Is cash transfer a better devil than food aid?
A study of Malawi’s use of cash transfer as a
response tool to food insecurity in 2012/2013
and 2013/2014
By Stern Kita
May 2014
1
Acknowledgement
I would like to express my sincere gratitude first to the United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs for offering me a grant to undertake this study.
Special thanks to the team at UN OCHA that closely supported my work; to my
bosses for allowing me to undertake the study and their support, despite the busy
office schedule; to all those that accepted to be interviewed and provided guidance
and suggestions, at times at very short notice; to family and friends for the support.
I would also like to extend my word of appreciation to James Chiusiwa for editing
and providing comments on the initial draft report; to Ephraim Nyondo and Dorothy
Tembo for helping in dotting the ‘i’s’ and crossing the ‘t’s.’
Much as I have tried to present the findings as they were presented to me by the
sources, any factual error or inaccuracy is my own responsibility.
2
Table of Contents
Acknowledgement ................................................................................................................................ 2
Executive summary .............................................................................................................................. 5
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 6
Food security and entitlements .......................................................................................................... 9
Cash transfer in humanitarian programmes ..................................................................................... 9
Types of cash transfer programmes ............................................................................................ 11
Factors to consider before using cash transfers during disasters ........................................... 11
Objectives of Study ............................................................................................................................ 12
Scope and Methodology .................................................................................................................... 13
Major Findings ..................................................................................................................................... 14
Humanitarian response decision making process ...................................................................... 14
Delivery mechanisms ..................................................................................................................... 18
Food basket, food consumption and cash transfers.................................................................. 23
Market behaviour, inflation ........................................................................................................... 24
Guidelines for CTP .......................................................................................................................... 24
Market assessments and monitoring ........................................................................................... 25
Sharing ............................................................................................................................................. 26
The influence of local leaders ....................................................................................................... 26
Timeliness and reliability: cash versus food aid ......................................................................... 29
Partnerships with private sector ................................................................................................... 30
Financial inclusion ........................................................................................................................... 30
Recommendations .............................................................................................................................. 31
Government’s role in coordination, monitoring and capacity building ................................... 31
Cash or food? .................................................................................................................................. 31
Targeting and beneficiary selection ............................................................................................. 32
Cash transfer guidelines ................................................................................................................ 32
Financial inclusion, technological and literacy ............................................................................ 32
Adoption of innovative cash delivery mechanisms .................................................................... 33
Food basket ..................................................................................................................................... 34
Capitalizing on changing global donor trends ............................................................................ 34
Learning from others...................................................................................................................... 35
The role of local leaders in the response programme .............................................................. 35
Conclusion............................................................................................................................................ 35
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Reference ............................................................................................................................................. 37
Annexes ................................................................................................................................................ 40
A: List of Key Informants Interviewed ........................................................................................ 40
B: Household questionnaire .......................................................................................................... 41
C: Focus Group Discussion Guide ................................................................................................ 45
D: Key informant interviews guide for implementing partners................................................ 46
4
Executive summary
The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami is considered as the first humanitarian
situation where cash transfers were used as an alternative to food aid. Since then,
cash transfers have been used as a standalone response tool to disasters, or used in
combination with food aid. Malawi piloted the use of cash transfer as a response tool
to food insecurity between 2005 and 2008. The first national response that used
cash to respond to food insecurity at a large scale was carried out in 2012/2013, and
then in 2013/2014. The purpose of this study was to assess how effective the use of
cash transfers was as a response tool to the humanitarian situation in Malawi. The
study was carried out through household interviews, focus group discussions, key
informant interviews as well as review of previous evaluations and studies on cash
transfers in Malawi and other countries.
Malawi has used cash transfers as a response tool on a large scale for 2
consecutive years. Ideally, the expectation would be that lessons learnt during the
first year and those gathered from previous pilot programmes would assist in
improving future programmes. However, most of the challenges noted in 2012/2013
response, some of which were highlighted in external programme evaluations, were
repeated in the 2013/2014 programme. This challenge cannot be attributed to the
cash transfer response programme alone. Even in provision of food aid, similar
challenges have been observed and continue to appear in almost every other
response. In some cases, vulnerable households, who are supposed to be benefiting
from the response programmes, have been the victims.
Findings of this study do not show that cash should substitute food as a
response tool; neither does it find that cash is always the best option. Just like food
aid, cash transfers too have their own shortfalls. Although cash transfers, on a larger
scale, offer more benefits than food aid, it should not be considered as a panacea,
and its implementation should be considered carefully and be promoted if backed by
reliable market assessments and other considerations, and should also include closer
monitoring of market behaviours during programme implementation.
Coordination systems, with appropriate checks and balances and strong
government’s monitoring, ought to be improved. For effective use of cash transfers,
appropriate systems need to be in place that would support such a response.
Challenges being experienced should be used to improve programme design and
implementation. The trend at the global level clearly shows that cash transfers are
here to stay as a response tool to disasters. Efforts should be made to capitalize on
this and develop clear guidelines for the implementation of cash transfers in
humanitarian situations in the country.
The study, however, does find that when planned and implemented properly,
cash would, overall, be a better devil than food aid.
5
Introduction
Malawi lies between latitude 9° 22’ and 17° 7’ South and between longitudes
32° 40’ and 35° 55’ East on the southern part of the East African Valley with a
territorial area of 111, 140 km2 and a tropical climate (Munthali et al., 2003;
McSweeney et al., 2008; Kalinga-Chirwa and Ngongondo, 2010). 73.9% of the
population live on less than 1.25 US$ a day, with a GDP per capita of US$ 794,
average annual population affected by natural disasters of 64,924 per million people,
adult literacy rate is 73.7% and 85% of the population live in rural areas (NSO,
2008; UNDP, 2011). As a predominantly rural based, landlocked country lacking
mineral resources, Malawi’s economy largely depends on agricultural exports
(Bryceson, 2006). About 90% of the population depend on agriculture for their
livelihood, with maize being the major food crop grown on 90% of land under
cultivation and tobacco as the main cash crop (GoM, 2001; Ellis et al., 2003; Brown,
2011a). About 75% of the labour force in Malawi is employed in the agricultural
sector and agriculture contributes more than 40% to the country’s GDP (NSO,
2005). Dry spells, drought, floods and strong winds are the major hazards affecting
Malawi (Nangoma, 2007). Malawi has had severe droughts during 1903, 1922,
1948/49 and 1991/92 and serious droughts in 1967/68, 1972/73, 1982/83 and
1994/95, 1997/98, 2001/02 and 2004/05. Recurrent floods and droughts in Malawi
have had far-reaching impacts on food, energy, health, water and the economy
(Nangoma, 2007). Between 1979 and 2008, 21.7 million people were cumulatively
affected by natural disasters with 2, 596 deaths (World Bank, 2011). A drought in
1991/92 affected more than 6 million people, led to a 60% decline in maize
production and an 8% decline in GDP (Clay et al., 2003).
Every year, since 2004, the Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee (MVAC)
conducts bi-annual assessments on food deficits and releases the main report in
June and an update in October. Households with food deficits and those who cannot
manage to get food on their own are considered vulnerable and to be with missing
food entitlements (MFEs). Figure 1 is a graph that shows trends in households with
missing food entitlements as a percentage of the national population between 2005
and 2012, using the MVAC June reports.
6
MFEs as % of total population
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Year
Figure 1: Population with missing food entitlements as a percentage of the national population
Source: MVAC Reports (2005-2012); NSO, 2010b
In 2012, a vulnerability assessment by the MVAC, identified 1,989,649 people as
missing their food entitlements as a result of dry spells and other hazards, and
therefore requiring humanitarian assistance. This was the first time in more than five
years for such a large number of people to be affected. The MVAC report for 2013
indicated that 1,855,183 people in 24 districts of the country were food insecure and
required humanitarian relief assistance for five months starting from October 2013.
Production in these districts was affected by a mixture of late on set of rains, early
cessation of rains, erratic rains, prolonged dry spells and flooding. The affected
districts are in all the three regions of the country, i.e. north, central and south.
