Centre for
European
Policy
Studies
CEPS Policy Brief
No. 68/April 2005
A Spreading Danger
Time for a New Policy towards Chechnya
Fiona Hill, Anatol Lieven and Thomas de Waal
Thinking ahead for Europe
Summary
The ongoing conflict in and around Chechnya is helping to feed the wider international jihadi
movement, and is endangering the West as well as Russia. The next “soft target” of North Caucasian
terrorism could be a Western one. Mutual recriminations over the conflict have badly damaged relations
between Russia and the West. While most of the blame for this lies with Russian policies, the Western
approach to the issue has often been unhelpful and irresponsible. Denunciations of Russian behaviour
have not been matched by a real understanding of the Chechen conflict or a real commitment to help. In
their own interest, Western countries need urgently to address the crisis in the North Caucasus. This
requires them to recognize the seriousness of the threat, to open a real dialogue on cooperation with
Russia rather than simply making criticisms, and to make a serious economic contribution to the region.
Fiona Hill is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. and has researched, published, and
commented extensively on Russian and Eurasian affairs and on international strategic and energy issues. Anatol
Lieven is a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. From 1990 to 1996 he was a
correspondent for the Times (London) in the former Soviet Union, and covered the first Chechen War as a reporter.
Thomas de Waal is Caucasus editor at the Institute for War and Peace Reporting.
This paper is reprinted by kind permission of the publisher from A Spreading Danger: Time for a New Policy toward
Chechnya, Anatol Lieven (Washington, DC; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005)
(http://ww.carnegieendowment.org). The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the institutions with which they are associated nor those of CEPS.
Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable only to the authors in a personal capacity and not to any
institution with which they are associated.
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (http://www.ceps.be)
Contents
Relations at an Impasse ............................................................................................................................1
A Broader Problem in the North Caucasus ..............................................................................................1
A Flawed Foreign Response.....................................................................................................................2
The Need for New Perceptions ................................................................................................................3
New Western Approaches ........................................................................................................................3
Related Resources ....................................................................................................................................5
A Spreading Danger
Time for a New Policy towards Chechnya
CEPS Policy Brief No. 68/April 2005
Fiona Hill, Anatol Lieven and Thomas de Waal
Relations at an Impasse
In 2004, Western countries’ dealings with Russia over the
war in Chechnya reached an impasse, full of mutual
suspicion and denunciation. If this situation is allowed to
continue, any positive Western contribution to the
improvement of conditions in the North Caucasus will
remain virtually impossible, and the situation there is likely
to become increasingly dangerous for Russia and the West.
The principal blame for the tension with the West over
Chechnya lies with Russian policy. However, the Western
approach to the conflict has too often been unhelpful and
irresponsible. On the Russian side, first the Yeltsin and then
the Putin administrations have grossly mismanaged
Chechnya. The first Russian military intervention, of
December 1994, was unnecessary, rash, and brutal. The
second, of October 1999, though more justified, was
premature and savagely conducted. As in the first
intervention, indiscriminate force was too often used.
Grozny has twice been bombarded into ruin. The fact that
such action has numerous parallels in Western military
campaigns does not make it any more acceptable.
On the ground, Russian servicemen have committed many
well-documented atrocities against Chechnya’s civilian
population. As of 2005, the Russian armed forces have to a
great extent won the main military campaign in Chechnya,
but this has only led Chechen extremists and their allies to
resort to larger-scale and more monstrous terrorist attacks
on “soft targets” outside Chechnya, including the Dubrovka
theatre in Moscow in October 2002 and the school in
Beslan in September 2004.
A Broader Problem in the North Caucasus
The problems stemming from the Chechen conflict have
broadened. It is no longer accurate simply to talk about
“Chechen militants”. The hostage-takers in Beslan included
Ingush and individuals from other parts of the North
Caucasus. Since defeating the Russian army in the war of
1994-1996, the Chechen radicals and their international
allies have had an agenda of undermining Russian rule
across the whole North Caucasus.
In recent years, entrenched poverty, corruption, criminality,
and ethno-religious divisions in the region have
strengthened their chances. While the situation in Chechnya
is slowly improving, things are getting markedly worse in
neighbouring North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Daghestan,
Kabardino-Balkharia, and Karachaevo-Cherkessia.
The North Caucasus has a long history of communal strife
that erupted again in the 1990s. The bloodiest episode was
a conflict between ethnic Ingush and Ossetians over a land
dispute that took more than 600 lives in 1992. The region is
also chronically underdeveloped, with high unemployment
and poverty rates, and low average wages and per capita
incomes.
