vol99_no3_a2-cover

®
The Law Journal of the International Trademark Association
Proving Your Bona Fides—
Establishing Bona Fide Intent to Use
Under the U.S. Trademark (Lanham) Act
Sandra Edelman
Good Will Enduring:
How to Ensure That Trademark Priority
Will Not Be Destroyed by the Sale of a Business
Neal R. Platt
Going After the Middleman:
Landlord Liability in the Battle Against Counterfeits
Daniel R. Plane
Some Cultural Narrative Themes and Variations
in the Common Law
Catherine W. Ng
Licences in OHIM Practice
Verena von Bomhard, Hugh O’Neill, and Anat Paz
Vol. 99
May-June, 2009
No. 3
788
Vol. 99 TMR
GOOD WILL ENDURING:
HOW TO ENSURE THAT TRADEMARK PRIORITY
WILL NOT BE DESTROYED BY
THE SALE OF A BUSINESS
By Neal R. Platt
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are advising your client Pam in the prospective
purchase of a few Italian restaurants located in a small geographic
area. All of the restaurants are owned by the same talented, but
aging, restaurateur named Lucio, who operates them under the
service mark LUCIO.1 Although the restaurants are popular and
profitable, Lucio has been unable to interest any of the younger
members of his family in assuming their operation, and so he has
decided to sell the business and retire to Tahiti at the earliest
possible moment.
From discussions with your client, you have learned that it
was Lucio who single-handedly developed all the special
characteristics of the restaurants that make them attractive to
their patrons, such as the recipes, menu and wine selections,
seating arrangements, and decor. Lucio also developed without
any assistance the solid and uniform quality-control standards
under which the restaurants are operated, standards that have
never been written down by Lucio or communicated to anyone else.
Similarly, it is Lucio, alone, who has conducted daily qualitycontrol inspections of each restaurant.
Pam has informed you that she and Lucio are aware that an
unrelated upstart named Irving Interloper has recently opened an
Italian restaurant under the name “Lucio” near one of Lucio’s
restaurants, and that she and Lucio have agreed that Lucio should
not precipitate immediate action against Interloper’s use of the
Lucio name.2 Pam has told you that she and Lucio both believe
Law.

Partner, Shwal & Platt; Special Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of
1. The analysis and prescriptions of this article apply equally to registered and
unregistered marks. See infra note 3.
2. Under many (perhaps most) circumstances, counsel will be unaware whether there
exists an interloper in a position to take advantage of the loss of priority occasioned by an
assignment in gross. The existence of the interloper has been brought to the reader’s attention
in this example solely to ensure that the potential catastrophe is kept ever in mind.
Vol. 99 TMR
789
that Interloper’s restaurant is likely to fail on its own within a few
months, as it appears to be experiencing serious difficulties both in
funding and in finding a satisfactory customer base. Pam has
informed you that she and Lucio have negotiated a price with full
knowledge of Interloper’s existence and his perceived prospects,
and she has instructed you to proceed with her purchase of Lucio’s
restaurants.
Last week, Lucio instructed his attorney to draft a purchaseand-sale agreement and to propose it to you. Upon your review of
the draft, you find that it contains no provision requiring Lucio to
pass along to Pam his knowledge of those characteristics of his
restaurants that are beloved by his customers or about his highly
successful quality-control standards. Unlike Lucio’s lawyer, who
appears to know little about trademark law, you are burdened
with the knowledge that if Lucio departs immediately upon the
closing of the sale without first imparting his beloved restaurant
characteristics and his quality-control standards to Pam, an
“assignment in gross” looms, with its dreaded consequences.
What is an “assignment in gross” ? An assignment in gross
occurs when a purchaser and seller violate the common-law
requirement that a mark be assigned only together “with the good
will of the business in which the mark is used, or with that part of
the good will of the business connected with the use of and
symbolized by the mark.”3 While the meaning of “good will” has
shifted perceptibly over the past century, a modern restatement of
the definition of good will and its relation to the trademark was
crafted by Judge Platt4 in 1994, as follows:
[G]ood will is the value attributable to a going concern apart
from its physical assets—the intangible worth of buyer
momentum emanating from the reputation and integrity
earned by the company. A trademark . . . is merely the symbol
by which the public recognizes that reputation and hence has
no independent significance apart from the owner’s good will.5
3. U.S. Trademark (Lanham) Act § 10(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(1) (2006). Although the
quotation in text is excerpted from the Lanham Act, which is devoted primarily to the
governance of federally registered marks, the requirement is derived from the common law
and is applied equally to all marks, without regard to registration. See, e.g., Clark & Freeman
Corp. v. Heartland Co., 811 F. Supp. 137, 139 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (“Although [Section 10]
applies only to registered trademarks, it parallels the common law rules of trademark
assignment. . . . Thus, no distinction is made herein between cases discussing assignability of
registered trademarks and those involving unregistered trademarks.”).
4. Judge Platt has no known family relation to the author, and is innocent of the
contents of this article.
5. Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp. v. Mattress Madness, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 1339,
1350 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (Platt, J.). Providing perhaps greater specificity, the U.S. Supreme
Court has defined “good will” as:
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Applying these concepts to our example, if Pam is found to
have purchased the LUCIO service mark without its attendant
good will, the assignment will be held to have been an assignment
in gross. The effect of such an invalid assignment will be the
irreversible destruction of all trademark priority rights earned by
Lucio up to the date of the closing, which are priority rights that
Pam will need in order to prevail in any impending trademark
dispute between her and Irving Interloper. In fact, if Pam loses the
trademark priority earned by Lucio prior to closing, she stands to
lose the LUCIO mark to Interloper altogether. After that, while
she may continue to operate the restaurants, she might be
prohibited from using the mark, and if so would no longer enjoy
the public confidence attendant upon it.
As Pam’s lawyer, you prudently want to insert a provision into
the purchase-and-sale agreement requiring Lucio to codify and
memorialize his beloved restaurant characteristics and qualitycontrol standards, impart them to Pam, and to stick around for a
time to help in their implementation. You should be aware,
however, that should you attempt to do so, you will have no
friends: not Lucio, not his lawyer, and not even your client Pam,
for the following reasons.
Lucio will be disinclined to undertake any such obligations, as
he expects that he has no post-closing interest in the survival of
the business. His perceived interest in the transaction is limited to
pocketing the proceeds, after which he hopes to leave town without
delay.
Lucio’s attorney will not want his client to undertake any such
obligations for several reasons. First, a client cannot be held liable
for failing to fulfill a contractual obligation he has not undertaken.