The Government of Malawi (GoM) coordinated the development of a response plan
where 4 humanitarian clusters were activated: Education, Nutrition, Protection and
Agriculture and Food Security. Humanitarian assistance was provided in phases to
the affected people from August 2012 to March 2013 and October 2013 to April
2014, using two main interventions: cash transfers and food aid. A total of
1,843,298 people received food aid while 146,244 received unconditional cash
transfers during the 2012/2013 response, while in 2013/2014 a total of 1,614,744
received food aid and 235,526 received cash transfers.
Malawi has 28 administrative districts and 16 districts were affected in 2012/2013,
while in 2013/2014, 24 districts were affected. Table 1 shows the number of people
identified as missing their food entitlements in 2012/2013 and 2013/2014.
7
District
2012/2013 Total Affected
Population
2013/2014 Total Affected
Population
1
Balaka
208,501
95,647
2
Blantyre Rural
129 971
98,747
3
Chikhwawa
275 653
4
Chiradzulu
28 711
56,462
5
Dedza
70 406
56,262
6
Dowa
31,753
7
Karonga
56,005
8
Kasungu
9
Machinga
20 556
114,234
10
Mangochi
14 340
118,691
11
Mchinji
12
Mulanje
349 389
37,501
13
Mwanza
71 916
71,358
14
Mzimba
15
Neno
16
Nkhotakota
17
Nsanje
105 012
81,154
18
Ntcheu
135 372
21,933
19
Ntchisi
20
Phalombe
21
Rumphi
22
Salima
52 468
99,367
23
Thyolo
193 387
59,294
24
Zomba
137 053
91,264
TOTALS
1 972 993
110,976
113,813
58,553
211,755
110 080
77,218
38,676
23,360
70 178
101,745
29,415
1,855,183
Table 1: Total affected population per district for 2012/2013 and 2013/2014
Source: MVAC 2013 and 2014 reports
Of the 16 affected districts in 2012/2013, cash transfers were administered in
selected areas in 7 districts, while 10 districts out of 24 were targeted during the
2013/2014 response. The cash transfer was delivered through different modes which
included use of commercial banks, mobile money as well as through direct
disbursement by third parties. Cash transfers were implemented by NGOs that fell in
two groups: one led by the UN World Food Programme while the other one was an
NGO-consortium led by Oxfam in 2012/2013 and by Save the Children during the
2013/2014 response programme. The Government of Malawi was responsible for
coordinating and leading the whole response programme. The 2012/2013 response
8
programme was the first time for Malawi to use cash transfers as a response to food
insecurity at a large scale. Previously some NGOs (Oxfam and Concern Worldwide)
had piloted the use of cash transfers in response to food insecurity on a small scale.
Food security and entitlements
There are three main components of food security: food availability, power to
acquire or access food and sufficient nutrition acquisition from the food (Boko et al.,
2007). Food insecurity is often associated with food availability and entitlement
failures (Sen, 1981; Adger, 1996, 2006; Kelly and Adger, 2000; Devereux, 2007).
Devereux (2007) argues that entitlement failures are a result of complex, iterative
and interacting processes which include production failure, labour market failure,
commodity market failure and transfers failures. Entitlements can be lost in either of
two ways: (i) a ‘pull’ failure implies the loss of the means or lack of income to
purchase food and (ii) a ‘response’ failure, where the market is not able to respond
to demand, either as a result of lack of food supply or due to traders cornering the
market. Since food aid ensures that people are still able to eat when food availability
is low, it addresses the ‘response’ failure. Cash transfers provide people with
resources to access and buy food, thereby addressing the ‘pull’ failure (Gore & Patel,
2006). Although food is available in some of the markets in the areas, access to such
food is a challenge. Access is usually hampered by factors such as availability of
money, high price of food, distance to the nearest market, illnesses and old age.
Cash transfer in humanitarian programmes
Cash transfers have been used for development programmes for a long time. Cash
transfers have been widely used especially in Latin America as a social protection
measure targeting the most vulnerable members of communities. Malawi launched a
Social Cash Transfer Scheme (SCTS) in 2006 where cash was provided to the most
vulnerable households at an average transfer value of US$14 a month, which vary
depending on household size and number of school-going children. The SCTS targets
the poorest 10% of households that are also labor constrained. However, they were
first used in humanitarian response programmes as an alternative to food aid during
the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami (Bailey, 2013). Cash transfers are considered
cheaper to administer than food aid. They have also been found to be less
paternalistic as they enable individual choice and reduces dependency and
disincentive; they generate pro-poor growth through investment, job creation in
addition to consumption; and have been associated with boosting purchasing power
thereby stimulating market growth (Devereux, 2007; Davies and Davey, 2008).
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At the global level, development aid funding to cash transfer programmes has
increased from US$23 million in 2007 to US$150 million in 2010, while humanitarian
aid spent on cash transfer programmes has increased from US$1.8 million in 2007
(about 0.7% of overseas development aid - ODA) to US$52 million in 2010 (25.9%
of ODA) (Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2013).
Figure 2: Spending on cash transfer programming in humanitarian emergencies
Source: Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2013
In January 2013, countries made a commitment that apart from food aid, they can
also make their food aid commitments through cash and vouchers through the Food
Assistance Convention. This is also seen as a major global policy shift in accepting
cash as an important tool for humanitarian response (Bailey, 2013).
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Types of cash transfer programmes
Unconditional cash
transfers
Conditional cash
transfers
Vouchers
Cash for work
People are given money as a direct grant with no conditions or
work requirements. There is no requirement to repay any money,
and people are entitled to use the money however they wish
The agency puts conditions on how the cash is spent such as
reconstructing a home. Alternatively, cash might be given after
recipients have met a condition, such as enrolling children in
school or having them vaccinated. This type of conditionality is
rare in humanitarian settings.
A voucher is a paper, token or electronic card that can be
exchanged for a set quantity or value of goods, denomination
either as a cash value or as predetermined commodities or
services. Vouchers are redeemable with preselected vendors or at
'voucher fairs' set up by the implementing agency.
Payment (in cash or vouchers) is provided as a wage for work,
usually in public or community programmes
Source: Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Good Practice Review (Global Humanitarian Assistance)
Factors to consider before using cash transfers during disasters
A number of factors have to be considered before a decision can be made as to
whether cash is to be used as a response tool in a humanitarian situtaion or not.
Although a market assessment is an important starting point, it is not the only factor
that has to be considered. In some cases, cash transfers might not be recommended
as the best option even when a market assessment establishes a very functioning
market in an area. The box below is a summary of some of the major factors that
ought to be considered in the decision making process (compare with figure 4).
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Factors to consider before using cash transfer programme as a response
tool to a disasters
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Intervention objective clearly identified and can be feasibly met using CTP;
Needs can be met though the market with readily available commodities or
services at the required quality, quantity and frequency for the given
project duration;
Cash is used in the operational context and beneficiaries are open to
receiving CTP;
Access to functioning, competitive and integrated markets or options to
support market recovery are present;
Agreement on targeting and safe receipt of resources, including analysis of
local gender dynamics;
Assessment and selection of cash delivery mechanisms (mobile operatives,
financial institutions) against clear criteria including: security, cost and scale
up capacity;
Position of national and local Governments;
Security risks of cash are compared to other approaches and it is
determined that risks to beneficiaries, agencies and any third parties can be
managed;
Humanitarian Agency (and implementation partner) has sufficient
organisational capacity & systems to deliver project – to involve logistics,
finance and legal advice as needed;
Inclusion of CTP within the coordination system (e.g. IASC cluster system
and/or Government-led coordination mechanisms) - including knowledge of
aggregate input/impact;
Accountability, monitoring and evaluation systems in place to demonstrate
continued appropriateness of the cash intervention and implementation
methods used.