These socioeconomic problems are breeding instability and
radicalism. Radical Islamist influence has risen since the
mid- 1990s, when militant groups entrenched themselves in
the region. The growth of militancy has only been
exacerbated by the heavy-handed reaction of the
authorities, who have, for example, closed down virtually
all the mosques in Kabardino-Balkharia.
The first modern Chechen war, of 1994-1996, largely
stopped at the borders of Chechnya. Chechen separatists
received very little support from their regional neighbours.
Today, this pattern has changed, as demonstrated by direct
Ingush involvement in a raid on the Ingushetian city of
Nazran in June 2004 and the participation of Ingush and
members of other North Caucasus ethnic groups in the
terrorist attack on the school in Beslan in September 2004.
Although reliable data are also hard to come by, much of
the Chechen rebel movement has clearly adopted a wider
radical agenda that goes beyond only independence for
Chechnya. During and after the war of 1994-1996, a small
but influential group of international jihadi fighters based
themselves in Chechnya under the leadership of an Arab
with the nom de guerre of Khattab, while home-grown
rebel leaders, such as Shamil Basayev, Arbi Barayev, and
Movladi Udugov, allied themselves with this group and
began to look to Middle Eastern Islamists for support.
Arabs based in the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia, alongside
Chechen fighters, were associated with an alleged plot to
launch a terrorist attack in London using the poison ricin.
Members of the international jihadi movement have sought
to exploit the Chechen conflict for their own wider ends,
just as they have in Palestine, Kashmir, and many other
places, and unfortunately, with considerable success. This
strategy has been set out by Al Qaeda’s second-incommand, Aiman al-Zawahiri, in his pamphlet “Knights
Under the Prophet’s Banner”.
|1
2 | Hill, Lieven & de Waal
Although Russian claims about the importance of the
international terrorist element in the Chechen conflict are
often exaggerated, this factor is nonetheless a real and
important one. There clearly is now an ideological and
financial link between the Chechen radicals and
international jihadi terrorists, and there is also a
demonstration effect. Terror tactics adopted by jihadis in
Chechnya have been propagated by video and the Internet
and adopted elsewhere, including in Iraq. This link with
international jihadi terrorism should be of direct concern to
Western governments because they must face the
possibility that the next soft target of North Caucasian
terrorism could be a Western one.
President Putin has provided an opening for a more positive
Western role in the region by informing German
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder of his desire for active
Western involvement in the economic development of the
North Caucasus region. The West should exploit this
opening by actively pursuing intensive talks with Russian
officials on how such a programme can be developed in
detail.
This approach should involve both Western state aid
organizations and international financial institutions, like
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
Western-supported programmes should include restoring
transport and communications links, improving social
infrastructure like housing and electricity, creating new
educational institutions, and helping in the creation and
growth of small businesses. Western help to the North
Caucasus region will be good in itself, and will be good for
the West because it will help to limit the spread of Islamist
extremism and terrorism. It will also help to develop a
climate of trust between Russia and the West, which should
give the West greater chances of exerting a positive
influence in Moscow over the conflict in Chechnya and
other areas of concern.
A Flawed Foreign Response
Foreign responses to the conflict in Chechnya have too
often been marked by ignorance, bad faith, and the
projection of other agendas. Western politicians have
repeatedly let their own political aims vis-à-vis Russia
shape their reaction to events in Chechnya. In 1994–1996,
for example, Western support for Boris Yeltsin in his
purported struggles with the remnants of the Communist
Party constantly softened Western criticism of Russian
brutalities in Chechnya. More recently, two other agendas –
the war on terror and a growing campaign to try to limit
Russian influence in the states of the former Soviet Union –
have further distorted Western thinking about Chechnya.
On the other hand, much of Western public comment on
Chechnya has been uninformed or biased against Russia.
Both media and policy elites disregarded the real threats to
Russian security and to the stability of the North Caucasus
emanating from Chechnya during its period of quasiindependence between 1997 and 1999. In those years, the
Western media largely failed to report the wave of savage
kidnappings against Russian citizens, including senior
Russian officials, and the establishment in Chechnya of
international Islamist extremists. Casualty figures in
Chechnya have often been grossly exaggerated by Western
journalists and commentators (see box on page 5). These
have in fact reduced markedly in recent years.
While Chechens complain justifiably of the very high level
of official and unofficial criminality and violence in their
republic, there are also some modest signs of improvement
in everyday life in Chechnya. Running water and electricity
are more readily available, checkpoints are much reduced,
travel is less restricted, and mobile phone usage is now
possible in the republic.
