Labor and the Democratic Party:
A Report on the 1998 Elections
TAYLOR E. DARK III
Doshisha University, Kyoto 602-8580 Japan
The nature of the relationship between organized lahor and the Democratic party —
still much debated among scholars — can be usefully examined through an analysis of
the role of unions in the 1998 congressional elections. Evidence drawn from a wide
range of sources shows tiiat the AEL-CIO and its affiliated unions devoted considerable
financial and organizational resources to mobilizing union members and allied constituencies to vote for Democratic candidates. Combined with the unions' direct financial contributions to campaigns, this activity made unions important players in the
elections and helped project an image of potency and effectiveness in the news media
and among politicians. As a result, the labor/Democrat alliance remained stronger
than one would expect on the basis of union density figures alone.
I.
Introduction
The relationship between organized labor and the Democratic party remains a controversial topic in labor studies. Some authors argue that this relationship has severely
deteriorated as the size and value of union political resources have diminished and
Democratic party officeholders have gone elsewhere (mainly to business groups) for
support (Aronowitz, 1998; Davis, 1986; Edsall, 1984; Ferguson and Rogers, 1986;
Fraser and Gerstle, 1989; Goldfield, 1987; Moody, 1988; Vogel, 1989). Others reach
quite different conclusions, arguing that the alliance with the Democrats has endured
rather well, with unions continuing to influence electoral and legislative outcomes and
figuring importantly in the calculations of politicians (Bennett, 1991; Form, 1995;
Green, 1996; Moore et. al., 1995; Radosh, 1996; Shostak, 1991). These disagreements
no doubt reflect differences in choice of measurement tools, conflicting values and ideologies, and divergent conceptions of what constitutes real political "power." But whatever the origins of these debates, they always involve claims about the size and character
of union resources, the demand for these resources among Democratic officeholders,
and the degree to which officeholders are willing to meet union demands in return for
the distinctive assets which unions possess. This article addresses several of these factors through a study of a single case of political intervention: the activity of labor unions
in the congressional elections of 1998. While a single case study can never resolve
deep-rooted disputes over union power, it can provide a solid data point for generating
comparisons with earlier and later episodes of union political involvement.
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Fall 2000
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To preview the argument, my evidence will show a surprising degree of vitality in
union political interventions, notwithstanding the long and unabated decline in union
representation in the work force. Especially in the context of a demobilized and rather
apathetic electorate, union money, organization, and voters can boost union influence
far beyond that which we would expect on the basis of union density figures alone. As
a result, unions have enhanced their reputation as powerful political actors. Moreover,
in politics, reputation and image matter: To some extent, an interest group that is seen
as powerful can gain power simply by virtue of that image. Especially for members of
Congress, operating under conditions of considerable electoral uncertainty, just the possibility that union activities can be decisive is sufficient to grant unions impressive
quantities of access and influence. Based on the role of unions in the 1998 elections, the
alliance with the Democratic party seems unexpectedly strong.
II. Union Goals and Strategy in 1998
The ultimate goal of the AFL-CIO and most national unions in 1998 was no secret:
The federation hoped to turn control of Congress back to the Democrats and thus
reverse the outcome of the 1994 election, which had delivered a Republican majority
for the first time since 1954. Short of accomplishing this goal, unions hoped to whittle
away at the Republican majority, especially in the House of Representatives. Any movement in this direction could be counted as a major success for the Democratic party, as
the usual pattern in midterm elections was for the party of the incumbent president to
suffer major congressional losses. Unions also hoped to foster divisions within the
Republican majority, both by promoting issues that appealed to swing voters, which
they believed would stimulate moderating electoral pressures on Republicans, and by
formally endorsing a few moderate Republicans who might break with their party on
future congressional votes. Thus, labor envisioned a two-track strategy: to remove as
many Republicans as possible from Congress and to direct pro-labor influences on
those who remained (Greenhouse, 1998a, 1998b; Meyerson, 1998b; Rosenthal, 1998).
In developing this strategy, the unions confronted the mixed legacy of their
involvement in the 1996 congressional and presidential elections, when the AFL-CIO
had orchestrated a major increase in union spending and organizational activity on
behalf of Democratic candidates. As part of an effort to revitalize the federation and its
affiliates as political organizations, newly elected AFL-CIO President John J. Sweeney
and his advisors had deliberately drawn public and media attention to the federation's
decision to allot $35 million to a campaign to defeat Republican members of Congress.
