Consciousness
Research
Group
DeferenKal Phenomenal Concepts? Not for the Zombie Mary.
Taipei, Taiwan
Lynn (Chien-­‐Hui) Chiu ([email protected])
Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri-­‐Columbia
Ins$tute of Philosophy of Mind and Cogni$on
Na1onal Yang-­‐Ming University
IntroducKon
Thesis
The Knowledge Argument against Physicalism: Mary, a hypothetical super-scientist growing up in a black-and-white room, has complete
knowledge of physical facts. However, when she experiences red for the first time, she still learns something new about the phenomenal
character of her experience of red. Thus this new knowledge is a non-physical fact.
To acquire the semantic competence of deferential phenomenal concepts, one must also possess nondeferential categorical concepts that are also phenomenal. Thus not all phenomenal concepts can be
possessed without the relevant experiences. A philosophical zombie can never acquire any deferential
phenomenal concepts.
P-REDe
Mary
P-REDp
Mary
Michael Tye (1999)
The Phenomenal Concept Strategy The new knowledge consists of a concept
that can only be gained via experience.
P-REDd
Mary
Mary
Michael Tye (2009)
No “special” concepts.
Phenomenal concepts CAN be possessed
WITHOUT the relevant experiences.
The Argument:
1. S can possess deferential concepts with partial understanding only if S also possesses at least one
appropriate categorical concept which the referents of the former also fall under.
Concepts: finely individuated mental representations of worldly entities that are exercised whenever we undergo thoughts or other
comparable mental states, such as noticing , recognizing, making a judgment, etc.*concepts will be indicated by capital letters, eg. RED; phenomenal concepts with an additional P, eg. P-RED*
A fortnight is a period of Kme.
✔
Tye’s (2009) Argument
1. If a concept C is deferential, S can possess C even if C is only partially understood.
2. If S can possess C even if C is only partially understood, it’s not necessary to undergo the relevant experiences to possess C.
3. All phenomenal concepts PCs are deferential.
C. It’s not necessary to undergo the relevant experiences for S to possess any PCs.
What is a deferenCal concept?
C is deferential iff a subject S, is willing to
have misapplications of C corrected by experts
Es. If S rejects E’s correction, S is operating
with another non-deferential concept.
What is parCal understanding?
To understand a concept is to have conceptions, i.e., clusters of beliefs
associated with the concept.
# of correct beliefs
Experts
How can phenomenal concepts be parCally understood?
-If X is deferential, P-X is deferential
One can have conceptions of a phenomenal concept without the relevant
experiences.
Ex. Someone who has never experienced red can know:
(A) what it is like to experience red is more similar to what it is like to experience
orange than what its is like to experience green
(B) Fire engines typically cause the experience of red
Ex. If a shade of red should count as orange, the experience of the
shade of red should count as one of orange, too.
-Judgments about the phenomenal character of
experiences can be corrected:
Ex. A philosophical zombie can acquire phenomenal concepts as
it could “correct itself” after experiencing for the first time: “I
thought I had experience, I was wrong.”
References: A fortnight is 14 days
A fortnight is 10 days
Burge, T. (1979). Individualism and the Mental. In A. Pessin & S. Goldberg (Ed.), The twin earth chronicles: twenty years of reflec3on on Hilary Putnam’s “ The meaning of ‘meaning’” (pp. 125). Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Jackson, F. (1986). What Mary didn’t know. The Journal of Philosophy, 83(5), 291.
Tye, M. (1999). Phenomenal consciousness: the explanatory gap as a cogniKve illusion. Mind, 108(432), 705
Many thanks to Andrew Melnyk for his helpful comments.
Tye, M. (2003). A theory of phenomenal concepts. Royal Ins3tute of Philosophy Supplement, 53, p.91
To request the complete paper, please contact: [email protected]
Tye, M. (2009). Consciousness revisited: materialism without phenomenal concepts. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
✖
Do not count as partially
understanding FORTNIGHT
A fortnight is a bicycle.
✖
A fortnight is 14 ducks.
2. S possesses a deferential phenomenal concept with partial understanding only if S also possesses at least
one appropriate phenomenal categorical concept which the referents of the former also fall under.
Tye’s examples fall into one of the below two types:
Type (1) Beliefs that reference other phenomenal concepts—like (A)
Type (2) Beliefs that reference physical concepts—like (B)
Type (1): judging similarity/differences of phenomena characters requires general
phenomenal categorical concepts
P-­‐PHENOMENAL CHARACTER
Non-experts
How can phenomenal concepts be deferenCal?
Categorical concept
P-­‐VISUAL
P-­‐RED
P-­‐ORANGE
P-­‐TACTILE
P-­‐BLUE
P-­‐PAIN
P-­‐ITCH
P-­‐POKE
Type (2): requires at least P-PHENOMENAL CHARACTER. Otherwise, one might hold the correct
belief of (B) but think that P-RED falls under DOG-PEE, a non-phenomenal concept that refers to
the property of often being urinated on by dogs.
3. The phenomenal categorical concepts are either deferential or non-deferential phenomenal concepts
4. P-PHENOMENAL CHARACTER is non-deferential.
If all PCs are deferential, then they would produce empty statements like “the A of juice is very similar to the B of apple cider, B is not
C, C is typically caused by rotting eggs.”
5. Therefore, S possesses a deferential phenomenal concept only if S possesses a non-deferential phenomenal
concept. Not all phenomenal concepts can be possessed without the relevant experiences.
Unless a philosophical zombie could correctly apply PHENOMENAL CHARACTER to EXPERIENCE prior to
experience (which it can’t), it exercises different concepts of EXPERIENCE after experience.
Consciousness Research Group
Ins1tute o
f P
hilosophy o
f M
ind &
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ogni1on, Na1onal Yang-­‐Ming University
To possess a deferential PC presupposes the possession of non-deferential categorical PCs.
Taipei, Taiwan