Impartial Judges? Race, Institutional Context, and U. S. State Supreme Courts
Author(s): Chris W. Bonneau and Heather Marie Rice
Source: State Politics & Policy Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Winter, 2009), pp. 381-403
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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Context,and
Race,Institutional
ImpartialJudges?
U.S. StateSupremeCourts
ChrisW.Bonneau,University
ofPittsburgh
HeatherMarieRice,University
ofPittsburgh
ABSTRACT
otherfactors
Weaddressa fundamental
beingequal,
questioninjudicialpolitics:
thanwhitejudges?Manypresume
do African-American
judgesbehavedifferently
in termsofsentencing,
fromtheirminority
thatwhitejudgesdiffer
counterparts
todate,little
decisions.
tooverturn
andpropensity
However,
deliberation,
empirical
between
thesejudges.
inbehavior
differences
existsto suggest
evidence
systematic
CourtDatabaseto
U.S.StateSupreme
created
thenewly
Here,weutilize
judge-level
isaffected
assesswhether
bytheraceofthejudge.Looking
judicialdecisionmaking
courtjudgesfrom1995to 1998,
casesdecidedbyU.S.statesupreme
atallcriminal
whiteandnon-white
between
wefindevidenceofdifferences
judges,butonlyin
of
theeffects
stateslackingan intermediate
suggests
appellatecourt.Thisfinding
of
structure
areconditioned
raceon judicialdecisionmaking
bytheinstitutional
thecourtsystem.
is an enduringarea of
the study of minority group representation
have
scientists
since
Pitkin
Ever
science.
in
(1967),
political
inquiry political
A
substantive.
and
focusedon twotypesofrepresentation:
politidescriptive
is descriptively
cal institution
when,forexample,thepercentrepresentative
ages ofAfricanAmericans,Hispanics,Asians,and NativeAmericansin the
institutionapproximatethe percentagesof minoritiesin the community
dealswiththe
substantive
serves.In contrast,
theinstitution
representation
of
the
constituents
the
interests
institution
the
represents
degreeto which
of therepreor thecommunityit governs,regardlessof thecharacteristics
sentatives
(Pitkin1967).
hasbecome
The questionofwhetherraceaffects
judicialdecisionmaking
Africanand
more
more
as
recent
in
of
an importanttopic inquiry
years
Americanjudges have ascended to the bench. Since 1853,when the first
African-American
court,relatively
judgewasappointedtoBoston'smagistrate
Vol.9,No.4 (Winter
andPolicy
StatePolitics
2009):pp.381-403
Quarterly,
ofIllinois
oftheUniversity
©2009bytheBoardofTrustees
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382
BONNEAU AND RICE
Thepast
fewracialminority
judgesmadeittohigherlevelsofthecourtsystem.
20 yearshavewitnesseda largeand growingnumberof minorities
entering
whites
at
of
the
the
number
of
level
careers,
every
legalfieldstill
legal
although
Bonneau(2001) reportsthat
faroutweighsthenumberofracialminorities.
in 1980-81,only0.6 percentofthejudgeson statesupremecourtswerenot
thisnumberjumpedto 8.7 percentin 1994and 11.6percent
white;however,
in 2000.Moreover,
Hurwitzand Lanier(2001) findthatin 1999,7.3 percent
ofjudgeson stateappellatecourtswerenonwhiteand 11.4percentoffederal
courtsofappealsjudgeswereminorities.
Whileneitherthelegislative
northeexecutivebranchescan be saidto be
representative,
manyempiricalstudieshavefoundevidenceof
descriptively
inthesetwobranches.Thejudiciary
of
substantive
representation minorities
and those
is unique in thatfewstudiesexiston substantiverepresentation
some studiesfindevidenceof
thathave been conductedare inconsistent;
others
find
little
to
no
evidence.In thisarticle,we
while
representation
manifestsitselfon
seek to betterexplainhow substantiverepresentation
is translatedinto
courtsby hypothesizing
thatdescriptiverepresentation
context
substantive
representation
onlywhenthepoliticaland institutional
is favorable.
relies
Sincethelinkbetweendescriptive
and substantive
representation
on theassumptionthatminority
and non-minority
actorsbehavedifferently
whenfacedwiththesamesetoffactors,
we analyzewhethertherearedifferencesin thewaywhiteand AfricanAmericanjudgesdecide cases.1If race
does notaffect
thenwe suggestthatincreasingthe
judicialdecisionmaking,
numberofAfrican-Americans
on thebenchwouldhaveno effect
on judicial
outcomes.Thus,we wouldfeelconfident
concludingthatwhilethejudiciary
is notbroadlyrepresentative
ofracialminorities,
suchlackofrepresentation
is notaffecting
theoutcomesofcasesbeforethecourt.2Atthesametime,if
thereareno differences
betweenwhiteandAfricanAmericanjudges,thenit
also meansthatthereis no substantive
on thebench.After
all,
representation
ifAfrican-American
are
cases
the
same
as
white
judges deciding
way
judges,
thenneithergroupis representing
the interests
of minorities.In sum,the
races
conceptof substantive
representation
impliesthatjudgesof different
willdecidecases differently?
REPRESENTATION
IN POLITICAL
INSTITUTIONS
The degreeof representation
in Americanpoliticalinstitutions
has been
results.The linkbetween
closelyexaminedby scholars,but withdiffering
relieson the expectationthat
descriptiveand substantiverepresentation
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WINTER 2OO9
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STATE POLITICS AND POLICY QUARTERLY
383
whenfacedwiththe
andnon-minority
actorsbehavedifferently
minority
actorsareexpected
tobehaveinsuch
samesetoffacts.
Specifically,
minority
totheirownminority
havecona waythatis sympathetic
group.Scholars
their
that
minorities
behave
than
found
differently
non-minority
sistently
andlegislative
etal.
inboththebureaucratic
arenas(e.g.,Keiser
counterparts
andMeier2002;Preuhs2006,2007;Wilkins
2000;Nicholson-Crotty
2007).
in
more
varied
the
courts.
Courts
rather
fewer
and
are
However,
findings
between
inthatsomestudies
havefounddifferences
appeartobetheoutlier
Gottschall
whiteandAfrican-American
1983;Welch,
judges(Uhlman1978;
and Britt2001),whileothershave
Combs,andGruhl1988;Steffensmeier
and
foundnosuchdifference
(Spohn1990a;SpohnandWelch1986;Walker
andWawro2004).4
Barrow1985;Farhang
andbureaucracy
fromlegislatures
different
Whatmakesthejudiciary
Weseekto answerthisquestionin thisarticle
in termsofrepresentation?
courts.
ofU.S.statesupreme
on
a variety
votes
Here,we
judge
byanalyzing
Database
Court
State
utilizethenewlycreated
(Bonjudge-level Supreme
assess
whether
to
and
Arceneaux
neau,Brace,
2006)
judicialdecisionmaking
casesdecidedbyall
criminal
is affected
byrace.Lookingatnonunanimous
ofdifevidence
courtjudgesfrom1995to 1998,wefindlittle
statesupreme
of
in
terms
American
whiteandAfricanbetween
ferences
propensity
judges
of
wedo findevidence
andsentences.
convictions
tooverturn
Nonetheless,
courts.
Weargue
intermediate
instateswithout
racialdifferences
appellate
ornot
inwhether
ofcourtsplaysa keyfactor
context
thattheinstitutional
under
certain
but
Raceaffects
racematters.
judicialdecisionmaking, only
reasonfortheincontheprimary
Wesuggest
institutional
arrangements.
to examinetheconditions
thusfarhasto do withthefailure
clusiveresults
underwhichjudgesmakedecisions.
