Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
Linking the Linguistic, Psychological, and Probabilistic
Aspects of Surprise from a Cross-linguistic Perspective
Tyler Peterson
Lecture 2
March 24, 2016
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
Contact
I
Contact and seminar website:
[email protected]
www.u.arizona.edu/∼tylerpeterson/diderot.html
I
Office hours/meetings: I plan to be on campus most days of the
week during regular hours (i.e. 10.00–17.00-ish), but I’m always
happy to make appointments discuss these topics or anything you are
working on
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
Next steps
I
Formulating our generalizations and moving towards a functional
explanation:
1. The witnessing heuristic: a guide for testing parasitic mirativity
(specifically, grammatical evidentials)
2. The mirativity condition: a functional explanation cast in terms of
markedness
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
The unmarked use of a grammatical evidential
The marked use of an evidential: seeing is believing
Representations
A couple of observations and a hypothesis
I
Hill (2012): ‘direct perception’ is only feature that a survey of seven
unrelated languages share in expressing mirativity
I
Peterson (2015, to appear ): parasitic mirativity is a result from the
interpretative tension that arises from using an indirect evidential in a
direct evidence context (c)
I
Informal hypothesis: it boils down to knowledge as informed by
direct perception
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
I
The unmarked use of a grammatical evidential
The marked use of an evidential: seeing is believing
Representations
Grammatical evidential give the speaker a way of talking about
states, event, or actions that they do not know to be true (or false):
(1)
Context: Gwen hears the sound of raindrops on the roof; Sheila
walks in with wet boots
’
nakw=hl
yukw tim wis
evid=cd prog fut rain
“Looks like it’s raining.”
I
We can assume that this is the unmarked use of a grammatical
’
evidential: in its typical usage evidential nakw
encodes the inference
a speaker makes for a statement based on the indirect sensory
evidence they experience
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
The unmarked use of a grammatical evidential
The marked use of an evidential: seeing is believing
Representations
I
Accordingly, if Gwen directly ‘experiences’ the rain, then she would
use a simple declarative, as in (2a)
I
As no inference is being performed on the part of the speaker, the
’
use of nakw
is typically infelicitous in this context, as in (2b):
(2)
a. Context: Gwen runs out to get carrots from the garden in the
middle of a storm; she returns soaking wet and says to Sheila
yukw=hl tim wis
prog=cd fut rain
‘It’s raining.’
’
b. #nakw=hl
yukw=hl tim wis
I
From another perspective, (2b) is infelicitous because she knows it’s
raining (the proposition p represented by the sentence) is true
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
I
The unmarked use of a grammatical evidential
The marked use of an evidential: seeing is believing
Representations
Epistemic modals in English behave in a similar fashion, as they can
often have an evidential use:
(3)
Context: Gwen runs out to get carrots from the garden in the
middle of a storm; she returns soaking wet and says to Sheila
a. ‘It’s raining.’
b. #‘It must be raining.’
I
(3b) is infelicitous because she knows it’s raining is true (also
because 3b asserts the ♦p, not simply p as 3a does)
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
The unmarked use of a grammatical evidential
The marked use of an evidential: seeing is believing
Representations
The unmarked use of an evidential
(4)
Context: Alvin and his friend drive by Bob’s place; they can smell
and see smoke coming out of the smokehouse; Alvin remarks
’
nakw=hl
se-hon-(t)=s
Bob
evid=cd caus-fish-3=cd Bob
“Bob must be smoking fish”
“Looks like Bob is smoking fish”
I
Why? Because Bob might be burning something else, like old leaves
(not used for smoking fish)
I
Notice that this is the same with epistemic must
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
The unmarked use of a grammatical evidential
The marked use of an evidential: seeing is believing
Representations
The marked use of an evidential
(5)
Context: Alvin approaches Bob’s smokehouse; upon opening the
door Alvin can see Bob working on his fire and tending to the
smoking fish
’
nakw=hl
se-hon-(t)=s
Bob
evid=cd caus-fish-3=cd Bob
“Looks like Bob’s smoking fish!”