None of these improvements suggest that violence and
atrocities in Chechnya are by any means over, but in
portraying Chechnya as an unchanging, unmitigated horror,
the West has precluded an honest discussion with Moscow
about the conflict. It has also treated Chechnya in a manner
very different from its treatment of similar separatist
conflicts in Turkey, India, and other states aligned with the
West.
In the case of Turkey, the EU took a harder line on human
rights than the United States, but both were careful always
to stress their support for the basic aims of the Turkish
campaign and for Turkish territorial integrity. Unlike in the
case of Chechnya, they were also careful to recognize and
praise any progress made in terms of respect for human
rights, and in the case of the EU, to offer incentives for
such progress in terms of greater integration into Europe.
Finally, while Western officials and commentators have
continued to press the need for a “political solution” to the
Chechen conflict, with very rare exceptions they have not
suggested what this political solution should or could be,
beyond a call for Moscow to negotiate directly with former
Chechen president and separatist leader Aslan Maskhadov.
Nor have they suggested in any detail how the West might
support a political solution.
In fact, hopes of long-term amelioration of the situation in
Chechnya depend not on a solution but a process involving
growing political participation, economic development, and
the gradual creation of a modern society in Chechnya. This
needs to be set in the wider context of development for the
region as a whole.
Although Aslan Maskhadov maintains an important
symbolic value for a segment of the Chechen people as the
legitimately elected former president, simply talking to
Maskhadov is no solution. He is the face most familiar to
Western observers, but he does not represent the only
political force in Chechnya and does not control a large part
of the Chechens fighting against Russia. Maskhadov’s
ability to solve the Chechen conflict and to provide peace
has dramatically declined over the years. Although he
retains standing in the Chechen population, he has lost the
potential to unify broader groups of Chechens. Maskhadov
A Spreading Danger: Time for a New Policy towards Chechnya | 3
should be part of a future process, but he cannot be the sole
element.
The Need for New Perceptions
The first step that the West needs to take is to change the
nature of the conversation that its representatives have with
Moscow about Chechnya and the North Caucasus. Their
approach needs to be more sophisticated, more detailed,
and more focused on offering practical solutions to a range
of problems that affect other countries as well as Russia.
Russia should rightly be reminded of the commitments it
made to defend human rights when it joined institutions
like the Council of Europe. But these reminders should be
accompanied by a recognition that progress has been made,
and assurances that the West is not just interested in
berating Russia but is genuinely ready to offer practical
help in dealing with the problems in the North Caucasus.
There will be no single solution to the Chechen conflict in
the sense of a “quick fix” – an agreement or treaty that
would end the violence. A very large number – perhaps a
majority – of the fighters in Chechnya and those carrying
out terrorist attacks in Russia will continue to do so
irrespective of any settlement, whether for ideological or
personal reasons, just as they did after the Russian
withdrawal from Chechnya in 1996.
It should be remembered that leading Chechen commanders
and their Islamist allies revolted against the authority of
President Aslan Maskhadov after the conclusion of the
Khasavyurt Accord and the establishment of quasiindependence in 1996. They did so in the name of the
creation of an Islamist republic and the continuation of
jihad against Russia, and despite the fact that Maskhadov
had been elected president by an overwhelming majority of
Chechens in January 1997.
One of the weaknesses of the Khasavyurt documents was
that they stipulated a decision on the final status of
Chechnya within the relatively short period of five years.
The clock was set ticking on Chechnya’s possible formal
independence from the very beginning. This heightened the
inevitable tensions between Grozny and Moscow in the
post-war period and meant that Russian- Chechen official
meetings, instead of concentrating on vital immediate
issues like reconstruction, crime, and extremism, were
constantly diverted into fruitless bickering over the
question of formal independence.
Today, after a decade of war and devastation, and against a
backdrop of similar conflicts in the international arena, it
should be clear that, for a very long time to come, the
development of a Chechen state and of a new Chechen
political society will have to take place within the Russian
Federation, and that independence for Chechnya is off the
agenda for many years to come. This now seems to be
accepted by the great majority of Chechens, including
officials of Aslan Maskhadov’s “government” in exile.
Recovery from the physical and socioeconomic devastation
of the past decade, and the struggle against Islamist
extremism, are far greater priorities. Moreover, the periods
of de facto independence in 1991-1994, and still more in
1997-1999, proved disastrous experiences. The wide
realization of this fact marks an evolution from views on
independence held both in Chechnya and in the West in
1996.
New Western Approaches
Given the inevitability of Chechnya’s medium-term
development within the Russian Federation, the West
should also recognize that President Putin’s current strategy
of “Chechenisation”, along with the progressive restoration
of the full autonomy of the Chechen republic, could
provide the basis for future cooperation between Western
governments and Moscow.
