The Effect of Electoral Proximities on Nationalistic Sentiments in New
Democracies: Are Democratization and Globalization Incompatible?
Ryo NAKAI
(Rikkyo Univeristy)
paper presented at the International Political Science Association
general conference 2014, Montreal, Canada, 23th July.
abstract
Elections can be a crucial time for politicians to mobilize nationalism.
Scholarly literature has recently argued that democratic electoral competition
could be a catapult of ethnonationalistic confrontation, or the rise of
nationalism. We observed that while some democratic competition erupt
national unity, other elections facilitate it. The conditions under which
democracies enhance or hinder nationalism remain unclear. To fill this gap,
this article provides a theoretical argument with statistical analysis.
Theoretical consideration regarding the study of electoral proximity and
nationalism in the context of economic inequality creates an implication that
the interaction of these two factors has a unique effect. Our statistical
analysis, with survey data from over 60,000 respondents in newly
democratized countries worldwide, found that 1) while economic inequality
and electoral proximity each have positive effects, as previous literature
maintains, its interaction has a negative effect on the enhancement of
national pride of respondents; and 2) while economic inequality and electoral
proximity hinder the respondents’ xenophobic or inter-ethnic sense of
aversion, those interactions increase emotions among people. These findings
result in the ambiguous two-faced aspect of democratization toward
nationalism.
Introduction
Elections can be a crucial time for forming political consciousness, but whether
elections uplift or tame nationalism is still under review. Some have said that national
level elections can be an important occasion in forming a sense of national unity, while
others believe that they can be an occasion for political entrepreneurs to mobilize
regional or ethnic alternative identities that devastate national unity. This article
explores the effect of electoral proximity on nationalism[s] in newly democratized

Assistant Professor, College of Law and Politics, Rikkyo University (Japan). nakai[at]rikkyo.ac.jp. This work is
supported by JSPS grants-in-aids #25780100 and #26285035. This research is preliminary, please contact author
before you cite.
1
countries within the interaction of economic inequality.
Feelings of nationalism include subtle differences in nuance depending upon
whether people feel a positive attachment to their nation-state or ethnic group. Many
agree that nationalism and ethnic identity [or ethnicities] are feelings of humans that
emphasize the cultural similarity of its adherents. “A successful nationalism implies the
linking of an ethnic ideology with a state apparatus” (Eriksen, 1994[2010]: 131).
The sense of nationalism, whether ethnic or civic (Ignatieff, 1993), is a socially
constructed identity. Many studies have demonstrated that ethnic or national identities
are not created by nature, but by political and economic processes that can change over
time. If so, why do some democracies cultivate a high-level of nationalism, while others
do not? A variety of research has tackled this question and found that many factors
exercise influences and differ cross-nationally. Nationalism, the sense of belonging, is
cultivated due to modernization (Deutsche, 1953, Gelner, 1983), the development of
print capitalism (Anderson, 1983[1991]), ethno-cultural kinships (Smith, 1987), or the
interaction of economic returns and status inside/outside groups (Laitin 1997).
These socially constructed aspects of nationalism or ethnicity are not just
conceptual tools, but empirical subjects that require research (Chandra, 2012). Recent
empirical literature uses survey data to investigate the substantive contents of this
feeling (Smith and Kim, 2006; Kunovich, 2009), cross-national/regional difference in
combinations of its components (Hjerm, 1998; Evans and Kelly, 2002), and the sources
of cross-national or cross individual levels of nationalism (Kunovich, 2009; Shayo,
2009; Solt, 2011; Han, 2013). The primary purpose of this article also was to investigate
factors that determine the varying levels of nationalism using surveys, and to explore
how those factors impact on nationalism.
This article focuses on how electoral mobilization and socioeconomic factors,
respectively, affect the rise of nationalism, and how the interaction of those factors
creates additional influences. The statistical analysis is based on a worldwide survey
with over 60,000 respondents in newly democratized countries and finds that while
economic inequality and electoral proximity individually raise respondents’ national
pride, the rise of xenophobic sentiment is hindered. However, at the same time, our
analysis finds as well that the interaction of economic inequality and electoral proximity
hinders the respondents’ sense of unity as represented by national pride but raise their
xenophobic sentiment.
Electoral Mobilization of Nationalism in New Democracies
Electoral mobilization is an important factor studied in ethnic identification, or
nationalism studies. Previous studies have pointed out that elections could be the
2
occasion for nationalistic mobilization (see: Laitin, 1986; Przeworski & Sprague, 1986;
Snyder, 2000; Posner, 2004, 2005; Chandra, 2005).These electoral mobilizations, which
may create conflict sometimes, cultivate the rise of the people identifying with
nationalism
This effect is more salient especially in newly democratized countries. In
Kenya, violent conflict between the incumbent and challenger followed the 2007
Presidential election, in the framework of interethnic struggle. In India, where
competitive elections were held following the collapse of a one-party dominance,
communal tensions between Hindu and Muslim inhabitants occurred in highly
competitive districts (Brass, 1997, Wilkinson, 2004). A far-right party in Latvia made
ethno-nationalistic issues the focus of its 1998 electoral campaign, which resulted in a
high saliency of ethnonationalism for political issues and low-intensity conflict between
the ethnic groups (Council of Europe 1998; Minorities at Risk 2010).
