Does Balance Matter?
Experiments in TV News
Pippa Norris and David Sanders
Shorenstein Center
Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, MA 02138
Fax: 617 495 8696
Email: [email protected]
www.ksg.harvard.edu/people/pnorris
Department of Government
University of Essex
Wivenhoe Park, Colchester
Essex, CO4 7SQ, UK
Fax: 011 44 1206 873894
Email: [email protected]
Synopsis:
The principle of political balance is one of the most basic
standards
commonly
used to evaluate bias, fairness and
impartiality in television coverage. Given its importance, this
study examines the impact of three types of balance commonly
employed in newsrooms - stop-watch balance, directional balance,
and agenda balance. The first s ection outlines the conceptual
and theoretical framework. The second section describes the
research design based on experiments within the context of the
1997 British general election.
The third section establishes
the core findings about the effects of b alanced news coverage
for party preferences. The conclusion considers the consequences
for our understanding of media effects and for the principles
guiding fair and impartial election coverage.
© Paper prepared for Panel 38 -12 'The ABC of Media Effects in British
Elections: Agenda, Balance and Change' at the Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association, Boston 3 -6 September 1998.
Does Balance Matter? Experiments in TV News
The concept of balance is commonly invoked as one of the main
criteria
used
to
evaluate
the
quality
of
news,
along
with
related
notions such as how far stories are 'fair', 'impartial', and 'objective'
(for
a
discussion
see
Westerstahl
1983;
McQuail
1992:200 -231).
The
principle of political balance is often used to dete rmine legal rights
to election broadcasts, as well as influencing the news agenda for
television
producers
conventional
and
yardsticks
editors,
used
for
and
functioning
scholarly
as
one
of
the
of
bias
in
evaluations
journalism. The issue of political balan ce is most sensitive in how
broadcasters cover parties and candidates during election campaigns and
there is perhaps no area of the news media which is more strictly
scrutinized.
Given its importance, this study examines the impact of three
types of balance commonly employed in newsrooms - stop-watch balance,
directional balance, and agenda balance. The first section outlines the
conceptual and theoretical framework. The second section describes the
research design based on experiments within the contex t of the 1997
British
general
findings
about
preferences.
election.
the
The
The
effects
conclusion
of
third
section
balanced
considers
establishes
news
the
coverage
the
for
consequences
core
party
for
our
understanding of media effects and for the princip les guiding fair and
impartial election coverage.
The Principle and Practice of Balance
Although widely agreed in principle, the concept of balance raises
complex
and
difficult
issues
in
practice.
'balance' may be another's idea of
One
person's
notion
of
'bias'. At least three distinct
meanings can be distinguished in conventional usage.
Stop-watch Balance
First, the concept is often understood in terms of
' stop-watch'
balance, meaning whether particular candidates, parties or groups have
been given equal or proportional coverage in the media (McQuail 1992:
224-5). We commonly tot up the number of column inches for X and Y, and
hunt for disproportionality, especially in controversial or disputed
matters
with
two
or
more
opposing
2
sides.
Which
candidate
go t more
coverage after a debate? Did we hear more from management or the unions
in a dispute? Which party convention got more attention on TV?
simple
stimulus-response
model
behind
this
exposure means more persuasive influence.
notion
is
that
The
greater
Stop-watch balance focuses
strictly upon the amount of coverage of each party or candidate, not its
contents or effects.
Ever since pioneering work by Lazarsfeld et al. (1944), comparing
press and radio coverage of Roosevelt and Wilkie, scholars have trie d to
assess whether election reporting has been balanced by this standard.
Content analysis
frequently
compares the amount of news coverage given
to each candidate or party to judge whether the media has been 'fair' 1.
Following this convention, in the 19 87 British election Miller et al.
added up the total hours of coverage of each party on television and
concluded that there was a "massive imbalance" which was overwhelmingly
right-wing:
"The
parties
did
not
receive
equal
treatment...The
Conservative government got two bites of the television cherry: once as
a party, once as a government." (Miller et al. 1989; Miller 1991:77; for
a critique of this approach see Harrison 1989).
and politicians
monitor
British broadcasters
carefully and assiduously stop -watch campaign news to
impartiality.
In
the
same
way
U.S.
Presidential
campaign
debates use rules regarded as fair if equal time is allocated to
candidate.
Similar
standards
are
used
to
grant
free
each
political
advertising to parties on an equal or proport ional basis, for example in
Denmark, the Netherlands and Israel (Kaid and Holtz -Bacha 1995).
Yet
while
it
is
relatively
easy
and
numerical balance of coverage, this may tell
bias in coverage unless we go
mechanical
to
count
the
us little about the actual
on to explore its impact. As McQuail
notes: "The stop-watch measure of balance in output only takes one to a
certain point. It reflects the concerns of interested 'senders' rather
than
any
rational
weighing
of
likely
consequences
of
balance
or
imbalance. Unless audience reach (and, if possible, response) is also
taken into account …[the] amount of media attention is limited as an
indicator
of
media
performance."
(McQuail
1992:
226).
If
the
conventional rules are changed, for example if one party receives fa r
more coverage than another, or if all parties (large and small) receive
equal airtime, would this matter?
Directional Balance
Directional balance takes the next step and measures the positive,
3
negative or neutral contents of reporting. In this familiar perspective,
which draws on classical liberalism, news
even-handed
is defined as impartial if
towards the pros and cons of any argument: Democrats
Republicans,
Government
v.
