume ownership and
command of their own development and future. Yet there are many in Afghanistan who view donor
resourcing of United Nations programmes as directly competitive to direct funding of the government, or of
available Trust Fund mechanisms. The UN is supportive of the growth and expansion of these direct
funding mechanisms, and, as autonomous Afghan capacity grows, foresees the rapid evolution to a lighter
UN footprint, derived from the competitive advantages that it may have. Is multilateral assistance through
the UN competing with direct funding to government? To what extent would money that today goes
through the UN otherwise go directly to the government? It is to the donor community, rather than to the
UN, that the government must turn for answers to this question, to the issue of how much flexibility might
exist between various resourcing channels to Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the best that the UN can do - the
role that UNAMA is playing, and intends to play - is to ensure that any multilateral resourcing of UN
assistance co-operation in this country is used to reinforce national priorities and is used effectively and
efficiently, until such time as it is no longer needed. We do not agree with those who say that the
government has no control of resources channelled through the United Nations. We see partnership based
on results and performance, guided by national priorities and the national budget, as a very effective means
for Afghans to own their own development processes and to manage the collaborative relationship with
international partners." (UNAMA 17 October 2002)
ITAP projects merged into the National Development Framework (July 2002)
•
ITAP requirements have been reorganised into NDF categories.
•
Under the NDF, the 12 programme areas are clustered into three pillars: Pillar 1: Building Human and
Social Capital; Pillar 2: Physical Reconstruction and Natural Resources; Pillar 3: Private Sector
Development
•
Programme Groups have been formed in each programme area to bring together all actors. Each
Programme Group is guided by a lead ministry, and technically supported by a Programme Secretariat,
200
normally a United Nations (UN) Agency, multi-lateral institution or an Non-Governmental
Organisation (NGO) appointed to support and help manage the Programme Group.
•
UNAMA actively supports the Programme Groups and their Secretariats, to ensure that, over time,
increasing technical and planning capacity is transferred to ministries.
" [...] ITAP requirements have been reorganised into NDF categories.
Whereas initial ITAP requirements and assistance strategies for Afghanistan were formulated prior to the
appointment of the Afghan Interim Authority, the NDF reflects an initial national vision of how recovery
and development need to be directed. It provides a comprehensive framework for the programming and
coordination of assistance activities. These, in turn, are reflected within the National Development Budget,
which covers assistance funding channelled through the ITAP, the Trust Funds, bilaterally, and from
private sources. Under the NDF, the 12 programme areas are clustered into three pillars. ITAP projects and
project requirements have been inserted into these pillars as follows:
Pillar 1: Building Human and Social Capital including:
(i) return and reintegration of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees;
(ii) education and vocational training;
(iii) health and nutrition;
(iv) livelihoods and social protection; and
(v) cultural heritage, media and sport;
Pillar 2: Physical Reconstruction and Natural Resources including:
(i) transport and communications;
(ii) water and sanitation;
(iii) energy;
(iv) urban management; and
(iv) natural resource management;
Pillar 3: Private Sector Development including:
(i) steps taken in several related fields such as finance, investment, trade, and anticorruption.
To promote better coordination, Programme Groups have been formed in each programme area to bring
together all actors. Each Programme Group is guided by a lead ministry, and technically supported by a
Programme Secretariat, normally a United Nations (UN) Agency, multi-lateral institution or an NonGovernmental Organisation (NGO) appointed to support and help manage the Programme Group. The
Programme Secretariat is tasked to assist the government in developing strong operational coordination
mechanisms, to provide technical support in drawing up the National Development Budget, and to channel
resources to national capacity building. The process will culminate in a National Development Plan. To
date, eight Programme Groups have been established1.
Beyond the twelve programme areas, several cross-cutting themes are set out in the NDF that are meant to
be incorporated at all stages of programming. These are governance, community empowerment and
participation, the return and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced populations, gender, drug
control, peace building, and human rights. The Guiding Principles and Planning Assumptions of the ITAP
continue to influence the international community's engagement in Afghanistan. Cutting across the three
pillars identified in the NDF are administrative and financial reform, governance, law and order, security
and gender.
201
The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) actively supports the Programme
Groups and their Secretariats, to ensure that, over time, increasing technical and planning capacity is
transferred to ministries. By reflecting the requirements of Programme Groups, this update reflects an early
step in this direction.
erally relate to the National Development Programme as follows:
National
Development
Framework
Programme Secretariats
Corresponding ITAP Sectors
Refugees and IDP Return
Refugees, Returnees and Reintegration
Education and Vocational Training
Education
Health and Nutrition
Health; Nutrition
Livelihoods and Social Protection
Food Security, Agriculture and Environment; Governance (Local Governance and
Community-led Development; Food Assistance)
Culture, Heritage, Media and Sport
Governance (Revival of Cultural Heritage)
Transport
Infrastructure
Energy, Mining and Telecommunication
Infrastructure
Natural Resources Management
Food Security, Agriculture and Environment
Urban Management
Shelter, Housing and Urban Renewal; Employment;
Public Administration
Governance
Security and the Rule of Law
Governance (Security and Justice)
Unclassified
Coordination and Common Services
The sectors delineated in Part IV of this update are presented according to the NDF structure as outlined
above, and can be cross-referenced by the reader to the corresponding ITAP sectors listed." (UNAMA, 10
July 2002, pp. 1-3)
See also in the same document:
II. Strategic objectives
III. Critical needs and prority areas of intervention
IV. Priority areas of urgent assistance
A. Return of Refugees and IDPs
B. Livelihoods and Social Protection
202
C. Natural Resources Management
D. Urban Management
E. Health and Nutrition
F. Public Administration
G. Education and Vocational Training
H. Transport
I. Security and the Rule of Law
J. Culture, Media and Sport
For more detailed information on the United Nations assistance to Afghanistan, see:
Afghanistan: Humanitarian Issues in Transition - Implementation Group Meeting, UNAMA, 17 October
2002
ITAP update and summary of progress by National Development Budget Programme Area, UNAMA, 13
October 2002
Immediate and Transitional Assistance Programme for the Afghan People 2002, UN, 21 January 2002
Coordination of UN assistance (January 2002)
"The key to ensuring a coherent and effective international response to assistance needs in Afghanistan is a
wellresourced and effective coordination structure. The UN Coordinator’s Office (UNCO), is the hub of the
coordination effort. In 2002, coordination arrangements will expand on existing structures while adapting
to the establishment of the Interim Authority and will provide the coordination capacity for an integrated
UN mission under the leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. Support will be
provided to ensure integration of relief and recovery activities at the local as well the central levels. The
main objectives of the evolving coordination structures will be (1) to support principled common
programming in order to enhance the effectiveness of the international community’s assistance to
Afghanistan and (2) to provide planning support in the Deputy SRSG’s office.
Seven Regional Coordination Offices (RCOs) are UNCO’s regional centres of operation. The RCOs work
in close partnership with the Regional Coordination Bodies (RCBs) comprising all UN agencies and many
NGOs active in the region. RCOs work to build consensus amongst all players on priorities and strategies
for interventions in the region, manage UN relations with the local authorities and advocate on key
humanitarian issues. The RCOs support the delivery of common services in communications, security,
information analysis, logistics and coordination. UNCO’s efforts in coordination are ably supported by key
NGO umbrella groups provide an important interface for policy discussions between NGOs and the wider
humanitarian community.
Coordination offices have also been established in Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. These
small offices support the Resident Coordinators incountry on issues related to the provision of assistance to
Afghanistan, with a particular focus on maintaining humanitarian corridors into the country. The UNCO’s
office provides support and leadership to these offices.
The Public Information Unit will continue to produce regular information materials regarding economic,
social and development issues in Afghanistan, to participate in daily press briefings on Afghanistan under
the aegis of the UNIC, and to inform all stakeholders of the ongoing work of agencies in Afghanistan.
The Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN-Asia), which has provided intensive coverage of the
Afghan crisis over the past year, will establish a suboffice in Kabul staffed by an expatriate information
203
officer and local writers. In addition, as part of its broader advocacy programme, IRIN will provides
humanitarian news stories free of charge to reputable radio networks, provide key local partners with
technology for Internet access by satellite, and translate its Afghanistan reports into Pashtu and Dari
thereby giving local populations greater access to impartial reporting.
The UNCO currently provides coordination services for resource mobilization. The establishment of the
UN Assistance Mission is considered likely to impact the current arrangements for resource mobilization.
However, existing structures and systems will assist in ensuring that the humanitarian dynamic remains a
visible element of the overall UN response. Appropriate strategic planning, sector coordination, interagency communications and information management will be critical to the full integration of the
humanitarian and development perspectives into the short and longer term relief and recovery assistance.
To achieve this, advisory and programme support resources will be required in the Deputy SRSG’s office."
(UN 21 January 2002, p. 59)
Assistance gaps
Finding durable solutions for IDPs not high on the local and provincial authorities'
agenda (June 2003)
•
Local authorities have at times been less than cooperative in ensuring that that most camp IDPs have
basic shelter, access to potable water and basic healthcare, as well as minimal nutritional standards for
fear of creating poles of attraction in the camps or because they were intent on dispersing the IDPs
elsewhere.
•
Current IDP situation is one where the majority of IDPs that have been able to return have done so,
leaving a residual population made up primarily of IDPs unable or unwilling to return for the time
being and who are in need of durable solutions.
•
It appears that finding durable solutions for IDPs is not yet high on the agenda of key provincial
authorities.
"The overall conditions of the IDPs remaining in camps have improved considerably from conditions in
early 2002. UNHCR in partnership with UNICEF, WFP and the NGOs have succeeded in ensuring that
most camp IDPs now have at least basic shelter, access to potable water and basic healthcare, as well as
minimal nutritional standards. However, this has not always been an easy achievement as local authorities
have at times been less than cooperative for fear of creating poles of attraction in the camps or because they
were intent on dispersing the IDPs elsewhere. UNICEF has been particularly concerned over denial of
access to education in some instances for such reasons.
Therefore, given the prevailing security conditions, the current IDP situation is one where the majority of
IDPs that have been able to return have done so, leaving a residual population made up primarily of IDPs
unable or unwilling to return for the time being. The Government is therefore faced with the challenge of
creating enabling environments in areas of origin that will encourage IDPs to return or, alternatively, for
creating durable solutions for IDPs in their areas of displacement or elsewhere. In either case, the
Government is being encouraged by UNHCR and its partners to shift from a policy that has primarily
consisted of care and maintenance of IDPs to one that seeks longer-term and lasting solutions.
However, while the central Government has endorsed a National Reintegration Strategy with the declared
objective of mainstreaming returnees and has accepted the overall principle of streamlining the
reintegration of IDPs into national development programmes as a declared priority, it appears that finding
durable solutions for IDPs is not yet high on the agenda of key provincial authorities. There appears to be
little coordinated effort by such authorities to address IDP solutions, despite the continued attempts by
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UNHCR to engage with representatives of relevant ministries, governors’ offices and influential
commanders in the various regions, and particularly in the south. Greater priority, understanding and
cooperation by national authorities in addressing the gap between agreed policies and poor implementation
at the provincial level is, therefore, essential to finding durable solutions. International assistance actors
thus need to pay greater attention to such a gap." (Inter-Agency Missions 19 June 2003, p. 3)
Lack of objective, accurate and neutral information on conditions in areas of return
lead to renewed displacement (June 2003)
•
Repatriation packages offered by UNHCR may have propmted many to return too early.
•
Many IDPs claim they did not have access to objective, accurate and neutral information on the
conditions to which they were returning in their villages or places of origin.
•
Some were not aware that assistance from UNHCR would be discontinued after return.
