DRAFT: Not for distribution without permission of the author. No quoting. This article a draft. Wording in final article different. The Routledge Companion to Cross-Cultural Management
(final article will be out in book form in 2015 Spring)
Matti Nojonen: What cross-cultural management doesn’t tell us: history
of generational dynamics in Chinese society
Abstract In this chapter we will illustrate the radically changing values and role of youth in Chinese modern history. These changing values have emerged as a reaction to historical structural changes in social, political and economic environment of the youth. Instead of relying on the predominant Western management literature explanation of strikingly homogeneous Confucian value system in China we will illustrate how the immediate socio-­‐political circumstances have repeatedly and severely altered the core values of youth generations during last 150 years of Chinese modern history. In breaking away from the Confucian explanation we will first analyse the revolutionary values and movement of youth during early 20th century and Maoist (1949-­‐1976) China. Then we will concentrate analysing how the amending circumstances of implemented one-­‐child policy combined with rapid commercialization, are once again revolutionising the values of Chinese youth. Current Chinese youth is possessed with extremely hedonist, self-­‐
centric values in a Communist party governed country that has unleashed fierce competitive market forces in its economy. Conventional Cross-­‐Cultural Management approach on China In CCM literature in general is written by Anglo-­‐American scholars and for Western audience. In their approach to distant cultures, like the China, they tend to reproduce the 18th century Western illustration of believed collectivist Confucian society. In these works scholars do not pay attention to the immediate and changing socio-­‐political conditions that are altering the value system of local people. In analysing the immediate socio-­‐political changes that have conditioned the actual values and social behaviour in tangible manner of Chinese youth over the last five to six generations enable us to take a critical stance to Western CCM studies that tend to observe and explain their findings through the stereotypical spectacles on Confucian collectivism (Hofstede and Hofstede 2005). This stereotypical approach is replicated in the curriculums of numerous Western business schools and best-­‐selling literature that illustrate how “the Chinese organizations are strongly permeated by Confucian values” (Ambler et.al. 2008: 203). In fact, Western management researchers on China seem to be obsessed by a desire to explain the values and behavioural patterns of individuals and organizations with Confucian orthodox values (Park and Luo 2001; Redding 2002). Consequently, China and Chinese people become strange creatures in the hands of Western management researchers. The values, observed behaviour – whether at the individual, organizational, regional or national level, are not only described in strikingly homogeneous terms that have not changed over the last two millennium, but are also explained in exceptionally uniform manner – with the Confucian belief system. 1 DRAFT: Not for distribution without permission of the author. No quoting. This article a draft. Wording in final article different. The prevalent approach of CCM literature is based on an extremely narrow reading on the rich and evolving Chinese idea history. Illustrative is that in Imperial China the Chinese themselves did not even have a concept of ‘Confucianism’ in Chinese language capturing the diversity of competing Confucian schools of thought. The Jesuit missionaries invented the concept of Confucianism in the 17th century during their missionary work in China (Jensen 1998). It is particularly evident that the prevailing CCM approach not only ignores the complexity of Confucian philosophy and evolution of Chinese value base, but also is particularly neglecting the revolution of values that shaped the fundamental political, philosophical and social beliefs of last five to six generations of Chinese youth. Confucianism and youth Confucianism promotes the notion of ‘harmony’ (hexie) and set high requirements on filial piety, respect of seniority and social position. Confucius stated that, “A youth should be filial at home, and, respectful to elders outside home. He should be earnest and correct. He should express adoration to all, and cultivate friendship with decent people.”1 Confucianism contains also ideas that youth should be respected. Confucius stated that “Respect the youth. When he will be at the age of forty or fifty, and people have not heard of him, then, alas, he is not worth of being respected.”2 Confucian philosophy contained additionally an idea of political change – even through rebellion. One of the three grounding fathers of Confucian philosophy, a philosopher named Xunzi (313 – 238 BC), states that “The prince is like a boat and people under him like the water. The water