As a consequence, lawyers tend to believe that when it comes to
obligations to be undertaken by the client, the fewer the better.
The lawyer’s general inclination is given specific impetus in this
case, as Lucio’s fulfillment of continuing quality-control obligations
would interfere with his express desire to forget about the
restaurants and his ungrateful family, and to leave for Tahiti as
soon as possible. Second, codifying and imparting the restaurants’
the advantage or benefit, which is acquired by an establishment, beyond the mere
value of the capital, stock, funds, or property employed therein, in consequence of the
general public patronage and encouragement which it receives from constant or
habitual customers.
Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 555 (1993) (quoting Metro.
Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 149 U.S. 436 (1893)). See also Glow Indus., Inc. v. Lopez,
273 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1107 (C.D. Cal. 2003); Irene Calboli, Trademark Assignment “With
Goodwill”: A Concept Whose Time Has Gone, 57 Fla. L. Rev. 771, 782 (2005) (“[G]oodwill . . .
is . . . the ability of a mark to attract and retain consumers and to communicate to the
public the qualities and characteristics of the marked products.”).
Vol. 99 TMR
791
most esteemed features and Lucio’s quality-control standards, as
well as assisting in their implementation by the purchaser, can be
arduous, time-consuming tasks from which Lucio’s lawyer would
like to spare his client. Third, Lucio is known to be ill-suited to
such tasks, having developed the restaurants’ special features and
his quality-control standards intuitively over his working life, and
being completely unaccustomed to organizing and writing down
complex thoughts. Indeed, it may come as a surprise to Lucio to
learn that his teaching the restaurants’ most esteemed features to
Pam is a matter of legal significance, that what he has been doing
all this time can even be called “quality control,” and that
continuation of such features is legally necessary to provide Pam
with the full value of her purchase.
Now, for “the most unkindest cut of all.”6 Even Pam does not
want a provision to be inserted requiring Lucio to codify the
restaurants’ most esteemed features and Lucio’s quality-control
standards, impart them to her, and (worst of all) hang around to
assist in their implementation. In fact, Pam is a bit miffed at you.
She is, frankly, insulted that you would think she needs guidance
in running the restaurants, an activity for which she feels
eminently qualified. In addition, she finds Lucio unpleasant and
irascible, particularly when discussing the prospect of turning over
the fruit of his lifelong labor to (as he fondly calls Pam) “an
amateur.” On a personal level, Pam would probably prefer the
insertion of a contractual provision requiring Lucio to move to
Tahiti immediately and have his signature applied at the closing
by his lawyer, as his attorney-in-fact.
The irony of all this resistance is that in the event the LUCIO
mark is assigned to Pam by means of an “assignment in gross,” all
of the people involved stand to lose. By no means is the issue
problematic solely for the purchaser who stands to lose the LUCIO
mark. To the contrary, Pam, or any other purchaser discovering
that she has failed to receive trademark priority for which she
believes she has paid, is very likely to consider recourse against
Lucio, as well as against her lawyer whose job it was to avoid such
problems, namely, you. Lucio, fearing liability, may consider
recourse against his own lawyer, whose job it was to protect Lucio
against such problems. In such a situation, it would provide you
with cold comfort simply to say, “I told you so.”
It should be simple to imagine that your situation would be no
less uncomfortable if you were, conversely, knowledgeable counsel
for Lucio (or another seller) faced with a less knowledgeable
counterpart, for in such case you would be advising your client to
6. William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar act 3, sc. 2, lines 181-86.
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insist that he contractually undertake burdensome obligations in
which he sees no hope of gain, and which have not been even
requested by the purchaser. Indeed, the purchaser can be expected
actively to resist precisely the cooperation she needs in order to
reap the full benefit of her bargain.
It is inevitable that on one day or another every lawyer will
alienate those around him by espousing a legal principle believed
by everyone else involved to be completely daft.7 A lawyer having
no choice but to carry the day in the face of unanimous resistance
deserves to be armed with more than mere knowledge of the legal
principle. It is the object of the following to provide the practitioner
with not only an understanding of the legal principle, but also to
provide a reasoned approach to the design and implementation of a
means, tolerable to all, of averting the assignment-in-gross
problem entirely.
II. RELEVANT LAW
A. Effect of Valid Assignment
The law of trademarks requires the seller of a trademark to
assign to its purchaser at the closing the “good will” of the business
to which the mark is appurtenant.8 So long as the trademark is
7. Indeed, for the knowledgeable practitioner involved in the conveyance of small- and
medium-size businesses, such days are legion. Although the bombast of opposing counsel may
be rationalized as high praise, and an occasional glare from the Bench perceived as an
acknowledgment of craft, the doubt and frustration of one’s own client are difficult to bear.
Nevertheless, for the lawyer to fulfill his role as a zealous advocate for his client’s interest, he
sometimes has no choice but to challenge the client’s view of her own interest. This article is
humbly offered in friendship to the otherwise friendless practitioner at one such time.
8. Section 10(a)(1) of the Lanham Act codifies the common law rule and applies it to
federally registered marks, as follows:
A registered mark or a mark for which an application to register has been filed shall
be assignable with the good will of the business in which the mark is used, or with
that part of the good will of the business connected with the use of and symbolized by
the mark.
Lanham Act § 10(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(1) (2006). Although Section 10(a)(2) provides that it
is unnecessary to recite the inclusion of “good will” in the assignment itself, that subsection is
intended simply to avoid elevating the words “good will” to some talismanic level such that any
assignment lacking their pro forma recitation would be deemed unacceptable for recording.
Implementing such statutory intention, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office instructs its
Trademark Examining Attorneys as follows:
As a general rule, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) does not
investigate or evaluate the validity of assignments. Therefore, the examining attorney
should issue an inquiry concerning the compliance of an assignment with the cited
provisions of §10 only if:
Vol. 99 TMR
793
sold together with such good will, in any post-closing trademark
dispute between the purchaser and a third party, the purchaser
will ordinarily be entitled to rely upon its seller’s priority.9 As a
practical matter, the trademark rights of the purchaser will
prevail over those of a conflicting third party who adopted a
confusingly similar mark at any time subsequent to the seller’s
adoption of the mark.
B. Effect of Assignment in Gross
The sale of a trademark without good will (that is, by an
assignment in gross) results in the irreversible destruction of
trademark priority earned by the seller up to the date of closing.
After an assignment in gross, in any post-closing trademark
dispute between the purchaser and a third party, the purchaser
will find itself unable to rely upon its seller’s trademark priority,
instead being relegated to reliance upon such priority as may have
been earned by the purchaser’s own post-closing use of the mark.