•
Some displaced women were not provided with accurate information to help them make an informed
decision to return
"Amnesty International is of the opinion that, in “supporting refugee decision-making” in relation to return,
UNHCR should be mindful of the reinforcing effect its attempts to facilitate repatriation can have on the
making of these decisions. Many refugees and IDPs interviewed by Amnesty International said they did not
have access to objective, accurate and neutral information on the conditions to which they were returning in
their villages or places of origin. Amnesty International interviewed a group of Uzbek villagers, who had
fled to Pakistan to escape the persecution of Turkmen Taleban in their native Imansahib district, and who
then returned in August 2002 unaware that the same group of Turkmen, now allied to the Jamiat-e-Islami
faction, were still in control of the village and of their land. The Turkmen continue to threaten the Uzbeks,
who are now forced to live in ruined buildings on the outskirts of the village, and are still denied access to
their land. In another case, returnees at the brink of destitution in Kabul said they were unaware, at the time
they made the decision to return to Afghanistan from Pakistan, that the assistance from UNHCR would not
be continued once they had arrived in their country of origin. Many displaced women have also not been
given accurate and impartial information, provided to them in a manner which is accessible and culturallysensitive, in order to be able to make an independent decision on return." (AI 23 June 2003, p. 18)
Afghan authorities neglecting southern IDPs, international agencies need to address
their long-term needs (April 2003)
•
No concrete steps have been taken so far to find a strategy that would respond to the long-term needs
of IDPs in the south.
•
Most assistance has been in the form of addressing the immediate needs.
•
Being aware of the limitations of the governement's assistance, all international actors share
responsibility in finding durable solutions for the displaced Kuchis and Pashtuns.
•
OCHA's IDP Unit will undertake training to increase the government's capacity to deal effectively with
IDPs, but training/advocacy efforts will be necessary for many years.
"Most IDPs [in the south] have been living in limbo for over four years ever since the drought began to
decimate the nomads’ herds in the southern Reg. No concrete steps apart from the creation of Zare Dasht
(ZD) have been taken by the government or assistance actors to implement a strategy to find a durable
solution for the IDP population, and that was not until after the fall of the Taliban government and many
Pashtun IDPs arrived from the north. To be fair, given the large numbers, the continuing drought and
insecurity in the area and the lack of human and development resources, not much could be expected from
assistance agencies to deal with this large IDP group given the fact the rest of the population was and still is
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in need. All efforts to date in the south have been merely to address the immediate care and maintenance of
these vulnerable groups of IDPs. It can be argued that the main responsibility is with the Afghan authorities
as the legitimate authority. However, all actors working in the south have knowledge that the authorities do
not have the capacity, skill, or desire at this period of time to address the IDP problem in a way that
considers the needs of the IDPs before their political and personal economic advantage. As long as the
authorities show little interest to respond, a responsibility remains for the international actors to continue to
find ways through long-term investments and interventions to address the authorities to begin to find a
solution for the drought affected Kuchi and Pashtun IDPs from the northern provinces.
To add to the uncertainty for the future, UNHCR and other assistance actors, will not be able to continue its
assistance to IDPs to the same extent as it has in the past year and one half. Which organisation(s) will fill
UNHCR’s lead role will be an important question to answer? The OCHA IDP Unit will be involved in
trainings and increasing the understanding of government officials to be able to give priority and to deal
with the continued areas in need of assistance. It will also assist the government in developing an over all
strategy to assist IDPs in the future. Through advocacy it will keep the issue alive in the minds of
international donors as focus on Afghanistan decreases over time. As development activities improve in
some areas and the drought persists in others and Pashtun tribes and others continue to cause instability
with their anti-government efforts, more population movements will occur in a less secure environment.
Efforts to develop the capacity of Afghans to deal with these problems and to continue advocacy for IDPs
will be necessary over many years." (UNAMA 7 April 2003, pp. 1-2)
UN's strategy not effective in addressing the human rights situation (December 2002)
•
Partially due to the limited scope of ISAF, UNAMA has focused on maintaining short-term political
stability in Afghanistan with a minimum of U.N. involvement in human rights monitoring.
•
UNAMA human rights officials did investigate human rights abuses in various parts of Afghanistan
throughout 2002.
•
Persistent insecurity has made it at times impossible for the U.N. to offer meaningful protection to
persons at risk.
•
Reluctance of UNAMA to expose the human rights abuses of politically important Afghan actors has
contributed to the general sense of impunity surrounding the warlords.
•
UNAMA’s “light footprint” approach was not an effective approach in addressing the human rights
situation in Afghanistan.
•
International community should put more resources into monitoring humanitarian abuses and should
take measures to weaken the hold on power of warlords and other known human rights abusers.
"In Annex II of the Bonn Agreement the United Nations was given an affirmative right under the Bonn
Agreement to investigate human rights violations. However, UNAMA has not implemented a strong
strategy on human rights over the past year. Partially because of the limited scope of ISAF, UNAMA has
focused on maintaining short-term political stability in
Afghanistan with a minimum of U.N. involvement in human rights monitoring.
UNAMA human rights officials did investigate human rights abuses in various parts of Afghanistan
throughout 2002 and maintained a limited number of human rights monitoring staff in all regional areas.
UNAMA staff mediated many disputes between commanders and in a number of cases prevented local
armed conflicts from erupting. UNAMA human rights staff also intervened in several cases to protect
vulnerable persons and encourage warlords to change their conduct.
But UNAMA’s work was seriously hampered by the absence of adequate security forces beyond Kabul,
which made it difficult and at times impossible for the U.N. to offer meaningful protection to persons at
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risk. Afghans who wished to be politically active, open newspapers, challenge local authorities, or engage
in similar activities have often been too scared to act. Moreover,
UNAMA’s leadership was often reluctant to publish its findings openly or to highlight human rights abuses
by politically important Afghan actors. This contributed to the general sense of impunity surrounding the
warlords, and further disheartened Afghans who sought to sideline those abusing power.
Overall, UNAMA’s “light footprint” approach—limiting the number of international staff and increase
Afghan participation in reconstruction efforts—was not an effective approach in addressing the human
rights situation in Afghanistan. U.N. offices in the mission had an insufficient number of human rights
staff, and monitoring and investigation work has only been a modest priority. UNAMA continues to reject
suggestions to substantially increase the number and geographical breadth of U.N. human rights monitors
despite its unique mandate to carry out this work and the expressed desire of many Afghans for a greater
U.N. presence. UNAMA’s
human rights staff needs to be strengthened so that it can effectively report on abuses and intervene with
authorities to remedy and prevent them.
In addition, the United States and other external powers must begin to take measure to weaken the hold on
power of warlords and other known human rights abusers. For example, an expanded ISAF or U.S.-led
coalition forces could work with Afghan officials to take control of customs posts (for example, through an
internationally respected company) so that customs revenues flow directly into national coffers instead of
fuelling the illegal activities of warlords. The international community could also put more resources into
monitoring humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to ensure that it is not strengthening warlords.
The failure of the international community and UNAMA to give human rights greater priority has
contributed to the general sense of impunity in the year since the Bonn Agreement. For example, in Herat
Ismail Khan has consolidated his power, creating a mini-state in the west of Afghanistan
in which there is no dissent and his opponents have been threatened, tortured, and sometimes killed.
Warlords like Ismail Khan and others continue to literally get away with murder." (HRW 5 December
2002, pp. 7-8)
"Concretizing a protection response for Afghans in Afghanistan will be an ongoing pressing need for the
years to come. Given the frailty of the actual State structure and the ineffectiveness of national protection
mechanisms, the UN should transitorily respond to protection concerns while building the State’s capacity.
Rising situations have generally been addressed through information sharing, often originating at the
humanitarian operator level leading to eventual action (or reaction) by UNAMA (Pillar I and Pillar II).
This process has given way to a case-by-case scheme, which is slowly turning to a more systematic
approach in dealing with protection and security issues. However, situations reported have generally
reached critical levels and leave little room for preventive action. Generally, remedial action is required,
such as the physical transfer of persons from one place to another.
A protection/prevention strategy and action plan in favor of IDP rights needs to correspond to the various
phases of displacement as well as respond to the specific requirements by region and population. In cases
of return, adequate monitoring of protection indicators should take place – especially, given that return
conditions are not and have not been ideal, as national authorities are absent and cannot comply with
affirmative human rights obligations (obligation to guarantee).
Several documents on protection standards and monitoring forms have been produced for Afghanistan;
however, the actual implementation of these standards and monitoring exercises is not taking place on a
systematic basis. Field operators state that they do not have time to conduct the full monitoring exercises
and generally appeal to shortened formats or subjective observation. Thus, the monitoring being performed
is superficial and does not provide sufficient information to allow for the timely detection of deteriorating
207
conditions. Physical presence and monitoring in places of return (by the international community) become
particularly pertinent given the absence of national protection.
In relation to ongoing displacement, whether persons are scattered or aggregated in one site, a protection
strategy also needs to be adopted. For camp -like settings, standards should be homogenized and put in
practice nationally. Initial training and practical exercises can be led in a selected group of sites, as pilot
experiences. Additionally, on-site assessments can be conducted, so as to implement recommendations and
monitor progress. Ideally, local authorities could be involved.
In relation to scattered IDPs (particularly in urban settings), awareness campaigns should be conducted and
a focal office (such as a reception center) should serve as a clearinghouse for information. Even if actual
services are not rendered to IDPs, guidance and information can be extended. On high-risk individual
cases, a protocol can be put in place, involving pertinent agencies and UNAMA (Pillar I).
Though draft strategy documents mention the creation of protection networks and the establishment of
national legal frameworks for the protection of IDP rights, these initiatives are far from being realized.
Special efforts need to be conducted to develop these types of initiatives and ensure that protection
concerns are not just addressed on a reactive basis, but on a proactive and preventive foundation. UNHCR
expertise, through policy and operational protection guidance, can be a starting point for the construction of
a national protection system.
With the intention of systematizing the protection response and acquiring a lessons-learned capacity, a
working group could be established for the elaboration of strategies, their implementation and follow-up of
the suggested course of action. This group would have to ensure close linkage with the Human Rights
Commission, including the eventual establishment of the field offices, where complaints could be lodged
and processed (substantively). Coordination with Pillar I would be required." (UNAMA July 2002, pp. 34)
See also:
All Our Hopes Are Crushed: Violence and Repression in Western Afghanistan, HRW, 5 November 2002
Data collected on IDPs lacks uniformity and quality (July 2002)
•
Quality of IDP information produced by a variety of sources is deficient, not centralized and not
comprehensive.
•
UNHCR has concluded the pilot phase of an information processing system on IDPs, but with mixed
results so far.
•
Two major flaws need to be corrected in UNHCR's data gathering exercise: all data gatherers must
comply with the level of specificity that is desired, and the information needs to be updated regularly.
•
Information produced by IOM and NGOs should be compiled centrally for analytical purposes.
"Multiple sources provide IDP information; however, the quality of information is deficient and does not
offer a complete picture of the IDP situation. Moreover, formats are incompatible and the compilation and
cross-referencing of data is difficult. UN agencies and NGOs have held multiple meetings to try to
standardize information gathering tools, but efforts have unfruitful except for return registration exercises
in some regions. Further aggravating the issue, the information is not centralized, so it is dispersed in the
various regions. The standard gathering of information, data processing and ensuing analysis on IDPs
should be conducted under a joint framework that allows a proper characterization of the IDP crisis in
Afghanistan.
208
UNHCR has concluded – with mixed results – the pilot phase of an information processing system on IDPs.
If this information system is adequately updated, it will facilitate a general overview of the IDP situation.
