® The Law Journal of the International Trademark Association Proving Your Bona Fides— Establishing Bona Fide Intent to Use Under the U.S. Trademark (Lanham) Act Sandra Edelman Good Will Enduring: How to Ensure That Trademark Priority Will Not Be Destroyed by the Sale of a Business Neal R. Platt Going After the Middleman: Landlord Liability in the Battle Against Counterfeits Daniel R. Plane Some Cultural Narrative Themes and Variations in the Common Law Catherine W. Ng Licences in OHIM Practice Verena von Bomhard, Hugh O’Neill, and Anat Paz Vol. 99 May-June, 2009 No. 3 788 Vol. 99 TMR GOOD WILL ENDURING: HOW TO ENSURE THAT TRADEMARK PRIORITY WILL NOT BE DESTROYED BY THE SALE OF A BUSINESS By Neal R. Platt I. INTRODUCTION Imagine you are advising your client Pam in the prospective purchase of a few Italian restaurants located in a small geographic area. All of the restaurants are owned by the same talented, but aging, restaurateur named Lucio, who operates them under the service mark LUCIO.1 Although the restaurants are popular and profitable, Lucio has been unable to interest any of the younger members of his family in assuming their operation, and so he has decided to sell the business and retire to Tahiti at the earliest possible moment. From discussions with your client, you have learned that it was Lucio who single-handedly developed all the special characteristics of the restaurants that make them attractive to their patrons, such as the recipes, menu and wine selections, seating arrangements, and decor. Lucio also developed without any assistance the solid and uniform quality-control standards under which the restaurants are operated, standards that have never been written down by Lucio or communicated to anyone else. Similarly, it is Lucio, alone, who has conducted daily qualitycontrol inspections of each restaurant. Pam has informed you that she and Lucio are aware that an unrelated upstart named Irving Interloper has recently opened an Italian restaurant under the name “Lucio” near one of Lucio’s restaurants, and that she and Lucio have agreed that Lucio should not precipitate immediate action against Interloper’s use of the Lucio name.2 Pam has told you that she and Lucio both believe Law. Partner, Shwal & Platt; Special Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of 1. The analysis and prescriptions of this article apply equally to registered and unregistered marks. See infra note 3. 2. Under many (perhaps most) circumstances, counsel will be unaware whether there exists an interloper in a position to take advantage of the loss of priority occasioned by an assignment in gross. The existence of the interloper has been brought to the reader’s attention in this example solely to ensure that the potential catastrophe is kept ever in mind. Vol. 99 TMR 789 that Interloper’s restaurant is likely to fail on its own within a few months, as it appears to be experiencing serious difficulties both in funding and in finding a satisfactory customer base. Pam has informed you that she and Lucio have negotiated a price with full knowledge of Interloper’s existence and his perceived prospects, and she has instructed you to proceed with her purchase of Lucio’s restaurants. Last week, Lucio instructed his attorney to draft a purchaseand-sale agreement and to propose it to you. Upon your review of the draft, you find that it contains no provision requiring Lucio to pass along to Pam his knowledge of those characteristics of his restaurants that are beloved by his customers or about his highly successful quality-control standards. Unlike Lucio’s lawyer, who appears to know little about trademark law, you are burdened with the knowledge that if Lucio departs immediately upon the closing of the sale without first imparting his beloved restaurant characteristics and his quality-control standards to Pam, an “assignment in gross” looms, with its dreaded consequences. What is an “assignment in gross” ? An assignment in gross occurs when a purchaser and seller violate the common-law requirement that a mark be assigned only together “with the good will of the business in which the mark is used, or with that part of the good will of the business connected with the use of and symbolized by the mark.”3 While the meaning of “good will” has shifted perceptibly over the past century, a modern restatement of the definition of good will and its relation to the trademark was crafted by Judge Platt4 in 1994, as follows: [G]ood will is the value attributable to a going concern apart from its physical assets—the intangible worth of buyer momentum emanating from the reputation and integrity earned by the company. A trademark . . . is merely the symbol by which the public recognizes that reputation and hence has no independent significance apart from the owner’s good will.5 3. U.S. Trademark (Lanham) Act § 10(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(1) (2006). Although the quotation in text is excerpted from the Lanham Act, which is devoted primarily to the governance of federally registered marks, the requirement is derived from the common law and is applied equally to all marks, without regard to registration. See, e.g., Clark & Freeman Corp. v. Heartland Co., 811 F. Supp. 137, 139 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (“Although [Section 10] applies only to registered trademarks, it parallels the common law rules of trademark assignment. . . . Thus, no distinction is made herein between cases discussing assignability of registered trademarks and those involving unregistered trademarks.”). 4. Judge Platt has no known family relation to the author, and is innocent of the contents of this article. 5. Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp. v. Mattress Madness, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 1339, 1350 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (Platt, J.). Providing perhaps greater specificity, the U.S. Supreme Court has defined “good will” as: 790 Vol. 99 TMR Applying these concepts to our example, if Pam is found to have purchased the LUCIO service mark without its attendant good will, the assignment will be held to have been an assignment in gross. The effect of such an invalid assignment will be the irreversible destruction of all trademark priority rights earned by Lucio up to the date of the closing, which are priority rights that Pam will need in order to prevail in any impending trademark dispute between her and Irving Interloper. In fact, if Pam loses the trademark priority earned by Lucio prior to closing, she stands to lose the LUCIO mark to Interloper altogether. After that, while she may continue to operate the restaurants, she might be prohibited from using the mark, and if so would no longer enjoy the public confidence attendant upon it. As Pam’s lawyer, you prudently want to insert a provision into the purchase-and-sale agreement requiring Lucio to codify and memorialize his beloved restaurant characteristics and qualitycontrol standards, impart them to Pam, and to stick around for a time to help in their implementation. You should be aware, however, that should you attempt to do so, you will have no friends: not Lucio, not his lawyer, and not even your client Pam, for the following reasons. Lucio will be disinclined to undertake any such obligations, as he expects that he has no post-closing interest in the survival of the business. His perceived interest in the transaction is limited to pocketing the proceeds, after which he hopes to leave town without delay. Lucio’s attorney will not want his client to undertake any such obligations for several reasons. First, a client cannot be held liable for failing to fulfill a contractual obligation he has not undertaken. As a consequence, lawyers tend to believe that when it comes to obligations to be undertaken by the client, the fewer the better. The lawyer’s general inclination is given specific impetus in this case, as Lucio’s fulfillment of continuing quality-control obligations would interfere with his express desire to forget about the restaurants and his ungrateful family, and to leave for Tahiti as soon as possible. Second, codifying and imparting the restaurants’ the advantage or benefit, which is acquired by an establishment, beyond the mere value of the capital, stock, funds, or property employed therein, in consequence of the general public patronage and encouragement which it receives from constant or habitual customers. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 555 (1993) (quoting Metro. Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 149 U.S. 436 (1893)). See also Glow Indus., Inc. v. Lopez, 273 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1107 (C.D. Cal. 2003); Irene Calboli, Trademark Assignment “With Goodwill”: A Concept Whose Time Has Gone, 57 Fla. L. Rev. 771, 782 (2005) (“[G]oodwill . . . is . . . the ability of a mark to attract and retain consumers and to communicate to the public the qualities and characteristics of the marked products.”). Vol. 99 TMR 791 most esteemed features and Lucio’s quality-control standards, as well as assisting in their implementation by the purchaser, can be arduous, time-consuming tasks from which Lucio’s lawyer would like to spare his client. Third, Lucio is known to be ill-suited to such tasks, having developed the restaurants’ special features and his quality-control standards intuitively over his working life, and being completely unaccustomed to organizing and writing down complex thoughts. Indeed, it may come as a surprise to Lucio to learn that his teaching the restaurants’ most esteemed features to Pam is a matter of legal significance, that what he has been doing all this time can even be called “quality control,” and that continuation of such features is legally necessary to provide Pam with the full value of her purchase. Now, for “the most unkindest cut of all.”6 Even Pam does not want a provision to be inserted requiring Lucio to codify the restaurants’ most esteemed features and Lucio’s quality-control standards, impart them to her, and (worst of all) hang around to assist in their implementation. In fact, Pam is a bit miffed at you. She is, frankly, insulted that you would think she needs guidance in running the restaurants, an activity for which she feels eminently qualified. In addition, she finds Lucio unpleasant and irascible, particularly when discussing the prospect of turning over the fruit of his lifelong labor to (as he fondly calls Pam) “an amateur.” On a personal level, Pam would probably prefer the insertion of a contractual provision requiring Lucio to move to Tahiti immediately and have his signature applied at the closing by his lawyer, as his attorney-in-fact. The irony of all this resistance is that in the event the LUCIO mark is assigned to Pam by means of an “assignment in gross,” all of the people involved stand to lose. By no means is the issue problematic solely for the purchaser who stands to lose the LUCIO mark. To the contrary, Pam, or any other purchaser discovering that she has failed to receive trademark priority for which she believes she has paid, is very likely to consider recourse against Lucio, as well as against her lawyer whose job it was to avoid such problems, namely, you. Lucio, fearing liability, may consider recourse against his own lawyer, whose job it was to protect Lucio against such problems. In such a situation, it would provide you with cold comfort simply to say, “I told you so.” It should be simple to imagine that your situation would be no less uncomfortable if you were, conversely, knowledgeable counsel for Lucio (or another seller) faced with a less knowledgeable counterpart, for in such case you would be advising your client to 6. William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar act 3, sc. 2, lines 181-86. 792 Vol. 99 TMR insist that he contractually undertake burdensome obligations in which he sees no hope of gain, and which have not been even requested by the purchaser. Indeed, the purchaser can be expected actively to resist precisely the cooperation she needs in order to reap the full benefit of her bargain. It is inevitable that on one day or another every lawyer will alienate those around him by espousing a legal principle believed by everyone else involved to be completely daft.7 A lawyer having no choice but to carry the day in the face of unanimous resistance deserves to be armed with more than mere knowledge of the legal principle. It is the object of the following to provide the practitioner with not only an understanding of the legal principle, but also to provide a reasoned approach to the design and implementation of a means, tolerable to all, of averting the assignment-in-gross problem entirely. II. RELEVANT LAW A. Effect of Valid Assignment The law of trademarks requires the seller of a trademark to assign to its purchaser at the closing the “good will” of the business to which the mark is appurtenant.8 So long as the trademark is 7. Indeed, for the knowledgeable practitioner involved in the conveyance of small- and medium-size businesses, such days are legion. Although the bombast of opposing counsel may be rationalized as high praise, and an occasional glare from the Bench perceived as an acknowledgment of craft, the doubt and frustration of one’s own client are difficult to bear. Nevertheless, for the lawyer to fulfill his role as a zealous advocate for his client’s interest, he sometimes has no choice but to challenge the client’s view of her own interest. This article is humbly offered in friendship to the otherwise friendless practitioner at one such time. 8. Section 10(a)(1) of the Lanham Act codifies the common law rule and applies it to federally registered marks, as follows: A registered mark or a mark for which an application to register has been filed shall be assignable with the good will of the business in which the mark is used, or with that part of the good will of the business connected with the use of and symbolized by the mark. Lanham Act § 10(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(1) (2006). Although Section 10(a)(2) provides that it is unnecessary to recite the inclusion of “good will” in the assignment itself, that subsection is intended simply to avoid elevating the words “good will” to some talismanic level such that any assignment lacking their pro forma recitation would be deemed unacceptable for recording. Implementing such statutory intention, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office instructs its Trademark Examining Attorneys as follows: As a general rule, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) does not investigate or evaluate the validity of assignments. Therefore, the examining attorney should issue an inquiry concerning the compliance of an assignment with the cited provisions of §10 only if: Vol. 99 TMR 793 sold together with such good will, in any post-closing trademark dispute between the purchaser and a third party, the purchaser will ordinarily be entitled to rely upon its seller’s priority.9 As a practical matter, the trademark rights of the purchaser will prevail over those of a conflicting third party who adopted a confusingly similar mark at any time subsequent to the seller’s adoption of the mark. B. Effect of Assignment in Gross The sale of a trademark without good will (that is, by an assignment in gross) results in the irreversible destruction of trademark priority earned by the seller up to the date of closing. After an assignment in gross, in any post-closing trademark dispute between the purchaser and a third party, the purchaser will find itself unable to rely upon its seller’s trademark priority, instead being relegated to reliance upon such priority as may have been earned by the purchaser’s own post-closing use of the mark. In other words, where there has been a prohibited assignment in gross, the purchaser’s trademark rights cannot prevail over those of a third party who adopted the mark prior to the date of the closing, and the purchaser even stands to lose its rights in the trademark to such a third party. Although the irreversible destruction of trademark priority earned by the seller might seem the exaction of a draconian (1) The application itself includes a statement indicating that the assignee is not a successor to the original applicant’s business, or portion of the business to which the mark pertains, if that business is ongoing and existing; or (2) All of the following conditions are present: (a) The assignment is executed before the filing of an acceptable amendment to allege use or statement of use; (b) The applicant submits the assignment document for inclusion in the application record; and (c) The assignment document fails to include the relevant language from §10 to the effect that the assignment includes the entire business of the applicant/ assignor or the portion of the business to which the mark pertains. The examining attorney should not require the submission of assignment documents to determine compliance. