Communication Between Taiwan And the USA at the time of The 1958 Quemoy Crisis: Dulles’ Meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek 47
Communication Between Taiwan And the USA at
the time of The 1958 Quemoy Crisis: Dulles’
Meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek
By Wan-chin Tai∗
One examines the background against which John Foster Dulles
visited Taiwan in the second half of October in 1958 during the
Quemoy Crisis. One notes the primary goals Dulles set in visiting
Chiang Kai-shek. The advice given by Lord Louis Mountbatten to
Dulles prior to his departure for Taiwan is also reviewed. Dulles,
indeed, debated with Chiang about the importance of Quemoy and
Matsu. Dulles scored a success in persuading Chiang into an
agreement to gradually reduce the Nationalist forces deployed on
Quemoy and Matsu. But Chiang disagreed with Dulles on an
armistice agreement proposal. One explores the role played by
Ambassador Everett F. Drumright in the communication between
∗ Dr. Wan-chin Tai （戴萬欽） is a professor at the Institute of American Studies
at Tamkang University. He also teaches at the Institute of Russian Studies and at the
Institute of History at the same university. Dr. Tai’s areas of specialization are in
American Foreign Policy, Russian History and China’s Foreign Relations in the 20th
Century. His published dissertation is The Sino-Soviet Rift: the Perception and
Response by the Kennedy Administration. One of his recent books is A Divided
China: the Response by the Truman Administration. In the past two years, he
presented three conference papers on the Quemoy Crises of 1958. Currently, he is
researching on Russia’s calculations in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO). Dr. Tai’s e-mail address is <[email protected]>.
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Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
Taiwan and the Eisenhower Administration. Additionally, one
evaluates the negotiating performance by the Nationalist government
in dealing with Dulles’ visit to Taiwan. One also studies Chiang’s
attitude in urging the Eisenhower Administration to consider the use
of the tactical atomic weapons against the PRC’s guns. The context in
which Chiang made the urging is examined as well.
Key Words: Taiwan Straits, Quemoy Crisis, Chiang Kai-shek,
John Foster Dulles Dwight D. Eisenhower, George
Yeh, The People’s Republic of China, Taiwan, The
United States, Quemoy, Mastu.
The visit by U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to Taiwan
amid the 1958 Quemoy Crisis was his fifth visit. Dulles made
previous trips to Taiwan in September, 1954, in March, 1955, in
March, 1956 and again in March 1958.1 On behalf of the Eisenhower
Administration, Dulles signed the Sino-Mutual Defense Treaty in
Taiwan in September 1954. Dulles’ visit to Taiwan during the
Quemoy Crisis in 1958 was another important page in the history of
Taiwan-U.S. relations.
INTRODUCTION
On October 16, 1958 before Dulles’ departure for Taiwan, The
New York Times in its editorial on October 16, 1958 strongly urged
that “the islands of Quemoy and Matsu should be turned over to the
Chinese Communists, for as long as that regime remains in power on
the Chinese mainland.”2 In other words, there emerged open appeals
1
Greg MacGregor, “ Taipei Is Hopeful Talk with Dulles Will Show Unity,” The
New York Times, October 19, 1958, p. 11.
2
Editorial, “Quemoy and Matsu Again,” The New York Times, October 16, 1958, p.
36.
Communication Between Taiwan And the USA at the time of The 1958 Quemoy Crisis: Dulles’ Meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek 49
in the major media of the United States to the Eisenhower
Administration to persuade the Government of the Republic of China
(GRC) to give up Quemoy and Matsu before Dulles visited President
Chiang Kai-shek. Indeed, the Eisenhower Administration faced the
pressures not only from some sectors of U.S. public but also its
Western allies, particularly the United Kingdom, against helping
defend Quemoy and Matsu. Most importantly, at one point of time
before Dulles paid a visit on President Chiang, the Eisenhower
Administration gave some consideration to a recommendation which
argued for a persuasion with the GRC to give up Quemoy and Matsu
so as to end the Taiwan Strait Crisis.
This paper will not study the motives of Mao Zedong in igniting
the 1958 Quemoy Crisis. Neither will it explore the Soviet role during
the Quemoy Crisis. This author explored those questions in other
writings. Instead, this paper will try to answer the following questions:
1. Did the Republic of China (ROC) take the initiative in inviting
Dulles to visit Taiwan? 2. What were the primary goals Dulles set in
visiting President Chiang? 3. How was the negotiation over the
response to the Beijing-launched bombardment between the GRC and
the Eisenhower Administration before Dulles’ visit? 4. Was the advice
given by Lord Louis Mountbatten of the United Kingdom useful to
Dulles? 5. What was the achievement Dulles thought most significant
in his visit to Taiwan? 6. How was the debate between Dulles and
President Chiang about the importance of Quemoy and Matsu? 7.
How did Dulles succeed in persuading President Chiang into an
agreement to gradually reduce the Nationalist forces stationed on
Quemoy and Matsu? 8. How did President Chiang disagree on an
armistice agreement proposal by Dulles? 9. What was Dulles’ reading
of the renewed bombardment made by the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) before his arrival in Taiwan? 10. How did Ambassador Everett
F. Drumright act in the communication between the GRC and the
Eisenhower Administration? 11. Did the Eisenhower Administration
50
Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
adopt a tougher military stance vis-à-vis the PRC after Dulles’ visit?
12. What were the negotiating skills employed by Dulles and the
Eisenhower Administration in dealing with the GRC? 13. How was
the negotiating performance by the Kuomintang Government in
dealing with Dulles’ visit to Taiwan? Last but not least, did President
Chiang request a U.S. tactical nuclear attack upon the PRC? The last
question is one which was rarely discussed earlier among academics.
This paper will simply take an initial step in scrutinizing it.
DULLES’ PRIMARY GOALS IN VISITING CHIANG
It was on October 17, 1958 that the Department of State
announced that Dulles would fly to Taipei next week to discuss the
Taiwan Strait crisis with President Chiang . The Department of State
also disclosed that accompanying Dulles would be Walter S.
Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.3
The Department of State in the announcement was reluctant to
say anything beyond the fact that President Chiang had invited Dulles
to Taipei for consultations under Article Four of the Mutual Defense
Treaty between the United States and the ROC. The Article Four of
the treaty says that “the parties through their foreign ministers or their
deputies will consult together from time to time regarding
implementation of this treaty.” 4 In other words, no provocative
remarks were made by the Eisenhower Administration against the
PRC when Dulles’ forthcoming visit to Taiwan was announced.
It is interesting to ascertain that it was Dulles who in midOctober took the initiative in proposing a trip to Taiwan. The U.S.
declassified archives testify to the fact that Dulles, in receiving
Geroge K. C. Yeh, the former ROC Foreign Minister and then ROC
3
4
E. W. Kenworthy, “Dulles Will Visit Chiang Next Week on Taiwan Crisis,” p.1.
MacGregor, “Taipei Is Hopeful Talk with Dulles Will Show Unity,” The New
York Times, October 19, 2003, p. 11.
Communication Between Taiwan And the USA at the time of The 1958 Quemoy Crisis: Dulles’ Meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek 51
Ambassador to the United States, on October 10 at the Department of
State proposed to call on President Chiang in Taiwan.5
As for the dates of Dulles’ visit, they were mainly decided by
Dulles with the approval of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. On
behalf of the GRC, Ambassador Yeh responded in telling Dulles
during their conversation that the dates of Dulles’ visit could be left to
be decided by Dulles himself. 6 On the following day, Dulles
immediately presented an outline to President Eisenhower about some
of the pros and cons of his plans to visit President Chiang en route
home from Rome. In reply, Eisenhower said that he was inclined to
feel that it would be desirable for Dulles to go to Taiwan “within the
present two-week period of suspension.” Eisenhower added that he
would await Dulles further and more mature thinking on that subject
following Dulles’ talks with his associates.7 So, it was confirmed that
the GRC largely let the Eisenhower Administration decide the dates of
Dulles’ visit to Taiwan.
Next, what were the goals which Dulles had on mind in
proposing a visit to President Chiang? In commenting on the
achievements of Dulles’ visit, The New York Times on October 25
noted that the primary purpose of Dulles’ trip was to concert measures
“which would have contributed to stabilizing an actual situation of
non-militancy.” The New York Times even specifically reported that
the feeling in official circles in Washington, D.C. was that Dulles had
persuaded President Chiang that “steps must be taken toward
5
Memorandum of Conversation between Dulles and Yeh, “Future Moves
Regarding Offshore Island Situation,” October 10, 1958, Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1958-1960, Volume XIX, China (hereinafter it is cited as FRUS),
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), p. 360.
6
Memorandum of Conversation between Dulles and Yeh, October 13, 1958, Ibid., p.
388.
7
Memorandum of Conversation between Eisenhower and Dulles, October 14, 1958,
Ibid., p. 404.
52
Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
demilitarization of the Chinese offshore islands when the time was
propitious.”8 Such an assertion was in contradiction with the fact.
Actually, President Chiang was not convinced by Dulles into
demilitarizing Quemoy and Matsu. As early as on October 18, The
New York Times already started to discuss the primary purpose of
Dulles’ visit. It reported that informed quarters made it clear that
President Chiang and Dulles had two principal objectives in Dulles
visit. According to the story of The New York Times, the first one was
to clear up misunderstandings over Mr. Dulles’ policy toward Quemoy
and Matsu. The second one was cited as to discuss the new “political
phase” in the Taiwan Strait crisis, “which has been marked by the
attempt of the Chinese Communists to drive a wedge between the
United States and the Chinese Nationalists.” 9 Indeed, in inviting
Ambassador Yeh to the Department of State on October 10, Dulles
spoke to Ambassador Yeh the wishes of the Chinese Communists
about spreading “the idea that there was dissension between the GRC
and the United States Governments and were attempting to create
sentiment against President Chiang and his Government in the United
States.” 10 In essence, The New York Times prior to Dulles’ visit told
the U.S. public that there were problems challenging the
communication between the Eisenhower Administration and the GRC.
In stating to Ambassador Yeh his interest in visiting Taiwan on
October 10, Dulles stated his goals of the visit, such as “to talk to
President Chiang about the problem of making our policy more
palatable to the people of the United States and our allies.” Dulles
8
E. W. Kenworthy, “Chiang Believed Resigned to Move to Disarm Isles,” The New
York Times, October 25, 1958, p. 1.
9
10
Ibid.
Memorandum of Conversation between Dulles and Yeh, “Future Moves
Regarding Offshore Island Situation,” October 10, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol.
XIX, China, p 359.
Communication Between Taiwan And the USA at the time of The 1958 Quemoy Crisis: Dulles’ Meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek 53
specifically pointed out:
There was a rising tide of opinion against our policy. There was
even a change in the United States. Two or three years ago this
was a bipartisan matter. Now it is no longer the case. We must
face up to bitter opposition and to the feeling that people don’t
want another world war……Now people are saying “Why die for
Quemoy.”11
Dulles emphasized to Ambassador Yeh that it was time to think
about and to do something with regard to the offshore island situation
in order to get the support which the Eisenhower Administration
needed for its policy. Dulles added that “it is important that the
initiative come from Ambassador Yeh’s government.” Dulles asked
Ambassador Yeh to convey to President Chiang his thinking and his
willingness to go out to Taipei to talk to President Chiang directly.12
In short, Dulles’ goal was to alleviate the criticism from some quarters
in the U.S. against the position taken by the Eisenhower
Administration over the defense of Quemoy and Matsu. Dulles
attempted to persuade President Chiang to revise his position on the
defense of Quemoy and Matsu.
NEGOTIATION BEFORE DULLES’ ARRIVAL
Apparently, Ambassador Yeh reported to the GRC about Dulles’
interest in visiting President Chiang immediately after Dulles told him
so. On October 13, President Chiang in person talked to U.S.
Ambassador to the ROC Drumright about the visit interest of Dulles.
In receiving U.S. Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy in Taipei on
October 13, President Chiang turned to Ambassador Drumright who
was also present and said that he hoped that “Secretary Dulles could
11
Ibid., p. 360.
12
Ibid.
54
Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
find time to come here to consult personally and to fix new policy
needed to cope with changed Communist tactics.” In his telegram to
the Department of State, Drumright cited President Chiang’s remarks
that “if Secretary came here for discussions there would need to be
careful preparation and timing and it would be desirable to avoid
impression Secretary to press for reduction of forces on Offshores,
withdrawal or demilitarization.” 13 President Chiang basically
welcomed Dulles’ visit proposal despite the fact that he was on guard
against possible adverse side effects.
In his meeting with President Chiang, Secretary McElroy said
that he could give assurance that the United States was glad to work
fully with President Chiang. Secretary McElroy added that the United
States “has every confidence in steadfastness of President (Chiang.)”
In closing the meeting, President Chiang emphasized that “GRC
strength is US strength.”14 President Chiang and McElroy, indeed,
exchanged pleasantries. President Chiang employed the occasion to
extend his welcome to Dulles’ visit as Dulles wished. But President
Chiang also skillfully expressed his hope that Dulles would moderate
13
Drumright, Telegram to the Department of State, October 13, 1958, Ibid., p. 379.