Nationalism (or ethnic identities) play key roles in an electoral competition
(competition to gain access to political power), particularly in newly democratized
countries. An electoral campaign can be a crucial moment for the rise of nationalism.
Under democratic rules, an election is a core and primary institution for the allocation of
social resources, power, and privileges, and is vital to politicians and voters. Therefore,
even radical ethnonationalist political elites have incentives to participate the elections
and identification plays a primary role in these processes (Guelke and Smyth, 1992;
Boone, 2009). While a new democracy itself does not always raise the risk for
ethnonational conflict (Saideman et al, 2002), sometimes, politicians do not hesitate to
mobilize even armed power with nationalistic discourses to grasp political power
(Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Collier et al. 2005; Cederman and Girardin 2007) and such
ethnonationalistic conflict tend to happen at the timing of elections are close (Brass,
1997; Wilkinson, 2004; Cederman et al., 2011a).
Apart from the issue of armed conflict, politicians can utilize nationalistic or
ethnic discourses as political currency to gain support and votes in an electoral
campaign. In other words, politicians tend to play the “ethnic card” when elections are
close. In addition, voters tend to rely on ethnic or national identification to distinguish
desirable candidates who would allocate material and non-material resources to them in
newly democratized countries where voters lack the political information to calculate
politicians’ prospective merits (Chandra, 2004; Hale, 2008). Emphasizing these
mechanisms, Eifert et al. (2010) states that ethno-national identification becomes
stronger as day of elections comes closer. These works emphasize the importance of
electoral proximities in the issue of nationalisms.
Where the effect of electoral proximity on ethnonaitonal identities demonstrate
3
sronger? Eifert et al. (2010) points out that the impact of electoral proximity on
ethno-national identities is stronger when elections are more competitive. Higashijima
and Nakai (2012) believe that the participation of powerful nationalist and ethnic
minority parties in electoral competition make electoral proximities effective occasion
for the rise of naitonalism. However, the relationship between the effect of electoral
proximity on ethno-national identifications, and aggregated and individual level
socioeconomic backgrounds is still unclear.
Further exploration is required regarding the conditions under which the impact
of electoral proximity exercises a powerful effect on the rise of nationalism from a
socioeconomic perspective. There has been a great deal of research on nationalism and
socioeconomic backgrounds, particularly relating to economic inequality. An integration
of these two streams of knowledge regarding the rise of ethno-nationalism to understand
nationalism and ethnic identification studies is required. Moreover, the previous
arguments concerning electoral proximities and ethno-national identification do not
directly suggest implications whether these mobilized identifications are
integration-oriented nationalism or separation-oriented nationalism. The inclusion of
socioeconomic insight will provide a better understanding of this issue, as well.
Economic Inequality and the Rise of Nationalism
Scholarly research arguing the relationship between economic inequality and
nationalism creates conflicting allegations. Disagreement concerning whether economic
inequality hinders or promotes nationalistic sentiment remains. Some argue that the
relative deprivation between social groups based on economic inequality decreases the
sentiment of national unification, or raises new alternative ethno-nationalism and
separatism, resulting in the dilution of the state level sense of nationalism. Others
maintain that nationalism is mobilized by the government in times of high economic
inequality to avoid pressure from calling for redistribution (Posen, 1993). Still, others
argue that the sense of nationalism tends to strengthen when and where economic
inequality is high in order to eclipse the negative aspect.
Solt (2011) summarizes studies regarding the relationship between economic
inequality and nationalism into four theories: 1) cohesion theory; 2) new nation theory;
3) diversionary theory, and 4) psychological theory. Cohesion theory and new nation
theory maintain that economic inequality breaks down the nationalistic pride of citizens
by decreasing feelings of unity and strengthening an alternative sense of belonging,
such as sub-national level ethno-nationalism. Particularly, new nation theory shed light
on the mobilization by political elites. In contrast, the diversionary theory and
psychological theory maintain that economic inequality conduce the fortification of
4
national identity. The difference between diversionary theory and psychological theory
is a focus on the government and the people. The results of Solt’s work (2011)
demonstrated that the diversionary theory is valid, while psychological theory failed to
show significant results. Han (2013) believes that psychological theory is still valid in
certain situations (high immigrant nation).
The recent progress in empirical research regarding the relationship between
nationalism and economic inequality favors claims that economic inequality promotes
the rise of nationalism. Then, is the new nation theories empirically invalid? Major
studies of nationalism and ethnic conflict have argued that mutual deprivation can be a
springboard to the rise of a movement by forming separate political entities for a
specific group in societies (Horowitz, 1985, Brass, 1991, Cederman and Girarding,
2007; Wimmer et al., 2009; Cederman et al., 2010; Cederman et al., 2011b). These
studies specifically focus on electoral mobilization under the democratic rule for
centrifugal ethnonationalism.