This type of information system does not supplant more in-depth sub-national studies and surveys, which
are crucial for operative and evaluative purposes.
The UNHCR system is based on information gathering activity conducted by the Sub-Offices; currently,
UNHCR has five Sub-Offices, some of which have field offices or another type of regional presence
beyond the Sub-Office. The Sub-Offices are supposed to collect the information based on an IDP
Monitoring Spreadsheet that has 14 fields of information and enter the data on an Excel spreadsheet on a
monthly basis. This information should then be centralized in the UNHCR – OCM Afghanistan, and
processed by the Information Unit. The raw data can then be made available on Excel format and filtered
through standard formulas or otherwise manipulated. Ideally, once the data has achieved desired quality
standards, it could be handed over to AIMS in order to represent or portray the results through mapping.
As stated before, the pilot phase of this exercise has concluded. Though the results are useful to establish
the information system, they cannot be used conclusively for analytical purposes. Two major flaws need to
be corrected in the data gathering exercise: all data gatherers must comply with the level of specificity that
is desired, and the information needs to be updated regularly. On the first aspect, some of the sub-offices
are not specifying district level information, but simply reporting provincially. This level of generality
does not allow the required analysis, given the extreme variations within the Afghan provinces.
Furthermore, given the rapidly changing environment, which includes a lot of spontaneous returns and
movements, the updating of information is crucial. Currently, some of the information in the data base
dates back to 2001 while other data was captured in June 2002. The time lapse does not allow for
analytical comparison or follow up through time. Notwithstanding, both of these flaws can be overcome
and the information tool can be of utmost importance for UNHCR and for the rest of the agencies and
organizations belonging to the Returnee and IDP Programme Group. This UNHCR effort seems to be the
only nationwide and comprehensive effort currently under way.
Other important sources of information exist, for example IOM and various NGOs, compile statistics and
reports that can be useful. The information available should be compiled centrally for analytical purposes.
Some of it can be instrumental in assembling regional IDP profiles. The Secretariat could concentrate the
information, systematize it and make it available for consultation." (UNAMA July 2002, pp. 5-7)
See also:
Need to better integrate existing information on IDPs (June 2003) [Internal link]
Food insecurity persists as a result of the gap between humanitarian aspirations and
relief realities (May 2002)
•
There is a gap between humanitarian aspirations and relief realities and food security persists as a
result.
•
The problem is not so much one of resources (although key sectors remain under-funded) as much as
absorptive capacity.
•
Vulnerable populations themselves have limited capacity to access relief organizations because of
limitation in transportation, differences in language and culture and inadequate systems of governance
to link those who need with those who can assist.
209
•
Refugees [and IDPs] have based their decisions to migrate back in part based on expectations of
generous and sustained assistance to their home areas, expectations that have been fueled by media
broadcasts.
•
Few households have received adequate assistance to reverse downward trends in food security.
•
There remains a strong bias in relief distributions closer to urban areas and major road networks.
"There is a gap between humanitarian aspirations and relief realities (i.e., the nature, quality and quantity of
assistance actually reaching vulnerable households), and food security persists as a result. In this moment
of focused political will and attention, the problem is not so much one of resources (although key sectors
remain under-funded) as much as absorptive capacity. The resulting gap is as much due to the extreme
logistical challenges posed by the Afghan terrain as is it a holdover from years of limited assistance to
Afghanistan to build up the (international and national) capacity to manage relief assistance. While talent
abounds in Afghanistan (some of the world’s finest relief experts have been sent to manage operations in
the UN and NGOs in recent months), it is largely concentrated at the heads of agency level and in the urban
areas, particularly Kabul. Vulnerable populations themselves have limited capacity to access relief
organizations because of limitation in transportation, differences in language and culture and inadequate
systems of governance to link those who need with those who can assist, for example.
Prior to AIA, only a minority of drought and conflict affected households and communities in Afghanistan
were assisted with international aid. This was due to a combination of insecurity, political isolation,
inadequate donor support, and, to a lesser extent, poor information about the nature and distribution of
suffering in Afghanistan. Continued conflict in Afghanistan precluded access to some of the worst affected
communities living in front line areas, for example. Historic geo-political tensions in particular limited the
ability of international staff, including staff from USAID, to work in Afghanistan.
Since the events in the US of September 11, 2001 and the US-led bombing campaign in Afghanistan that
commenced in October 2001, humanitarian relief operations have increased exponentially. Donor pledges
of assistance have been broadcast widely and there has been a visible increase in the number of relief
workers, vehicles and offices, especially in urban centers in Afghanistan. The value of the Afghani
currency has been buoyed in part because of the expectations that the people of Afghanistan hold for the
humanitarian community. Refugees have based their decisions to migrate back to Afghanistan in part based
on expectations of generous and sustained assistance to their home areas, expectations that have been
fueled by media broadcasts.
All UN and NGOs in country have been challenged by these rapid increases of visibility, resources,
expectation and responsibilities. Some have managed better than others, and there are notable examples of
impressive humanitarian relief operations undertaken by national Afghan organizations, international
NGOs, the Red Cross and the United Nations agencies. The majority of households in the survey received
relief assistance this year, and most of this assistance was directed towards areas identified by the UN
(especially WFP’s vulnerability assessments) as being greatest in need. Food aid and emergency water
interventions had the most obvious impact on households in the focus group interviews.
Despite impressive results in humanitarian operations, however, few households have received adequate
assistance to reverse downward trends in food security. This is due to continuing challenges facing disasteraffected populations and relief organizations alike in remote areas, as well as inadequacies in the bundle of
assistance being provided (e.g. a limited depth and breadth of relief interventions). There remains a strong
bias in relief distributions closer to urban areas and major road networks. The capacity for delivering relief
assistance lags behind donor commitments and agency aspirations (as well as actual needs) because of
relief organization limitations in human, operational and logistical capacities, and (to a lesser extent) the
security challenges that the current conflict in Afghanistan poses for external actors." (Feinstein
International Famine Center May 2002, pp. 37-39)
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Relief operations too often l imited to urban areas and near roads networks (May 2002)
•
The misdistribution of relief efforts limit the quality of information about the broader distribution of
vulnerability to food insecurity, leading to an overrepresentation of urbanbased needs and an underestimation of needs in more remote areas.
•
The UN agencies remain resistant to inter-agency coordination at the provincial and sub-provincial
level; NGOs and relief agencies alike are wary of efforts by local authorities to coordination them
•
The clustering of relief operations in urban areas and road networks is one factor that limits vulnerable
populations’ access to relief organizations.
•
Lack of local political representation in urban areas can be particularly problematic for IDP
populations and can lead to exclusion from relief operations.
"Despite impressive increases in the proportion of households receiving assistance in recent months,
Afghanistan’s poor road and communication infrastructure limits the 'reach' of humanitarian organizations
in Afghanistan. Coupled with insecurity due to on-going coalition military operations and conflicts between
commanders of politicized ethnic groups and landmines, the pattern of relief operations in Afghanistan
remains biased towards urban areas and near road networks.
This misdistribution of relief efforts limit the quality of information about the broader distribution of
vulnerability to food insecurity, leading to an overrepresentation of urbanbased needs and an underestimation of needs in more remote areas. WFP’s helicopterbased rapid assessments have tried to overcome
this problem of information bias. However, the helicopter assessments have limitations of their own,
including security constraints that limit the time that teams can spend on the ground (e.g. 2 – 3 hours) and
the limited types of areas that are conducive to helicopter operations (e.g. those areas with flat expanses of
land as opposed to deep and narrow valleys or steep mountain areas.)
The clustering in urban areas should theoretically lead to better coordination of relief operations across
agencies. Despite a multitude of coordination mechanisms, however, there was little evidence of effective
coordination at the provincial and sub-provincial levels, except where extraordinary individuals had
exercised a degree of (positive) influence over the distribution of relief efforts. Even where needs were
identified, there was not an empowered entity in Afghanistan that could, in effect, order the redistribution
of relief efforts from one area to another. The AIA has yet to extend its reach outside of Kabul; the UN
agencies remain resistant to inter-agency coordination at the provincial and sub-provincial level; NGOs and
relief agencies alike are wary of efforts by local authorities to coordination them; and, donors are not
actively present in operational areas. Combined, these factors are contributing to an atmosphere of 'to each
his own', i.e., agencies are doing their best within their mandates, capacities and resources, fairly
unencumbered by the demands of coordination mechanisms.
[…]
The clustering of relief operations in urban areas and road networks is one factor that limits vulnerable
populations’ access to relief organizations. Other agency-imposed barriers also are limiting vulnerable
populations access to relief, e.g. security constraints that (international) organizations have put in place
(e.g. guards that block visitors from entering compounds, locating offices away from population centers),
language barriers between relief workers and local populations, etc. Local authorities play an important
role in facilitating (or not) communication between vulnerable populations and relief organizations, leading
to the exclusion from relief operations of populations that lack local political representation in urban areas.
This is particularly problematic for IDP populations." (Feinstein International Famine Center May 2002,
pp. 42-43)
NGOs complain on the lack of clarity of the coordination structure (April 2002)
211
•
NGO complaints on the lack of a clear picture of "who does what when" concerning coordination are
widespread.
•
A major problem built into the UN relief-development pillar of the UNAMA structure is the
integration of relief and development programmes and the same approach that it is taken in
coordinating both.
•
The result of the integration of relief and development into one coordination structure and the top-todown approach to humanitarian programmes, may be that the UN coordination is, in fact, out of sync
with the situation prevailing outside of Kabul.
"NGO complaints on the lack of a clear picture of "who does what when" concerning coordination are
widespread. Comments on the coordination situation range from comments as "a meetings' circus" to "a
coordination mess," and "the UN is trying to organise itself." At the time of the visit, several teams of the
World Bank were in the country and were holding meetings with Ministries, UN agencies, and NGOs.
These teams appeared to be part of a seventeen assessment missions plan, to visit Afghanistan. When and
how these assessments will feed into processes, such as the Afghan Planning Board and the related Afghan
Support Group, or other donor and coordination processes, were questions that nobody seemed able to
answer.
In fact, it appears to be quite impossible to obtain an overall picture of 'the plethora' of coordination
structures. Several senior UN staff were asked to provide such a picture on paper, for example in the form
of a diagram. Unfortunately, and perhaps typical for the state of play at this moment, basically no one was
able to provide this overview.
At present, the UN agencies are folded into the integrated UNAMA structure, led by SRSG Brahimi, with
two deputies: one for relief and developments, Nigel Fisher, and one for political affairs and security, Karl
Fisher. UNAMA will absorb all coordination activities carried out by UNOCHA and will be in charge of all
operations of the humanitarian and development activities of the UN, as well as taking over UNSMA (UN
Special Mission to Afghanistan), which has been dealing with political and civil affairs.
A major problem built into the UN relief-development pillar of the UNAMA structure is the integration of
relief and development programmes and the same approach that it is taken in coordinating both.
Humanitarian programmes, however, normally follow a bottom-up (coordination) process, starting at the
ground level. Long-term development process are exactly the other way around and start with focussing on
the structures that are supposed to ma nage them. At the moment, many donors and the UN seem oblivious
to this problem. Conferences, such as the Tokyo donor conference and the 4 March Afghan Support Group
meeting have been discussing the Afghan situation as if it requires a full-swing developmental approach,
while insecurity and a lack of access to certain parts of the country continue. The result of this attitude, and
the integration of relief and development into one coordination structure, may be that the UN coordination
is, in fact, out of sync with the situation prevailing outside of Kabul." (Ed Schenkenberg van Mierop 9
April 2002, p. 9)
Close links between UNAMA and the Afghan Interim Authority may reduce the
humanitarian space (April 2002)
•
With the re-emergence, albeit in a different form, of the Principle Common Programming (PCP) and
the Strategic Framework, NGOs are concerned about the reduced space that humanitarian workers can
operate in as political considerations might prevail over humanitarian concerns.