Dulles was involved in McElroy’s visit plan. On September 25, 1958, Dulles invited
John J. McCloy, Chairman of the Board of the Chase Manhattan Bank, to go with
McElroy to visit President Chiang in order to persuade him into giving up Quemoy
and Matsu. Dulles reported to President Eisenhower on such a proposal on
September 26. See Letter from Dulles to Eisenhower, September 27, 1958, Ibid., p.
290. Actually, McCloy on September 27 declined the invitation from Dulles to
assume the role as an emissary. In his letter to Dulles, McCloy gave four reasons for
the decline of the offer. McCloy basically believed that his association with
President Chiang was not so good to achieve successful persuasion. Besides,
McCloy believed that “any hope of getting Chiang to go along with what I feel the
situation demands by persuasion is so remote that I can only see the likelihood of
increased rigidity in his attitude…..” . See Memorandum from McCloy to Dulles,
September 27, 1958. Box 10, Dulles-Herter Series, Ann Whitman File, Dwight D.
Eisenhower Papers as President, The Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. .
14
FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XIX, China, p. 380.
Communication Between Taiwan And the USA at the time of The 1958 Quemoy Crisis: Dulles’ Meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek 55
the demand made by the Eisenhower Administration on the question
of reducing the Nationalist forces on Quemoy and Matsu.
DULLES’ EARLIER VIEWS ON ROC OFFSHORE FORCES
Actually, in late September, there had already emerged voices
within the Eisenhower Administration in favor of asking President
Chiang to withdraw ROC forces from Quemoy and Matsu. General
Nathan F. Twining, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in his
meeting with President Eisenhower at 10:30 a.m. on September 29,
said that “he would get some thinking started in the Pentagon as to
what could be done with Chiang to get him out of the offshore
islands.” In response, President Eisenhower “asked that this be
done.”15 In a memorandum written on the same day, Dulles noted that
in his meeting with President Eisenhower at 11 a.m. on that day,
President Eisenhower indicated to Dulles that General Twining earlier
just had spoken of “the heavy cost of the Formosa operation and his
hope that it would not have to continue indefinitely.”16
At a news conference on September 30, Dulles commented
extensively on the Taiwan Strait crisis. When asked whether or not the
United States had agreed to the buildup of the Nationalist forces on
Quemoy and Matsu, Dulles replied that the United States “did not feel
that it was sound” to make such a major commitment of forces to
those areas but that it had acquiesced and had not attempted to veto it.
Subsequently, Dulles was asked whether it would be sound to work
out some arrangement for the withdrawal of Nationalist forces on the
two offshore islands. In his reply, Dulles said:
It all depends upon the circumstances under which they would be
withdrawn. I think to withdraw as a retreat under fire would not
15
Memorandum of Conference between Eisenhower and Twining, September 29,
1958, Ibid., pp. 296-297.
16
Ibid., p. 296n.
56
Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
be a wise step to take because of the probable impact of that upon
other peoples, other countries, and upon the morale, indeed, on
Formosa itself.17
But in response to a follow-up question as to the circumstances
under which such a withdrawal might be possible, Dulles replied that
“if there were a cease-fire in the area which seemed to be reasonably
dependable, I think it would be foolish to keep these large forces on
these islands.”18
The statements Dulles made at the press conference caused both
displeasure and anxiety from President Chiang. Subsequently on
October 2, President Chiang summoned Ambassador Drumright. In
his telegram to Dulles on the evening of October 2, Ambassador
Drumright reported the displeasure of President Chiang. Ambassador
Drumright said that he found President Chiang “in highly tense and
disturbed state of mind.” Ambassador Drumright noted in his telegram
that according to President Chiang and his subordinates, Dullles’
suggestion of the reduction of the Nationalist forces on Quemoy and
Matsu “has had most unsettling effect and is highly damaging to their
morale.”19 In the telegram, Drumright reported that Chiang Kai-shek
told him in the morning that “talk of withdrawal of GRC forces would
confirm Communists’ belief they proceeding correctly to obtain
objectives. They would become more intransigent and demanding if
they perceived US position to be weakening. If this sort of thing
continued, it would pave way for Communists to seize islands.”
Drumright cited that President Chaing was also unhappy with such
remarks made by Under Secretary of State Christian A. Herter about
“’pathological attachment’ to offshore islands and their unessentiality
17
Editorial note on Dulles’ news conference of September 30, Ibid., p. 301.
18
Ibid.
19
Drumright, Telegram to Dulles, October 2, 1958, Ibid., p. 319 & 320.
Communication Between Taiwan And the USA at the time of The 1958 Quemoy Crisis: Dulles’ Meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek 57
to defense of Taiwan also were harmful.” 20 Herter made such
comments to the U.S. press earlier.
A few days later, Ambassador Yeh, in his meeting with U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Robertson at the
Department of State on October 7, also complained about Dulles’
press conference on September 30 and particularly about Dulles’ use
of the word “foolish.” Robertson explained to Ambassador Yeh that
what Dulles had in mind was simply that it was militarily unwise for
the GRC to station so many troops on the offshore islands. Robertson
added that “the Secretary had been very much upset by the
interpretations which the newspapers had given to his remarks—that
here had been a change in U.S. policy.” Ambassador Yeh replied that
“the Generalissimo’s personal ride had been hurt by some of the
expressions used in recent public statements such as Mr. Herter’s use
of the word “pathological” and Mr. Dulles’ use of the word
“foolish.”21 It was true that the question of the Nationalist forces on
Quemoy and Matsu was one of the major frictions between the GRC
and the U.S. prior to Dulles’ visit on President Chiang.
In summoning Ambassador Drumright on October 2, President
Chiang also emphasized that he already made concessions when he
openly made his point that the “offshores would not be used as
springboard to attack mainlands.” In his telegram to the Department of
State, Ambassador Drumright reported that President Chiang had also
made it clear that “he would not ask that US ground forces be used in
assisting defense of offshore islands, for he know US people would be
unwilling to see this happen. He had risked his own prestige in
making foregoing remarks.”22
20
Ibid.
21
Memorandum of Conversation between Yeh and Robertson, October 7, 1958,
Ibid., p. 343.
22
Drumright, Tlegram to Dulles, October 2, 1958, Ibid., p. 320.
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Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
Moreover, President Chiang asserted that no further concessions
of his position about the offshore islands would be made. Ambassador
Drumright added in his telegram as follows:
President said these represented his “maximum concessions” to
US position. He could not go further in accommodations to
Communists in offshore areas. If even a small number of troops
were to be withdrawn from offshores it would be just as well to
withdraw all. It would be tantamount in end to giving up Taiwan.
He then said with great emphasis that nothing would get his
troops out of Kinmen.23
In ending the telegram, Drumright said:
I agree with Chiang that statements implying withdrawal from
offshores or suggesting their indefensibility or unessentiality will
lead Communists to think we are weakening, and thus increase
their intransigence and lead them to further adventures. Such
statements also discourage mainlanders hoping for liberation and
make it easier for communists to maintain their controls.
Respectfully suggest these points be taken into account in
framing public utterances.24
Drumright expressed his sympathy to President Chiang’s position,
and counseled caution to the Department of State in public statements
about the Nationalist forces on the offshore islands.
23
Ibid., p. 321. In a record of the meeting between President Chiang and
Ambassador Drumright prepared by James Shen, a secretary of President Chiang, it
was written that President Chiang “asked the Ambassador to convey to U.S.
government that no external pressure, nor any weapons, including atomic bombs,
could ever force the Chinese Government to evacuate a single soldier from the
offshore islands. Chinese troops would keep on fighting on the offshore islands till
the last drop of their blood.”See Ibid., p. 321n.
24
Ibid., p. 321.
Communication Between Taiwan And the USA at the time of The 1958 Quemoy Crisis: Dulles’ Meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek 59
CHIANG’S WORRY OVER REDUCTION OF FORCES
On October 6, President Chiang granted an interview to Vice
Admiral Smoot, the U.S. Commander of the Taiwan Defense
Command. Following it, President Chiang instructed ROC Foreign
Minister Huang Shao-ku to convey his worries to Drumright about the
possible U.S. reaction to PRC Defense Minister Peng Dehuai’s
broadcast on October 6. In his broadcast, Peng specifically referred to
the press statement made by Dulles on September 30. Peng also made
mention of the Warsaw Talks. Peng particularly said that the U.S. was
sure to abandon Taiwan eventually. 25 It was true that President
Chiang was quite worried about the impact of Peng’s propaganda on
the morale of the Nationalist forces.
In specific terms, President Chiang told Vice Admiral Smoot his
worries that the Eisenhower Administration “will advocate acceptance
of Peng’s offer and even use it as pretext to suggest withdrawal or
reduction of GRC garrisons from offshores.” Through Foreign
Minister Huang, President Chiang expressed his hope that the “US
Government will not propose or talk about withdrawal of offshore
garrisons.” In his telegram to Dulles, Ambassador Drumright noted
that President Chiang additionally said that he “suggests US
Government attempt to explain to US people it impossible to defend
Taiwan and Penghu if GRC should withdraw or reduce garrisons on
offshores. He fears if US pressed such withdrawal, armed forces and
people might adopt anti-American attitude; this is sources of concern
and worry to him.”26 According to Ambassador Drumright, President
25
The text of Peng’s broadcast was drafted by Mao Zedong himself. See “Letter to
Taiwanese Compatriots, October 6, 1958,” Mao Zedong Writings since the
Founding of the People’s Republic of China,” (Jianguo Yilai Maozedong Wengao,)
Vol. 7 (Beijing: Chungyangwenxian, 1992), pp. 439-441.
26
Drumright, Telegram to Dulles, October 6, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XIX,
China, p. 332.
60
Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
Chiang even stressed the sensitivity of the attitude of the public in
Taiwan in an attempt to dissuade the Eisenhower Administration from
pressing a withdrawal of the Nationalist forces.
In meeting with Dulles on October 13, Ambassador Yeh
defended the needs for the Nationalist forces on Quemoy and Matsu.
Ambassador Yeh pointed out: “The ratio of GRC and Communist
troops was 1 to 4. If the GRC reduced its troops very much it would
reach the point where it couldn’t hold Quemoy. The United States
would then have to put in that much more assistance if the islands
were attacked. If the GRC had more troops on the island, it would be
easier for the United States and they could confine its activities to
convoying.” Ambassador Yeh went further to suggest that “during the
coming two weeks there would be no further talk about reducing or
withdrawing FRC forces” as such talk would be a blow to morale on
Taiwan. Ambassador Yeh added that “it would be a political mistake
to talk about GRC reduction of force unless in terms of reciprocal
Communist reduction. There had been too much talk about reducing
GRC forces on the offshore islands.”27 Ambassador Yeh’s abovementioned emphasis illustrated that the debate about the utility of the
Nationalist forces on Quemoy and Matsu was intense prior to Dulles’
visit.
Moreover, President Chiang in person made a resolute statement
about his position on not abandoning Quemoy and Matsu before the
Department of State officially announced Dulles’ plan to visit Taiwan.
On October 17, President Chiang announced to the press in Taipei that
while not making predictions, “we are definitely determined to hold
the offshore islands.” Beyond that, Presdient Chiang asserted that it
was “clear as daylight that the Chinese Communist attack on Quemoy
was aimed at the ultimate objective of expelling the United States
27
Memorandum of Conversation between Dulles and Yeh, “Offshore Island
Situation and Secretary’s Visit to Taipei,” October 13, 1958, Ibid., p. 387.
Communication Between Taiwan And the USA at the time of The 1958 Quemoy Crisis: Dulles’ Meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek 61
from the entire Western Pacific.”28
CHIANG’S WORRIES ABOUT WARSAW TALKS
Before Dulles arrived in Taiwan, the GRC repeated its concerns
over the U.S. conduct at the Warsaw Talks. In summoning
Ambassador Drumright on October 2, President Chiang told
Ambassador Drumright that the people and the soldiers in Taiwan had
been shaken at Dulles’ offering to resume negotiations with Chinese
Communists in his statement to the press at Newport. President
Chiang told Drumright that “he considered Communists had scored
psychological victory when we agreed to resume talks.”29 President
Chiang’s words truly reflected his profound misgivings and suspicions
about the Warsaw Talks.
On the evening of October 13, Ambassador Drumright sent his
comments to the Department of State on the Chiang-McElroy
conference earlier on the same day. In his telegram, Drumright said
that President Chiang was clearly obsessed with the idea that in U.S.
negotiations with the Chinese Communists in Warsaw, the Eisenhower
Administration would somehow made concessions to the detriment of
the ROC. Ambassador Drumright noted that “Chiang is probably
laboring under impression we are discussing a deal at Warsaw or
through some third party at expense of GRC.” Ambassador Drumright
pointed out that President Chiang’s “fears were heightened by
President’s and Secretary’s most recent press conferences and by
persistent news reports that US is advocating reduction of offshore
defenses, et cetera.” 30 Drumright’s report illustrated the strong
28
Greg MacGregor,. “Chiang Insistent on Keeping Isles,” The New York Times,
October 18, 1958, p. 1.
29
Drumright, Telegram to Dulles, October 2, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XIX,
China, pp. 319-320.
30
Drumright, Telegram to the Department of State, October 13, 1958, Ibid., pp.
62
Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
suspicion on the part of President Chiang about U.S. negotiating
position at the Warsaw Talks.