I
This is the use of a indirect evidential in a direct evidence context
I
The result: the evidential expresses surprise – it is the mirative use of
an evidential
I
In other terms: it shows the marked use of an evidential
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
The unmarked use of a grammatical evidential
The marked use of an evidential: seeing is believing
Representations
Hypothesis
I
Question: So what exactly determines the conditions of the marked
use of an evidential? Or, what are the conditions on the context that
give rise to the mirative use of an evidential?
I
Hypothesis: That the speaker sees or has direct experience or
perception of the context that p talks about
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
The unmarked use of a grammatical evidential
The marked use of an evidential: seeing is believing
Representations
Evidentials and direct experience
I
Tsafiki (Barbacoan): the indirect evidential suffix -nu encodes ‘information
inferred from physical evidence’ and mirativity in certain contexts
(Dickinson 2000: 407)
(6)
a. tse lowa=bi ne=chi
keere-i-i-nu-e
1fem bed=loc from=loc throw-become-ncongr-evid-decl
“I must have fallen out of bed.” (I’m on the floor). (2000: 412)
b. moto
jo-nu-e
motorcycle be-evid-decl
“It’s a motorcycle!” (I see the motorcycle approaching) (2000: 411)
F Crucial observations: The speaker knows the proposition (I fell out of
bed and it’s a motorcycle) embedded under the evidential is true
because the speaker sees that it’s true or experiences that it is true
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
The unmarked use of a grammatical evidential
The marked use of an evidential: seeing is believing
Representations
Evidentials and direct experience
I
The evidential suffix -k in Qiang (LaPolla 2003): an inference may be
based on evidence obtained visually or by some other sense
(7)
Context: the speaker knew the person was supposed to go to
Chengdu, but wasn’t sure when, and then saw the person luggage
gone, so assumed he had left for Chengdu
the: ýdýytA:
HA-qi-k
3sg chengdu.loc or-go-infer
“He went to Chengdu.”
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
The unmarked use of a grammatical evidential
The marked use of an evidential: seeing is believing
Representations
Evidentials and direct experience
I
If we adjust the context such that the speaker actually witnesses the
door in the state of being open, (8) expresses the speaker’s surprise.
(8)
‘The speaker sees that the door is open, but doesn’t know who
opened it’
dýy de-ýge-ji-k
door or-open-csm-infer
“The door is open!”
F Crucial observation: The speaker knows the proposition (the door
is open) embedded under the evidential is true because the
speaker sees that it’s true or experiences that it is true
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
The unmarked use of a grammatical evidential
The marked use of an evidential: seeing is believing
Representations
Evidentials and direct experience
I
The indirect evidential particle lõ in Hare (Athabascan) (DeLancey
1997: 38-40, 2001: 375-378)
I
If we adjust the context such that the speaker actually witnesses the
guy sitting in the tree, (9) expresses the speaker’s surprise.
(9)
heee, gúhde daweda!
ch’ifi dachı́da lõ
hey, up.there sg.sit.3sg.imperf. guy sitting evid
“Hey, he’s sitting up there! The guy is sitting up there!”
(DeLancey 2001: 376)
F Crucial observation: The speaker knows the proposition (he’s
sitting up there) embedded under the evidential is true because
the speaker sees that it’s true or experiences that it is true
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
The unmarked use of a grammatical evidential
The marked use of an evidential: seeing is believing
Representations
Evidentials and direct experience
I
Full circle: Turkish -miş
I
If we adjust the context such that the speaker actually witnesses
Hakan’s, (10) expresses the speaker’s surprise.
(10)
Hakan gel-miş
Hakan came-evid
‘Hakan came!’
F Crucial observation: The speaker knows the proposition (Hakan
came) embedded under the evidential is true because the speaker
sees that it’s true or experiences that it is true
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
The unmarked use of a grammatical evidential
The marked use of an evidential: seeing is believing
Representations
Evidentials and the witnessing heuristic
(11)
I
Witnessing Heuristic (Peterson 2015)
If a speaker uses an indirect evidential in a direct evidence
context, then the evidential expresses surprise
Why is this called a heuristic and not a test?
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
The unmarked use of a grammatical evidential
The marked use of an evidential: seeing is believing
Representations
Not all evidentials implicate mirativity
(12)
ima-sh ga-naq,
rachak-shi kinra-n
kinra-n
what-rep be-3/a/s.mir toad-rep side-3.poss side-3.poss
ĉura-naka-ra-:ri-na(q)
ĉaski-yubay-si
place-recp-pfv-pl-3.a/s.mir relay.runner-cmpr-add
“What had actually happened? The toads had posted each other
on different spots along the track as in a relay-race.”
