Michael Johnston
Corruption and Reform: One Size Does Not Fit All
IACSA - International Anti-Corruption
Summer Academy
Publication 2012
IACSA Publication 2012
Michael Johnston
IACA - INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION ACADEMY
IACSA - International Anti-Corruption Summer Academy
Publication 2012
Michael Johnston
Corruption and Reform: One Size Does Not Fit All
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Table of Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 3
1
Corruption in its context........................................................................................................................... 3
1.1 Four syndromes .............................................................................................................................. 3
1.2 Contrasts in participation and institutions........................................................................................ 4
1.3 Influence Market corruption ............................................................................................................ 5
1.4 Elite Cartel corruption ..................................................................................................................... 6
1.5 Oligarch-and-Clan corruption .......................................................................................................... 6
1.6 Official Mogul corruption ................................................................................................................. 7
1.7 Where do countries fit in? ............................................................................................................... 8
2
The syndromes in action ......................................................................................................................... 8
2.1 From the inside out ......................................................................................................................... 9
2.2 A “forced choice” approach ........................................................................................................... 10
3
Implications for reform ........................................................................................................................... 11
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................. 12
References ................................................................................................................................................. 13
Introduction
The pursuit, uses, and exchange of wealth and power takes place in a historical and cultural context, and
in specific climates of opportunities, resources, risks, uncertainties, and constraints. Those factors, and the
kinds of corruption they engender, can vary not only among societies but within them. The choice of
specific reforms critical, but lasting reform requires the sustained support from real groups of many types,
involving political processes that can vary considerably. Urging corruption-plagued societies to implement
whatever controls they appear to lack when compared to better-governed countries ‒ countries that have
had generations to deal with the problem, and whose safeguards are outcomes rather than the causes of
reform ‒ is futile. But if there are contrasting kinds of corruption, what might they be, and can we say which
kinds are most important in a given society?
1
Corruption in its context
1.1 Four syndromes
I explored these and related questions several years ago in a book (Johnston, 2005) on the ways various
countries’ corruption problems differ in kind. Using statistical indicators and case studies, the book offered
the argument that four major syndromes of corruption can be observed in countries around the world:
Influence Markets: in a climate of active, well-institutionalized markets and democratic politics, private
wealth interests seek influence over specific processes and decisions within strong public institutions, not
only bribing officials directly but channeling funds to and through political figures who put their access and
connections out for rent. The United States, Japan, and Germany were discussed as case studies (Ibid.:
Ch. 4).
Elite Cartels: in a setting of only moderately strong state institutions, colluding elites ‒ political,
bureaucratic, business, military, and so forth ‒ build high-level networks by sharing corrupt benefits, and
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are able to stave off rising political and economic competition. Examples presented were Italy, South
Korea, and Botswana (Ibid.: Ch. 5).
Oligarchs and Clans: a small number of contentious elites backed by personal or family followings pursue
wealth and power in a climate of very weak institutions, rapidly expanding opportunities, and pervasive
insecurity, using bribes and connections where they can and violence where they must. Opponents of
corruption, and of dominant parties and politicians, face major risks and uncertainties. Distinctions
between public and private sectors, and between personal and official loyalties and agendas, are very
weak in this syndrome. Case studies included Russia, the Philippines, and Mexico (Ibid.: Ch. 6).
Official Moguls: powerful individuals and small groups, either dominating undemocratic regimes or
enjoying the protection of those who do, use state and personal power ‒ at times, a distinction of little
importance ‒ to enrich themselves with impunity. The primary loyalties and sources of power are personal
or political, rather than official in nature; anti-corruption forces, like opposition to the regime generally, are
very weak. In this final group China, Kenya, and Suharto’s Indonesia were examined in detail (Ibid.: Ch. 7).
These four syndromes are “ideal types” (Coser, 1977: 223-224) highlighting important similarities and
contrasts, and do not necessarily describe any one country’s situation in complete detail. Some problems
such as police corruption occur everywhere. These syndromes refer to types of corruption problems, not to
system or regime types, and are intended to classify those problems in terms of deeper underlying causes.
