CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH IN INDIA (ISSN 2231-2137): VOL. 5: ISSUE: 2
INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY-IDEALISM TO REALISM
(REALPOLITIK)
Dr. Tanushree Srivastava, Ph.D. (University of Lucknow, Lucknow),
L.L.B (University of Mumbai, Mumbai)
Abstract: The paper endeavors to selectively present some of the new stances and challenges that India’s foreign policy is likely to
face in the next few decades. Section one examines the transformations that altered the content and trajectory of India’s foreign
policy since independence. Section Two deals with the transformation of foreign policy from idealism to realism. The third section
discusses the possibility of a paradigm shift from hard to soft power and discusses the viability of it as an option for the
practitioners of foreign policy in India. Section Four assesses Re-invented foreign policy along with compilation of Prime Minister
Modi’s diplomatic calendar. The last section ‘Moving Ahead” discusses some of significant recommendations
Key words: India, foreign policy, China, USA, Asia, Canada, Russia, USA, Mongolia, Seychelles, Mauritius, South
Korea, Japan.
Introduction:
‘Emerging India’ is the most popular
leitmotif informing a wide array of discourses among
academics, policy-makers and the intelligent lay
public. Most of these accounts of India’s newfound
glory in the comity of nations allude to the attendant
re-orientation of India’s foreign policy in the postliberalization era. The decade of the 1990s is seen as
a watershed which not only ushered India into
economic reforms but also brought about marked
shifts in its foreign policy. India was no longer a
prisoner to the historical legacy of non-alignment,
socialism, and ‘third world solidarity’. In a way, the
need for departing from its traditional core values in
the domain of foreign policy was as much an
outcome of pulls and pressures of the newly
emerging global realities as of changes in the internal
political dynamic. While negotiating numerous
challenges since then, India’s foreign policy has to
contend with the rising aspirations that epithets like
‘emerging power’, ‘rising power’, ‘great power’
necessarily give rise to. As a matter of fact, there are
diverse ways of understanding the changes in
orientations of India’s foreign policy. Scholars have
perceived these changes in different ways. For
instance, while discussing the ambiguities of its past,
Subrata K. Mitra, comments: “The Gandhian legacy,
nostalgia for the halcyon days of Nehru’s
panchasheela and, most of all, the political anchor of
foreign policy in the larger project of nation-building,
explain the ambiguities that characterize India's
foreign policy (....) closer inspection of ground reality
reveals clear, effective and determined action that
holds the potential to be woven into a coherent
doctrine, on the lines of a ‘third way’ in international
politics”.(1)
Moreover, the existential realities of the
region – its location in an insecure South Asian
region, being surrounded on all sides by unstable
democracies, conflict-ridden countries, militant
activity, authoritarian leaders or weak governments
persuaded India to move forward to imbibe historic
changes in its foreign policy. India’s Look East
policy, efforts at cooperation with specific individual
and regional partners, pro-activeness at the various
international foray, among others pressurized India
to reinvent its foreign policy. In a nutshell, failures
within the region alongside domestic and
international compulsions led to the re-examination
of India’s policy in international affairs. Reacting to
India’s recent ‘proactive’ foreign policy behavior, C.
Raja Mohan writes, “after more than a half century
of false starts and unrealized potential, India is now
emerging as the swing state in the global balance of
165
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH IN INDIA (ISSN 2231-2137): VOL. 5: ISSUE: 2
power.(2)
Traditionally India’s foreign policy has been
explained as India’s grand strategy that divides the
world into three concentric circles. The first, which
encompasses the immediate neighbor hood – where
India has sought to consolidate its position and has
attempted, though in a limited manner – to keep the
‘outside powers’ from direct influence or interference
within region. The second encompasses the so-called
extended neighbor hood stretching across Asia and
the Indian Ocean littoral, India has sought to balance
the influence of other powers and attempted to
prevent them from undercutting its own national
interests. The third, which includes the entire globe,
India has endeavored to make its place as one of the
great powers – a key player in international peace and
security. It is in each of these concentric circles that a
transformation is seen in terms of policy postures.(3)
Idealism Versus Realpolitik: A Historical
Overview:
In 1947 India’s foreign policy makers had to
deal with a host of challenges: the partition of the
country, creation of Pakistan, extreme poverty,
military weakness, underdevelopment, backwardness
in the core sectors of Indian industries, simmering
religious and regional tensions.(4) However, a deep
belief in Third World solidarity and cooperation
encouraged independent India to establish relations
with all of its neighbours and the other newly
independent countries of the developing world.