REPRESENTATION ON STATE SUPREME COURTS
wecancomparetheperon courts,
To examinedescriptive
representation
ofthestateas a whole
the
to
the
bench
on
minorities
of
population
centage
is a de
since
the
in
oflawyers
ortothepopulation
state,
beingan attorney
meacourtjudge.5
a statesupreme
forbecoming
factoqualification
Byeither
as descriptively
courtscannotbe characterized
represure,statesupreme
ofminority
becausethepercentage
sentative
equalingthe
judgesisfarfrom
of
number
or
American
African"[W]hilewomenand
attorneys.
population
the
intothelegalprofession,
inroads
havemadenotable
minorities
including
because
minorities
to
be
considered
continue
must
political
they
judiciary,
on thebenchlagfarbehindthoseofwhitemalesin both
theirnumbers
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384
BONNEAU AND RICE
absoluteand relativeterms"(Hurwitzand Lanier2003,330). A quicklook
at thenumbersmakesthisclear.From1985to 1999,therateof non-white
males(femalesand racialminorities)on stateappellatecourtsdoubledfrom
about 13 percentto about 27 percent(Hurwitzand Lanier2001). However,
the increasein judges fromracialminoritieswas less than 1 percent.The
newswas slightly
betterforwomen;in 1985,theratewas lessthan7 percent
and itwas morethan21 percentin 1999.These numberslead Hurwitzand
Lanier(2001,92) to conclude:"[W]hilethepresenceofpoliticalminorities
overtime,most
in thejudiciaryhas becomesomewhatmorerepresentative
appellatejudgesin theUnitedStatesare stillwhitemales."
us tolookattheactualdecisubstantive
requires
representation
Examining
Americancommunity
sionspoliticalactorsmake.Forexample,theAfricanwiththe
ifthejudiciarymade decisionsconsistent
would be "represented"
of
ofthecomposition
interests
oftheAfricanAmericancommunity,
regardless
that
ofthejudiciaryhavesuggested
thejudiciary.
Advocatesfordiversification
as a democraticand responsive
thejudiciary'slegitimacy
thiswillstrengthen
Tobias
institution
and
Barrow
1990;Smith1994).Thatis,racial
1985;
(Walker
minoritiesand womenon thebenchmightbe moreconcernedwith- and
in thejudicial
to- questionsof racialand genderdiscrimination
responsive
the
issues
that
strike
at
the
heart
of
the
fairness
of
judicialsystem.
process,
thesejudgesmightrenderdecisionsmorefavorableto plaintiffs
Ultimately,
insuchcasesgiventhatwomenand minority
judgesaremorelikelythantheir
whitecounterparts
at some
to havepersonallyencountereddiscrimination
in
their
lives
Beiner
Ifill
1999;
1990;
(Tobias
2000).
point
As previouslymentioned,thelinkbetweendescriptive
and substantive
relieson the expectationthatminorityand non-minority
representation
actorsbehavedifferently
whenfacedwiththesame setof facts.Specifically,
actors
are
to
minority
expectedto behavein sucha waythatis sympathetic
theirown minority
It
has
been
assumed
that
white
differ
group.
long
judges
fromtheirminority
in termsof sentencing,
and
deliberation,
counterparts
propensityto overturndecisions.However,to date,evidenceon whether
thereare systematic
in behaviorbetweenthesetwo groupsof
differences
has
been
elusive.
judges
largely
Therearepowerful
theoretical
reasonsforwhyraceshouldaffect
judicial
Giventhehistory
ofAfrican
AmericansintheUnitedStates,
decisionmaking.
African-American
tolessfortunate
judgesmightbe moresympathetic
people
Gottschall
Smith
Since
mostcriminaldefen1983;
(Goldman 1979;
1983).
dantsareeitherpoororracialminorities
(Smith1983;Mitchell1980),itis not
hardto imaginethatAfrican-American
judgeswouldbe moresympathetic
to defendantsbecause of theirown negativeexperiencesin society.That
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WINTER 2OO9
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STATE POLITICS AND POLICY QUARTERLY
385
judicial
beingsaid,therearealsogoodreasonstothinkracewillnotaffect
AfricanAmerican
First,
judgestendtobemoreDemocratic
decisionmaking.
of
(e.g.,Goldman1997)andhencemoreliberal.In ourdata,58.3percent
caseswerecastbyDemocrats;
thevotesbywhitejudgesinnonunanimous
for
forAfrican-American
Thus,after
controlling
judges,itwas96.0percent.
determinant
ofjudicial
notbea significant
racemight
independent
ideology,
ofjudgesdo notservea lifeterm;they
behavior.
Second,thevastmajority
orelites(thegovernor
orlegislature)
on either
theelectorate
aredependent
to the
have
to
be
attuned
thesejudges
forreappointment.
Consequently,
thelegislature,
or the
actors(eitherthegovernor,
ofexternal
preferences
and
Stalans
studies
both
andas indicated
(Roberts
electorate),
scholarly
by
actorsfavor
noneoftheseexternal
rhetoric,
1997)andcampaign
positions
tocriminals.
thataresympathetic
Thisraisesa fundamental
questionaboutjudicialbehaviorand the
thefactsofthecaseand
whenweighing
of
administration
justice:
impartial
This
decision?
the
affect
race
of
the
his/her
does
the
judge
interpreting law,
because
court
state
relevant
for
supreme
judges,
questionis particularly
includon mostmatters,
thefinalarbiters
thesejudgesare (essentially)
convicted
whether
a
and
even
sentence
criminal
convictions,
length,
ing
shouldbe executed.
criminal
TRANSLATING DESCRIPTIVE INTO SUBSTANTIVE
REPRESENTATION ON STATE SUPREME COURTS
hascomeupshortofa conTodate,empirical
scholarship
judicialbehavior
than
racialminority
clusiveansweron whether
judgesbehavedifferently
has
a
States
United
that
the
theirwhitecounterparts.
long
given
Intuitively,
thattheraceof
onewouldthinkthatitis likely
ofracialdisparity,
history
shapedbythatracewouldweighheavily
judgesandtheirlifeexperiences
have
Aswenotedabove,somestudies
andpolicymaking.
ontheirdecisions
whiteandAfrican-American
between
founddifferences
judges(Uhlman
and
1983;Welch,Combs,andGruhl1988;Steffensmeier
1978;Gottschall
havefoundnosuchdifference
Britt
(Spohn1990a;Spohn
2001),whileothers
andWawro2004).Many
andBarrow
andWelch1986;Walker
1985;Farhang
areduetothelevelofthecourtexamined
intheliterature
ofthedifferences
natureofthedata.
thelimited
and/or
ofraceon judicialbehavior,
studieson theeffects
In oneoftheearliest
trialjudgessentenced
American
Uhlman(1978)foundthatwhileAfricanforvery
race
white
than
more
somewhat
defendants
judges, accounted
harshly
thatcase
He theorized
in individual
fewofthedifferences
decisionmaking.
