Explosive safety management and risk analysis
Symposium 2
Diversification of use of explosives and ammunition
Fireworks vs prompt
sympathetic detonation
MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA
SEGRETARIATO GENERALE DELLA DIFESA E
DIREZIONE NAZIONALE DEGLI ARMAMENTI
Direzione degli Armamenti Terrestri
Ten.Col. ing. s. SM Dario PORFIDIA
Roma, 23/11/2016
NON CLASSIFICATO
AGENDA
 AIM
 National regulations
 Safety
 Formulae
 Safety and Munitions Risk Management
 Conclusions
2/39
1
AIM
Different critical factors concerning the factories where
fireworks are manufactured
• inconsistencies in the national regulations about this
sector
• technical dichotomies
• dispersion of skills
• inadequate communication and coordination among the
many institutions involved
WHY
WHAT
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
CONCLUSION
3/39
THAT SHOULD NOT HAPPEN
Enschede_ esplosion of fireworks
factory 13. 05. 2000
Tagliacozzo_ explosion of
fireworks factory 09.07.2011
WHY
WHAT
The aim of this work is to introduce my studies
and my personal opinion on the reasons about
the presence of so strong consequences on
infrastructures and manpower. As we can see
from these pictures is obvious that we had not
a domino effect, but something different and
so strong to destroy everything and the
persons were killed with bodies blown to
pieces for a couple hundred yards . And that
should not happen
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
CONCLUSION
4/39
2
Prompt Sympathetic Detonation Phenomena
Sympathetic detonation
Propagation of an explosion (e.g. stack to stack), with sufficient
time delay between reactions, with the result being that
coalescence (e.g. joining) of blast pressure waves does not
occur. The result is that each explosion is viewed as a separate
event, with its own QD.
Prompt Sympathetic Detonation
Propagation of an explosion (e.g. stack to stack), without
sufficient time delay between reactions, with the result being
coalescence (e.g. joining) of the two or more blast pressure
waves into a single pressure wave similar to one that would
have been generated by a single explosion involving the
combined NEQ at all the reacting munitions.
NEQ : Net Explosive Quantity
WHY
WHAT
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
CONCLUSION
5/39
CONCLUSION
6/39
MUST HAPPEN
WHY
WHAT
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
3
KEY SOLUTION
Factories where ‘fireworks’ are produced are particularly
safety-sensitive.
An accidental explosion of a depot can have several
effects
Quantity Risks Analysis is the key
due to the presence of civilian and definitely to
sustainability including effect on the environment
WHY
WHAT
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
CONCLUSION
7/39
Safety distance
Safety distances take into account the consequences of an
inadvertent event. These distances provide the minimum
“acceptable” level of protection to surrounding exposures.
The Safety Distance between storage sites is the minimum
distance to avoid sympathetic detonation
The major risks associate with blast or explosives on fire
are:
- Blast overpressure
- projection of part of unexploded material
- Debris from the storage facility
- Thermal effects
- Ground shock
WHY
WHAT
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
CONCLUSION
8/39
4
Definitions
ES
ES
Perimeter of the explosive facility
PES
ES
Separation Distance
WHY
WHAT
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
CONCLUSION
9/39
Mechanism
CNAD: Conference of National Armaments Directors
Ammunition Safety Group
ASG
SG C
Logistic Committee LC–
LC Executive Group LCEG
ESMRM
Explosive Safety Munitions
FF.AA.
Risk Management
ESMRM:
Logistica
NATO
TULPS
Consolidated Text of Public Safety Laws
WHY
WHAT
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
CONCLUSION
10/39
5
Mechanism
CNAD:
ASG
SG C
ESMRM:
Logistica
NATO
Legislazione
Nazionale
TULPS
Evoluzione della
Logistica
Nazionale
WHY
WHAT
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
CONCLUSION
11/39
First Critical Aspect
Contradictions in terminology, classification, and
prescriptions included in the main piece of legislation
Consolidated Text of Public Safety Laws (TULPS- 1939)
1. Explosives are divided into 5 categories based on their
chemical/physical properties
2. safety distances and the maximum quantity of
explosive (Q) allowed for storage. The safety distance
from the depot is determined based on the principle of
mitigation of the effects of an explosion as related to
squared distance from the origin
WHY
WHAT
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
CONCLUSION
12/39
6
Obsolete formulae vs scientific one
Scientifically speaking, the multiplication by the square
root is no longer consistent with current international
regulations, according to which, the effects of a blast are
mathematically represented by the cubic root of the mass
of explosive as the physical representation of a spherical,
three-dimensional blast wave
Z is a coefficient that links the pressure curve and distance;
It determines what the value of pressure is at a certain
distance once Q is known and therefore determines the
effects
WHY
WHAT
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
CONCLUSION
13/39
Obsolete formulae vs scientific one
Overpressure has been translated into mathematical
formulas by several authors, as a result of experimentation
as referred to TNT. Applicability of these formulas to other
types of explosives is based on the relation with what is
know as TNT equivalent, which is a function of
thermodinamical data of the explosive material being used.