Nehru and others believed that the countries of the
Third World had a common destiny because of a
common past. This belief motivated the Nehruvian
policy which rapidly developed and India established
diplomatic relations with almost all the countries
around the world. Nehru’s and India’s deep rooted
belief in Panchsheela guided India’s foreign policy in
the early years of India’s independence. Amitabh
Matto and Happymon Jacob in their book, Shaping
India’s Foreign Policy: People, Politics and Places,
state that “post-independence [relations with the
world] grew rapidly and in somewhat exuberant
manner”.(5) In fact, accordingly the success of
independence movement was reflected in the
buoyancy of Nehru’s interactions and India sought
cooperation and friendship with the newly
decolonized and independent countries of Asia and
Africa.
Nehru virtually single-handedly defined the
main contours of India’s foreign policy in the first
decades of independence. Nehru’s ideas had a lasting
impact on the country’s foreign policy – the grand
strategy rested on two pillars – self-reliance and nonalignment. In a real sense, non-alignment was far
from neutrality – India was active in the movement
for disarmament, in decolonization, in the campaign
for more equitable international economic
development, the UN peace-keeping forces, etc.(6)
India’s post-independence foreign policy was viewed
as a severe critic against colonialism and racism,
undemocratic and unequal distribution of
international power. India had also argued that
nuclear weapons and excessive military spending
were the prime source of global insecurities – all
themes that curried favour with the newly emerging
independent states of Asia and Africa.However,
India’s shocking military defeat during Sino-India
War of 1962 hauled Indian policymakers out of their
Nehruvian “idealism”.(7) The absence of realpolitik
in the policymaking as well as the limits of
Nehruvian idealism was apparent. However, the
Nehruvian legacy survived in many other ways
despite the injection of power politics into Indian
policymaking.(8)
The visible change in India’s foreign policy
was apparent from the early 1970s with Indira
Gandhi coming to power. Dramatic changes like the
first nu-clear tests in Pokhran in 1974, India’s role in
East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh, close
and friendly relations with the Soviet Union were the
high-lights of this period’s foreign policy. The 1974
nuclear test ushered in a new phase in India’s foreign
policy. The test was the first step towards beginning
of a realist phase in Indian foreign policy and
justifying the raison d'être. IttyAbraham wrote, “the
rationale [that] reiterated India’s size, regional
importance and new found military clout while
sidelining the post-colonial considerations of earlier
166
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH IN INDIA (ISSN 2231-2137): VOL. 5: ISSUE: 2
times”.(9) The initiation of the period of
liberalization from the early 1990s not only
commenced a new period in India’s political and
economic growth and development, but the foreign
policy
sector
too
witnessed
extensive
transformations. By the mid 1980s realpolitik became
the defining feature of India’s foreign policy. The
second round of nuclear tests in Pokhran in May
1998, in fact, could be the beginning of this
pragmatism and proactive materialization of India’s
foreign policy. Matto and Jacob state that the 1998
tests were, “defying traditional assumptions,
analytical predictions, and international opinion…
conducted a series of nuclear bomb tests… a new
phase of Realism in India’s foreign policy”(10). Thus
in an attempt to retain its autonomy in key areas of
decision making and to continue its increased
interface with the world, India persevered to avoid
capitulating to international pressure and has been
dealing dexterously with the pressures of
globalization.(11)
The Road Ahead: India’s Soft Power?
