Review of The Sound of Two Hands Clapping,
by Georges Dreyfus
I. J. Coghlan
Monash University
Georges B. J. Dreyfus, The Sound of Two Hands Clapping: The
Education of a Tibetan Buddhist Monk. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2003. 445 pp., 14 b & w photographs. $60.00
hard; $24.95 paper.
The title of this work, The Sound of Two Hands Clapping, invokes the noisy
pursuit of knowledge within a Tibetan debate, one that contrasts with the quiet
contemplation of the paradox of the sound of one hand clapping. The subject matter
itself is multi-layered, dealing as it does with the education of a Tibetan monk,
with the practice of debate that is at the heart of that education, and with the
scholasticism that exists at the core of debate. In brief, the author seeks to examine
the system that has produced the powerful and decisive minds of Tibetan scholars.
The author’s thesis is twofold. First, he holds that scholasticism in general needs
rehabilitation through reconceptualization “as a range of diverse practices that
shape its participants” (10); and secondly, that the specific Dge lugs model of
scholasticism, with its emphasis on debate, stands as a possible model in this
process of reconceptualization. Interestingly, his style recapitulates a debater’s
defense, employing the techniques used by monks to defend Tibetan scholasticism
against the competing tendency to anti-scholasticism both within the Tibetan
tradition and in the post-modern west.
The text is written for both scholars and for the wider non-academic public.
The author is fully aware of the inherent biases of thought, and evinces his
sensitivity in this regard by frequently invoking his own history and point of
reference. This enhances the academic tone of the work, and at the same time
makes the book more accessible. The work is divided into three parts and fourteen
chapters. Part One establishes the context for evaluating Tibetan scholasticism.
Journal of the International Association of Tibetan Studies, no. 1 (October 2005): 1-3.
www.thdl.org?id=T1225.
1550-6363/2005/1/T1225.
© 2005 by I. J. Coghlan, Tibetan and Himalayan Digital Library, and International Association of Tibetan Studies.
Distributed under the THDL Digital Text License.
Coghlan: Review of The Sound of Two Hands Clapping, by Georges Dreyfus
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Part Two deals with the intellectual techniques that comprise scholasticism. Part
Three investigates issues related to scholasticism, such as rationality and
superstition, and the external and internal limits of inquiry.
The focal point of the work, however, is really Part Two, wherein the author
analyzes the three scholastic practices of (1) memorization, (2) commentary, and
(3) debate. Memorization plays a subsidiary role in providing a foundation for
commentary and debate. But it is the role of commentary and debate that form the
central field of analysis. The author seeks to define them, to distinguish their
hermeneutical functions, and to provide a framework for evaluating their interaction.
We are led to the conclusion that when they function together harmoniously, they
complement each other in a process where commentary transmits the tradition,
and debate provides the essential freedom necessary for inquiry. Within such a
stable yet dynamic union scholasticism is vindicated.
This work has considerable merit. It is a robust and incisive analysis of Tibetan
scholasticism, wherein the author applies a wide and eclectic mix of observations
gleaned from the scholastic traditions of the ancient and medieval worlds, and
from the ideas of post-modernist thinkers. One is carried along by the irresistible
current of Dreyfus’s thinking and enriched by his penetrating insight. The work is
impressive and destined to become a standard reference in this genre.
Some points still require further investigation. When discussing the five topics
of study (po ti) of Dge lugs scholasticism, the author downplays the importance
of Vinaya and Abhidharma. He emphasizes the deconstructive dialectic
representative of the study of Madhyamaka over the essentially constructive
dialectic prominent in the interpretation of Vinaya and Abhidharma. But such an
approach underestimates their perceived role in the development of correct view,
and questions the importance that Tsong kha pa and other scholars placed on
explaining both ultimate and relative truth.
Also, at times a lack of clarity arises when the author discusses technical issues
within a framework in which the words are not clearly defined. For instance, what
does the author mean when he states that emptiness “is not…an object that can be
conceptually captured” (241)?; or that “ultimate reality is beyond description and
thus cannot be grasped” (282)? At face value, such statements seem to contradict
the widely held view that all existent entities – including emptiness – are held
(’dzin) and comprehended (rtogs) by conceptual thought. Further, in claiming that
the effectiveness of the Heart Sūtra “lies in its ritual power, not its content” (249),
he gives the impression that in the tradition valid textual passages teaching
emptiness through argument and consequence are not seen as the direct cause of
conceptually comprehending emptiness, or that the ritual recitation of such texts
does not facilitate the discernment of their content.
I found the structure of the text to be sound, and the work as a whole to be well
documented. However, due to the complexity of the subject matter, tables or charts
could have been effectively used to summarize and clarify points, especially for
the nonspecialist. I also feel that this book would have benefited from a more
Journal of the International Association of Tibetan Studies 1 (October 2005)
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detailed survey of the system of debate that evolved in India, since it formed the
foundation of Tibetan dialectic.
In conclusion, this text provides a detailed and well-argued assessment of Tibetan
education. It opens a window into the experience of scholarly monks, and into
their attempt to assimilate and benefit from the techniques of scholastic practice.
It also establishes a framework for penetrating more deeply into the systems that
have produced the critical acumen of traditional Tibetan scholars. Equally important
is its call for a more in-depth examination of the idea of scholasticism in general,
its view that the west would benefit from broadening its scope by examining Asian
systems of thought and praxis, and its espousal of dialectic as a mode of
investigation. Many of the points stated by the author would be hotly contested by
those trained in debate. But the point of debate is not to be invulnerable, as the
author has shown us, but to put oneself in a position where one’s opinions are
exposed to criticism, thereby creating the possibility for intellectual growth.
I. J. Coghlan
Monash University
Brisbane, Australia