Similarly, they are not categories of more or less corruption, by other names. After all, we have no valid or
reliable ways of comparing amounts of corruption among societies. Another is that while the categories do
differ in, for example, the extent of impunity and the strength of restraints upon corrupt dealings, it is
entirely possible for a country to have a great deal of Influence Market corruption (for example, Japan) and
another to experience only a moderate amount of Elite Cartel abuses (Botswana), or to have Official Mogul
corruption that is extensive yet tightly-controlled (Kuwait). In addition, the syndromes do not collectively
define a path of development: it is not assumed that countries move from Official Moguls to Oligarchs to
Elite Cartels to Influence Markets. Several kinds of transitions are possible.
A country may experience more than one syndrome at once, depending upon the levels of government,
regions of the country, and/or economic sectors we are considering. At the same time, because the
syndromes reflect contrasting underlying patterns of participation and institutions, they do not readily mix
or combine. Influence Markets and Official Moguls, for example, reflect fundamental differences in political
hegemony and openness; Elite Cartels, and Oligarchs and Clans, to cite just two more possible pairings,
embody stark contrasts in relationships among top-level elites.
1.2 Contrasts in participation and institutions
These four syndromes reflect underlying trends in, and balances or imbalances between, participation and
institutions: that is, the ways people pursue, use, and exchange wealth and power, and the climate of
social, political, economic and state institutions within which they do so. Participation also refers to a
society’s balance of political and economic opportunities. As Huntington (1968: 59-72) suggested, where
economic opportunities are more plentiful than political ones, people are likely to use wealth to buy power,
while in places where political opportunities outnumber the economic, power will more often be used to
pursue wealth. Institutions can be of several types: social, such as customs of reciprocity, the values and
strength of civil society, and systems of norms; political, as for example parties, electoral systems, and
patterns of leadership and followership; and public institutions broadly defined, including not only laws,
courts, and bureaucracies, but also banking systems, capital markets, regulatory bodies, and so on.
Participation and institutions vary in many ways, but certain combinations are most common. Table 1
(based on Johnston, 2005: Ch. 3) summarizes these broad patterns:
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Table 1. Four syndromes of corruption
Syndrome
Participation
Institutions
Examples
Political
Opportunities
Economic
Opportunities
State/Society
Capacity
Economic
Institutions
(cases in bold were case
studies in Syndromes of
Corruption)
Influence
Markets
Mature democracies
Liberalized, steady
competition and
participation
Mature markets
Liberalized, open; steady
competition; affluent
Extensive
Strong
United States, Japan,
Germany,
Australia, France, UK,
Uruguay
Elite Cartels
Consolidating/
reforming democracies
Liberalized; growing
competition and
participation
Reforming markets
Largely liberalized and
open; growing
competition; moderately
affluent
Moderate
Medium
Italy, South Korea,
Botswana, Argentina,
Belgium, Brazil, Israel,
Poland, Portugal, S.
Africa, Zambia
Oligarchs and Transitional regimes
Clans
Recent major liberalization;
significant but poorlystructured competition
New markets
Recent major
liberalization; extensive
inequality and poverty
Weak
Weak
Russia, Philippines,
Mexico, Bangladesh,
Bulgaria, Colombia, India,
Malaysia, Niger, Senegal,
Turkey
Official
Moguls
New markets
Recent major
liberalization; extensive
inequality and poverty
Weak
Weak
China, Kenya,
Indonesia, Algeria, Chad,
Haiti, Iran, Kuwait,
Nigeria, Rwanda, Syria,
Uganda
Undemocratic
Little liberalization or
openness
1.3 Influence Market corruption
Most Influence Market societies are mature, well-institutionalized market democracies. Competition is
relatively orderly in each arena, and legitimate paths of access exist between them. Neither politicians nor
wealth interests are clearly dominant, but yet each side has things the other wants. Businesses, wealthy
individuals and well-funded interest groups have the money politicians and parties need to fund their
campaigns (or to line their own pockets); political figures have valuable influence over policy, not only in
legislatures but also within bureaucracies. Some money finds its way directly into the hands of
bureaucrats, via bribery and extortion, but more often corruption involves political figures who put their
connections out for rent.