Much of current foreign policy literature
makes reference to the need to harness India’s
potential as a soft power in the global arena. The idea
of soft power is a concept developed by Joseph Nye
where power is described as the ability to alter the
behavior of others to achieve the set goals. Nye has
described power in three ways: coercion (sticks),
inducements (carrots), attraction (soft power).(12)
Most contemporary scholars on foreign policy agree
that hard power is no longer the only viable
instrument for achieving the national interests of
states today. They put forward the concept of soft
power to be a very powerful instrument in
influencing other states or people. Itty Abraham
writes, “The apparent choice facing India today is
covered in terms of greater or lesser autonomy from
existing power structures (....) India’s foreign policy
has not changed much. It continues to remain,
primarily India’s search for security and stability in
South Asia and quest for influence in international
politics – beyond the immediate neighborhood –
through growing ‘hand’ and ‘soft’ power that forms
the main-stay of New Delhi’s foreign policy”.(13)
Other scholars like Shashi Tharoor have
stated, “If there is one independent India to which
increasing attention should now be paid around the
globe, its not economic or military or nuclear
strength, but the quality that India is already
displaying in ample measure today and that is its ‘soft
power’”.(14) Tharoor writes, the mantra should no
longer be non-alignment but what he calls “MultiAlignment,” which constitutes an effective strategy
to new transnational challenges of the 21st century
where neither autonomy nor alliance offer adequate
answers.(15)
India’s Foreign Policy Re-Invented:
The style and substance of Narendra Modi’s
foreign policies have been very different from those
of his predecessors. The contrast is most apparent in
the energy and attention that has been invested in
international relations, rather than in the direction.
After all, while core national interests—such as
border security and development—endure, the
manner of pursuing them can indeed change. Modi’s
articulation of his vision of the country has included
new elements like the “Make in India” campaign; he
has also brought a greater speed and intensity to the
pursuit of foreign policy objectives such as attracting
foreign direct investment to promote manufacturing
in India. In pursuing the goal of industrialization,
Modi has shed some of the ideological elements of
“third-worldism” and non-alignment, which were the
signature of the previous government.(16)
Modi has not tried to craft a new foreign
policy, but has infused a level of energy and
confidence in his outreach which is a new
development… the number of foreign visits have
taken foreign policy to a new level, Modi has visited
countries like Canada, Nepal or Sri Lanka, where no
Indian prime minister had been for decades. His
government’s decisive foreign engagements have
already changed international perceptions. The
agreement signed with Bangladesh to conclude the
Land Boundary Agreement is very significant
because, along with improved relations with Nepal
and Sri Lanka, it is changing India’s positioning in its
167
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH IN INDIA (ISSN 2231-2137): VOL. 5: ISSUE: 2
own neighbourhood, even if Pakistan remains
hostile.His visits to the U.S., Canada, Japan,
Australia, these were in search of making an
expansion of nuclear energy possible…getting the
technology and also seeking Uranium supplies.(17)
By inviting all the SAARC heads to his
swearing-in ceremony, Modi signaled his intent to
focus on the neighbourhood.The Modi-Sharif
bonhomie at the swearing-in ceremony raised hopes
that the quality of interaction between the two
neighbours would change. But Pakistan is imploding,
so India should direct its energies at strengthening
ties with the other SAARC countries.
Modi’s
decision
to
make Nepal and Bhutan his first foreign policy stops
must be followed up as both countries have massive
hydropower potential. India should push through the
Teesta water-sharing accord and the Land Boundary
Agreement, as well as undo the damage caused by
communal
rhetoric on
illegal immigrants
from Bangladesh. The Sri Lanka government has
made positive overtures by releasing Indian
fishermen and sharing intelligence on LeT
operatives. However, India must reiterate that
the Thirteenth Amendment to the Sri Lankan
constitution is the basis for ending the discrimination
faced by Sri Lankan Tamils.(18)
Russia
In Delhi, President Vladimir Putin and Modi
signed three key energy agreements, with nuclear coopearation at the centre. This re-established Russia as
a trusted friend and partner for India in defence
supplies and nuclear technology. Ten more nuclear
power reactors will now be built in India with
Russian assistance over the next 20 years.