•
The result of the strategy to work so closely with the government is that there is no longer room for
criticism. Protection, human rights issues, and humanitarian principles will be swept under the carpet
in order to maintain good relations.
212
•
In the new coordination structure, the senior human rights adviser position will be erased since it is
found that all human rights work should be done outside the UNAMA.
•
NGOs have been asked to facilitate the Loya Jirga in various ways, including monitoring at the district
level and there is concern that it could seriously jeopardise their neutrality and non-political role.
"One issue that emerged in conversations with many non-UN and some UN staff is that of the reduced
space that humanitarian workers can operate in. UNAMA is supposed to be a political, peace-building
structure and a structure for coordinating humanitarian aid, as well as reconstruction and development aid.
NGOs have already pointed to the re-emergence of, albeit in a different form, the Principled Common
Programming (PCP) and the Strategic Framework. These are two frameworks or reference tools that were
developed in Afghanistan at the end of the nineties to ensure that political actors and humanitarian workers
were working towards the same endgoal, and which have also been critised by some NGOs as they found
that political considerations often prevailed over humanitarian concerns.
Advocates of the strategy to work exclusively with, and through, the Interim Authority would say that
UNAMA has no other option. For the first time in decades, Afghanistan has an internationally-recognised
government, the Interim Authority, and the UN needs to embrace it. How much it is embracing it appears,
for example, from the fact that as one senior aid official reported: "one UN agency has been producing
policy documents, which were later distributed as documents from the ACA."
A political body, however, that has to work with, and through, the government and, at the same time, needs
to assert the neutrality, impartiality, and independence of the humanitarian agencies that it coordinates, may
find itself in an internal conflict. The result of the strategy to work so closely with the government is that
there is no longer room for criticism. Protection, human rights issues, and humanitarian principles will be
swept under the carpet in order to maintain good relations.
For some three years UNOCHA’s coordinating structure included a senior human rights adviser, whose
role was to ensure that protection and human rights issues would be incorporated into assistance activities
and part of the coordination process. It has been decided that in the new coordination structure, this position
will be erased since it is found that all human rights work should be done outside the UNAMA.
The single scenario strategy could become a greater problem if the government changes at the end of June.
Afghanistan, outside Kabul, is a land ruled by warlords. They will try to influence the outcome of the Loya
Jirga, the traditional country-wide meeting of clan and tribal leaders, which is to take place in the coming
three months, starting this April and culminating in June. If the Interim Authority will not be the eventual
transitional government, the UN may well be seen as no longer credible in the eyes of the newly chosen
leaders, given its earlier strategy.
The UNAMA structure is keen on supporting the Loya Jirga process. NGOs have been asked to facilitate
the Loya Jirga in various ways, including monitoring at the district level. While several NGOs have pointed
out that this type of involvement would seriously jeopardise their neutrality and non-political role,
UNAMA (and the ACA) pointed to the political engagement of many of the same NGOs as they have taken
on advocacy roles. Since UNAMA has explained that funding is available for those NGOs that wish to be
involved, there is a risk that the process will attract particularly the more 'contracting' type of NGOs." (Ed
Schenkenberg van Mierop 9 April 2002, p. 11)
IOM criticized for its mismanagement of the IDP situation in Herat (April 2002)
•
UNHCR will assume overall responsibility for all displacement issues in the Afghan context in the
near future.
•
Wide criticism has been voiced over IOM’s mismanagement of the IDP situation in the region of
Herat. The quality of assistance programmes remained poor and protection issues were swept aside.
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"UNHCR will assume overall responsibility for all displacement issues in the Afghan context in the near
future. As in other crises, also in Afghanistan many uncertainties have surrounded the question of who is
mandated to ensure protection and assistance to IDPs. While on the headquarters level several processes
took place in recent years to clarify UNHCR’s mandate with regards to IDPs, the process in the Afghan
context has been based on political opportunism.
However, UNHCR is indeed best equipped to deal with IDPs In February, ethnic differences came up in the
North that required international protection expertise. In this case, UNHCR did not shy away from taking a
vocal stance although it led to tensions with the Interim Authority in Kabul.
The International Organisation for Migration (IOM), which has given itself a heavy operational role inside
Afghanistan, does not have the experience and expertise to manage IDP situations. Wide criticism has been
voiced over IOM’s mismanagement of the IDP situation in the region of Herat. The quality of assistance
programmes remained poor and protection issues were swept aside. It would suit IOM if it would decide to
review its operations inside Afghanistan through an external evaluation." (Ed Schenkenberg van Mierop 9
April 2002, p. 15)
Need for a common strategy on providing assistance and protection to IDPs (March
2002)
•
Humanitarian and development agencies have yet to adopt and implement a commo n, coherent
strategy on providing assistance and protection to IDPs.
•
This lacuna is even more critical today as Afghanistan prepares to reintegrate thousands of returning
refugees and IDPs.
•
The convergence and integration of return programs in favour of IDPs and refugees is not only
advisable but also inevitable as a distinction between refugess and IDPs will become artificial in the
return communities.
•
Mission recommends that UNHCR urgently formulate a comprehensive solutions strategy for IDPs
and returning refugees in close cooperation with its main operational partners and in consultation with
the national authorities.
•
Support provided to IDPs must be anchored into long-term protection programs being implemented by
all relevant organisations, such as UNHCR, UNICEF, ILO, IOM, UNIFEM, ICRC and the UNCO
human rights program.
•
The early involvement of UNDP and its development partners in the planning process of the
reintegration program is strongly advised.
"Despite some good information-sharing practices at regional and provincial levels, humanitarian and
development agencies have yet to adopt and implement a common, coherent strategy on providing
assistance and protection to IDPs, either at the point of displacement or in support of return.
This lacuna, which was identified in April 2001 as a major gap by the mission of the Senior Network for
IDPs, is even more critical today as Afghanistan prepares to reintegrate thousands of returning refugees and
IDPs. Under the current scenario, all concerned actors stress the need for common planning to effectively
support the return of these two groups, whose distinction will become artificial in the return communities,
including in terms of reintegration assistance packages. Therefore, the convergence and integration of
return programs in favour of IDPs and refugees is not only advisable but also inevitable.
With the arrival of new implementing partners, and the reinforcement of those with extended experience in
the country, the matrix of implementing partners and sectoral activities in Afghanistan is expanding
exponentially. Consequently, it is critical that support to IDPs and returning refugees not be delivered in a
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piece-meal manner if rehabilitation and reintegration programming is to be optimalized. It is incumbent
upon UNHCR, therefore, that it closely coordinates and fully integrates the return of IDPs into its broader
programming for refugee return.
To this effect, the Mission recommends that UNHCR, building on its initial plan, urgently formulate a
comprehensive solutions strategy for IDPs and returning refugees in close cooperation with its main
operational partners and in consultation with the Ministry of Repatriation and Reintegration. A protection
framework setting out the rights and mechanisms of which IDPs and returnees can avail to in their reintegration process should be an integral part of such a strategy. Strengthened inter-agency cooperation,
information campaigns for IDPs, institutional-building projects and the creation of a protection mo nitoring
capacity, are all fundamental ingredients of this concerted effort.
When formulating the strategy, agencies are strongly advised to draw on the Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacements as an overall framework in orienting their planning and policy development. Furthermore,
the strategy should serve as a blueprint for the coordination and monitoring role of the lead sectoral agency,
which ultimately is accountable for its effective implementation. Likewise, it should guide the work of all
operational partners by setting forth the overriding operational principles and standards of the reintegration
program, thus enabling uniform programming built upon a rights, needs and community-based approach.
If reintegration is to form the basis for a truly lasting solution, support provided to IDPs must be anchored
into long-term protection programs being implemented by all relevant organisations, such as UNHCR,
UNICEF, ILO, IOM, UNIFEM, ICRC and the UNCO human rights program. All these efforts should
converge into the common goal of reinforcing the national human rights system as ultimate guarantor, but
also as overseer of the State capacity to comply with its primary responsibility to protect all Afghan citizens
without distinction.
In light of the sheer size of the humanitarian and development needs, the Mission calls upon UNAMA and
all partner agencies to expeditiously complete the process of building-up their field capacity, thus enabling
the timely implementation of a protection-minded return and re-integration program. Likewise, it
underlines the importance of sustained and concerted donor support to UNAMA, its operational partners,
and the emergent Afghan authorities in this major endeavour.
In order to ensure a smooth transition between rehabilitation and longer-term development, the early
involvement of UNDP and its development partners in the planning process of the reintegration program is
strongly advised. However, the Mission was alerted of the slowness in which this process was taking place
at the field level. Thus, during its field visit, the Mission seized the opportunity to encourage agencies,
especially UNDP and FAO, to strengthen their support to humanitarian/development actors for the early
rehabilitation efforts." (IDP Unit-OCHA 28 March 2002, pp. 4-5)
Long-term development plans should be drawn before return takes place (February
2002)
•
The repatriation package proposed by UNHCR for returning refugees and displaced persons includes
transportation, food, shelter materials, and miscellaneous items.
•
Longer-term development aid should be factored into the services available for returnees and their
communities from the beginning to help ensure that they become economically self-sufficient and selfsustaining.
•
UNHCR's rapid build-up and focus on displaced persons has caused friction with other international
organizations in Kabul which resent what they see as a lack of UNHCR collaboration with other
agencies.
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"UNHCR's tentative 2002 plans are to facilitate the repatriation of 400,000 refugees from Pakistan and
400,000 from Iran and the return to their homes of 700,000 displaced persons. The International
Organization for Migration (IOM) will also play an important role in helping with the return of refugees
and displaced persons.
[…]
The repatriation package proposed by UNHCR for returning refugees and displaced persons includes
transportation, food, shelter materials, and miscellaneous items, as required, such as seeds and agricultural
tools. UNHCR will also undertake Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) – short-term investments to generate
income for returnees, dig wells, etc.
However, a successful return program will also require long-term economic development assistance to help
returnees and their communities become economically self-sufficient. The lesson learned from large-scale
refugee returns in Cambodia in the early 1990s is that a partnership is needed between UNHCR and UNDP,
with the latter focusing on community development in regions where large numbers of refugees and
displaced persons are returning. Many of the returnees will be going back to the poorest, most conflictive,
and drought-impacted areas of Afghanistan. Longer-term development aid should be factored into the
services available for returnees and their communities from the beginning to help ensure that they become
economically self-sufficient and self-sustaining.
In preparation for the repatriation program, UNHCR Afghanistan has built up its staff quickly in Kabul and
other Afghan cities and is now one of the largest and strongest UN agencies in the country. UNHCR's rapid
build-up and focus on displaced persons has caused friction with other international organizations in Kabul
which resent what they see as a lack of UNHCR collaboration with other agencies. However, whatever its
sins may be, UNHCR is the best-prepared and best-qualified lead agency for displaced persons in
Afghanistan.
Hopefully, the UN Secretary General's recent appointment of a Deputy Special Representative for
Humanitarian Affairs will result in concrete steps to foster coordination among UN agencies and donors.
Uncertain, however, is the division of responsibilities of the Deputy Special Representative with the
UN/OCHA humanitarian coordinator. Clarity should be sought quickly" (RI 8 February 2002)
Recommendations
Inter-Agency mission recommends that UNDP take the lead in finding durable
solutions for the non-protection residual IDPs (June 2003)
•
UNHCR is advocating for a shift to a more comprehensive development oriented strategy for IDPs
who remain affected by loss of livelihoods.