Constitutional and legal frameworks, free news media, strong civil societies and judiciaries, and open
economies check some of the worst abuses in these societies. Outright bribery and extortion are usually
the exception in day-to-day dealings, not the rule, and corruption is unlikely to halt economic development
or destabilize politics. Influence Market corruption is more often a matter of pushing familiar, and often
desirable, processes and connections to unacceptable extremes. Contributions to election campaigns, for
example, are an accepted part of the democratic process in most Influence Market societies, but
contributions that are too large or kept secret are likely to be corrupt. Often the issue is the openness or
fairness of a process: Warren (2004), for example, argues that the essence of corruption in a democracy is
the violation of norms of inclusion.
Most Influence Market abuses revolve around specific outcomes ‒ winning a contract or an election, or
rewriting a regulation, not massive theft or violence. In fact, the very strength of public institutions raises
the value of influence within them: decisions are likely to be carried out effectively, meaning that routine
policy processes can deliver large benefits. Much Influence Market corruption works through the system
(an imaginative analysis is in Lessig, 2011), rather than undermining it: after all, Influence Market
participants are generally well served by existing arrangements.
It is tempting to see these societies as having prevailed over corruption, or at least as having rendered it a
much less serious problem. But that would be a mistake. The other three syndromes, as we shall see,
generally revolve around the exploitation and abuse of a particular state; even though their corruption can
have regional and international implications, the corrupt processes themselves are generally rooted in
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specific places and agencies. Much Influence Market corruption, by contrast, takes place internationally,
beyond the reach of any one state, and its spread is driven by a variety of market principles ‒ often
enjoying substantial political, normative, and institutional support ‒ that have a way of “crowding out” other
values (Sandel, 2012). Moreover, banks and investment markets in Influence Market countries are often
the repositories, or participate in the laundering, of corrupt gains from elsewhere. Multinational businesses
make deals abroad that would be prohibited at home (on the activities of British Aerospace in Saudi
Arabia, as just one example, see Guardian Unlimited, 2008; House of Lords, 2008). Other problems are
domestic: both economic and political interests have a stake in limiting competition and protecting their
advantages. The costs of their dealings may thus come in the form of political competition that is more
apparent than real, economic and policy alternatives that are kept off the public agenda, and the
concentration of wealth and power in fewer and fewer hands.
1.4 Elite Cartel corruption
In other societies ‒ many of them moving into post-conflict or post-dictatorial stages ‒ institutions are
weaker, yet politics and markets are gradually becoming more competitive. Political, business,
bureaucratic, military, media elites, and others, unable to capitalize upon a strong institutional framework
and unable or unwilling to dominate through coercion, find collusion attractive. The result, often, is
pervasive sharing of corrupt rewards to maintain networks strong enough to fend off challengers. In some
cases those elite networks are strong enough to govern relatively effectively, at least as compared to the
likely, as opposed to ideal, alternatives.
Societies marked by Elite Cartel corruption are not wholly undemocratic or uncompetitive, but power and
wealth are in flux, creating both new opportunities and risks. More than in our other syndromes corruption
often has important defensive aspects: power and self-enrichment depend upon protecting existing
advantages. Official positions will be particularly valuable, but collusion often links top figures in many
segments of society. Laws, bureaucracies, and rights that have only moderate credibility weaken anticorruption efforts, and make life more difficult for opposition elites and news media. Civil society and many
social institutions are likely to be even weaker and driven by distrust.
Elite Cartels can maintain a working order of sorts and a gradual pace of change, even if they accomplish
both out of self-serving motives. On the whole they are more successful economically than Oligarch-andClan cases (Johnston, 2005: Appendix), as their relative stability may attract some investors. Several, such
as South Korea, Botswana, Israel, Spain, South Africa, and some of the formerly communist states of
Eastern Europe, have built sustainable democracies too. Reasons for such success vary from case to
case; for now it is worth suggesting that an Elite Cartels alignment might have advantages as a transitional
“halfway” situation.