In other words, where there has been a prohibited assignment in
gross, the purchaser’s trademark rights cannot prevail over those
of a third party who adopted the mark prior to the date of the
closing, and the purchaser even stands to lose its rights in the
trademark to such a third party.
Although the irreversible destruction of trademark priority
earned by the seller might seem the exaction of a draconian
(1) The application itself includes a statement indicating that the assignee is not a
successor to the original applicant’s business, or portion of the business to which the
mark pertains, if that business is ongoing and existing; or
(2) All of the following conditions are present:
(a) The assignment is executed before the filing of an acceptable amendment to
allege use or statement of use;
(b) The applicant submits the assignment document for inclusion in the
application record; and
(c) The assignment document fails to include the relevant language from §10 to
the effect that the assignment includes the entire business of the applicant/
assignor or the portion of the business to which the mark pertains.
The examining attorney should not require the submission of assignment documents
to determine compliance.
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure § 501.01(a)
(5th ed. 2007).
9. See, e.g., Premier Dental Prods. Co. v. Darby Dental Supply Co., 794 F.2d 850, 855 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986); The Money Store v. Harriscorp Fin., Inc., 689 F.2d 666,
677-78 (7th Cir. 1982); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Inc. v. Brown, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
29562 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (“Generally, an assignment of a trademark and its accompanying
goodwill will entitle the assignee to ‘step into the shoes’ of the assignor, gaining whatever
priority the assignor might have had in the mark.”); J. McCarthy, 3 McCarthy on Trademarks
and Unfair Competition § 18:15 (4th ed. 2008) [hereinafter McCarthy].
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penalty, it should not be viewed in such a dim light. Good will is
the public’s approval resulting from the seller’s exercise of quality
control. The doctrine of assignment in gross attempts to ensure
that the public’s approval cannot be bought, except by a purchaser
demonstrating preparedness to earn it by continuing the seller’s
quality-control standards. If a purchaser is unprepared to exert
the least effort to perpetuate the seller’s quality control, then the
assignment in gross doctrine does nothing more than deprive the
purchaser of the ownership of something the purchaser is
unprepared to earn. Viewed in this light, the destruction of the
seller’s priority is both precisely coextensive with the parties’
infraction, and its natural legal result. Whatever the merits of
such a result, it has been deemed essential to vindicate the
consumer’s interest in not being defrauded:
If one obtains a trademark through an assignment in gross,
divorced from the good will of the assignor, the assignee
obtains the symbol, but not the reality. Any subsequent use of
the mark by the assignee will necessarily be in connection
with a different business, a different good will and a different
type of product. The continuity of the things symbolized by the
mark is broken. Use of the mark by the assignee in connection
with a different good will and different product would result in
a fraud on the purchasing public, who reasonably assume that
the mark signified the same things, whether used by one
person or another.10
Viewed rightly, the bargain between seller and purchaser is in
no way altered by an assignment in gross, as title to the mark
remains precisely where the parties intended, that is, with the
purchaser.11
10. Money Store, 689 F.2d at 676; see also Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir.
1984); Haymaker Sports, Inc. v. Turian, 581 F.2d 257, 262 (C.C.P.A. 1978); Pepsico, Inc. v.
Grapette Co., 416 F.2d 285, 289 (8th Cir. 1969) (“It seems fundamental that either the
defendant did not acquire any ‘goodwill’ as required by law or if it did, assuming as
defendant argues the mark itself possesses ‘goodwill,’ by use of the mark on a totally
different product, [defendant] intended to deceive the public. Either ground is untenable to
the validity of the assignment.”).
11. But see R & R Partners, Inc. v. Tovar, 447 F. Supp. 2d 1141,1150 (D. Nev. 2006); 3
McCarthy, supra note 9, at § 18:20. In the author’s view, the few authorities holding that the
assignor in an assignment in gross effectively retains ownership of his pre-closing priority
have gerry-rigged an ill-considered technique that would destroy the doctrine of assignment in
gross entirely, as it fails to vindicate either the “public deception” or the “abandonment”
rationale for the doctrine, see text accompanying notes 29 through 32, and would render the
assertion of the seller’s pre-closing priority against an interloper a question merely of the
purchaser’s ability to obtain the seller’s joinder in the action. In any event, justifying the
catastrophic effect of an “assignment in gross” is beyond the scope of this article, its sole
concern being how to avoid it.
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795
Not only can the flaw in the purchaser’s trademark priority
caused by an assignment in gross be catastrophic, but it may
become manifest at any time; it does not fade away. There is
simply no time limit on a third party’s right to assert the
purchaser’s loss of trademark priority rights.
Experience teaches that many practitioners are unaware of
the hazards posed by an assignment in gross, and that even those
aware of the issue often do not know how to avoid such a disaster.
The practitioner’s difficulty in ensuring the fulfillment of the
requirement that good will be conveyed together with the
trademark begins with the inherent difficulty in interpreting the
meaning of good will. The term itself is vague, and its meaning has
shifted over much of the past century.12 At one time, the
requirement that good will be conveyed was generally thought to
be satisfied by the passing of title to all tangible assets of the
seller’s business.13 Later, the good will requirement became
commonly understood to be fulfilled by the seller’s ceasing to sell
goods of the kind previously sold under the mark.14 Numerous
judicial decisions have made it clear that neither understanding
retains any force.15
12. The history of the good will requirement is painstakingly traced in Irene Calboli,
Trademark Assignment “With Goodwill”: A Concept Whose Time Has Gone, 57 Fla. L. Rev.
771, 788-95 (2005). The history recounted in the article is marred, however, by its
unpersuasive characterization of the uneven development of the good will concept as a contest
between warring judicial factions, characterized as “liberal” and “conservative,” when such
development appears rather to evidence each court’s struggle to protect the interests of
consumers by affording continuing meaning to the good will concept without unduly restricting
the freedom of contracting parties to deal in trademarks appurtenant to their businesses and
without unnecessarily destroying trademark priority. While legal application of the term “good
will” has changed, the core concept has remained largely unchanged. In 1620, an English court
defined “good will” as the “friendly attitude and patronage of customers.” Broad v. Jollyfe, Cro.
Jac. 596, 79 Eng. Reprint 509 (1620). In 1893, the California Supreme Court defined goodwill
as “the probability that the old customer will resort to the new place.” Bell v. Ellis, 33 Cal. 620
(1867).