•
It has proposed to the Government that responsibility to seek and implement longer-term solutions for
the non-protection IDPs - primarily the Kuchi and other drought displaced - be vested with MRRD and
supported by UNAMA in close collaboration with the development community.
•
Government has commit itself to include IDPs into national development programmes, but it remains
reluctant, however, to set up special programmes for local integration of IDPs.
•
UNDP’s presence is required at the provincial level - in Kandahar especially - in order to galvanize the
relevant organizations into an integrated programme approach in support of the provincial authorities’
implementation of durable solutions for the displaced.
•
Inter-agency mis sion recommends that UNDP provides the operational leadership, in close
coordination with other development agencies and NGOs, for finding durable solutions for the nonprotection residual IDPs.
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"While UNHCR remains fully committed to assisting MoRR in IDP care and maintenance and is looking
for return solutions for the remaining protection IDPs, it is advocating for a shift to a more comprehensive
development oriented strategy for IDPs who remain affected by loss of livelihoods. It has proposed to the
Government that responsibility to seek and implement longer-term solutions for the non-protection IDPs primarily the Kuchi and other drought displaced - be vested with MRRD and supported by UNAMA in
close collaboration with the development community. The Government has yet to endorse this shift in
policy. Given that large sectors of this IDP population are unable and/or unwilling to return to traditional
pastoral livelihoods, and consequently will need to be integrated among local populations, it is necessary
that the required ‘development’ responsibilities are assumed by the development actors - MRRD and
relevant line ministries in partnership with UNDP, FAO, ILO, UN Habitat, other appropriate UN agencies
and NGOs.
Initial response by MRRD to UNHCR’s proposal has been to commit itself to mainstreaming those IDPs
unable to return to their traditional livelihoods into national development programmes. It remains reluctant,
however, to set up special programmes for local integration of IDPs. Clearly some middle ground must be
found since the national development programmes such as NEEP, NSP, NABDP and NCP, are slow to get
off the ground and are unlikely to impact areas of Kuchi IDP concentrations for some time to come. In the
interim, the Kuchi Commission in MRRD Kabul must broaden its membership to include all actors that can
support the integration and mainstreaming of Kuchi into Afghan society.
The mission was frequently advised by informants at the provincial level of the limited visibility of the
development community outside of Kabul. UNDP was especially singled out. The mission was pleased to
learn that regional advisors are now being deployed by UNDP’s NABDP to strengthen the capacities of
MRRD, and that NEEP is posting professional staff into each provincial administration. However, it is
unlikely that these interventions will have any tangible impact on finding durable solutions for IDPs as part
of larger community-based programmes. UNDP’s presence is required at the provincial level - in Kandahar
especially - in order to galvanize the relevant organizations into an integrated programme approach in
support of the provincial authorities’ implementation of durable solutions for the displaced. Likewise,
UNDP has an important role to play in support of MRRD in other IDP concentrations in the west and north.
The MOUs between UNHCR and UNDP, UNHCR and UNICEF, the current joint initiatives on the 4Rs
Repatriation, reintegration, rehabilitation and reconstruction in other post-conflict countries, and the
ongoing discussions of the UNDG-ECHA Transitional Working Group, all clearly define the roles that
should be assumed by the development community in addressing displacement issues in the broader longerterm recovery context. Therefore, the mission recommends that UNDP provides the operational
leadership, in close coordination with other development agencies and NGOs, for finding durable
solutions for the non-protection residual IDPs. Working with MRRD and the Consultative Group on
Livelihoods, and linked to the NABDP, UNDP should facilitate the integration of IDPs into host
communities through targeted development initiatives to those communities that are willing to have IDPs
integrate among them." (Inter-Agency Missions 19 June 2003, pp. 15-16)
Inter-Agency mission recommends establishment of a small task force to assist the
Gov. develop a policy and operational strategy for durable solutions for all IDPs (June
2003)
•
UNAMA has a responsibility for advocating for and coordinating UN system programming, but
limited capacity of the office has resulted in little success in promoting integrated programming.
•
UNAMA has proposed that a small task force represented both at the Kabul (policy) and provincial
(operational) levels be immediately established to assist the Government develop a policy and
operational strategy for durable solutions for all IDPs that are unable or unwilling to return.
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•
Inter-Agency mission recommends that this task force be immediately established, including
representation from the NGO community, to assist Government define a durable solutions strategy for
all IDPs.
•
It also recommends that UNAMA intervenes at the highest level of Government to ensure that
President Karzai’s stated aims of solving the country’s IDP problem be translated into concrete actions,
while ensuring that the rights of IDPs are fully respected.
"While UNAMA remains a non-operational mission, it has a responsibility for advocating for and
coordinating UN system programming. However, its attempts at promoting integrated programming, much
desired by the donors, have so far met with only limited success. In part this is due to the limited capacity
of the office. Hence, based on UNHCR’ proposal that UNAMA takes on a more prominent role in the
search for longer-term durable solutions for the non-protection IDPs, UNAMA has accepted to promote as
a first step the integrated programming of the operational agencies, especially UNDP, UNHCR, UNOPS,
UNICEF and WFP. It should also consider including some ‘development’ NGOs. Consequently UNAMA
has proposed that a small task force represented both at the Kabul (policy) and provincial (operational)
levels be immediately established to assist the Government develop a policy and operational strategy for
durable solutions for all IDPs that are unable or unwilling to return. The mission therefore recommends
that this task force be immediately established, including representation from the NGO community, to
assist Government define a durable solutions strategy for all IDPs, with special reference to those unable
or unwilling to return to areas of origin. This UN system task force should feed directly into the
Consultative Group on Refugees and IDP Programmes and aim at having an integrated durable solutions
strategy in place by August. OCHA’s Internal Displacement Unit could provide short-term assistance to
the task force if this is required. The planning of programmes has, to date, often remained restricted to UN
agencies and Government officials. By bringing in the NGOs into planning and design of programmes at
an earlier stage, the chances of successful implementation could be greatly enhanced
UNAMA must also continue playing a key advocacy role on behalf of IDPs. The mission therefore
recommends that UNAMA intervenes at the highest level of Government to ensure that President
Karzai’s stated aims of solving the country’s IDP problem be translated into concrete actions, while
ensuring that the rights of IDPs are fully respected. " (Inter-Agency Missions 19 June 2003, pp. 16-17)
Need to better integrate existing information on IDPs (June 2003)
•
There is a need for the various databases on the IDP situation to be integrated, together with other
relevant databases such as those from the NGOs, in order to build a clearer and more comprehensive
picture of vulnerability.
•
Role of AIMS in information gathering and dissemination could be significantly strengthened.
•
Inter-Agency mission recommends a heightened level of information gathering and dissemination by
AIMS on behalf of the UN system and that UNAMA officers in the field ensure a systematic and
proactive dissemination of information that would benefit all UN agencies and NGOs working in
camps or areas of return.
•
UNAMA’s Senior IDP Advisor has played a key role in monitoring and reporting on the on-going IDP
situation.
•
Mission recommends that this post be maintained for another year and that the recruitment of three
national assistants be expedited.
"One area where the mission believes UNAMA can strengthen its activities is in information gathering and
dissemination. There appears to be a widespread consensus that the role of AIMS could be significantly
strengthened. While UNHCR, IOM, WFP and UN Habitat, as well as MoRR, all have extensive databases
on the IDP situation, there is a need for these to be integrated, together with other relevant databases such
as those from the NGOs, in order to build a clearer and more comprehensive picture of vulnerability, as
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well as identifying where, who, when and how agencies are addressing IDP needs within communities..
The mission also heard concern about the level of detail and timeliness of UNAMA’s dissemination of
information, especially at the field level. Therefore the mission recommends a heightened level of
information gathering and dissemination by AIMS on behalf of the UN system and that UNAMA
officers in the field ensure a systematic and proactive dissemination of information that would benefit all
UN agencies and NGOs working in camps or areas of return. Responsibility for this should rest with
UNAMA management in Kabul as well as with the heads of all UNAMA field offices. There should also
be stronger linkages established between AIMS and the Central Office for Statistics.
Over the past six months, UNAMA’s Senior IDP Advisor has played a key role in monitoring and reporting
on the on-going IDP situation. While based primarily in Kandahar, he has also covered the rest of the
country where IDPs are located. The mission recommends that this post be maintained for another year
and that the recruitment of three national assistants be expedited. However, in the light of some of the
recommendations made in this report, it will be necessary to review and adjust the TORs of the Senior IDP
Advisor. It will also be necessary to clearly define the working relationships with UNHCR that the national
assistants are expected to assume. The mission concurs that these three assistants will be posted to Mazar,
Kabul and Kandahar. With the placement of these assistants, the Senior IDP Advis or will be in a better
placed to spend more time in all areas with IDPs. With the proposed shift in responsibility for longer-term
solutions for the non-protection IDPs from UNHCR to UNAMA and the development actors, the Senior
IDP Advisor will also have an additional responsibility of ensuring that coordination among UN actors and
between them and the relevant national and provincial authorities is sustained." (Inter-Agency Missions 19
June 2003, pp. 16-17)
Government and international community should address the long-term needs of the
displaced (June 2003)
•
MoRR, MRRD, MBTA (Ministry for Border and Tribal Affairs) and local authorities are responsible
for developing strategies for local integration or relocation for IDPs that have no intent or ability to
return to areas of origin.
•
IDP groups most concerned are the Kuchis and the Pashtuns from north and northwest.
•
Inter-Agency mission recommends that the Government, together with the international community,
address the full range of options for durable solutions simultaneously, determine which options are
most appropriate for specific IDP groups, and make provisions for access to land where necessary.
•
It also recommends that every effort be made to implement the agreed principle to include IDP
populations, whether in areas of return or in process of being integrated locally, into national
development programmes such as NEEP, NSP, the NABDP and the soon to be initiated National
Credit Programme (NCP).
"[...], it is incumbent upon the MoRR, in close collaboration with the MRRD, the Ministry for Border and
Tribal Affairs (MBTA) and local authorities, to develop strategies for local integration or relocation for
IDPs that have no intent or ability to return to areas of origin. The international community, and especially
UNHCR, UNDP and UNAMA must strongly advocate for the acceptance of such durable solutions and for
the authorities to provide the necessary access to land to make integration feasible while keeping in mind
the ‘do no harm principles’. This would primarily address the Kuchi, albeit there are many IDPs from the
north and northwest who will never be able to return for fear of retaliation for actual or alleged past
political affiliation or crimes.
The mission therefore recommends that the Government, together with the international community,
address the full range of options for durable solutions simultaneously, determine which options are most
appropriate for specific IDP groups, and make provisions for access to land where necessary. It is
proposed that the Consultative Group for Refugees and IDPs, together with the Consultative Group on
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Livelihoods, be responsible for following up on this recommendation. At the same time, the phasing out of
relief assistance should be gradual, synchronized, and coordinated with the introduction of these long-term
initiatives in order to avoid the oft-noted ‘gap’ between relief and development interventions.
The mission also recommends that every effort be made to implement the agreed principle to include IDP
populations, whether in areas of return or in process of being integrated locally, into national
development programmes such as NEEP, NSP, the NABDP and the soon to be initiated National Credit
Programme (NCP). It is suggested that this need be placed on the agenda of the Consultative Group on
Livelihoods by MRRD in close collaboration with UNAMA and UNHCR. The Senior IDP Advisor in
UNAMA should sustain close working relationships with the project managers of the above programmes to
ensure the IDP agenda is being actively addressed by the respective managers while reporting to the UNCT
regularly on progress made and/or unresolved issues." (Inter-Agency Missions 19 June 2003, pp. 6-7)
Conditions in areas of return should be better monitored and IDPs should be better
informed (June 2003)
•
In west and south local authorities push for IDP return to areas of origin and are reluctant to support
any moves for local integration of those who are determined not to return to their areas of origin.