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
The unmarked use of a grammatical evidential
The marked use of an evidential: seeing is believing
Representations
Building representations
I
Why take this step? So we can isolate and abstract over the relevant
features that capture the observations
I
This way we can better observe the alternations that drive the
mirative use of an evidential
Basic logic can do this for us:
I
I
I
I
I
I
c is the context of the conversation between discourse participants
p is a ‘thought’ about something; it is the proposition represented by a
sentence; the semantic ‘core’
Ks (p) is a convenient representation of an attitude verb like know : a
speaker s knows p
Standard logical connectives ¬ ‘not’ and ∧ ‘and’
A predicate of evidence: evid(p) = the speaker has indirect evidence
for p in a context c
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
The unmarked use of a grammatical evidential
The marked use of an evidential: seeing is believing
Representations
A logical representation of an evidential sentence
I
I
’
When a speaker uses an evidential such as nakw,
we can say they
have evidence for a proposition, or evid(p)
’
The speaker uses the evidential (like nakw)
for making an inference
for p, and crucially, the speaker does not know p is in fact true or not
I
This lack of knowledge of the truth of p is represented logically as
¬Ks (p) ∧ ¬Ks (¬p)
I
In words: “It’s not the case that a speaker knows p and it’s not the
case that a speaker knows not p
I
More informally: the speaker doesn’t know p or not p
I
What this represents: a speaker doesn’t know if p is true or not
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
The unmarked use of a grammatical evidential
The marked use of an evidential: seeing is believing
Representations
A logical representation of an evidential sentence
I
We can turn this condition on the use of a grammatical evidential as
a felicity condition (cf. Searle etc.):
(13)
Felicity condition on the use of a grammatical evidential
In a sentence containing a grammatical evidential or modal, S
cannot know if p is true or not: ¬Ks (p) ∧ ¬Ks (¬p)
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
The unmarked use of a grammatical evidential
The marked use of an evidential: seeing is believing
Representations
A logical representation of an evidential sentence
(14)
p = Alvin arrived.
a. witxw=t Alvin
arrive=pd Alvin
‘Alvin arrived.’
Ks (p) = s knows p is true
’
b. nakw=hl
witxw=s Alvin
evid=cd arrive=pd Alvin
‘Looks like Alvin arrived.’
¬Ks (p) ∧ ¬Ks (¬p) = s knows neither p nor ¬p
evid(p) = The speaker has indirect evidence for p
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
The unmarked use of a grammatical evidential
The marked use of an evidential: seeing is believing
Representations
Applying the witnessing heuristic
(15)
Context: Gwen is preparing a surprise birthday party for Alvin. She
doesn’t expect him home for another hour. However, in the middle of
her preparations, Alvin walks through the door. Gwen says to Sheila
’
nakw=hl
witxw=s Alvin
evid=cd arrive=pd Alvin
‘Looks like Alvin arrived.’
p = Alvin arrived.
’
a. Non-mirative nakw:
¬Ks (p) ∧ ¬Ks (¬p) = s believes neither p nor ¬p
evid(p) = The speaker has indirect evidence for p
’
b. Mirative nakw:
Ks (p) = s knows p is true
evid(p) = The speaker has indirect evidence for p
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
I
The unmarked use of a grammatical evidential
The marked use of an evidential: seeing is believing
Representations
These logical representations reveal that mirative evidentials are
semantically identical as non-evidential sentences with regards to
speaker knowledge:
(16)
a. Non-evidential:
KS (p) = s knows p is true
b. Evidential:
¬Ks (p) ∧ ¬Ks (¬p) = s believes neither p nor ¬p
evid(p) = The speaker has indirect evidence for p
c. Mirative evidential:
Ks (p) = s knows p is true
evid(p) = The speaker has indirect evidence for p
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
The unmarked use of a grammatical evidential
The marked use of an evidential: seeing is believing
Representations
A closer look
(17)
Mirative evidential:
Ks (p) = s knows p is true
evid(p) = The speaker has indirect evidence for p
I
Questions: so what happens to evid(p)? How can a speaker have
indirect evidence in a direct evidence context?