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure § 501.01(a) (5th ed. 2007). 9. See, e.g., Premier Dental Prods. Co. v. Darby Dental Supply Co., 794 F.2d 850, 855 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986); The Money Store v. Harriscorp Fin., Inc., 689 F.2d 666, 677-78 (7th Cir. 1982); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Inc. v. Brown, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29562 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (“Generally, an assignment of a trademark and its accompanying goodwill will entitle the assignee to ‘step into the shoes’ of the assignor, gaining whatever priority the assignor might have had in the mark.”); J. McCarthy, 3 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 18:15 (4th ed. 2008) [hereinafter McCarthy]. 794 Vol. 99 TMR penalty, it should not be viewed in such a dim light. Good will is the public’s approval resulting from the seller’s exercise of quality control. The doctrine of assignment in gross attempts to ensure that the public’s approval cannot be bought, except by a purchaser demonstrating preparedness to earn it by continuing the seller’s quality-control standards. If a purchaser is unprepared to exert the least effort to perpetuate the seller’s quality control, then the assignment in gross doctrine does nothing more than deprive the purchaser of the ownership of something the purchaser is unprepared to earn. Viewed in this light, the destruction of the seller’s priority is both precisely coextensive with the parties’ infraction, and its natural legal result. Whatever the merits of such a result, it has been deemed essential to vindicate the consumer’s interest in not being defrauded: If one obtains a trademark through an assignment in gross, divorced from the good will of the assignor, the assignee obtains the symbol, but not the reality. Any subsequent use of the mark by the assignee will necessarily be in connection with a different business, a different good will and a different type of product. The continuity of the things symbolized by the mark is broken. Use of the mark by the assignee in connection with a different good will and different product would result in a fraud on the purchasing public, who reasonably assume that the mark signified the same things, whether used by one person or another.10 Viewed rightly, the bargain between seller and purchaser is in no way altered by an assignment in gross, as title to the mark remains precisely where the parties intended, that is, with the purchaser.11 10. Money Store, 689 F.2d at 676; see also Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir. 1984); Haymaker Sports, Inc. v. Turian, 581 F.2d 257, 262 (C.C.P.A. 1978); Pepsico, Inc. v. Grapette Co., 416 F.2d 285, 289 (8th Cir. 1969) (“It seems fundamental that either the defendant did not acquire any ‘goodwill’ as required by law or if it did, assuming as defendant argues the mark itself possesses ‘goodwill,’ by use of the mark on a totally different product, [defendant] intended to deceive the public. Either ground is untenable to the validity of the assignment.”). 11. But see R & R Partners, Inc. v. Tovar, 447 F. Supp. 2d 1141,1150 (D. Nev. 2006); 3 McCarthy, supra note 9, at § 18:20. In the author’s view, the few authorities holding that the assignor in an assignment in gross effectively retains ownership of his pre-closing priority have gerry-rigged an ill-considered technique that would destroy the doctrine of assignment in gross entirely, as it fails to vindicate either the “public deception” or the “abandonment” rationale for the doctrine, see text accompanying notes 29 through 32, and would render the assertion of the seller’s pre-closing priority against an interloper a question merely of the purchaser’s ability to obtain the seller’s joinder in the action. In any event, justifying the catastrophic effect of an “assignment in gross” is beyond the scope of this article, its sole concern being how to avoid it. Vol. 99 TMR 795 Not only can the flaw in the purchaser’s trademark priority caused by an assignment in gross be catastrophic, but it may become manifest at any time; it does not fade away. There is simply no time limit on a third party’s right to assert the purchaser’s loss of trademark priority rights. Experience teaches that many practitioners are unaware of the hazards posed by an assignment in gross, and that even those aware of the issue often do not know how to avoid such a disaster. The practitioner’s difficulty in ensuring the fulfillment of the requirement that good will be conveyed together with the trademark begins with the inherent difficulty in interpreting the meaning of good will. The term itself is vague, and its meaning has shifted over much of the past century.12 At one time, the requirement that good will be conveyed was generally thought to be satisfied by the passing of title to all tangible assets of the seller’s business.13 Later, the good will requirement became commonly understood to be fulfilled by the seller’s ceasing to sell goods of the kind previously sold under the mark.14 Numerous judicial decisions have made it clear that neither understanding retains any force.15 12. The history of the good will requirement is painstakingly traced in Irene Calboli, Trademark Assignment “With Goodwill”: A Concept Whose Time Has Gone, 57 Fla. L. Rev. 771, 788-95 (2005). The history recounted in the article is marred, however, by its unpersuasive characterization of the uneven development of the good will concept as a contest between warring judicial factions, characterized as “liberal” and “conservative,” when such development appears rather to evidence each court’s struggle to protect the interests of consumers by affording continuing meaning to the good will concept without unduly restricting the freedom of contracting parties to deal in trademarks appurtenant to their businesses and without unnecessarily destroying trademark priority. While legal application of the term “good will” has changed, the core concept has remained largely unchanged. In 1620, an English court defined “good will” as the “friendly attitude and patronage of customers.” Broad v. Jollyfe, Cro. Jac. 596, 79 Eng. Reprint 509 (1620). In 1893, the California Supreme Court defined goodwill as “the probability that the old customer will resort to the new place.” Bell v. Ellis, 33 Cal. 620 (1867). 13. See, e.g., Nettie Rosenstein, Inc. v. Princess Pat, Ltd., 220 F.2d 444, 453 (C.C.P.A 1955). 14. See, e.g., Indep. Baking Powder Co. v. Boorman, 175 F. 448, 451-54 (C.C. D.N.J. 1910); Eiseman v. Schiffer, 157 F. 473, 475-76 (C.C. S.D.N.Y. 1907). 15. See Burgess v. Gilman, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 19090, at *4 (9th Cir. 2008); Clark & Freeman Corp. v. Heartland Co., 811 F. Supp. 137, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); see also Defiance Button Mach. Co. v. C&C Metal Prods., 759 F.2d 1053, 1059 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844 (1985) (“[A] trademark may be validly transferred without the simultaneous transfer of any tangible assets, as long as the recipient continues to produce goods of the same quality and nature previously associated with the mark.”) (citing Visa, U.S.A., Inc. v. Birmingham Trust Nat’l Bank, 696 F.2d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 826 (1983); Sterling Brewers, Inc. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 441 F.2d 675, 680 (C.C.P.A. 1971); Hy-Cross Hatchery, Inc. v. Osborne, 303 F.2d 947, 950 (C.C.P.A. 1962)). On an international level, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property expressly allows for the possibility that the law of some (but not necessarily all) signatory countries may condemn a trademark assignment made without a contemporaneous transfer of the “business or good will to which the mark belongs.” 796 Vol. 99 TMR To understand the more recent consensus about the meaning of good will requires mention of the dual implied representations inherent in the use of a trademark, namely, those of continuity of source and quality control.16 As for the representation of continuity of source, the assignment of a trademark unavoidably “puts the lie” to that representation, at least temporarily.17 There is little the While the Convention avoids defining “business or good will” (or attempting to distinguish between them), it makes clear that a signatory country is prohibited from conditioning the effectiveness of a trademark assignment upon the transfer of any business or good will beyond that which is “located in that country.” The Convention thus mandates that national boundaries be respected in defining the “business or good will” that a signatory country may require to be contemporaneously transferred. Article 6quater provides as follows: (1) When, in accordance with the law of a country of the Union, the assignment of a mark is valid only if it takes place at the same time as the transfer of the business or goodwill to which the mark belongs, it shall suffice for the recognition of such validity that the portion of the business or goodwill located in that country be transferred to the assignee, together with the exclusive right to manufacture in the said country, or to sell therein, the goods bearing the mark assigned. (2) The foregoing provision does not impose upon the countries of the Union any obligation to regard as valid the assignment of any mark the use of which by the assignee would, in fact, be of such a nature as to mislead the public, particularly as regards the origin, nature, or essential qualities, of the goods to which the mark is applied. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, art. 6quater. See also Walter J. Derenberg, Territorial Scope and Situs of Trademarks and Good Will, 68 TMR 387 (1978). While Article 21 of TRIPS provides that “[m]embers may determine conditions on the . . . assignment of trademarks, it being understood . . . that the owner of a registered trademark shall have the right to assign his trademark with or without the transfer of the business to which the trademark belongs,” evidently the contemporaneous transfer of good will may yet be required by member states. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, opened for signature April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Rounds vol. 31, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (1995). 16. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & Econ. 265, 286 (1987) (“[A] trademark is not only a symbol of origin, but a symbol of a level of quality.”) (quotation attributed in that article to Professor McCarthy). 17. Economic theory supporting the law’s protection of trademarks holds that a mark’s primary value to the consumer lies in reducing consumer search costs, such that “the consumer [says] to himself, ‘I need not investigate the attributes of the brand I am about to purchase because the trademark is a shorthand way of telling me that the attributes are the same as that of the brand I enjoyed earlier.’” William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & Econ. 265, 269 (1987): For this strategy to be efficient, however, not only must it be cheaper to search for the right trademark than for the desired attributes of the good, but also past experience must be a good predictor of the likely outcome of current consumption choices—that is, the brand must exhibit consistent quality. Id. (emphasis added). For the consumer’s purposes, continuation of quality control, not simply source, is the key. Indeed, the mark is rendered no less valuable by the consumer’s having no idea who the source of the marked goods is, his interest lying rather in the accuracy of the implied assurance that control over the quality of the marked products is being exercised Vol. 99 TMR 797 law can do to remedy that problem, except perhaps to adopt the wholly uneconomic policy of prohibiting the assignment of trademarks. While, alternatively, the law could require the purchaser to raise public awareness of the assignment, as by advertisement,18 such a requirement would work at cross-purposes with the parties’ principal commercial purpose in assigning the trademark, which is to change ownership while fostering the public illusion that nothing of consequence has changed.19 The current consensus on the meaning of good will arises out of the courts’ determination to ensure the accuracy of the remaining implied representation, namely, that of continuity of quality control.20 The rule prohibiting an assignment in gross is now understood to require the seller and purchaser to attempt to ensure the accuracy of the implied representation of continuity of quality control by taking steps to ensure that some facsimile of the seller’s quality control remains in place through the closing and for some indefinite period thereafter.21 It is insufficient (perhaps even irrelevant) for the purchaser to show that for some time after the closing the purchaser exercised quality control that was “good” or even “excellent”; the purchaser’s burden, rather, is to show that for such period her quality control remained essentially the same as the seller’s.22 today in the same manner as it was yesterday. Id. (citing Comment, Trademarks and Generic Words: An Effect-on-Competition Test, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 868 (1984)). 18. This is one suggestion made by Professor Calboli. See Irene Calboli, Trademark Assignment “With Goodwill”: A Concept Whose Time Has Gone, 57 Fla. L. Rev. 771, 836-37 (2005). 19. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & Econ. 265, 285 (1987) (“If A sells just his trademark to B, and consumers know about the sale, attaching A’s trademark to B’s good will not, at least as a first approximation, enable B to obtain a higher price for his good.”). 20. See id. at 284-85. 21. Attributing a “quality control” denotation to the modern concept of “good will” has the additional salutary effect of unifying the doctrine prohibiting “assignment in gross” with that prohibiting “naked licensing” of trademarks. Under the latter doctrine, an owner/licensor is required by common law to exercise its own control over the quality of the goods or services sold by the licensee under the licensed mark. A licensor’s failure to exercise its own quality control over such goods and services will result in a judicial holding that the license was “naked,” the effect of which is the irreversible destruction of the owner’s priority in the mark up through the expiration or earlier termination of the naked license. See Barcamerica Int’l USA Trust v. Tyfield Imp., Inc., 289 F.3d 589, 595-96 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Moore Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Ryu, 960 F.2d 486, 489 (5th Cir. 1992)). 22. See, e.g., Clark & Freeman Corp. v. Heartland Co., 811 F. Supp. 137, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (“For these purposes, it is not dispositive that plaintiff’s footwear is of high quality. . . . Plaintiffs’ argument that customers cannot be harmed or deceived either because their shoes are of such high quality or because they are available for inspection prior to purchase misses the mark.”). 