This article addresses the controversy by combining a temporal aspect. There
are temporal gaps between the statements that economic inequalities hinder nationalism
and that economic inequality strengthen it. We summarized and declared that these
arguments are a cover-up theory, which economic inequality strengthens nationalism
These cover-up theories address the temporally constant aspect of the intensification of
nationalism based on economic inequalities. Governments under pressure to redistribute
in areas where economic inequality is high have always had to avert this pressure by
mobilizing nationalistic sentiment. In addition, poor people must constantly maintain a
strong nationalistic sentiment to overlook their own relatively disadvantaged status. In
contrast, the new nation theory does not necessarily satisfy the assumption of the
temporally constant effect. Rather, it focuses on the temporally ephemeral aspect of
mobilization and the collective mobilization of the relatively poor population to have
the alternative ethno-nationalism by political entrepreneurs. Political entrepreneurs
generally play the role of challenger to the status quo in these circumstances, and the
critical moment for them is an election under the democratic rules. Therefore, we can
observe when and where economic equality hinders nationalism, which may be
concentrated when the time of elections are close. We shed light on again the new
nation theory by introducing the temporal aspect of the mobilization of political actors.
We propose three hypotheses. First, as literature maintains, electoral
proximity increases the commitment to nationalistic sentiment (H1). Second, economic
inequality alone increases the commitment to the nationalistic sentiment of the people
(H2). Finally, if the times of elections are close in countries where economic inequality
is high, the sense of nationalism will decrease (H3).
5
Design of Statistical Analysis
To investigate the effect of electoral proximity, economic inequality, and its interaction
on nationalism in newly democratized countries, we used the World Value Survey
(WVS) and European Value Survey (EVS) multi-national survey.1 New democracies
are defined as countries that were democratized following the third wave of
democratizations until the early 1990s, without setbacks (Polity IV score ≥ 6), and
experienced democratic periods (to observe at least multiple points of survey research
data). The targeted countries were Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, the Czech
Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Mali, the Philippines, Poland,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Ukraine, and
Uruguay (Hungary is excluded due to a technical problem).
Dependent Variables
There are two primary dependent variables, with the first drawn from the question on
national pride (g006 in WVS/EVS integrate dataset: “How proud are you to be
[nationality/nations’ resident]?”). The national pride variable was a primary variable
used to estimate the intensity of nationalism in previous research (Hjerm, 1998; Evans
and Kelley, 2001; Solt, 2011; Han, 2013). Original WVS/EVS data has an ordered scale
from 1 [very proud] to 4 [not at all proud]. We reversed this numerical order from 1 [not
at all proud] to 4 [very proud] to ease result interpretation. While the national pride
variable is broadly recognized, it does not distinguish whether mobilized nationalistic
sentiments are inclusive or exclusive. Therefore, the second dependent variable is from
the question regarding xenophobic sentiment or inter-ethnic hatred (a124_06 in
WVS/EVS integrate dataset: “Could you please sort out any that you would not like to
have as neighbours?; Immigrants/foreign workers = mentioned”).
Independent and Control Variables
The electoral proximity in this article is based on the temporal distance between the
month when national elections were held and the month the survey research began.2 An
invariable3 minus this absolute value results in the electoral proximity. The referenced
elections are lower house parliamentary and presidential elections. We constructed two
1
We used integrated WVS/EVS data. The waves and periods of this integrated survey as follows: Wave 1 (WVS
wave1 and EVS wave1): 1981-84, Wave 2 (WVS wave2 and EVS wave2): 1989-93, Wave 3 (WVS wave3): 1994-99,
Wave 4 (WVS wave4 and EVS wave3): 1999-2004, Wave 5 (WVS wave5): 2004-08, Wave 6 (EVS wave4): 2008-10.
2
Although some countries did not complete their survey research for one month, most raw data does not provide any
information regarding the month that the survey was conducted mainly. Therefore, for the consistency of research, we
set the month when the survey began as the reference point.
3
We set 30 as the invariable because the maximum number of the electoral distances all country/year data was 29.
6
types of electoral proximity variables, one that refers only to parliamentary elections,
and the second that refers to both parliamentary and presidential elections. Economic
inequality is measured by the Gini index, derived from Solt’s (2009) SWIID dataset. We
used Gini index numbers in each survey wave’s first years. The interaction term
between these electoral proximities and the Gini index estimated a more complex effect
of electoral mobilization in the context of various economic situations (Hypothesis 3).
The major country/year independent variables are listed in Table 1.
Table 1. The list of major numerical information regarding I.V.
Integrated
the month of
Country WVS/EVS
research*2
wave*1
Central and Eastern Europe
Bulgaria
3
1997 Nov
4
1999 Jun
5
2007 May
6
2008 Apr
Czech Rep.