Still, Elite Cartels are hardly an ideal: their stabilizing function derives from elites’ stake in fending off
competition. Confronted with stress they may not so much bend as break: during the 1997-98 Asian
financial crisis, for example, the collusive and unaccountable business practices of Korea’s politically
privileged chaebols (huge family-owned industrial combines) were revealed as an economic house of
cards.
1.5 Oligarch-and-Clan corruption
In other societies rapid change ‒ often, simultaneous if poorly integrated political and economic transitions
‒ and very weak institutions put large stakes on the table in a setting of few constraints. Would-be
business people and political leaders ‒ categories that may extensively overlap ‒ have much to gain and,
potentially, everything to lose in a setting of profound insecurity. The strongest institutions are personal
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followings, gangs, or families; official bodies have little credibility, and citizens who might elsewhere build a
strong civil society find it prudent to focus on survival.
Corruption in such settings is likely to consist of a disorderly, sometimes violent scramble among
contending Oligarchs and their personal Clans. In a setting of high stakes, brutal competition and porous
boundaries between public and private sectors, contending elites parlay personal clout into wealth and
power. Indeed, each is needed in order to win and protect the other. Unlike Elite Cartel situations,
corruption does not underwrite an overarching network, and is anything but stabilizing. Indeed violence,
organized crime, and protection rackets may be integral parts of the corruption picture (Varese, 2001).
Oligarch-and-Clan corruption is not only extensive but also unpredictable, and thus particularly disruptive
to development (Campos, Lien, and Pradhan, 1999). Investors, in Oligarch-and-Clan settings, face
unpredictable and even conflicting corrupt demands, have little assurance that paying up will produce
lasting benefits, yet risk violence if they do not comply. That state of affairs can devastate economic
development. Corrupt gains too will frequently be shipped out of the country to places with harder
currencies and safer banks. Anyone confronting the Oligarchs will be taking on powerful factions
answerable to no one but themselves, and will have few meaningful rights to fall back upon. The resulting
poverty and insecurity inhibit democratizing trends and interests, and further weaken resistance to
corruption.
Oligarchs may be victims as well as perpetrators of corrupt deals, depending upon who commands what
advantages in a given sector, and followers may bolt from one clan to another. Indeed, it may be difficult to
say just what is public and what is private, who is a politician and who is an entrepreneur. Post-conflict and
post-dictatorial societies in a state of overall insecurity, with weak institutional frameworks and high levels
of distrust, will be particularly vulnerable to Oligarch and Clan corruption, and thus to self-perpetuating
cycles of insecurity, corruption, poverty, and violence.
1.6 Official Mogul corruption
A final group of countries is characterized by undemocratic rule, growing economic opportunities, and ‒
again ‒ very weak institutions. There, powerful figures or inner circles plunder the economy, often with
impunity. Opposition forces and civil society, to the extent that either term is meaningful, are weak,
intimidated, or manipulated by official patronage. In smaller or more unified societies the key figures may
be a dictator, family, or tight ruling circle, and power is personal in its sources and use. In more complex
settings multiple groups, monopolizing fragments of state authority, may operate more independently. Of
our four syndromes this one is least focused upon influence within official state processes: institutions and
offices may be merely useful tools in the search for wealth.
Economies in most such societies are liberalizing to some extent, if only in response to global incentives.
Officials can exploit emerging economic opportunities with impunity if they enjoy top-level status or
protection, and at least avoid scrutiny from above. The integration into the world economy that often
accompanies liberalization may help check corruption (Larraín and Tavares, 2004; Sandholtz and Koetzle,
2000; Treisman, 2000; for important qualifications, see Zhu, 2009) for reasons ranging from the influx of
advanced management techniques and enhanced international scrutiny to the emergence of alternatives
to doing business with official moguls. But for poor, undemocratic countries just beginning to open up
markets ‒ especially those dependent upon the export of basic commodities ‒ such integration is often on
unfavorable terms. That makes it easier for authoritarian rulers to monopolize cross-border flows of goods
and capital and to cut lucrative personal deals with international businesses. But even in poor countries a
political monopoly can be the source of great wealth, if only from tapping into aid, loans, and any
investment flowing in from outside.