798 Vol. 99 TMR In the case of the sale of a large business having many sites, whether wholly owned or franchisee-operated, it is generally a simple matter to ensure that the seller’s quality control procedures remain in place for a reasonable period after the closing. In such a case, the seller has generally maintained a printed compendium of quality standards, and has employed numerous people to inspect each site and ensure that its quality conforms to those standards. So long as key personnel remain with the business for a time after the closing, ensuring continuity of the seller’s standards and operations, an assignment in gross can readily be avoided.23 Compare that, however, to the far more common situation, such as Pam’s, where the seller is an aging restaurateur operating a few restaurants in a small area. In such a case, it is all too common for quality-control standards to have existed in the mind of only one person, and for quality control inspections to have been conducted only by that same person. If that person departs the company upon the closing of the sale without codifying the restaurants’ most esteemed features and the seller’s qualitycontrol standards, and imparting them to the purchaser, an assignment in gross problem threatens. C. Two Alternative Routes to Avoiding Catastrophe? In Clark & Freeman Corp. v. The Heartland Company,24 Judge Martin observed that there appear to be two alternative routes by which a trademark assignment may avoid characterization as an assignment in gross.25 Under the first alternative, the assignee may show that “the assignee is producing a product or performing a service substantially similar to that of the assignor and [that] customers would not be deceived or harmed.”26 Under the second alternative, the assignee may demonstrate that the assignee “is able to ‘go on in real continuity with the past . . . or [that] there is a continuity of management.’”27 23. Retention of the seller’s quality-control employees appears to ensconce the assignment safely within the category of valid assignments, as it readily lends itself to characterization as “real continuity with the past” and “a continuity of management.” See infra note 27 and accompanying text. 24. 811 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 25. This dictum has been repeated in later decisions. See, e.g., Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Flight 001, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51012, at *25 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 26. 811 F. Supp. at 139. 27. Id. at 140 n.3 (citing, inter alia, Defiance Button Mach. Co. v. C&C Metal Prods., 759 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844 (1985)). Vol. 99 TMR 799 1. First Alternative: “Substantial Similarity” Between the Seller’s and Purchaser’s Products In determining whether a trademark assignment is valid, courts applying the first alternative have long struggled to discern whether post-closing goods or services are sufficiently similar to pre-closing goods or services to sustain the assignment. A verbal standard requiring “substantial similarity” between the goods or services is simply too imprecise to enable counsel to reach a reliable determination on the issue prior to closing. Where the application of a standard proves capable of widely divergent outcomes, the lawyer’s natural inclination is to apply the standard as consistently as possible with its underlying rationale. In this instance, however (as is often the case), the absence of a predictive standard arises out of a corresponding absence of judicial consensus on the rationale for allowing the degree of similarity between the assignee’s and assignor’s goods or services to determine whether a trademark assignment should be upheld or struck down.28 One rationale for relying principally upon the degree of similarity between the assignee’s and assignor’s goods or services posits that the assignee’s use of the mark on goods or services differing from goods or services of the “quality and nature previously associated with the mark [under the assignor’s regime]”29 is misleading to the public, and should rightly result in loss of the seller’s priority on such grounds. In applying this alternative, Judge Martin observed: The facts of record in this case support a finding of assignment in gross here. [The seller] sold only women’s pixie boots under the mark “Heartland,” while [the purchasers] immediately applied it only to men’s shoes, then later to men’s hiking boots. The markets for the two goods are substantially distinct; it is unlikely that men buying [the purchasers’] “Heartland” shoes 28. If a court were primarily concerned with ensuring that the parties give substance to the implied representation of continued quality control, these two “alternative” standards could reasonably be understood as alternative evidentiary bases by which a court may deem itself satisfied that the seller’s quality control has survived assignment of the mark in some meaningful way. The purchaser’s continuation of the sale of goods “substantially similar” to those sold by the seller under the mark could be deemed to provide some assurance that the seller’s quality control has continued through the transition of ownership, whether because the goods being sold by the purchaser were already contained in the seller’s inventory and could thus reliably be expected to have been deemed acceptable by the seller himself, or because the purchaser could be presumed to have learned from the seller how to make the same goods of the same quality. As discussed in text, however, by no means is this the only possible, or even a favored, interpretation. 29. Clark & Freeman Corp. v. Heartland Co., 811 F. Supp. 137, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 800 Vol. 99 TMR would be considering a reputation for footwear generally that [the seller] built by selling women’s boots.30 This “public deception” rationale seems self-refuting, however, for where the target demographics for the purchaser’s and seller’s goods or services are entirely discrete, there would scarcely be an opportunity for deception. Few members of the purchaser’s target demographic could be expected even to be aware that the seller had formerly been selling goods or services under the mark, let alone that the seller’s goods or services were of a particular type, or level of quality. The unlikelihood of any public reliance upon the seller’s pre-assignment reputation greatly diminishes any possibility of deception, undermining (rather than reinforcing) the notion that the threat of public deception provides a rational basis for forfeiture of the seller’s priority. An alternative rationale for regarding the similarity between the assignee’s and assignor’s goods or services as being fundamental to a determination whether to strike down the assignment as being in gross is that the purchaser’s use of the mark on goods or services that differ in “quality and nature [from goods or services] previously associated with the mark [under the seller’s regime]” effectively constitutes an abandonment of any good will accumulated by the seller effective at the moment of closing, eo instante.31 Such a rationale is highly problematic, however, for several reasons. Although it is undoubtedly possible for the owner of any item of property to abandon it immediately by voluntarily manifesting an immediate intention to relinquish all claim to it, someone who has taken title to a trademark by means of an assignment in gross obviously has no such intention; to the contrary, any such assignee would be mortified by the prospect of losing the mark. The abandonment rationale also seems at odds with the U.S. Trademark (Lanham) Act, which provides that abandonment will not even be rebuttably presumed without a showing of non-use for a period of three continuous years.32 Moreover, as later decisions confirm, trademark abandonment is rarely regarded as having occurred instantly.33 Abandonment thus provides an equally infirm basis for deciding whether to approve a 30. Id. at 141. 31. Defiance Button Mach. Co. v. C&C Metal Prods., 759 F.2d 1053, 1059 (2d Cir)., cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844 (1985). 32. Lanham Trademark Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (subsection (1) of definition of “Abandonment of Mark”): “Nonuse for 3 consecutive years shall be prima facie evidence of abandonment.” 