Objectives of Study
The overall objective of this study was to assess the effectiveness of cash transfers
as a tool in responding to food insecurity and general humanitarian crises. The study
would identify key areas of success and challenges in the use of cash transfers as a
response to food insecurity and provide recommendations on improvements to be
made in future humanitarian interventions using cash transfers. Results of this
research will help in the design and implementation of future humanitarian
programmes that intend to use the cash transfer approach. The study focused on:
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(1) the methodology used to disburse the cash (2) recipients perceptions of the cash
transfer methodology and utilization of the cash received as compared to those
receiving food aid, (3) cost of implementation of the cash transfer programme as
compared to food aid (4) implementers perspective, focusing on design, challenges
and lessons learnt in the implementation.
The initial design of the study was to focus on the 2012/2013 response programme
only. However, the time of study coincided with another response programme,
which also covered the same districts as the 2012/2013 programmes as well the
same beneficiaries in some cases. Similar delivery mechanisms, implementing
partners and approaches were used in the 2 responses. The study, as a result, had
to combine both programmes, but with much focus on the 2012/2013 response.
Scope and Methodology
The study was conducted through focus group discussions, questionnaire survey and
semi-structured key informant interviews. Local level focus group discussions were
carried out in Mangochi, Nsanje and Zomba districts, while household surveys were
conducted in Mangochi and Zomba districts. Focus group discussions were
conducted with individuals who had benefitted either from the cash transfer or food
aid programme—both male and female beneficiaries. The study was conducted in
Traditional Authorities (TA) Mponda in Mangochi, Ngabu in Nsanje and Chikowi in
Zomba over a period of 5 months. Using purposive and random sampling, a total of
40 households were selected from the 2 TAs for questionnaire interviews using
registration records from the implementing NGOs. 7 focus group discussions were
also conducted in the 3 districts, with a minimum of 2 FGDs per district and with
between 10 and 14 participants in each. Separate FGDs were conducted for men
and women in Zomba and Mangochi. The FGDs in Zomba and Mangochi only
targeted beneficiaries, while for Nsanje the FGDs combined beneficiaries and local
leaders and Civil Protection Committees (CPCs). The interviews targeted both those
that had received food aid and those that had received cash.
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with key informants responsible for the
response programme, who included NGOs at national and district levels, one bank,
government officers at both national and district levels and one donor. District level
key informant interviews for government and NGO partners were conducted in 9
districts. The list of key informants interviewed is provided as annex A. Annexes B to
D are samples of the tools used in data collection.
13
A content analysis of qualitative data was carried out by looking at the themes
emerging from different FGD and interviews through constant comparison analysis.
The technique was appropriate for this study as the study used multiple groups and
interviewees to look at the same issue (Bryman, 2008; Onwuegbuzie et al., 2009).
The analysis initially involved breaking down of data into component points or
themes that formed codes. As explained by Charmaz (2006), this involves two main
steps: the first step, called initial coding, involves creating as many codes as possible
to create an initial impression of the data. The second step, called selective or
focused coding, involved further analysis of the developed codes, selecting the most
common ones, combining similar codes to create new codes, dropping irrelevant
ones. Constant comparison analysis was used to analyse themes that were
appearing in more than one group or interview, and also to check whether there
were disagreements, whether there were themes that only applied to a single group
or interviewee. This process created concepts, categories and their properties,
hypothesis as well as theories (Bryman, 2008). Questionnaires were entered into a
Microsoft Excel sheet where it was analysed. Community responses were
quantitatively analysed to identify common issues coming out of the interviewees. A
descriptive analysis was done on quantitative data from questionnaires. Response
items were initially coded according to the different thematic areas and questions
before being analysed. A univariate analysis was done on responses for frequency,
central tendency and dispersion of particular themes and areas.
Major Findings
Humanitarian response decision making process
a) Field Vulnerability Assessment – The Malawi Vulnerability Assessment
Committee (MVAC) conducts regular assessments of household food availability
and access, focusing on regions that have been identified through a process of
inquiry based on both secondary data from Ministry of Agriculture and Food
Security (MoAFS), Department of Climate Change and Meteorological Services
(DoCCMS), Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET) and the National
Statistical Office (NSO); and primary data from District Agriculture Development
Officers, agriculture extension planning areas (EPAs) and farmers themselves.
Areas that are deemed to have been affected by hazard(s) are mapped out and
subjected to analysis of establishing whether they will meet all their annual food
requirements during the consumption year; based on a 2100kcal/person/day
threshold. Those populations failing to meet their annual food needs are
14
aggregated at EPA and district levels. MVAC uses an approach called Household
Economy Approach (HEA) which basically can be illustrated by the following four
(4) concept equation: BASELINE + HAZARD + COPING = OUTCOME. This
depicts how people get by from year to year and the connection with other
people and places that enable them to do so, which forms the baseline. The
outcome is as a result of investigation of how the baseline access to food and
income might change as a result of a specific hazard such as drought or floods
and the capacity of different wealth groups of the population to cope with the
hazard. The access to food and income at household level is predicted for a
defined period (usually 12 months) based on two critical thresholds: the survival
and livelihood protection thresholds.
b) Market assessment – after the vulnerability annual assessments, MVAC
conducts market situation analysis in areas identified under the initial
vulnerability assessments. The main parameters that inform interventions are:
the capacity of markets to meet demand at the most critical time of the
marketing season, market competitiveness, integration and responsiveness.
Markets that better fulfil these criteria are recommended for cash.
c) Humanitarian Response Committee - MVAC assessment reports are then
shared with the affected districts and the government’s Humanitarian Response
Committee, chaired by DODMA, which makes the final decision on the response
program to be implemented in line with findings and recommendations of MVAC’s
vulnerability and market assessments.
Figure 3 is a decision tree used to identify whether cash transfers can be used or
not, in line with the market assessment findings, while figure 4 is a humanitarian
resource decision support tool which can be used in making decisions as to the
type of humanitarian response to be funded.
15
Figure 3: Decision tree for identifying when cash transfers should be considered
Source: Draft Cash Transfer Guidelines for Malawi
16
Figure 4: Humanitarian response decision support tool
Source: DFID Humanitarian Guidance Note: Cash Transfer Programming, 11/2013
17
d) Response - Following the decision of the Humanitarian Response Committee,
resources to implement the programme are mobilized and, depending on the
magnitude of the emergency, government engages other partners to support
implementation of the response programme.
e) Targeting – The selection of beneficiaries is done by existing committees at the
community level through a community based targeting system. The Village
Development Committee (VDC) identifies potential beneficiaries based on poverty
levels, households head, chronic illnesses in the household and ability to provide
labour. The identified beneficiaries assemble at a community meeting together
with the VDC and members of the community. The identified beneficiaries are
then certified as qualified beneficiaries by the community at large. This process is
the same for both cash and food aid.
f) Monitoring and Evaluation System – Monitoring of the programme is done
by government at both central and local level, as well as by those implementing
and those that provide financial support for the programme. Apart from on-site
monitoring, joint post-distribution monitoring is also carried out at regular
interval to check on post-distribution issues such as usage of food or cash
received.
Delivery mechanisms
While the draft guidelines on cash transfer programming and international best
practices recommend the use of ‘pull’ delivery mechanisms, most of those used
during the programme can be categorized as ‘push’ mechanisms. Pull approaches
require beneficiaries to travel to distribution points at specified times to collect the
cash transfer, whereas push approaches allow recipients to access their transfers at
a time and location of their own choice, for example, through the use of a bank
branch, a local agent or ATM.
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Mapping of delivery partners
According to Malawi’s draft guidelines on cash transfer, selection of delivery
mechanisms for cash transfer should involve mapping out delivery partners, where
the following factors should be considered:
• what cash delivery systems are available, and their locations
• proximity of pay point locations to beneficiaries. The target distance should preferably
be within 5km walking distance of the beneficiaries where possible, and should always be
less than 10 km.
• whether the particular delivery mechanism would exclude any vulnerable groups
• administrative and financial viability (accreditation / risk of bankruptcy, etc)
• any security issues (for beneficiaries and staff)
• Cost considerations. Service fees for contracting out cash distribution should normally be
within the range of 6 – 10% of the amount distributed (Horn Relief, 2007). The upper
limit may, in exceptional cases, extend to 15% of the amount distributed, e.g. in very
remote areas with severe accessibility problems and supporting infrastructures
significantly below the rural norm.