Sweeney clearly wanted to establish that unions were "back" as political forces, and to
create a sense of excitement and momentum among labor leaders and activists.
Although the AFL-CIO ultimately failed to realize its goal of a Democratic congressional majority, Sweeney did succeed in electing many union-endorsed candidates and
in creating a new image ofthe federation as a political powerhouse (Dark, 1999; Jacobson, 1999; Masters and Jones, 1998).
At the same time, however, these efforts raised the prospect of a backlash against
the unions. Backlash effects have always been a problem for the labor movement, as
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they are for any interest group of mixed popularity that takes a highly visible role in the
political process (Calkins, 1967; Lipset, 1986). The danger was two-fold: first, that voters, especially swing voters, would resent the magnitude of the union intervention, and
thus vote against candidates who had become too close to the unions and, second, that
Republican party leaders and their conservative allies would redouble their efforts in
response to the labor onslaught. In this sense, the very active, aggressive, and quite
open union involvement in the 1996 campaign was a calculated gamble: on the one
hand, it could help reestablish the importance and vitality of labor as a political actor;
on the other, it might prove counterproductive by precipitating a backlash among
Republicans in Congress and voters at large. At the time, union leaders were cognizant
of these risks and concluded they were worth taking (Grossinger, 1998; Clymer, 1996).
Much to the satisfaction of union leaders, the feared backlash from voters never
seemed to materialize, despite efforts by Republican presidential nominee Robert Dole
to draw attention to the rising power of unions (especially teachers and other public
employees) in the Democratic party. The reaction of Republican officeholders and
activists was, however, a different story. In the aftermath ofthe 1996 intervention, they
sought at both the state and federal levels to find new legal mechanisms for restricting
union political spending. In Congress, conservatives sponsored a bill (HR 2608), which
they dubbed the "Paycheck Protection Act," that would require prior written permission
from individual union members before their dues money was spent on "political activities," including lobbying, education, and electoral interventions. Unions saw this measure as an attempt to place onerous and unfair restrictions on their capacity to intervene
effectively in politics and opposed it vehemently. As a result of their lobbying, the bill
was defeated in the House of Representatives (by a vote of 166 to 246, with 52 Republicans voting against). But the action did not stop here, as conservative activists then
turned to the state level, promoting similar bills or ballot initiatives in 31 states. Most
notably, in California, Proposition 226, the state's equivalent to the national paycheck
protection act, was placed on the June 1998 primary ballot with the strong support of
Republican Governor Pete Wilson.
Despite early polling data suggesting widespread popular support for restrictions
on union spending, the attack on unions actually proved counterproductive for Republicans. Facing a major threat to their political operations, and recognizing California's
bellwether status in national affairs, unions engaged in an all-out mobilization. In the
June primary, unions spent at least $20 million on television advertisements opposing
the measure and for grassroots operations to bring out union voters, while the proponents ofthe bill could barely muster $5 million (Grossinger, 1998; Meyerson, 1998a).
Unions donated 50 full-time organizers to the campaign and claimed to have arranged
650,000 telephone calls to union members and the sending of at least eight pieces of
mail to every AFL-CIO affiliated unionist in the state. The unions also claimed to have
recruited 28,000 new political activists who helped to organize walks in 5,000 precincts
and visits to 18,000 work sites. The latest campaign techniques were brought into play
as the messages of grassroots union activists were polished according to the results of
polls and focus-groups. The United Food and Commercial Workers Union even sent
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80,000 anti-226 videos to its California members (Grossinger, 1998). In addition,
unions also successfully encouraged most of the state's major business leaders to stay
neutral in the campaign, reportedly after labor activists threatened to initiate retaliatory ballot petitions eliminating corporate tax breaks (Galvin, 1998c). Throughout the
campaign, unions tried to frame the debate as one centering on whether unions should
have a voice in politics sufficient to countervail business power. Unionists argued that
passage of the measure would undermine the quality of political representation for all
workers, with negative consequences in such areas as Medicare, education, and even
food safety.