can carry the boat, but the water can topple the boat”3. Hence, the youth in traditional Chinese idea history were provided a somewhat dual role. On the one hand, the dominating strict Confucian moral code of filial piety and respect of seniority pinned them down into a certain fixed position. On the other hand, the Confucian philosophy provided the right to revolt against the tyrannical and corrupt leaders. However, since the turn of the 20th century the youth began an escalating revolt against the Confucian establishment itself. Youth as the vanguard force in the revolutionary 20th century The first Opium War (1839-­‐42) and following escalating imperialist aggressions on China caused not only a collective national humiliation in China, but also radicalised the Chinese youth. By the early 20th century it became painfully evident that the half-­‐witted Imperial reforms of “Western methods, but Chinese core” (Xiyong Zhongti) were insufficient to restore the strength of China. The youth understood that the complete eradication of the traditional Confucian establishment way the only way to strengthen China. Consequently, radicalizing youth began to study, adopt and propagate Western philosophies, values, thinking and political ideologies (Li 1994). 2 DRAFT: Not for distribution without permission of the author. No quoting. This article a draft. Wording in final article different. Young intellectuals, like Chen Duxiu (1879-­‐1942), became political active and gained a prominent role in overthrowing the Qing-­‐dynasty and establishing the first democracy in Asia; the Republic of China in 1912. As the Republic was soon thrown into warlord era, revolutionary intellectuals set off a cultural and intellectual uprising called as New Cultural Movement that changed the fate of China. In support for this cultural uprising young intellectuals quickly adopted new forms of media – magazines and journals. The most prominent journal, the New Youth, was established in 1915. Eventually, this journal agitated a whole generation of youth who eventually uprooted the Confucian establishment (Li 1994). In these revolutionary publications young radicals demanded abolition of the Confucian learning and demanded “complete Westernization” (quanpan Xihua). The activists took democracy, teaching and education based on Western scientific methods as their ultimate goals. Ideas such as liberalism, structuralism, nationalism, patriotism, different theories on democracy, social Darwinism, and eventually Marxism found fertile ground in young radical minds. Even a number of liberal, egalitarian and radical ideals, such as equality between sexes, free love, sexually liberated feminist ideas and anarchistic ideas of Kropotkin, found also home within radical youth circles (Pusey 1983). These young intellectuals identified themselves of being part of an emancipatory Chinese enlightenment movement (qimengyundong) (Li 1994). It was a blossoming time of radical freethinking. However, changes in political environment altered everything. The change came in the form of May Fourth Movement in 1919 shifting the energies away from liberal enlightenment ideals toward collective political mobilization. The movement began as a student demonstration on the fourth of May 1919 protesting against Chinese government’s impotent response to the signing of Treaty of Versailles that handed over the extraterritorial rights of Qingdao from Germany to Japan. This became to be the crucial turning point in the minds of Chinese youth. They set aside the more liberal or egalitarian values and ideals and replaced them with the collective goals of “saving from destruction” (jiuwang). Consequently, as the youth adopted radical collectivist values of Nationalism and Communism they forcefully suffocated the whole enlightenment strive. A twenty-­‐four year old assistant at the Peking University Library, named Mao Zedong (1893-­‐1976), was one of the radicals that became interested in the Communist ideology. The Chinese Communist Party was established in 1921 and soon the so called first generation of Chinese leaders; Mao Zedong, future premier Zhoun Enlai (1898-­‐1976) and even young Deng Xiaoping (1904-­‐1997) among other communist party members became central players in organizing the underground Communist movement and revolution in China. 