• management structure and ability to coordinate the required activities
• check whether the banking network or local alternatives are perceived as secure,
accepted / trusted by the population
• reliability, particularly in terms of timely delivery of the transfers
• ability to deliver the amount of cash required in time and without disrupting the system
• time required to establish the distribution system (issuing cards, establishing accounts
etc.). This may be an important factor in short-term emergency response situations
• help or support beneficiaries will need to learn to use unfamiliar systems.
Cash transfers in Malawi were delivered through 3 major mechanisms: through
banks, through G4S and through mobile money electronic payment system. While
the intention of the programme implementers was to use a delivery system that
offered flexibility in obtaining the cash, all three mechanisms used ended up being
‘pull’ approaches, where beneficiaries had to travel to final distribution points to get
their cash from cashiers. However, despite a number of shortfalls, 67% of
households interviewed indicated that they were satisfied with the delivery
mechanism used in the programme.
Although use of agents was felt would encourage individuals to obtain cash in small
amounts as and when required, they were usually not available in the local
community or, where they were present, their levels of liquidity was usually very low
to meet the demand. In cases where some were available, such as in Mchinji,
beneficiaries withdrew the whole amount of cash from local agents. The observation
was also made by Opportunity International Bank of Malawi (OIBM), where some
beneficiaries went to their bank and withdrew the whole amount at once. To curb
19
this, the bank conducted financial literacy awareness to the beneficiaries
emphasizing the need to be withdrawing in smaller amounts. However, the following
month, all beneficiaries cashed out the whole amount and, in the end, the bank
resorted to giving out cash directly to beneficiaries.
Defeating the system
While the bank had initially planned to disburse cash using their ATMs,
where beneficiaries would open bank accounts, get ATM cards and get
their cash from the ATMs whenever they needed it, the system was
abandoned in the end. During the initial stages when the bank went to
make payments directly to the beneficiaries, it would later on debit their
accounts with the funds, to be credited at a later stage as the payments
were done using an offline system. Some beneficiaries got information
that their bank accounts had funds and went to withdraw the whole
amount. This was despite the fact that such beneficiaries had already
received the money the previous day or so. Because of such cases, the
bank agreed with WFP to be only making direct cash payments. Those
whose bank accounts were opened did not use them for the response
programme.
This questions the idea that cash gives flexibility to beneficiaries to save the money
and withdraw as they prefer. Reasons as to why this was the case range from (i)
lack of trust in the system, (ii) lack of cash-out points, including agents in the
communities, (iii) need to purchase food items at once to avoid price increases, (iv)
prestige that ownership of such a large amount of cash gives to an individual. From
the discussions with communities as well as those implementing the programme,
one issue that needs to be emphasized in the whole programme is intensive financial
literacy.
The use of electronic payment systems created its own challenges, especially
considering that it was targeting rural households. Some notable challenges faced in
the use of the mobile electronic payment system included the following:
i)
Some beneficiaries hid the phones, never charged them and only accessed
them when they were about to receive a notification to receive cash. In
some cases, by the next distribution day, the phone batteries had run out
and could not be used;
20
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
vii)
viii)
ix)
There were challenges in network coverage in some areas, to the extent
that some never received the text message informing them about the next
date of disbursement and amount;
In most areas where cash was being disbursed, electricity is not available.
This phone charging a challenge: in some areas, people had to pay to
have their phone charged through solar or battery operated charging
systems;
Since all phones provided were identical, there were cases where, due to
lack of electricity and where people were charging at one centre, people
ended up taking phones that did not belong to them. This meant that they
could not access their monthly entitlements;
In some cases during the 2012/2013 response programme, such as in
Dedza, some beneficiaries were allocated phones with different phone
numbers from those they were registered to. This happened due to
mispackaging and messages ended up being sent to wrong people;
A number of beneficiaries who had received mobile phones had challenges
in operating them. During focus group discussions and interviews with
some key informants, it was revealed that demonstration on the use of
mobile phones was not adequate, which led to some SIM cards being
blocked and people failing to access their entitlement.
In some cases, beneficiaries were provided with different numbers in the
phones as compared to those they had registered with. Blockage of SIM
cards and allocation of wrong numbers created backlogs of beneficiaries
who had to receive double payments in the following month;
There were cases of fraudulent activities in some rare cases, especially
where beneficiaries were supposed to get cash for 2 or more months at
once. In one incident in Dedza, money was deliberately sent to numbers
not on the list of beneficiaries;
In one area in Zomba district, a local leader asked the beneficiaries to
surrender all phones to him for safe keeping. When this was reported to
the implementing NGO, the phones were recovered and given to the
rightful owners.
Cases of mistrust between beneficiaries and the implementing agencies were also
common where mobile money technology was used. During the initial stages, the
beneficiary would be given a phone, with a SIM card. Approximately a week prior to
the day of distribution, a message would be received on the phone indicating the
amount of money to be cashed during that month. Normally this would be the
amount of cash the beneficiary would receive plus a transaction cost for the service
provider. On the day of redeeming the cash, the beneficiary would go with their
phone, undergo verification, show the message to the cashiers and present their
password and get their cash. The service charge would be deducted by the cashier
21
at this point. However, in some cases (such as in Zomba for 2 months during the
2013/2014 response programme), beneficiaries would get incomplete messages on
their phones, such as “Trans” with no other texts indicating their entitlements for
that month and they would be told of this during the distribution (see figure 2).
Although the implementing agencies are able to explain their monthly entitlements
before the disbursement starts, most beneficiaries interviewed indicated this as a
source of mistrust as they were not sure whether the amount they were getting was
what they were really entitled to.
Figure 5: A beneficiary showing an incomplete message received from the mobile service provider
The use of mobile money electronic payment systems can only be effective if
sufficient infrastructure is in place, including improving liquidity levels of agents. The
current practice being used defeats the whole purpose of promoting use of mobile
technology, as beneficiaries still have to queue to get their money from super agents
due to low liquidity levels from the traditional agents. In some cases, beneficiaries
could wait for up to 7 hours before they received their cash. Use of electronic
payment systems such mobile technology can also be more costly if used over a
shorter period of time: some of the response programme implementers had to
switch from using mobile money systems to banks due to higher operational costs
for the mobile network.
22
Food basket, food consumption and cash transfers
The food basket used to calculate the amount of transfers per month comprised the
following food items:
•
•
•
•
Maize: 50 kg per HH
Corn Soya Blend (CSB): 5 kg per HH
Oil: 2 litres per HH
Pulses: 10 kgs per HH (average for pigeon peas, cow peas, beans)
This is the same package that was given to those that were getting food. During the
study, interviews with beneficiaries produced mixed reactions, with most of those
receiving food prefering food to cash, while those receiving cash preferring cash to
food, with various reasons provided. While more than 50% of the cash received was
used to purchase food items, 45% bought some household assests with the cash
received, which were usually in the form of livestocks and household utensils.
According to Bailey (2013), cash transfers may directly affect food consumption in a
number of ways:
Households might use the additional income to improve the quantity,
i)
quality and diversity of food they consume.
ii)
Cash transfers might prevent or mitigate negative responses to food
insecurity, such as skipping meals.
iii)
Cash transfers might increase dietary diversity when compared to food
rations because cash can be used to purchase any type of food available.
iv)
Cash transfers might indirectly improve food consumption through
investment in livelihoods that increase income.
63% of households interviewed indicated that food items they were buying were
similar to those they had been consuming before, while the rest indicated that there
were changes in the type and amount of food consumed, with 96% indicating that
the food items they wanted were readily available on the local markets.
Although CSB was provided under the food aid basket, in most markets CSB was not
available and very few of the beneficiaries interviewed indicated CSB as one of the
food items they purchased. In some months, the cost of CSB was equivalent to a
third of the total transfer value. In addition to this, some of the pulses given to the
communities were not those they usually consume but they are still forced to
consume them.