On election day. Proposition 226 was decisively defeated by a vote of 54 percent
to 46 percent, with 71 percent of union voters opposed. Voters from union households
constituted about 33 percent ofthe state turnout, as opposed to 29 percent in the 1994
primary (Barabak, 1998). Interestingly, given conventional perceptions about union
decline, both the 1994 and 1998 turnout figures were well above the 18 percent rate of
union representation in the state's work force, thus indicating that union mobilization
efforts provided unions with a disproportionately large voice in the electorate. Journalist Harold Meyerson concluded that the campaign had "raised the level of mobilization among union members to a forty-year high" and had brought about "labor's
greatest victory not just of the Sweeney years but of the several preceding decades"
(Meyerson, 1998b, p. 23). Sweeney himself simply declared the outcome "a modem
political miracle" (Berke, 1998), while supporters of the measure complained that the
very dues money they sought to restrict had been used against them (Jordan, 1998).
Union leaders and campaign operatives drew one main lesson from both the reaction to their 1996 involvement and their successful resistance to it: that it would be better in the future for unions to work on a less visible, more grassroots basis, instead of
the high profile, self-consciously aggressive style of 1996. Thus, the new plan for 1998
was to come in "under the radar screen," as labor operatives put it, by discreetly mobilizing members and local communities without immediately alerting labor's adversaries
that they were the target of a massive, nationally orchestrated campaign (Greenhouse,
1998b). Union operatives also concluded that the television advertising used in 1996
was too diffuse in its impact, activating not only union supporters but also many union
opponents. To avoid these problems, the AFL-CIO's operatives adopted a strategy they
called the "ground war" rather than the TV and radio-based "air war" of 1996 (Galvin,
1998a, 1998b; Weisman, 1998). Steve Rosenthal, the Sweeney-appointed director of the
AP'L-CIO's Committee on Political Education (COPE), announced that labor would
put more of its money and resources into independent educational activities directed
toward members rather than the usual technique of larger campaign contributions,
which union activists derided as "checkbook" politics (Merl, 1998). He especially
encouraged "one-on-one" communications between union activists and individual
members, which, while "extremely labor-intensive," could best take advantage of the
unions' preexisting organizational structures (Galvin, 1998b; Rosenthal, 1998).
In a rather different development, the AFL-CIO also announced its intent to
endorse 27 Republican congressional incumbents. Although the New Yoric Times
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(Greenhouse, 1998a) trumpeted this as a major departure in labor strategy, it was actually in keeping with the longer term labor tactic of endorsing Republicans (mainly in
the Northeast and Pacific Northwest) who had maintained a moderate voting record on
union issues and who, in any event, seemed unlikely to be defeated. This decision
reflected a larger calculation about how to succeed in Congress. For labor, the ideal situation is a Congress controlled by Democrats, but with a subset of moderate Republicans who are willing to vote with labor on key issues, thus counteracting occasional
defections by conservative (mainly Southern) Democrats. The support of a few moderate or liberal Republicans provides some protection against the emergence of the
"conservative coalition" that has often bedeviled union legislative initiatives. The difficulty with this approach in recent years, however, has been that there have been far
fewer liberal or even moderate Republicans left to endorse (just as there have been
fewer conservative southern Democrats deeply opposed to organized labor) (Rohde,
1991). In this context, the failure to regain a Democratic majority in 1996 made a return
to limited endorsements of the few remaining labor-friendly Republicans a predictable
maneuver, and one that had virtually no ramifications on the labor/Democrat relationship as a whole.
In summary, the federation, in conjunction with the affiliated national unions,
devised a strategy based on increased grassroots mobilization of union members and
other Democratic-leaning voters, a "stealthy" rather than "flamboyant" style of political work, and a willingness to endorse selected Republicans. All of this was, of course,
combined with the usual labor techniques of campaign donations and independent
expenditures — mainly on TV and radio ads — in selected key races.