However, it would be a grave mistake to believe that
Moscow’s current strategy in Chechnya or the North
Caucasus as a whole is remotely adequate. Criminality and
corruption in Chechnya and beyond are at catastrophic
levels. Amongst the worst culprits are federal forces and
the so-called Kadyrovtsy, fighters grouped around Ramzan
Kadyrov, the son of former pro-Moscow leader Akhmad
Kadyrov. The Kadyrovtsy are responsible for extrajudicial
killings, abductions, and torture. Moreover, even if overall
levels of violence have decreased, daunting socioeconomic,
health, and psychological problems remain.
Although the tent camps in Ingushetia have been closed,
tens of thousands of displaced people continue to live in
substandard accommodations, both in Ingushetia and in
Chechnya itself. Chechens are also increasingly seeking
refugee status and asylum in Europe. In a detailed survey of
displaced people in Ingushetia and Chechnya in 2004,
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) found that more than 90
percent of respondents had been exposed to violence, with
about one sixth of those surveyed stating that they had
witnessed the violent death of a member of their nuclear
family in the conflict. MSF recorded extremely high levels
of emotional distress and physical illness, including most
notably tuberculosis.
This means that the West should present a more nuanced
message. While reaffirming Russia’s territorial integrity
and welcoming federal efforts to rebuild Chechnya, it must
speak firmly about the alarming human rights situation and,
in particular, the behaviour of the Kadyrovtsy. The message
that can be delivered should be one of concern at Moscow’s
failure to control its local allies rather than one blaming the
Kremlin for deliberately unleashing violence on ordinary
Chechens.
A central problem in Chechnya has always been that the
armed forces, whether Russian, Chechens allied to Russia,
or separatist, tend to become criminalized entities beholden
only unto themselves. Thus, murder, theft, extortion, and
kidnapping by the Russian troops and their local allies have
undermined any goodwill Chechens might ever feel toward
4 | Hill, Lieven & de Waal
the Russian government or the Moscow-backed authorities
in Chechnya.
Western Media Accounts of Chechen Casualties
Since the renewed Russian military intervention in 1999, some
elements of the Western media have routinely referred to
civilian casualties from both Chechen wars in the range of
250,000. This is despite the fact that even most Russian human
rights groups opposed to the Putin administration estimate
around 80,000-100,000 total casualties, including Russian
soldiers and Chechen fighters.
Western media and policy elites have also failed to recognize
that the scale of the conflict within Chechnya has changed
greatly since 2002. Nor have they acknowledged Russian
official attempts – albeit limited and inadequate – to address
human rights abuses by Russian forces.
According to the Russian Human Rights group, Memorial, 293
Chechen residents were killed in 2004. This number included
114 civilians, 101 security personnel, and 36 fighters, with the
remainder local government officials and their families or
unidentified. A further 173 people were abducted by unknown
assailants and disappeared without a trace. Memorial monitors
only five of Chechnya’s seventeen regions, including heavily
populated Grozny but excluding the mountains where much of
the fighting is taking place, and reports only on cases where it
has direct evidence. So the real casualty figures may be very
considerably higher. But this does still mark a welcome
reduction in overall levels of violence.
The figures are in stark contrast to the estimated 10,000–
20,000 killed in 1999-2002. The Memorial estimate for the
plains of Chechnya in 2004 is exceeded by the numbers killed
in the Nazran and Beslan terrorist attacks outside Chechnya,
and is considerably less than the 400-500 people estimated by
the Economist (January 1, 2005) to have been killed by the
U.S. military in the Iraqi city of Ramadi alone in the months
since September 2004. It may then be more appropriate today
to talk about widespread armed criminality and political
violence rather than full-scale war in Chechnya.
The West must continue, therefore, to push Russia greatly
to improve its overall strategy and the political process it is
trying to establish in Chechnya. This relates to:
• The need to rein in the behaviour of Russian security
forces and their Chechen allies toward the population
and to prosecute abuses much more extensively.
• A real amnesty for all Chechen fighters (as opposed to
the dubious amnesties offered in the past), including for
those who have killed Russian soldiers and civilians, on
the model of the British amnesty for IRA and Loyalist
terrorists in Northern Ireland. The only exception should
be those guilty of planning bestial atrocities like Beslan.
• The need for the Russian state to make the political
process in Chechnya much more genuinely democratic
and pluralist. At the very least, Moscow should allow
real competition for power between Chechen leaders
who accept membership in the Russian Federation.