23
Whether households that receive cash got the same dietary energy intake as
compared to food is an area that has not been studied in Malawi and was not
included in this study. However, households that received cash indicated during
interviews that they were able to buy diverse food items with the cash received.
Whether the foods purchased are of sufficient calorie content as required could not
be ascertained with this study. Studies conducted in other humanitarian programmes
using cash and food have produced results indicating that transfers that lead to
increased consumption of staple foods increase daily calorie intake, with studies in
Ecuador and Yemen indicating that people receiving food consume more calories
than those receiving cash, while another study in Uganda found that those receiving
cash transfers increased daily kilocalorie intake more than those getting food. While
cash has been seen to provide more dietary diversity, some studies have found that
cash has led people to buying cheap food stuffs with low calorie content (Bailey,
2013). In most communities, meals are usually eaten with vegetables and
vegetables were the most commonly bought dish by communities.
Market behaviour, inflation
A common practice of traders anywhere is to increase prices of commodities once
they know that the demand is high. Cases of price increases or inflation cannot be
conclusively said to have been rampant as a result of injection of cash into the
communities. Often, it was maize prices that were affected. Price increases were
most common in Ntcheu district during the 2012/2013 response which continued to
rise steadily during the whole programme. Although traders were aware of the
programme and sometimes raised commodity prices for 3 to 5 days, beneficiaries
often used a number of strategies to address this, such as:
•
•
Only buying a small amount of commodities and buying the rest once prices
stabilized; and
Buying the commodities from markets outside their traditional market areas
Guidelines for CTP
While there are a number of guidelines for implementing cash transfer programmes
developed by humanitarian organizations, the country does not have standard
guidelines for the implementation of cash transfer programmes. Malawi started the
process of developing cash transfer guidelines in 2009/2010, but they are yet to be
finalized. Lack of clear guidelines on how and when to implement cash transfer was
noted by different stakeholders as a major obstacle in successful implementation of
the programme. Each agency, therefore, used their own guidelines, with the NGO
24
consortia relying mostly on guidelines developed under the Cash Learning
Programme, while WFP used their own internal guidelines. The country, however,
has a ‘Manual for the Provision of General Food Distributions during Emergency
Programmes in Malawi’ which was developed under a Joint Emergency Food Aid
Programme (JEFAP). The guidelines, often referred to as JEFAP Guidelines, apply to
food aid and they have been used for cash transfer too for the beneficiary selection,
targeting and sensitization stages. According to the Department of Disaster
Management Affairs (DoDMA), both guidelines have shortfalls and are in the process
of being reviewed. Lack of guidelines, not just focusing on the design and
implementation of the cash transfer programme but with sufficient details as to
cover all forms of cash transfer programming, was also identified in a study by the
Cash Learning Programme as a major obstacle in preparedness and scaling up of
cash transfer interventions (Austion & Frize, 2011).
Market assessments and monitoring
For both response programmes,the market assessment to determine areas suitable
for cash and food was conducted in August, which also delayed determination of the
response in some areas. The design of the cash transfer programme is made in such
a way that the amount of cash provided every month changed depending on the
prices of food items within the food basket on the market. Each implementing NGO
conducted bi-monthly market monitoring to assess market behaviour in terms of
food prices and availability. Table 2 is an example of a market assessment report for
Concern Worldwide response programme in Salima district.
Month
Dec
Jan
Feb
Mar
Market
-
Maize
4,100
4,900
4,800
4,800
4,800
9,500
7,500-8,000
8,500
CSB
3,895
3,025
3,025
3,025
3,025
3,025
3,025
3,025
Cooking oil
1,600
1,360
1,400
1,600
1,360
1,400
1,600
Pulses
3,400
4,100
3,430
3,430
3,530
3,300
3,140
3,600
Total ration
11,395
13,625
12,615
12,665
12,995
17,185
15,315
16,346
Rate distributed
12,000
13,100
13,000
16,400
Table 2: Market price for food items in Salima, Dec 2012 - Mar 2013
(Source: CWW Internal Evaluation Report)
Although beneficiaries were told of the modalities used in determining their monthly
cash entitlements, some expected it to be rising every month, even in cases where
food items on the market had gone down or not changed.
25
Sharing
While the most common form of sharing reported was voluntary, there were
instances of forced sharing in some areas during the implementation of the
programme. However, compared to food aid, the extent of sharing for cash was
limited. Considering that a number of beneficiaries were elderly or chronically ill,
some sent relatives to receive the cash on their behalf, which also created
challenges. About 21% of recipients interviewed received the cash on behalf of
others, usually relatives who were elrderly or chronically illl. In Machinga, for
instance, one beneficiary was being forced by relatives to share the cash received:
the local CPC had to intervene by buying the food items on behalf of the beneficiary.
In Mchinji, there were cases where people entrusted to receive the cash on behalf of
others that could not travel to the distribution point ended up getting part of the
cash and only giving a portion to the rightful owner.
People place much value on cash than food received. For some recipients, rather
than sharing the cash they received, they shared the food that they eventually
bought with the cash. The complaint mechanisms that were put in place helped in
reducing cases of forced sharing. However, in most cases, the findings indicate that
sharing is part of the common way of livelihood support and survival: people always
share with relatives and neighbours whenever they are in need. Such kind of sharing
cannot be controlled.
The influence of local leaders
While selection of beneficiaries is done through a community based targeting
system, local leaders appear to exert substantial influence in the process. Chiefs
normally yield a lot of power and they are respected by members of the
communities in which they are based. Some of the major challenges experienced
during the response programme were caused or influenced by local leaders. While
some local leaders were in the forefront in trying to control any malpractice, others
were the cause of the challenges. Cases of forced sharing were mostly due to the
local leaders’ influence. However, due to the nature of community setup and the
authority that local leaders hold, such cases were rarely reported. People were afraid
to indicate such malpractices for fear of being left out in subsequent programmes.
Most cases came to light through tip-offs. Forced sharing was also rampant with
food aid in a number of districts where local leaders even threatened to remove
people on the list of beneficiaries if they did not share the food they received.
26
The box below shows examples of cases which were influenced or done by local
leaders.
27
The influence of local leaders in cash transfer programme
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
While in some cases the local leaders requested beneficiaries to be giving
them a portion of what they received, some like in Machinga, had to go
door to door to collect the money from the beneficiaries, which in some
cases was up to 30% of the money they received. In some areas in
Mangochi, local leaders were demanding to get 50% of the money the
beneficiaries were receiving;
In Salima, local leaders were collecting cash from beneficiaries under the
pretext of sharing this to other beneficiaries who had not received
anything, and in some cases they were announcing during sensitization
meetings that the cash received should be shared with others. This was
also the case in some areas in Nsanje where the cash received was being
taken from beneficiaries and redistributed by the chiefs;
In one village in Mangochi, there were internal conflicts between 2 local
leaders over chieftaincy, where a village was divided into 2 camps and
there was no agreement as to how the affected households could be
assisted. As a result, 90 households who were supposed to receive cash
did not as the resources were reallocated to another village;
In a number of districts (Mangochi, Machinga, Nsanje and Salima),
households that were not entitled were registered by local leaders and
committees to receive cash or food aid. These were mostly close relatives
of the local leaders and members of committees. In Nsanje, some local
leaders registered ghost beneficiaries so that the money received could
be shared with them after the programme: some who were identified
were forced to pay back the money they had taken. In one area in
Salima, the whole list of beneficiariesbeneficiaries used for the first
month was redone during the second month afterafter noting a number
of people that were not supposed to receive the cash;
In Chikhwawa during the 2013/2014 response, due to challenges faced
during previous cash transfer programmes where people were not able to
access their money in banks, local leaders were reluctant to accept cash
transfers as a response tool. The programme eventually rolled out after
lengthy discussions between the implementers and the local leaders.