III. Union Campaign Activity
The AFL-CIO claimed that it was quite successful in carrying out the strategy
described above. In a report issued shortly after the November election, the federation
said that it had hired, along with its affiliated unions, nearly 400 full-time organizers
to work in selected congressional districts, where they were able to help register a
half-million new voters and oversee get-out-the-vote efforts on election day. Union
voters and other liberal constituencies were mobilized through the sending of more
than 9.5 million pieces of mail to union households, the distribution of a wide-range
of fliers at "hundreds of thousands" of work sites, and the making of 5.5 million
personal telephone calls (with several hundred thousand on election day itself) (AFLCIO, 1998b). Local mobilizational efforts were often coordinated with other Democratic party constituencies, including women's groups, black community groups, gay
activists, youth groups, seniors, ethnic groups, disability groups, and others (Weisman, 1998). A major focus was on one-to-one contact: In the weeks leading up to the
1998 election, union volunteers went door-to-door, distributed leaflets, and organized
phone-banks and rallies to inform other union members about important union issues
and candidates' positions (Seelye, 1998). The AFL-CIO claimed that it spent about
$15 million on these endeavors, as well as another $5 million on broadcast TV ads
(Galvin, 1998b).
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A few examples of the form that activism took in crucial battleground states illustrate the magnitude and nature of the union effort. Although the descriptions that follow are largely drawn from the AFL-CIO's own post-election reports, and may therefore
refiect a degree of bias and exaggeration, they do capture the flavor of union activism
in 1998 and the extent to which the AFL-CIO sought to implement a coordinated,
nationwide grassroots effort (AFL-CIO, 1998b; Hall, 1998). In California, unionists
wanted to reelect embattled liberal Democratic Senator Barbara Boxer, maintain control over the state legislature, and help Gray Davis in his bid to become the first Democratic governor in 16 years. Building on the earlier campaign against Proposition 226,
tens of thousands of union members were mobilized to participate in phone banks,
precinct walks, get-out-the-vote rallies, and workplace meetings. The Los Angeles
County Federation of Labor's claimed that it sent at least four election mailings and
arranged telephone calls to almost all ofthe county's 472,000 union members. The federation's efforts specifically targeted the county's 160,000 recently registered Latino
voters (only 10 percent of whom were union members), 60,000 black union households, and 40,000 nonunion blacks who lived in labor-dominated precincts (Hall, 1998;
Fournier, 1998). Such unions as the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) and the Service Employees International Union (SEIU)
were particularly active, motivated not only by congressional races, but by a desire to
gain greater control over the state and local government agencies which hired a large
percentage of their members (Merl, 1998).
In North Carolina, where Senator Lauch Faircloth, a conservative Republican
much disliked by union leaders, was running for reelection, unions distributed more
than 50,000 pieces of literature. According to the AFL-CIO, every local labor council
in the state participated in a member-to-member mobilization, with hundreds of unionists joining phone banks and leafleting plant gates. In Nevada, where Democratic Senator Harry Reid was in a tight race for reelection, rank-and-file volunteers visited 39,000
members at home for face-to-face talks, and every local union in the state AFL-CIO ran
a program urging its members to register to vote. Seven hundred volunteers were on the
streets on election day and hundreds more took campaign literature to 21,000 targeted
homes the weekend before the election. In Washington State, union activists organized
45 phone banks in the weeks leading up to the election as they sought to reelect Democratic Senator Patty Murray. Four thousand volunteers also collected 288,000 signatures to put Initiative 688 on the ballot, which would raise the state's minimum wage
to $6.50 an hour and index it to the rate of inflation.
In Oregon, union operatives were most concerned with defeating Measure 59, the
state's own "paycheck protection" initiative, similar to California's Proposition 226.
The state federation said it contacted 33,000 unregistered citizens and urged them to
register to vote. As election day approached, 350 union members staffed phone banks
and another 200 volunteered to go door-to-door. In total, unions said they made more
than 40,000 contacts with their members and sent more than 250,000 pieces of mail to
union homes. AFSCME and SEIU each claimed that they contacted each of their members two to three times, while another public employees union, the Firefighters, produced its own campaign video and distributed it to all the union's members.
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In addition to these forms of voter mobilization, unions were also very active in
campaign finance. Their commitment to Democrats (and their mainly token support
for Republicans) was evident in campaign contributions (Table 1). According to Federal Election Commission data, labor unions contributed $41 million to Democratic
candidates and only $4 million to Republicans. Labor also gave about 12 percent of its
money to Democratic candidates running in open seats and another 12 percent to Democratic challengers — figures that were much higher than the rate for most other interest groups (Center for Responsive Politics, 1998). Labor's high level of support for
challengers reflected its commitment to a partisan strategy of supporting Democratic
candidates rather than an access-oriented strategy of endorsing incumbents regardless
of party (Rudolph, 1999). Unions were also major "soft money" donors to Democrats,
contributing more than $9 million to state and national party accounts left largely unregulated by federal election laws (Common Cause, 1999). Moreover, the total amount of
labor spending was undoubtedly much higher than these figures suggest, since in-kind
contributions, educational issue advertising, and other forms of political involvement
do not need to be formally reported under federal election law.