3
1998 Nov
4
1999 Mar
6
2008 May
Hungary*3
3
1998 Dec
4
1999 Nov
6
2008 Nov
Poland
3
1997 Oct
4
1999 Feb
5
2005 Dec
6
2008 Jun
Romania
3
1998 Jun
4
1999 Jul
5
2005 Sep
6
2008 Apr
Slovakia
3
1998 Nov
4
1999 Jun
6
2008 Jul
Slovenia
3
1995 Sep
4
1999 Oct
5
2005 Nov
6
2008 Mar
Asia
South Korea
Philipine
Taiwan
the closest
parliamentary
election
the closest
national
election
Gini index
1997 Apr
2001 Jun
2005 Jun
2009 Jul
1998 Jun
1998 Jun
2006 Jun
1998 May
1998 May
2010 Apr
1997 Sep
1997 Sep
2005 Sep
2007 Oct
1996 Nov
2000 Nov
2004 Nov
2008 Nov
1998 Sep
1998 Sep
2010 Jun
1996 Nov
2000 Oct
2004 Oct
2008 Sep
same
same
2006 Oct
same
same
same
same
same
same
same
same
same
same
same
same
same
same
same
same
1999 May
same
same
1999 May
same
same
28.1
25.5
26.9
33.2
23.2
25.4
25.5
31.9
29.2
25.9
29.1
28.6
31.5
29.5
26.0
28.0
30.6
33.1
21.3
24.3
25.3
21.1
23.2
23.1
23.1
2000 Apr
2004 Apr
1995 May
2001 May
2004 Dec
2002 Dec
same
same
same
same
31.4
31.4
31.4
47.8
51.4
28.2
30.6
Country
Former Soviet
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Ukraine
America
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Uruguay
3
4
5
3
4
3
5
1996
2001 Nov
2005 Dec
1996 Mar
2001 Jul
1994
2006 May
El Salvador
Integrated
1st (1981-84)
2nd (1989-93)
3rd (1994-99)
4th (1999-04)
5th (2004-08)
6th (2008-10)
EVS's wave
1st (1981-82)
2nd (1990-93)
3rd (1999-01)
4th (2008-10)
the month of
research*2
the closest the closest
parliamentary national Gini index
election
election
3
4
6
3
4
6
3
4
6
3
4
5
6
1996 Nov
1999 Oct
2008 Jul
1996 Oct
1999 Mar
2008 Jul
1997 May
1999 Nov
2008 Jul
1996 Sep
1999 Dec
2006 Nov
2008 Jul
1995 Mar
1999 Mar
2007 Mar
1995 Sep
1998 Oct
2006 Oct
1996 Oct
2000 Oct
2008 Oct
1998 Mar
1998 Mar
2006 Mar
2007 Sep
same
same
same
same
same
same
same*4
same
same
same
1999 Oct
same
same
36.2
35.3
31.8
27.6
31.9
36.1
32.3
32.5
35.5
37.3
32.5
27.2
27.2
2
3
4
5
2
3
5
2
3
4
5
2
3
5
3
ND
1995 Sep
1999 Jan
2006 Jun
ND
1997 Jun
2006 Nov
ND
1996
2000 Nov
2006 Jun
ND
1996 Oct
2006 Oct
1999 Sep
1995 May
1999 Oct
2005 Oct
1998 Oct
2006 Oct
2001 Dec
2005 Dec
1994 Nov
2004 Oct
2000 Mar
same
same
same
same
same
1999 Dec
same
same
same
1999 Mar
42.8
42.7
44.9
46.0
53.4
51.9
49.5
31.0
49.8
51.0
49.1
41.6
42.1
43.9
46.4
3
4
5
5
1996
2001 Mar
2006 Nov
2007 Mar
1999 Jun
2009 Apr
2007 Jul
same
same
2007 Apr
52.6
59.8
55.9
36.7
Africa
South Africa
Mali
WVS's wave
1st (1981-84)
2nd (1989-93)
3rd (1994-99)
4th (1999-04)
5th (2004-08)
Integrated
WVS/EVS
wave*1
*1 Please refer left sub-table.
*2 We set the month when the survey began as the reference point
*3 Due to the technical reason, Hungary's data is excluded from the following analysis,
but it will be included for further research after solving the problem.
*4 The first round of presidential election was held on December, 1997. Howver, its electoral
proximity to the closest survey is same with the previous parliamentary elections' one.
The primary goal of this research was to estimate the effect of electoral
mobilization based on socioeconomic context. Our intent was to investigate the effect of
various national-level variables on nationalism as studies previously conducted were
from several perspectives. For simplification, we put national level impacts into the
state specific fixed effect of each nation using the least square dummy variable (LSDV)
method, or the panel analysis in a fixed effect model. Although our analysis lacked a
7
national level estimator, the impact could be controlled by each countries fixed effect.
Individual personal factors were controlled because the sentiment of nationalism is
strongly affected by respondents own socioeconomic backgrounds. Our analysis created
four variables that measured the sense of ethnic identifications or nationalism. The age
of respondents (x003 in WVS/EVS integrated data) may enhance his/her nationalistic
sentiments, as previous studies have demonstrated. The income level of respondents
was deduced from a question with 11 scales of income per country (x047 in WVS/EVS
data). The variable of unemployment is a dummy variable created by the author based
on a question regarding respondents’ employment status (x028 in WVS/EVS data). A
variable of 1 was assigned if a respondent’s answer that s/he was unemployed,
otherwise a variable was 0 was assigned. Respondents’ educational level is an eight
scale variable drawn from WVS/EVS data regarding respondents’ highest educational
level attained (x025). These variables were added to the analysis to control the
respondents’ individual level effects on his/her sense of nationalism. Therefore, the
structure model of the analysis is (individual i, country j, country-year k).