LORD MOUNTBATTEN’S ADVICE TO DULLES
Next, one will evaluate the advice given to Dulles by Admiral
Lord Louis Mountbatten of the United Kingdom prior to Dulles’
departure for Taiwan. It was a coincidence that Mountbatten called on
President Eisenhower in mid-October and got himself involved in the
Quemoy Crisis. On the suggestion of President Eisenhower,
Mountbatten subsequently visited Dulles on October 17. President
Eisenhower hoped that Mountbatten could describe to Dulles his
experience in dealing with President Chiang for over two years during
the World War II in the capacity as the Supreme Allied Commander in
Southeast Asia.
Acting on President Eisenhower’s urge, Mountbatten told Dulles
that his experience with President Chiang was that “if one took a
strong line with Chiang and at the same time gave him a face-saving
means of retreat, he would back down.” Mountbatten specifically
recommended that it was likely that “in the present situation President
Chiang could similarly be induced to pull out of the offshore islands if
the United States took a hard line with him while at the same time
giving him a graceful, face-saving means of acceding by providing
additional amphibious lift and other modernization of forces.” In the
view of Mountbatten, such a move would strengthen the position of
the GRC and thus be in the best interest of President Chiang.31
In response, Dulles said that “he was going out to Taiwan merely
to get the feel of the situation and to give President Chiang a better
understanding of the problems……he planned to see what might be
379-380.
31
Memorandum of Conversation between Mountbatten and Dulles, “Chiang Kaishek and the Offshore Islands.” Ibid., p. 411.
Communication Between Taiwan And the USA at the time of The 1958 Quemoy Crisis: Dulles’ Meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek 63
done to improve the situation.” Dulles emphasized that “he did not
intend to try to carry out any specific course of action at this time.”32
Dulles was candid in telling so to Mountbatten. However, in retrospect,
Mountbatten’s advice on a “face-saving” approach to deal with
President Chiang was of good reference value to Dulles.
Coincidentally to some extent , the staff at the Department of State by
October 13 already thought about exploring the probability of
persuading President Chiang into reducing the Nationalist forces by
providing him with additional amphibious capabilities. 33
Mountbatten’s advice to Dulles was an important interlude. . .
DRAFT TALKING PAPER PREPARED FOR DULLES
As discussed earlier, to convince President Chiang for a
reduction of the Nationalist forces on Quemoy and Matsu was one of
the primary goals Dulles set for his visit. As early as on October 13,
the staff at the Department of State already prepared a draft talking
paper for Dulles regarding his forthcoming visit to Taiwan. The draft
talking paper had been circulated to several people within the
Department of State for their comments before it was presented to
Dulles.
The draft talking paper argued in particular for the merits of the
reduction of the Nationalist forces stationed on Quemoy and Matsu. It
said as follows:
Some appreciable reduction of forces under the conditions
suggested would give comparable security to what now exists.
There would be enough forces left not only to maintain internal
security, but to put up a substantial resistance. The number left
behind could at any time be augmented from Taiwan, particularly
32
33
Ibid.
“Draft Talking Paper Prepared by Secretary of State Dulles,” October 13, 1958,
Ibid., p. 400.
64
Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
if additional amphibious power were provided……It would be a
necessary accompaniment of the foregoing that the Chinats
should make clear that they did not intend to use the offshore
islands for provocative purposes. Actually, there is very little
“provocation” now by the Chinats from the offshore islands.
They are not used for purposes of blockading the ports of Amoy
and Foochow.34
Eventually, such words as there was no intention to use the
offshore islands for the prosecution of the civil war, e.g., for
blockading the Ports of Amoy and Foochow, or “jumping off” to the
China mainland , were kept in the October 21 version of the talking
paper Dulles brought to Taiwan. They were even contained in the
written statement presented by Dulles to President Chiang during their
meeting on the morning of October 22.35
In other words, Dulles had had relatively good preparations done
before he visited Taiwan.
DULLES’ REVIEW OF HIS MISSION
It is important to identify the most significant achievements
Dulles felt in his visit on President Chiang. At 3 p.m. on October 23,
Dulles sent a telegram to President Eisenhower, reporting the
achievements of his visit to Taiwan. In the words of Dulles, the three
days of consultation in Taiwan had been very much worthwhile.
Dulles noted: it was not practical to bring about any immediate
military changes because of the resumption of bombardment by the
PRC. But Dulles believed that a groundwork had been laid. In the
telegram, Dulles said, “Most importantly in the communiqué we are
issuing the Chinese Nationalists declared their dependence upon
34
35
Ibid.
Memorandum of conversation between Dulles and President Chiang, October 22,
1958, Ibid., p. 425.
Communication Between Taiwan And the USA at the time of The 1958 Quemoy Crisis: Dulles’ Meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek 65
political ideals rather than upon force to liberate the peoples of the
China mainland.”36 To Dulles, President Chiang’s agreement to rely
mainly on political ideals for the recovery of the China mainland was
the most significant achievement of his visit.
However, on October 24, immediately after the joint
communiqué was issued, disappointment among some sectors of the
public in Taiwan with undertones of bitterness greeted the news about
the agreement by President Chiang to renounce the main reliance on
force to return to the China mainland. The New York Times noted that
“the disappointment was expressed in public and in newspaper
editorial comment.”37 In other words, the people in Taiwan, including
President Chiang, did not share with the joy of Dulles over his most
significant achievement of his Taiwan visit.
The process in which Dulles brought President Chiang to such an
agreement in the joint communiqué warrants a detailed review. In his
meeting with Dulles on October 21, President Chiang said that “he did
not want a world war in order to free the Chinese people on the
Mainland. He himself was a revolutionary. He realized that you could
not have a revolution merely by force. What was required was popular
support.” President Chiang took the initiative to indicate no intention
to widen the crisis and involve the free world into a war. President
Chiang referred to the agreement with the Eisenhower Administration
on the principle of not attacking the China mainland by air. In the
record taken down by the U.S., President Chiang emphasized: It was a
hard question for the ROC, “but the ROC accepted it because the
ROC agreed with us on the principle of not taking action which might
36
37
Telegram from Dulles to President Eisenhower, October 23, 1958, Ibid.., p.444.
Greg MacGregor, “Assent by Chiang Scored in Taiwan,” The New York Times,
October 25, 1958, p. 4. MacGregor also reported that the agreement made to reduce
Nationalist troop strength on the offshore islands over a long-term period was
withheld from the public, Ibid.
66
Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
precipitate a world war. There was no desire to put the US on the
spot.” According to U.S. record, President Chiang went on to
complain that even the Eisenhower Administration lacked trust in him,
and said that he wanted more of the confidence from the Eisenhower
Administration. In reply, Dulles said: He hoped that President Chiang
was not referring to him. “There was no one in the world that I would
trust more implicitly than he once he had given his word. I did not
disguise the fact that there were many people, some on Taiwan, who
thought that the GRC, not necessarily the President himself, were
trying to involve us in war as a means of returning to the Mainland.”38
In his subsequent cable to President Eisenhower, Dulles said:
President Chiang pleaded for more trust and confidence on the part of
the Eisenhower Administration in his emphasis of his desire for peace
rather than for war.39 It was true that President Chiang essentially
gave his pledge of no intention to aggravate the Quemoy Crisis.
President Chiang in the meanwhile asked for more confidence in him
from the Eisenhower Administration. But actually, Dulles did not
mitigate his push for President Chiang’s commitment.
On October 22, in his meeting with President Chiang in the
morning again, Dulles read a statement and left copies of his statement
to President Chiang. In the read statement, Dulles particularly said that
“the great danger faced by the GRC is not primarily military but
political.” Dulles emphasized to President Chiang in his statement that
“the feeling shared by most of the freed world countries that the
relationship between the GRC and CPR not only endangers the peace
but that the GRC wants it to endanger the peace and involve the US as
the only means of returning to the mainland.” Dulles pointed out that
38
Memorandum of Conversation between Chiang Kai-shek and Dulles, October 21,
1958, FRUS,1958-1960, Vol. XIX, China, pp. 418-419.
39
“Telegram from Secretary of State Dulles to the Department of State,” October 21,
1958, Ibid., p. 420.
Communication Between Taiwan And the USA at the time of The 1958 Quemoy Crisis: Dulles’ Meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek 67
the GRC was in a battle “in which the position of the GRC has been
deteriorating because it is made to appear as a civil war survival
essentially militaristic in its outlook.” Dulles advised President Chiang
that the ROC should make it clear to the world its recognition that the
bases for GRC counterattack against the mainland are “rather in the
minds and souls of the 600 million Chinese people on the mainland
who hope and pray for delivery from their present bondage.”40
POLITICAL MEASURES IN JOINT COMMUNIQUE
Later in his meeting with President Chiang on the evening of
October 22, Dulles said that Ambassador Drumright had handed a
proposed draft joint communiqué to ROC Foreign Minister Huang
Shao-ku who was not present there. Ambassador George Yeh
interjected that he thought Huang Shao-ku would have some
suggestions in connection with Paragraph Six of the draft joint
communiqué. President Chiang observed humorously that if Dulles
had prepared the draft, it “must be good.”41
Actually, the GRC side made a number of suggestions about the draft
joint communiqué, particularly with reference to Paragraph Six at the
brief discussion after the dinner on that evening.42
In the discussion of Paragraph Six after dinner, Ambassador Yeh,
after conferring with President Chiang, particularly conveyed GRC
suggestion that the phrase “will never itself initiate war” be amended
to read “will never itself initiate general war.”
At the meeting which started at 9:30 a.m. in the next morning
with the GRC counterpart, Dulles brought a draft joint communique.
40
Memorandum of Conversation between Dulles and President Chiang, October 22,
1958, Ibid., pp. 424-425.
41
Memorandum of Conversation between Dulles and President Chiang, October 22,
1958, 7 p.m., Ibid., p. 430.
42
Ibid., p. 432.
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Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
Its Paragraph Six read as follows:
The two governments reaffirmed their dedication to the
principles of the Charter of the United Nations. They recalled
that the Treaty under which they are acting is a defensive treaty
only. The Government of the Republic of China rejects the
concept that its high mission as the representative of Free China
is a mission of war. The Republic of China has no military bases
for attacks upon the Mainland. Its bases are already on the
Mainland, in the minds and hearts of the Chinese people. These it
will seek to sustain by its conduct and example.43
But the GRC did not accept the revised version of Paragraph Six.
So Dulles. Dulles wrote down the GRC suggestions in his prepared
draft.44 Dulles was again very firm in criticizing the ROC for an
attempt to involve the U.S. in its aspiration to recover the China
mainland.
Actually, by the morning of October 23, the ROC already
accepted the U.S. recommendation for an emphasis on political efforts
to recover the China mainland. Therefore, on the morning of October
23, Dulles told President Chiang that “a very important milestone had
bee passed by the position to be publicly announced by the GRC in its
communique shifting the emphasis from military to political efforts
43
44
Ibid., p. 441.
Ibid., The final version of Paragraph Six in the joint communiqué read as follows:
The two Governments reaffirmed their solidarity in the face of the new Chinese
Communist aggression now manifesting itself in the bombardment of the Quemoys.
This aggression and the accompanying Chinese Communist propaganda have not
divided them, as the Communists have hoped. On the contrary, it has drawn them
closer together. They believe that by unitedly opposing aggression they serve not
only themselves but the cause of peace. As President Eisenhower said on September
11, the position of opposing aggression by force is the only position consistent with
the peace of the world. Ibid., p. 443.
Communication Between Taiwan And the USA at the time of The 1958 Quemoy Crisis: Dulles’ Meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek 69
vis-à-vis the Mainland.”45
In the joint communiqué released later on the same day,
references were made to the emphasis by the ROC on political
measures rather than military measures. It stated as such:
The Government of the Republic of China considers that the
restoration of freedom to its people on the mainland is its sacred
mission. It believes that the foundation of this mission resides in
the minds and the hearts of the Chinese people and that the
principal means of successfully achieving its mission is the
implementation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s three people’s principles
(nationalism, democracy and social well-being) and not the use
of force.46
In the next morning, Dulles, in reporting in person his mission to
Taiwan to President Eisenhower, pointed out, “There was some
considerable difficulty in getting the ‘non-force’ declaration. I felt,
however, that my talks with the Gimo about the non-use of force and
also about the unsoundness of identifying his cause with two exposed
pieces of real estate such as the Quemoys and the Matsus had had
some effect.”47
Dulles also quickly informed some U.S. major allies of this
significant achievement of his mission. In his letter on October 24 to
UK Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, Dulles stressed his talks with
President Chiang on the emphasis of political measures for the
reunification cause. Dulles revealed that he had many hours of private
conversation with President Chiang with only an interpreter,
Ambassador Yeh, present. Dulles said in his letter, “……I expounded
45
Memorandum of Conversation between Dulles and President Chaing, October 23,
1958, 11 a.m., FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XIX, China, p. 440.
46
47
“Joint Communique,” October 23, 1958, Ibid., pp. 443-444.
Memorandum of Conversation between Dulles and President Eisenhower,
October 24, Ibid., p. 445.
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fully my philosophy that the Nationalists should look upon their
mission as an essentially peaceful one and should renounce the use of
force in an attempt to reunify China.”48 Even with Dulles saying so,
the GRC did not actually pledge to give up military means thoroughly.