•
Inter-Agency mission recommends that MoRR, in close collaboration with UNHCR, expedites the
systematic re-profiling of existing IDP population and, where necessary, undertake additional
screening in order to specifically identify protection IDPs who are unwilling and/or fearful of returning
to areas of origin in the current climate.
•
By international standards it is unacceptable for the international community to promote movements to
areas where returning individuals will likely be exposed to serious human rights violations.
•
The mission recommends that the humanitarian community continue to provide potential returnees
with current and accurate information on prevailing security and livelihood conditions in areas of
origin. It also recommends that as an integral part of any return facilitation all operational agencies
and NGOs working in sensitive areas reinforce their responsibility for monitoring the outcome of these
returns under the coordination of MoRR and UNHCR.
•
Any return or relocation must be on a voluntary and informed basis.
•
It is recommended that advocacy for, and support to the Return Commission be heightened among the
international community, including donors, and that the Commission be encouraged, through its
Mazar-based Working Group, to consult with NGOs and broader sections of the community, including
women and children, regarding current conditions, return scenarios and community needs.
"With respect to the protection cases that are currently in the south and west, it is clear that local authorities
are resolute that these IDPs return to their areas of origin. In the west, this is primarily because of their
ethnicity. Indeed, the authorities appear to be placing pressure on people to return regardless of the
prevailing situation at their places of origin. In the south, where the protection IDPs are of the same
ethnicity as the local population, the reason for wanting them to return is to prevent any legitimization of
the displacement of predominantly Pashtun communities from the north and northwest. The latter position
was strongly reinforced to the mission by the Governor of Kandahar and his senior advisors despite the fact
that many displaced from the north have clearly indicated their wish to remain in the south. The
implication of this in both the west, and especially in the south, is that local authorities remain reluctant to
supporting any moves for local integration of those who are determined not to return to their areas of
origin.
Given the above scenario, the mission recommends that MoRR, in close collaboration with UNHCR,
expedites the systematic re-profiling of existing IDP population and, where necessary, undertake
additional screening in order to specifically identify protection IDPs who are unwilling and/or fearful of
returning to areas of origin in the current climate. Such data will more clearly identify IDPs for whom
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alternate durable solutions need to be sought while maintaining their rights to return and property and
kinship rights. It will also identify IDPs for which continuing assistance will be required pending the
Government and the international community finding other means to sustain them as they await return.
Responsibility for this task has been allocated to Consultative Group on Returnee and IDP Programmes
(see Annex 2 for TORs of this Consultative Group).
While by international standards it is unacceptable for the international community to promote movements
to areas where returning individuals will likely be exposed to serious human rights violations, an obligation
is still placed on international actors to ensure that any IDPs wishing to return to their areas of origin do so
in a well-informed manner and that their return is voluntary. Hence, the mission recommends that the
humanitarian community continue to provide potential returnees with current and accurate information
on prevailing security and livelihood conditions in areas of origin. It also recommends that as an
integral part of any return facilitation all operational agencies and NGOs working in sensitive areas
reinforce their responsibility for monitoring the outcome of these returns under the coordination of
MoRR and UNHCR. As such, operational UN agencies and NGOs need to ensure their programmes
incorporate protection elements and build stronger linkages with UNAMA’s human rights monitors and
with the Independent Afghan Human Rights Commission. The mission proposes that UNHCR, in
collaboration with UNAMA’s human rights monitors, be responsible for the increased dissemination of
information on conditions in areas of return and facilitates return where appropriate. In order to be able to
successfully undertake this role, the human rights monitoring and protection role that UNAMA needs to be
strengthened, particularly at the provincial level.
Any return or relocation mu st be on a voluntary and informed basis. Information regarding humanitarian
assistance, about conditions in areas of origin, and related to return or relocation must be provided in a
timely manner to those in the camps/settlements. The local authorities and UNHCR must take a lead in
ensuring that the rights of IDPs to information is respected.
Given the critical need for the creation of enabling environments for return in the north, it is recommended
that advocacy for, and support to the Return Commission be heightened among the international
community, including donors, and that the Commission be encouraged, through its Mazar-based
Working Group, to consult with NGOs and broader sections of the community, including women and
children, regarding current conditions, return scenarios and community needs. It is proposed that the
Consultative Group on Returnee and IDP Programmes be responsible for mobilizing further support to the
commission and broadening its web of consultative partners. UNHCR should follow-up on this
recommendation, including with donors, and that UNICEF assists in ensuring that the voices of women and
children are heard by the Return Commission Working Group." (OCHA IDP Unit 19 June 2003, pp. 9-10)
UN Security Council and UNAMA should clarify their strategies on human rights and
aid conditionalities (August 2002)
•
Contrary positions by the UN Security Council and UNAMA regarding aid conditionalities is affecting
the credibility of both, but foremost of the protection of human rights in Afghanistan.
"The consternation generated by the contrary positions of the Security Council and UNAMA regarding aid
conditionalities is having an especially deleterious effect on the credibility of both, and perhaps upon the
protection of human rights in Afghanistan too. The confusion concerning the human rights monitoring
arrangements and lack of progress on the establishment of the Independent Human Rights Commission
warrants urgent attention.
a. The UN Security Council and UNAMA should clarify their strategies on human rights and aid
conditionalities. It is quite conceivable that there may be irreconcilable differences between the Security
Council and UNAMA, and between UN agencies, donors, NGOs and the AIA/ATA. It is better that these
221
are acknowledged and then managed on an “agree to disagree” basis, than to allow critical amounts of
senior management time to be swallowed up in the politics allowed by the current confusion.
b. The independence of the Human Rights Commission should be reviewed. If it is to be in fact a
government led commission, it is inappropriate for it to be called “independent”. If instead the spirit of the
Bonn Agreement is to be upheld, the composition of the Commission needs reconsidering and adequate
international support should be availed rapidly.
c. The human rights monitoring arrangements are confused and unsatisfactory. The decision to place the
human rights monitoring function in Pillar One, reporting to the SRSG’s office should be reviewed. The
possibility of merging the two monitoring capacities under a revitalised and genuinely independent Human
Rights Commission should be considered." (AREU August 2002, p. 4)
IDPs unable or unwilling to return have specific protection needs (July 2002)
•
When returning refugees and IDPs are in the same areas, the integrated approach seems adequate.
•
However, when IDPs cannot or are unwilling to return and once most refugees have returned, IDPs
could be isolated and ostracized.
•
As long as IDPs are returning, their treatment can and should be analogous to returnees, but if they
cannot return they will face a different reality and mechanisms need to be put in place to ensure the
realization of their rights as well as satisfaction of needs.
"Given the generalized problem of forced human mobility, amongst other reasons, agencies working in the
field have opted for an integrated response to both returnee and IDP needs and rights. In as much as
returnees and IDPs can be found in proximate if not the same areas, the integrated approach seems adequate
– particularly when undertaking return processes. For the immediate and mid-term future, IDPs in this
situation would be adequately protected under the analogous application of refugee standards and practice.
However, caution should be taken with regards to those IDPs that cannot or will not return to their place of
origin. As time goes by, and the returnee/refugee caseload diminishes and the bulk has surpassed the initial
reintegration period, IDPs could be isolated and ostracized. In the absence of their refugee counterparts and
the operations on their behalf, IDPs could face severe discrimination and simply be marginalized.
The manifestation of this concern is not meant to advocate for the creation of a special task force on behalf
of IDPs, but rather to underscore the importance of addressing particular IDP issues within the Programme,
which is currently immersed in responding to a massive return operation and ensuring proper reintegration.
To conclude, as long as IDPs are returning, their treatment can and should be analogous to returnees. Upon
return these two groups are likely to face similar rights conflicts – involving economic, social and cultural
rights, as well as civil and political rights – that will require adequate resolution. However, if IDPs cannot
or choose not to return, they will face a different reality and mechanisms need to be put in place to ensure
the realization of their rights as well as satisfaction of needs. This caveat is especially relevant provided the
weakness (or non-existence) of national protection mechanisms. Where international protection is clearly
defined on behalf of refugees/returnees, it is not clear vis a vis IDPs.
This predicament presents one of the most important challenges for the Programme Secretariat, in its
coordination role. The protection of IDPs that cannot or choose not to return will demand a differentiated
set of actions as well as a different response on behalf of the government." (UNAMA July 2002, p. 2)
222
Government's response on behalf of IDPs need to be strengthened (July 2002)
•
So far the primary responsibility of the response to IDPs and returnees has fallen on UNHCR , other
UN agencies and NGOs.
•
The extreme politicization of the central government has not facilitated further advancement of
capacity-building activities.
•
Cooperation has primarily concentrated on providing the Ministry and its provincial counterparts with
resources and some training. However, self-reliance and administrative capacity have not been
targeted.
•
Office of Disaster Preparedness (ODP) could offer some practical advantages over the Ministry of
Repatriation, including: a reportedly successful operational history, and smaller in size and politically
less controversial.
"Until now the response to IDPs and returnees has concentrated on meeting the basic needs of the affected
populations. Though government entities, particularly the Ministry of Repatriation, have been present, the
primary responsibility has fallen on UNHCR, other UN agencies and NGOs. Plans of action and
institutional goals have not been set to strengthen the government’s role and responsibility, but rather to
respond to the most pressing needs and the seek the protection of the most vulnerable populations.
The recent restructuring of the State and transitory nature of the Ministry of Repatriation (given its
mandate) has not assisted in providing a clear picture as to which entity should be the object of institutional
strengthening programmes or what methodology to follow. Another aspect that has not facilitated further
advancement of capacity-building activities is the extreme politicization of the central government.
Given the recent establishment of the Transitional Authority, it is an opportune time to structure a longerterm capacity building plan. Until now, cooperation has primarily concentrated on providing the Ministry
and its provincial counterparts with resources and some training. However, self-reliance and administrative
capacity have not been targeted.
The adoption of a plan, as called for under the LoU, should be a mid-level priority. However, an adequate
institutional assessment should be conducted of all alternatives available within the governmental structure,
before decisions are taken.
For example, the transitory or shifting nature of the Ministry of Repatriation needs to be clarified. For
example, if a successful governmental transition is completed, will the Ministry of Repatriation still
respond to the displacement caused by drought? Should a special operative unit be created within the
Ministry or should other existing units be targeted? How should the decentralization process be tackled,
given the extreme politicization of the regional appointments?
There are other entities that could be targeted as part of a program aiming at strengthening the
government’s response on behalf of IDPs. For example: The Office of Disaster Preparedness (ODP). The
OPD was established in 1971 as a department within the Executive. It worked as an operational response
unit until 1992, when its response weakened. Currently, UNDP is leading a small capacity-building pilot
within the ODP. It has provided computer and communications equipment, training, and has also
contributed to the staffing of the office through a national staff member and an international UNV.
(However, funding is running short and the positions can only be guaranteed for six months and six weeks,
respectively). The Asian Development Bank has taken interest in the ODP and will in the future place an
adviser within the office.
According to available projections, the ODP will have a central office in Kabul and two sub-offices in
disaster prone areas. Additionally, to provide guidance, a steering committee should be conformed by the
following ministries: Reconstruction, Rural Development and Repatriation.
223
The OPD could offer some practical advantages over the Ministry of Repatriation, including: a reportedly
successful operational history, and smaller in size and politically less controversial. These comments are
exploratory, but should be kept in mind to widen the scope of potential partners." (UNAMA July 2002, pp.