Nationalismijk = α + βxjk + γxj + δxi + εijk
Methods and Models
Four sets of analysis were completed using the combination of two types of dependent
variables to minor differences of independent variable (electoral proximity). Each
combination is as follows: national pride and parliamentary electoral proximity (A1),
national pride and national electoral proximity (A2), xenophobia and parliamentary
electoral proximity (B1), and xenophobia and national electoral proximity (B2). The
variable of national pride was a four scale variable with models A1 and A2 using the
ordered logistic analysis model. For the robustness check, we used the panel data linear
analysis in fixed effect mode. The variable of xenophobia is a dichotomous variable;
hence, models B1 and B2 use the simple logistic regression model. Unfortunately, panel
data logistic regression in a fixed effect model failed to run due to a numerical overflow.
We controlled the effect of each country’s traits with the LSDV method (omitted from
the result reports). The standard errors of all analyses are robust standard errors.
Results and Discussion
The analysis results for models A1 and A2 support our hypotheses (Tables 2 and 3). The
interaction term of economic inequality and electoral proximity has a statistically
significant negative effect on the rise of nationalism. There is not a vast difference
between the results of models A1 and A2. As previous literature has pointed out, the
8
nationalistic sentiments of respondents became more salient as elections got closer.
Although the effects of economic inequality on national pride were not rigid, its positive
effect is significant in the full-scaled model (models A1b and A2b). However, as our
argument predicted, its interaction had a negative effect on peoples’ intensity of national
pride. This result can be interpreted as follows: while electoral proximity intensifies
national pride, its effect decreases as economic inequality grows. This result verified the
temporal effectiveness of the new nation theory that when economic inequality is high,
mutual deprivation leads to centrifugal sentiment, contrary to state level nationalism.
Calculations from the results of analyses tell us that the effect of electoral proximity
loses its positive effect on the rise of national pride when the Gini index reaches about
30 points. In the high economic inequality countries, national pride decreases as
elections get closer.
Table 2: National pride, inequality, and parliamentary electoral proximity
DV = “How proud are you to be [nationality/nations’ resident]?; larger number = higher pride”
model A1a
Electoral proximity
Gini index
Electoral proximity
* gini index
Age
Income
Education
Unemployment
Constant
Second Threshold
Third Threshold
N
Pseudo R2/Overall R2
model A1b
model A1c
Ordered Logit
Ordered Logit
Panel Linear Regression
Fixed effect (LSDV)
Fixed effect (LSDV)
Fixed effect model
.0430 (.0052)**
.0038 (.0047)
-.0016 (.0002)**
.1423 (.0080)**
.0497 (.0069)**
-.0042 (.0002)**
.0485 (.0110)**
.0169 (.0091)*
-.0014 (.0003)**
-4.754 (.2046)**
-3.106 (.2034)**
-1.044 (.2031)**
.0120
-.0222
-.0356
-.1255
-2.351
-.6967
1.388
.0041 (.0009)**
-.0074 (.0047)
-.0117 (.0048)**
-.0526 (.0300)*
2.495 (.4063)**
-
66448
.086
(.0006)**
(.0044)**
(.0338)**
(.0338)**
(.3040)**
(.3029)**
(.3033)**
45087
.113
Note1: SE is robust standard errors.
Note2: The report of each country’s dummy variables in models A1a and A1b are omitted.
** p < .01 * p < .05
9
45087
.004
Table 3: National pride, inequality, and parliamentary and presidential electoral proximity
DV = “How proud are you to be [nationality/nations’ resident]?; larger number = higher pride”
Electoral proximity
Gini index
Electoral proximity
* gini index
Age
Income
Education
Unemployment
Constant
Second Threshold
Third Threshold
N
Pseudo R2/Overall R2
model A2a
model A2b
model A2c
Ordered Logit
Ordered Logit
Panel Linear Regression
Fixed effect (LSDV)
Fixed effect (LSDV)
Fixed effect model
.0293 (.0050)**
-.0024 (.0047)
-.0013 (.0002)**
.1156 (.0083)**
.0380 (.0069)**
-.0037 (.0003)**
.0366 (.0094)**
.0126 (.0101)
-.0011 (.0002)**
-5.036 (.2047)**
-3.386 (.2036)**
-1.324 (.2033)**
.0121 (.0006)**
-.0191 (.0044)**
-.0383 (.0052)**
-.1263 (.0338)**
-2.906 (.3029)**
-1.253 (.3019)**
.8292 (.3022)**
.0042 (.0009)**
-.0061 (.0049)
-.0129 (.0045)**
-.0531 (.0301)*
2.735 (.4512)**
66448
.086
45087
.112
45087
.001
Note1: SE is robust standard errors.
Note2: The report of each country’s dummy variables in models A2a and A2b are omitted.
** p < .01 * p < .05
To understand this analysis, we have a simulation of the effect of economic
inequality and electoral proximity on national pride based on the analysis model A2c.4
After calculating the predicted value of nationalism by the post estimation of the
model’s result, we generated a simulation matrix using the Renka–Cline method5 on the
scales of the Gini index and difference in months6 between surveys and national
elections. Figures 1 and 2 show the simulated average value of predicted level of
national pride on the scale of economic inequality, and the gap in timing between survey
month and national election month. This results in three implications. First, the
predicted value of national pride tends to be higher in countries where economic
inequality is high and when elections were not held recently. Second, electoral
proximity enhances the predicted value of national pride where economic inequality is
not very high. The third and most important finding of this study is that national pride
tends to be weak where economic inequality is high and when elections were held
recently.