A key test of Russian behaviour concerning this last point
will be parliamentary elections in Chechnya. The Russian
government has announced that these elections will be held
in 2005, but has not yet set a date. The West should hold
the Kremlin to this promise, and offer support, recognition,
and legitimacy in return for guarantees that the elections
will be free and fair. If properly conducted, the elections
could be used to take the political and economic monopoly
away from the Kadyrovtsy and to bring in respected
Chechens both from Chechnya and from the Chechen
diaspora in Russia, who thus far have been excluded from
the political process.
Unfortunately, while none of this is formally opposed to the
stated goals of Russian policy in Chechnya, in practice it
runs against much of the spirit of Vladimir Putin’s political
strategy in Russia as a whole, with its tendency toward
centralization and the weakening of autonomous
institutions. In Chechnya, this is reflected in a continued
reliance on the Kadyrovtsy to the exclusion of all other
potential allies. This, however, need not be an insuperable
obstacle. In practice, Russian officials recognize that
Chechnya is a very special case, and the Kremlin might be
able to accept a special status for Chechnya in return for
full Western support and a better chance of combating
terrorism.
For a more sensible and effective approach to be accepted
by the Russian government, Western interlocutors need to
offer serious incentives. An opening in this regard has been
provided by the Putin administration’s desire for
international economic help in developing the North
Caucasus region. This was stated by President Putin during
his meeting with Chancellor Schroeder in December 2004
and has led to preliminary discussions between Russian
officials and representatives of international financial
institutions.
Western incentives to Russia to change its strategy in
Chechnya should include:
• Explicit and repeated support for Russian territorial
integrity.
• Intensified technical assistance to Russia to help cut off
funding to the Chechen separatists from the Middle East
and to capture or kill extremist leaders like Shamil
Basayev.
• A commitment to secure the Georgian- Russian border
against infiltration by Chechen and international jihadi
fighters. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) monitoring contingent on
this border has been not very effective, but Russia’s
veto of its extension is unjustified and risks dangerous
consequences. Intensive discussions should take place
with Moscow on how the West can help to increase
security on this frontier.
• Substantial aid to Chechnya to support a settlement and
political process as part of a general package of aid from
Western governments and international institutions
directed at the North Caucasus.
A Spreading Danger: Time for a New Policy towards Chechnya | 5
• In particular, support for programmes aimed at helping
Chechen refugees return to their homes and rebuild their
lives.
• Support for genuine elections in Chechnya. In return for
Russian guarantees in this regard, the West should
accept President Putin’s invitation to send international
election monitors to cover the elections and – if they do
in fact merit this – to legitimize them in the eyes of the
Chechens and the world.
• The creation of an international working group that
could assist with the development of a more pluralistic
political process, similar to the groups set up to facilitate
the peace processes in Northern Ireland and in
Tajikistan (where Russia itself was directly involved).
Such a working group could be created under the auspices
of the United Nations Security Council, or the G8organizations in which Russia feels it has a major role and
an important stake, and which are not likely to be seen as
automatically biased against Russian views and interests.
Unfortunately, the Council of Europe and the OSCE are no
longer useful bodies from this point of view.
None of this will bring about an early or complete end to
the violence in Chechnya. As in Palestine, Kashmir, and
elsewhere, however, an internationally backed political
process will however contribute to isolating the extremists
and terrorists, and rallying moderate Chechens to fight
against them. It will also help lay the basis for a modern
Chechen society, with political parties and civic
institutions, and for a developed Chechen economy.
This kind of modernization will be essential to peace and
progress for the Chechen people whether or not they remain
permanently within the Russian Federation, and indeed for
the North Caucasus as a whole. Such development in the
region is vitally important to Russia, but in the context of
the threat from Islamist extremism and terrorism, it should
also be of great importance to the West.
Related Resources
Visit www.CarnegieEndowment.org/pubs for these and
other publications.
Chechnya: What Can Be Done?, Anatol Lieven, Thomas de
Waal, and Fiona Hill, statements on Chechnya
(Carnegie Endowment, October 28, 2004), available
at
www.CarnegieEndowment.org/events/
index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=729.
Russia’s Restless Frontier: The Chechnya Factor in PostSoviet Russia, Dmitri Trenin and Aleksei V.
Malashenko with Anatol Lieven (Carnegie
Endowment, 2004).
Chechnya after September 11th, Anatol Lieven, prepared
statement before the CSCE of the U.S. Congress
(May
9,
2002),
available
at
www.CarnegieEndowment.org/publications/index.cf
m?fa=view&id=978.
Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus, Thomas de Waal and
Carlotta Gall (NYU Press, 1998).
Chechnya, Tombstone of Russian Power, Anatol Lieven
(Yale University Press, 1998).
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