Opposition,
Coverage is regarded as biased if it is
Tweedledum
v.
v.
Tweedledee.
disproportionately critical,
negative or hostile to one side or the other, or alternatively too
hagiographic and propagandistic (see, for example, the Glasgow Media
Group 1976, 1980). Directional accounts emphasize the contents and tone
of news more than the more mechanical length of exposure. This notion
often features in professional codes of conduct and frequently crops up
in
informal
discussions
among
journalists.
Participant
observation
studies of British newsrooms during election campaigns have found that
editors and producers commonly stress the need for equidistant coverage
of the main political parties, as well as even -handedness in commentary,
interviews with party leaders, and reports from the campaign trail
(Blumler and Gurevitch 1995; Semetko 1 996). The typical story in most
British
election
broadcasts
tends
to
present
one
party's
policy
proposals or record, and then a rebuttal from opponents, in a familiar
'on the one hand and on the other' sort of format, rather like watching
the ball at Wimbledon.
countries: a
Similar news values have been found in other
five-nation survey
by Paterson (1998) found that balance,
or 'expressing fairly the position on both sides of a dispute' was one
of
the
commonest
ways
for
journalists
to
understand
objecti vity,
especially in the United States and Britain.
Agenda Balance
Lastly, the notion of agenda balance is based on the idea common
in
theories
of
voting
behaviour
that
parties
often
have
'issue
ownership': hence, rightwing parties are usually regarded as stronger on
issues like defense, crime and inflation, while leftwing parties are
usually seen as stronger on education, welfare and unemployment (Budge
and Farlie 1983). By focussing election coverage disproportionately on
one
set
of
immigration,
issues,
this
such
plays
on
as
proble ms
conventional
of
inner
party
city
poverty
stereotypes
and
or
can
therefore skew the reporting in a partisan direction. Miller et al, for
example, argued that the media focus on international security issues in
the 1987 British election campaign constituted a "massive and consistent
rightwing
bias
in
the
issue
agenda"
government(Miller et al. 1989: 650).
4
which
favored
the
Thatcher
The Context of British Broadcasting
How are these different notions of balance applied in the con text
of broadcasting British election campaigns?
The BBC Producer Guidelines
stress the strict need for political impartiality, written into the BBC
Charter, but are fairly vague about how this is to be achieved in
practice: "There is an absolute obligati on for the BBC's journalism to
remain impartial as the people of the United Kingdom exercise their
right to vote.… Editors should ensure that, through the course of the
campaign,
their
coverage
has
proved
wide -ranging
fair." 2
and
Requirements of 'due impa rtiality' are also written into the Independent
Television Commission's Program Code 3. Like much British electoral law,
the regulations governing broadcasting embodied in Section 93 of the
Representation
parliamentary
Television
of
the
People's
candidates
coverage
of
Act
standing
parties
only
in
is
controls
less
of
constituencies. 4
particular
determined
coverage
by
law
than
by
conventions which have evolved since the creation of the BBC in 1922
(Blackburn 1995: 258-261).
During British election campaigns b roadcasting is dominated by the
concept
of
'stop-watch'
balance,
meaning
proportional
(not
equal)
coverage of political parties. The allocation of free party political
broadcasts is determined by the Committee on Political Broadcasting,
created in 1947, a body whose proceedings are never published and which
has not actually met in person since 1983, but which is composed of
senior representatives from the broadcasters and the parties. Through
negotiations this body agrees the time allocation for regular par ty
political broadcasts (PPBs) outside of elections, and also for party
election broadcasts (PEBs) during the official campaign (for details see
Scammell and Semetko 1995).
As shown in Table 1, during the 1997
general election, in line with many previous
contests, the ratio was
5:5:4, meaning that the Conservatives and Labour were each given five 10
minute PEBs, while the Liberal Democrats were allowed four, and minor
parties
which
mustered
a
minimum
of
Independence Party and the Greens,
fifty
candidates,
like
the
UK
received at least one five -minute
broadcast each, with additional arrangements for Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland (for details see Harrison 1997:149 -154)5.
Most importantly, the agreed ratio of time allocated to each party
also
operates
coverage
of
in
election
parties
in
newsrooms.
election
news
5
During
the
on
public
all
official
and
campaign
commercial
television channels reflects the agreed proportion of time allocated to
parties for election broadcasts. The stop -watch principle does no t apply
to each daily broadcast, but rather to party coverage for each news or
current affairs program during the course of the campaign. Participant
observation studies of newsrooms during campaigns have found that the
'stop-watch' principle is conscienti ously implemented and continually
monitored by news organizations and by parties (Blumler and Gurevitch
1995; Semetko 1996). In 1992 ITN put slightly greater emphasis on news
values driven by editorial judgements rather than the stop -watch rule,
but in practice the overall time ITN allocated to parties differed
little from the 5:5:4 formula which would otherwise have applied (Tait
1995:60).
'Stop-watch' balance is one of the prime ways that British
broadcasters
try
to
be
impartial.
The
1997
campaign
follow ed
this
pattern: the proportion of coverage given to each of the parties in
television news
Table 1).
closely reflected the allocation of time for PEBs (see
Nevertheless other criteria of impartiality are also applied
by producers, for example even -handedness in the relative position of
parties
in
the
running
order
and
equivalence
of
tone
in
reporting
campaign events. Leader is matched against leader, issue against issue,
and press conference against press conference. In this sense the notions
of
directional
and
agenda
balance
are
also
pervasive
in
election
newsrooms.