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386
BONNEAU AND RICE
The
factshad moreimportanceon judicialbehaviorthangroupdifferences.
andexterofAfrican-American
conformity
judgescouldbe duetotheinternal
nal pressuresof compliancewiththeircolleagueson thebench.In contrast
to Uhlman,Welch,Combs,and Gruhl(1988) foundthatAfrican-American
thanwhite
intheirtreatment
ofdefendants
trialjudgesaremoreeven-handed
judges increasesthe
judgesare.Moreover,havingmoreAfrican-American
Thus,Welch,Combs,and Gruhlfindevidenceofsubequalityoftreatment.
and Britt(2001) provide
stantive
Mostrecently,
Steffensmeier
representation.
mixedevidenceon theeffects
ofraceand judicialbehaviorat thetrialcourt
morepunitivethan
level:theyfindthatAfricanAmericanjudgesareslightly
exhibitsimiwhitejudges are when convictingdefendantsbut ultimately
sentencelength.
lar patternsas theirwhitecounterparts
whendetermining
criminal
factorwhendetermining
Further,
theyfindthatraceis a significant
and "courtroom
convictions
becauselifeexperiences
pressures
organizational
somewhatfromthoseofwhitejudges"
facingAfrican-American
judgesdiffer
theirjudicialdecisonmaking.6
(762), ultimately
influencing
of
all of thestudiesdiscussedabove
some
areas
Despite
disagreement,
concludethattherearedifferences
betweenwhiteand nonwhite
judgesatthe
trialcourtlevel.In starkcontrastto thesestudies,Spohn(1990a) and Spohn
ofjudicial
and Welch(1986) concludethatraceis nota significant
predictor
in
This
result
is
confirmed
of
either
conviction
or
terms
behavior,
sentencing.
of race on judicial
byWalkerand Barrow(1985), who examinetheeffects
oftheCarterappointeesto theFederalDistrictCourts.They
decisionmaking
utilizeda matched-pair
ofmatchingeachAfricanAmericanCarter
strategy
a
with
white
and
appointee
appointee comparedtheoutcomes
corresponding
oftheirseparatedecisionsin personalliberties,
criminalrights,
federaleconomicregulation,
andwomen'sand minority
issuecases.Allresults
produced
differences
between
white
and
African-American
insignificant
judges.
Whilemostofthestudieshavebeenconductedatthetrialcourtlevel,evidenceattheappellatelevelis similarly
mixed.Gottschall
(1983) examinedthe
FederalCourtsofAppealsand founda dramaticdifference
betweenAfricanAmericanand whitejudgesin criminaland prisonerrightscases:AfricanAmericanjudgesvotedto supporttheserights
to a significantly
extent
greater
thanwhitejudges.In contrast,
FarhangandWawro(2004) lookedatdiscriminationcaseson theFederalCourtsofAppealsin 1998and 1999andfoundthat
foreverytypeofdiscrimination
effects
failedto reach
case,therace-of-judge
statistical
the
authors
conclude
that
the
on
FederalCourtsof
Thus,
significance.
fromwhitejudges.
Appeals,racialminority
judgesdo notholdviewsdifferent
injudicialbehavior
Justas at thetriallevel,theevidenceforracialdifferences
on theFederalCourtsofAppealsis mixed.
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WINTER 2009
/
STATE POLITICS AND POLICY QUARTERLY
387
intosubstantive
ofdescriptive
relies
Sincethetranslation
representation
thattherearedifferences
on theexpectation
betweenwhiteandAfricanwe
to
need
dissect
on
American
whypaststudiesofrepresentation
judges,
andinconsistent
results.
Whatcouldexplain
courtscometosuchdivergent
in theliterature?
moststudiesarelimited
to a
thelackofconsensus
First,
ofstatesor cities.Forexample,
handful
Welch,Combs,and Gruhl(1988)
"MetroCity,"
whileSteffensmeier
and
lookattrialcourtsina northeastern
It is possiblethatthe
Britt(2001)examinefourcountiesin Pennsylvania.
in
therecouldbe differences
theresults;
selection
ofstatesandcitiesaffects
orinsomecities,
butnotin
insomeareasofthecountry
judicialbehavior
varies
as well.
each
others.
Second,thetimeperiodcovered
widely
by
study
1968
and
decisions
between
look
at
and
Gruhl
1979,
Combs,
Welch,
(1988)
1991
and
decisions
between
examine
andBritt(2001)
whileSteffensmeier
betweenGottschall
1994.Thesameis trueforthedifferences
(1983) and
is
thatwhile
level.
It
at
the
Wawro
and
(2004)
possible
appellate
Farhang
either
the
is
no
the
this
in
decisions
raceaffected
case,
longer
past,
judicial
is
identinonwhite
white
and
of
distribution
becausetheideological
judges
orsomeotherreason.
cal,thenatureofthecaseshaschanged,
wearguethatthe
Whilewecannotruleoutthosepotential
explanations,
models.
the
of
from
come
lackofconsensus
misspecification empirical
may
from
A
differs
forwhether
thansimply
B,we
Rather
Judge
Judge
searching
underwhich
conditions
andpolitical
fortheinstitutional
shouldbelooking
B. Scholars
fromJudge
A to differ
theraceofthejudgemightallowJudge
racial
what
circumstances
and
under
how
of
the
havelargely
ignored question
Substantive
on
courts.
intosubstantive
istranslated
representation
presence
itselfat all times,butrather
manifest
not
does
necessarily
representation
is favorable.
context
Here,we specify
whenthepoliticaland institutional
set
the
willmanifest
whenandhowrepresentation
itself,
utilizing framework
contend
we
etal.(2002)inthebureaucratic
Specifically,
setting.
upbyKeiser
to substantive
is translated
thatdescriptive
representation
representation
overtheirdocketandthusan intermediate
whenthecourthasdiscretion
whenthecourtis facedwitha racializedissue
appellatecourtis present,
than
cases),andwhenjudgesareelectedrather
(here,wedealwithcriminal
appointed.
hasmovedinthedirecliterature
therepresentative
bureaucracy
Recently,
andpoliticalcontext
therolethattheinstitutional
tionofanalyzing
plays
intosubstantive
ofdescriptive
inthetranslation
representarepresentation
andMeier2002;Wilkins
tion(Keiseretal. 2002;Nicholson-Crotty
2007).
a
neotaken
have
scholars
et
al.
Keiser
with
(2002),bureaucracy
Beginning
characterthat
on
institutional
arguing minority
perspective representation,
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388
BONNEAU AND RICE
istics(sex specifically)
resultin increasedrepresentation
onlywhencertain
institutional
Keiseret
and politicalcircumstances
are present.Specifically,
al. (2002) arguethattwonecessary(butnotsufficient)
conditionsmustexist
forsexto facilitate
ofpassiveintoactiverepresentation.
thetranslation
First,
thebureaucrats
musthavediscretion
overthepolicyarea.Second,thepolicy
issuemustbe a genderedone. Forinstance,childsupportand publiceducationhavebeenidentified
as genderedpolicyareas(Keiseretal. 2002;Wilkins
structure
forresearching
and Keiser2006). Keiseret al.'s (2002) theoretical
of minority
the
of
the
effects
links
is
useful
for
representative
exploration
besidesthebureaucracy.
presencein otherbranchesof government
In thisarticle,
we use statesupremecourtjudgevotesas theunitofanalysis becausewe can makeusefuldistinctions
betweenwhetherthecourthas
- two
discretion
overitsdocketand whether
judgesareelectedor appointed
of descriptive
contextsthatmightfacilitate
thetranslation
keyinstitutional
docketcontrol,in
intosubstantive
representation
representation.
Regarding
somestatecourtshavealmostcompletecontroloverthedocket;inothers,
they
haveverylittlecontrol.Thatis,whilethestatesupremecourts(SSCs) insome
statesareliketheUnitedStatesCircuitCourtsofAppeals(USCCA), others
are moreliketheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt (USSC). This is important
becausethedocketofmostUSCCAs consistsof"routine"cases.Sincethereis
a rightto an appeal,USCCAs (and thosestatesupremecourtswithoutdocket
control)mustruleon all cases,includingthosethathavelittleor no merit.In
allowssomeSSCs to choosetohear
contrast,
jurisdiction
havingdiscretionary
casesthatare "tough"or moreambiguousin termsof theproperoutcome.