13. See, e.g., Nettie Rosenstein, Inc. v. Princess Pat, Ltd., 220 F.2d 444, 453 (C.C.P.A
1955).
14. See, e.g., Indep. Baking Powder Co. v. Boorman, 175 F. 448, 451-54 (C.C. D.N.J.
1910); Eiseman v. Schiffer, 157 F. 473, 475-76 (C.C. S.D.N.Y. 1907).
15. See Burgess v. Gilman, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 19090, at *4 (9th Cir. 2008); Clark &
Freeman Corp. v. Heartland Co., 811 F. Supp. 137, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); see also Defiance
Button Mach. Co. v. C&C Metal Prods., 759 F.2d 1053, 1059 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
844 (1985) (“[A] trademark may be validly transferred without the simultaneous transfer of
any tangible assets, as long as the recipient continues to produce goods of the same quality and
nature previously associated with the mark.”) (citing Visa, U.S.A., Inc. v. Birmingham Trust
Nat’l Bank, 696 F.2d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 826 (1983); Sterling Brewers,
Inc. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 441 F.2d 675, 680 (C.C.P.A. 1971); Hy-Cross Hatchery, Inc. v.
Osborne, 303 F.2d 947, 950 (C.C.P.A. 1962)). On an international level, the Paris Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property expressly allows for the possibility that the law of
some (but not necessarily all) signatory countries may condemn a trademark assignment made
without a contemporaneous transfer of the “business or good will to which the mark belongs.”
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To understand the more recent consensus about the meaning
of good will requires mention of the dual implied representations
inherent in the use of a trademark, namely, those of continuity of
source and quality control.16 As for the representation of continuity
of source, the assignment of a trademark unavoidably “puts the
lie” to that representation, at least temporarily.17 There is little the
While the Convention avoids defining “business or good will” (or attempting to distinguish
between them), it makes clear that a signatory country is prohibited from conditioning the
effectiveness of a trademark assignment upon the transfer of any business or good will beyond
that which is “located in that country.” The Convention thus mandates that national
boundaries be respected in defining the “business or good will” that a signatory country may
require to be contemporaneously transferred. Article 6quater provides as follows:
(1) When, in accordance with the law of a country of the Union, the assignment of
a mark is valid only if it takes place at the same time as the transfer of the business
or goodwill to which the mark belongs, it shall suffice for the recognition of such
validity that the portion of the business or goodwill located in that country be
transferred to the assignee, together with the exclusive right to manufacture in the
said country, or to sell therein, the goods bearing the mark assigned.
(2) The foregoing provision does not impose upon the countries of the Union any
obligation to regard as valid the assignment of any mark the use of which by the
assignee would, in fact, be of such a nature as to mislead the public, particularly as
regards the origin, nature, or essential qualities, of the goods to which the mark is
applied.
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last revised at
Stockholm July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, art. 6quater. See also Walter J.
Derenberg, Territorial Scope and Situs of Trademarks and Good Will, 68 TMR 387 (1978).
While Article 21 of TRIPS provides that “[m]embers may determine conditions on the . . .
assignment of trademarks, it being understood . . . that the owner of a registered trademark
shall have the right to assign his trademark with or without the transfer of the business to
which the trademark belongs,” evidently the contemporaneous transfer of good will may yet be
required by member states. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, opened for signature April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Rounds vol. 31,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (1995).
16. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective,
30 J.L. & Econ. 265, 286 (1987) (“[A] trademark is not only a symbol of origin, but a symbol of
a level of quality.”) (quotation attributed in that article to Professor McCarthy).
17. Economic theory supporting the law’s protection of trademarks holds that a mark’s
primary value to the consumer lies in reducing consumer search costs, such that “the
consumer [says] to himself, ‘I need not investigate the attributes of the brand I am about to
purchase because the trademark is a shorthand way of telling me that the attributes are the
same as that of the brand I enjoyed earlier.’” William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & Econ. 265, 269 (1987):
For this strategy to be efficient, however, not only must it be cheaper to search for the
right trademark than for the desired attributes of the good, but also past experience
must be a good predictor of the likely outcome of current consumption choices—that
is, the brand must exhibit consistent quality.
Id. (emphasis added). For the consumer’s purposes, continuation of quality control, not simply
source, is the key. Indeed, the mark is rendered no less valuable by the consumer’s having no
idea who the source of the marked goods is, his interest lying rather in the accuracy of the
implied assurance that control over the quality of the marked products is being exercised
Vol. 99 TMR
797
law can do to remedy that problem, except perhaps to adopt the
wholly uneconomic policy of prohibiting the assignment of
trademarks. While, alternatively, the law could require the
purchaser to raise public awareness of the assignment, as by
advertisement,18 such a requirement would work at cross-purposes
with the parties’ principal commercial purpose in assigning the
trademark, which is to change ownership while fostering the
public illusion that nothing of consequence has changed.19
The current consensus on the meaning of good will arises out
of the courts’ determination to ensure the accuracy of the
remaining implied representation, namely, that of continuity of
quality control.20 The rule prohibiting an assignment in gross is
now understood to require the seller and purchaser to attempt to
ensure the accuracy of the implied representation of continuity of
quality control by taking steps to ensure that some facsimile of the
seller’s quality control remains in place through the closing and for
some indefinite period thereafter.21 It is insufficient (perhaps even
irrelevant) for the purchaser to show that for some time after the
closing the purchaser exercised quality control that was “good” or
even “excellent”; the purchaser’s burden, rather, is to show that for
such period her quality control remained essentially the same as
the seller’s.22
today in the same manner as it was yesterday. Id. (citing Comment, Trademarks and Generic
Words: An Effect-on-Competition Test, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 868 (1984)).
18. This is one suggestion made by Professor Calboli. See Irene Calboli, Trademark
Assignment “With Goodwill”: A Concept Whose Time Has Gone, 57 Fla. L. Rev. 771, 836-37
(2005).
19. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective,
30 J.L. & Econ. 265, 285 (1987) (“If A sells just his trademark to B, and consumers know about
the sale, attaching A’s trademark to B’s good will not, at least as a first approximation, enable
B to obtain a higher price for his good.”).
20. See id. at 284-85.
21. Attributing a “quality control” denotation to the modern concept of “good will” has the
additional salutary effect of unifying the doctrine prohibiting “assignment in gross” with that
prohibiting “naked licensing” of trademarks. Under the latter doctrine, an owner/licensor is
required by common law to exercise its own control over the quality of the goods or services
sold by the licensee under the licensed mark. A licensor’s failure to exercise its own quality
control over such goods and services will result in a judicial holding that the license was
“naked,” the effect of which is the irreversible destruction of the owner’s priority in the mark
up through the expiration or earlier termination of the naked license. See Barcamerica Int’l
USA Trust v. Tyfield Imp., Inc., 289 F.3d 589, 595-96 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Moore Bus. Forms,
Inc. v. Ryu, 960 F.2d 486, 489 (5th Cir. 1992)).