3 DRAFT: Not for distribution without permission of the author. No quoting. This article a draft. Wording in final article different. It is notable that most of the central Party activists and leaders at this early stage were in their twenties and thirties. The early Communist movement was a revolutionary movement carried out by the Chinese youth. Journalist Edgar Snow, who in 1936 visited the Communist hideout caves in Yan’an depicted the followers as “red-­‐cheeked ‘little Red devils’ – cheerful, gay, energetic, and loyal – the living spirit of an astonishing crusade of youth” (Porter 1997: 71). Youth and Mao’s permanent revolution On the October 1st, 1949 Mao Zedong, the child of well-­‐off peasant and a man of no formal education stood on the Tiananmen gate and proclaimed the birth of New China. The achievement of the Communist revolution from throwing out foreign aggressors and nationalists and ending the century long national humiliation were quickly personified in Mao himself. He became to be, beyond any doubt, the hero of Chinese youth and object of great admiration among liberated Chinese people. As soon as Mao conquered whole country he decided to lift China to its glorious position through the practice of permanent revolution that took the form of escalating mass campaigns. These campaigns intensified and got more violent one after another, and subsequently build up his personal cult. After the drastic failure of the Great Leap Forward campaign (1958-­‐61) that killed more than 30 million people Mao retreated from power and began to read classical Chinese literature, write poems and plan his next move – the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-­‐1976) – that once and for all unleashed the vigorous power of Chinese youth. (Schoenhals 1996) The Cultural Revolution was launched in May 1966. The official political spearhead of this compound revolution was aimed at the bourgeois, revisionist and feudalist practices, which according to Mao had infiltrated the government and society. In Mao’s thinking new China could only be built after deconstructing the old. Mao believed that the potential revolutionary zeal resided in the youth and only they could attack the establishment. Mao believed in constant revolution, a kind of violent form of Schumpeterian creative destruction where any form of institutionalization was a potential nest of reactionary forces and had to be destroyed. The principle of “no construction without destruction” (bupo buli) was always present in Mao’s policies. (Schoenhals 1996) During the Cultural Revolution youth became smitten by a personal cult of Mao. They responded spontaneously to Mao's revolutionary appeal by forming Red Guard groups all around the country. On August 18, 1966, millions of Red Guards from all over the country gathered in Beijing for an audience with the Chairman. Dozens of millions of Red Guards pilgrimaged to Mao’s birth village Shaoshan that became the Chinese holy place, China’s version of Bethlehem or Mecca. At the early stage the university campuses became the hotspots of the radicalizing Red Guards. The red youth terror began on campuses and spread like prairie fire to all organizations and across whole China. Consequently universities and high-­‐schools closed their doors. The utterances of Mao “to rebel is justified” (zaofan youli) and ”bombard the headquarter” (baoda silingbu) gave 4 DRAFT: Not for distribution without permission of the author. No quoting. This article a draft. Wording in final article different. legitimacy to turn the world upside down. As one student wrote in People’s China, the leading mouthpiece of the party that, “… we turn the world upside down, smash it to pieces, pulverize it, create chaos, and make a tremendous mess, the bigger the better”4. Student youth succeeded in realizing the words of their leader Mao Zedong, “There is great chaos under heaven — the situation is excellent” (Tianxia da luan, xingshi da hao). Consequently, the country fell into real chaos during the following years. Between 1967 and 1969 the Red Guards, could freely and randomly choose their targets of harsh criticism and violence. In practice, anything could in surrealist manner determine the faith of individuals in the hands of the Red Guards. (Schoenhals 1996) It also meant endless struggle meetings, study-­‐sessions and writing self-­‐criticism that all interrupted the ordinary daily routines of individuals and families. Even language, words and single Chinese characters became in surreal manner targets of violent political attacks. There was no space left for the self to exist, not even in one’s own mind, the borders between the self and the collective did not only vanish, but Mao’s ideology supressed the self forcing people to “forget myself” (wang wo). All aspects of personal life had to be constantly open to the public analysis that had frantic and surreal altering political criteria. (Schoenhals 1996) Eventually the young Red Guards turned against each other and even guns and weapons were used in settling the ideological disputes. The chaos lasted until the military stepped in, the Red Guard units were abolished and the urban youth were sent to countryside. As the fever of Cultural Revolution waded away by the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, most of the urban youth returned home and universities and high schools reopened their doors. The Cultural Revolution left behind a traumatized country where basically whole generation of youth, the future leaders of China, and all families had been hit by the destructive force of Mao’s last revolution. Changing role of youth during the early reform era As Deng Xiaoping rose to power in 1978 he rapidly ended the Maoist violent mass-­‐campaigns, practice of constant