IS IRAN REALLY CHANGING? AN
ASSESSMENT OF THE FIRST YEAR
OF HASSAN ROUHANI’S PRESIDENCY
9
Robert Czulda
List of Contents
Introduction
Expectations and promises
Internal dimensions of Rouhani’s presidency
Rouhani’s foreign policy
Conclusions
Reference
Introduction
Hasan Rouhani’s victory in the nationwide elections in June 2013
brought high hopes both in Iran and internationally. Many believed that
Rouhani’s success would lead to a breakthrough in relations between
Iran and the world, and introduce economic, political and social
reforms. Rouhani was labelled as a moderate candidate, avoiding radical
views, always seeking a peaceful solution. In the past he expressed
some sympathies with the “Green Movement,” and criticized media
censorship and government lies. Many commentators have forgotten,
however, that in 2004, Rouhani was labelled by the Iranian media as a
rising star of the conservative camp. Thus it is not surprising at all that
no breakthrough can be noticed so far.
Expectations and promises
The period of 2012-2013 in Iran was seen as a time of waiting for a
new president. Ahmadinejad has been “worn away” politically. In mid2012 in Iran almost everybody was tired of Ahmadinejad’s presidency,
who was then almost completely alone. Former allies and supporters, if
they had not already been politically eliminated, lost their parliamentary
seats in the elections (March and May 2012), which resulted in an
unfavourable outcome for Ahmadinejad and his fraction. The difficulty
of waiting for a new president and a fresh opening was exacerbated,
because in 2012 the US and the EU imposed new sanctions on Iran’s oil
and financial sectors. It was a huge blow – in late 2011 Iran exported 2.3
million barrels per day, in mid-2012 this slumped to just 800 thousand
(Al Arabiya News 2012). In the last quarter of 2012, Iran was affected
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by the height of the currency crisis. The Supreme Leader announced
the “resistance economy,” an unspecified concept, which was to help
Iran bring its economy on track within two years. In March 2013, Iran
noted an inflation of approximately 38.7 percent and a GDP growth of
-1 percent (Rajabova 2013).
Presidential elections were planned for 14 June, 2013. The political
atmosphere before that event was very warm. Hopes mingled with
uncertainty. Nobody knew, including the ruling ayatollahs, how society
would react to a new president. The opposition speculated as to whether
the conservatives would allow their candidates to take part in the
elections. One visible proof that there was a boiling atmosphere among
Iranians was the funeral procession in June 2013 for Ayatollah Jalal
Al-Din Taheri, a senior religious figure, a critic of the decision-makers
and a former member of the Assembly of Experts, who questioned the
legality of Ahmadinejad’s presidency. During the ceremony in Esfahan,
people chanted “Down with the dictator!”, “Shame on the dictator!”
and “Political prisoners must be freed.” Sensing a possible crisis, the
Supreme Leader warned that “enemies of Iran” intended to cause unrest
during the elections.
After several TV debates, elections were held, with a turnout of about 73
percent of eligible voters. On the same day, the victory of the 65-year-old
cleric, Hassan Rouhani, was announced. According to official results,
he won 50.88 percent of all the votes (Press TV 2013). The opposition
felt that there was no better candidate and expressed great satisfaction
with this choice (Rouhani was also supported by Rafsanjani). The
new president was considered a moderate candidate, avoiding radical
positions and seeking peaceful agreements. Gary Samore, the White
House coordinator for arms control and weapons of mass destruction
in the Obama administration’s first term, described Rouhani’s image as
that of a “pragmatic and moderate person” with whom it is possible to
“do business” (Gwertzman 2013).
Rouhani is also a diplomat and an intellectual, which is a clear
qualitative leap, compared to Ahmadinejad. In the past he expressed
some sympathies toward the “Green Movement,” and criticized the
censorship of the media and the lies of the government. Rouhani has
good relations with the Supreme Leader – he has advised Khamenei
on security issues from the late 1980s. Rouhani is believed to have
played a key role in halting Iran’s secret nuclear programme in 2003
(Nicoullaud 2013). During his presidential exposé, Rouhani said that
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Iran must stay away “from the abyss of extremism” and follow a path
of “moderation.” He also promised “constructive interaction with
the world,” the reconstruction of the economy and a “restoration of
morality.” He warned that “discrimination against women will not be
tolerated,” and pledged to decrease hostility in relations between Iran
and the US. Rouhani selected conservatives and centrists to form his
government.