22. See, e.g., Clark & Freeman Corp. v. Heartland Co., 811 F. Supp. 137, 140 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) (“For these purposes, it is not dispositive that plaintiff’s footwear is of high quality. . . .
Plaintiffs’ argument that customers cannot be harmed or deceived either because their shoes
are of such high quality or because they are available for inspection prior to purchase misses
the mark.”).
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In the case of the sale of a large business having many sites,
whether wholly owned or franchisee-operated, it is generally a
simple matter to ensure that the seller’s quality control procedures
remain in place for a reasonable period after the closing. In such a
case, the seller has generally maintained a printed compendium of
quality standards, and has employed numerous people to inspect
each site and ensure that its quality conforms to those standards.
So long as key personnel remain with the business for a time after
the closing, ensuring continuity of the seller’s standards and
operations, an assignment in gross can readily be avoided.23
Compare that, however, to the far more common situation,
such as Pam’s, where the seller is an aging restaurateur operating
a few restaurants in a small area. In such a case, it is all too
common for quality-control standards to have existed in the mind
of only one person, and for quality control inspections to have been
conducted only by that same person. If that person departs the
company upon the closing of the sale without codifying the
restaurants’ most esteemed features and the seller’s qualitycontrol standards, and imparting them to the purchaser, an
assignment in gross problem threatens.
C. Two Alternative Routes to Avoiding Catastrophe?
In Clark & Freeman Corp. v. The Heartland Company,24 Judge
Martin observed that there appear to be two alternative routes by
which a trademark assignment may avoid characterization as an
assignment in gross.25 Under the first alternative, the assignee
may show that “the assignee is producing a product or performing
a service substantially similar to that of the assignor and [that]
customers would not be deceived or harmed.”26 Under the second
alternative, the assignee may demonstrate that the assignee “is
able to ‘go on in real continuity with the past . . . or [that] there is
a continuity of management.’”27
23. Retention of the seller’s quality-control employees appears to ensconce the
assignment safely within the category of valid assignments, as it readily lends itself to
characterization as “real continuity with the past” and “a continuity of management.” See infra
note 27 and accompanying text.
24. 811 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
25. This dictum has been repeated in later decisions. See, e.g., Pan Am. World Airways,
Inc. v. Flight 001, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51012, at *25 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
26. 811 F. Supp. at 139.
27. Id. at 140 n.3 (citing, inter alia, Defiance Button Mach. Co. v. C&C Metal Prods., 759
F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844 (1985)).
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1. First Alternative: “Substantial Similarity”
Between the Seller’s and Purchaser’s Products
In determining whether a trademark assignment is valid,
courts applying the first alternative have long struggled to discern
whether post-closing goods or services are sufficiently similar to
pre-closing goods or services to sustain the assignment. A verbal
standard requiring “substantial similarity” between the goods or
services is simply too imprecise to enable counsel to reach a
reliable determination on the issue prior to closing. Where the
application of a standard proves capable of widely divergent
outcomes, the lawyer’s natural inclination is to apply the standard
as consistently as possible with its underlying rationale. In this
instance, however (as is often the case), the absence of a predictive
standard arises out of a corresponding absence of judicial
consensus on the rationale for allowing the degree of similarity
between the assignee’s and assignor’s goods or services to
determine whether a trademark assignment should be upheld or
struck down.28
One rationale for relying principally upon the degree of
similarity between the assignee’s and assignor’s goods or services
posits that the assignee’s use of the mark on goods or services
differing from goods or services of the “quality and nature
previously associated with the mark [under the assignor’s
regime]”29 is misleading to the public, and should rightly result in
loss of the seller’s priority on such grounds. In applying this
alternative, Judge Martin observed:
The facts of record in this case support a finding of assignment
in gross here. [The seller] sold only women’s pixie boots under
the mark “Heartland,” while [the purchasers] immediately
applied it only to men’s shoes, then later to men’s hiking boots.
The markets for the two goods are substantially distinct; it is
unlikely that men buying [the purchasers’] “Heartland” shoes
28. If a court were primarily concerned with ensuring that the parties give substance to
the implied representation of continued quality control, these two “alternative” standards
could reasonably be understood as alternative evidentiary bases by which a court may deem
itself satisfied that the seller’s quality control has survived assignment of the mark in some
meaningful way. The purchaser’s continuation of the sale of goods “substantially similar” to
those sold by the seller under the mark could be deemed to provide some assurance that the
seller’s quality control has continued through the transition of ownership, whether because the
goods being sold by the purchaser were already contained in the seller’s inventory and could
thus reliably be expected to have been deemed acceptable by the seller himself, or because the
purchaser could be presumed to have learned from the seller how to make the same goods of
the same quality. As discussed in text, however, by no means is this the only possible, or even
a favored, interpretation.
29. Clark & Freeman Corp. v. Heartland Co., 811 F. Supp. 137, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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would be considering a reputation for footwear generally that
[the seller] built by selling women’s boots.30
This “public deception” rationale seems self-refuting, however,
for where the target demographics for the purchaser’s and seller’s
goods or services are entirely discrete, there would scarcely be an
opportunity for deception. Few members of the purchaser’s target
demographic could be expected even to be aware that the seller
had formerly been selling goods or services under the mark, let
alone that the seller’s goods or services were of a particular type,
or level of quality. The unlikelihood of any public reliance upon the
seller’s pre-assignment reputation greatly diminishes any
possibility of deception, undermining (rather than reinforcing) the
notion that the threat of public deception provides a rational basis
for forfeiture of the seller’s priority.