Mature market democracies resemble each other in many ways ‒ not least, their relatively dispersed
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power structures ‒ but in Official Mogul cases much depends upon the personalities and agendas of those
at the top. Some may seek reform or at least refrain from the worst corruption, and where that is the case
considerable growth may occur. Others ruthlessly exploit both state and economy with devastating results.
Official Mogul societies are not necessarily stable, however: those who hold power without rules may face
enemies, rather than competitors or political oppositions. Elite insecurity, in turn, may drive egregious
“hand over fist” corruption (Scott, 1972) as leaders facing threats but few institutional constraints take as
much as they can, as fast as they can take it.
1.7 Where do countries fit in?
The 2005 analysis employed a statistical cluster analysis (Ibid.: Ch. 3) of national-level participation and
institutional indicators (not including corruption indices) to show that across nearly a hundred countries the
four combinations of attributes presented in Table 1 do seem to exist. Table 2 (source: Johnston, 2005:
Appendix A) shows the results of that classification process for about one hundred countries ‒ results that
have been consistent across several subsequent replications:
Table 2. Country groupings by syndrome, 2005
Influence Markets (N=18)
Australia
Finland
Austria
France
Canada
Germany
Costa Rica
Ireland
Denmark
Japan
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
UK
Uruguay
USA
South Korea
Namibia
Panama
Paraguay
Poland
Portugal
Slovak Rep
South Africa
Spain
Zambia
Oligarchs and Clans (N=30)
Albania
Guatemala
Bangladesh
Honduras
Benin
India
Bulgaria
Jamaica
Colombia
Madagascar
Ecuador
Malaysia
El Salvador
Mali
Ghana
Mexico
Nepal
Nicaragua
Niger
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Romania
Russia
Senegal
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Trinidad & Tobago
Turkey
Venezuela
Official Moguls (N=29)
Algeria
Cameroon
Central Afr. Rep.
Chad
China
Congo, Rep. of
Egypt
Gabon
Malawi
Morocco
Myanmar
Nigeria
Oman
Rwanda
Syria
Tanzania
Togo
Tunisia
Uganda
UAE
Zimbabwe
Elite Cartels (N=21)
Argentina
Belgium
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Chile
Czech Rep
Greece
Hungary
Israel
Italy
Guinea-Biss.
Haiti
Indonesia
Iran
Ivory Coast
Jordan
Kenya
Kuwait
Statistical groupings, by themselves, do not confirm that certain kinds of corruption take place; the real
test, in corruption terms, came through case studies (Ibid.: Ch. 4-7) which generally confirmed the
existence of the expected patterns of corruption.
2
The syndromes in action
The syndromes scheme is, of necessity, a simplification. Can we distinguish among the four types of
corruption in practice?
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One way to do that involves looking at the big picture in a society ‒ that is, at the corrupt dealings that
seem predominant ‒ and assessing participation and institutional factors. Our concern is not which corrupt
techniques are most frequent; as noted earlier, some varieties like police corruption occur more or less
everywhere and may not tell us anything distinctive about a given country. Nor are we asking which cases
have made the biggest headlines or involved the largest amounts of money. We might ask, what sorts of
corrupt processes have most to do with patterns of wealth and power in a given country. Our answers are
likely to be educated guesses, and will inevitably involve many exceptions, but are still useful
assessments.
2.1 From the inside out
Another approach is to start with specific cases and work outward to the broader influences shaping them.
To take this route, again begin by asking what kinds of corrupt dealings are the most typical of the broader
economic and political arenas. Table 3 offers a more general breakdown of how those factors can
combine, breaking down each syndrome by typical participants, stakes, techniques, and targets of
corruption, and concluding with the general sorts of corruption vulnerabilities associated with each. It will
be noted that a particular vulnerability may arise in more than one syndrome; electoral corruption, for
example, may be common in both Influence Markets and Elite Cartel situations, although it would be likely
to involve contrasting participants and agendas. As suggested above, working backwards from corrupt
practices to causal factors without considering deeper causes can yield confusion.
Table 3. Recognizing corruption syndromes in practice
Who?