Due to the political influence and other powers that the local leaders
hold, there have been cases where district council officials as well as law
enforcement agencies have been reluctant to punish those responsible.
Some cases of forced sharing like in Mangochi that were reported to law
enforcement agencies have not been resolved yet since they were
reported in January/February 2014.
28
Timeliness and reliability: cash versus food aid
One major challenge observed with food aid during both the 2012/2013 and
2013/2014 response programmes were delays in delivering the food, largely due to
logistical/operational challenges. The case of Malawi’s food insecurity response is a
good example where logistical bottlenecks in timely delivery of food aid have had
major negative impacts. Although the Government of Malawi had pledged to provide
maize to be used for response in 2012/2013, maize became scarce as the maize
stored in the grain silos became discoloured. On the local market, there was no
sufficient maize to cover the requirements of the response programme. This had to
force WFP to start sourcing some maize from neighbouring countries. A second
logistical issue was road terrain. The food insecurity response programme in Malawi
usually runs between August and April; the rainy season runs between October and
March or April. Almost all areas that are targeted for response are located in rural
areas where roads are very poor. Successful provision of food aid requires
prepositioning of the food items: due to other pipeline challenges prepositioning was
not possible for all the food items and
trucks had to ferry the food items to the
distribution centres in very poor road
Figure 7: A vehicle for response coordination stuck
along the way
conditions. Usually, they ended up
getting stuck and this greatly
Figure 6: Food distribution taking place along the road
affected provision of food aid. In
due to impassable roads in Dedza
Dedza, one vehicle overturned when the
Photo courtesy of Dedza District
driver tried to negotiate through the
Council/Concern Universal
muddya road. The food items ended up
being soaked and some pulses got damaged and 90 tins of cooking oil were lost in
the process. In some cases, beneficiaries went up to 2 months without getting their
food ration. Such challenges did not affect the cash transfer programme much as
even where vehicles have to transport cash to the areas, the vehicles are light and
are not affected by the road terrain.
29
Partnerships with private sector
The cash transfer response programme provided a unique partnership opportunity
between government, NGOs, donors and the private sector. The Malawi response
programme was initiated and coordinated by government, implementation was
carried out by NGOs and district councils with one being led by the UN World Food
Programme. Resources for the programme were provided by government and other
donors such as DFID, USAID, Norwegian government, Irish Aid, WFP and Save the
Children, delivery of cash was carried out by the private sector who included the
mobile service provider, banks and G4S. Around 95% of the transporters of food
commodities were from the private sector. Such a partnership provides an
opportunity to the service providers, implementing agencies and government. One of
the service providers indicated that the programme provided them with an
opportunity to reach out some of the unbanked communities and expand their
customer base. It also provided an opportunity in learning on how best to implement
some of the technologies, especially when working with rural communities. To
government, this provides an opportunity for further collaboration, including in
seeking support from the private sector for other humanitarian response
programmes.
Financial inclusion
A common argument made by humanitarian workers championing the use of cash
transfer is on its potential to increase the involvement of the rural communities in
financial services, as well as exposing them to opportunities. This point was also
emphasized by one of the banks implementing the programme indicating that they
would capitalize on the individuals that opened bank accounts to increase their
customer base and encourage others within the communities to be utilizing the
bank. However, financial inclusion does not happen automatically and requires
additional investment and trust building in the system by the beneficiaries. The
financial service providers, government and other partners ought to intensify
financial literacy lessons and civic education as a way of encouraging communities to
use such services. Studies in other countries such as Kenya have found that
although targeted poor communities are able to utilize mobile banking services, it
does not change their habitual savings culture (Smith et al., 2011). The design of
emergency response programmes is that the cash be utilized to meet the emergency
needs: this makes it a challenge for beneficiaries to save the funds received. The
practice with the Malawi response programme has been that beneficiaries cash all
their entitlements, even when they get the funds from a bank’s automatic teller
machine. A study in Nigeria also found that 50% of households in a cash transfer
programme cashed out immediately, with none opening a bank account. As argued
by Smith et al. (2011), if the humanitarian intervention aims at achieving financial
30
inclusion, this should be properly articulated in the programme design, with specific
activities indicated for the objective.
Recommendations
Government’s role in coordination, monitoring and capacity building
While government is responsible for the coordination of the programme as a whole,
it needs to improve its monitoring of the response programme. During both the
2012/2013 and 2013/2014 response programmes, DoDMA coordinates the response
programme, rarely monitored implementation. Although monthly coordination
meetings on cash transfers were being held with the implementing partners, the
focus of such meetings was to agree on transfer values and could not provide the
right fora for key implementation challenges to be identified and addressed. This
was also the case with monitoring by the district councils, where lack of (or delays in
receiving) funds was cited as a major challenge in coordination and monitoring at
the council level. Government should allocate sufficient funds for proper
coordination, especially during response programmes such as those of 2012/2013
and 2013/2014 which were being led by non-state actors. Considering that
government’s experience in the use of cash transfers in humanitarian programmes is
limited, it is essential that it is fully involved in the whole process and takes effort to
build the capacity of its staff in cash transfer programming. There were two (2)
groups implementing the programme, and each appeared to have some differences
in understanding how best the programme could be implemented. Addressing such
challenges requires closer government monitoring and coordination.
Cash or food?
There is no straightforward answer regarding the question whether to use cash or
food aid as a response tool to food insecurity. The findings of this study, however,
supports the argument that in areas where markets are functioning and there is
adequate infrastructure and partners to support cash based response, cash
transfers, despite some shortfalls, would work better than food aid and should,
therefore, be prioritized. Apart from the traditional advantages of cash transfers over
food aid, there are two peculiar issues to the Malawi case: the first is the availability
of food in strategic grain reserves when needed and the second issue relates to
logistical challenges in transferring food to the affected communities during rainy
season when most roads are impassable. Both issues were major challenges that
31
affected provision food aid during both the 2012/2013 and 2013/2014 response
programmes.
Use of cash transfers during sudden onset disasters such as floods might not be very
effective, unless the response is long-term and markets have normalized.
Targeting and beneficiary selection
Although there are clear guidelines on how targeting is to be done, the study has
found that there are loopholes in the targeting and beneficiary selection system
being used, to such an extent that some unscrupulous individuals, especially local
leaders, have used the targeting system for their own benefits. In some cases,
committees entrusted to lead the process have also been found to be involved in
such malpractices. In a number of districts, there have been cases where
undeserving people have been found on the beneficiary list. Although some of such
issues have been addressed in the end by replacing the undeserving ones with those
vulnerable, the fact that others were still able to receive the cash or food has denied
others what they were entitled to. One way to reduce these cases would be to limit
the power of local leaders in the targeting process. It is also crucial that the
implementing agencies and district councils closely monitor this process.
Cash transfer guidelines
Although the process of selecting beneficiaries for cash transfers is the same as for
food aid, lack of standard guidelines to guide the implementation of the cash
transfer response programme poses challenges to those implementing and
coordinating the programme. Guidelines are critical especially in areas where
different delivery mechanisms and implementing partners are used, as was the case
with the Malawian response programme. The available guidelines are still in draft
form, and have been in draft form, for close to 5 years. Although government’s
coordination role on some elements is strong, lack of guidelines gives liberty to
implementing partners to use guidelines that apply to their organizations.
Financial inclusion, technological and literacy
The target of the food insecurity humanitarian response programme are people who
are the least well-off and most vulnerable among the vulnerable population. Usually,
these are people with low levels of education, limited knowledge and access to
32
technologies being used. While technology is good, it should be gradually introduced
to the communities, and sufficient infrastructure should be available for it to be a
success. Deliberate effort should be made to conduct intensive awareness of the
target population, including on financial literacy and use of mobile technologies.
Government should take deliberate effort to promote short and long term adult
literacy programmes, especially in areas that are annually affected by disasters, if
the humanitarian response programme is to be a success. The humanitarian
response programme could also be used as an entry point to champion this:
however, if financial inclusion is to be achieved, it should be clearly indicated as one
of the objectives of the humanitarian cash transfer programme, with specific
activities on promoting financial inclusion.