An alternative rationale for regarding the similarity between
the assignee’s and assignor’s goods or services as being
fundamental to a determination whether to strike down the
assignment as being in gross is that the purchaser’s use of the
mark on goods or services that differ in “quality and nature [from
goods or services] previously associated with the mark [under the
seller’s regime]” effectively constitutes an abandonment of any
good will accumulated by the seller effective at the moment of
closing, eo instante.31 Such a rationale is highly problematic,
however, for several reasons. Although it is undoubtedly possible
for the owner of any item of property to abandon it immediately by
voluntarily manifesting an immediate intention to relinquish all
claim to it, someone who has taken title to a trademark by means
of an assignment in gross obviously has no such intention; to the
contrary, any such assignee would be mortified by the prospect of
losing the mark. The abandonment rationale also seems at odds
with the U.S. Trademark (Lanham) Act, which provides that
abandonment will not even be rebuttably presumed without a
showing of non-use for a period of three continuous years.32
Moreover, as later decisions confirm, trademark abandonment is
rarely regarded as having occurred instantly.33 Abandonment thus
provides an equally infirm basis for deciding whether to approve a
30. Id. at 141.
31. Defiance Button Mach. Co. v. C&C Metal Prods., 759 F.2d 1053, 1059 (2d Cir)., cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 844 (1985).
32. Lanham Trademark Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (subsection (1) of definition of
“Abandonment of Mark”): “Nonuse for 3 consecutive years shall be prima facie evidence of
abandonment.”
33. See, e.g., Emergency One, Inc. v. Am. Fireeagle, Ltd., 228 F.3d 531 (4th Cir. 2000);
Gaffrig Performance Indus., Inc. v. Livorsi Marine, Inc., 2003 WL 23144859, at *10 (N.D. Ill.
2003).
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trademark assignment based solely on a comparison of pre-closing
and post-closing goods or services.
Whatever rationale (or combination of rationales) may
underlie the substantial similarity requirement of the first
alternative, it is effectively backward-looking, refusing to lend
itself to prescriptive measures. As it is impossible at this point to
articulate a unitary rationale supporting this alternative basis for
salvaging an otherwise “in gross” assignment, the exercise is best
left to courts reviewing transactions in which the parties have
failed to provide any semblance of post-closing continuity of the
seller’s quality-control standards.
2. Second Alternative: Real Continuity with the Past,
or Continuity of Management
Now that good will has come to mean “the seller’s quality
control,” the second alternative is the more meaningful, under
which an assignee can insulate an assignment from being
characterized as an assignment in gross by demonstrating that the
assignee “is able to go on in real continuity with the past . . . or
[that] there is a continuity of management.”34 It is indeed possible
for parties to a purchase-and-sale transaction to take forwardlooking measures to assure the purchaser’s successful invocation of
this second alternative, should the need arise. The methods
prescribed by this article are therefore intended to satisfy this
second alternative.
III. HOW TO AVOID CATASTROPHE
In organizing the how-to portion of this article, it has been
assumed that, after the introduction of the purchaser and seller to
each other, the purchase-and-sale transaction will occur in distinct
steps separated by three interstices:
(a) at least a brief period between the introduction of the
purchaser and seller to each other and an agreement upon the
terms of the purchase-and-sale agreement, during which
period the seller and purchaser are prepared to devote time
and effort to real-world preparations for the conveyance;
followed by
(b) at least a brief period during which parties and counsel
will negotiate the purchase-and-sale agreement, during which
period the purchaser will customarily conduct a thorough “due
34. Clark & Freeman Corp., 811 F. Supp. at 140 n.3 (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
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diligence” investigation into the business, the end result of
which should ideally be an accounting of every significant
asset involved in the sale and a clear understanding of the
characteristics of the business that make it a success. This
period will be concluded by execution of the agreement;
followed in turn by
(c) a period of a few weeks after the parties’ execution of the
purchase-and-sale agreement, culminating in the closing of
the sale on a set date, at which there will be an exchange of
consideration and ownership papers.35
The proffered technique for avoiding an assignment-in-gross
catastrophe is intended to guide the practitioner’s conduct on four
key questions, namely: (a) how to ascertain the “good will” of the
business; (b) what to include in the purchase-and-sale agreement;
(c) what to do before the closing; and (d) what to do after the
closing. Each such point will be addressed separately below.
Two caveats. First, although the following is framed as
guidance for the lawyer representing the person who stands to
suffer most immediately by an assignment in gross, namely, the
purchaser, the prudent seller’s lawyer will not only cooperate fully
in the implementation of such guidance, but will insist upon it, lest
a material step be missed. Second, the proffered technique for
avoiding the assignment-in-gross catastrophe is in no way a
substitute for: (a) additional provisions commonly found in
purchase-and-sale agreements, such as the requirement that the
seller deliver a properly executed assignment of the trademark at
the closing, or (b) the timely recording of the trademark
assignment.36
A. How to Ascertain the Good Will of the Business
A competently drafted agreement governing the purchase-andsale of a business using a trademark will be designed to ensure the
35. In the unpredictable world of legal practice, of course, no interstices between
transactional steps can be guaranteed. On occasion, the parties’ introduction, the execution of
the purchase-and-sale agreement, and the closing have been known to occur all within a day or
two. While such a radical compression of ordinarily separate steps may require corresponding
compression of the steps prescribed in this article, every effort should be made to provide the
parties with sufficient time to ensure their joint codification and post-closing implementation
of the seller’s quality-control procedures. An assignment of a mark is not immunized from
challenge on grounds of assignment in gross simply because the various steps in the
transaction were compressed in time.
36. See Lanham Act § 10(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(4) (2006): “An assignment shall be
void against any subsequent purchaser for valuable consideration without notice, unless the
prescribed information reporting the assignment is recorded in the United States Patent and
Trademark Office within 3 months after the date of the assignment or prior to the subsequent
purchase.”
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transfer of the good will of the business appurtenant to and
symbolized by the mark by ensuring the purchaser’s adoption and
maintenance of the seller’s quality control procedures. Before
drafting a quality control provision, the purchaser’s lawyer should
ascertain from his client the elements of quality most salient to the
type of business being bought and sold, as the principal elements
of quality can be expected to vary greatly from one type of business
to another. The purchaser should be advised to gather such
information by spending substantial time at the site of the
business while it remains under the seller’s operation (which many
a careful purchaser will do in any event, if only to observe the
activity at the till) and to talk to the seller,37 its employees, and its
customers. The purchaser should be advised that the most useful
mental exercise in this respect is to ask, “What is it about this
particular business that has caused it to appeal to its customers
such that it can fetch the purchase price I am prepared to pay for
it, when other businesses of the kind have either failed to survive
or are unworthy of such a price?”38
For example, a retail business may have distinguished itself in
its customers’ minds by adapting its opening and closing days and
times to suit customer traffic patterns, by providing a specific
array of goods and services, by assuring a certain depth of
inventory, by implementing flexible special-order and return
policies, by maintaining a certain level of cleanliness, by ensuring
that a sufficient number of employees is always present on the
sales floor (which may either be fixed as an absolute number or
determined according to its sufficiency in assuring that maximum
customer-wait times are not exceeded), by dividing employees’ job
assignments in a particular manner, by demanding a certain level
of employee attire and courtesy, and so on.