[Table 1 about here]
The
question
raised
by
the
formal
conventions
of
balance
is
whether 'due impartiality' is achieved in practice. The situation is
carefully monitored by broadcaster s and campaign managers alike, with
vociferous complaints if the party balance is seen as unfair.
The
extent of directional balance in the 1997 election was measured in
content
analysis
favourability of
by
Scammell
stories
and
Semetko
which
analyzed
the
about each party on the main evening news
bulletins on BBC1, ITN and Sky News during the April 1997 election
camapign 6.
perspective
The
tone
of
the
of
that
party
story
on
a
as
a
whole
7 -point
scale
was
coded
ranging
from
from
the
'very
negative' (1) to 'very positive' (7). If we compare the mean scores the
results in Table 2 show that the mean tone proved very similar for all
major
parties,
although
the
Conservatives
received
slightly
less
favourable coverage on all three channels. If we then recode d the data
into three categories to examine the distribution of stories, we can
confirm that over 80 percent of all stories fell into the 'internally
6
balanced' or mixed category. Nevertheless the Conservatives did suffer
from
twice as many negative stories as Labour, while the Libe ral
Democrats had the strongest positive directional bias.
[Table 2 about here]
Nevertheless the effects of balance upon viewers remain largely
unknown. The ITC regularly surveys the public's perceptions of bias in
the media (see, for example, Gunter et al. 1994). When asked after the
1997 campaign how far the major channels provided news programs which
were 'balanced', viewers tended to give high marks to Channel 4, and
about half thought that BBC2 and ITV achieved this 'just about always'
or 'most of the time', compared with one third who thought this of
BBC1's news (Norris 1998). Studies suggest that such perceptions of bias
matter for voting behaviour (Mughan 1992).
But perceptions may or may
not be accurate. Moreover surveys of public opinion can tell us little
about the effects of changing the existing news conventions.
If the
rules were radically altered, for example if third parties like the
Liberal Democrats were given equal airtime, or if there were no rules
governing party balance and the contents o f news programs was determined
purely by news values, would this matter? Despite the importance of the
principle of stop-watch balance for regulating political broadcasting,
we do not know. What we need to do is to systematically vary the
contents of the media message and then monitor the effects.
Research Design, Hypotheses, and Methods
To explore these issues, as one part of a larger multi -method
study (Norris et al. forthcoming), the approach adopted here follows the
classic logic of experiments. During the 1990s experimental methods have
gradually entered the standard repertoire of political research (Iyengar
and
Kinder
1987;
Iyengar
1991;
Ansolabehere
and
Iyengar
1997).
Nevertheless because this approach remains less familiar than survey
analysis we will outline our research design in some detail. In order to
examine the effects of stop -watch, directional and agenda balance on
voters' perceptions, we carried out a series of 15 experiments. To
summarize the process, respondents completed a pre -test questionnaire
and then randomly assigned to separate groups.
Each group was exposed
to a distinctive 30-minute selection of video news and a post -test
questionnaire was then administered to each respondent. The purpose of
the experiments was to establish the extent to which any changes between
7
pre- and post-test responses varied according to the type of video
footage that had been seen.
Fieldwork and the Selection of Respondents
The
experiments
(Regent Street).
were
conducted
in
a
central
London
location
We included 1125 respondents in total, more than most
experimental designs.
Participants were drawn primarily from Greater
London and south-east England.
Respondents were not selected explicitly
as a random sample of the British electorate, but they did g enerally
reflect
the
background
location
Greater
and
party
during
the
including
managers,
London
population
preferences.
day
to
We
provide
office -workers
in
terms
chose
a
a
diverse
and
of
busy
their
social
central
London
group
casual
of
Londoners
shoppers .
The
generalisability of the results rests not on the selection of a random
sample of participants, as in a survey design, but on the way that
subjects were assigned at random to different experimental groups.
Any
difference
the
in
the
response
of
groups
sho uld
therefore
reflect
stimuli they were given rather than their social backgrounds or prior
political attitudes.
One potential problem of experiments is that participants may
alter
their
own
behaviour
given
the
artificiality
of
setting and their perceptions of the aims of the study.
the
research
In order to
counter this, respondents were told that they would be participating in
research to learn how people evaluate and understand television news.
Prior to the experiment, we informed respondents (fal sely) that we were
primarily interested in "selective perception", that is, whether young
people and older people, or men and women, are interested in different
stories in the news.
We did not mention that the news would be about
the election, which might well have discouraged participation by the
politically apathetic, and we found that many participants believed we
were carrying out television market research.
We used a single -shot
rather than a repeated design so that respondents would not become
unduly conditioned by the research process itself.
Participants completed a short (15 -minute) pre-test questionnaire
about their media habits, political interests and opinions and personal
background.
They were then assigned at random to groups of 5 -15 to
watch a 30-minute video compilation of television news.
Respondents
subsequently completed a short (15 -minute) post-test questionnaire.
8
The
experiments were carried out in April 1997 during the middle of the
official general election campaign.
This timing w as deliberate: we
wanted to examine the attitudes of participants who had been subjected
to
the
intensive
barrage
of
political
coverage
that
characterizes
television news during an election period.