7-8)
OCHA's IDP Unit visits Afghanistan to assess the the IDP situation : recommendations
(March 2002)
•
IDP Unit undertook a mission to Afghanistan in February-March 2002 to assess the IDP situation, their
prospects for return and the overall response to their needs.
•
See below the recommendations of the Mission.
"At the request of the Emergency Relief Coordinator, the Unit on Internal Displacement, led by the
Director of the Unit, undertook a mission to Afghanistan from 26 February to 14 March, 2002. The main
objectives of the Mission were to:
undertake an assessment of the prevailing IDP situation and the prospects for return;
review the UN and other partners’ programmes that address the needs of IDPs; and
review the current institutional arrangements for addressing the needs of the displaced with a view to
identifying possible gaps and making specific recommendations to improve the response in favour of IDPs,
either in their host communities or their areas of return.
The Mission met with government authorities, representatives of the United Nations, including the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Afghanistan, the Red Cross Movement, other
international organizations and non-governmental organisations, and members of the diplomatic
community, both in Islamabad and in Afghanistan. Agencies operating out of Peshawar were also
consulted. In Afghanistan, members of the Mission visited Kabul, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif and Jalalabad.
Unfortunately, due to his absence from Kabul during the Mission’s visit it was not possible to meet the
Deputy SRSG responsible for the Relief, Recovery and Reconstruction Pillar (Pillar II) of UNAMA.
[...]
II. The current IDP situation: characteristics and trends
[...]
Recommendations:
IDP data and profiles of areas of return:
AIMS must be given adequate human resources to immediately deploy IT capacity at the regional level,
thus enabling the completion of a nation-wide IDP database.
UN and partners must accelerate the process of completing district profiles of potential areas of return
(security, mines, water/sanitation, food, shelter, health, education and livelihoods), using standardized
methodology and survey instruments throughout the country, and ensure that these data are collated and
disseminated through AIMS.
AIMS must complete the sectoral activity matrixes and tracking system with the active participation of UN
agencies and partner NGOs.
III. A Comprehensive Solutions Strategy
[...]
Recommendations
224
For a comprehensive solutions strategy
In close cooperation with its main operational partners and in consultation with the Ministry of Repatriation
and Reintegration, UNHCR should urgently elaborate a comprehensive solutions strategy for IDPs and
returning refugees, including the support to IDPs who choose to remain in their host communities.
Common protection framework
As an integral part of the overall strategy, UNHCR should develop a protection framework setting out the
overriding principles, rights and operational standards guiding the common response of all operational
partners in favour of IDPs.
Principle of voluntary return
A mechanism must be entrenched within UNHCR to provide timely and objective information of
conditions in areas of return thus enabling IDPs and refugees make informed decisions regarding return and
thereby guaranteeing its voluntary character.
Monitoring capacity
As sector-coordinating agency, UNHCR will be expected to build-in within its own field operational
structure an effective monitoring capacity to ensue the non-discrimination of IDPs and returnees, that basic
survival levels are being achieved in areas of return and/or to ensure that the pace of return movements is
realistically geared to the capacity of rural areas to absorb returnees. This monitoring capacity should be
enhanced by pursuing linkages with protection mechanisms within other sectors as developed by sister
agencies, as well as with the national human rights system.
Operational capacity
Humanitarian and development agencies should boost their operational capacity and complete their field
deployment as rapidly as possible, thus ensuring a sharp improvement in implementation rates.
Preventing new displacement
Swift preventive/remedial action to end displacement of ethnic minorities is currently the most critical
protection intervention, urgently required to preserve an environment enabling the implementation of a
return program with minimum protection guarantees. The Mission, therefore, joins the calls made by other
concerned actors in support of the implementation of the following measures:
a)UNAMA to cooperate with the government in the development and implementation of a plan of action,
pursuant to the assessment mission to the north of the high level government commission;
b) Early implementation of a DDR program.
Documentation of conflicts and human rights violations:
A capacity be created within UNAMA and the proposed National Human Rights Commission to monitor,
document and map all local conflicts, tensions and human rights violations as a prerequisite for preventing
displacement and ensuring rapid remedial response.
Contingency planning:
In view of the fragility of the situation, it is recommended that UNHCR develop a contingency plan, thus
enhancing preparedness for the delivery of protection and assistance to IDPs under worsening scenarios
Political representation of IDPs:
Steps should be taken to capacitate IDPs in political processes so as to ensure that the special needs of IDPs
are expressed by the IDPs themselves, particularly on the Loya Jirga.
Rural reintegration needs:
A successful reintegration of returnees to rural areas is contingent upon the international community, and
especially the FAO, meeting the chronic seed gap that persists. FAO must increase its efforts at seed
replication and food-for-seed acquisition in the coming months. Donors must increase their support for
this.
225
Reintegration and self-reliance in rain-fed areas is also contingent upon the rehabilitation of animal draught
power. The rehabilitation of livestock herds as a safety net for semi-arid regions where drought is endemic
is also currently very limited and with virtually no funding. Concerned agencies should develop
programmes to address these chronic needs. Donors must be encouraged to provide support in this regard.
Planning for longer-term urban IDPs:
Regional coordinators must be tasked with coordinating contingency plans among humanitarian and
development actors for the medium-term support of IDPs that will remain in urban areas and/or other
returnees that are likely to congregate in urban areas.
Community-based approach:
Agencies supporting the return and reintegration of IDPs should ensure that assistance is provided under a
community-based approach to avoid tensions between the returning populations and the receiving
communities and thus ensuring that aid is a positive factor in the reconciliation process.
Community development:
There is an urgent need to strengthen the linkages between the humanitarian actors and the development
actors. UNHCR and UNDP must establish and sustain a close collaboration that ensures that immediate
returnees assistance by UNHCR and its partners is followed-up with medium-term community
development that promotes livelihoods and basic services. Without the latter, reintegration is at risk of
failing.
IV. Institutional Arrangements
[...]
Recommendations
Overall coordination of IDPs:
It is incumb ent upon the DSRSG to formalise the coordination arrangements as soon as possible, including
the formal designation of UNHCR as the coordinating agency for IDPs.
The sectoral coordinating agency for IDPs to discharge its role in full respect of the qualifications outlined
above.
The DSRSG to oversee the effectiveness of the sectoral coordination for IDPs and returnees, including
through its regional coordination structure which must be provided with the necessary financial and human
resources.
[...]
V. Support and Follow-up by the IDP Unit
Training and capacity building of UN agencies and their partners, as well as for the emergent authorities on
the issue of internal displacement was raised by various interlocutors as a critical need. In this light, the
Unit would envisage promoting the delivery of the Inter-Agency IDP Training Programme. A series of
regional workshops would ensure that all actors are working within the guiding principles and are adopting
consistent practices in their respective interventions.
The Unit would also envisage supporting the efforts to develop a common solution strategy to address the
issue of displacement in a comprehensive manner, taking into account the needs of the displaced and of the
returnees.
226
Upon the endorsement of the report’s recommendations by ERC and the DSRSG for Afghanistan, it will be
incumbent upon the Internal Displacement Unit to monitor the implementation of the recommendations.
In light of the above, the Unit would propose the placement, on a temporary basis, of a senior level IDP
advisor within UNAMA/Pillar II (or UNHCR). The Advisor would also be responsible for monitoring and
promoting interaction between the authorities and all agencies addressing IDPs. In the medium-term, the
Senior Advisor should increasingly work, and possible be placed, directly with the authorities within the
Ministry of Repatriation and Reintegration." (IDP Unit-OCHA 28 March 2002, pp. 10-11)
HRW calls for a independent monitoring of human rights prior to the return process
(January 2002)
•
HRW is urging the U.N. to make human rights work central to this mission, including monitoring,
investigations, consultations with Afghan officials regarding legal reform, and assistance in
reconstruction of judicial institutions.
•
HRW urges donors to provide sufficient and specific funding for the human rights components of the
future U.N. mission.
•
Independent human rights monitoring on conditions inside Afghanistan is also critical to the
repatriation and return process for Afghan refugees and internally displaced persons as returnees can
only make a voluntary decision about return if they have access to reliable, impartial, and accessible
information concerning conditions in their home areas
"Human Rights Watch calls on international donors meeting in Tokyo to ensure that the promotion of
human rights is given a central place in reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. The creation of an interim
administration in Kabul, and the physical and institutional reconstruction of the country at large, offer a
unique opportunity for instituting human rights protections into Afghanistan's political and societal
structures.
[…]
The office of the U.N. Secretary General's Special Representative to Afghanistan is currently designing an
integrated U.N. mission to support and coordinate emergency humanitarian aid, assist with reconstruction
efforts, and organize ongoing political dialogues. Human Rights Watch is urging the U.N. to make human
rights work central to this mission, including monitoring, investigations, consultations with Afghan
officials regarding legal reform, and assistance in reconstruction of judicial institutions.
Human Rights Watch urges donors to provide sufficient and specific funding for the human rights
components of the future U.N. mission. Alternatively, we ask donor governments to work to ensure that all
human rights components in the U.N. mission are guaranteed funding through assessed contributions. We
also ask that donors adequately fund the U.N. trust fund for Afghanistan - as requested by the Special
Representative's office - so that the interim authority of Afghanistan has adequate resources with which to
begin rebuilding Afghanistan's government.
[…]
Independent human rights monitoring on conditions inside Afghanistan (mentioned above) is also critical to
the repatriation and return process for Afghan refugees and internally displaced persons. Refugees and
returnees can only make a voluntary decision about return if they have access to reliable, impartial, and
accessible information concerning conditions in their home areas. Human rights monitoring during the
post-return phase is also critical to ensuring that return is sustainable and safe. Funding and support for incountry human rights monitoring is therefore a priority need from a refugee protection standpoint, as is
funding to ensure coordination between monitoring efforts and any future repatriation or screening
programs.
[...]
The conflict-related devastation of many rural areas within Afghanistan will restrict the full reintegration of
returnees into their home communities; in particular their ability to resume farming or access adequate
227
shelter. Reconstruction programs should be aimed at (among other things) facilitating voluntary returns.
Reintegration programs should be crafted so that they meaningfully meet the specific needs of female and
disabled returnees. Any demobilization programs must include returning refugees and be particularly
sensitive to the needs of former child soldiers among them.
In order to help meet all of these standards, the interim government will create a department for refugees
and displaced persons, to work with UNHCR and address the needs of all sectors of the refugee population.