The opposition and reformers expected changes, but, as noted by Urszula
Pytkowska, Rouhani “is not a reformer (…) in 2004 he was labelled by
Iranian media as a rising star of the conservative camp. It was even
believed that he was being prepared to take presidential office in 2005.
That is why an analysis of his victory must not be made without taking
this fact into account. The well recognized position of Rouhani among
the conservatives and his role as a trusted advisor to Ayatollah Khamenei
could be a gap that will allow him to really participate in the process of
governing. If the newly elected president proves himself as an efficient
diplomat he will certainly be able to find his place in the configuration of
powers and his role will not be purely ceremonial” (Pytkowska 2013).
In carrying out an analysis of Rouhani’s presidency, in both its internal
and international dimensions, preparing a calculation of profits and
losses, fulfilled and unfulfilled hopes and promises, one must remember
that Rouhani – although it cannot be considered as an accusation – is
a man of Iran’s current political establishment, well-placed within the
Supreme Leader’s circle of power. For many years, Rouhani has been a
member of such bodies as the Supreme National Security Council, the
Assembly of Experts and the Expediency Council. Majid Rafizadeh has
no doubts: Rouhani can be considered as one of the “founding members
of the current political structure under the Islamic Republic of Iran”
(Rafizadeh 2013).
Internal dimensions of Rouhani’s presidency
Despite the announcement of political reforms concerning civil liberties
and Rouhani’s critical opinions on the limited access to information,
Iranian society still struggles with access to, for instance, social media,
such as Facebook or Twitter, which are banned (and which Rouhani
uses). However, perhaps Rouhani, who has just started his presidency,
needs more time given that the introduction of deep social change is
never easy ‒ especially in a conservative country like Iran. However, it
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IS IRAN REALLY CHANGING? AN ASSESSMENT OF THE FIRST YEAR OF HASSAN ROUHANI’S PRESIDENCY
is difficult to be optimistic if the series of setbacks is taken into account.
They are evidence that the conservatives and right-wing establishment
have dug in deeply and are far from being ready to surrender. Just like
president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who came under fire for “sinfully”
consoling Hugo Chavez’s mother, now a target for attack is Rouhani’s
close aide – Mahmoud Sariolghalam, who wore a tie during the World
Economic Forum in Davos. After a vicious attack from right-wingers, he
was forced to step down. What is more, several newspapers supporting
the government were shut down. It is a visible proof that the real
centre of power is elsewhere and it does not belong to the president,
who – whoever it is, a moderate like Khatami, pragmatic and powerful
Rafsanjani, the centrist Rouhani or the conservative Ahmadinejad – is
not fully independent. Anti-reformist campaigns are also evidence that
the conservative establishment is not willing to make any political and
social concessions because it could threaten the ideological foundations
of the ayatollahs’ Iran, which is invariably based on the ideas of the
Islamic Revolution of 1979. Too much freedom could create a dangerous
precedent triggering a flood of Western influence (also via the Internet)
and consequently undermine the current political system.
Despite many setbacks and problems, it is possible to find some internal
successes although these are just minor ones (at least so far). The first
one is that there is still a high level of hope among Iranians. Obviously,
this is a typical glass half-empty/half-full-type dilemma. An optimistic
person might appreciate that some people have been released from
prison, while a pessimistic commentator would point out that many
political activists, including Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi,
are still in captivity. The former could add that Rouhani is unable to
do more because he is conscious of internal constraints to his powers
and remembers the massive offensive started against President Khatami
who attempted to increase press freedom and other liberties. For the
optimist, the surge in the number of executions is proof that he is a real
threat to the conservatives, who are scared and want to undermine his
position with such actions (note that the judiciary is controlled by the
right-wingers and not the president). Furthermore, for the pessimist, it is
evidence that Rouhani is either unable to act firmly or is not willing to
act at all. The realist could counter by saying not to expect any radical
changes at all.