4
We were not able to calculate uninterrupted predicted value based on the ordered logistic analysis’ post estimation
in STATA 12.
5
Authors used the Origin 9.1 to do this simulation.
6
Numbers are not absolute value of the difference in month between surveys and elections. Negative numbers means
that survey took place before the elections, and positive numbers means vice versa.
10
Figure 1: Predicted value of national pride, electoral timing, and economic inequality.
Figure 2: Predicted average value of national pride, electoral timing, and economic inequality [3D].
These findings provide us a more nuanced implication regarding the effect of
elections and economic inequality on national pride. However, it is still unclear whether
these enhanced and diluted nationalistic identifications lead to inter-ethnically exclusive
xenophobic sentiments. The results of analysis in models B1 and B2 provide insight.
11
The results (Tables 4 and 5) demonstrate that electoral proximity, economic inequality,
and their interaction have the reverse effect on residents’ xenophobic or inter-ethnic
antagonistic feelings. While electoral proximity and economic inequality alone have an
independently negative effect on the rise of peoples’ exclusive sentiments, its interaction
raises those feelings. These results are also stable between models B1 (proximity for
parliamentary elections only) and model B2 (proximity for parliamentary and
presidential at national level elections). Hence, we can assume that enhanced national
pride in cases where economic inequality or electoral proximity is high is civic
nationalism rather than ethnically exclusive. However, the decrease in high inequality
and close elections do not result in the dilution of nationalistic identification, but occur
as a quid pro quo for the rise of inter-ethnically antagonistic or xenophobic alternative
type of ethno-nationalistic feelings.
Table 4: Xenophobia, inequality, and parliamentary electoral proximity
D.V. = “Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as
neighbours? Immigrants/foreign workers = mentioned (1)”
model B1a
Electoral proximity
Gini index
Electoral proximity
* gini index
Age
Income
Education
Unemployment
Constant
N
Pseudo R2/Overall R2
model B1b
Logit
Logit
LSDV method
LSDV method
-.0475 (.0070)**
-.0656 (.0065)**
.0012 (.0002)**
-.0866 (.0109)**
-.1333 (.0102)**
.0025 (.0003)**
.0683 .2858
68276
.042
.0051
-.0265
-.0708
.1173
2.7113
(.0008)**
(.0057)**
(.0067)**
(.0406)**
(.4438)**
46024
.060
Note1: SE is robust standard errors.
Note2: The report of each country’s dummy variables in model A2a and A2b are omitted.
** p < .01 * p < .05
12
Table 5: Xenophobia, inequality, and parliamentary and presidential electoral
proximity
D.V. = “Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as
neighbours? Immigrants/foreign workers = mentioned (1)”
model B2a
Electoral proximity
Gini index
Electoral proximity
* gini index
Age
Income
Education
Unemployment
Constant
N
Pseudo R2/Overall R2
model B2b
Logit
Logit
LSDV method
LSDV method
-.0443 (.0067)**
-.0647 (.0064)**
.0011 (.0002)**
-.0832 (.0107)**
-.1295 (.0099)**
.0024 (.0003)**
.0260 (.2820)
68276
.042
.0050
-.0275
-.0701
.1175
2.5401
(.0008)**
(.0057)**
(.0067)**
(.0406)**
(.4305)**
46024
.060
Note1: SE is robust standard errors.
Note2: The report of each country’s dummy variables in model A2a and A2b are omitted.
** p < .01 * p < .05
This effect may, however, be marginal. If we use the simulated7 average score
of predicted value of dependent variable based on model 2B on the scale of the Gini
index and the gap between electoral and survey calendar (Figure 3), there is a decreased
but unclearly relationship between xenophobic feelings and economic inequality and
electoral proximity. This may be because we calculated the predicted ratio as a score of
1 in an originally dichotomous answer into numerically continuous numbers and
aggregated it in country/year level to get its average score. This may have resulted in
technical problems. Another (and more plausible) reason is that xenophobic sentiment is
relatively less fragile against electoral mobilization or the effect of economic inequality,
although it has statistical significant, and the importance of other individuals’
background information (such as educational level, unemployment status, etc.) is more
critical in determining xenophobic or inter-ethnically hatred.
7
Simulation method is same for Figures 1 and 2, but Figure 3 use two-dimension figure to better understanding.
13
Figure 3: Predicted average ratio of people who consider
immigrants or foreigners as undesirable neighbours.