The Construction of Video Stimuli
The video compilations o f news stories were chosen to represent a
"typical" evening news program
during the campaign.
We drew on stories
recorded from all the main news program on the terrestrial channels
from mid February until early to April 1997.
same format.
7
The videos all had the
They consisted of a "sandwich", with
footage at the top and bottom of each program
identical, standard
and one of fifteen
different experimental video stimuli in the middle "core" (see the list
in Appendix B).
Respondents were not told which video was being shown
to which group or even that different videos were being watched by
different groups of respondents.
To
test
for
the
effects
of
stop -watch
balance
on
party
preferences, we monitored the reactions of 261 participants who were
divided at random into three treatment groups
shown respectively a 20
minute core of Conservative coverage (CON20), 20 minutes of Labour
coverage (LAB20), and 20 minutes of Liberal Democratic coverage (LIB20).
Most importantly, the stories selected for the comp osite news bulletins
were judged to be 'internally -balanced' or neutral overall.
Each story
usually opened with the proponent's case and then presented a rebuttal
by opponents. A claim that, for example, taxes had been cut under the
Conservatives would be followed by counterclaims by Labour and Liberal
Democrat spokespersons, with equally pro and con comments from vox pop
and
outside
experts.
We
recognize
the
difficulty
of
objectively
determining whether or not the content of a particular video selection
is
genuinely
'internally -balanced'.
Our
decision
rule
as
to
what
constituted positive, negative and neutral news coverage was that an
item had to be coded as such by two independent coders.
confidence, however, that similar codings would have
other researchers.
We have every
been produced by
Full transcriptions of the content of the videos
concerned are available from the authors.
The four directional experiments involved 258 respondents who were
shown consistently positive or negative coverage for the L abour or
Conservative parties as the 10 minute core (see Appendix B), for example
9
one group was shown a series of critical stories about the Conservative
government's record in office, divisions over Europe and internal party
splits. Lastly the seven agend a experiments, with 484 participants,
varied the subject matter of the video core in terms of policy issues,
such
as
whether
description
elsewhere
of
news
the
(Sanders
about
Europe,
directional
and
Norris
and
pensions
agenda
1997;
or
taxation.
experiments
Norris
and
are
Sanders
A
full
provided
1997),
and
monitored
the
further brief details can be found in Appendices A and B.
In
addition
reactions of
to
the
treatment
groups,
we
also
an explicit control group of 110 participants who were
shown a core with the standard 5:5:4 ratio of stop -watch party balance.
This
control group was used for the descriptive means. Our simple
expectation
is
that
subjects
in
this
control
group
did
not
significantly change their preferences for the major parties between the
pre- and the post-test whereas subjects in the stop -watch groups did.
For the multivariate analysis to compare the relative effects of the
stop-watch, directional and agenda balance experiments we recoded all
the 15 groups into dummy variables, comparing the effects of those who
received one treatment against all the other participants, excluding the
control group.
Hypotheses
Based on common assumptions about the effects of
and
building
upon
the
results
of
previous
analysis
news balance,
of
the
dataset
presented elsewhere (Norris and Sanders 1997; Sanders and Norris 1997),
we developed a series of specific testable propositions. The first set
of hypotheses concern the direct effects of television exposure upon
party
preferences,
response,
variables.
without
following
taking
the
account
simple
of
any
logic
of
mediating
direct
or
stimulus-
intervening
The core assumption of the principle of stop -watch balance
is that, ceteris paribus, (H#1) greater exposure to one party will have
a direct positive impact on pr eferences for that party .
The core
assumption makes no distinction between different types of voters or
messages, instead the effects of exposure are regarded as equally likely
across all groups in the electorate. We can examine this hypothesis by
analyzing changes in the reactions of respondents exposed to each of the
different Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat 20 minute video
stimuli compared with the control group.
10
Critics of the stop-watch principle often argue that to expect any
effects simply from greater exposure to one side or another is naïve, at
best, and misunderstands the complex nature of the interaction between
the
news
media
and
viewers
(Harrison
1989:655).
The
principle
of
directional balance presupposes (H#2) that 'positive' television news of
a particular party will tend to create a more favourable preferences for
that
party
while
'negative'
favourable preferences.
coverage
will
tend
to
produce
less
We have demonstrated elsewhere that direction
does matter: positive news was foun d to have a significant impact upon
party
images,
even
controlling
for
a
wide
range
of
potentially
confounding factors, whereas negative news failed to exert a significant
influence (Sanders and Norris 1997). To build upon earlier work, in this
study
we
can
compare
the
relative
influence
of
stop -watch
and
directional effects.
In contrast, the model of agenda balance suggests that focussing
upon
certain
types
of
issues
will
advantage
one
party
or
another,
depending upon the policy areas which are traditional ly regarded as
their greatest strength or home ground. Given the position of British
parties across the ideological spectrum we would therefore hypothesize
(H#3)
that
Conservative
news
programs
party
focussed
support,
whereas
on
taxation
television
will
tend
stories
to
about
boost
social
policy (such as jobs, health and pensions) would probably improve Labour
party preferences. Foreign policy issues are more complex to predict,
but given the type of coverage during the campaign we would anticipate a
priori that stories focussing upon Europe would probably be to the
disadvantage of the Conservatives , given well-publicised splits within
the back-benches over this issue, whereas news about overseas aid for
developing countries would probably slightly benefit La bour. Accordingly
we can compare the effects of each of these issues using the groups in
the seven agenda experiments.