IV. Who Got the Credit?
The results of the election surprised most observers. Since the end of World War II, the
average loss for the president's party in midterm elections has been 28 seats in the
House and four seats in the Senate, with even worse performances during a president's
second term. Although the Republicans' massive win of 52 seats in 1994 reduced the
likelihood that GOP gains would rise to the historical average, virtually all pundits and
political scientists expected that the party would at least gain eight seats in the House,
and two to three seats in the Senate (Raum, 1998; Todd, 1998). Instead, the Republicans lost five seats in the House, and the party balance in the Senate was left unchanged.
Table 1
Labor Political Action Committee Contributions to Federal Candidates, 1997-1998
Sector
Building Trade Unions
Total
Democrats
Republicans
$8,080,070
$7,353,154
$710,416
$9,981,223
$9,754,364
$194,984
Transportation Unions
$10,709,554
$8,838,059
$1,846,295
Public Sector Unions
$11,521,728
$10,247,579
$1,242,449
Miscellaneous Unions
$4,939,772
$4,763,672
$158,100
$45,232,347
$40,956,828
$4,152,244
Industrial Unions
Total
Source: Federal Election Commission, data released March 1, 1999.
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The unions were, unsurprisingly, quite willing to claim a large measure of the
credit for the unexpected outcome. President Sweeney triumphantly declared on Election Day: "I believe the 1998 elections usher in a new era of people-powered politics
— with union members turning out at record levels and making the difference in race
after race, and with African-American and Latino participation way up over the last
midterm election" (AFL-CIO, 1998b). In fact, Sweeney's claims were supported by
some hard data. An exit poll conducted by the Voter News Service showed that 23 percent of the national electorate in 1998 was composed of voters from union households,
in comparison to only 14 percent in the 1994 midterm elections (AFL-CIO, 1998b). The
1998 union share of the electorate comfortably exceeded the level of union density,
still lodged at about 14 percent of the work force despite recent efforts at new organizing. The turnout among union voters was at 49 percent, compared to 33 percent in
nonunion households, and of these union voters, 71 percent supported Democratic candidates for the House of Representatives, up from 60 percent in 1994. In absolute numbers, voters from union households reached 16.8 million, up from 10.1 million in 1994.
Perhaps most impressive, a post-election survey by Peter D. Hart Research, found that
70 percent of union members said they had received information about the election
from their unions, with 64 percent saying this information was "important" or "very
important" to them in their electoral decision-making (AFL-CIO, 1998b).
Labor's involvement seemed particularly important in several of the most highly
competitive races around the country. In California, Democratic candidates did exceptionally well, with Gray Davis prevailing in the gubernatorial race and Senator Barbara Boxer securing reelection in a contest that she was originally expected to lose by
a large margin. CBS News exit polls showed Davis was supported by 80 percent of
union voters, and that union member turnout in the state was one-third higher than
nonunion turnout (CBS News, 1998). Union turnout was also crucial in the New York
Senate contest, where Representative Charles Sehumer scored an upset victory over
Republican incumbent Al D'Amato. In 1994, only a quarter of New York voters said
they had union members in their household, while this number had grown to more than
a third by 1998 (Associated Press, 1998).
Unions were also credited with playing a crucial role in close Democratic victories in Nevada. Senator Harry Reid was reelected by 459 votes, and attributed his victory to the mobilization of 40,000 casino workers in Las Vegas by the Hotel Employees
and Restaurant Employees Union (Bernstein, 1998). CBS News flatly declared that Reid
"owes his narrow victory on Tuesday to the union label" (CBS News, 1998b). In North
Carolina, Senator Faircloth was defeated in an upset, and three union-backed House
members who had been targeted by conservatives were reelected. In Washington state,
the labor movement was successful in promoting its ballot measure to index the state's
minimum wage to inflation and in getting Senator Patty Murray reelected. In Oregon,
unionists successfully turned back Measure 59 (the state's "payeheck protection" measure) by 51 to 49 percent — a close margin where union mobilization could reasonably
be seen as crucial to the final outcome. In the aftermath of this success, Sweeney
announced "the absolute, total defeat of the avalanche of 'payeheck deception' initiatives hurled our way" (Sweeney, 1998a).