I
Parsimony: nothing; we ‘misuse’ words all the time (metaphor,
irony, sarcasm, etc.)
I
I will return to this... (hint: it has to do with deixis)
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
Opening thoughts
Parasitic mirativity as functional markedness
Non-parasitic mirativity as formal markedness
An observation
I
Think of a sentence as representing a proposition:
(18)
I
p = Alvin is here
a. “Alvin’s here.”
b. “Alvin’s here!”
c. “Wow heeey, Alvin’s here!”
declarative: asserts (p)
exclamative: asserts (p)
exclamative: asserts (p)
and speaker is surprised at p
(17) b. and c. formally mark a sentence to register the surprise of
the speaker at this state of affairs
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
Opening thoughts
Parasitic mirativity as functional markedness
Non-parasitic mirativity as formal markedness
An observation
(19)
p = Alvin is here
a. witxw=t Alvin
arrive=pd Alvin
‘Alvin is here.’
’
b. nakw=hl
witxw=s Alvin
evid=cd arrive=pd Alvin
“Looks like Alvin is here.”
I
declarative: asserts (p)
evidential: asserts (p)
and evids (p)
In a context where Alvin is here (and everyone can see that he
is here) (18b) functionally marks a sentence to register the surprise
of the speaker at this state of affairs
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
Opening thoughts
Parasitic mirativity as functional markedness
Non-parasitic mirativity as formal markedness
Formal and functional markedness
I
What’s the difference?
I
Exclamatory intonational contours and expressives (or illocutionary
adverbs) always mean what they mean: surprise, regardless
(perhaps) of the context and the knowledge of the conversational
participants:
(20)
I
A. “Wow heeey, Alvin’s here!”
B. [In the next room out of sight] “What, are you surprised?
Didn’t you know he was coming home early?”
This is because “Wow heeey” always expresses surprise (cf. a
non-parasitic mirative): it formally marks a sentence S that espresses
a proposition p
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
Opening thoughts
Parasitic mirativity as functional markedness
Non-parasitic mirativity as formal markedness
Formal and functional markedness
I
What’s the difference?
I
Indirect evidentials always mean what they mean: the speaker
has indirect evidence for p
I
Only in direct evidence contexts can it function to implicate surprise
’
nakw
is functionally marked in a direct evidence context
I
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
(21)
Opening thoughts
Parasitic mirativity as functional markedness
Non-parasitic mirativity as formal markedness
The Mirativity Condition
A sentence S 0 is a formally or functionally marked alternative of S
such that both S 0 and S express the same proposition p in a
context c. If a speaker s knows or believes the proposition p
denoted by S 0 is true in c, then
a. a functionally marked S 0 is used by s with the intention
to express mirativity.
b. a formally marked S 0 is used by s to express mirativity.
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
(22)
Opening thoughts
Parasitic mirativity as functional markedness
Non-parasitic mirativity as formal markedness
p = Alvin arrived
S
Declarative:
witxw=t Alvin
arrive=pd Alvin
‘Alvin arrived.’
Ks (p) = s knows p in c
S0
Mirative (functionally marked evidential):
’
nakw=hl
witxw=s Alvin
evid=cd arrive=pd Alvin
‘Looks like Alvin arrived.’
Ks (p) = s knows p in c
evid(p) = The speaker has sensory evidence for p in c
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
(23)
Opening thoughts
Parasitic mirativity as functional markedness
Non-parasitic mirativity as formal markedness
Kemal gel-miş
Kemal came-evid
‘Kemal came.’
p = Kemal came.
a. Non-mirative:
(S)c = (23)
evid(p) = The speaker has indirect evidence for p in c
¬Ks (p) ∧ ¬Ks (¬p) = s does not know or believe p in c
b. Mirative:
(S 0 )c = (23)
evid(p) = The speaker has indirect evidence for p in c
Ks (p) = s knows p in c
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
(24)
Opening thoughts
Parasitic mirativity as functional markedness
Non-parasitic mirativity as formal markedness
Hare (DeLancey 1990, 1997, 2001, 2012)
S
júhye
sa k’ı́nayeda
hereabout bear sg.go.around.3sg.subj/perf
‘There was a bear walking around here.’