Seeking what?
How?
Where?
Corrupt activities
Syndrome…
Myriad private
interests:
businesses, lobby
groups
Politicians,
bureaucrats
Bureaucratic and
political access
Influence over
specific decisions
Money
Political
contributions;
personal gifts;
bribes, networking
Trading access,
influence for money
Bureaucracy, less
public aspects of
legislative process,
nominations and
pardon processes
Influence peddling
Abusive patronage
Electoral corruption
Campaign finance
violations
Conflicts of interest
Influence Markets
Networked colluding
elites -- political,
bureaucratic,
business, military,
facing growing
political, economic
competition
“Connected” wealth
interests
To preserve power,
status quo
To fend off rising
competitors
To solidify elite
networks
Mutual enrichment
Favorable policy,
decisions
Political collusion:
sharing corrupt $$,
rigging elections
Politicizing
bureaucracy, courts;
bringing selected
private interests into
elite circles
Large payments,
kickbacks
Control over:
electoral politics,
state/parastatal
sectors, public
contracting,
procurement
Privatization,
development,
regulatory,
nationalization
decisions
Communications
media
Military
Electoral corruption, Elite Cartels
collusion
Politicized judicial,
law enforcement
processes
Corruption via
patronage, charitable
“contributions”
Politicized lending,
regulation, oversight
A few “Big Men”;
their personal
followings and
clients; private
armies or security
forces
Rapid, major gains in
wealth and power
Protecting those
gains from state,
each other
More predictability in
business,
government
Theft, fraud,
patronage abuses;
bribery or
intimidation of
officials, rivals
Capitalizing on
insecurity, fear
Violence
Liberalizing
economic sectors;
energy, natural
resources;
privatizations
Trading in state
assets; banking,
currency, money
laundering
Natural resource,
public asset theft
Judicial, law
enforcement
corruption
High-level political
(grand) corruption
Money laundering
Illicit trafficking
Violence, terror
Oligarchs and Clans
Monopolistic abuses
of state, personal
power, patronage
with impunity;
Grand corruption in
extractive,
international
aid/trade sectors
Official Moguls
Organized crime
Capitalizing on weak
institutions
Monopolistic
leadership (dictator,
juntas); bureaucratic
rings
Inner circle; family,
political clients
Major gains in wealth
To exploit
dominance
To tap into capital
flows
Enrichment of
selves, clients;
rewarding political
backers
Security services
(formal and illicit)
Official theft of public
or private assets
Misappropriation of
investment, aid
Phony privatizations
Patronage
Investment, aid;
public works,
contracting,
procurement, military
spending
Extractive industries
Land ownership,
banking
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Table 3 can be used beginning with any column, depending upon what is known about corruption cases.
The cell entries are meant to be suggestive, not definitive; some judgment will be needed in order to
reconcile contrasts.
2.2 A “forced choice” approach
A final method consists of a set of deliberately simplified choices about participation and institutions.
Particularly given its forced-choice design, results from this approach should be judged with some caution.
It involves answering three questions:
•
Is this case an Established democracy; a New or reforming democracy now, or recently, undergoing
significant liberalization; or Undemocratic?
•
Does this case have Established markets and general affluence; Reforming or liberalizing markets
and moderate affluence; or New/weak markets with considerable poverty and inequality?
•
Are political and economic institutions Strong and legitimate; only Moderately strong or reforming; or
Weak and lacking in credibility?
Now, track your answers using Figure 1:
Figure 1. Participation, Institutions, and Corruption Syndromes
The arrows are not intended to imply causation, but rather to indicate how the answers work together to
produce a classification. The forced-choice format makes each answer an approximation, but again
suggests ways participation and institutions might shape corruption. It also provides a useful reminder of
the deeper influences and contrasts highlighted by the syndromes: we are not relying upon personalities,
short-term temptations, or specific administrative problems to account for contrasts, nor are we
differentiating among them primarily in terms of the specific corrupt tactics.
If a society does not fit anywhere in the scheme we might look at its regions or sectors. And if that
approach still produces a muddle, by that point we may have a sense of why the case does not fit, and of
what factors set it apart. That, by itself, is still a useful advance over a single index score or impressionistic
claims about amounts of corruption.