37. The purchaser should be encouraged to ask the seller how he keeps customers coming
back. The purchaser should also be encouraged to ask the seller about the complaints of
disgruntled customers, and any steps the seller has taken to ensure that such incidents do not
recur. As with all quality-control matters, the purchaser should take notes, and date and
preserve them as possible evidence.
38. Preventing an assignment in gross is hardly the purchaser’s sole incentive to identify,
document, systematize, and preserve the characteristics of the business that have made it
successful. To the contrary, the purchaser’s primary incentive in doing so is to ensure that the
business will remain profitable after purchase. In furtherance of that aim, the International
Organization for Standardization (or “ISO”), which claims to be the world’s largest developer
and publisher of international standards, has devoted an entire family of standards, known as
“ISO 9000,” to aid in systematizing and preserving quality assurance procedures. The ISO
website can currently be found at www.iso.org. To bring an outsider’s perspective to the
situation, it may be advisable for the lawyer also to imagine himself “in the customer’s shoes.”
(Far be it from the author to suggest that the lawyer actually visit the business to observe it
from a customer’s standpoint, as this might violate the unwritten prohibition against a
lawyer’s leaving his office for any professional reason other than to attend a closing or go to
court.)
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The same question, addressed in our primary example of the
LUCIO brand Italian restaurants, might yield many of the same
considerations, but a few different ones, as well. For example, the
restaurant chain may have distinguished itself in its customers’
minds by maintaining a menu having a certain level of variety, by
retaining certain signature dishes, by ensuring the availability of a
“prix fixe” or reduced-price menu, by assuring a certain level of
cleanliness by means of the retention of a certain sanitarian, and
so on.
The purchaser should be specifically admonished to identify to
counsel any aspect of the seller’s good will that might threaten the
commercial viability of the business should it be continued for a
time after the anticipated purchase. Such aspects will be discussed
further below.
Ideally, the seller and the purchaser should jointly prepare a
list of characteristics of the business that they believe have made
it successful, enumerating for each such characteristic the steps
they believe to be required of each of them to ensure the continued
success of the business without the seller’s active participation. If a
key component of the company’s past success will not be present
after closing, the parties should be asked to devise a plan allowing
for a transition with a minimal impact on quality, and revenue.
B. What to Include in the
Purchase-and-Sale Agreement
Once the principal elements of quality control have been
identified, they should be reduced to writing and annexed as an
exhibit to the purchase-and-sale agreement. The agreement should
include the seller’s representation and warranty that the annexed
statement of quality-control policies is a materially complete
statement of the seller’s successful business-generating
characteristics, quality-control standards, and inspection methods,
that have been applied to the business by the seller for some
representative period.39 As the seller, the purchaser, or both, may
deem it important to ensure the confidential or “trade secret”
character of certain elements of the business or quality-control
policies, it would be prudent to include a written promise of both
the seller and the purchaser to take all reasonable and necessary
39. It is to be expected that any seller’s quality-control procedures will have evolved over
time. Although the law of assignment in gross does not specify any particular period during
which the quality control procedures imparted to the purchaser must have been enforced by
the seller, ideally the parties should contractually quantify a representative look-back period
during which the seller’s most important quality-control procedures have been in effect, so as
to impart confidence to any court examining the purchase-and-sale transaction that the good
will conveyed to the purchaser was current at the time of the trademark assignment.
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steps to maintain the confidentiality of such matters both before
and after closing.
The agreement should also contain the seller’s promises:
(a) to familiarize the purchaser with every aspect of the
business by accompanying the purchaser on personal visits to
each site of the business:
(i) no fewer than a prescribed number of times for a
prescribed minimum number of hours per visit; and
(ii) with specific named persons to be present during the
entire visit;
(b) to cooperate in the preparation, authentication, and
preservation of full and accurate evidence of each such visit;
(c) to provide the purchaser with complete access to all
facilities, keeping no place “off limits” to the purchaser; and
(d) to disclose to the purchaser all information concerning
the operation of the business, including but not limited to,
sources of supply, recipes and formulas, processes, and
quality-control standards and testing procedures.
The purchase-and-sale agreement should also be drafted to
include the seller’s promise to remain active in the operation of the
business for a prescribed post-closing period to assist in the
implementation of the quality-control procedures enumerated in
the annexed exhibit (and any additional quality-control procedures
that the seller may later realize have been omitted), and to assist
the purchaser in implementing necessary changes to any aspects of
the seller’s operation that may become uneconomic. As sellerconsultation agreements are often entered into at the closing of
purchase-and-sale transactions (for tax and other purposes),
memorializing such a promise should impose little additional
paperwork. Any such consultation agreement should specifically
impose upon the seller an obligation to assist in the
implementation of prescribed quality-control procedures.
In the event that the arrangement provides the seller with
inadequate post-closing financial incentive to ensure fulfillment of
his post-closing contractual obligations, adequate provision should
be made to ensure that he does what he is required to do. Such a
provision might take the form of an escrow of a held-back portion
of the purchase price to be paid to the seller only upon fulfillment
of the post-closing obligations, or a liquidated-damage provision
designed to compensate the purchaser for the loss of value
reasonably expected to be suffered on account of a specified
delinquency by the seller, together with adequate security.
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Any aspect of the seller’s good will that might threaten the
commercial viability of the business if it were to continue for some
time after the anticipated purchase40 should be governed as
follows. The purchase-and-sale agreement should specify that the
seller and purchaser have reached agreement upon both the need
to change such uneconomic aspects of the seller’s operation,41 and a
technique for implementing such change that is satisfactory to the
purchaser and deemed by the seller to be consistent with the
seller’s quality-control standards. The seller should be
contractually required either to implement the necessary changes
prior to closing or to assist the purchaser in implementing them
after closing. The object of such a provision is to insulate the
implementation of foreseeably necessary changes from effective
challenge on grounds that they represent material deviations from
the seller’s quality-control standards.
C. What to Do Before the Closing
Before the closing, the parties should jointly implement such
changes to uneconomic aspects of the seller’s operation as they
have agreed to make prior to closing.
For evidentiary record-keeping purposes, the purchaser’s
attorney (with his client’s cooperation) should design a written
form to be manually completed and legibly signed by both the
purchaser and the seller at the conclusion of each quality-training
visit, reflecting all pertinent facts about such visit, such as their
dates, times, and durations, as well as the locations of sites visited,
the persons present at such sites, and the quality control
procedures discussed and observed. The completed, signed forms
should be delivered to, and preserved by, the purchaser’s counsel.