The moreroutinethecase,thelessdiscretion
judgeshave;themoreambiguous thecase,themorediscretion
judgeshave(e.g.,Kalvenand Zeisel 1966).
inthelawmeansthatjudges'preferences
can moreeasilyenterinto
Ambiguity
thedecisionmaking
At
the
same
the
removalofroutinecases
time,
process.7
can lead to ideologyor otherfactorsdwarfing
theeffects
ofracein statesthat
haveintermediate
appellatecourts.Thus,ifAfrican-American
judgesaremore
to defendants,
we shouldsee racialdifferences
in stateswithout
sympathetic
intermediate
appellatecourtssincethesecourtswilldealwithmorecasesthat
trial
court
out byintermediate
error,casesthathavenotbeen filtered
allege
Americanjudgesshould
appellatecourts.Otherfactors
beingequal,Africanbe moresympathetic
to allegationsof error.Consequently,
thepresenceof
an intermediate
court
could
be
an
institutional
structure
appellate
important
thatconditionstheeffects
ofraceon judicialbehavior.
Regardingmethodof selection,in some statesjudgesare electedwhile
in otherstheyareappointed.Moreover,
thevastmajorityofjudgeson SSCs
do not servelifeterms.Rather,theymustinitiallybe eitherelectedby the
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WINTER 2009
/
STATE POLITICS AND POLICY QUARTERLY
389
orlegislature
and thencontinuetobe
electorate
orappointedbytheexecutive
electedor appointedto retaintheirjobs. Thus,theycan be heldaccountable
fortheirdecisionswhileon thebench.Thisrelativelackofjudicialindependenceon SSCs is also likelyto affectthebehaviorofjudges.Moreover,one
cannotascertainthissimplybylookingat one stateor at thefederalsystem.
theprior(mixed)findIn sum,we shouldbe carefulaboutsimplyextending
to judgeson SSCs and
of
on
of
the
effects
race
judicialdecisionmaking
ings
institutional
and
ratheraim foridentifying
politicalcontextswhere
specific
into
is
to
translate
substantive
representarepresentation likely
descriptive
tion.
differences
Thesearetwomajorinstitutional
amongcourtsthatshould
affectthe natureof judicial decisionmaking(Brace and Hall 1995, 1997;
Bonneau,and Brace2008). Thus,anystudythatseeksto evaluate
Arceneaux,
takeintoaccountthecontextunder
mustexplicitly
judicialdecisionmaking
occurs.
whichthatdecisionmaking
DATA AND HYPOTHESES
we usethejudge-levelstatesupremecourtdatabase(Bonneau,
In thisarticle,
Arceneaux
and
2006). Thisdatasetcontainsthevotesin all casesofall
Brace,
judgesservingon statecourtsof lastresortfrom1995 to 1998.8Thus,our
unitofanalysisis thejudge-votein each case.Consistentwithpastresearch,
we limitour focusto criminalcases because of theracializednatureof the
and
issue(e.g.,Uhlman1978;Welch,Combs,and Gruhl1988;Steffensmeier
Gottschall
Welch
Britt2001; Spohn 1990a,1990b;Spohn and
1986;
1983).9
of a
convicted
individual
where
an
instances
all
we
examine
Specifically,
state
to
the
decision
an
adverse
crime(or a current
supreme
prisoner)appeals
We chooseto focus
courtand thedecisionofthecourtis notunanimous.10
on nonunanimouscases because thesecases providelegitimatedisagreementabouttheproperoutcomein thecase. This limitleavesus over9,000
judge-votesin our analysis.
Estimation
Technique
Sinceour dependentvariablesare dichotomous,we use probitto estimate
variablesdiscussedbelow
oftheindependent
ourbasicmodelsoftheeffects
a convictionor a sentence.In all
on thelikelihoodof a judge overturning
models,we use robustvarianceestimatorsclusteredon judge,whichare
robustto assumptionsaboutwithin-group
(i.e.,judge) correlation.
we also examifraceaffects
In additionto simplytesting
decisionmaking,
contexts.
institutional
in
different
matters
ornotrace
inewhether
Specifically,
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390
BONNEAU AND RICE
as discussed
courthasbeen
ofanintermediate
above,thepresence
appellate
foundtoaffect
infundamental
Bonneau,
ways(Arceneaux,
decisionmaking
totestfor
andBrace2008).Consequently,
weuseseemingly
unrelated
probit
theeffects
ofracein different
institutional
contexts.
Thisallowsus totest
ifthecoefficients
fromeachotheracrossthetwo
arestatistically
different
inthe
models(IACvs.noIAC).11
thatdifferences
Table1suggests
partitioned
ofoverturning
a conviction
a sentence)
likelihood
(butnotnecessarily
might
with
tostates
existinstates
without
intermediate
courtscompared
appellate
suchcourts.Indeed,fully
one-third
ofallvotesbyjudgesinstateswithout
intermediate
courts
werevotestooverturn
a conviction
compared
appellate
toone-fourth
ofthoseinintermediate
court
states.
appellate
DependentVariables
is whether
Weexaminetwodependent
variables
inthisanalysis.
Thefirst
conviction
Secor nota judgevotesto overturn
a criminal
{conviction).
a judgevotesto overturn
a criminalsentence
ond,we examinewhether
to an
In bothcases,a voteto overturn
is a voteto grantrelief
{sentence).
individualconvicted
ofa crime(and can be termeda liberaldecision).
a conviction
is a moreliberalformofrelief
Thatbeingsaid,overturning
a
could
thansimplyreducing
a sentence.
overturned
Having conviction
oftenreturns
allowtheaccusedto go free,whileoverturning
a sentence
a sentence
is
thecasetoa lowercourtforresentencing.
Whileoverturning
in
is
it
considered
a
less
liberal
decision
significant,general
byprosecutors
andlowercourtjudges.Thatis,prosecutors
wouldmuchprefer
tohavea
sentence
overturned
thana conviction
setaside.Thus,weestimate
separate
modelsforeachtypeofbehavior.
Table1. Propensity
to Overturn
Convictions
and Sentences
byPresenceofIAC,
Nonunanimous
Decisions
IAC
No IAC
X2TestofSignificance
Votesto Overturn
Conviction
Votesto Overturn
Sentence
24.6% (2,140of8,683)
33.7% (378 of 1,122)
Pr= 0.000
28.1% (2,403of8,549)
27.9% (274 of981)
Pr= 0.907
Table2. Propensity
to Overturn
Convictions
and Sentences
byRace,
Nonunanimous
Decisions
RaceofJudge
White
Black
X2TestofSignificance
Votesto Overturn
Conviction
Votesto Overturn
Sentence
25.8% (2,197of8,509)
22.3% (203 of911)
Pr= 0.020
28.1% (2,322of8,256)
26.8% (241 of899)
Pr= 0.403
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WINTER 2009
/
STATE POLITICS AND POLICY QUARTERLY
39I
ofstatesupremecourtjudgesto overIn Table2,we showthepropensity
based solelyon race.As Table 2 shows,surturnconvictionsor sentences,
less likelyto overturna
African-American
judgesare statistically
prisingly,
thanwhitejudgesare,butnota sentence.In over22 percentofthe
conviction
votes,African-American
comparedto
judgesvoteto overturna conviction,
African-American
almost26 percentforwhitejudges.Lookingat sentences,
while
white
of
the
26.8
them
overturn
time,
judgesdo so 28.1
percent
judges
A first
look
not
difference
is
time
of
the
(this
statistically
significant).
percent
in
of
race
the
based
on
differences
some
atthedatasuggests
propensity judges
butnotsentences.
to overturn
convictions,
Variables
Independent
severalfactors
andjudicialbehaviorsuggests
on representation
The literature
For
orsentence.
a conviction
ofa judgeoverturning
thelikelihood
shouldaffect
in Table3.12
we detailthesevariablesand theirmeasurement
convenience,
Our primaryindependentvariableis therace of the
JudgeCharacteristics.
judge (white).Giventhatwe arelookingat a highlyracializedarea (crime),
we expectthatAfrican-American
judgeswillbe morelikelyto overturna
convictionand sentencethanwhitejudgeswill.However,itis importantto
notethatTable2 indicatesthatAfrican-American
judgesmaybe less likely
to do so.