Mediating Variables
These simple hypotheses, however, say nothing about the different
tendencies of various sorts of voters to shift th eir party preferences.
In line with evidence reported by Iyengar and Kinder (1987), we might
well expect that the effect of media exposure on party preferences would
not be uniform across the electorate but would vary in systematic and
predictable
ways
according
to
the
11
prior
political
predispositions,
social characteristics and television habits. Many studies, starting
with Lazarsfeld et al. (1944), have suggested that the groups most
susceptible
to
influence
by
the
media
during
the
campaign
are
the
waverers who have yet to make up their minds how to vote even late in
the
campaign.
Specifically,
we
would
therefore
expect
that
the
politically well-informed, interested and strong partisans would be less
likely to change their pre -test to post-test responses than
the less
informed,
relative
uninterested
and
undecideds.
By
examining
the
influence of exposure to the videos broken down by the respondent's pre test
voting
intentions,
pre -test
interest,
and
level
of
political
voters'
changing
knowledge we can examine these propos itions.
Two
other
perceptions
sets
need
to
be
of
potential
effects
considered.
Given
on
the
information
that
we
obtained from our pre -test and post-test questionnaires, we are also in
a
position
to
apply
controls
both
for
(a)
the
stand ard
set
of
socio-demographic variables (age, gender, education and so on) that are
normally
found
to
exert
significant
effects
on
voters'
political
preferences and (b) respondents' television -watching habits (such as
frequency of watching and trust in TV n ews).
As a result of our
experimental design, however, our hypotheses in both of these contexts
favour the null.
The experimental approach is predicated on the random
assignment of subjects to test and control groups.
(video
exposure)
respondents'
regardless
genuinely
party
of
image),
affects
the
respondents'
the
group
response
effect
If the stimulus
(a
should
socio -demographic
shift
be
in
the
observable
characteristics
or
television-habits because the test and control groups should contain
roughly equal proportions drawn from all groups.
level, we could, of course, simply
television-habit
effects
do
not
At the individual
assume that socio-demographic and
confound
any
bivariate
statistical
relationships that we might observe between video exposure and ch anging
party-images.
possible
We prefer, however, to conduct formal tests for any such
effects.
Specifically,
we
hypothesize
that
the
observed
relationship between video exposure and pre - to post-test changes in
party
preferences
will
not
be
confounded
by
the
application
of
statistical controls for the effects of (a) the standard battery of
socio-demographic
habits.
In
the
variables
or
subsequent
(b)
models
respondents'
we
television -watching
therefore
test
for
the
relationship between media messages an d party preferences controlling
for the mediating effects of the political attitudes, social background
12
and television habits.
Dependent Variable: Party Preferences
We designed the research to achieve conceptual replication of
responses, that is, tests we re repeated with conceptually similar but
empirically different measures of the variables under scrutiny.
We
included nine related, BES -based, measures of party support in both the
pre-test and the post-test.
For each of the three major parties, we
asked respondents to assess, on 0 -10 scales, (a) how likely it was that
they would vote for the party, (b) how much they liked the party, and
(c) how highly they rated the (named) party leader.
For each party, and
for both the pre-test and the post-test measures, the three scales were
averaged to produce a single party support index where a 0 score meant a
respondent had a very poor image of the party and 30 meant a very good
image. Tests proved that these items were strongly inter -correlated and
formed reliable scales (the Cronbach Alpha was, respectively, .90 for
the Conservative index, .89 for the Labour index, and .82 for the
Liberal Democrat index). Accordingly composite party preference indexes
were used summing scores on the three separate items.
Calcula ting each
respondent's "change in party support" score was simply a matter of
subtracting the pre-test score from the post -test score: a positive
(negative)
change
favourable
view
indicated
of
the
that
party
manipulation than before it.
a
in
respondent
question
had
after
a
the
more
(less)
experimental
We assume that our composite support
scores, precisely because they are based on three different response
items, more accurately measure each respondent's party preference than
any single party-response item considered in isolation.
Analysis of Results
First in Table 3 we
can compare the mean response on the pre -test
and post-test average scores on party preferences and
change over time.
the average
The overall pattern shows that respondents greatly
preferred the Labour party across all three indicators, but the party
enjoyed a particular advantage on the probability to vote score. This
increased our confidence in the results, since this pattern was broadly
in line with the substantial Labour victory on poll ing day two weeks
later. In terms of the change over time from the pre - to the post-test
scores, there was very modest change across all parties. Given the
limitations of the research design, with only a single stimulae in a 30
13
minute compilation of news, we would expect only very modest short -term
effects to be evident. Indeed, if we found any strong results from such
a small stimuli we would become slightly concerned about preconditioning
participants in our methodology. The lack of overall variance, comb ined
with
the
limited
numbers
within
each
video
group,
reinforces
the
importance of any findings which do prove statistically significant.
Overall the Liberal Democrats most consistently improved their support
while Labour tended to do less well, with the
exception of a slight
boost in the proportion liking Tony Blair. Exposure to television news
also produced a slight increase in the propensity to vote, as found in
other studies of the influence of television news (Norris 1997).