Tangible
or
electronic
copies
should
be
provided
contemporaneously to seller’s counsel, as an additional off-site
repository.
Given that assignment-in-gross allegations may be raised
whenever a trademark dispute arises between the purchaser and
an interloper, due care should be taken for the preservation of such
40. The measure of a reasonable transition period is discussed below at Section III.D.
What to Do After the Closing.
41. Ideally, no material aspect of the business should be changed during the transition
period. By making specific mention of the possible need to change an aspect that is (or may
become) “uneconomic,” this article merely recognizes that sometimes a business may be
confronted with a need to change in order to survive. While there can be no assurance that a
court would countenance a change made on such grounds, necessity is often among the
strongest of arguments. Moreover, even if such an argument were doomed to fail, the rational
owner confronted with a choice between a loss of trademark priority and bankruptcy would
ordinarily be expected to sacrifice trademark priority (or even the whole mark) rather than to
lose the whole business.
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evidence, including, but not necessarily limited to, the formal
appointment of a custodian (preferably a long-term, full-time
officer of the purchaser’s business),42 the insertion of originals in a
securely bound compendium, and the creation and distribution of
durable electronic copies of full sets of the completed forms,
including the maintenance of off-premises copies to minimize the
risk that evidence will be lost in the event of fire or other casualty.
D. What to Do After the Closing
It would be both uneconomic and pointless for a court to
demand that either product or service offerings or quality-control
techniques be frozen in place for the remaining life of the business,
as the public implicitly recognizes both that its own tastes change
and that product and service offerings and quality-control
techniques eventually change from time to time, even when a
business never changes hands. As required by the agreement,
however, every effort should be made to comply with the seller’s
pre-closing quality control procedures for some reasonable time
after the closing, to be referred to hereinafter as the “transition
period.” Although legal research has provided no firm guidance in
fixing a minimum duration for such a period, the transition period
should be deemed reasonable in duration so long as it is long
enough to provide a substantial factual underpinning for the
public’s natural assumption that the uninterrupted use of the
mark through the change of ownership has been accompanied by a
good-faith effort to ensure the uninterrupted continuity of quality
control. One consideration to take into account in fixing the
transition period should be the duration of the business’s
customary change cycle, so that a business that changes its car
models every year might warrant a longer transition period than a
restaurant that revamps its entire menu once per season.
During whatever appropriate transition period is agreed by
the parties, the seller should remain “on call” to make good his
promise to assist the purchaser in implementing and enforcing the
42. The reason for the appointment of a specific officer to maintain and preserve such
records is to maximize the likelihood that such evidence will be admissible to rebut any
allegations of assignment-in-gross that may be made in a formal proceeding. By way of
example, only, the Federal Rules of Evidence provide:
Records of Regularly Conducted Activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data
compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or
near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if
kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular
practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record or data
compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness
....
Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) (2006).
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seller’s pre-closing quality-control procedures, and to assist in the
creation and preservation of accurate records of his activities in
this regard. The purchaser and counsel should ensure that records
of the seller’s post-closing participation are kept and preserved in
the same manner as that set forth above for pre-closing activities.
During the transition period, if the purchaser (or, more
accurately, the new owner) finds that in order to maintain or
enhance the profitability of the business, the purchaser needs to
change the business, the purchaser should diligently ensure that
the quality of both existing and new goods and services conforms
as closely as possible to the seller’s pre-closing quality-control
standards. For example, if the business is a drug store that during
the seller’s pre-closing tenure operated a pharmacy, it would be
imprudent during the transitional period for the purchaser to close
the prescription window on grounds that its continued operation is
too costly or inconvenient. If prior to the closing the business was a
burger joint, during the transition period the purchaser should not
eliminate or change existing burger offerings simply because the
purchaser has a better idea. If fundamental change need be
implemented during the transition period, it should be made only
with the seller’s full knowledge and approval.
IV. CONCLUSION
Professor McCarthy takes an uncharacteristically despairing
view of the practitioner’s ability to parse the internally
inconsistent case law well enough to enable one to insulate a
trademark assignee from the loss of the seller’s priority:
One cannot hope to understand the disparate case law on
point without appreciating the continuing policy tension which
effectively replays the 1930s legislative debate in every
litigation over the validity of an assignment. While some
courts will apply the anti-assignment-in-gross rule with
myopic vigor, other courts will interpret “good will” so as to
focus on the nature of the assignee’s use, not the formalism of
what assets passed to the assignee. Thus, predictability of
judicial response to a given assignment transaction is a risky
business. Attorney and client must decide whether to take a
conservative or risk-taking posture in structuring the
transaction.43
Although this article may be subject to criticism on grounds
that it advises the practitioner to take a conservative route, its
central concern, being that of the practicing lawyer, is to effectuate
43. 3 McCarthy, supra note 9, at § 18:10.
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the client’s intentions zealously within the bounds of the law. In
that sense, this article is no more conservative than are the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct.44
While not all judicial decisions evince precisely the same
understanding of good will, they do make clear that no court
relishes the opportunity to find an assignment in gross. To the
contrary, decisions finding an assignment in gross have addressed
transactions where the parties have left the court with no practical
alternative to such a finding, having made no good-faith effort to
continue the seller’s quality-control practices for any period after
closing on the sale of a business. While no course of conduct can be
guaranteed to result in a finding of no assignment in gross, in no
reported decision have efforts as diligent and demonstrable as
those prescribed in this article resulted in an adverse holding on
this question.
While any practical advice must necessarily be haunted by the
specter of a contrary unreported decision or the ever-lurking
possibility of a legislative or judicial upheaval in established case
law, the practitioner has little choice but to comply with the law as
currently expressed in reported decisions. The prescriptions made
in this article are the practitioner’s best bet for protecting any
client, such as Pam, and anyone else in like position, from the
adverse effects of negotiating an assignment in gross.
44. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2004):
[1] A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition,
obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and take whatever lawful and
ethical measures are required to vindicate a client’s cause or endeavor. A lawyer must
also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in
advocacy upon the client’s behalf. A lawyer is not bound, however, to press for every
advantage that might be realized for a client. For example, a lawyer may have
authority to exercise professional discretion in determining the means by which a
matter should be pursued. See Rule 1.2. The lawyer’s duty to act with reasonable
diligence does not require the use of offensive tactics or preclude the treating of all
persons involved in the legal process with courtesy and respect.