Anotherfactorthathas been presumedto affectpoliticaldecisionmakthatwomenweremoreliberalthan
ingis gender.Leader(1977) determined
men afteranalyzinginterest
groupratingsof membersof Congress.Welch
(1985) foundthatwomenweremorelikelyto castliberalvotesin theHouse
decreasedovertime.Nonethebut thatthe difference
of Representatives,
to providemuch consensus
failed
have
behavior
in
less,analyses judicial
frommalejudges.Whilesomestudieshave
on whetherfemalejudgesdiffer
betweenmale and femalejudges (Gottschall1983;
foundslightdifferences
differDavis 1986;Allenand Wall 1987), othershave foundno significant
Wawro
and
Most
Barrow
and
(2004)
ences(Walker
1985).
Farhang
recently,
panelsof theCourtofAppealsand foundthat,while
analyzedthree-judge
theother
thepresenceofa racialminority
judgeon a paneldid notinfluence
thepresenceofa femalejudgeinducedtheotherjudgestobecome
members,
and Hebert(1999) arguethat
moreliberal.That beingsaid,Steffensmeier
male
than
femalejudgessentencemoreharshly
judges,otherfactorsbeing
equal (see also Spohn 1990b). Thus,we includea variableforthe gender
of thejudge (female)and hypothesizethatfemalejudges are less likelyto
overturnconvictionsand sentences.
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392
BONNEAU AND RICE
Table3. Variablesfora ModelofCriminalConvictions/Sentencing
VariableDescription
Variable
DependentVariables
a criminalconviction
1 ifa judgevotedto overturn
0 otherwise
a criminalsentence
1 ifa judgevotedto overturn
0 otherwise
Conviction
Sentence
JudgeCharacteristics
1 ifthejudgeis white
0 otherwise
1 ifthejudgeis female
0 otherwise
and Hall (2000) measureofjusticeideology,
Brace,Langer,
ranging
to 100(liberal)
from1 (conservative)
a prosecutor
1 ifthejudgewasformerly
0 otherwise
White
Female
Ideology
Prosecutor
Case Facts
Violent
Drugs
Deathpenalty
Publicdefender
ofassault,manslaughter,
1 ifthepersonis convicted
murder,
or rape
kidnapping,
0 otherwise
1 ifthecaseinvolved
drugoffenses
0 otherwise
ofthedeathpenalty
1 ifthecourtis reviewing
theimposition
bya lowercourt
0 otherwise
1 ifthepersonwas represented
bya publicdefender
0 otherwise
StateInstitutional
Arrangements
Election
No IAC
1 ifthejudgeis subjectto reelection
(partisanor nonpartisan)
0 otherwise
1 ifthestatedoesnothavean intermediate
appellatecourt
0 otherwise
One ofthedominant
injudicialpoliticsis thata judge'sidefindings
affects
decisions
his/her
ology
judicial
(e.g.,SegalandSpaeth2002).This
is especially
thecaseforjudgeswhositon courtsoflastresort,
sincethey
cannotbe overruled
statesupreme
courtscan
byhighercourts.
Although
be overturned
Court,thefactthattheU.S.
technically
bytheU.S.Supreme
Courthearsso fewcasesandstatesupreme
courtshearso many
Supreme
meansthatstatesupreme
courtseffectively
serveas theendofthejudicial
ofcases.Thus,ideology
shouldmatter
forstate
processforallbuttherarest
courtjudgesjustas itdoesforjusticesontheU.S.Supreme
Court.
supreme
Wemeasureideology
and
Hall's
scores.
Brace,
(2000)PAJID
using
Langer,
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STATE POLITICS AND POLICY QUARTERLY
393
Thevariableis a party-adjusted
ideologyscoreforeachjudgecreatedby
oftheirelitesandtheideostatesbasedonthepartyaffiliations
comparing
the
time
the
of
the
electorate
at
judgewaselectedtothe
disposition
logical
thismeasureto
Hall
and
bench.
Brace,
(2000,
408)
compared
Langer,
high
andfoundPAJIDtobe a "valid,stablemeasureof
measures
otherexisting
thanpartisan
affiliation."
courtsthatisbetter
instatesupreme
preferences
Thescoresforeachjudgerangefrom1 to 100,wherea scoreof1 indicates
We
and a scoreof 100indicatesstrongliberalism.
strongconservatism
more
the
the
a
liberal
the
more
likely judgeis
judge(ideology),
expectthat
orsentence.
a conviction
tooverturn
willalso
that
we
experience
Finally, expect a judge'spriorprosecutorial
Weexpectthatjudgeswhohave
ofreversal.
onthelikelihood
havean effect
toupholda lowercourt
willbemorelikely
asprosecutors
served
(prosecutor)
tobe tough
be morelikely
sincethesejudgesmight
orsentence
conviction
cases(Tate
incriminal
tothestate's
oncrimeandmoresympathetic
position
that
state
found
Hall
In
Brace
Hall
and
fact,
(1995)
1994).
1981;
supreme
discernible
havea statistically
whohaveservedas prosecutors
courtjustices
tosupport
capitalpunishment.
tendency
Centralto ourpurposein thispaperare
StateInstitutional
Arrangements.
thatoccurfromstateto state.Aswe
variations
institutional
thestate-level
environhavefoundthattheinstitutional
havediscussedabove,scholars
behavior(Hall 1992;Braceand Hall
mentin whichjudgesactcan affect
1995,1997).13
hisor
Themethodbywhicha judgekeepshisorherjob shouldaffect
thatjudgesaltertheir
havedocumented
onthebench.Scholars
herbehavior
the
of
the
ofelections,
inthepresence
behavior
typeofelection
regardless
Hall
and
Brace
face
must
1995,
1997).Specifically,
judges
(Hall 1992;
judge
casesiftheymustwinreelection
liberaldecisionsin criminal
makefewer
rewards
Theelectorate
thevoters.
from
judgeswhoaretoughon crimeand
to
be
are
who
those
(Hall2001).Weexpect
perceived pro-criminal
penalizes
willbelesslikely
tokeeptheir
thatjudgeswhomustfacevoters
jobs(election)
and
sentences.
convictions
criminal
tooverturn
betweenstate
differences
one ofthemajorinstitutional
Additionally,
Statesthat
court
ofan intermediate
(IAC).
courtsis thepresence
appellate
have
courts
haveintermediate
jurisdiction;
primarily discretionary
appellate
such
thatis,theygetto decidewhatcasestheyhear.Butin stateswithout
thestatesupremecourtis theonlyappellatecourtto heara case.
courts,
courthasto hearmany
Nothavingan IAC meansthatthestatesupreme
heard
be
casesthatwouldordinarily
(anddecided)bytheIAC.Thus,any
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394
BONNEAU AND RICE
errorsmade bythetrialcourthaveto be overturned
bythestatesupreme
courtwhen,in stateswithIACs,thisis a job usuallyperformed
bytheIAC.
We includea variableforwhetherthestatedoes not havean intermediate
a convicappellatecourt(noIAC) and expecta higherlikelihoodofreversing
tionor sentencein stateswithoutsuch courts,as in thesestatesthecourts
of last resortmustservea moreprominenterror-correction
role.We also
estimateseparatemodelsforstatesthathaveIACs and thosethatdo not,as
we discussedearlier.
Case Facts.In orderto properlyspecifyour models,we also musttakeinto
accountcharacteristics
ofthecasesas wellas characteristics
ofthejudgeand
cases
are
more(or less)
institutional
Some
arrangements
(e.g.,Segal 1984).