During his presidential campaign, Rouhani spoke out clearly, but at the
same time carefully, about the problem of releasing political prisoners,
knowing that on this matter his powers would be very limited: definitely
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an internal battle for influence and power is far from over. This struggle,
which is taking place in almost every dimension of Iran’s public
life, was painfully visible in February 2014 when an interview with
Rouhani in Iranian TV was delayed for more than one hour after an
alleged disagreement about who should be the interviewer – a person
sympathetic to Rouhani’s camp or a hard-line journalist who is a former
supporter of Ahmadinejad (Mostaghim 2014).
A second success, also very modest, concerns the economy, which, for
most Iranians, is the most important matter. From the perspective of most
Iranians, issues like the nuclear programme are secondary, definitely
less important than the standard of living or the unemployment rate.
It is a tremendous challenge for Rouhani because the Iranian economy
has been the victim not only of many years of painful international
sanctions, but also of mismanagement, resulting in total disarray: the
rapid loss of the rial’s value, costly subsidies and decreasing profits from
oil exports, state-centrism , corruption, and a lack of innovation and new
technologies. This remains Iran’s top concern. His government was able
to squash inflation to the lowest level in two years in February 2014 (El
Baltaji 2014). However, prices rose in February 2014 to 23% compared
with the same month the previous year. In April, Rouhani announced
the second phase of the subsidy reforms, aimed at cutting governmental
subsidies of energy (including gasoline), utilities and food, in order to
save some 60 billion US dollars per year. While this will improve the
conditions of the state budget, at the same time, it has increased prices
and triggered a higher inflation rate. Unfortunately for Iranians, the
national currency (rial) in April hit its lowest level since the beginning
of Rouhani’s presidency. Some good news is that the International
Monetary Fund predicts growth of between 1 percent and 2 percent after
two years of contraction (Foroohar 2014).
Rouhani’s foreign policy
What distinguishes Rouhani from Ahmadinejad is, for instance, the fact
that, while the latter was a not-very-subtle hard-liner lacking political
flexibility, unable to read diplomatic nuances, the new president is a
pragmatist, an experienced diplomat who knows when to speak and
what words can help him achieve his goals. Ahmadinejad tried to
build his support and raise social activity and unity by fuelling a siege
syndrome, constantly employing “Hannibal ante portas” rhetoric.
Rouhani is aware that Iran can achieve much more by negotiating than
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by using confrontational words. Following this logic, in September
2013, Rouhani talked via telephone with Barack Obama. It was the first
conversation between the presidents of Iran and the US in more than 30
years. Rouhani did not miss out on any opportunity to point out this fact,
including posting a photo, on Twitter, which he uses as an element of his
well-studied campaign of building a positive image in the international
arena.
From the outset, Rouhani initiated a “charm campaign.” Every word
spoken by the new president is well-balanced and focused on building
a positive image and atmosphere. It is difficult to categorically assess
the degree to which they represent his actual views and the degree to
which they are a result of his pragmatism and diplomatic craftsmanship,
a need to achieve a warming in the face of such painful sanctions. Their
removal is key to the Iranian economy’s salvation. It is difficult not to
see that his positive words and actions are part of a bigger strategy.
Eleven political prisoners, among them a human rights lawyer and a
winner of the Sakharov Prize, Nasrin Sotoudeh, were released just a few
days before a planned visit by Rouhani to New York, where he spoke at
the United Nations, presenting Iran’s policy of a “new opening.”
But nice gestures are not enough to achieve a détente and decisive
actions are required if Rouhani actually wants to start a new chapter in
Iran’s relations with the rest of the world, and thus lead to a reduction of
international sanctions, which – as was stated above – are devastating
to the Iranian economy and society. These relations are, however,
complicated because Iran has its own geo-strategic interests and goals,
which are in conflict with the interests and goals of the West. This applies
for example to Syria. Despite the “new opening,” Tehran continues to
support the regime of Bashar al-Assad, which, from the Iranian geostrategic point of view, is logical and understandable. Iran is believed to
deliver weapons, which is in opposition to the actions of the West and the
Arab states of the Persian Gulf who support the rebels (sometimes the
Islamic radicals). Iranian policy and the vocal objections of the Syrian
opposition meant that the representatives of Iran were not invited to the
peace conference on the Syrian issue (Gordon and Barnard 2014). In
this respect, geostrategic calculations and interests will be exceptionally
difficult for Iran to reconcile.