USA
Modi made his maiden visit to the U.S. in
September 2014, where he successfully repaired a
bilateral that been suffering neglect and discord
over intellectual property rights, trade disputes,
diplomatic butts and business disengagement. Modi
brought his domestic economic agenda to the fore—
infrastructure development sanitation and smart
cities—and into the joint vision statement, published
as an unprecedented joint Op-Ed in The Washington
Post.
Demonstrating
an
understanding
of
American and Indian strengths, Modi and U.S.
President Barack Obama made virtual not physical
infrastructure -building and services the operating
principle of the bilateral. The renewal of the 2005
Framework for the U.S.-India Defence Relationship
for a further 10 years reflects this new technology
driven narrative.In a dramatic meeting in New York,
Modi urged the Indian Diaspora to invest in India
and demonstrate success—much in the way the
government of Deng Xiaoping lured overseas
Chinese investment into the country in
1978.However there was little concrete progress on a
number of crucial issues such as clean energy (export
of American LNG) and climate change on which
there were no concrete agreements. There was also
no change on the visa issue which is of great
importance to Indian IT companies.
Later President Obama’s visit as the chief
guest for India’s Republic Day celebration was laden
with symbolism but also delivered tangible results.By
signing the Joint Strategic Vision for Asia Pacific and
Indian Ocean, India acknowledged a shared interest
in acting as a counterweight to China in the U.S.’s
policy of rebalancing Asia. The visit put the bilateral
relationship on a higher trajectory and towards
qualitatively closer cooperation in Asia.
The renewal of the 10-year ‘2015 Framework
for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship’ is significant
as it
will activate technology
transfer,
codevelopment,
and
co-production.
The operationalisation of the India-U.S. nuclear
agreement was announced the technical details and
legal safeguards of the political understanding are still
unclear.(19)
China
The September (2014) month saw Chinese
President Xi Jinping travel to India as well. The
outcome was one of historic proportions in the
economic arena. China promised to invest $20 billion
in India over the next five years. Around 30 MoUs
were signed across a spectrum of sectors including
168
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH IN INDIA (ISSN 2231-2137): VOL. 5: ISSUE: 2
industrial parks and railway modernization, and
several agreements were signed between Indian and
Chinese
private
entities
as
well
as
banks.Fundamental differences on the border were
starkly highlighted by the face-offs between troops at
Chumar and a “civilian confrontation” at Demchok
in Ladakh while Xi was in India. Strangely, Xi
himself chairs the Central Military Commission and
has to approve any military action.
During the May 2015 India and
China signed 24 agreements during the visit,
highlighting the eagerness of Chinese financial
institutions to invest in India. The two countries also
signed deals worth 22 $billion, mainly on
infrastructure
investment
and
renewable
energy.Modi’s interaction with Chinese internet and
telecom companies such as Alibaba, Huawei and
Xiaomi are indicative of the role e-commerce is likely
to play in the bilateral and the growing global
presence of Chinese services companies, a space
traditionally mastered by India. Important geoeconomic issues such as collaboration in AIIB, One
Bel One Road (OBOR) and APEC received
surprisingly little attention during the visit. Instead,
the Chinese fervently pursued the Bangladesh-ChinaIndia-Myanmar corridor, likely due to their
inclination to include it in OBOR in the near
future.(20)
Mongolia
Modi’s visit to Mongolia was the first by an
Indian prime minister. Situated between China and
Russia, Mongolia is strategically important. The two
countries signed 13 agreements, with India agreeing
to extend a $1 billion credit line to Mongolia for
development
of
infrastructure
and
dairy
cooperatives.Mongolia, which has significant reserves
of uranium, can potentially be a stable supplier of
nuclear fuel for India. (21)However, Mongolia has
not started mining uranium yet – it could be a few
years until it is possible for the country to be a
supplier.