In termsof
of
the
nature
of
the
case.
to
be
overturned
because
likely
simply
criminalcases,one ofthekeydistinctions
amongtypesofcrimesis whether
theyinvolvedphysicalviolence.In general,violentcrimesare moresevere
thannonviolent
violentoffenses
crimes.Thus,we distinguish
(manslaughter,
from
otheroffenses.
and
assault,rape,murder, kidnapping)
Simplyput,we
expectthatcrimesinvolvingphysicalviolence(violent)willbe lesslikelyto
be overturned
thanothercrimes,otherfactorsbeingequal.
Anotherrelevantcase factthatmightaffect
judicialbehavioris whether
thecaseinvolveddrugs(eitheruse orpossession).Thesecasesaremorelikely
to involveissuesof illegalsearches(and seizures)and thusmightbe more
of a convictionor sentence.Moreover,
likelyto resultin the overturning
thesecasesarea nontrivial
proportionofall criminalappealsheardbystate
courts:
11.1
supreme
percentofthenonunanimous
judge-votesinthedataset
occurredin drugcases.Thus,we expectcasesinvolving
drugoffenses
(drugs)
are morelikelyto be overturned
thanothercases.
A finalrelevant
casefactinvolves
thosecaseswherethelowercourtimposed
thedeathpenalty.
Scholarshavefoundthatjusticesareresponsive
totheirstate's
thedeathpenalty(e.g.,Hall 1995). Given
politicalenvironment
regarding
thehighlevelofstatesupportforcapitalpunishment
in everystate(Braceet
al. 2002),judgeswho overturn
sentencesof deatharevotingcontrary
to the
sentiment
in
their
states.
we
in
that
prevailingpublic
Consequently, expect
caseswherethecourtis reviewing
theimpositionofthedeathpenalty(death
a sentence.14
penalty),
judgeswillbe lesslikelyto overturn
also is notequal.
Justas all crimesare notequal,all legalrepresentation
Whileeverydefendant
is entitled
to a lawyer,
thequalityofrepresentation
can
Publicdefenders
arecommonly
as unabletoprovidethe
varywidely.
perceived
sameleveloflegalserviceas privateattorneys
due totheirheavyworkloadand
lackof resources(Smith1994;Etienne2005). Moreover,
empiricalevidence
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WINTER 2OO9
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STATE POLITICS
AND POLICY QUARTERLY
395
supportsthisperception(Welch,Combs,and Gruhl1988; Spohn 1990a).
thata defendant
Hence,wehypothesize
represented
bya publicdefender
(pubis morelikelyto havea convictionor sentenceoverturned.15
licdefender)
RESULTS
Table4 examinesthelikelihoodthata statesupremecourtjudgewilloverturna criminalconviction.As one can see fromlookingat Model 4.1,there
betweenwhitejudgesand African-American
differences
are no significant
a
judges.Simplyput,theraceofthejudge is not relevantin understanding
As
a
further
we
conviction.
a
criminal
to
overturn
vote
test,
generated
judge's
based on therace of thejudge.16Withall variables
predictedprobabilities
of a judgevotingto overturna convicheldat theirmeans,theprobability
tionwas 25.1 percent.Ifwe hold all variablesat theirmeansexcepttherace
a conviction
ofa whitejudgevotingto overturn
ofthejudge,theprobability
Decisions
AllNonunanimous
a Conviction,
Table4. LikelihoodofOverturning
White
Female
Ideology
Prosecutor
Violent
Drugs
Public defender
Election
No IAC
1995
1996
1997
Constant
N
y}
Prob.>%2
CorrectlyPredicted
PREa
Model 4.1
All
Model 4.2
IAC
Model 4.3
No IAC
0.086(0.064)
-0.030(0.058)
0.002 (0.001)
-0.138(0.051)
-0.169(0.037)
0.303 (0.045)
0.012 (0.035)
0.097 (0.052)
0.264(0.050)
0.230(0.048)
0.182(0.045)
0.133(0.039)
-0.940 (0.095)
9,083
309.75
0.000
82.206%
-0.537%
0.102(0.067)
-0.028(0.064)
0.002 (0.001)
-0.124(0.058)
-0.210(0.040)
0.248 (0.049)
-0.064 (0.041)
0.048 (0.060)
-0.351(0.096)
-0.048(0.091)
0.001 (0.001)
-0.205(0.080)
-0.001(0.082)
0.506 (0.1 10)
0.269 (0.078)
0.267 (0.084)
0.209(0.053)
0.230(0.046)
0.169(0.040)
-0.913 (0.105)
8,021
188.82
0.000
82.485%
1.040%
0.503(0.103)
0.012(0.123)
-0.041(0.117)
-0.516 (0.164)
1,062
77.90
0.000
78.234%
-22.979%
Y overthemodal
in predicting
measurestheimprovement
in error(PRE) statistic
reduction
a. The proportional
themodelcanendup makingmany"incorrect"
variableis skewed,
Whenthedependent
predictions
category.
We thinkthisis whatis happeninghere,especially
covariates.
evenifthereareseveralstatistically
significant
around80 percentofthecasesin all modelsand severalofour independent
sincewe arecorrectly
predicting
convictions
ofthevotescastweretooverturn
variablesarestatistically
Moreover,
only17.7percent
significant.
sentences.
ofthevotescastwereto overturn
and only19.4percent
in bold arestatistically
tests.Coefficients
aretwo-tailed
Notes:Alltestsofsignificance
(p<0.05). Test
significant
[IAC]White= [No IAC] White.%2(1) = 14.88.Prob.>%2 = 0.000
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396
BONNEAU AND RICE
is 25.3 percent;forAfrican-American
judges,thelikelihoodis 22.7 percent,
No matterhowwe look at it,theraceof
a smallbutinsignificant
difference.
thejudge does notmatter.
crimiIn termsof the othervariables,consistentwithour hypothesis,
have
their
to
more
crimes
are
of
who
are
convicted
nals
likely
drug-related
otherfactorsbeing equal. Also as expected,those
convictionoverturned,
convictedofviolentcrimesarelesslikelyto havetheirconvictionsetaside.
as is ideology.We also
thegenderofthejudge is insignificant,
Additionally,
uncoverno evidenceforthe inadequacyof public defenders:defendants
arenotmorelikelyto havetheirconviction
bypublicdefenders
represented
overturned.
Nor is thereanyevidencethatjudgeswho are electedbehave
thanthosewho arenot.
differently
we do findthatjudgeswho previously
Consistentwithour expectations,
less likelyto overturna conviction,
servedas prosecutorsare significantly
otherfactorsbeing equal. Judgeswho werepreviouslyprosecutorsonly
votedto overturna conviction22.4 percentof thetime,comparedto 26.8
percentof thetimeforjudgeswho werenot prosecutorsbeforeascending
to thebench.
Also as hypothesized,
the presenceof an intermediate
appellatecourt
aremorevotes
there
in stateswithoutintermediate
matters:
courts,
appellate
arefunctionresort
that
courts
of
last
convictions.
This
indicates
to overturn
in theabsenceofintermediate
institutions
appellate
ingas error-correcting
courts.That is, in stateswithan intermediateappellatecourt,IACs take
careofmostoftheclear-cutcases,thereby
leavingthecourtoflastresortto
addressthemoreambiguouscases.