Conclusion
The main purpose of this article is to report the results of an investigation concerning
the effect of elections on peoples’ ethnic or nationalistic identification in the context of
socioeconomic background. In other words, specifying the more detailed temporal
aspect of democracies in the relationship with the nationalism questions. Recent
progress in the study of electoral mobilization and ethnic identification and nationalism
pointed out that the peoples’ nationalistic sentiment tended to be enhanced when
elections got closer, but the variance of its effect based on a given condition still
requires further research. This article approached this issue from the viewpoint of
economic inequality. The analysis results demonstrate, and theorists have argued, that
economic inequalities and electoral proximities have positive effects on the rise of
national pride. However, combining these two factors results in a negative impact for
the rise of national pride; rather, in these situations, people’s xenophobic feelings tend to
be stronger than in other situations. In other words, while democratic competition in
new democracies and the economic inequalities on market competition each have
positive effects on the formation of the healthy non-hostile nationalism, the combination
of these two factors erode a state level sense of unity and result in unhealthy
nationalism.
We interpreted these results using two viable hypothetical stories. If we apply civic
14
attachment to the nation (represented by national pride) and ethnically exclusive
attachment to their group (represented by xenophobia) as incompatible feelings, the
erosion of national pride, and the rise of xenophobia in countries with high economic
inequality and elections are close is a result of the effectiveness of different type of
political entrepreneurs’ mobilization. However, if we treat xenophobic feelings as
escalated nationalism, the erosion of national pride, and the rise of xenophobia results
because of the radicalization of mobilization strategy by same type political
entrepreneurs to cover-up or utilize economically inequalities.
This analysis provides two theoretical implications. Concerning the study of electoral
competition and nationalism, our findings provide an in-depth distinction when electoral
mobilization enhances healthy nationalism or raises the centrifugal feelings among
people. For the study of economic inequality and nationalism, our findings provide the
temporal projection line to coordinate the two lines of argument regarding whether
economic inequality hinders or facilitates national pride. Temporally different points
exist on a comorbid. The insights recognizing that democratization is not necessarily
progress or inter-ethnic cooperation, but rather the cultivation of inter-ethnic conflict
and hatred are not recent findings. As mentioned in the introduction section, previous
studies have shown that democratic competition occasionally enhances non-healthy
nationalism. At the same time, national level elections can be a crucial occasion to
enhance the feelings of national unity in newly democratized countries. Linz and Stepan
(1996) state that national level elections could be a crucial moment to form a state level
sense of unity. The results in this article provide an insight that coordinates these
conflicted views on the elections and nationalism, and finds additional implications in
its interactional effect with economic background from the temporally differential
aspect. This nuanced inter-temporal effect provides us with a better understanding of the
relationship between the democracy and nationalism. In addition, these findings may
lead to the study of the relationship between economic inequality and nationalism. As
noted above, the argument stressing that economic inequality facilitates national pride
and the argument that emphasizing economic inequality hinders national pride for a
given nation-state can coexist if we pay attention for the inter-temporal aspect. Solt
(2011) argues that there is no evidence for any hypothesis and that government’s
mobilize national pride to divert peoples’ attention from the problem of economic
inequality. Although we admit that Solt’s findings may be true in the broader sense,
there are exceptions in specific situations (where economic inequality is high). Electoral
proximity provides systematic temporal space for the new nation theory to function in
the context of studies regarding economic inequalities and nationalism.
Our study only analyzed newly democratized countries where the issue of
15
nationalism or ethnic identity has had strong influences on electoral politics. It is a
crucial assumption of our theoretical argument. This limitation could be one reason why
national pride erodes in economically unequal countries when elections are close. We
admit that our argument will lose its external validity if we apply the insight gained in
this research to traditional democracies. However, exploration on the effect of electoral
proximity and determining whether it creates healthy nationalism or not in newly
democratized countries is an important task during the waves of democratizations.
If we define the process of globalization as the expansion of market economy and
economic inequality, and the progress of inter-ethnicities living together, and define the
process of democratization as the expansion of free competitive elections, our findings
provide two positive and one negative conclusion. First, national elections can be a key
institution to forming a positive state level sense of unity, even in politically
unconsolidated new democracies. Second, economic inequality does not immediately
erode this sense of unity in peoples’ solidarity, even in new democracies (rather, it
enhances healthy national pride among people). These conclusions are a bright spot in
the progress of globalization and democratization. These two global level processes can
merge in a healthy manner. However, as a negative conclusion, coincidence of
economic inequality and democratic competition erode healthy nationalism. This
prediction that the simultaneous progress of globalization and democratization in a
given nation’s economic inequalities and competitive elections may lead to the
abandonment of a delusional dream that everything is all right.
Appendix. Descriptive Statistics.
National Pride
Xenophobia
Gini Index
Electoral Proximity [Parliamentary]
Electoral Proximity
[Parliamentary and Presidential]
Age
Income Level
Unemployment
Educational Level
N
75294
78524
80772
70524
70524
Mean
3.31
0.19
36.53
16.73
17.56
SD
0.81
0.39
10.94
7.71
7.91
Min
1
0
21.1
1
1
Max
4
1
59.8
29
29
80571
56837
80772
77845
43.63
4.42
0.97
4.62
16.95
2.49
0.30
2.16
16
1
0
1
103
10
1
8
16
References
Anderson, Benedict. 1983[1991]. Imagined Communities, Verso.
Brass, Paul R. 1991. Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison, London: Sage
Publication.
——————. 1997. Theft of an Idol, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Boone, Catherine. 2009. “Electoral Populism Where Property Rights Are Weak: Land Politics in
Contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa,” Comparative Politics, 41(2), 183-201.