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Although there were clearly several different causes of the Democratic surge
(including widespread dissatisfaction with Republican willingness to consider the
impeachment of President Clinton), a common conclusion in Washington was that labor
unions and African-Americans, who turned out at unusually high rates, had "saved"
the party at a time of great peril. This was certainly how the media saw it. Business
Week (Bernstein, 1998) reported that "the result exceeded even labor's most optimistic
expectations" and would allow it to "reap lots of political gain," while the New York
Times concluded that "union played a pivotal role in re-electing embattled Democrats"
(Greenhouse, 1998b). Politicians saw things similarly. Senator Mitch McConnell of
the Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee observed about the union campaign:
"I admire the effort they made. They deserve a lot of respect and congratulations for the
skillful way in which they turned out their base." The chainnan of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee likewise declared that "labor did a tremendous job"
(Greenhouse, 1998b). House Democratic leader Richard Gephardt had this to say: "I
did learn something in 1998. I did not think labor's effort was going to work. I was
worried that they were not really going to be able to motivate and educate and inform
their members to the extent they did. I was wrong" (Schneider, 1999). The increase in
the union turnout rate, as well as the high level of support by union members for laborendorsed candidates, certainly appeared to reflect the increased organizational activities of the labor movement. Moreover, in a low-turnout election these efforts may have
actually shifted electoral outcomes. At the least, union leaders could credibly make that
claim, and that is all they needed to do to use the results to enhance their bargaining
power with both Democrats and Republicans in Washington.
V. Policy Consequences
Given the vagaries of the policymaking process, it is difflcult to adequately measure the
role of unions (or other interest groups) in affecting legislative and other policy outcomes. And, in any case, it is premature to attempt a full evaluation of the impact of
labor's efforts in 1998 and in other recent elections. Nonetheless, there are some consequences of labor's intervention in 1998 that are noteworthy. Most signiflcantly, by
mobilizing strongly in both 1996 and 1998, labor demonstrated its importance as a
Democratic constituency. This did not go unnoticed by aspirants for the 2000 Democratic presidential nomination, who realized that an early AFL-CIO endorsement, or
endorsements by key individual unions, could help them wrap up the nominating eontest early. Prior to his decision in early 1999 not to run for the nomination. House
Minority Leader Richard Gephardt made systematic efforts to consolidate union support for his candidacy (Germond and Witcover, 1997). At the same time. Vice President
Al Gore was earnestly trying to convince union leaders of the depth of his own support
for the labor movement (Nichols, 1998). Former New Jersey Senator Bill Bradley, pursuing a long shot bid for the nomination, also sought to reassure union leaders that he
was a friendly candidate that they ought to consider supporting (Moberg, 1999). All of
these efforts, taking place in the year 1998, after decades of declining union density,
were impressive signs of continued union clout in the nominating process. Indeed, as
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the New York Times observed in early 1999: "The success of liberal groups in helping
turn last fall's congressional elections into a victory for Democrats — and Gore's need
for their all-out support next year — has given unions, black groups, women's organizations and other left-leaning constituencies what they regard as new leverage with the
White House" (Stevenson, 1999).
Unions were not reticent about using this leverage in novel ways, including a
demand that politicians support union organizing efforts as a condition for labor
endorsements. COPE Director Rosenthal argued that unions must "ask elected offlcials
to urge employers to be neutral in a campaign or to recognize a union based on a majority showing on union cards.... We must begin to demand more from the politicians we
support. We must make them understand that by helping to increase union membership
they are helping to increase their electoral base" (Rosenthal, 1998). In response to these
efforts, both Al Gore and Richard Gephardt appeared at rallies for striking workers,
where they condemned employers who had violated labor laws and called for strengthening legal sanctions against them. The Communication Workers of America, in
announcing an early endorsement of Gore for the Democratic presidential nomination,
said the Clinton administration "was the first administration since FDR's time to publicly advocate the unionization of workers" and lauded Gore for defending a group of
employees fired during a CWA organizing drive (Bahr, 1999).