[Table 3 about here]
Table 4 goes on to test one of our primary hypotheses by analyzing
the mean size and direction of changes in party preferences caused by
exposure
to the stop -watch video stimuli compared with the control
group shown a 'balanced' (5:5:4) news broadcast. The res ults show a
mixed pattern. Those who watched the Conservative news bulletin (CON20)
experienced a small but significant increase in Conservative support, as
predicted by Hypothesis 1, however there was also a significant and
stronger increase in Liberal De mocrat support among these participants.
Viewers who watched the Labour video (LAB20) also modestly increased
their support for Labour and the Liberal Democrats, although these
changes
did
not
achieve
statistical
significance.
Exposure
to
the
Liberal Democrat bulletin (LIB20) also proved to have no significant
effects.
[Table 4 about here]
To test our primary hypotheses about the effect of watching each
of the video stimulae, with the range of control variables described
earlier, we can turn to the OLS mult iple regression models in Table 5.
The results of the analysis shows that directional balance proved the
most
significant
effect,
supporting
Hypothesis
positive news bulletins (where the 30 minute video
2.
Specifically
the
showed a 10 minute
core of positive stories about each party) produced a significant impact
in the expected direction for both the Conservative and Labour parties,
even
after
including
the
full
battery
of
control
variables.
confirms and reinforces our previous conclusions about the
positive news on
This
effects of
preferences for the major parties (Sanders and Norris
1997). In contrast negative news had no significant effect on levels of
party support.
14
[Table 5 about here]
The effects of watching the stop -watch party balance videos prov ed
slightly
more
complex
to
interpret.
The
simple
hypothesis
we
are
testing here is that greater exposure to a party in the news will
strengthen preferences for that party. The effects of watching the 20
minute series of stories about the Labour party was
since
this
had
no
impact
on
Labour
party
straightforward
preferences.
Viewing
the
Conservative party bulletin (where the 30 minute video showed 20 minutes
of
neutral
or
'internally
balanced'
footage
about
the
Conservative
party) also produced no significa nt improvement in Conservative party
preferences, after controlling for other factors. Indeed, contrary to
the
hypothesis
we
were
testing,
watching
the
Conservative
video
unexpectedly served to boost Liberal Democratic preferences. In contrast
to
our
hypothesis,
bulletin
was
viewing
associated
the
a
20
minute
slight
Liberal
fall
in
Democratic
Liberal
news
Democrat
support(although only significant at the .08 level), not an increase.
These results give no support for the core hypothesis about stop -watch
balance and the modest effects we did find remain a puzzle. It may be
that
although
we
evaluated
the
selected
stories
for
each
party
as
'internally-balanced' or neutral, others perceived them as negative. We
did
not
control
the
creation
of
these
news
stories ,
only
their
selection, since we were editing typical stories from the campaign.
Perhaps our selection of the Conservative and Liberal Democrat stories
provided some unintentional directional cues against these parties.
Lastly the assumptions of agenda ba lance, as suggested by Miller
et al. (1989), also find no support in these tests. Showing respondents
a 30 minute bulletin which includes a 10 minute core of stories about
one of six
different issues produced no significant boost for any
party. On these grounds we have to discount Hypothesis 3.
Conclusions and Implications:
The BBC Producer's Guidelines stress: " Due impartiality lies at
the heart of the BBC. It is a core value and no area of programming is
exempt from it. It requires programme makers to
fairness and a respect for truth. "
are
written
into
the
BBC
8
Charter
show open-mindedness,
Requirements of due impartiality
and
the
Independent
Television
9
Commission's Programme Code . The principle of balance is the standard
most commonly used by journal ists, broadcasting regulators and scholars
15
to judge the impartiality of news. The question explored by this study
is how far stop-watch balance, directional balance and agenda balance
actually exerted any influence on experimental subjects during the 1997
British election campaign.
The assumptions of stop -watch balance are that there needs to be
proportional treatment of the major parties in the news because greater
coverage of one of the major parties would automatically give them an
electoral advantage. The principle assumes that media exposure, ceteris
paribus, will lead to persuasion. But the results of this analysis
strongly suggests
pervasive
in
that the principle of stop -watch balance, which is so
regulating
coverage
of
election
news
in
British
broadcasting, is not supported by this evidence. The results suggest
that the short-term effects of the amount of coverage of each party in
the news, measured by the stop -watch principle,
does not provide an
automatic boost in that party's support, or a consi stent decrease in
support for other parties. On this basis we find little evidence for
Hypothesis 1.
The assumptions of directional balance are that what
matters is less the amount than the positive or negative contents of
television news. In this view im partiality is achieved by an evenhanded
approach to criticism and praise of each party. Our evidence, confirming
Hypothesis
2,
suggests
that
directional
balance
is
important,
in
particular that positive news has the capacity to provide a short -term
and modest boost to that party's
for
Hypothesis
newsrooms:
the
3
about
policy
the
topic
fortunes.
need
of
to
Lastly we found no support
maintain
stories
which
agenda
we
balance
examined
had
in
no
differential effect upon levels of party preferences. A newsroo m which
focussed heavily on coverage of
health and jobs, for example, would not
thereby be improving Labour support any more than one which carried many
stories about tax would necessarily help the Conservatives. In a nut shell, we conclude that what matt ers is how parties are covered in
television news, in particularly positive stories, rather than how much
coverage they receive or on what topics.
These results may have important implications for public policy
and the conventions which dominate British broadcasting during election
campaigns.