In Models4.2 and 4.3,we estimateourmodelseparately
on votesin states
withintermediate
those
without
courts
and
{no IAC). Inter(I
AC)
appellate
find
here
the
does
affect
we
that
the
race
of
decisionmaking,
estingly,
judge
butonlyin stateswithoutintermediate
appellatecourts.The %2testindicates
thatthedifference
betweenthewhitecoefficient
in Model 4.2 and Model 4.3
is statistically
That
the
difference
we observeis a statistically
is,
significant.17
difference.
at
states
no
with
IAC,withallvariablesattheir
significant
Looking
the
likelihood
a
of judgeoverturning
a conviction
is 33.6percent;itis
means,
almostthesameforwhitejudges(33.5 percent).Thisis an impressively
high
almost
one-third
of
the
a
in
withvotes
are
to
overturn
conviction
state
figure;
outan intermediate
thatthelowercourts
appellatecourt.Thisfinding
suggests
aremakinga substantial
numberoferrors
inthesecases.Ashighas thenumber
forall judgesis,itjumpsto 47.4 percentwhenlookingat African-American
Americanjudgesin states
judges.Almostone-halfofthevotescastbyAfricanwithoutintermediate
courts
are
votes
to
overturn
a conviction.
appellate
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WINTER 2009
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STATE POLITICS AND POLICY QUARTERLY
397
Whatcouldexplainthisresult?We thinkithas muchto do withthelack
ofdocketcontrolin stateswithoutIACs.In thesestates,thecourtmustmake
a decisionon all casesthatcomebeforeit.18Thus,therearemanymorecases
withno IAC to
wherethecourtis servingas an error-correcting
institution;
of
trial
the
court
last
resorthasthat
the
cases
of
obvious
court
out
filter
error,
task.This theoryexplainsthehighpercentageofvotesto overturnconvictions.Our resultfortherace of thejudge indicatesthatAfrican-American
to allegationsof trialcourterror,
judgesare likelyto be moresympathetic
earlier.
reasonswe discussed
forthetheoretical
Hence,bybeingmorelikely
to takeclaimsoferrorsin theprocessmoreseriously,
theyaremorelikelyto
overturna conviction.
differences
someotherinteresting
appear
Lookingatalltheothervariables,
IACs.
betweencourtsin stateswithIACs and thosewithout
Havinga public
on thelikelihoodof a voteto overturnin stateswith
has no effect
defender
IACs whileit increasesthelikelihoodof sucha votein stateswithoutIACs.
Thisis likelydue to publicdefenders
beingperceivedto be oflesser"quality"
In stateswith
andthusmorelikelytomakemoreerrors.
thanprivateattorneys
IACs,theseobviouserrorsarecaughtbytheIAC; in stateswithoutIACs,the
supremecourthas to disposeofthesecases.The sameis trueforjudgeswho
mustfaceelection:in stateswithIACs no relationship
exists,whileelected
IACs.Allthese
in
without
states
a conviction
judgesaremorelikelytooverturn
injudicialdecisionmaking
differences
fundamental
resultssuggest
depending
ornotthestatehasadoptedan IAC.Courtswithoutdocketcontrol
on whether
fromthosewhohavedocketcontrol
(whenthereisno IAC) aresimplydifferent
Bonneau,andBrace2008).Thepresenceofan IAC fundamentally
(Arceneaux,
thenatureofthejudicialdecisionmaking
affects
process.Failingto recognize
and modelthiscouldlead scholarsto makeerroneousinferences.
In Table 5, we examinethe likelihoodof a judge votingto overturna
sentencehandeddownfora conviction.Model 5.1 showstheresultsforall
judges,Model 5.2 forjudgesin stateswithIACs,and Model 5.3 forjudgesin
stateswithoutIACs.A familiarfindingis displayedin Table5: no differences
betweenwhiteand nonwhite
judgeswhenlookingat all cases.However,once
morelikelyto overjudgesare significantly
againwe see African-American
turnor reducea sentencein stateswithoutan intermediate
appellatecourt.
Our explanationforthisresult(discussedabove) is further
supportedbythe
forjudgesin
in
these
cases
matters
of
the
the
factthat ideology
judgesonly
effect.
no
stateswithIACs.Withno docketcontrol,ideologyhas significant
a sentencewhen
ofoverturning
However,ideologyis an important
predictor
oftherace
The
effects
to
hear.
want
cases
the
can
they
judges pick-and-choose
in
these
states.
effects
of
the
be
dwarfed
ofthejudgesmight
ideology
by
This content downloaded from 136.142.39.140 on Tue, 22 Oct 2013 14:42:10 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
398
BONNEAU AND RICE
AllNonunanimous
Table5. LikelihoodofOverturning
a Sentence,
Decisions
Model5.1
All
White
Female
Ideology
Prosecutor
Violent
Drugs
Deathpenalty
Publicdefender
Election
No IAC
1995
1996
1997
Constant
N
X2
Prob.>X2
CorrectlyPredicted
PRE
Model5.2
IAC
Model5.3
No IAC
0.061(0.101)
-0.095(0.076)
0.004(0.001)
-0.076 (0.070)
0.043(0.043)
0.236(0.054)
-0.1 10 (0.046)
0.083(0.046)
-0.052 (0.059)
-0.063(0.092)
0.234 (0.070)
-0.1 14 (0.067)
0.229(0.041)
-0.854(0.137)
0.083(0.096)
-0.116(0.080)
0.004(0.001)
-0.045 (0.071)
0.012(0.047)
0.186(0.058)
-0.104 (0.046)
0.001(0.052)
-0.177 (0.060)
-0.346(0.117)
0.025(0.141)
0.000(0.002)
-0.118 (0.112)
0.216(0.093)
0.577(0.135)
-0.759 (0.238)
0.417(0.056)
1.026(0.123)
0.189(0.073)
-0.154 (0.070)
0.211(0.041)
-0.752(0.135)
0.897(0.175)
0.450 (0.188)
0.517(0.151)
-1.839(0.240)
8,788
147.34
0.000
80.818%
1.353%
7,897
207.72
0.000
80.777%
1.142%
891
177.86
0.000
77.597%
-15.212%
tests.Coefficients
in bold arestatistically
Notes:Alltestsofsignificance
aretwo-tailed
(p<0.05). Test
significant
[IAC]White= [No IAC] White.X2(1) = 8-00.Prob.> %2= 0.005
CONCLUSION
Webeganthisarticle
wereanydifferences
between
whiteand
askingifthere
on
state
African-American
courts.
Based
on
the
supreme
representajudges
tionliterature
andcourts),
welookedfor
bureaucracies,
(fromlegislatures,
aneffect
intheplacewhereweweremostlikely
tofindit:onanissuesalient
toAfrican-American
wheretherewasno docket
judgesunderconditions
control.
After
our
model
a
of
specifying
variety waysandlookingat two
one
conclusion
isapparent:
African-American
variables,
separate
dependent
tothoseconvicted
ofcrimes,
butonlyinstates
judgesaremoresympathetic
withnointermediate
courts.
The
of
effects
race
on
appellate
judicialbehavior
areconditioned
institutional
factors
suchas
by
arrangements.
Additionally,
under
some
the
(forsentencing,
conditions), natureofthecrime,
ideology
andthepresence
ofanintermediate
courtaffect
thelikelihood
that
appellate
a judgewilloverturn
a conviction
orsentence.
Our findings
do notmeanthattheraceofthejudgedoesnotmatter
moregenerally
in othercircumstances.
Forexample,
itis entirely
possible
thatintrialcourts,
where
andhavetomakedozens
judgesseethedefendant
ofrulings
thataffect
theoutcomeofthecase,theraceofthejudgeplaysa
role.
wouldnotdismiss
we
studies
thatfindthatwhite
So,
significant
judges
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WINTER 2009
/
STATE POLITICS AND POLICY QUARTERLY
399
sentencemoreharshlythanAfrican-American
judges (e.g.,Welch,Combs,
and Gruhl1988) or thatAfrican-American
judgesaremorelikelyto convict
and Britt2001). We do feelconfident,
however,thatat the
(Steffensmeier
the
between
white
and
African-American
differences
judges
appellatelevel,
of thecourts.
conditionedbytheinstitutional
are primarily
arrangements
Futureresearchshouldfurther
explorethesedifferences.