Cederman, Lars-Erik, and Luc Girarding. 2007. “Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity
onto Nationalist Insurgencies,” American Political Science Review, 101(1), 173–185.
Cederman, Lars-Erik, Brian Min, and Andreas Wimmer. 2010. “Why do ethnic groups rebel?
New data and analysis,” World Politics, 62(1), 87-119
Cederman, Lars–Erik, Kristian S. Gleditsch, and Simon Hug. 2011a. “Elections and Ethnic Civil
War,” Comparative Political Studies, 46(3), 387–417.
Cederman, Lars-Erik, Nils B. Weidmann, and Kristian S. Gleditsch. 2011b. “Horizontal
Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global Comparion,” American Political
Science Review, 105(3), 478–495.
Chandra, Kanchan. 2004. Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in
India, New York: Cambridge University Press.
——————. 2005. “Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability,” Perspectives on Politics, 3(2),
235-252.
——————. 2012. K. Chandra ed. 2012. Constructivist Theories of Ethnic Politics, Oxford
University Press.
Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 1998. “On the Economic Causes of Civil War,” Oxford
Economic Papers, 50, 563–573.
Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler, and Nicholas Sambanis. 2005. “The Collier-Hoeffler Model of
Civil War Onset and the Case Study Project Research Design,” In Paul Collier and
Nicholas Sambanis eds. Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysi (pp.1–
33),Washington DC: World Bank.
Council of Europe 1998. Council of Europe. (1998). Observation of Parliamentary Elections in
Latvia (3 October 1998) (Document No. 8255), Retrieved from
17
[http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc98/EDOC8255.
htm (Accessed: August 8, 2012).
Deutsch, Karl. 1964 “The Price of Integraion,” P. Jacob and J. Toscano eds. The Integration of
Political Communities, (pp. 143-178), J. B. Lippincott.
Eifert, Benn, Edward Miguel, and Daniel N. Posner. 2010. “Political Competition and Ethnic
Identification in Africa,” American Journal of Political Science, 54(2), 494-510.
Eriksen, Thomas. H. 1994[2010]. Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives,
third edition, New York: Pluto Press.
Evans, Mariah D. R. and Jonathan Kelly. 2002. “National Pride in the Developed World: Survey
data from 24 Nations,” International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 14(3),
303-338.
Gelner, Ernest. 1983. Nations and Nationalism, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Guelke, Adrian and Jim Smyth. 1992. “The Ballot Bomb: Terrorism and the Electoral Process in
Northern Ireland,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 4(2), 103-124.
Hale, Henry E. 2008. The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and Nations in
Eurasia and the World, Cambridge University Press.
Han, Kyung-Joon. 2013. “Income Inequality, International Migration, and National Pride: A
Test of Social Identification Theory,” International Journal of Public Research, 25(4),
502-521.
Higashijima, Masaaki and Ryo Nakai. (2011). Elections, Ethnic Parties, and the Salience of
Ethnic Identity: Evidence from the Baltic States, 1993-2008 (SSRN Working Paper
Series, No.1901401).
Hjerm, Mikael. 1998. “National Identities, National Pride and Xenophobia: A Comparison of
Four Western Countries,” Acta Sociologica, 41, 335-347.
Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of
California Press.
Ignatieff, Micheal. 1993. Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism, Chatto &
Windus, 1993
Kunovich, Robert M. 2009. “The Source and Consequences of National Identification,”
American Sociological Review, 74(4), 573-593.
Laitin, David D. 1986. Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Change Among the Yoruba,
Chicago/London: University Chicago Press.
Minorities at Risk. 2010. “Chronology for Russians in Latvia,” Minorities at Risk Project,
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/chronology.asp?groupId=36701.
Posen, Barry. 1993. “Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power,” International Security,
18(2), 80-124.
18
Posner, Daniel N. 2004. “Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa,” American Journal of
Political Science, 48(4), 849–863.
——————. 2005. Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa, Cambridge University Press.
Przworski, Adam, and John Sprague. 1986. Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Saideman, Stephen M., David J. Lanoue, Michael Campenni, and Samuel Stanton. 2002.
“Democratization, Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict: A Pooled Time-Series
Analysis, 1985-1998,” Comparative Political Studies, 35(1), 103-129.
Shayo, Moses. 2009. “A Model of Social Identity with an Application to Political Economy:
Nation, Class, and Redistribution,” American Political Science Review, 103(2),
147-174.
Smith, Anthony D. 1987. The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Wiley.
Smith, Tom W. and Seokho Kim. 2006. “National Pride in Comparative Perspective: 1995/96
and 2003/04,” International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 18(1), 127-136.
Snyder, Jack L. 2000. From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict, WW
Norton.
Solt, Federick 2009 “Standardizing the World Income Inequality Database,” Social Quarterly,
90(2), 231-242.
——————. 2011. “Diversionary Nationalism: Economic Inequality and the Formation of
National Pride,” Journal of Politics, 73(3), 821-830.
Wilkinson, Steven. 2004. Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India,
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Wimmer, Andreas, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Brian Min. 2009. “Ethnic Politics and Armed
Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Global Data Set,” American
Sociological Review, 74, 316–337.
19