Adoption of innovative cash delivery mechanisms
Although the country is just starting the use of cash transfer as a response tool to
disasters at large scales, it is important that it promotes use of innovative electronic
payment (e-payment) systems, than the current cash-based system. The Malawi
case, however, has shown that although what was being promoted during
programme design was an e-payment system, what actually happened was that all
payments were done using direct cash payments to the beneficiaries. Where usage
of electronic payment systems such as use of mobile money transfer systems and
bank ATMs were promoted, they ended up failing.
Studies have shown a lot of benefits in using e-payments: they provide improved
security to both staff and recipients; there are reduced leakage cases; they offer
improved reconciliation and expenditure control; there is greater speed and
efficiency of transfers; there are reduced costs for the agency and recipient; and the
potential for realising wider impacts for the recipient is high. However, success of
using e-payments requires several considerations, including use of strong partners to
deliver the services; adequate training for all stakeholders; presence of on-theground support; availability of well functioning agents with sufficient liquidity levels;
a solid strategy by the private sector and broader commitment to the development
of emerging systems or networks; and a financial regulatory environment suited to
or adapted to the realities of the humanitarian context (Smith et. al., 2011). As has
been observed in the Malawi case where use of mobile electronic payment systems
faced challenges such as invalid SIM cards, faulty batteries for phones, poor or no
network coverage, such issues need to be considered and addressed before the
response programme rolls out. For successful use of mobile electronic payments
systems, the following factors could be considered before rolling out the programme
and/or selecting the delivery mechanism:
33
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
Availability of adequate infrastructure in the area where the response
programme is to be implemented, including network coverage;
Presence of adequate agents or banks with sufficient liquidity to allow
recipients choice of encashment;
Capacity and willingness of service provider to carry out user/beneficiary
training on the use of the technology. This requires use of competent staff
with adequate adult training skills;
Where mobile phones are to be used, electricity should be available in the
area or an assessment should be done to identify if there are places where
mobile phones can be charged.
While the past two response programmes have used different delivery mechanism, it
is clear that capacity among service providers remains a major challenge. The
delivery mechanisms used did not give beneficiaries the choice of getting cash when
and wherever they wanted as cash was brought to the communities and they got it
in full amounts. Even where communities are closer to banks, the practice was that
the banks would still go to give out cash to the beneficiaries directly.
Food basket
The calculation for the amount of funds to be transferred to recipients is based on a
food basket similar to that given to those receiving food aid. The traditional food
basket used comprises maize, corn soya blend, cooking oil and pulses. While
monthly cash entitlements are based on this, in most cases some of the items being
used, especially corn soya blend, were not readily available on the market. Most of
the cash recipients interviewed indicated that they never used the money to buy
corn soya blend. It may be necessary to consider having a food basket that includes
items that are readily available on the market, as well as containing food items that
communities are used to. Provision of cooking oil was a challenge at the start of the
food aid programme for 2013/2014 due to pipeline challenges and beneficiaries
were, therefore, being denied of their entitlements due to logistical defects.
Capitalizing on changing global donor trends
There is growing interest by different donors in using cash transfers for
humanitarian response programmes, as opposed to the traditional food aid. Locally,
there has also been a lot of donor interest in the use of cash transfers for
humanitarian response programmes. DFID, for instance, indicated that they made
deliberate effort to include cash transfer funding as part of their response to the
34
humanitarian food insecurity situation in Malawi. It is, therefore, important that
government and humanitarian workers consider the changing donor interests on
how to finance humanitarian response programmes in their contingency planning
and general programming.
Learning from others
A lot of innovation approaches and delivery mechanisms are being used in a number
of countries where cash transfer is being used for humanitarian response.
Government and other interested stakeholders should take the initiative of
organizing learning visits or workshops where such best practices are shared. Some
of the mechanisms being used in the Malawi case, such as direct cash
disbursements, were being promoted decades ago when cash transfer programmes
were being introduced and have become outdated now. Countries such as Kenya,
Uganda, Somalia, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe have implemented cash transfer
programmes using innovative technologies, which can be of benefit to the Malawi
case.
The role of local leaders in the response programme
Implementation challenges caused by local leaders can be reduced if their powers in
beneficiary selection processes are limited and involve them in coordination
meetings. District council officials should also assist in sorting out some of the major
challenges that emanate from the local leaders, including through using some of the
senior local leaders to curb some of the malpractices and using the leaders to
champion transparent and accountable systems during programme sensitization
meetings.
Conclusion
This study has shown a number of benefits of using cash transfers as a tool for
responding to food aid. It has also shown several challenges that were faced during
implementation of the programme. Although there is growing interest and support
towards the use of cash transfers as a response tool to disasters, apart from the
traditional use in development programmes, this does not mean that cash should
replace food. This is a common perception held by those that are against use of
cash transfers for disaster response purposes: the argument is that cash transfer
35
should be considered as one of the response options in response decision making.
Where the situation is conducive for cash based response, cash should be prioritized
over food. The Malawi case has also shown that it takes time for the system to start
working effectively, especially in areas where it is just being introduced. The Malawi
case is also unique in that those being targeted are people with low literacy levels,
mostly the elderly and those that are chronically ill. Such a target group takes time
to adapt to technology and new ways of doing things: appropriate systems should
be built including building the capacity of the targeted vulnerable groups to use the
technologies. The two response programmes have been based on unconditional cash
transfer. As a way of promoting long-term recovery and resilience, the use of
conditional cash transfers in recovery and risk reduction programmes, such as cash
for work, should also be promoted. The Public Works Programme (PWP) could be
considered as a learning point where conditional cash transfers have been used over
time for community-based development projects.
36
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39
Annexes
A: List of Key Informants Interviewed
1
2
3
4
Name
Chiyambi
Mataya
Bile Khalif
Duncan
Ndhlovu
Louis
Kawenda
5
Gwyneth
Coteas
6
Selvi Vikan
7
Sophie
Sikwese
8
Hadrod
Mkandawire
9
Fumakazi
Munthali
10 Gerald Ferrie
11 George
Chimseu
12 James
Chiusiwa
13 Dyce Nkhoma
14 Fyawupi
Mwafongo
15 Carlolyn
Chabwera
16 Zione Viyazgi
17 Shepherd
Jere
18 Blessings
Kamtema
19 Francis
Kadzokoya
20 Memory
Chipyola
21 Florence
Ntepa
Organization
OXFAM
Position
Humanitarian Programmes Officer (lead for
2013/2014 NGO consortia cash transfer
response programme and response in
Kasungu in 2013/2014)
WFP
Cash Transfer Officer
WFP
Programme Officer-Disaster Risk Reduction,
Emergency, Refugees
Catholic Development CADECOM’s Manager for MVAC Response
Commission
(CADECOM)
Concern World Wide
Assistant Country Director
Concern World Wide
OIMB
Cash Transfer Project Manager
Project Manager
OIBM
Senior Programme Manager
DFID
Social Development Advisor
Save the Children –
NGO Cash Transfer
Consortia
Malawi
Vulnerability
Assessment Committee
Department of Disaster
Management Affairs
Department of Disaster
Management Affairs
Department of Disaster
Management Affairs
Mangochi
District
Council
Dedza District Council
Machinga
District
Council
Salima District Council
Programme Manager for 2013/2014 DFID
Consortia Cash Transfer Progarmme
Technical Assistant
Director for Disaster Risk Reduction
Chief Relief and Rehabilitation Officer
Principal Relief and Rehabilitation Officer
Assistant District Disaster Risk Management
Officer (ADDRMO)
ADDRMO
ADDRMO
ADDRMO
Chikhwawa
District ADDRMO
Council
Ntcheu District Council Disaster Risk Management Desk Officer
Zomba District Council
ADDRMO
40
22 Humphrey
Magalasi
23 Kingsley
Chioko
24 Duncan
Teputepu
25 Fredrick
Nyongani
26 Alex Kafuwa
27 Mayamiko
Gwirima
28 Kondwani
Khonje
29 Martin
Katunga
30 Edison
Ndalama
Nsanje District Council
ADDRMO
Mchinji District Council
Disaster Risk Management Desk Officer
Goal Malawi - Nsanje
MVAC Response Coordinator
CADECOM – Mangochi
Diocesan Secretary
World Vision Malawi – Community Superviser
Chikhwawa
Save the Children – Distribution Officer
Machinga
Coopi – Salima
Deputy Programme Manager
Emmanuel
International
–
Machinga
Concern Universal - District Coordinator
Dedza
B: Household questionnaire
Introduction:
My name is …………………………………. and I am working on a project to assess the effectiveness of the
use of cash transfers as a response tool to food insecurity and disasters in general. The project is
being funded by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Your
household has been selected randomnly from the list of households that received cash transfers/food
aid (enumerator: state applicable one) in response to food insecurity that your husehold faced.