Additionally, on October 25, the Department of State issued a
circular telegram to all U.S. diplomatic missions overseas, briefing
them the joint communiqué Dulles and President Chiang reached
during Dulles’ visit to Taiwan. The circular telegram instructed all the
diplomatic missions of the United States to discuss over the
significance of the joint communiqué with the leaders of the
governments to which they were accredited. The circular telegram
further said that “this declaration is indicative of important evolution
in thinking of GRC away from expectation of early return to mainland
through violent means toward reliance on longer term prospect of
reunification of country in freedom after collapse of Communist
tyranny.”49 The above were the follow-up actions Dulles took. They
clearly confirmed that Dulles believed that a GRC agreement on the
principal means of political ideals rather than military force was the
most significant achievement of his visit on President Chiang.
However, the disappointment or frustration among the ROC
nationals made the GRC decide to slightly modify its commitment to
the Eisenhower Administration. In meeting with U.S. Assistant
Secretary Robertson on October 29, Ambassador Yeh placed emphasis
on the negative reaction by the overseas Chinese to the question about
the use of force contained in the joint communiqué. Ambassador Yeh
mentioned the criticism from both overseas Chinese newspapers and
the Central News published in Taiwan. Ambassador Yeh said that the
GRC had not given up its intention to restore freedom to the China
48
49
Letter from Dulles to Lloyd, October 24, 1958, Ibid., p. 450.
“Circular Telegram from the Department of State to All Diplomatic Missions.”
October 25, 1958, Ibid., p. 452.
Communication Between Taiwan And the USA at the time of The 1958 Quemoy Crisis: Dulles’ Meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek 71
mainland but would “carry out its intention 70% by political means
and 30% by military if and when necessary.” Ambassador Yeh assured
Robertson that the GRC policy remained unchanged. Ambassador Yeh
said that “the joint Communique had simply clarified the stand of the
GRC that this objective would be achieved primarily by building up
psychological base on the mainland.”50 In short, faced with criticism
from ROC nationals and some overseas Chinese, the GRC devised a
nuanced formula to satisfy not only the ROC nationals in its support
but also the Eisenhower Administration.
CHIANG AND DULLES DEBATED ON IMPORTANCE OF
QUEMOY
Even though Dulles was happy with the achievements he had in
negotiating with President Chiang. Between them, debates occurred
on the question of the importance of Quemoy and Matsu. In receiving
Dulles on October 21, President Chiang mentioned the importance of
Quemoy’s security to Taiwan. Dulles noted in his memorandum that
President Chiang “remarked incidentally that if Kinmen were lost, he
thought the effect of that on the morale on Taiwan would be so serious
that the defense of Taiwan itself would crumble.”51 President Chiang
could be purposeful in making the mention.
On the morning of October 23, Dulles met again with President
Chiang. In their talk, Dulles referred to President Chiang’s earlier
statement that “if Quemoy was lost, that would carry with it the loss of
Taiwan and the end of Free China.” Dulles expressed his objections to
President Chiang’s views as follows:
50
Memorandum of Conversation between Yeh, Robertson and Martin, “Reaction to
GRC-United States Joint Communique of October 23,” October 29, 1958, Ibid., pp.
463-464.
51
Memorandum of conversation between Chiang Kai-shek and Dulles, October 21,
1958, Ibid., p. 419.
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Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
I did not think that this relationship ought to be accepted. I recall
that when the Generalissimo was defending Free China against
the Japanese he did not identify his cause with Peking, and
Nanking, or Hankow, or even Chungking. Great causes are not to
be identified with the holding of particular territorial positions.52
Immediately, President Chiang rebutted it by saying that Dulles’
references to the fighting on the China mainland during the war
against Japanese aggression were not relevant because at that time
they had plenty of land to trade for time. But, Dulles did not accept
President Chiang’s argument. Dulles emphatically cited Winston
Churchill’s statement that “they would fight on the beaches, etc., but
that if the British Isles were conquered, they would still go on fighting
from any overseas positions that were available.” Dulles pointed out
that Churchill “had not identified the survival of Free England with
holding even any part of the British Isles.”53 In other words, Dulles
did not hesitate at all to cite Churchill’s words to refute the validity of
President Chiang ‘s argument.
52
Memorandum of conversation between Dulles and President Chiang, October 23,
1958, 11 a.m., Ibid., p. 439. Colonel Edwin F. Black from Operations Coordinating
Board sent a memorandum to Special Assistant to the President for Security
Operations Coordination Karl G. Harr, emphasizing that the U.S. Navy felt that
some military importances of Quemoy and Matsu might have been overlooked.
Black listed them as: “1. Occupation of these islands by the Chinats interrupts the
Chicom north-south coastal shipping lanes. 2. quemoy blocks the port of
Amoy…..which is the best harbor on the China mainland for mounting submarine
operations. 3. Quemoy and Matsu contain important early warning installations
which are an essential part of the Formosa air defense system……4. With the
completion of the railroad to Amoy and Foochow……these two cities become the
logical invasion ports for operations against Taiwan. See Memorandum from Edwin
F. Black to Harr, “Military Values of the Off-shore Islands,” Box 8, Subject
Subseries, OCB Series, White House Office of Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs: Records, The Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.
53
Memorandum of conversation between Dulles and President Chiang, October 23,
1958, 11 a.m., FRUS, 1958-1960, p. 439.
Communication Between Taiwan And the USA at the time of The 1958 Quemoy Crisis: Dulles’ Meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek 73
In response, President Chiang said that in his opinion Taiwan
could not be held long after Quemoy fell. He pointed out that there
were plenty of Communist agents on Taiwan and they would see that
the loss of Quemoy as the inability of the GRC to survive long. He
added that “there had been reports that the Chinese Communists were
willing to make a deal whereby they would, in exchange for the
Quemoy and Matsu Islands, agree not to use force against Taiwan for
five years.” He emphasized that “they would not need five years. The
Government could not survive five months.” He assured Dulles that
“he could ‘guarantee’ the successful defense of Quemoy given the
level of assistance which the US was rendering.” But Dulles still said,
“While I had great respect for the military judgment of the Gimo, I did
not think that anybody could ‘guarantee’ the indefinite defense of an
island situated as was Quemoy.”54 Dissent existed between Dulles
and President Chiang over the strategic importance of Quemoy
throughout Dulles’ visit.
On October 24, The New York Times was very keen in
criticizing the Eisenhower Administration for its failure to downplay
the importance of Quemoy and Matsu in the joint communiqué. In its
editorial on October 24, The New York Times said, “On this point, the
communiqué is purposely vague. It repeats the Administration’s
contention…..that the defense of Quemoy and Matsu ‘is closely
related’ to the defense of Taiwan, thereby again implying an American
commitment to go to war over the islands.”55 The criticism made by
The New York Times was strong. The New York Times might not be
fully aware of the efforts Dulles had put in trying to convince
President Chiang about the fringe importance of Quemoy and Matsu.
Incidentally, the strategic importance of Quemoy and Matsu to the
ROC declined very significantly by the 21st Century. Not only the
54
Ibid., p. 439.
55
Editorial, “Conference in Taiwan,” The New York Times, October 24, 2003, p. 32.
74
Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
power configuration of the world already changed dramatically but
also the contacts across the Taiwan Straits changed considerably.
While the military strength gap across the straits is in favor of the
PRC, the mindset among some people in Taiwan changed in regard to
the territory of the ROC.
NEGOTIATION OVER REDUCTION OF OFFSHORE
FORCES
Actually, the GRC made a few concessions to Dulles’ pressures
over the need for loosening the tension on Quemoy and Matsu. On the
afternoon of October 22, ROC Foreign Minister Huang Shao-ku met
with U.S. Ambassador Drumright. Huang Shao-ku on behalf of the
GRC gave initial reaction to Dulles’ written statement left with
President Chiang at their morning meeting. Huang’s comments were
that “the Chinese Government has demonstrated its intense desire for
peace by exercising almost superhuman self-restraint in the face of
Communist provocations.” He pointed out that “instead of delivering
effective counter-blows to the enemy in return for his savage attacks,
we have gone out of our way to declare that the offshore islands would
not be used as a springboard to assault the mainland.” Huang
emphasized in addition:
It would be a travesty of justice to consider the maintenance and
defense of its legality and territorial integrity by the Republic of
China against the aggressive actions of the rebel regime as a
source of irritation affecting peace.56
Huang went on to say that “the often-repeated Chinese
Communist declaration……have made it crystal clear that what they
are aiming at is not only the seizure of the offshore islands or even the
elimination of Free China, but the wholesale expulsion of the U.S.
56
Memorandum of conversation between Drumright and Huang Shao-ku, October
22, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960,Vol. XIX, China, p. 428.
Communication Between Taiwan And the USA at the time of The 1958 Quemoy Crisis: Dulles’ Meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek 75
from the Western Pacific, thereby to secure the domination of Asia.”57
By saying so, Huang meant that any abandonment of Quemoy and
Matsu still could not satisfy the ambitions of the PRC.
In his talk to Ambassador Drumright, Huang also explained that
the ROC was “confronted with the choice between the loss of support
of our own people and the loss of support of some foreign
governments.” Huang continued to assert that “we would not hesitate
to accept the consequences of the latter situation, however painful it
may be.” 58 Huang was firm in following President Chiang’s
insistence on not giving up Quemoy and Matsu.
Relevant to Huang’s firm statement was the issue about the
reduction of the ROC forces on the offshore islands. Since President
Chiang on October 17 had openly excluded the probability of
withdrawing the Nationalist forces from Quemoy and Matsu, to
persuade President Chiang into accepting a reduction of the
Nationalist forces from Quemoy and Matsu became an uneasy task in
Dulles’ mission. Amid his very tight schedules on Taiwan, Dulles still
had a meeting over the force reduction issue with those U.S. highranking military officers then in Taiwan. On the afternoon of October
22, Dulles had a meeting with General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief of
Staff of U.S. Army, Vice Admiral Smoot, General Issac D. White,
Commander in Chief of U.S. Army Pacific, Major General Doan and
others. General Taylor was originally scheduled to visit Taiwan from
October 22-25 in the course of a trip to several Asian countries. But
his trip to Taiwan was rescheduled to be from October 21-23, to
coincide with Dulles’.
To those high-ranking military officials, Dulles first outlined his
presentation to President Chiang. Subsequently, Vice Admiral Smoot
and General Doan described a plan, which General Doan had found in
57
Ibid.
58
Ibid., p. 429.
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Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
his contact with the ROC Ministry of National Defense, for “reducing
the number of troops on Quemoy by a total of about 17,000 men.”
That plan envisaged withdrawal of one full division of 12,000 men
and reduction of 1,000 men from each of the remaining six divisions.
But General Doan noted that it was “not proposed to put that plan into
effect immediately, in the present circumstances.” General Taylor
added that study was also given to the possibility of improving the
artillery on Quemoy and Matsu, including the possible addition of
about 12 240 mm howitzers on Quemoy. In response, Dulles
suggested that “the howitzers be provided only in return for GRC
agreement to reduce the total troop strength on Quemoy by between
15,000 and 20,000 men.” Dulles also said that he would leave the
details of how that reduction might be accomplished for military
determination. Eventually, Dulles agreed that the howitzers could be
put in position on Quemoy and Matsu before an agreed troop
reduction was completed, although not before agreement with the
ROC on that reduction was reached. Dulles expressed that he was
“willing to take the risk that this might lead to non-fulfillment of the
agreement.” 59 It seemed that Dulles’ communication with those
military officers was quite smooth.
In meeting with President Chiang on the morning of October 23,
Dulles once again brought up the question of the size of the garrison
on Quemoy. Dulles hoped that “this could be reduced both as a
political gesture and also a gesture which was consistent with sound
military policy.” In response, President Chiang said that he would be
“prepared to move in this direction if there were a suspension of
hostilities. It was virtually impossible for him to do so under fire.”
Dulles then said, “I understood that plans were being discussed for a
change in the number and character of divisions and for some
59
Summary record of meeting between Dulles and generals, October 22, 1958, Ibid.,
pp. 426-427.
Communication Between Taiwan And the USA at the time of The 1958 Quemoy Crisis: Dulles’ Meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek 77
improvement of weapons which would reduce the Quemoy garrison
by between 15,000 to 20,000 persons……I hoped an opportunity
could be found shortly to bring this about.”60
In his telegram to President Eisenhower after the joint
communiqué was released, Dulles said that President Chiang had
accepted the principle of an appreciable reduction of forces on
Quemoy to be effected “whenever there was a suspension of the
fighting.” Dulles noted in his telegram that President Chiang pledged
his full cooperation to our policies asking only that before they are
formulated he should be adequately consulted.”61
Later in reporting to President Eisenhower about his mission to
Taiwan, Dulles did not forget to mention the failure to overcome the
difficulties in persuading President Chiang to abandon Quemoy and
Matsu. But he added that “if there were a period of lull the forces on
Quemoy would be substantially reduced between 15,000 and 20,000
persons pursuant to a military rearrangement cutting back the number
of present divisions.” Dulles further said that “I also said that if
anything like an armistice could be arranged, I would see no great
difficulty in a further very substantial change in the character of the
Nationalists’ presence on the offshore islands.”62
On October 24, Dulles briefed UK Foreign Secretary Lloyd also
on the progress of persuading the ROC in reducing its forces on
Quemoy and Matsu. In his letter to Lloyd, Dulles said that the ROC
government “is working with our military advisers on plans for a
60
Memorandum of Conversation between Dulles and President Chiang, October 23,
1958, 11 a.m., Ibid., p. 440.