The unions also maneuvered deftly during the effort to impeach President Clinton.
The AFL-CIO strongly opposed the impeachment drive, with Sweeney calling the effort
"a single-minded, hate-driven, partisan stampede to oust a President twice elected by
working families to pursue an agenda on their behalf (AFL-CIO, 1998b). Both
Sweeney and AFSCME President Gerald McEntee intervened to encourage Minority
Leader Gephardt to stand by the president after his August 17, 1998 admission of an
affair with Monica Lewinsky (Mitchell, 1998). The federation also sponsored its own
public opinion poll by Peter D. Hart Research Associates, which showed that "voters
in the home districts of moderate Republican members of Congress oppose impeachment by the same overwhelming margins found in national voter opinion sampling"
(AFL-CIO, 1998a). Sweeney concluded: "Now, moderate Republicans are making their
choice — and they appear to be choosing to listen to their party leadership instead of
their constituents. . . . The result of a clearly partisan vote will be disastrous for this
country and for the Republican party" (Sweeney, 1998a).
What did labor get in return for such loyalty? Journalistic commentary suggested
that the formulation in early 1999 of the Clinton administration position on Social Security reform was deeply influenced by the activity of unions and other liberal constituencies (Stevenson, 1999). While the administration had previously indicated that
it might consider supporting the establishment of private individual retirement accounts
outside of the Social Security system, by the time of the president's State of the Union
speech such ideas had been scuttled in favor of stock purchases by the Social Security
Trust Fund and a commitment to using all future budget surpluses to "save Social Security first." Sweeney commented: "We are espeeially pleased with the President's strong
opposition to replacing our nation's most important family protection program with
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private accounts" (Sweeney, 1999). In fact, the previous October the AFL-CIO had
begun a campaign, including television and radio ads, intended to "up the pressure on
Congress to use the federal budget surplus . . . for no purpose other than strengthening
Social Security" (AFL-CIO, 1999). The New York Times observed: "The proposal Clinton made on Social Security in his State of the Union address in January matched almost
precisely what labor had been advocating" (Stevenson, 1999).
Of course, the final disposition of Social Security reform and the many other issues
on labor's agenda is beyond the scope of this article, but it seemed likely that no matter what happened, unions would at least be at the negotiating table with top congressional Democrats and President Clinton. Most important, labor appeared to be in a good
position to block bills it did not like, either in floor votes in the House, by the use of the
filibuster in the Senate (ironically, given its frequent historic use against labor law
reform), or through a presidential veto (Abrams, 1998; Bernstein, 1998). The unions
were also primed to exercise greater influence among moderate Republicans. AFL-CIO
Legislative Director Peggy Taylor predicted such Republicans would break with their
party leadership on such issues as a patient's bill of rights, minimum wage increases,
overtime legislation, trade issues, and reform of Social Security (Bernstein, 1998). By
early 1999 it seemed clear that labor lobbying was a major force in fostering congressional opposition to the entry of China into the World Trade Organization and in building congressional support for a minimum wage increase and new restrictions on foreign
steel imports (Hook, 1999; Mitchell, 1999; Sanger, 1999).
VI. Conclusion
Labor unions made well-coordinated and energetic efforts in 1998 to elect Democratic
members of Congress, both through intensive voter mobilization drives and large financial contributions to Democratic campaigns. Perhaps of equal significance, unions
received credit from media observers and politicians for their involvement. These successes were particularly impressive in California, where unions appeared to be a key
ingredient in the Democratic party's victories in campaigns for both state and federal
office. Given California's reputation as a trailblazer of post-industrial transformation,
labor's influence there bodes well for the capacity of unions to maintain a powerful
voice in politics despite rapid — and in many ways adverse — sociological change.
This finding also suggests that unions, perhaps like farmers and some other minority
groups, have learned how to navigate skillfully through the American political system
even in a period of declining numbers in both absolute and relative terms. Thus, despite
various claims made about the "breakdown" or "collapse" or "cessation" of labor/
Democrat ties during the 1980s and 1990s, organized labor has remained a critical ally
for Democratie offieeholders.
638
JOURNAL OF LABOR RESEARCH
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