South Korea
India and South Korea signed 7 agreements
during Modi’s visit, mainly on security and
infrastructure development. South Korea agreed to
invest $10 billion to develop power generation
capacities, railways and smart cities in India.Modi
invited investments in ship building, including LNG
tankers which India needs in order to scale-up
imports of natural gas.(22) However, South Korean
firms will need to share their shipbuilding knowhow, which they have been reluctant to do in the
past.
Japan
Modi’s friendship with Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe was evident in Tokyo visit of August
2014. Optics apart, Modi had a job to do: secure
investment from Japan. This came in the promise of
$35 billion in manufacturing and infrastructure over
the next five years. India will have to implement deep
regulatory reforms to draw the maximum
benefits from Japan’s assurance of public and private
investment.Some hopes on the defence and strategic
side remain are still incomplete, like the bilateral
Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of
Nuclear Energy, which were not completed during
Modi’s visit.(23)
Indian Ocean countries: Sri Lanka, Mauritius
and Seychelles
Modi’s visit to Sri Lanka in march 2015,
highlighted the importance of the bilateral
relationship and India’s enhanced focus on its
maritime strategy, especially given the island nations’
strategic location. While the two countries signed
numerous
agreements
in
February,
the
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement is
yet to be concluded.(24) In Mauritius and Seychelles,
Modi signed bilateral agreements whereby India will
develop sea and air transportation facilities in both
countries. These facilities could become a major
strategic asset for India in any future naval
confrontation.(25)
France
Two major deals were signed during Prime
Minister Modi’s visit in april 2015 to France – the
purchase of Rafale jets and the set-up of six units
of Areva’s
Evolutionary
Pressurized
Water
Reactors (EPR) in India. The decision to purchase 36
169
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH IN INDIA (ISSN 2231-2137): VOL. 5: ISSUE: 2
Rafale jets from France will strengthen the Indian
Air Force’s squadron. Aspects of the strategic
relationship such as counter-terrorism and exchanges
within the armed forces will also be further bolstered
by the deal.(26)
Germany
Make in India was the theme for Modi’s visit
to Germany, where over 300 Indian companies
participated in the Hannover Messe. Among the
world’s largest industrial technology trade fairs, at
this high-visibility event Modi demonstrated
energetic salesmanship, pitching India as an attractive
investment destination.
Canada
Modi’s visit to Canada in April 2015 was the
first standalone bilateral visit to the country by an
Indian prime minister in over 40 years. The key focus
of the visit was nuclear energy – the two countries
announced a $350 million deal for Canada’s Cameco
Corp. to supply 3,220 metric tones of power to
India’s reactors over the next 5 years. The deal with
Canada is part of a larger approach that includes a
deal with Australia, to secure stable supplies of
nuclear fuel for India.(27)
Moving Ahead
• Finding a fine balance between China, Japan
and the U.S
India must remain balanced in the global
rivalry between China and the U.S., as what happens
in Asia affects us most. At a regional level, India
should
hedge
Chinese
expansion
by
cementing ties with Vietnam, Japan and Australia.
• A full-time defence minister needed
Continuing to leave Arun Jaitley with two
important portfolios is baffling in a rapidly changing
strategic scenario. Finance and defence are critical
portfolios and both need a full-time minister.
• Reorganize defense forces
The most immediate threat to our borders
comes from China and Pakistan that collude on
strategic and nuclear matters. With the rise of the
Islamic State taking the focus back to the Arab
world, Pakistan is no longer under as much scrutiny
and will increase the use of non-state actors to hurt
India. India’s police and intelligence agencies need to
be reorganized and upgraded as are the defence
forces heavy on manpower, but inadequate in
technology and training. Space and cyber defence call
for greater attention.
• Strengthening maritime security
A concerted focus on the Bay of Bengal
Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic
Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and the Indian Ocean Rim
Association of Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) is
needed given China’s increasing presence in both
regions.
The India story has resumed, slowly but surely.