61
Telegram from Dulles to President Eisenhower, October 23, 1958, 3 p.m., Ibid., p.
444.
62
Memorandum of Conversation between Dulles and President Chiang, October 24,
1958, Ibid., p. 445.
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Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
substantial reduction of forces in Quemoy and Matsu.” 63 A
commitment from President Chiang to gradually reduce the forces on
Quemoy and Matsu was another important achievement of Dulles’
visit.
In a telegram on October 27, Ambassador Drumright reported to
Dulles that Vice Admiral Smoot and Major General L. L. Doan had
general discussion with ROC Defense Minister Yu Ta-wei and Chief
of General Staff Tiger Wang on modernization of ROC forces and
rationalization of Quemoy defenses on October 25. Vice Admiral
Smoot and Major General Doan were reported to have got favorable
response, especially from Defense Minister Yu. But Drumright noted
that Foreign Minister Huang told him that he “had no comment other
than to caution that any approach to troop reduction should be handled
carefully and not be pushed precipitately by the United States.” In
Drumright’s telegram, Huang was cited as that “he intimated if not
handled well, troop reduction could be exploited psychologically by
Communists and pointed out press is already carrying reports to effect
US is pressing GRC to effect troop reduction on offshores.”64 In the
account given by Ambassador Drumright, Defense Minister Yu was
more receptive than Foreign Minister Huang to the troop reduction
proposal by the U.S.
A Special National Intelligence Estimate under the title as
“Probable Developments in the Taiwan Strait Crisis” was submitted to
President Eisenhower on October 28. The intelligence report
estimated that the GRC would “probably be unwilling to portray any
such garrison reduction as a political move designed to facilitate the
achievement of a modus vivendi with the Chinese Communists on the
offshore island question.” It went on to say that “their opposition to a
proposal to demilitarize or neutralize the offshore islands would be
63
Letter from Dulles to Lloyd, October 24, 1958, Ibid., p. 450.
64
Telegram from Drumright to Dulles, October 27, 1958, Ibid., p. 454.
Communication Between Taiwan And the USA at the time of The 1958 Quemoy Crisis: Dulles’ Meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek 79
even stronger, as they would view such action as tantamount to
surrendering the offshore islands.” 65 In essence, the intelligence
report concluded that the GRC would not accept a withdrawal of the
Nationalist forces from Quemoy and Matsu. But the intelligence
report also portrayed that it was quite a success for Dulles to have
persuaded President Chiang into accepting a “gradual force reduction”
on the offshore islands.
GRC REJECTION OF ARMISTICE SUGGESTION
It was not an unimportant issue that Dulles, during his visit, made
efforts to try to persuade President Chiang to pursue an armistice with
the PRC. Amid his efforts to stop the armed conflict between the GRC
and the PRC, Dulles set an aim in persuading President Chiang to
pursue a cease-fire with the PRC.
In his conversation with President Chiang on the morning of
October 22, Dulles said that in the world there existed four countries
which were divided by Communist efforts: China, Korea, Vietnam,
and Germany. Among the four only in the case of China there was no
armistice. Dulles added that he was convinced that the Communists
would not accept an armistice. But Dulles emphasized, “the Republic
of China must make clear that it is willing to accept a situation
comparable to that in the other three divided countries. In short , the
blame for disturbing the peace must be placed on the Communists and
not the Republic of China.”66 Dulles took the opportunity to express
65
Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 100-12-58, “Probable
Developments in the Taiwan Strait Crisis,” October 28, 1958, Ibid., p. 461.
66
Memorandum of conversation between Dulles and President Chiang, October 22,
1958, Ibid., p. 423. In its editorial on October 16, 1958, The New York Times
supported Dulles’ position of pursuing “dependable” cease-fire. It said that “Mr.
Dulles is absolutely right in insisting on the prerequisite of a ‘dependable’ cease-fire
in the Taiwan Strait.” It emphasized that “the Eisenhower-Dulles doctrine of ‘no
force’ on either side—Mao’s side or Chiang’s side—is the proper place from which
80
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his hope that the GRC would declare its willingness in an armistice no
matter whether the PRC would readily accept such a proposal.
Dulles continued by saying that he wished to make it perfectly
clear that “he does not envisage that by adopting a peaceful role, the
Republic of China should give up its mission to restore freedom to the
mainland.” Dulles explained to President Chiang that his thinking
about the actions recommended for the GRC was contained in a paper
he presented. At that point, President Chiang replied that “he would
like to reserve his views on the Secretary’s paper until he and his
colleagues had had time to consider it.” President Chiang went on to
say the following: He was a revolutionary and his government was a
revolutionary government. “As such, he and his Government attach a
great importance to principles.”67 It was widely known that President
Chiang had for some time opposed the Two-China concept, insisting
that the ROC was the sole legitimate government of China. President
Chiang seemed to be quite sensitive to the subtle implications of
Dulles’ armistice suggestion.
In his paper prepared in advance to President Chiang, Dulles
listed some of the acts which might be taken by President Chiang in
an effort to “dramatize the larger and enduring role” of the ROC. On
top of them was that “the GRC should make clear that, so far as it is
concerned, and on a basis of de facto reciprocity, it will conduct itself
as though there were an armistice along the line of present division,
and indeed would be willing itself to conclude such an armistice.”
Additionally, Dulles stated in the paper that “there should be reemphasis on what the Generalissimo has already indicated—that the
to start.” See “Quemoy and Matsu Again,” Editorial, The New York Times, October
16, 1958, p. 36.
67
Memorandum of Conversation between Dulles and President Chiang, October 22,
1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XIX, China, p. 423.
Communication Between Taiwan And the USA at the time of The 1958 Quemoy Crisis: Dulles’ Meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek 81
GRC will not initiate an attempt forcibly to return on the mainland.”68
While President Chiang did not immediately reject Dulles’
suggestion for an armistice, ROC Foreign Minister Huang took over
the role in giving a response.
In talking to Ambassador Drumright later on the same day,
Huang responded by saying that the ROC was not prepared to oppose
a “de facto” ceasefire. Huang’s words were: “We are even prepared
not to oppose a de facto ceasefire as long as the Communists would
not disturb the peace.” But Huang went on to say, “No self-respecting
government can do more than this without forfeiting its birthright.” In
a forthright way, Huang rebutted Dulles’ armistice suggestion. In
clear-cut terms, Huang asserted:
The suggestion advanced by Secretary Dulles appears to be of
such a nature as almost to shake the foundation of the Republic
of China. It is tantamount to a voluntary announcement by this
Government of its acceptance of the “Two China” idea. This
would at once alienate the support of all Chinese, especially
those on the mainland who hope for eventual deliverance from
Communist tyranny.69
Huang concluded his response by saying that “the Chinese
Government appreciates Secretary Dulles’ suggestion that we should
redouble our efforts on education, art and other aspects of Chinese
culture.”70
Huang‘s response illustrated that the GRC was apt to interpret
Dulles’ armistice proposal as a step to persuade the GRC to shift to
take a “Two-China” posture. In retrospect, the insistence upon a “One
China” policy by the GRC had other factors in its calculations, such as
68
Ibid., p. 425.
69
Memorandum of Conversation between Drumright and Huang Shao-ku, October
22, 1958, Ibid., p. 429.
70
Ibid.
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the domestic politics factor in Taiwan.
The so-called “rumors” of such a rift between the United States
and the ROC on an armistice proposal were circulated quickly in press
circles. Ambassador Geroge Yeh mentioned it at the beginning of the
meeting between Dulles and President Chiang on the evening of
October 22.71 After all, they were not rumors.
The PRC’s bid for a United Nations membership was another
question of sensitivity Dulles addressed to the GRC. On the morning
of October 23, Dulles touched on the continued bid by the PRC for a
UN membership. Dulles met with Premier Chen Cheng, Foreign
Minister Huang and Ambassador Yeh. Dulles said that he wondered
“whether we could continue now to treat the China representation
question in the United Nations as one of credentials or whether it
should not be treated as one of admission of a new member.” Right
away, Ambassador Yeh objected it by giving the reason as “this sort of
reasoning came too close to implying a ‘Two-China theory.” On that
Dulles disagreed. The discussion was inconclusive.72
71
Memorandum of Conversation between Dulles and President Chiang, October 22,
7 p.m., Ibid., p. 430.
72
Memorandum of conversation between Dulles and Chen Cheng, Huang Shao-ku
as well as George Yeh, October 23, 1958, Ibid., p. 438. George J. Hecht, Publisher
of the Parents’ Magazine and Family Home Guide wrote a letter to President
Eisenhower, recommending that the United Nations hold a plebiscite in Taiwan. On
October 20, 1958, Wilton B. Persons, the Assistant to the President, wrote a reply to
Hecht, forwarding to him the comments made by the Department of State in an
attached memorandum. The memorandum prepared by the Department of State says:
“Any attempt by the United Nations to hold a plebiscite in Taiwan, as Mr. Hecht
suggested, would be considered by the Republic of China as an affront to its
sovereignty. The Chinese Communist have also opposed such suggestions as
interference in ‘China’s internal affairs.” It notes that the PRC even rejected an
invitation from the United Nations to discuss the Taiwan Straits situation in 1955. It
emphasized that the PRC reiterated such a position in a formal announcement issued
on October 12, 1958. See letter from Wilton B. Persons to George J. Hecht, October
20. 1958, Box 802, General Files, White House Central Files, The Dwight D.
Eisenhower Library.
Communication Between Taiwan And the USA at the time of The 1958 Quemoy Crisis: Dulles’ Meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek 83
At that time, the mid-term election was at its heat in the United
States. Prior to Dulles’ visit to Taipei, Harrison A. Williams Jr., a
Democratic candidate for the Senate, urged publicly that the United
States should keep out of the dispute over Quemoy and Matsu while
campaigning in New Jersey on October 16, 1959. Williams said that
“let’s take the question to the United Nations……The islands could
well be a subject of U.N. trusteeship.”73 In comparison with Williams
Jr., Dulles’ attitude toward the GRC was quite friendly. Dulles’
aspirations for a sort of “modus vivendi” between the ROC and the
PRC was not ill-intended.
WHETHER TO HAVE JOINT COMMUNIQUE
In the following, one will, once again, touch on the question of
the joint communiqué. Whether or not to have a joint communiqué
during Dulles’ visit was one of the issues negotiated between the
Eisenhower Administration and the GRC prior to Dulles’ visit.
Originally, it was the GRC which proposed the need for a joint
communiqué. Ambassador Yeh raised the question when Dulles on
October 13 gave him a briefing about Dulles’ plan for the visit.
Ambassador Yeh said, “It was the Generalissimo’s idea that after the
discussions there would be a simple joint communiqué issued stating
that the two had reached agreement on policy. There should be no
appearance that the United States was putting pressure on the GRC for
reducing troops or eliminating provocations.” Ambassador Yeh also
said that “The Generalissimo thought that the military problem was
now pretty well taken care of and the field of discussion between them
should be narrowed down to political problems.” 74 But President
73
Clarence Dean, “Williams Favors Debate on Policy,” The New York Times,
October 17, 1958, p. 22.
74
Memorandum of Conversation, “Offshore Island Situation and Secretary’s Visit
to Taipei,” October 13, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XIX, China, p. 385 & 388.
84
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Chiang changed his attitude about a joint communiqué after Dulles
arrived in Taiwan.
Dulles met with President Chiang at Chiang’s residence on the
afternoon of October 21. Ambassador Yeh was their interpreter. Dulles
said that he had in mind about making some sort of a joint declaration.
But President Chiang’s reply was that it would be better if their
decisions are private.75
In his meeting with President Chiang on the morning of October
22, Dulles said that he believed that before his departure back to the
United States a joint statement of solidarity should be issued. Dulles
gave the reasons as that “such statement should make clear that
Communist resumption of fighting will not serve to separate the two
sides but bring them closer together.” Until then President Chiang did
not reply that he was in agreement with Dulles’ suggestion.76 In short,
President Chiang did not consistently sense the need for a joint
communiqué.
PRC’S RENEWED BOMBARDMENT
In discussing Dulles’ negotiation with President Chiang, it is
inappropriate to disregard the interference of the renewed
bombardment by the PRC on Quemoy and Matsu.
In his report to President Eisenhower as early as on October 14,
Dulles said that that “there was a chance that the Chicoms might use
my presence there as an excuse for breaking or terminating the ceasefire.” Dulles was foresighted in predicting such a risk of his visit to
Taiwan. But President Eisenhower gave a reply that “this was a risk
that would have to be taken; that, in fact, whether they continued or
75
Memorandum of conversation between Dulles and President Chiang, October 21,
1958, Ibid., p. 418.
76
Ibid,, p. 422.
Communication Between Taiwan And the USA at the time of The 1958 Quemoy Crisis: Dulles’ Meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek 85
broke the cease-fire would be determined by other considerations.”77
In short, President Eisenhower did not think that Dulles’ trip should be
foreclosed by a possible resumption of PRC bombardment.