33. See, e.g., Emergency One, Inc. v. Am. Fireeagle, Ltd., 228 F.3d 531 (4th Cir. 2000); Gaffrig Performance Indus., Inc. v. Livorsi Marine, Inc., 2003 WL 23144859, at *10 (N.D. Ill. 2003). Vol. 99 TMR 801 trademark assignment based solely on a comparison of pre-closing and post-closing goods or services. Whatever rationale (or combination of rationales) may underlie the substantial similarity requirement of the first alternative, it is effectively backward-looking, refusing to lend itself to prescriptive measures. As it is impossible at this point to articulate a unitary rationale supporting this alternative basis for salvaging an otherwise “in gross” assignment, the exercise is best left to courts reviewing transactions in which the parties have failed to provide any semblance of post-closing continuity of the seller’s quality-control standards. 2. Second Alternative: Real Continuity with the Past, or Continuity of Management Now that good will has come to mean “the seller’s quality control,” the second alternative is the more meaningful, under which an assignee can insulate an assignment from being characterized as an assignment in gross by demonstrating that the assignee “is able to go on in real continuity with the past . . . or [that] there is a continuity of management.”34 It is indeed possible for parties to a purchase-and-sale transaction to take forwardlooking measures to assure the purchaser’s successful invocation of this second alternative, should the need arise. The methods prescribed by this article are therefore intended to satisfy this second alternative. III. HOW TO AVOID CATASTROPHE In organizing the how-to portion of this article, it has been assumed that, after the introduction of the purchaser and seller to each other, the purchase-and-sale transaction will occur in distinct steps separated by three interstices: (a) at least a brief period between the introduction of the purchaser and seller to each other and an agreement upon the terms of the purchase-and-sale agreement, during which period the seller and purchaser are prepared to devote time and effort to real-world preparations for the conveyance; followed by (b) at least a brief period during which parties and counsel will negotiate the purchase-and-sale agreement, during which period the purchaser will customarily conduct a thorough “due 34. Clark & Freeman Corp., 811 F. Supp. at 140 n.3 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 802 Vol. 99 TMR diligence” investigation into the business, the end result of which should ideally be an accounting of every significant asset involved in the sale and a clear understanding of the characteristics of the business that make it a success. This period will be concluded by execution of the agreement; followed in turn by (c) a period of a few weeks after the parties’ execution of the purchase-and-sale agreement, culminating in the closing of the sale on a set date, at which there will be an exchange of consideration and ownership papers.35 The proffered technique for avoiding an assignment-in-gross catastrophe is intended to guide the practitioner’s conduct on four key questions, namely: (a) how to ascertain the “good will” of the business; (b) what to include in the purchase-and-sale agreement; (c) what to do before the closing; and (d) what to do after the closing. Each such point will be addressed separately below. Two caveats. First, although the following is framed as guidance for the lawyer representing the person who stands to suffer most immediately by an assignment in gross, namely, the purchaser, the prudent seller’s lawyer will not only cooperate fully in the implementation of such guidance, but will insist upon it, lest a material step be missed. Second, the proffered technique for avoiding the assignment-in-gross catastrophe is in no way a substitute for: (a) additional provisions commonly found in purchase-and-sale agreements, such as the requirement that the seller deliver a properly executed assignment of the trademark at the closing, or (b) the timely recording of the trademark assignment.36 A. How to Ascertain the Good Will of the Business A competently drafted agreement governing the purchase-andsale of a business using a trademark will be designed to ensure the 35. In the unpredictable world of legal practice, of course, no interstices between transactional steps can be guaranteed. On occasion, the parties’ introduction, the execution of the purchase-and-sale agreement, and the closing have been known to occur all within a day or two. While such a radical compression of ordinarily separate steps may require corresponding compression of the steps prescribed in this article, every effort should be made to provide the parties with sufficient time to ensure their joint codification and post-closing implementation of the seller’s quality-control procedures. An assignment of a mark is not immunized from challenge on grounds of assignment in gross simply because the various steps in the transaction were compressed in time. 36. See Lanham Act § 10(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(4) (2006): “An assignment shall be void against any subsequent purchaser for valuable consideration without notice, unless the prescribed information reporting the assignment is recorded in the United States Patent and Trademark Office within 3 months after the date of the assignment or prior to the subsequent purchase.” Vol. 99 TMR 803 transfer of the good will of the business appurtenant to and symbolized by the mark by ensuring the purchaser’s adoption and maintenance of the seller’s quality control procedures. Before drafting a quality control provision, the purchaser’s lawyer should ascertain from his client the elements of quality most salient to the type of business being bought and sold, as the principal elements of quality can be expected to vary greatly from one type of business to another. The purchaser should be advised to gather such information by spending substantial time at the site of the business while it remains under the seller’s operation (which many a careful purchaser will do in any event, if only to observe the activity at the till) and to talk to the seller,37 its employees, and its customers. The purchaser should be advised that the most useful mental exercise in this respect is to ask, “What is it about this particular business that has caused it to appeal to its customers such that it can fetch the purchase price I am prepared to pay for it, when other businesses of the kind have either failed to survive or are unworthy of such a price?”38 For example, a retail business may have distinguished itself in its customers’ minds by adapting its opening and closing days and times to suit customer traffic patterns, by providing a specific array of goods and services, by assuring a certain depth of inventory, by implementing flexible special-order and return policies, by maintaining a certain level of cleanliness, by ensuring that a sufficient number of employees is always present on the sales floor (which may either be fixed as an absolute number or determined according to its sufficiency in assuring that maximum customer-wait times are not exceeded), by dividing employees’ job assignments in a particular manner, by demanding a certain level of employee attire and courtesy, and so on. 37. The purchaser should be encouraged to ask the seller how he keeps customers coming back. The purchaser should also be encouraged to ask the seller about the complaints of disgruntled customers, and any steps the seller has taken to ensure that such incidents do not recur. As with all quality-control matters, the purchaser should take notes, and date and preserve them as possible evidence. 