Ks (p) = s believes p in c
S
júhye
sa k’ı́nayeda
lõ
hereabout bear sg.go.around.3sg.subj/perf evid
‘I see there was a bear walking around here.’
¬Ks (p) ∧ ¬Ks (¬p) = s does not believe p in c
evid(p) = The speaker has indirect evidence for p in c
S0
heee, gúhde daweda!
ch’ifi dachı́da lõ
hey, up.there sg.sit.3sg.imperf. guy sitting evid
“Hey, he’s sitting up there! The guy is sitting up there!”
Ks (p) = s believes p in c
evid(p) = The speaker has sensory evidence for p in c
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
Opening thoughts
Parasitic mirativity as functional markedness
Non-parasitic mirativity as formal markedness
I
With non-parasitic miratives we should expect to find some lexeme or
other kind of grammatical marking of surprise
I
We can also help ourselves to a bit of logical notation, where a
formally marked mirative sentence is mir(S)
(25)
p = Alvin is here
a. “Alvin’s here.”
b. “Alvin’s here!”
c. “Wow heeey, Alvin’s here!”
Tyler Peterson
asserts (p) = S in c
asserts (p) and mir(S) = S 0 in c
asserts (p) and mir(S) = S 0 in c
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
(26)
Opening thoughts
Parasitic mirativity as functional markedness
Non-parasitic mirativity as formal markedness
p = Zara has come
a. Non-mirative (unmarked):
Zaara j-iena
Zara j-come.perf
‘Zara has come.’ (and she is still here I expected her to come)
(S)c = (26a)
Ks (p) = s knows p in c
b. Mirative (marked):
Zaara j-iena-q
Zara j-come.perf-mir
‘Zara has come!’ (I didn’t expect her to come).
mir(S) = (S 0 ) = (26b)
Bels (p) = s knows p in c
mir = s is surprised the information in c, and uses the morpheme -q to
formally mark the sentence S denoting p
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
Opening thoughts
Parasitic mirativity as functional markedness
Non-parasitic mirativity as formal markedness
p = Musa had picked the pears
(27)
Non-mirative evidential:
Muusa-s quorash
hwa-b-iax-na
xilliera
m.erg pear.pl.nom here-b-pick-cvbant cop.ppl
‘Musa had picked the pears.’ (I did not see the event, but I saw a
basket full of pears that he had picked)
(S) = (27)
evid(p) = The speaker has inferential evidence for p in c
¬Ks (p) ∧ ¬Ks (¬p) = s does not know p in c
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
Opening thoughts
Parasitic mirativity as functional markedness
Non-parasitic mirativity as formal markedness
p = Musa had picked the pears
(28)
Mirative (formally marked) and with evidential:
Muusa-s quorash
hwa-b-iax-na
xilliera-q
m.erg pear.pl.nom here-b-pick-cvbant cop.ppl-mir
‘Musa had picked the pears.’ (I did not see the event, but I saw a
basket full of pears and I was surprised)
mir(S) = (S 0 ) = (28)
evid(p) = The speaker has inferential evidence for p in c
¬Ks (p) ∧ ¬Ks (¬p) = s does not know p in c
mir = s is surprised at and/or unprepared for the new information
in c, and uses the morpheme -q to formally mark the sentence S
denoting p
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
(29)
Opening thoughts
Parasitic mirativity as functional markedness
Non-parasitic mirativity as formal markedness
p = Alvin’s here
a. Non-mirative:
(S)c = ‘Alvin’s here.’
Ks (p) = s knows p in c
b. Mirative:
mir(S)c = (S 0 ) = ‘Alvin’s here!’
Ks (p) = s knows p in c
mir = speaker is surprised at the information in c, and uses
exclamatory intonation (‘!’) to formally mark the sentence S
denoting p
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
Opening thoughts
Parasitic mirativity as functional markedness
Non-parasitic mirativity as formal markedness
Thinking more about English
I
A standard neo-speech act analysis of surprise, where an illocutionary
adverb such as surprisingly modifies the sincerity conditions of a
speech act:
(30)
I
Surprisingly, Alvin arrived on time.
p = Alvin arrived on time
illocutionary force = assert(p)
sincerity condition = The speaker is surprised that p
Is this adequate?