But when Dulles was on the way to Taiwan, the PRC renewed
the bombardment. Dulles received the reports, which apparently
included an inaccurate report of air attacks, while he was at the
Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska. Dulles immediately discussed the
possibility of returning to Washington, D. C. in a series of telephone
conversations with Acting Secretary of State Herter and other officials,
including Assistant Secretary of State Robertson who was then
already in Taipei. Robertson told Dulles that the fighting had been
light and it had stopped. Dulls then telephoned President Eisenhower.
President Eisenhower and Dulles agreed that Dulles should continue
the journey to Taipei. In addition, President Eisenhower approved a
statement which Dulles was about to issue to the press.78 After all, the
resumption of the bombardment did not stop Dulles from continuing
on the journey.
HOW
DULLES
AND
CHIANG
READ
RESUMED
BOMBARDMENT
In cabling a report to President Eisenhower from Taipei on
October 21, Dulles first analyzed the reasons why the PRC resumed
the bombardment prior to his arrival. Dulles counseled prudence to
President Eisenhower in response to Beijing’s renewed bombardment.
Dulles told President Eisenhower that the PRC might not indicate its
determination to take Quemoy and Matsu by renewing the
bombardment. But Dulles advised President Eisenhower to suspend
U.S. convoying supplies temporarily. Additionally, Dulles advised
77
“Memorandum of Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Secretary of
State Dulles,” October 14, 1958, Ibid,, p. 405.
78
Ibid,, pp. 411-412.
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President Eisenhower not to instruct the Seventh Fleet for an
immediate resumption of assistance to the Nationalist Navy. Dulles’
words were as follows:
I spent the morning being briefed by our military about the
Quemoy situation. There is no clear verdict as to why the
bombardment was resumed and just what it means. The majority
view was that it probably did not presage a major effort to take
the islands by assault but primarily an effort to get away from the
weekly or biweekly “extensions” and to create and perpetuate a
state of uncertainty which is bad for morale. The disposition here
is not to respond by our convoying further supplies for the next
few days to see what develops……However, from the political
standpoint we need to bear in mind that we had announced that
the orders to the Seventh Fleet were to assist so long as there was
interdiction fire, to cease assisting if the interdiction fire ceased
but to resume assisting if the firing resumed. However, I think we
can from a political standpoint wait two or three days although I
would not for long think it wise to act as though we had been
deterred by Communist threats.79
After arriving in Taiwan, Dulles exchanged views with President
Chiang about the motive of Beijing’s renewed bombardment. In
receiving Dulles and his delegation on the morning of October 22,
President Chiang said that he was not certain whether the resumption
of bombardment by the PRC really represented a renewed effort to
take the offshore islands or it was a part of a total Communist
propaganda effort to take advantage of Dulles’ visit to Taiwan. In
response, Dulles said that unless the PRC made an effort within the
next two or three days to seize Quemoy, he believed that the ROC and
the United States “should revert for the time being to the procedures
79
“Telegram from Secretary of State Dulles to the Department of State,” October 21,
1958, Ibid. , p. 420.
Communication Between Taiwan And the USA at the time of The 1958 Quemoy Crisis: Dulles’ Meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek 87
they had employed prior to cessation of the shelling.” Before Dulles
gave the response, Premier Chen Cheng interjected that bombardment
from the PRC had been resumed at 9:30 in that morning.80 Beijing’s
resumption of the bombardment continued after Dulles arrived in
Taiwan. Certainly, both President Chiang and Dulles closely watched
its development.
However, In receiving Dulles later again on the evening of
October 22, President Chiang joked to Dulles that “it was possible that
the Chinese Communists had resumed firing on Kinmen as salute or
token of welcome to Dulles.” President Chiang subsequently predicted
that “the present Communist pattern of operations will probably
continue, that is, firing awhile and stop and then resume firing.”
President Chiang cautioned: It was “a typical Communist way of
attempting to paralyze the morale of the opposing side by tightening
the grip on the opponent’s nerves and then loosening up. In the long
run, if the Communists are allowed to alternate hold-fire with shelling,
the Republic of China side will suffer more than is commonly
realized.” President Chiang was pessimistic in expressing his worries
that “the effect on the general morale of the people, the economy, et
cetera, would be adverse.” President Chiang characterized the
employment of “two tactics” by the PRC as “fight and talk, talk and
fight, fire and cease-fire.” President Chiang noted with caution that
“alternation of fighting with cessation of fighting and the tension of
waiting for resumption of the attack are particularly tiring and wear
down troops.” President Chiang urged that Dulles must find time to
study the military aspects of the situation. President Chiang
emphasized to Dulles that the ROC “must find some way to
strengthen its defenses—military and civilian—so as to offset the
possible effects of Communist tactics on the morale of the population
80
Memorandum of Conversation between Dulles and President Chiang, October 22,
1958, Ibid., p. 422
88
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and the armed forces.” 81 Apparently, President Chiang took the
opportunity to impress upon Dulles the needs of the ROC for stronger
defense by interpreting the tactics of the PRC in renewing the
bombardment.
On October 24 after presenting his report to President
Eisenhower at the White House, Dulles issued a statement to the press
about his visit on President Chiang. In the statement, Dulles reflected
on the motive behind the PRC’s move in resuming the bombardment
of the offshore islands. Dulles said, “It is possible that the firing is
more for psychological than for military purposes. Apparently the
Communists desire to throw roadblocks in the way of stabilized
tranquility……”82 In retrospect, Dulles’ analysis on Beijing’s motive
of the renewed bombardment was largely correct.
On the same day, Dulles additionally wrote a letter to UK
Foreign Secretary Lloyd. In the letter, Dulles interpreted PRC’s
motive of the renewed bombardment as that it “seemed to be
deliberately calculated to make it more difficult to make progress on
what might be called “peace” or “armistice” proposals. In the letter,
Dulles particularly noted the announcement by the Radio Beijing
about that “the United States has met with defeat in her original plot to
use the Chinese temporary suspension of shelling Quemoy to promote
a permanent cease-fire.” Apparently, Dulles knew that the PRC meant
to give a negative response to the armistice proposal he made to
President Chiang. Interestingly, Dulles went on to analyze the PRC’s
goals in manipulating the suspension and resumption of the
bombardment as follows::
81
Memorandum of Conversation between Dulles and President Chiang, October 22,
1958, Ibid., p. 430.
82
“Text of Dulles Statement,” The New York Times, October 25, 1958, p. 4. See
also E. W. Kenworthy, “Chiang Believed Resigned to Move to Disarm Isles,” The
New York Times, October 25, 1958, p. 1 & 4.
Communication Between Taiwan And the USA at the time of The 1958 Quemoy Crisis: Dulles’ Meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek 89
We believe that the Chinese Communists, for the time being,
want to keep the civil war at least intermittently active, and to use
Quemoy as a sort of “whipping boy” to be lashed whenever there
are “intrusions” by the United States or acts by the Chinese
Nationalists which indicate lack of “repentance.”83
Checked with Mao Zedong’s disclosure of his intention, Dulles’
perception in this respect was largely correct. Dulles did not have
misperception in this regard, nor did he intend to have a distorted
perception.
On October 25, Peng Dehuai, the PRC Defense Minister, issued a
message to “Compatriots in Taiwan.” In the message, Peng announced
that the PRC would not fire on the offshore islands on even numbered
days and would perhaps fire on odd-numbered days. But the statement
by Peng added that refraining from shelling “was still conditional on
not introducing American escorts.” Dulles’ comments on Peng’s
announcement were: “This rather fantastic statement seems to confirm
our analysis of the Chinese Communist attitude as being essentially
political and propaganda rather than military.” 84 Actually, Peng’s
statement could be taken as the PRC’s response to the joint
communiqué signed between the ROC and the United States at the
conclusion of Dulles’ visit to Taiwan.
On the afternoon of October 25, Dulles went further to send a
circular telegram to all U.S. diplomatic missions overseas. In the
circular telegram, Dulles mentioned his reading of the resumed PRC
bombardment before and during his visit to Taiwan. The circular
telegram said as follows:
But Chinese Communists deliberately resumed firing at Quemoy
to make Secretary’s mission to Taiwan more difficult, even
boasting “The United States has met with defeat in her original
83
Letter from Dulles to Lloyd, October 24, 1958, FRUS, Vol. XIX, China, p. 449.
84
Ibid., p. 451.
90
Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
plot to use the Chinese temporary suspension of shelling Quemoy
to promote a permanent cease-fire.” Chinese Communists clearly
wish keep civil war alive in their effort get Taiwan. Continued
provocative shelling by Chinese Communists whenever they
please could ultimately break admirable restraint of GRC and
destroy our hopes of working out with it reasonable program for
tranquilizing Taiwan situation.”85
As noted earlier, Dulles’ perception about the PRC’s motive
accords with the historical fact.
DRUMRIGHT AS A SUCCESSFUL DIPLOMAT
Next, one will evaluate the role played by Ambassador
Drumright in the communication between the GRC and the
Eisenhower Administration before Dulles’ visit. The role played by
Ambassador Drumright should not be underestimated.
As discussed earlier, Ambassador Drumright did not ignore
President Chiang’s displeasure and anxiety over Dulles’ press
conference statement on the reduction of the Nationalist forces on
Quemoy and Matsu on September 30. Neither did Ambassador
Drumright delay in reporting President Chiang’ s dismay over Herter’s
remarks on the unimportance of Quemoy and Matsu. Ambassador
Drumright scrupulously studied President Chiang’s and other GRC
leaders’ repeatedly open vow that “not one inch of GRC territory will
be evacuated.” In the analysis of Drumright, such a posture “is largely
political and psychological, not military.” In his report to the
Department of State on October 10, Drumright predicted that it was
more likely that the GRC would garrison “Tan Islands” to bitter end
while reducing the number of defenders there to more manageable
levels. Drumright added that “in fact this is already taking place.”
85
“Circular telegram from the Department of State to All Diplomatic Missions,”
October 25, 1958, Ibid., p. 452.
Communication Between Taiwan And the USA at the time of The 1958 Quemoy Crisis: Dulles’ Meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek 91
Besides, Ambassador Drumright made specific recommendations for
the Eisenhower Administration on how to respond. His
recommendations were:
I would suggest that we sit back and let GRC come to us if
military difficulty arises. Then we can discuss islands purely
from military viewpoint. If we take initiative to urge evacuation I
predict such action will sow dissension and renew GRC
suspicions about our basic policies in regard to Offshores. I
predict too that our urging to evacuate Tans will be rebuffed by
Chiang……I also continue to believe we should not discuss with
GRC what Offshore Islands we will defend and not defend unless
and until there is some concrete development which renders this
absolutely necessary. I still hope we can weather storm without
necessity for tackling this touchy problem.86
Ambassador Drumright’s recommendations for prducence in
dealing with the psychological sensitivities of President Chiang won
acceptance from the Department of State. On the following day, the
Department of State instructed Ambassador Drumright that neither
Ambassador Drumright nor Vice Admiral Smoot should take the
initiative in urging the withdrawal of the Nationalist forces from the
Tans Islands while such withdrawal would be welcome. The
Department of State “instructed Drumright that if the GRC requested
his opinion, he would advise that Smoot be consulted……”87 From
the archives declassified by the U.S. Government, Ambassador
Drumright was proven quite a competent and shrewd diplomat.
Ambassador Drumright distinguished himself in smoothing the
communication between the U.S. and the Kuomintang Government
during the Quemoy Crisis.
86
Drumright, Telegram to the Department of State, October 10, 1958, Ibid., pp.
371-372.
87
Ibid., p. 372n.
92
Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
DULLES’ CAUTIOUSNESS ON NO RESUMPTI0N OF
ESCORT
To assure the GRC of the determination by the Eisenhower
Administration to help defend the ROC, including Quemoy and Matsu,
was part of the purposes for which Dulles visited President Chiang.
But Dulles basically adopted a guideline not to provoke the PRC into
escalating the military tension even though the PRC resumed its
bombardment over Quemoy and Matsu prior to Dulles’ arrival in
Taiwan. A series of self-restrained measures were taken by the
Eisenhower Administration to avoid any escalation of the military
tension.
On the afternoon of October 22 in Taiwan, Dulles told Vice
Admiral Smoot his views on how to respond to the resumption of the
bombardment by the PRC. Dulles said that it was desirable to await
further developments regarding the resumed shelling on the offshore
islands in the next few days before whether or not to resume escorts
was decided. Precisely speaking, Dulles’ position was that so long as
he was in Taiwan, no resumption of escort would be made. But Dulles
said that escort activity should then be resumed if shelling by the PRC
continued after he departed from Taiwan.88 But after Dulles left, the
PRC did not make massive bombardment.
Therefore, the GRC did not request the U.S. for the resumption
of convoy after Dulles left. Neither did Vice Admiral Smoot sense the
need. On October 25, Vice Admiral Smoot sent a telegram to U.S.
Commander in Chief of the Pacific Admiral Harry D. Felt. Smoot
noted his several conferences with ROC Defense Minister Yu Ta-wei,
88
Telegram from Dulles to the Department of State, October 22, 1958, Ibid., p. 427.
On October 8, the Department of State issued a statement, declaring, inter alia, that
if the PRC attacks were resumed, then U.S. escort activity would be “resumed
forthwith to the extent necessary.” See Ibid., p. 427n.