revolution and most importantly began the economic reforms. Decades of over-­‐politicisation had alienated ordinary people from politics and they were ready to devote their energies to economic activities. Despite the Party ended the mass-­‐campaigns the historical responsible role of youth in reforming China waded away slowly. In 1978 after the Cultural Revolution ended the government relaxed political control and once again the students and young city-­‐dwellers, as all previous generations before them, expressed their criticism against the government and demanded political reforms and democracy. The subsequent suppression of this Beijing Spring of 1978 marked a beginning of a new era in the relationship between the party and the youth that took its final form in the subsequent 1989 Tiananmen movement. The economic reforms in 1980s improved livelihood of people, but caused escalating cycles of inflation and social problems. Students followed the 5 DRAFT: Not for distribution without permission of the author. No quoting. This article a draft. Wording in final article different. traditional example of early 20th century revolutionary Communist heroes and demanded the end of nepotism, corruption and echoed the reform slogans of Soviet Union – glasnost and perestroika. Soon ordinary city-­‐dwellers joined student demonstrations in cities, like on the Tiananmen square in Beijing. With the ensuing suppression of the movement in June 1989 the Party not only crushed the movement, but also stripped off the rights of the youth to act as a vanguard force of reforming China. The clampdown of the Tiananmen movement also meant that the Party forcefully curbed the historical responsibility and role of youth introducing new values, practices and structures into Chinese society. After the Tiananmen incident, the Party intensified the propagation of Communist egalitarian values particularly on university campuses. However, the youth got soon a mixed set of messages as the Party leader Deng Xiaoping successfully launched the slogan of “To get rich is glorious” in 1992 to push forward Chinese economic reforms. The post-­‐80s and -­‐90s generations The catchphrase “To get rich is glorious” speeded up the breakneck deconstruction of the plan economy system and boosted overall commercialization, consumerism and opening-­‐up to the outside world of China. However, in 90’s the one-­‐child policy that was instigated in 1979 began inevitably affect values and practices of urban families. These macro-­‐level, i.e. socio-­‐economic reforms, and micro-­‐level, i.e. family structure, changes have profoundly and irrevocably shaped and affected the values and role of youth in China. One-­‐child policy restricts the number of children of urban families to one child with the exception if the first child is severely disabled. Also rural Han-­‐Chinese families can have two children if the first child is a girl or a disabled boy. As a result of this policy in 2010 there were estimated 136 million under 30 year old Chinese without siblings. The total share of working age youth, including rural and urban youth between the age of 20 to 34 years in 2010 census was 20,78% (267,9 million). Due to the one-­‐child policy family structures in cities follow a so-­‐
called 4-­‐2-­‐1 pyramid where the child is the apex the pyramid, followed by parents and grandparents. 5 The 4-­‐2-­‐1 pyramid structure has resulted in the widely known “Little Emperor Syndrome” in urban China where the only child gets excessive amounts of attention from their parents and grandparents. The economic reforms have dramatically increased welfare, material and spending power of urban families. This novel circumstance is alluring parents and grandparents to desire for their only child experiences and material they themselves were denied during the tumultuous and deprived pre-­‐reform era. The excessive attention can severely affect a balanced social, physical and psychological development of the child (Cameron et.al. 2013). At the same time as parents spoil, over-­‐protect and over-­‐feed their children the reforms have unleashed competitive forces in society that condition all aspects of peoples’ lives. In a country, where the social security and pension systems are 6 DRAFT: Not for distribution without permission of the author. No quoting. This article a draft. Wording in final article different. still absent the school success of youngest generation improves possibilities of finding good jobs and thus eventually will secure the livelihood of the ageing older generations. In other words, as the child grows up the 4-­‐2-­‐1 pyramid turns upside down and the single child eventually will need to carry the burden of the two older generations. It is the education market where the children get their first dip into the fierce competitive environment of China. It is common that children take entrance exams even to kindergartens, primary and high schools. The competitive pressure amounts and peaks in the gaokao exam, named to be the "most pressure packed examination