38. Preventing an assignment in gross is hardly the purchaser’s sole incentive to identify, document, systematize, and preserve the characteristics of the business that have made it successful. To the contrary, the purchaser’s primary incentive in doing so is to ensure that the business will remain profitable after purchase. In furtherance of that aim, the International Organization for Standardization (or “ISO”), which claims to be the world’s largest developer and publisher of international standards, has devoted an entire family of standards, known as “ISO 9000,” to aid in systematizing and preserving quality assurance procedures. The ISO website can currently be found at www.iso.org. To bring an outsider’s perspective to the situation, it may be advisable for the lawyer also to imagine himself “in the customer’s shoes.” (Far be it from the author to suggest that the lawyer actually visit the business to observe it from a customer’s standpoint, as this might violate the unwritten prohibition against a lawyer’s leaving his office for any professional reason other than to attend a closing or go to court.) 804 Vol. 99 TMR The same question, addressed in our primary example of the LUCIO brand Italian restaurants, might yield many of the same considerations, but a few different ones, as well. For example, the restaurant chain may have distinguished itself in its customers’ minds by maintaining a menu having a certain level of variety, by retaining certain signature dishes, by ensuring the availability of a “prix fixe” or reduced-price menu, by assuring a certain level of cleanliness by means of the retention of a certain sanitarian, and so on. The purchaser should be specifically admonished to identify to counsel any aspect of the seller’s good will that might threaten the commercial viability of the business should it be continued for a time after the anticipated purchase. Such aspects will be discussed further below. Ideally, the seller and the purchaser should jointly prepare a list of characteristics of the business that they believe have made it successful, enumerating for each such characteristic the steps they believe to be required of each of them to ensure the continued success of the business without the seller’s active participation. If a key component of the company’s past success will not be present after closing, the parties should be asked to devise a plan allowing for a transition with a minimal impact on quality, and revenue. B. What to Include in the Purchase-and-Sale Agreement Once the principal elements of quality control have been identified, they should be reduced to writing and annexed as an exhibit to the purchase-and-sale agreement. The agreement should include the seller’s representation and warranty that the annexed statement of quality-control policies is a materially complete statement of the seller’s successful business-generating characteristics, quality-control standards, and inspection methods, that have been applied to the business by the seller for some representative period.39 As the seller, the purchaser, or both, may deem it important to ensure the confidential or “trade secret” character of certain elements of the business or quality-control policies, it would be prudent to include a written promise of both the seller and the purchaser to take all reasonable and necessary 39. It is to be expected that any seller’s quality-control procedures will have evolved over time. Although the law of assignment in gross does not specify any particular period during which the quality control procedures imparted to the purchaser must have been enforced by the seller, ideally the parties should contractually quantify a representative look-back period during which the seller’s most important quality-control procedures have been in effect, so as to impart confidence to any court examining the purchase-and-sale transaction that the good will conveyed to the purchaser was current at the time of the trademark assignment. Vol. 99 TMR 805 steps to maintain the confidentiality of such matters both before and after closing. The agreement should also contain the seller’s promises: (a) to familiarize the purchaser with every aspect of the business by accompanying the purchaser on personal visits to each site of the business: (i) no fewer than a prescribed number of times for a prescribed minimum number of hours per visit; and (ii) with specific named persons to be present during the entire visit; (b) to cooperate in the preparation, authentication, and preservation of full and accurate evidence of each such visit; (c) to provide the purchaser with complete access to all facilities, keeping no place “off limits” to the purchaser; and (d) to disclose to the purchaser all information concerning the operation of the business, including but not limited to, sources of supply, recipes and formulas, processes, and quality-control standards and testing procedures. The purchase-and-sale agreement should also be drafted to include the seller’s promise to remain active in the operation of the business for a prescribed post-closing period to assist in the implementation of the quality-control procedures enumerated in the annexed exhibit (and any additional quality-control procedures that the seller may later realize have been omitted), and to assist the purchaser in implementing necessary changes to any aspects of the seller’s operation that may become uneconomic. As sellerconsultation agreements are often entered into at the closing of purchase-and-sale transactions (for tax and other purposes), memorializing such a promise should impose little additional paperwork. Any such consultation agreement should specifically impose upon the seller an obligation to assist in the implementation of prescribed quality-control procedures. In the event that the arrangement provides the seller with inadequate post-closing financial incentive to ensure fulfillment of his post-closing contractual obligations, adequate provision should be made to ensure that he does what he is required to do. Such a provision might take the form of an escrow of a held-back portion of the purchase price to be paid to the seller only upon fulfillment of the post-closing obligations, or a liquidated-damage provision designed to compensate the purchaser for the loss of value reasonably expected to be suffered on account of a specified delinquency by the seller, together with adequate security. 806 Vol. 99 TMR Any aspect of the seller’s good will that might threaten the commercial viability of the business if it were to continue for some time after the anticipated purchase40 should be governed as follows. The purchase-and-sale agreement should specify that the seller and purchaser have reached agreement upon both the need to change such uneconomic aspects of the seller’s operation,41 and a technique for implementing such change that is satisfactory to the purchaser and deemed by the seller to be consistent with the seller’s quality-control standards. The seller should be contractually required either to implement the necessary changes prior to closing or to assist the purchaser in implementing them after closing. The object of such a provision is to insulate the implementation of foreseeably necessary changes from effective challenge on grounds that they represent material deviations from the seller’s quality-control standards. C. What to Do Before the Closing Before the closing, the parties should jointly implement such changes to uneconomic aspects of the seller’s operation as they have agreed to make prior to closing. For evidentiary record-keeping purposes, the purchaser’s attorney (with his client’s cooperation) should design a written form to be manually completed and legibly signed by both the purchaser and the seller at the conclusion of each quality-training visit, reflecting all pertinent facts about such visit, such as their dates, times, and durations, as well as the locations of sites visited, the persons present at such sites, and the quality control procedures discussed and observed. The completed, signed forms should be delivered to, and preserved by, the purchaser’s counsel. Tangible or electronic copies should be provided contemporaneously to seller’s counsel, as an additional off-site repository. Given that assignment-in-gross allegations may be raised whenever a trademark dispute arises between the purchaser and an interloper, due care should be taken for the preservation of such 40. The measure of a reasonable transition period is discussed below at Section III.D. What to Do After the Closing. 