References:
*Realpolitik –A german term meaning the politics of real,it refers to the realist determination of politics to
treat as they really are and not as the idealist would wish them to be.
(1) See: Subrata K. Mitra, Novelty of Europe as seen from the Periphery: Indian Perceptions of the “New
Europe” in a Multi-polar World, Heidelberg Papers in Comparative and South Asian Politics, 2005,
available at http://www.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/archiv/6387 (accessed 24 July 2007).
(2) C. Raja Mohan, India and the Balance of Power, “Foreign Affairs”, Vol. 85, No. 4, 2006, p. 17.
(3) ibidem,p-18
(4) Panchasheela, a term derived from Buddhist scriptures, encapsulated the “five principles of peaceful
coexistence” as enshrined in the 1954 agreement between India and China, which were supposed to
frame Sino-Indian relations as well as India's foreign policy more generally. The five principles referred
to: 1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; 2) mutual non-aggression; 3)
mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; 4) equality and mutual benefit; and 5) peaceful
coexistence.
170
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH IN INDIA (ISSN 2231-2137): VOL. 5: ISSUE: 2
(5) Amitabh Matto, Happymon Jacob, “Foreign Relations of India: The Federal Challenge”, in: eadem (eds),
Shaping India’s Foreign Policy: People, Politics and Places, New Delhi, Har-Anand Publications, 2010,
p. 26.
(6) Ibidem, p. 24.
(7) S K Mitra opcit
(8) Itty Abraham, The Future of Indian Foreign Policy, “Economic and Political Weekly”,
Vol. 42, No. 42, 20 October, 2007, p. 4209.
(9) A. Matto, H. Jacob, op. cit., p. 25.It should be noted that India’s interest in Afghanistan is not just
historical: lying as it does on Pakistan’s western border, close relations with Afghanistan which
constitutes a significant strategic asset to India.
(10) S.K. Mitra, op. cit.
(11) D.S. Rajan, East Asia Integration – China’s Reservations on India Playing a Leading Role, South Asia
Analysis Group, No. 4377, 14 March 2011, www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers44%5Cpaper4377.html (accessed on 24 February 2012).
(12) Shashi Tharoor, India as a Soft Power, “India International Centre Quarterly”, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2008, p.
35.
(13) Abraham, op. cit., p. 4210.
(14) S. Tharoor, India as a Soft Power, op. cit., p. 35.
(15) S. Tharoor, PaxIndica: India and the World in the 21st Century, New Delhi, Allen Lane, 2012, p. 422.
(16) Deo Neelam,”India’s Foreign Policy Re imagined”,The Diplomat, January 3,2015.
(17) Sirohi Seema,”Modi:Charing a new foreign Policy Course”,GateWay Publicaions,June 18,2015.
(18) Publicaion by Gateway House,Indian Council on Global Relaions, “Modi’s Foreign Policy;The Way
Forward”.Sepember 2,2014.
(19) Bhaumik Subhir,”Narendra Modi’s International Balancing Act”, February 12,2015.Indepth Features,
AlZazeera.
(20) M K Narayan,”The Chinese Fault Line in Foreign Policy”,The Hindu,May 29,2015.
(21) Narayani Basu,”Modi in Mongolia:Cultural Crossroads in Far East”’The Diplomat,May 16,2015.
(22) ”PM Modi Visits South Korea:Signs 7 agreements including DTAA revision.”The Indian Express,Press
Trust Of india, May 18,2015.
(23) Ramesh Thakur,”Modi’s Foreign Policy Agenda”,Opinion,The Japan Times,May 23,2014.
(24) Smruti S Pattnaik,”Modi’s Visit will herald a new chapterin India-Sri Lanka Relations.”,IDSA
Comment,March 12,2015.
(25) C Raja Mohan,”Narendra Modi and The Ocean:Maritime Power and The Responsibility.March 12,2015.
(26) Harsh V Pant,”In France,Germany and Canada Modi Impresses.”The Pulse in The Diplomat,April
20,2015.
(27) Ibidem
171