If
we
can
generalize
from
the
results
of
short -term
experiments to the cumulative experience of the real world, and this is
a real 'if', then it follows that all the paraphernalia of stop -watch
balance which is so c arefully monitored by the party managers and by
16
news executives and producers may, at best, be irrelevant, and, as
worst, may obscure
any real biases in British television journalism. A
more laissez-faire attitude to time balance, so that stories are driv en
by news values more than by the need to give proportional coverage to
each party, irrespective of what they are actually doing during the
campaign, might produce more stimulating and effective coverage. But
since it is relatively easy and mechanical to measure the time allocated
to different parties, while it is highly problematic and controversial
to
measure
directional
bias,
we
can
probably
expect
that
even
if
irrelevant, the principle of stop -watch balance will continue to be
observed in British broad casting. If nothing else, it provides a modest
fig-leaf of impartiality to clothe naked and unprotected journalists hit
by the chill winds of charges of party bias.
17
Appendix A:
Video News Compilations Used in the Party Balance Experiments
All
video
compilations
had
th e
same
beginning
and
end
segments
consisting of:
Beginning
1.
Report
on
the
Commentary by Robin Oakley.
opening
day
of
the
official
campaign.
Statements by Major, Blair and Ashdown.
Discussion by Oakley of the four main issues of the campaign: the
economy, Europe, constitutional reform and leadership. [5 minutes].
2.
Continuation of news on the opening day of the campaign.
Description of Major's, Blair's and Ashdown's activities during the day.
Description of the timetable for the election and the ti ming of the next
Queen's Speech.
"feelgood
factor"
Discussion by John Pinnaar on the failure of the
to
re -kindle
Conservative
fortunes
thus
far.
[5
minutes].
End
1.
Description of a runaway horse incident at a racecourse. [2
minutes].
2.
Discussion of motorway traffic congestion.
[1.5 minutes].
3.
Incident of two bombs left beneath flyover on the M6.
[1.5
minutes].
4.
Discussion of the introduction of self -assessment tax forms.
[1.5 minutes].
5.
Discussion of freemasonry in public life.
[1.5 minut es].
6.
Results of the Oscar award ceremony in US.
[2 minutes].
18
Appendix B
Timing of 30 minute Video Experimental Stimuli
Experiment
STOPWATCH BALANCE
Start
Core
End
Control
10 neutral
Conservative Balance
5 neutral
Labour balance
5 neutral
Liberal Democrat
5 neutral
4 Con: 4 Lab: 3
LibDem
20 minute Con
neutral
20 minute Lab
neutral
20 minute LibDem
neutral
10 minute
neutral
5 minute
neutral
5 minute
neutral
5 minute
neutral
DIRECTIONAL BALANCE
Con Positive
Con Negative
Lab Positive
Lab Negative
AGENDA BALANCE
Tax
Jobs
Health
Pensions
Europe
Overseas Aid
Issue Control
10
10
10
10
neutral
neutral
neutral
neutral
10
10
10
10
Con
Con
Lab
Lab
positive
negative
positive
negative
10
10
10
10
neutral
neutral
neutral
neutral
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
neutral
neutral
neutral
neutral
neutral
neutral
neutral
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
tax neutral
jobs neutral
health neutral
pensions neutral
Europe neutral
overseas aid
mixed issues
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
neutral
neutral
neutral
neutral
neutral
neutral
neutral
19
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20
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Parties Yearbook, 1996 , pp.128-142.
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It Was the Media, Stupid:
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21
News
Reporting'.
Communications
Table 1: Ratio of Election Broadcasts and Proportion of
Election News,
Major Parties 1964-1997
Party Election
Proportion of BBC TV
Proportion of ITV
Broadcasts
Election News
Election News
Con
Lab
LDem
Con
Lab
LDem
Con
Lab
LDem
1964
5
5
3
42
41
17
41
39
20
1966
5
5
3
39
42
16
43
40
16
1970
5
5
3
46
42
10
45
43
11
1974F
5
5
3
39
40
18
37
36
22
1974O
5
5
4
35
35
26
37
37
21
1979
5
5
3
35
35
22
37
37
21
1983
5
5
4
34
36
26
34
37
27
1987
5
5
5
35
31
25
38
31
26
1992
5
5
4
32
32
31
31
34
32
1997
5
5
4
35
31
24
35
30
28
Sources: Information about PEBs from Margaret Scammell and Holli Semetko
1995 'Political Advertising on Television'
and
Christina
Holtz-Bacha
(eds.)
Table 3.1. In Lynda Lee Kaid
Political
Advertising
in
Western
Democracies (Thousand Oaks, Sage). The proportion of election news per
party from successive volumes of T he British General Election of.. by
David Butler et al.
22
Table 2: Directional Balance of Television News, 1997 Campaign
Conservative
Labour Party
Party
Liberal
Democratic
Party
Negative
12.2
6.3
0.9
Mixed
82.5
84.9
92.0
5.4
8.8
7.1
Negative Minus Positive
-6.8
+2.5
+6.2
Mean Directional Score
3.92
4.04
4.08
N. of Stories
1267
1276
1269
Positive
Note: Coding of political stories on BBC1 9 O'Clock News, ITN News at
10, and Sky News evening bulletin. The Directional Score is calculated
on a 7-point scale from 1 (Neg ative) to 7 (Positive).
Source: Seketko, Scammell and Goddard 1997 British General Election
Campaign Content Analysis.