Communication Between Taiwan And the USA at the time of The 1958 Quemoy Crisis: Dulles’ Meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek 93
Tiger Wang and Admiral Liang Shiuh-chao regarding the question of
the resumption of convoy. Smoot said that their general attitude had
been very different from that which prevailed prior to the cease-fire.
In general, the ROC top military leaders were cited to have agreed ,
“Supply situation on offshore islands is in excellent shape and that
there is no need to demonstrate our capability of running convoys just
for the sake of running them. Accordingly there are no specific
convoy plans now and there has been no request to resume convoy
escort with US forces.” Besides, Smoot mentioned ROC Defense
Minister Yu as “particularly wishes to avoid resumption air resupply
to obviate possibility of expanding air war.”89 There was largely a
consensus between the United States and the GRC on no resumption
of convoy.
Besides, President Eisenhower saw no need to act on General
Nathan F. Twining’s recommendation for instructing Vice Admiral
Smoot to reinstate the original guidance which commanded “Vice
Admiral Smoot to convoy only in international waters when
required.”90 On October 27, President Eisenhower, in his conference
with General Twining, made a decision that Vice Admiral Smoot
should only be instructed to resume “normal” patrolling with no
mention of convoying. President Eisenhower added that “an
emergency requiring immediate automatic action will not happen.” In
the estimation of President Eisenhower, “at the most, enemy action
can only cut off one day’s supply, and supplies on Quemoy are now
quite adequate.” President Eisenhower in person decided to further
soften U.S. military stance vis-à-vis the PRC.
Dulles left Taiwan on October 23. On the next day, U.S. Acting
89
Telegram from Vice Admiral Smoot to Admiral Felt, October 25, Ibid., p. 448.
On October 8, the United States announced the suspension of U.S. convoy.
90
Major John S. D. Eisenhower, “Memorandum of conference with President
Eisenhower,” October 27, 1958, Ibid., p. 455.
94
Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs J. Graham Parsons
cabled a letter to Ambassador Drumright, advising him to delay the
proposed ROC-US field training exercise for Special Forces. The
exercise had been tentatively scheduled for October-November of
1958. In the letter, Parsons said, “It is my feeling that a joint exercise
of this type and on the scale proposed would be unwise in the near
future……I believe it most important that we avoid any unnecessary
actions that might embarrass us before world opinion in our efforts to
demonstrate that we and our Chinese allies are earnestly seeking a
peaceful resolution of the crisis.” Parsons suggested to Ambassador
Drumright that “you discuss with Admiral Smoot the matter of
deferring this exercise for the time being.” Parsons also said that “I
will be interested in receiving your reactions as well as those of
Admiral Smoot to this suggestion.”91 Parsons’ letter instructing the
delay of the scheduled ROC-U.S. field training exercise for Special
Forces was in harmony with the goal which the Eisenhower
Administration set for deescalating the military tension in the Taiwan
Straits. The Eisenhower Administration consistently softened its
military posture vis-à-vis the PRC after Dulles’ visit to Taiwan.
The negotiating skills employed by Dulles and the Eisenhower
Administration in dealing with President Chiang deserve a close
examination. As mentioned earlier, before meeting with President
Chiang, Dulles had a prepared talking paper with him. Dulles planned
to assure President Chiang of U.S. determination to help protect the
security of the ROC. Dulles listed the actions that could be taken in
several scenarios of military attacks launched by the PRC. In the
prepared talking paper, it was said:
We believe that it is possible to cope with the military effort of
the CPR. If they resume efforts at interdiction by bombardment, that
will be overcome, as in the past. If they seriously raise the level of that
91
Letter from Parsons to Ambassador Drumright, October 24, 1958, Ibid., p. 447.
Communication Between Taiwan And the USA at the time of The 1958 Quemoy Crisis: Dulles’ Meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek 95
effort, as by use of bombers against Q and M, that may call for raising
the level of GRC reply.
If they attempt an amphibious assault, that can be and will be
repulsed. If they attack Taiwan by air, that will evoke a joint
reply……There is capacity and will to cope with any aspect of
assault at whatever level the CPR make it. In each case, the
initiative will be theirs. The final word will be ours.92
The above is valid in proving that Dulles reassured the GRC of
the determination by the Eisenhower Administration to help defend
the ROC, including both Taiwan and the offshore islands. Such a
reassurance in concrete details was a valuable gift brought by Dulles
in person to President Chiang. It satisfied the immediate “survival
interests” of the GRC.
However, as discussed earlier, Dulles on the other hand exerted
pressure to President Chiang on such questions as shifting the
emphasis onto political ideals from military means and a reduction of
the Nationalist forces on the offshore islands. Dulles was scrupulous
in deliberating over the question of the best possible formula to
persuade President Chiang to make concessions regarding Quemoy
and Matsu.
It was true that Dulles originally hoped to persuade President
Chiang into giving up Quemoy and Matsu. As early as September 27,
Dulles discussed the subtlety of persuading President Chiang into
abandoning Quemoy and Matsu in a letter to President Eisenhower.
But in it, Dulles said, “I explained to Jack that as far as concessions
respecting Quemoy and Matsu were concerned the limiting factor was
not our views but the views of Chiang and how much we could bring
him to accept without the reaction which would collapse the situation
92
“Talking Paper Prepared by Secretary of State Dulles,” October 21, 1958, Ibid., p.
414.
96
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on Formosa.”93 Even Dulles himself was not thoroughly convinced in
the merits of persuading President Chiang to give up Quemoy and
Matsu.
The “Jack” Dulles mentioned in the letter was John J. McCloy,
who was then the Chairman of the Board of the Chase Manhattan
Bank. Dulles on September 25 sounded out with McCloy whether or
not he could go along with Secretary McElroy on his trip to Taiwan
and try to persuade President Chiang to give up Quemoy and Matsu.
But McCloy replied in a memorandum that he felt that he could not
undertake the mission. McCloy believed that he could be “a poor
emissary.” Interestingly, McCloy added that “I really fear that my
inclinations would go further in the way of concessions respecting
Quemoy and Matsu than the Department or you feel it is wise to go.”94
McCloy was another example of those Americans who favored an
abandonment of Quemoy and Matsu in the face of PRC bombardment.
DULLES’ PREPARATION FOR THE VISIT—PERSUASION
SKILL
The persuasion skill of Dulles was basically remarkable. Prior to
his visit on President Chiang, Dulles skillfully transmitted to President
Chiang the expectation or pressure, to be more precise, on the
question of a reduction of the Nationalist forces on Quemoy and
Matsu through Ambassador Yeh. Dulles received Ambassador Yeh on
October 13. Dulles first asked Ambassador Yeh’s reaction to the
statement issued on October 12 by the Chinese Communist Ministry
of National Defense about extending the ceasefire for two weeks.
Afterwards, Dulles told Yeh that “he didn’t want o go out to Taipei
and have it look as though he was putting pressure on the GRC.” But
93
Letter from Secretary Of State Dulles to President Eisenhower, September 27,
1958, Ibid., p. 290.
94
Ibid., p. 290n.
Communication Between Taiwan And the USA at the time of The 1958 Quemoy Crisis: Dulles’ Meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek 97
Dulles added that “we do think there are too many soldiers on
Quemoy.” Dulles went on to mention a JCS military concept “which
would reduce forces on the offshore islands without implying retreat
or abandonment.”95 Dulles’ emphasis on no implication of retreat or
abandonment was helpful in conducting the persuasion task with the
GRC.
Additionally, Dulles told Yeh the following:
What he wanted to discuss with President Chiang was how we
could combat the trend against our policy. We could not hold
countries like Canada, Belgium and France indefinitely. Once
one or two of them switched there would be an avalanche. We
must face this problem squarely. We must cooperate and help
each other to meet it.96
Purposely, Dulles adduced to Ambassador Yeh that the divergent
views of those U.S. Western allies. Dulles emphasized that they were
the significant pressure confronting both the Eisenhower
Administration and the GRC.
The prepared talking paper, which Dulles held in his hands on
October 21, further intended to warn the GRC against the likely
escalation of U.S. pressure in future. The talking paper said:
Except for the Republic of Korea and Vietnam, the USA is the
only vigorous supporter of the GRC……It is doubtful whether
even the US can long protect the GRC under present
circumstances. It is far from certain that a subsequent US
administration will be willing to be as staunch for the GRC as has
been the Eisenhower-Dulles administration of foreign policy.97
95
Memorandum of Conversation, “Offshore Island Situation and Secretary’s Visit
to Taipei,” October 13, 1958, Ibid., p. 384.
96
97
Ibid., p. 385.
“Talking Paper Prepared by Secretary of State Dulles,” October 21, 1958, Ibid., p.
415.
98
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In short, Dulls then wished to warn the GRC that the future
administrations of the United States might not staunchly support the
GRC’s position vis-à-vis the PRC. Dulles intended to smoothly
persuade the GRC into softening its resistance to U.S. proposals for
peaceful solution of the Quemoy Crisis.
However, Dulles was still reluctant to coerce President Chiang
into accepting U.S. proposal for a reduction of the Nationalist forces
on the offshore islands. Instead, Dulles employed a “quid pro quo”
approach.
On October 13, the draft talking paper, which was prepared for
Dulles, already suggested the use of additional amphibious power to
exchange for the agreement from the GRC for a reduction of its forces
on the offshore islands. It argued that “the ability of the Chinats would
be increased with less diffusion of their forces, with more located at a
focal point such as Taiwan. From there they could be either
redeployed to the offshore islands or elsewhere, rather than be
immobilized on the offshore islands.” 98 Such a “compensation”
formula had its own logic and merit for Dulles to sell it to the GRC.
Besides, the above-mentioned draft talking paper repeated the
point that the offshore islands, such as Quemoy and Matsu, “are not
covered by the United States-Republic of China Mutual Defense
Treaty.” It emphasized that “the President is not authorized to use the
Armed Forces for their defense unless he judges this necessary or
appropriate for the defense of Taiwan.” 99 Such an emphasis was
forceful. It was true that the Sino-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty did not
obligate the United States to help defend Quemoy and Matsu.
There were references to the Sino-US Mutual Defense Treaty in
the joint communiqué issued during Dulles’ visit. It was stated at the
beginning of the joint communique that “consultations have been
98
Ibid., pp. 400-401.
99
Ibid., p. 400.
Communication Between Taiwan And the USA at the time of The 1958 Quemoy Crisis: Dulles’ Meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek 99
taking place over the past three days between the Government of the
United States and the Government of the Republic of China pursuant
to Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty.” The joint communiqué
additionally stated, “The two Governments reaffirmed their dedication
to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. They recalled
that the treaty under which they are acting is defensive in
character……The consultations which took place permitted a
thorough study and reexamination of the pressing problems of mutual
concern……It is believed that such consultations should continue to
be held at appropriate intervals.”100
After all, Dulles refrained from hurting the dignity of President
Chiang or from causing him a severe embarrassment during his visit.
In meeting with President Eisenhower on October 14, Dulles said that
out of his visit to Taiwan there should not emerge any announcement
“indicative of changes in the China attitude toward the offshore
islands and the deployment for their defense.” Dulles added that “such
a change, if it came about at all, would undoubtedly only come about
gradually over a period of weeks or perhaps months and would have
to be under circumstances that would indicate that the change was of
their own making and their own volition.” Dulles went on to say that
any statement the Eisenhower Administration might make during his
visit “would probably have to be confined to an expression of the
solidarity of our two countries under our Mutual Security Treaty.”101
The remarks made above by Dulles to President Eisenhower
confirmed that Dulles did not at all wish to embarrass or to push the
GRC too far during his visit. It was particularly noteworthy that
Dulles wanted to maintain an image of solidarity between the
Eisenhower Administration and the GRC.
100
101
“Joint Communique,” October 23, 1858, Ibid., pp. 443-444.
“Memorandum of Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Secretary of
State Dulles,” October 14, 1958, Ibid., p. 405.
100
Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
A U.S. scholar Glenn H. Snyder holds that during the Quemoy
Crisis, the Eisenhower Administration was able to exercise a high
degree of control over the GRC.102 The discussions above on Dulles’
attachment of importance to the solidarity image do not contradict
with such an assessment made by Snyder.
On the other hand, it is also important to note that Dulles, in the
meanwhile, gave emphasis to the employment of all possible pressure
on the PRC for putting an end to its military offensive.
In his letter to Lloyd on October 24 immediately after his trip to
Taiwan, Dulles emphasized that it was important “to put all available
pressure on the Chinese Communists to be ready to stop their military
activities.” Dulles added that “I feel confident that if this disposition
could be brought about, there would be reciprocity from the Chinese
Nationalists.”103 In his circular telegram to all the U.S. diplomatic
missions overseas on October 25, Dulles also said that “it is of utmost
importance to bring all possible pressure to bear on Peiping regime to
stop its military activities.”104
Doubtlessly, Dulles hoped to simultaneously exert pressure on both
the GRC and the PRC in order to resolve the Quemoy Crisis. But,
Dulles basically avoided provoking the PRC during his visit to Taiwan.
EFFECT OF DULLES’ VISIT
The Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles on October 28
submitted to President Eisenhower an intelligence analysis report
102
Glenn H. Snyder, “Crisis Bargaining,” in Classic Readings of International
Relations, eds. Phil Williams, Donald M. Goldstein and Jay M. Shafritz (Belmont,
California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1994), p. 320.