in the world”, the national university entrance exam. In June 2013 more than 9,2 million young people took from one to three days long exam that determined the lives not only of the student and his/her immediate future family, but can in the future safeguard the living standard of ageing parents and grandparents. The competition is fierce. Illustrative of this pressure was the widespread critical Chinese discussion on the gaokao-­‐system in 2012 that was sparked by a photo posted on the internet of students who had hooked up to intravenous drips of amino acid while preparing for the gaokao6. The examination system is also shaping high-­‐school teaching methods. Due to the importance of the gaokao exam teachers promote a form of teaching where high school students learn by heart enormous amount of facts and disregard creative solution learning. It is reported that in 2012 a student from Anhui Province had a one in 7,826, a 0,01 percent, likelihood of getting into the prestigious Peking University, while a student from Beijing had one in 190 odds, or 0.5 percent chance. In comparison Harvard University had a 5.9 percent acceptance rate in 2012.7 The first one-­‐child generation is reaching the age of mid thirties and organizations and society have gained experience of their values and patterns of behaviour. A widespread discussion is taking place on the social ramifications of the one-­‐child policy. There are also increasing demands in China to abolish the one-­‐child policy. The demands are based on the observations on social problems and personality disorder young people have in China. There is a deep shared concern about the social skills of the Y-­‐ and Z-­‐generations in China. Observations and experience point out that these generations tend to be more self-­‐centered and less cooperative. Consequently, the Party decided in November 2013 to reform the one-­‐child policy practices, but has not announced details of their intention.8 A clear indication of this self-­‐centric behaviour and values of the youth is the recent “Elderly Peoples’ Rights Protection Law” from 2013 that stipulates the youth to regularly visit their parents. The law states that adults should care about their parents and never snub or neglect elderly people. The law was widely ridiculed in Chinese social media. Netizens openly stated that the need to stipulate such law illustrate clearly how the fundamental moral values of Chinese society have completely been destroyed. There are already cases where the courts have ordered young adults to visit their parents or face possible fines or detention.9 7 DRAFT: Not for distribution without permission of the author. No quoting. This article a draft. Wording in final article different. A number of studies support the widely shared collective experience that the importance of freedom to pursue own happiness, self-­‐realization, purely hedonistic “me-­‐myself-­‐and-­‐I” attitudes and adoration of materialism are dominating trends amidst current Chinese youth (Zhang 2011; Di 2013; Zou 2011). In the minds of youth, success in life is measured in wealth and material. The Party is concerned over these widely shared individualistic values and has repeatedly launched ‘top-­‐down’ propaganda programs on egalitarian Communist values and has even selectively revitalised traditional communitarian Confucian values in China (Zeng 2007). However, it appears that the Party has lost the battle of values. Illustrative of this defeat is the box-­‐office movie “Tiny Times”, a story of four college girls in Shanghai that became a blockbuster in summer 2013 in China. The movie unashamedly adores fashion-­‐based materialism and became an all-­‐
time hit amidst urban youth. Movie’s lines such as “Love without materialism is just a pile of sand” outraged the official film critics in the central Party controlled newspapers that all blasted the “materialism”, “hedonism” and “pathological greed” of the movie. Based on comparative studies between the pre-­‐ and post-­‐one-­‐child era, the policy has produced significantly less trusting, less trustworthy, more risk-­‐
averse, less competitive, more pessimistic and less conscientious individuals. Studies claim that the upbringing of children where they get excessive attention and too much social pressure to succeed cause these personality traits. The self-­‐