23
Table 3: Average Rating of Party Preference Variables
Pre-
Post-
Mean
N. for
test
test
Change
mean
change
Probability of voting Conserv ative
2.82
3.01
0.21
945
Liking of Conservatives
3.19
3.32
0.14
1082
Liking of John Major
3.86
3.84
-0.02
1084
Conservative party preference index
9.98
10.31
+0.34
916
Probability of voting Labour
5.67
5.50
-0.09
1003
Liking of Labour
5.30
5.29
-0.03
1085
Liking of Tony Blair
4.94
5.08
+0.13
1089
Labour party preference index
16.2
16.0
-0.02
936
Probability of Voting Liberal Democrat
3.25
3.43
+0.20
889
Liking of Liberal Democrats
4.46
4.64
+0.13
1053
Liking of Paddy Ashdown
4.69
4.76
+0.04
1068
Liberal Democrat party preference
12.4
12.9
+0.31
859
7.24
7.41
+0.19
1113
index
Probability of Voting
Note: All measured on a 10 -point scale except for the index which is
summed to
a 30 point scale. The index score is the summed aver age of
the other three scores in each party grouping. It is only measured for
those respondents who answered all six component questions.
Source: Television News Experiments, April 19 97.
24
Table 4:
Mean Changes in Party Preferences by Stop-Watch Balance Video
Stimuli
Change in
Conservative
preferences
Mean
P.
N.
Change in
Labour
preferences
Mean
P.
N.
Change in
Liberal Democrat
preferences
Mean
P.
N.
92
-.26
98
+.22
70
+.14
78
+1.29
.01
76
+.50
76
+.51
71
+.36
56
-.84
61
-.34
50
Control video
-.28
Cons. video
+.69
Labour video
LibDem video
*
*
90
*
65
Note: The significance of the mean difference between the control group
and the exposed group is measured through ANOVA. P. *=05. **=.01.
Source: Television News Experiments, April 19 97.
25
Table 5:
Changes in the Party Preference by Video Balance Experiments
Video Group
Change in
Change in
Labour
preferences
Conservative
Change in
Liberal
Democrat
preferences
Preferences
B
Constant
STOPWATCH BALANCE
CON20
LAB20
LIBDEM20
DIRECTIONAL BALANCE
Con Positive
Con Negative
Lab Positive
Lab Negative
AGENDA BALANCE
Tax Issue
Jobs Issue
Health Issue
Pensions
Europe
Overseas Aid
CONTROL VARIABLES
Gender
Graduate
Age
Ethnicity
TV Trust
TV Use
Political Knowledge
Political Interest
Own vote
Undecided vote
R2
N.
S.e. of estimate
Sig
-2.0
**
.02
.01
.02
.05
-.03
.06
.04
.09
-.02
-.01
-.01
.06
.04
.10
.05
.04
.04
916
2.64
Sig
-.59
.06
-.02
.02
.11
.03
.06
.04
B
**
**
.12
.64
.68
.04
.04
-.08
.01
.35
.09
.31
-.04
.06
.11
.03
.62
.86
.67
.21
.49
.12
.26
.01
.61
.69
.87
.09
.30
.01
.20
.32
Sig
.57
.29
.33
.02
.09
.01
-.07
.26
.13
.01
.50
-.01
.02
.01
.02
.91
.69
.80
.54
.02
.01
.04
-.01
-.03
.04
.58
.88
.30
.93
.43
.36
.01
-.03
-.01
-.01
-.06
-.01
.80
.49
.65
.84
.14
.69
.01
-.01
.04
.03
-.01
-.06
-.01
.05
.01
.05
.04
969
3.18
.83
.75
.24
.27
.71
.07
.89
.20
.85
.22
.01
.01
-.01
.01
.08
-.03
-.08
-.02
-.09
-.01
.03
859
3.36
.70
.85
.76
.98
.02
.42
.07
.68
.02
.75
*
**
Note: OLS regression models. P. *=05. **=.01.
Source: Television News Experiments, April 1 997.
26
B
*
*
**
.02
.88
.08
1
See, for example, the chapter on broadcasting in
D.E. Butler and
Anthony King The British General Election of 1964 (1965, London:
Macmillan) and successive editions.
2
See the BBC Producer Guidelines 1996 Chapter 19 (5.1).
http://www.bbc.co.uk/info/editorial/prodgl
3
See ITC Programme Code: http://www.itc.org.uk/regulating .
4
Section 93 of the Representation of the People's
Act is designed to
ensure strict impartiality by requiring the prior consent of every
candidate in a seat to any broadcast about the constituency during the
campaign.
candidates
But it only regulates coverage in of part icular parliamentary
running
in
particular
constituencies,
not
the
national
campaign.
5
It should be noted that the parties determine the editorial contents
of the programs although as the publisher the broadcasters must ensure
that the programs follow the law on libel and contempt, and also follow
accepted standards of taste and decency. The precise timing of election
broadcasts is also within the hands of the television companies.
6
We would like to thank Holli Semetko and Maggie Scammell for access to
this data, which will be forthcoming in Pippa Norris et al.
Communicating the Campaign (Sage, forthcoming)
7
The programs sampled were Nine O'Clock News (BBC1), News at Ten (ITN),
Channel Four News and Newsnight (BBC2).
8
See the BBC Producer Gu idelines 1996
http://www.bbc.co.uk/info/editorial/prodgl .
9
See the ITC Programme Code http://www.itc.org.uk/regulating .
27