103
Letter from Dulles to Lloyd, October 24, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XIX,
China, p. 450.
104
“Circular telegram from the Department of State to All Diplomatic Missions,”
October 25, 1958, Ibid., p. 452.
Communication Between Taiwan And the USA at the time of The 1958 Quemoy Crisis: Dulles’ Meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek 101
“Special National Intelligence Estimate” under the topic as “Probable
Developments in the Taiwan Strait Crisis.” The Special National
Intelligence Estimate evaluated the effect of Dulles’ visit to Taiwan as
such:
The recent visit of Secretary of State Dulles has probably made
the GRC leaders more confident of US support during the present
crisis, but they are probably uncertain concerning US long-term
intentions, and may believe that the US is groping toward an
eventual resolution of the offshore island question at the expense
of the GRC.105
That intelligence report was prepared with the participation of the
Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the
Department of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint
Staff.106 The observation made by the afore-said Special National
Intelligence Estimate was both correct and keen.
In spite of the uncertainty felt by the GRC about the long-term
security of Quemoy and Matsu, Dulles believed that the result of his
visit to Taiwan demonstrated the flexibility of the approach by the
Department of State to the question of Taiwan’s security.107
A few days after Dulles’ return to Washington, D.C., Canadian
Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker told Dulles that “he was greatly
relieved and enthusiastic about the outcome of the Secretary’s trip.”
Diefenbaker was cited by Dulles as saying also that “he felt that the
danger of Chiang’s getting himself and the US into a war with the
Chinese Communists was removed.” 108 Diefenbaker gave high
105
Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 100-12-58, “Probable
Developments in the Taiwan Strait Crisis,” October 28, 1958, Ibid., pp. 459-460.
106
Ibid., p. 456.
107
Gerald C. Smith, “Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy
Planning,” undated, Ibid., p. 463.
108
Ibid.
102
Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
appraisal to the achievement of Dulles in the visit.
A U.S. scholar Robert E. Osgood listed four principal functions
of alliances as: accretion of external power, internal security, restraint
of allies, and international order109. In pressuring President Chiang to
openly emphasize political ideals more than military means, Dulles
succeeded in employing the function of an alliance relationship in
restraining the ROC.
CHIANG’S NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR
Did the GRC realize its goals in receiving Dulles’ visit? It was
reported from Taipei by The New York Times that the GRC on
October 18 disclosed that to “destroy rumors of disunity inspired by
the Chinese Communists was the goal set by Taiwan over the
forthcoming meeting between Dulles and President Chiang. The New
York Times continued to say that the invitation from President Chiang
to Dulles was believed to have been prompted by the desire to destroy
the rumors that split between the United States and the GRC was
imminent.110 Basically, it was not an exaggeration to say that the
GRC emphasized the importance of maintaining harmonious alliance
relations with the United States.
Dulles’ trip strengthened President Eisenhower’s confidence in
the utility of communicating with President Chiang. President
Eisenhower told Dulles that “it would be useful for me to try to keep
up a certain measure of personal correspondence with the Gimo.”111
109
Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 21.
110
MacGregor, “Taipei Is Hopeful Talk with Dulles Will Show Unity,” The New
York Times, October 19, 1958, p. 1. MacGregor in his story noted that “the Chinese
Communists have charged on two recent occasions that the United States would
abandon the Nationalists.” Ibid.
111
Memorandum of conversation between Dulles and Eisenhower, October 24,
1958, FURS, 1958-1960,Vol.XIX, China, p. 445.
Communication Between Taiwan And the USA at the time of The 1958 Quemoy Crisis: Dulles’ Meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek 103
President Eisenhower apparently believed that Dulles’ trip to Taiwan
was worthwhile. To Eisenhower, President Chiang was a person with
whom communication was both possible and useful.
On October 24, President Eisenhower sent a telegram through
U.S. Embassy in Taipei to President Chiang. In the telegram, President
Eisenhower said that he was “fully satisfied with the results” of
Dulles’ visit. President Eisenhower emphatically said, “When many
outsiders are seeking to distort our respective views to create mischief
and division between us, there is no substitute for face-to-face high
level talks.” 112 It was clear that both President Eisenhower and
President Chiang then knew well the “mutual interests” of maintaining
an image of their partnership.
In receiving Dulles on the morning of October 23, President
Chiang said that he did not insist that the ROC point of view be
accepted by the Eisenhower Administration but only that it should at
least be considered. President Chiang added that he “did however
hope we would not do anything which would tend to depreciate his
prestige and hurt him before his people.”113 President Chiang knew
well that some concessions must be made to satisfy Dulles while
emphasizing the importance he attached on the “saving of his face.”
President Chiang’s request for maintaining his dignity was reasonable
and acceptable.
President Chiang’s insistence on maintaining his dignity won
personal response from President Eisenhower. In his telegram to
President Eisenhower on October 24, President Eisenhower noted that
112
Telegram from President Eisenhower to President Chiang, October 24, 1958,
Ibid., p. 446. A copy of this telegram is kept at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.
Its location is in Box 3, International Series, Office of the Staff Secretary, White
House Office File, The Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.
113
Telegram from President Eisenhower to President Chiang, October 24, 1958,
FRUS, 1958-1960,Vol. XIX, China, p. 446. Dulles cosigned that letter from
Eisenhower as “observe Presidential Handling.”
104
Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
he welcomed the expression made to Dulles from President Chiang for
the “determination to cooperate with our considered views, arrived at
after consultation with you.” President Eisenhower went further to
assure President Chiang that he would consult with President Chiang
before any significant decision was taken. President Eisenhower said
as follows:
We seek to have consultation on all significant matters of joint
concern. No doubt at times there are unintended inadequacies.
But I can assure you that it is our purpose never to take any
important new position, or to ask anything of your Government,
unless we have previously had an opportunity to consider fully
your point of view.114
Such an assurance from President Eisenhower must have
comforted President Chiang while a gradual reduction of the
Nationalist forces on the offshore islands would be implemented.
Under close examination, President Chiang, confronting the
pressures from the Eisenhower Administration, did not adopt a
“minimalist” approach in receiving Dulles. President Chiang, as
largely an “unequal ally” to the United States, did not bow to Dulles’
original demand for giving up Quemoy and Matsu. While making no
concession on the “survival interests” of the GRC, President Chiang
still made concessions on certain “vital interests.” Additionally,
President Chiang employed the tactic of “fait accompli” in some
issues. President Chiang was not an “incompetent negotiator” in
receiving Dulles. After all, President Chiang was sophisticated enough
in communicating with the Eisenhower Administration during the
Quemoy Crisis.
114
Telegram from President Eisenhower to President Chiang, October 24, 1958,
Ibid., p. 446. Dulles cosigned that letter from Eisenhower as “observe Presidential
Handling.”
Communication Between Taiwan And the USA at the time of The 1958 Quemoy Crisis: Dulles’ Meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek 105
CHIANG ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST
PRC
Additionally, it is important to note that the question of the
appropriateness of using the nuclear weapons against the PRC’s
deeply emplaced guns was discussed during Dulles’ visit on President
Chiang. One will first explore whether President Chiang took the
initiative in discussing the question.
In talking to Dulles on the evening of October 22, President
Chiang replied that Dulles that “the most effective immediate method
would be to strengthen the defenses with more guns so that the enemy
positions could be silenced.” Upon hearing that, Dulles responded that
the United States was considering the provision of more guns.
However, Dulles added: “He knew of no one in the U.S. military who
believed that conventional weapons could be used to knock out deeply
emplaced guns. Only nuclear guns could do that job effectively.”
Dulles subsequently asked President Chiang whether he wanted the
United States to use nuclear weapons.
Then, President Chiang said that “he believed that it would not be
necessary to use nuclear weapons; however, he believed that the use of
tactical atomic weapons might be advisable.” Instantly, Dulles replied
that “there is no tactical atomic weapon in existence which could be
used at Kinmen to knock out enemy gun emplacements that would not
have the power of the Hiroshima or Nagasaki bombs.” Dulles added:
“The use of such a weapon at Kinmen would kill millions of people.
There would be a heavy fissionable fall-out if bombs exploded in air
or on the ground. The danger lies not in the size of the bomb but in
how it is exploded……If an atomic bomb was exploded in the air, the
explosion would have no effect on gun positions.”115 Dulles tried to
tell President Chiang the difference of the devastating power between
115
Memorandum of Conversation between Dulles and President Chiang, October
22, 1958, 7 p.m., Ibid., pp. 431-432.
106
Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
a tactical nuclear weapon and a tactical atomic weapon.
Clarifying that he was neither an artillery nor a nuclear expert,
President Chiang still suggested that the problem of the tactical atomic
weapons be left for study. Then, Dulles expressed his agreement that
aerial bombing and artillery bombardment were not effective in
deterring the Chinese Communist tactic of alternating fire with
ceasefire. However, President Chiang continued to emphasize that
“some positive action is needed” to maintain the spirit and morale of
the Nationalist troops on Quemoy. Dulles expressed his opposition to
any suggestion about employing nuclear weapons. Dulles added that
“the use of nuclear weapons would involve Taiwan and if nuclear
weapons were used to attack Taiwan, there would be nothing left of
Taiwan.” Subsequently, Dulles authorized Ambassador Drumright,
who was then present at their meeting, to arrange for an authoritative
military briefing on that subject for President Chiang.116
In receiving Dulles in the next morning, President Chiang again
raised the question of whether measures could be taken to limit the
attacking power of the Chinese Communists and to end their “on
again-off again” tactics which were very hurting to the morale of the
ROC forces on the offshore islands.
In reply, Dulles said, as he did in the previous evening, that “it
was highly dubious that the Communist fire power could be
substantially diminished by conventional fire whether from ground,
ships or planes.” Dulles went on to say that “the only effective
measure was the use of nuclear weapons with ground bursts and that
this would not really defend Quemoy but probably lead to the
obliteration of all the inhabitants through lethal fallout.”117 Dulles
unequivocally emphasized to President Chiang that it was
116
117
Ibid., p. 432.
Memorandum of Conversation between Dulles and President Chiang, October
23, 1958, 11 a.m., Ibid., p. 439.
Communication Between Taiwan And the USA at the time of The 1958 Quemoy Crisis: Dulles’ Meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek 107
inappropriate to employ any nuclear weapons for alleviating the
bombardment by the PRC.
Immediately after Dulles’ departure, Ambassador Drumright
followed up the instruction by Dulles to arrange an authoritative
briefing about the devastating power of tactical nuclear weapons for
President Chiang. In his telegram to Admiral Felt on October 25, Vice
Admiral Smoot said that Ambassador Drumright already informed
him of the short discussion between Dulles and President Chiang
about the use of nuclear weapons against the PRC’s gun positions.
Smoot mentioned that he was told by Ambassador Drumright that
President Chiang demonstrated “alarming ignorance” on capabilities
and limitations of nuclear weapons. Smoot added that it was Dulles’
desire for him to brief President Chiang on the subject. But he found
“our capability here to do so intelligently very limited. I would not
undertake this project without complete knowledge of all phrases
including the extent to which Gimo can be briefed.”118
To be fair, it was not President Chiang who initiated the
discussion of whether or not it was appropriate to launch a nuclear
attack on the PRC. However, President Chiang did indicate his belief
that it was advisable for the Eisenhower Administration to consider
using the “tactical atomic weapons” against the PRC’s guns. Certainly,
President Chiang did not advocate the use of tactical nuclear weapons
against the civilian population on the China mainland. After all, the
discussion of the tactical nuclear weapons question was an episode
which could not be lightly put aside when studying the visit by Dulles
on President Chiang during the Quemoy Crisis.
CONCLUSION
The mutual concessions made by Dulles and President Chiang
118
Telegram from Vice Admiral Smoot to Admiral Felt, October 25, 1958, Ibid., p.
448.
108
Tamkang Journal of International Affairs
confirmed that there existed a high degree of “complementary
interests” and “overlapping interests” between the United States and
the ROC at that time. As an “unequal ally” dependent upon the United
States, the negotiating behavior of President Chiang and the GRC in
receiving Dulles’ visit remained sophisticated and well-balanced.
President Chiang acted better than the average “client states” of the
United States did.
The handling by the Eisenhower Administration over the
Quemoy Crisis validated that the alliance relationship between the
United States and the ROC was a “defensive alliance.” Dulles’ visit to
Taiwan maintained the relatively high levels of “solidarity” in the
alliance despite some frictions behind the scenes. To the Eisenhower
Administration, Dulles’ visit was quite successful. Dulles, once again,
proved to be a skillful diplomatist. Above all, Dulles correctly
perceived the motive behind the PRC’s resumption of bombardment
against the offshore islands. His response accordingly was both
prudent and correct. After all, the Eisenhower Administration still
gained more than the GRC in Dulles’ visit to Taiwan during the
Quemoy crisis. Basically, the GRC was in a “defensive” or ambivalent
position to respond to Dulle’s visit proposal. But it was the
Eisenhower Administration which salvaged the GRC from the
Quemoy Crisis. Dulles’ visit was not only significant but also historic.
Interestingly, the “demilitarization” of Quemoy and Matsu is
increasingly a subject of public debates in today’s Taiwan. The
strategic importance of both Quemoy and Matsu declines sharply in
the 21st century.