Tripartite repatriation commissions set up with UNHCR, Afghanistan and host countries (most notably
Pakistan and Iran) will also need to be created to work with this governmental department. However, both
the governmental ministry and all tripartite commissions must be adequately funded to ensure that any
return program is based on international human rights standards. " (HRW 17 January 2002)
228
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
4Rs
AACA
ACBAR
ACF
ACT
ACTED
ADB
AHSAO
AIA
AIMS
ANCB
APB
ARC
ARCS
AREA
ASG
ATA
CARE
CAWS
CCA
CIMIC
CIC
CJCMOTF
CWS
DACAAR
DAD
DANIDA
DDR
DPVPV
DFID
ECHO
EO/CA
EPI
FAO
FFW
FOODAC
GAA
GAF
GAVI
GIS
GTZ
HICFA
IA
IAM
IASF
ICC
ICC
Repatriation, Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority
Agency Coordination Body for Afghanistan
Action Contre la Faim
Action by Churches Together
Agence d'aide à la coopération technique et au développement
Asian Development Bank
Afghans' Health and Social Assistance Organisation
Afghan Interim Administration
Afghanistan Information Management Service
Afghan NGOs Coordination Bureau
Afghanistan Programming Body
Afghan Relief Committee
Afghanistan Red Crescent Society
Agency for rehabilitation and energy-conservation in Afghanistan
Afghanistan Support Group
Afghanistan Transitional Administration
Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere
Central Authority for Water and Sanitation
Cooperation Centre for Afghanistan
Civil Military Cooperation
Children in Crisis
Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force
Church World Service
Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees
Donor Assistance Database
Danish International Development Agency
Disarmement, Demobilisation, Reintegration
Department for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice
Department for International Development
European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office
Ecumenical office/Christian aid
Expanded Immunisation Programme
Food and Agriculture Organization
Food for Work
Food for Asset Creation
German Agro Action
German Afghanistan Foundation
Global Alliance for Vaccine Initiative
Geographic Information System
German Technical Cooperation
Humanitarian Information Center for Afghanistan
Interim Authority
International Assistance Mission
International Security Assistance Force
Islamic Coordination Council
Inter-Agency Coordination Committee
229
ICRC
IDP
IMCI
IMSMA
IOM
IRC
IRIN
ISRA
ITAP
JICA
LEP
LVAU
MACA
MAAH
MAPA
MCH
MDM
MEDAIR
MIWRE
MMR
MoC
MoE
MoF
MoHE
MoIC
MoPH
MoRR
MoUDH
MoWA
MRRD
MUDH
NABDP
NDB
NDF
NCA
NIDs
NPF
NSC
NSF
NSP
NWFP
OCHA
ODP
OI
OIC
Oxfam
PCP
PDPA
PHC
PHR
International Committee of the Red Cross
Internally Displaced People
Integrated Management of Childhood Illnesses
Information Management System for Mine Action
International Organization for Migration
International Rescue Committee
Integrated Regional Information Network
Islamic Relief Agency
Immediate and Transitional Assistance Programme 2002
Japan International Cooperation Agency
Landmine Education Programme
Livelihoods and Vulnerability Analysis Unit
Mine Action Center for Afghanistan
Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry
UN Mine Action Programme
Mother and Child Health
Medecins Du Monde
Christian Relief and Aid Organisation
Ministry of Irrigation, Water Resources and Environment
Matermal Mortality Rate
Ministry of Construction
Ministry of Education
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Higher Education
Ministry of Information and Culture
Ministry of Public Health
Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation
Ministry of Urban Development and Housing
Ministry of Women's Affairs
Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
Ministry of Urban Development and Housing
National Area-Based Development Plan
National Development Budget
National Development Framework
Norwegian Church Aid
National Immunization Days
New Police Force
National Security Council
National Security Force
National Solidarity Programme
Northwest Frontier Practice
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Office of Disaster Prepardness
Ockenden International
Organization of the Islamic Conference
Oxford Committee on Famine Relief
Principled Common Programming
People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
Primary Health Care
Physicians for Human Rights
230
PRB
ProMIS
RCB
RCOs
RDD
REACH
RMAC
RTMP
SCA
SC/US
SFA
SMEs
SNI
SRSG
TAPA
TB
TBA
TISA
TPUs
UF
UNAMA
UNCHS
UNCO
UNDG
UNHCR
UNHAS
UNIC
UNICEF
UNIFEM
UNJLC
UNDP
UNFPA
UNGA
UNOCHA
UNSG
UNSMA
USAID
USCR
UXO
VAM
VRF
WES
WFP
WHO
WSS
Pamir Reconstruction Bureau
Project Management Information System
Regional Coordination Bodies
Regional Coordination Officers
Rehabilitation and Development Department
Radio Education for Afghan Children
Regional Mine Action Center
Road and Transport Master Plan
Swedish Committee for Afghanistan
Save the Children (US)
Strategic Framework for Afghanistan
Small and Micro Enterprises
Shelter Now International
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Transitional Assistance Programme for Afghanistan
Tuberculosis
Traditional Birth Attendants
Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan
Training Production Units
United Front (The Northern Alliance)
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
United Nations Center for Human Settlements
United Nations Coordinator's Office
United Nations Development Group
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
United Nations Humanitarian Air Service
United Nations Information Service
United Nations Children's Fund
United Nations Development Fund for Women
United Nations Joint Logistics Center
United Nations Development Programme
United Nations Populations Fund
United Nations General Assembly
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to
Afghanistan
United Nations Secretary General
United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan
United States Agency for INternational Development
United States Committee for Refugees
Unexploded Ordnance
Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping
Voluntary Repatriation Form
Water and Environmental Sanitation
World Food Programme
World Health Organization
Water and Sanitation Services
231
LIST OF SOURCES USED
(alphabetical order)
Action by Churches Together (ACT) International, 12 October 2001, Emergency
Assistance Appeal -ASAF-11 (Revision 1)
Internet : http://www.act-intl.org/appeals/appeals_2001/ASAF11Rev1.pdf , accessed 19
October 2001
Afghanistan Assistance Coordination Authority (AACA), 9 April 2003, Terms of
Reference (TOR's) of the Humanitarian Affairs Advisory Group (HAAG)
Internet
:
http://www.afghanistangov.org./resources/aaca/cg+adf/humanitarian_aff_ag/Humanitaria
n%20Affairs%20AG%20TOR.doc , accessed 17 June 2003
Afghanistan Assistance Coordination Authority (AACA), April 2003, Terms of
Reference (TOR's) of the Returnee & IDPs Consultative Group
Internet
:
http://www.afghanistangov.org./resources/aaca/cg+adf/refugee_return_cg/IDPs%20%20Returnees%20TOR.doc , accessed 17 June 2003
Afghanistan Information Management Service (AIMS), 8 October 2002, Number of
Assisted returnee in the period of March 01 up to September 18 and returned IDPs
(Feb25-Oct06) and their final destination
Afghanistan Information Management Service (AIMS), 9 October 2002, Who's doing
What Where, Report 4 - Lists Organizations by Sector, AIMS, 9 October 2002
Internet : http://www.aims.org.pk/wdww/documents/wdww_reports/wdww_report4.pdf ,
accessed 21 October 2002
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), 11 May 2003, A short note on
AREU's planned follow-up to the Taking Refugees for A Ride paper
Internet
:
http://www.afghanistangov.org./resources/aaca/cg+adf/humanitarian_aff_ag/AREU%20r
esearch.doc , accessed 17 June 2003
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), August 2002, Strategic
Coordination in Afghanistan
Internet
:
http://www.hic.org.pk/area_coordination/coordination_issues/strategic_coord.pdf
,
accessed 24 April 2003
Agence d'Aide à la Coopération Technique et au Développement (ACTED), 2003,
Emergency Assistance to IDPs in Baghlan & Takhar
232
Agence France-Presse (AFP), 21 February 2002, "Tens of thousands flee ethnic
persecution in northern Afghanistan"
Internet
:
http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/ffcac6e4b1e
3f081c1256b67005659c9?OpenDocument , accessed 1 March 2002
Agence France-Presse (AFP), 3 April 2002, "No change in policy allowing military to
distribute aid: Pentagon"
Internet
:
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/73421329e17
97cce85256b90006fec0d?OpenDocument , accessed 4 April 2002
AlertNet, 11 October 2002, "Agencies off guard as Afghans flock home"
Internet : http://www.alertnet.org/thefacts/reliefresources/531198?version=1
20 October 2002
,
accessed
AlertNet, 28 May 2003, "International community is failing displaced Afghans -MSF"
Internet : http://www.alertnet.org/thefacts/reliefresources/AFdisplaced.htm , accessed 3
June 2003
Amnesty International (AI), 23 June 2003, Afghanistan Out of sight, out of mind: The
fate of the Afghan returnees
Internet
:
http://web.amnesty.org/aidoc/aidoc_pdf.nsf/Index/ASA110142003ENGLISH/$File/ASA
1101403.pdf , accessed 23 June 2003
Amnesty International (AI), 25 July 2002, Afghanistan: Continuing need for Protection
and Standards for Return of Afghan refugees
Internet
:
http://web.amnesty.org/aidoc/aidoc_pdf.nsf/index/ASA110142002ENGLISH/$File/ASA
1101402.pdf , accessed 12 September 2002
Amnesty International (AI), 9 October 2001, Protect Afghan civilians and refugees
Internet
http://web.amnesty.org/802568F7005C4453/0/AEA853224BFFEDC980256AE00056BC
08?Open , accessed 9 July 2002
:
Amnesty International (AI), November 1999, Afghanistan: the Human Rights of
Minorities, November 1999, ASA 11/14/99, (AI November 1999a)
Internet : http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/ASA110141999 , accessed 9 July
2002
BBC News , 28 January 2000, "Taleban captures opposition strong hold"
Internet
http://news6.thdo.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/south_asia/newsid_622000/622327.stm
accessed 11 July 2000
:
,
233
British Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG), 12 August 2002, BAAG Afghanistan
Monthly Review Jul 2002
Internet
:
http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/437a83f9fa966c40c12564f2004fde87/e5561d09fe2
d8cda85256c1300679362?OpenDocument , accessed 20 September 2002
British Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG), 31 August 2002, BAAG Afghanistan
Monthly Review Aug 2002
Internet
:
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/3a81e21068ec1871c1256633003c1c6f/3bf0a9d95c09
fa1c85256c330065b8e7?OpenDocument , accessed 25 September 2002
British Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG), 4 October 2001, BAAG Afghanistan
Monthly Review Sep 2001
Internet
:
http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/efd26a35afd
bda9585256adb00601956?OpenDocument , accessed 5 October 2001
British Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG), April 2003, Afghanistan: Monthly
review
Internet : http://www.baag.org.uk/baag_apr_03.pdf , accessed 28 May 2003
Children in Crisis (CIC), 17 July 2000, E-mail from CIC Official
Children in Crisis (CIC), July 2000, Educating children in Afghanistan
Internet : http://www.childrenincrisis.org.uk/ , accessed 14 January 2003
CONCERN, 22 December 2000, "Concern's response to the latest emergency in
Afghanistan"
Internet
:
http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/e42dd5ec48
e8a9e8852569bd005cd9d9?OpenDocument , accessed 12 February 2001
Danish Immigration Service, March 2003, The Political, Security and Human Rights
Situation in Afghanistan, Report on fact-finding mission to Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif,
Afghanistan and Islamabad, Pakistan, 22 September - 5 October 2002
Department for International Development, UK (DFID), 5 October 2001, Afghanistan
crisis situation report No. 10
Internet
:
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/6481438aefe8
2900c1256adc0036348f?OpenDocument , accessed 8 October 2001
Deutsche Presse Agentur (DPA), 19 June 1999, "Four killed fighting forest fire in
Afghanistan"
234
Internet
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/c05d8f2e0515
3e72c12567970049154d?OpenDocument , accessed 11 February 2000
:
Ed Schenkenberg van Mierop, 9 April 2002, NGO Coordination and Some Other
Relevant Issues in the Context of Afghanistan from an NGO Perspective
Farr, Grant, September 2001, Afghanistan: Displaced in a Devastated Country, in
Caught Between Borders - Response Strategies of the Internally Displaced, ed. Birgit
Refslund and Marc Vincent
Federation of American Researchers (FAS), Intelligence Resource Program, 8
September 1998, Afghanistan - Introduction
Internet
:
http://web.archive.org/web/20010426184925/209.207.236.112/irp/world/afghan/intro.hta
ccessed 14 January 2003
Feinstein International Famine Center, May 2002, Food Insecurity in Afghanistan 1999
- 2002
Internet : http://famine.tufts.edu/pdf/cash_famine.pdf , m , accessed 17 October 2002
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 16 August 2002, FAO/WFP Crop and
Food Supply Assessment Mission to Afghanistan
Internet
:
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