Your participation in the study is voluntary and all information obtained from the study will be
confidential. The information will be used to prepare a report, but no specific names will be used. This
interview will take about fifteen to twenty minutes.
Date of interview:…………………………………
A
A1.
A2.
A3.
A4.
Starting time: …………………………
Respondent Personal Details
Identification
Name:
Village:
TA:
District:
Sex
2. Female
1. Male
Marital status
2. Married
1. Single
5. Separated
4. Widowed
Age (years)
2. 21-30
1. Below 20
41
3. Divorced
3. 31-40
A5.
A6
B
B7
5. 51-60
4. 41-50
6. Above 61
Household type
2. Female headed
1. Male headed
3. Child headed
4. Elderly headed
(60 years+)
Household size (number of people in the household)
1. 1-3
2. 4-6
3. 7-9
4. 10 and above
About the response programme
How were you identified to benefit from the programme?
2. Done by DC office
3. Done by community
1. Done by NGO
5. Other (please specify)
4. I don’t know
B8
Do you think there are other people that deserved
assistance but they were not targeted?
( If yes specify)
B9
Who was distributing the food aid/cash transfer? Please state
B10
Have you been a beneficiary of
food aid or cash transfers?
If 1, go to part C. If 2, go to part D
C
C11
Food Aid (the following questions should be asked to beneficiaries of food aid only)
Which of the following items did you receive?
1. Maize
2. Maize flour 3. Cooking oil 4. Pulses 5. Corn soya blend 6. Other (specify)
C12
How would you rate the usefulness of each of the following relief items
received in terms of meeting your needs (rate on a scale of 1 to 4, (1= not
useful, 2 = a bit useful, 3 = useful, 4 = very useful). Choose only those that
apply
3. Cooking oil
1. Maize
2. Maize flour
4. Pulses
5. Corn soya
blend
What did you use the items for? ( State all)
C13
C14
1. Food aid
Did you sell any of the items you received?
If yes, go to C14 and C15. If no, go to C16
State the items sold
C15
42
1. Yes 2. No 2. Cash transfer 1. Yes 2. No State the reasons for selling them
C16
C17
Were the items you received sufficient to
meet your food needs?
D
About Cash Transfer (the following questions should be asked to beneficiaries of cash transfer
1. Yes
2. No
only)
D18
D19
D20
D21
How much cash did you receive in each of the foloiwng months?
October: …………. November:…………… December: …………. January: …………..
February: ………………….. March: ………………………..
How many people in your
household received the
cash?
If more than 1, did you all
1. Yes 2. No receive equal amounts?
If no, state the reasons why you received different amounts
D22
Did you buy any household
assets from the cash you
received? If yes, list down
the assets.
D23
What proportion of the cash did you use to buy food?
More than ½
Less than ¼ About ½ Whole amount What food items did you purchase with the cash received? Please, specify
D24
D25
D26
D27
D28
D29
D30
1. Yes Were the food items you were
buying with the cash the same as
what you used to eat before
receving the cash?
Was the cash you received enough
to meet the food needs?
If no, how much would you want?
(Specify)
Were the food items you wanted
readily available on the markets?
Did the price of food commodities
on the market increase as a result
of the cash you received?
What else did you use the cash you
received for?
Utilities bills Settling debts Other (please specify) 43
2. No 1. Yes
2. No
1. Yes
2. No
1. Yes
2. No
1. Yes
2. No
School fees Hospital bills Fertilizer Seeds Started business D31
D32
Do you still have any cash
Yes
No
remaining from what you received?
If not, for how long did you use the money you received (in days)?
If yes, state how much.
Did you make a budget on the use
Yes
of the money?
What method was used to give the cash to you?
1. Bank
2. Airtel money 4. Other (please specify)
Did you have any challenge with the 1. Yes delivery method used?
If yes, state the challenge(s)
No
No
D38
Have you had any problems from
the community or your household
as a result of the cash you received?
If yes, state the problems`
E
E39
Distribution methodology
How far is your home from the distribution point (In Km)?
E40
How did you travel to the distribution point?
1. On foot
2. By bus
4. Hired bicycle
5. Other (please specify) D33
D34
D35
D36
D37
E41
E42
E43
E44
E45
Yes
3. Direct from NGO 2. No 3. Personal bicycle
If you hired transport, how much did you pay for it?
When were you informed about the distribution programme?
1. On the day of distribution 2. A day before distribution
3. A week before
4. More than one week before
distribution
distribution
How were you informed about the distribution?
1. Through NGO 2. Through the chief 3. Through local structures 4. Other (specify) Did you go to receive the
1. Yes 2. No relief items yourself?
If you could choose between food aid and cash
1. FA transfer, what would you prefer? State why
44
2. CT E46
E47
Did you encounter any challenges during the
actual distribution exercise?
If yes, what were the challenges?
1. Yes 2. No Any other comments about the food insecurity response programme
Thank you very much for your time!
C: Focus Group Discussion Guide
NB: Different questions were asked for those receiving food aid.
1. How were you identified to benefit from the cash transfer programme?
a. Describe the selection/identification process
b. Was the selection process fair?
c. Were the people selected the right ones?
i. Was there any special consideration for vulnerable groups
2. How much cash did you receive?
3. How did you use the cash you received?
a. How much did you use to buy food?
b. What were the food types you bought?
c. What else did you use it for?
d. How much did you remain with at the end of the motnh?
4. Were food items available on the markets?
a. Did prices of food items change as a result of the cash you received?
5. What was the distribution method for the cash?
a. How far was the distribution point from most homes?
b. Did you experience any challenges in receiving the cash or in using the
distribution method?
6. Do you know who the source of the cash you are receiving is?
7. What would you prefer: receiving food aid or cash? Explain why
8. How would you describe the implementing NGO?
9. Did you share some of the cash you received?
a. If yes, with whom?
b. What percentage?
c. Was this sharing voluntary or forced?
45
D: Key informant interviews guide for implementing partners
NB: Different guides, adapted from the following sample, were used for
government, WFP, service providers, with soecific questions targetting
them.
10. Describe the process you used to:
a. Identify the beneficiaries
b. Disburse the cash
c. Monitor the program
11. What tools/guidelines did you use to implement the programme?
12. Of the different modes of delivering cash, which one was (if you used more
than 1 delivery method):
a. Cheaper?
b. Easier to use/coordinate for both the beneficiary and the organization?
c. Timely?
13. What were some of the challenges you faced in managing the programme?
What would you say was the biggest challenge?
14. What are some of the lessons you learnt from the programme? How have
these helped in future programming?
15. One issue coming from programme monitoring and evaluation is sharing?
a. Between cash and food aid, which was mostly shared?
b. Why do you think so?
16. Did you do a market monitoring?
a. If yes,
i. Were food items available on the markets?
ii. Did prices change as a result of the cash?
iii. What strategies were beneficiaries using to address price
increases?
17. Do you think there are opportunities of using cash in other humanitarian
situations, other than food insecurity? Please explain
18. What would you prefer to use in responding to food insecurity between food
aid and cash? Explain why in terms of costs, efficiency, effectiveness, impact,
etc?
46