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
Opening thoughts
Parasitic mirativity as functional markedness
Non-parasitic mirativity as formal markedness
Applying this analysis
(31)
p = Alvin arrived on time.
a. Non-mirative:
(S)c = ‘Alvin arrived on time.’
Ks (p) = s knows p in c
b. Mirative:
mir(S)c = (S 0 ) = ‘Surprisingly, Alvin arrived on time.’
Ks (p) = s knows or believes p in c
mir = the speaker is surprised at the information in c, and
uses the adverb surprisingly to formally mark the sentence S
expressing p
I
Is this adequate? Does it make the right predictions?
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
Entailment and Implicature
Assent/dissent and embedding
I
The division of mirativity into parasitic and non-parasitic types is
essentially a semantically-based typology
I
Some of these terms (i.e. illocutionary force modifiers, speech act
meaning, expressives) already claim certain kinds of behaviours wrt
semantic testing
As such, it is either determined by or subject to the usual semantic
tests
I
I
I
I
I
I
Entailment
Implicature
Assent/dissent
Embedding and negation
Even if we don’t have the data, these – coupled with the witnessing
heuristic – can guide future investigations into mirativity
F So what might these look like?
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
Entailment and Implicature
Assent/dissent and embedding
The basic predictions
I
As specified in the categories that make up the typology:
I
I
I
Parasitic mirativity: surprise that is implicated (i.e. not entailed)
Non-parasitic mirativity: surprise that is encoded (i.e. perhaps
entailed?)
From another perspective:
I
I
Parasitic mirativity is the functionally marked use of an
evidential (for example) to implicate surprise
Non-parasitic mirativity: is formally marked surprise via
exclamatory intonational contour, expressives (for example)
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
Entailment and Implicature
Assent/dissent and embedding
The basic predictions
I
As such:
I
I
Parasitic mirativity should not result in a contradiction when
negated (for example)
Non-parasitic mirativity should result in infelicity if negated (for
example)
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
I
The (parasitic) mirative use of -miş does not result in a contradiction
when the surprised meaning is cancelled (i.e. ‘negated’):
(32)
I
Entailment and Implicature
Assent/dissent and embedding
[Kemal gel-miş]surprise implicated ,
Kemal came-evid
[ama ben o burada sürpriz değilim]surprise cancelled
‘Kemal came, but I’m not surprised he’s here.’
(Upon seeing Kemal walking through the door)
Result: the surprise meaning of -miş in a direct evidence context is
implicated, not entailed
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
I
The (non-parasitic) mirative intonational contour, plus exclamative
words in English result in infelicity (or at least weirdness):
(33)
I
Entailment and Implicature
Assent/dissent and embedding
[Wow heeey, Alvin’s here]surprise expressed ,
#[Not that I’m surprised or anything...]surprise
cancelled
This suggests that the surprised meanings of mirative intonational
contour and/or exclamative words are entailed
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
I
But what about other surprise ‘words’, such as the embedding verb
surprise:
(34)
I
Entailment and Implicature
Assent/dissent and embedding
[I’m surprised Alvin’s here]surprise expressed ,
#[Not that I’m surprised or anything...]surprise
cancelled
This is clearly a lexical entailment (as the contradiction shows), and
it could be used to probe surprise in other mirative-like words
(35)
[I’m amazed Alvin’s here]surprise expressed ,
#[Not that I’m surprised or anything...]surprise
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
cancelled
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
I
Entailment and Implicature
Assent/dissent and embedding
But there is more to this: lexical surprise can be displaced in time:
(36)
Context: two friends talking about Alvin showing up – uninvited –
to a party last night
[I was surprised Alvin was there]surprise expressed ,
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
I
Entailment and Implicature
Assent/dissent and embedding
Speakers of Gitksan and Turkish report that indirect evidentials in
these languages cannot be used at any other time than in the
immediate speech context
(37)
Context last night: two friends talking about Alvin showing up –
uninvited – to a party
’
witxw=s Alvin t’ahlaakw
nakw=hl
evid=cd arrive=pd Alvin yesterday
‘Looks like Alvin showed up yesterday.’
p = Alvin arrived last night
evids (p) = the speaker has sensory evidence for this
I
(37) can never be interpreted miratively
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
Entailment and Implicature
Assent/dissent and embedding
Questions
1. Does the provide another feature that can distinguish between
parasitic and non-parasitic mirativity?