41. Ideally, no material aspect of the business should be changed during the transition period. By making specific mention of the possible need to change an aspect that is (or may become) “uneconomic,” this article merely recognizes that sometimes a business may be confronted with a need to change in order to survive. While there can be no assurance that a court would countenance a change made on such grounds, necessity is often among the strongest of arguments. Moreover, even if such an argument were doomed to fail, the rational owner confronted with a choice between a loss of trademark priority and bankruptcy would ordinarily be expected to sacrifice trademark priority (or even the whole mark) rather than to lose the whole business. Vol. 99 TMR 807 evidence, including, but not necessarily limited to, the formal appointment of a custodian (preferably a long-term, full-time officer of the purchaser’s business),42 the insertion of originals in a securely bound compendium, and the creation and distribution of durable electronic copies of full sets of the completed forms, including the maintenance of off-premises copies to minimize the risk that evidence will be lost in the event of fire or other casualty. D. What to Do After the Closing It would be both uneconomic and pointless for a court to demand that either product or service offerings or quality-control techniques be frozen in place for the remaining life of the business, as the public implicitly recognizes both that its own tastes change and that product and service offerings and quality-control techniques eventually change from time to time, even when a business never changes hands. As required by the agreement, however, every effort should be made to comply with the seller’s pre-closing quality control procedures for some reasonable time after the closing, to be referred to hereinafter as the “transition period.” Although legal research has provided no firm guidance in fixing a minimum duration for such a period, the transition period should be deemed reasonable in duration so long as it is long enough to provide a substantial factual underpinning for the public’s natural assumption that the uninterrupted use of the mark through the change of ownership has been accompanied by a good-faith effort to ensure the uninterrupted continuity of quality control. One consideration to take into account in fixing the transition period should be the duration of the business’s customary change cycle, so that a business that changes its car models every year might warrant a longer transition period than a restaurant that revamps its entire menu once per season. During whatever appropriate transition period is agreed by the parties, the seller should remain “on call” to make good his promise to assist the purchaser in implementing and enforcing the 42. The reason for the appointment of a specific officer to maintain and preserve such records is to maximize the likelihood that such evidence will be admissible to rebut any allegations of assignment-in-gross that may be made in a formal proceeding. By way of example, only, the Federal Rules of Evidence provide: Records of Regularly Conducted Activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness .... Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) (2006). 808 Vol. 99 TMR seller’s pre-closing quality-control procedures, and to assist in the creation and preservation of accurate records of his activities in this regard. The purchaser and counsel should ensure that records of the seller’s post-closing participation are kept and preserved in the same manner as that set forth above for pre-closing activities. During the transition period, if the purchaser (or, more accurately, the new owner) finds that in order to maintain or enhance the profitability of the business, the purchaser needs to change the business, the purchaser should diligently ensure that the quality of both existing and new goods and services conforms as closely as possible to the seller’s pre-closing quality-control standards. For example, if the business is a drug store that during the seller’s pre-closing tenure operated a pharmacy, it would be imprudent during the transitional period for the purchaser to close the prescription window on grounds that its continued operation is too costly or inconvenient. If prior to the closing the business was a burger joint, during the transition period the purchaser should not eliminate or change existing burger offerings simply because the purchaser has a better idea. If fundamental change need be implemented during the transition period, it should be made only with the seller’s full knowledge and approval. IV. CONCLUSION Professor McCarthy takes an uncharacteristically despairing view of the practitioner’s ability to parse the internally inconsistent case law well enough to enable one to insulate a trademark assignee from the loss of the seller’s priority: One cannot hope to understand the disparate case law on point without appreciating the continuing policy tension which effectively replays the 1930s legislative debate in every litigation over the validity of an assignment. While some courts will apply the anti-assignment-in-gross rule with myopic vigor, other courts will interpret “good will” so as to focus on the nature of the assignee’s use, not the formalism of what assets passed to the assignee. Thus, predictability of judicial response to a given assignment transaction is a risky business. Attorney and client must decide whether to take a conservative or risk-taking posture in structuring the transaction.43 Although this article may be subject to criticism on grounds that it advises the practitioner to take a conservative route, its central concern, being that of the practicing lawyer, is to effectuate 43. 3 McCarthy, supra note 9, at § 18:10. Vol. 99 TMR 809 the client’s intentions zealously within the bounds of the law. In that sense, this article is no more conservative than are the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.44 While not all judicial decisions evince precisely the same understanding of good will, they do make clear that no court relishes the opportunity to find an assignment in gross. To the contrary, decisions finding an assignment in gross have addressed transactions where the parties have left the court with no practical alternative to such a finding, having made no good-faith effort to continue the seller’s quality-control practices for any period after closing on the sale of a business. While no course of conduct can be guaranteed to result in a finding of no assignment in gross, in no reported decision have efforts as diligent and demonstrable as those prescribed in this article resulted in an adverse holding on this question. While any practical advice must necessarily be haunted by the specter of a contrary unreported decision or the ever-lurking possibility of a legislative or judicial upheaval in established case law, the practitioner has little choice but to comply with the law as currently expressed in reported decisions. The prescriptions made in this article are the practitioner’s best bet for protecting any client, such as Pam, and anyone else in like position, from the adverse effects of negotiating an assignment in gross. 44. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2004): [1] A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client’s cause or endeavor. A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf. A lawyer is not bound, however, to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client. For example, a lawyer may have authority to exercise professional discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be pursued. See Rule 1.2. The lawyer’s duty to act with reasonable diligence does not require the use of offensive tactics or preclude the treating of all persons involved in the legal process with courtesy and respect.
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