An illustration of the scale of tensions in the Middle East with Iran in
the background was the suicide bombing in front of the Iranian embassy
in Lebanon (November 2013) which caused the deaths of 23 people and
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injured at least 160 others. A Sunni Islamist terrorist group, the Abdullah
Azzam Brigade, claimed responsibility for the attack.
Rouhani had a chance to introduce himself to the international community
as a reasonable person who helped to achieve some progress, between
2003 and 2005, when he served as Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator. Iran
agreed to suspend most parts of its controversial enrichment programme,
which was later revoked by Ahmadinejad. Rouhani, once president,
declared in March 2014 that Iran, being based on Islamic principles,
decided not to acquire nuclear weapons. Before that, during the P5+1
talks, Iran accepted the interim agreement and agreed to temporarily
freeze key parts of its nuclear programme in exchange for a decrease
in sanctions. This agreement, the implementation of which began
in January 2014, was seen as a starting point for further negotiations
(Borger and Dehghan 2013). Despite that, in March 2014, the EU
decided to renew its sanctions on the Iranian oil industry, as well as the
banking and financial sector. Despite the “charm offensive,” Iran still
holds a strongly intransigent stance.
Conclusions
The answer to the question in the title, “Is Iran Really Changing?”,
and whether Rouhani is a disappointment or not depends, primarily,
on what changes we expected from and what we saw in Rouhani. If
somebody saw in him a true reformist, who could transform Iran into
a state that is fully transparent and friendly towards the West, then that
was wrong from the beginning. Such hopes were a big misconception,
made by those who expected too much. In other words, some people
wanted to see a reformist in Rouhani. What is more, he was also seen
as a reformist because he was the least conservative among all the
eligible candidates and he was contrasted with the ultra-conservative
Ahmadinejad. However, being less of a hard-liner and less conservative
than Ahmadinejad does not automatically make one a reformist.
He is foremost a very flexible pragmatic, a true “political beast,” ready to
say what people want to hear in order to win. The fact that Rouhani was
allowed to take part in the presidential elections may indicate that the
Supreme Leader and conservative circles did not consider him a threat
to the Islamic Republic but a chance for a well-balanced, careful and
thoughtful change, in terms of reducing economic sanctions and social
discontent, which consequently might increase the political legitimacy
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of the ruling ayatollahs. The need for such a candidate grew due to
the increasing economic sanctions, crippling the Iranian economy, but
also due to the Arab Spring, which was anxiously observed by political
decision-makers in Tehran.
Of course, the fact that Rouhani is a member of the religious establishment
and is on some kind of “a leash” held by the Supreme Leader does not
make him automatically a puppet of Ali Khamenei, but it is hard not to
notice that after eight years of Ahmadinejad “tightening the screws,”
Iran needed more freedom, although still limited and controlled, to cool
down the political atmosphere in its society. Perhaps after Rouhani’s
presidency, Iran will return to its gloomy closure once again. Rouhani
was thus an ideal candidate for this up-and-down strategy – he was
liberal enough to convince the reformists and young Iranians, but still
he is a conservative at heart. On the one hand, he calls for changes and
gives people hope, but, at the same time, all his appeals are balanced,
which means that they will not shake the carefully built political system
and thus will not challenge the ayatollahs’ establishment.
Probably the biggest change that might bring a potential positive
breakthrough during Rouhani’s presidency is a change in the atmosphere
concerning Iran (although it is foremost a result of his personal
charm and the good will of the West than the result of real actions and
diplomatic successes). Thanks to Rouhani, the military option, at least
for the US, was taken off the table. From an optimistic point of view, this
“new opening” can be considered as a perfect atmosphere for further
negotiations. The first step to achieve a breakthrough is always good will
and a positive atmosphere ‒ and those, for many years, were missing.