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Implications for reform
If we are confident in our classifications, then what? Can the typology steer us toward useful reforms and
away from serious mistakes? Reform is an immensely complex topic in its own right, but the syndromes
typology is intended to provide some general guides for action, as well as some suggestions of what not to
do. It can also give us a rough sense of desirable sequencing. Some reforms that seem attractive in an
Influence Market case ‒ decentralization, for example ‒ may, in an Oligarchs-and-Clans situation, add fuel
to the fire. Often our early measures must be indirect ‒ not frontal assaults on corruption, which may well
endanger reform-oriented citizens while accomplishing little. More gradual and indirect approaches, by
contrast, might keep us from pushing a society from one syndrome of corruption over into a much more
disruptive one by, for example, undercutting existing institutions too aggressively. Indeed, some of the
most promising strategies may not be explicitly aimed at corruption at all; for example, literacy
programmes or guarantees of civil liberties may build valuable institutional strength.
Thus, in an Official Moguls situation our first task may well be to open up some measure of public or civic
“space”, and to encourage the formation of grassroots organizations, even if they are explicitly nonpolitical, in order to lay the groundwork for future countervailing political forces. That agenda will often
have to be pursued gradually, lest reform call down repression by the regime. In an Oligarchs-and-Clans
situation, we will need to ease the sense of insecurity and risk before we ask citizens and civil society
groups to take serious action against corruption. More predictable and credible law enforcement, courts,
and taxation may well be required before an anti-corruption movement can take shape.
In Elite Cartels and Influence Market cases, formal institutions are stronger; particularly in the latter the rule
of law, civil liberties, and accountability already have some meaning. There, more direct anti-corruption
action is possible, although reform movements will need to link corruption control to the enduring selfinterests of citizens. For Influence markets, broader-based political participation, more credible and
decisive electoral competition, and stronger economic rules and limits might be of the essence ‒ measures
that would make little sense for some of our other syndromes. In all cases we must remember that many
citizens may benefit from corruption ‒ or think they do ‒ and may well not trust their neighbors to give up
their shares. Reform efforts will need to offer diverse incentives and appeals (one analysis of such appeals
is offered in Johnston and Kpundeh, 2002).
A full analysis of reform strategies, tactics, and sequencing lies well beyond the scope of this discussion.
But as a beginning, consider Tables 4A and 4B, below:
Table 4A. Reform Recommendations, Influence Markets and Elite Cartels
Syndrome
Strategic Goals
Strategic Reform
Targets
Tactical Reform
Targets
Measures to Avoid
Strategic Progress
Indicators
Influence
Markets
•
•
•
Electoral systems
Party/campaign
Finance
Freedom of Info
legislation
Public $, other
incentives to
increase political
competition
Increase political
participation
Avoid party,
incumbent
monopolies
•
Private $ to
challengers as well
as incumbents
Extensive ethics,
financial disclosure
Conflict of Interest
rules
Reform lobbying
rules
Creative matching
of small
contributions
Civic education on
lobbying, pol
finance
•
Too-low limits on
political funding
Replacing all
private funding
with public $
Excessive
disclosure, conflict
of interest
monitoring
Too much access
to bureaucracy
Pol funding
systems
encouraging “onestop shopping” at
the top
•
Electoral systems,
stronger parties
More bottom-up
political
participation
More secure
•
Conflict of Interest,
Freedom of
Information
legislation
Increasing
legitimate party
•
Rapid increase in
pol competition
Rapid deregulation,
privatization, while
pol collusion
•
•
•
•
Increase political
competition
Increase legitimate
access to
government
Check corrupt
access
Enhance citizens’
sense of fairness
•
•
•
•
Elite Cartels
•
•
•
Strengthen
public/private
boundaries
Smaller state role
in economy
More decisive
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
11
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Reduced