In additionto theinstitutional
structure
ofcourts,anotherreasonforthe
betweenwhiteandAfrican-American
lackofdifference
judgesingeneralmight
of
state
haveto do withtherelative
supremecourtjudges.The
homogeneity
ofjudges(electedand nonelectedalike)aredistinguished
vastmajority
jurists
inthejudicialsystem.
Thesejudgesarealso socialized
withyearsofexperience
Thishomogeneity
thesameway(bothinlawschoolandinthelegalprofession).
- mayserveto
the
andexperience largely
insocialization
uniqueto judiciary
crimeis an issuesalientto
thatexist.19
Moreover,
anyracialdifferences
mitigate
elitesand votersalike(e.g.,Hall 2001); thus,mostjudges(whiteand AfricanAmericanalike)who siton statesupremecourtsarerelatively
homogeneous
intermsoftheirpositionson criminalcases.One is notabletobecomea state
of whetherone is appointedor elected)if
supremecourtjustice(regardless
one is softon crime.Thishomogeneity
mightnotexistatthetrialcourtlevel,
and approach.
wherejudgesaremorediversein termsoftheirexperience
ourfindings
In termsofrepresentation,
suggestthepresenceofsubstanon statecourtsof last resort,dependingon the institiverepresentation
tutionalcontext.African-American
judges in stateswithno intermediate
to criminaldefendantsthanwhite
more
are
court
sympathetic
appellate
judges.In additionto thebenefitsof a diversebench,increasingthenumAmericanjudgescould significantly
ber ofAfricanchangetheoutcomeof
cases decidedby statesupremecourts,at leastundercertaininstitutional
No evidencesuggeststhatAfrican-American
judges decide
arrangements.
institutional
the
when
thanwhitejudgesingeneral;however,
casesdifferently
Americanjudges
inthewayAfricantherearedifferences
contextis favorable,
and whitejudgesdecidecriminalcases,otherfactorsbeingequal.
ENDNOTES
Paul Brace,Melinda
David Barker,
The authorswouldliketo thankKevinArceneaux,
KirkRandazzo,
GannHall,KrisKanthak,
GeorgeKrause,DrewLanier,BrandonMyers,
thank
theNational
like
to
would
also
Bonneau
comments.
for
their
andLJZigerell
helpful
and
1
1
1
05
849
1
05
SES
05
Grant
ScienceFoundation
6600,
6049,
).
(
findings,
Anyopinions,
in thisarticlearethoseoftheauthorsand
conclusionsor recommendations
expressed
theviewsoftheNationalScienceFoundation.
reflect
do notnecessarily
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400
BONNEAU AND RICE
1. Wedealexclusively
withthe
withAfrican-American
consistent
judgesinthisarticle,
literature.
Thereareonly80 (0.8 percent)nonunanimous
Hispanicjudge-votesandonly
119 (1.2 percent)nonunanimous
Asianjudge-votesin ourdataset.
there
2.Thisisnottosaythatdescriptive
isunimportant.
Tothecontrary,
representation
aremanyreasonswhyinstitutions
shouldreflect
thecharacteristics
oftheirconstituenoftheinstitution
cies,suchas theperceived
(Hurwitzand Lanier2003).This
legitimacy
thenatureof
doesmean,however,
thatdescriptive
representation
simplydoesnotaffect
thedecisions.
3. Itis important
tonotethatwearenotmakingtheargument
thatracecausesjudges
to behavedifferently.
We are simplytestingwhetheror notAfrican-American
judges
factors
whenmakingtheirdecibehavedifferently
(or considerdifferent
systematically
sions)thando whitejudges.
between
4. Thisis also trueforfemalejudges.Some studieshavefounddifferences
ofwomen'sissues
femaleand malejudges,suchthatfemalejudgesaremoreprotective
andHebert1999),while
1983;Steffensmeier
(AllenandWall1987;Davis1986;Gottschall
otherscholarshavefoundno suchdifferences
betweenfemaleand malejudges(Walker
and Barrow1985).
5. Duringtheperiodofthisstudy,
allstatesupremecourtjudgeshada lawdegree.For
an interesting
thecaseforlocaljudges,seeGlaberson
reportofhowthisisnotnecessarily
(2006).
andBritt(2001;754,761) alsodiscusstheinfluence
of"token"reason6. Steffensmeier
ing:African-American
judgesfearbeingperceivedas "soft"on crimebecauseAfrican
Americans
aremoreoftenassociatedwithcrimethanwhites.
7. Thisis similarto the"liberation
first
introduced
hypothesis"
byKalvenand Zeisel
(1966) in theirstudyofjuries.
8. The universeof casesforeach statein eachyearis includedup to 200 cases.For
statesinwhichmorethan200 casesaredecidedin a year,a randomsampleof200 cases
wasused.Moststatesin mostyearsdecidefewer
than200 cases.
9. Becausewelimitourfocustocriminal
cases,weusecasesdecidedbytheTexasCourt
of CriminalAppealsand OklahomaCourtof CriminalAppeals.Thesetwostateshave
twocourtsof lastresort,
one thatdealsexclusively
withcivilcasesand one thatdeals
withcriminalcases.
exclusively
10.Wefirst
selectedallcriminal
casesinthedataset.Then,wedeletedallcasesthatdid
notinvolveindividuals
convicted
ofcrimesor current
codes1021
(Petitioner
prisoners.
and 1026.)Wealsoranthemodelswithout
thisfurther
race
screen;ourresults
regarding
areidentical.
11.We also ranouranalysisrunningseparatemodelsforjudgeswhoareelectedand
thosewhoarenotelected.However,
wefoundno differences
betweenwhiteandAfricanAmerican
oursampleinthismanner.
White
wasinsignificant
judgeswhenwepartitioned
in bothmodels(electedand non-elected)
and therewas no statistical
difference
in the
coefficients
forwhitebetweenthemodels.
12.Somescholarshaveincludedtheraceofthedefendant
as an independent
variable
and hypothesized
thatnonwhite
better
judgesarelikelyto treatnonwhitedefendants
thanwhitejudges(Steffensmeier
andBritt2001;Smith1983;Welch,Combs,andGruhl
wedo notincludea variablefortheraceofthedefendant
fortworeasons.
1988).However,
itisnotpossibletogather
theraceofdefendant
information
ina systematic
fashion.
First,
Sometimes
itis mentioned
inthecase;mostoften,
itis not.Second,we aredealingwith
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WINTER 2OO9
/
STATE POLITICS AND POLICY QUARTERLY
4OI
thejudgesare
thantrialcourts.In manyofthecasesinthedataset,
appellatecourtsrather
inthe
is notpresent
sincethedefendant
tobe unawareoftheraceofthedefendant
likely
is representing
or at anyothertime(unlessthedefendant
courtduringoralarguments
himself/herself).
motivated
state-level
variations
allowsus
fortheoretically
13.Additionally,
controlling
as opposedto simplyputting
to ascertain
theprecisemechanisms
bywhichstatesdiffer,
in fixed-effects
foreachstate.
a
thelikelihoodof overturning
14.We haveno reasonto thinkthatthiswillaffect
sincewe alreadycontrolforthenatureofthecrimein themodel.Thus,we
conviction,
models.
onlyincludethisvariableinthesentencing
a defendanton
15. This variablemeasureswhethera publicdefenderrepresents
appeal.
werecalculatedusingCLARIFY(King,Tomz,andWit16.Allpredicted
probabilities
2000).
tenberg
testsfortheothervariablesin themodelscan be obtainedfromthe
17.Coefficient
authors.
or rendera formal
thecourtdoes nothaveto hearoralarguments
18.Nevertheless,
written
opinion.
so homogis thesocialization
ofthegovernment
19.Indeed,in no otherinstitution
enous.The factthatall statesupremecourtjudgesmusthavea lawdegreeensuresthat
theyareall socializedsimilarly.
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