Now a great opportunity has been created. If played correctly, at least
in theory, it could be a win-win game, particularly for Iran, who needs a
breakthrough more than the West. Having international sanctions lifted
would be an enormous success for Rouhani.
Of course, it is not easy due to the main problem of the “dual voice.”
Political powers in the fields of foreign and security policy are divided
in Iran between the President and the Supreme Leader. Iran’s Parliament
has also a voice, as do non-formal entities, such as the Revolutionary
Guards (IRGC). This “dual voice” is visible especially nowadays, since
the President is not entirely consistent with the conservative camp. So,
when Rouhani spread his “charm offensive” and cancelled the annual
“Great Prophet” military exercises, which infuriated the hard-liners
(Binnie 2014), the Iranian navy announced that a number of warships had
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been ordered to approach the maritime border of the US. Military tests
are still conducted, including a test on the eve of the anniversary of the
1979 revolution of the “Barani” long-range ballistic missile. In January
2014, Basij commander General Mohammad Reza Naqdi said that Iran
is trying to establish paramilitary groups in Egypt and Jordan to attack
Israel. He added that such units are already in Syria and Lebanon (FARS
News Agency 2014). In response, Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad
Javad Zarif openly admitted that he does not control Iranian actions in
Syria (Abdo 2014).
On the other hand, Rouhani appeared on TV issuing a message that
“Iran’s children successfully test-fired a new generation of missiles”
– coincidentally ahead of nuclear talks. After that, the president asked
Iran’s military decision-makers to reduce their hostile rhetoric and
demonstrations of military manoeuvres. This political schizophrenia can
be explained by the need to speak to three different types of recipients
simultaneously: the international community, willing to ease the crisis,
Iranian reformists and liberals, and the conservatives. However, the
question still unanswered is which Rouhani is the real one? The one who
truly convinces the world that Iran is acting in good will and is ready to
make concessions while – keeping in mind the needs of some internal
groups – using war-like rhetoric simply not to be accused of being too
soft? Or maybe Rouhani is not that much different from Ahmadinejad
in respect to internal policy and his “charm offensive” is just a torrent of
words and decisions which are expected by the West? One Rouhani is
the real one. Only time will tell which one.
Without any doubt we should not expect any radical changes in both
the internal and external dimensions of Iran’s policy. We might simply
witness different tones, but Iran’s main course will stay the same. This is
an integral part of the foundations of the Islamic Republic. A significant
change is highly unlikely not only because there are powerful forces
opposing any radical changes, scared that some successes will allow
Rouhani to gain more popularity and will result in the political isolation
of the conservatives. This also includes Rouhani himself, who did not
loudly protest after Ahmadinejad’s government forces crushed the
Green Movement in 2009. Some kind of liberalization could be possible
if Rouhani solved the economy’s problems, which is still Iranians’ top
concern. That could gain him more support from the Supreme Leader,
which is needed to make any decisive move. A lack of economic
successes will bring Rouhani more problems – without them he will
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disappoint many Iranians who voted for him. Very likely, it will present
a threat to his re-election when his first term ends in 2017.
However, there is even a bigger challenge ahead of Iran and Rouhani.
If The Times is right, it could end for Rouhani even faster – the press
said that right-wing former commanders from the Revolutionary Corps
Guard have warned that “he risks being overthrown unless he delivers a
favourable nuclear deal with the West within months” (Tomlinson 2014).
Some of them, like Yahya Safavi, are now very close to the Supreme
Leader so the threat is very serious. It shows that, as Geneive Abdo put
it, “the honeymoon that Iran’s hard-liners extended (…) is coming to
an end” (Abdo 2014). In other words, Rouhani’s position is not easy.
He is in a trap without a good solution. He can either disappoint the
liberals and the Iranians or the conservatives and right-wingers who
may even abolish the presidential post. It is likely he will be forced to
surrender to the latter, which might have consequently negative impact
on his chances for rapprochement with the West and for the easing of
the nuclear crisis.
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