incumbent
advantages
Slowing growth of
large-scale
campaign,
lobbying spending
Improved levels of
public trust,
expectations
More citizen
participation at
polls, in campaign
finance
Stronger civil
society
Elections produce
meaningful policy
change,
particularly in the
economy
Bureaucracy,
IACSA Publication 2012
•
•
•
elections
Greater
bureaucratic
autonomy
More free political
space for citizens
Democratization at
a moderate pace
Michael Johnston
•
•
•
property rights
Selective
privatization/
deregulation
Constitutional
reform: checks,
balances, stronger
judiciary
Strong, politically
independent
capital markets,
news media
•
•
•
funding, and
grassroots bases
•
Procurement,
bidding,
contracting reform •
and oversight
Higher
bureaucratic
professionalization,
pay, status
Strengthen civil
service systems,
protections
persists
Starving pol
process of
legitimate funding
Measures sharply
increasing elite
insecurity
•
•
•
media become
more autonomous
Parties sink roots
in civil society,
become less
personalized
More independent
watchdog, pol
groups
Higher mass pol
participation, trust
Table 4B. Reform recommendations, oligarchs and clans, and official Moguls
Syndrome
Strategic Goals
Strategic Reform
Targets
Tactical Reform
Targets
Measures to Avoid
Strategic Progress
Indicators
Oligarchs
and Clans
•
•
•
•
(Further) rapid
privatization
Rapid entry of int’l
businesses
Public
management
improvements
without top-level
ownership
Elections without
procedural
safeguards
Anti-corruption
crusades
becoming factional
conflicts
Reforms
needlessly
endangering
citizens
•
•
Rapid economic,
political
liberalization,
democratization
Public
management
improvements
without top-level
backing
Public morality
campaigns
Reforms with
short-term
timelines
Reforms that
greatly increase
elite insecurity
Reforms
needlessly
endangering
citizens, regime
critics
•
•
•
•
•
•
Reduce violence,
insecurity
Credible official
policy, processes
More secure
property rights
Reducing violence
Reduce “informal”
econ, pol activity
Enhance rule of
law
•
•
•
Moderate the
expansion of pol,
econ opportunities
Strengthen,
professionalize
courts, police
Weaken organized
crime, private
armies, elite
followings
Enhance credibility
of basic state
functions in
citizens’ eyes
•
•
•
•
•
•
Amnesties for illicit
gains, followed by
prosecution
Better, timely
public-sector pay
Easier, more
credible titling of
property
Financial
disclosure, conflictof-interest rules
Improve banking
system
Stronger currency
Simplified taxation
•
•
•
•
•
•
Official
Moguls
•
•
•
•
•
•
Gradual growth of
political
competition
Credible official
roles, institutions
Increased
pluralism of pol
resources, action
Strengthen press,
civil society
gradually
Shield private
sector from official
raids
Emergence of
“civic space”
•
•
•
•
•
•
Improved civil
liberties
Improved, fairer
taxation
Independent
political social orgs
Enhance security
of int’l business
Enhance
bureaucratic
autonomy,
professionalism
Reduce political
dominance of
“inner circle” or top
families
•
•
•
•
•
Transparency in
dealings with int’l
orgs and business
Conditional
rewards for
strategic reforms
Conditional
incentives for
public
management
improvement
Strengthen
property rights
Growth of
politically
independent
businesses,
organizations
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Reduced crime
Reduced capital
flight
Civil society
independent, less
intimidated
Public/private
boundaries clearer
Investors plan for
the longer term
Improved popular
trust, expectations
Gradual growth in
pol competition,
economic
openness
Power, policy,
accountability
become more
public, less
personal
Signs of elite,
social pluralism
Less political
intrusion into
economy
Emergence of
independent
grassroots
organizations,
initiatives
Conclusion
The primary goal of any anti-corruption programme must be enabling those who suffer from the problem to
oppose it in ways that cannot be ignored. That suggests that rather than setting a reform agenda and then
seeking citizen support, we should choose anti-corruption measures that seem most likely to strengthen
citizens’ ability to advocate and defend their own best interests. Looked at that way, reform is a problem of
accountability, fairness, and justice ‒ ultimately, the main reasons why we should worry about corruption in
the first place.
12
IACSA Publication 2012
Michael Johnston
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