Likely not: it seems weird to use exclamatory intonational contour
etc. (Wow heeey, Alvin’s here!) to express surprise about a past
event (unless you are ‘acting out’ or recreating the surprise for your
interlicutor)
2. Is the verb of surprise really about surprise?
I
Probably, but not always (emotion vs. emotive)
Possible generalizations:
1. parasitic mirativity is bound to the speech context
2. non-parasitic mirativity can be but is not necessarily bound to the
speech context
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
Entailment and Implicature
Assent/dissent and embedding
Mirativity at the illocutionary level
I
Linguistic material can contribute either to the propositional content
(i.e. as part of a modal) of an utterance, or to its illocutionary force
I
What we know about the behaviour of illocutionary adverbs and
expressive: because they are the level ‘above the propostion’ they
resist assent and dissent
I
Sincerity conditions are part of the logical structure of a speech act
I
Particles such as damn and frankly as expressing something of the
attitude or sincerity of a speaker towards the sentence it accompanies
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
Entailment and Implicature
Assent/dissent and embedding
Illocutionary Adverbs
(38) Damn(p)
illocutionary force = assert(p)
sincerity condition = The speaker is upset that p
(39) Frankly (p)
illocutionary force = assert(p)
sincerity condition = The speaker is being frank in expressing p
I
We typically cannot embed illocutionary operators like these in an
indirect speech context, nor challenge them.
I
Illocutionary adverbials such as frankly, honestly, and with attitudinal
adverbials such as unfortunately, sadly.
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
Entailment and Implicature
Assent/dissent and embedding
Illocutionary Adverbs
I
We cannot directly ‘challenge’ the content of an illocutionary adverb:
responses of “No! That’s not true.” target the propositional content
only:
(40) (i.)
A:
B:
(ii.) A:
B:
(iii.) A:
B:
I
Damn! Barbara forgot to put gas in the car again!
No! That’s not true. (6= you are not upset)
Frankly, my opinion is that Bruce should do it.
No! Not true (6= you are not being frank)
Surprisingly, Steve has improved his attitude.
No! Not true (6= you are not surprised)
The illocutionary adverb surprise behaves as we expect, but does it
still express surprise?
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
Entailment and Implicature
Assent/dissent and embedding
Illocutionary words of surprise
I
This a little harder to test with parasitic miratives, but the results
seem clearer with non-parasitic miratives
(41)
A. Wow, Steve is a good mood again!
B. That’s not true (6= you are not surprised)
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
I
Entailment and Implicature
Assent/dissent and embedding
’
Challenging judgments involving nakw
is also not possible. Assenting
’
or dissenting to a nakw-based
statement such as in (42) is not
possible:
’
(42) nakw=hl
siipxw-t
evid=cd sick-3
“He must be sick.”
’
a. *ee’e, nakw=hl
ap wilt
6= “Yes, it must be true.” (I agree because his face is all red.)
’
b. *needii nakw=hl
siipxwt-t
6= “No, he can’t be sick.” (I saw him at work today and he
looked fine.)
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
I
It is also well known that illocutionary adverbs cannot be embedded
within indirect discourse:
(43)
I
Entailment and Implicature
Assent/dissent and embedding
John said that wow, Steve is a good mood again!
At best, the exclamation/surprise can only be John’s and not the
speaker of the sentence
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar
Intro
The Witnessing Heuristic
Markedness and the Mirativity Condition
Back to the semantic tests
I
Entailment and Implicature
Assent/dissent and embedding
Not surprisingly, parasitic mirativity also cannot be embedded; for
example, Granny cannot report the speaker’s surprise:
(44)
’
a. nakw=hl
bakw=diit
evid=cd arrive.pl=3pl
“They’re here!”
“Look who’s here!”
“I see you’re here!”
’
b. #diya=t nits’iits’
nakw=hl
bakw=diit
say=pd grandmother evid=cd arrive.pl=3pl
#“Granny said they must be here(!)”
I
’
Incidently, nakw
cannot be embedded at all, even with it’s unmarked
’
evidential use (but this is special to nakw,
not all grammatical
evidentials...
Tyler Peterson
Mirativity seminar