centred and less-­‐cooperative values and low self-­‐esteem of current youth have direct consequences on the organizational level work as well (Cameron et.al. 2013). From organizational perspective the youth has been claimed to have a tendency to criticise authority and question decisions or working patterns in organizations, and the youth lack determination of taking responsibility of work tasks. The arrogant attitudes are also creating communicative obstacles between co-­‐workers. The youth is also criticised for not having the stamina of facing the hardship of work, but want to find easy solutions and work shorter hours. (Di 2013) A number of a management magazines and also the wider public already discuss and compare emerging differences of social behaviour between the 80’s and 90’s one-­‐child generations. The 90’s generation is generally depicted to be more freedom and enjoy-­‐driven and their attitudes toward authority are more critical than the generation born in 1980’s. Based on still one of the few comparative studies between 80’s and 90’s generations we can see that at this stage both share identical motives in evaluating their job criteria. For both generations salary is the most important criteria of choosing jobs. The possibility to develop and express special knowledge at work is ranked to the second most important requirement in considering their career moves. The relaxed nature of their workplace is third most important conditions for the youth. Surprisingly, social status, possibilities to pursue chances leaving abroad to work and power were the least important criteria of choosing work. (Di 2013; Zou 2011) 8 DRAFT: Not for distribution without permission of the author. No quoting. This article a draft. Wording in final article different. HERE Table 1. Y and Z generation university students’ criteria of choosing jobs. However, we can identify tangible differences between the Y-­‐ and Z-­‐generations when we compare their preferential choices of employers. In 2004 the three most ideal employers of Y-­‐generation were colleges or universities, big or medium size state owned enterprises and party or governmental organizations. In 2009 the Z-­‐generation strongly preferred either state owned enterprises, the party controlled state bureaucracy or the foreign sector as their most desirable employer. It is notable that the state controlled sector had a dominating position in the preferable choices for both generations. This can be explained by job-­‐
security reasons and the dominating position of state sector in Chinese economy. (Zou 2011) Lastly, the Z-­‐generation illustrated great interests to work in the party apparatus or the party dominated governmental sector. There was significant increase of desire, from about quarter to half of the respondents, to find a work within the core structure of Chinese state. This development parallels with the current increasing desire of youth to join the party. Three out of four university students informed that they would like to become accepted to the party, in comparison every second respondent of Y-­‐generation would like to join the party. However, less than one in ten of them said that they believed in the Communist ideology. The possibility of “realizing self” in society was the most important reason for their desire to join the party. (Zou 2011) HERE: Table 2. Y and Z generation university students preferable sectors of occupation. Conclusion We illustrate in this chapter how the relationship between the immediate socio-­‐
political and economic circumstances has deeply altered the values and role of Chinese youth during recent century. The dominating political and economic values changed drastically over time; from the broad political liberal values and movements and eventual revolutions in early 20th century to relentless over-­‐
politicised collectivist values in Mao’s China. It is notable that as in this process took part several highly politicised youth generations they all shared a common goal; to destroy the Confucian establishment and creating a strong China. The current youth generations form an exception in this sense. They are highly apolitical and instead they are described to be selfish, unable to co-­‐operate with other people and adore materialism. The Party has carried out dramatic structural changes in Chinese society that has affected the value development of current youth: the economic reforms that has unleashed unprecedented competitive forces in China and the one-­‐child policy launched in 1979 that have changed the lives of urban families. In addition, the Party made two political decisions that have changed the values and societal role of current youth; with the clampdown of the Tiananmen 9 DRAFT: Not for distribution without permission of the author. No quoting. This article a draft. Wording in final article different. movement in 1989 the Party deprived the moral right of the youth to practice their historical vanguard role of carrying out critical evaluation of the fundamental values of Chinese society; and since the aftermath of Tiananmen the Party has strongly and successfully propagated Deng’s mantra of “to get rich is glorious”. Hence, it comes as little surprise that the youth is not interested in communitarian issues and tend to be self-­‐centric, hedonist and adore materialistic values. However, the party dominated official value structure and actual values of youth are deeply paradoxical. On the one hand, the Party is deeply concerned with the commercial value development that it has prompted and as a reaction to it Beijing is carrying out massive propaganda war against the values it has unleashed in society whilst the Party needs to push forward the economic reforms and encourage people to consume. On the other hand, these self-­‐centric material adoring young individuals have expressed their strong desire to become members in the Communist party that still clings to communitarian values. Drawing conclusions that these individualistic values would have a Confucian origin or that the modernisation process would have an isomorphic affect and ‘Westernise’ Chinese values are both questionable. We have no reason to expect that modernisation would lead in a progressive manner to Westernization of China nor to expect that the Chinese youth would unequivocally embrace the communitarian Confucian or egalitarian Communist values. Instead we need to analyse carefully the immediate context of increasingly complex and evolving socio-­‐political, economic and cultural environment that shape and co-­‐evolve together with the changing values of the future generations of China. This is also the key to understanding the actual future projection of Chinese values in the cross-­‐cultural context in current China. Bibliography Ambler, T., Witzel, M. and Chi, X.: Doing business in China, Routledge, London, 2008 Cameron, L., Erkal, N., Gandadharan, L. and Meng, X.: ”Little Emperors: Behavioral Impacts of China’s One-­‐Child Policy”, Science, 339, 2013, 953-­‐957 Di Lijuan: ”80, 90hou yuangong de tezhi ji guanli”, Qiye wenming, 8, 2013, 53-­‐56 Hofstede, G. and Hofstede, J.: Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind, McGrawHill, London, 2005 Jensen, L.: Manufacturing Confucianism: Chinese tradition and universal civilization, Duke UP, 1998 L. Cameron, N. Erkal, L. Gandadharan and X. Meng: ”Little Emperors: Behavioral Impacts of China’s One-­‐Child Policy”, Science, 339, 2013, 953-­‐957 Li, Z.: Li Zehou shi nian ji, 3 juan xia, Anhui wenyi chubanshe, 1994 Park, S. H. and Luo Y.D.: ‘Guanxi and Organizational Dynamics: Organizational Networking in Chinese Firms', Strategical Management Journal, 22, 5, 2001, 455-­‐
477 Porter, E.: The People’s Doctor: George Hatem and China’s Revolution, University of Hawaii Press, 1997, 71 Pusey, J.: China and Charles Darwin, Harvard UP, Cambridge, 1983 10 DRAFT: Not for distribution without permission of the author. No quoting. This article a draft. Wording in final article different. Redding, G.: “The capitalist business system of China and its rationale”, Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 19; 2-­‐3, 2002, 221-­‐249 Schoenhals, M.: China’s Cultural Revolution, 1966-­‐69: Not a Dinner Party, M.E. Sharpe, 1996 Zeng Yanbo: ”Dangdai Zhongguo qingnian jiazhiguan fazhan tedian ji shengcheng yinsuo yanjiu”, Mao Zedong Deng Xiaoping lilun yanjiu, 6, 2007, 36-­‐45 Zhang Bin: ”Y shidai daxuesheng de tedian he guanli gongzuo de xin silu”, Huanan gongli daxue xuebao, 13, 2, 2011, 109-­‐111 Zou Qiang: ”80hou daxuesheng yu 90hou daxuesheng jiazhiguan bi fenxi”, Guanxi jiaoyu xueyuan xuebao, 3, 113, 2011, 71-­‐75 TABLES TABLE 1: Social status Power Salary Possibilities to express and develop special knowledge Relaxed atmosphere of work The possibility to pursue going abroad Geographic location TABLE 2: Party or governmental organization College or academia Primary or high-­‐school Research institute Foreign joint-­‐venture or wholly owned foreign enterprise NGO Township and village enterprise Big and medium size State Owned Enterprise Entrepreneurship Pre 1990 born students (2004) Rank Chosen by (%) 5 23,9 7 9,0 1 83,9 2 66,0 Post 1990 born students (2009) Rank Chosen by (%) 5 24,5 7 7,4 1 85,0 2 65,8 3 46,3 3 55,4 6 11,3 6 13,0 4 33,3 4 32,9 Pre 1990 born students (2004) Rank Chosen by (%) 3 28,1 Post 1990 born students (2009) Rank Chosen by (%) 2 50,6 1 4 8 5 43,3 25,8 11,3 23,6 6 8 4 3 18,8 9,3 40,3 40,4 5 7 23,6 16,8 3 9 40,4 6,1 2 29,1 1 64,6 9 10,6 7 16,6 1 http://ctext.org/analects/xue-­‐er (Access: 2014-­‐03-­‐25) 2 http://ctext.org/analects/zi-­‐han (Access: 2014-­‐03-­‐25) 11 DRAFT: Not for distribution without permission of the author. No quoting. This article a draft. Wording in final article different. 3 http://ctext.org/xunzi/wang-­‐zhi (Access: 2014-­‐03-­‐25) 4 http://www.csmonitor.com/1988/1221/ochin14.html (Access: 2014-­‐03-­‐25) 5 http://tieba.baidu.com/p/1182475037 (Access: 2014-­‐03-­‐25); http://www.csstoday.net/xuekepindao/zhengming/82115.html (Access: 2014-­‐
03-­‐25) 6 http://news.ifeng.com/society/2/detail_2012_05/06/14340557_0.shtml (Access: 2014-­‐03-­‐25) 7 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/world/asia/burden-­‐of-­‐chinas-­‐college-­‐
entrance-­‐test-­‐sets-­‐off-­‐wide-­‐
debate.html?_r=0&adxnnl=1&pagewanted=all&adxnnlx=1382043141-­‐
VizKTzkWPSMnKxiuZ9pP4A (Access: 2014-­‐03-­‐25) 8 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/31/time-­‐running-­‐out-­‐china-­‐
one-­‐child-­‐policy-­‐exemptions (Access: 2014-­‐03-­‐25) 9 http://www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/shehui/xl-­‐07032013101907.html (Access: 2014-­‐03-­‐25); http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2013/07/china-­‐beefs-­‐up-­‐
elderly-­‐rights-­‐law/ (Access: 2014-­‐03-­‐25) 12