[kPa] with 1.0 <Z<10
(Baker, Du Pont, Henrych)
WHY
WHAT
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
CONCLUSION
14/39
7
Dichotomy
The Italian classification of explosives for transport is
made based on UN recommendations concerning the
transportation of dangerous goods, as adopted with
legislative decree 27 January 2010, no. 35. The
international System for the classification of dangerous
goods includes all hazardous materials. These are broken
down into nine classes, Class 1 being Explosives.
Following careful research, all EU and non-EU countries
classify materials for transportation and storage
according to the risk (dangerousness) they represent.
UN: International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG)
WHY
WHAT
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
CONCLUSION
15/39
Hazard division classification vs Real Consequences
With Hazard division classification and its empirical meaning we can have
the specific effects on and damages to people and things. Just for the sake
of example, given HD=1.1, the value of Z used to calculate the distance of
housing from depots is equal or higher than 22.2, which corresponds to a
maximum pressure of 5kPa. This would cause negligible damage and low
probability that glass windows break. The distance of laboratories from
storage sites is calculated with Z = 8, which corresponds to a pressure peak
of 21kPa, i.e. severe injuries to personnel.
In IATG there is a table where
Z=8
is reported the linkage Z, P
and consequences;
TULPS do not establish any relation between Z (o K) values and the
pressure spike in the site involved.
WHY
WHAT
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
CONCLUSION
16/39
8
Dichotomy
Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 on classification, labelling
and packaging of substances and mixtures. Introduces the
GHS classification system in Europe (Globally Harmonized
System) regarding dangerous substances and mixtures.
Directive 2003/105/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 16 December 2003 amending Council
Directive 96/82/EC on the control of major-accident
hazards involving dangerous substances - Legislative
Decree n° 238 of 21 September 2005 (the so-called Seveso
III). It must be used the “quantitative risk analysis”
As far as dangerousness is concerned, explosive materials
has classified as ADR , in Hazard Divisions.
WHY
WHAT
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
CONCLUSION
17/39
Definition of Threshold Values
The relevant literature provides tables that associate
damage/effects to overpressure.
• National Fire Protection Association NFPA
• The Decree of the Ministry of Public Works dated 9 May
2001 establishes threshold values for territorial planning
in municipalities where plants entailing major accident
risk are located.
• Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers dated
25 February 2005 on the guidelines for the definition of
an external contingency plan
WHY
WHAT
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
CONCLUSION
18/39
9
Mathematical comparison: HD 1.1
0,08-0.14 bar
0,34 bar
WHY
WHAT
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
CONCLUSION
19/39
Definition of Threshold Values
The relevant literature provides tables that associate
damage/effects to overpressure.
• National Fire Protection Association NFPA
• The Decree of the Ministry of Public Works dated 9 May
2001 establishes threshold values for territorial planning
in municipalities where plants entailing major accident
risk are located.
• Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers dated
25 February 2005 on the guidelines for the definition of
an external contingency plan
WHY
WHAT
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
CONCLUSION
20/39
10
Definition of Threshold Values
The threshold value for initial fatality in manufacturing
facilities due to the constant presence of staff is 0.14 bar
(14kPa). These values can only be associated to formulas
indicating the cube root trend of the quantity of explosive.
Furthermore, internal distances, in particular distances
related to laboratories, are undersized, which makes the
danger of a potential domino effect far from negligible (P=
0,3 bar; P=30kPa).
WHY
WHAT
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
CONCLUSION
21/39
Definition of Threshold Values
The analysis was carried out by applying the
aforementioned formula Henrych, whose values of the
overpressure refer to TNT; the same to be applied to
materials other than TNT, they need to be multiplied by a
factor called "TNT equivalent TNT = RE", obtained
experimentally by comparing the values of the
thermodynamic parameters obtained during the explosion
(the ratio of the heat of the explosion TNT, and the artifact
in evaluation). For Fireworks in the literature it is taken as
the 0.7 TNT RE value in the presence of the material FLASH
100 kg ~70 kg
WHY
WHAT
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
CONCLUSION
22/39
11
Definition of Threshold Values
The majority of air blast and impulse equations predict for
TNT, and it is therefore desirable to convert the explosive
mass into equivalent TNT charge mass.
MTNTe = (Edexp/EdTNT) . Mexp
MTNTe = TNT
Equivalent Mass (kg)
Edexp = Specific Detonation Energy of Explosive (J/kg)
EdTNT = Specific Detonation Energy of TNT (J/kg)
Mexp = Mass of Explosive (kg)
WHY
WHAT
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
CONCLUSION
23/39
Definition of Threshold Values
[kPa] with 1.0 <Z<10
01,300
01,200
01,100
01,000
00,900
00,800
00,700
00,600
P over= 0,3bar; D=21m; Z=5,1
00,500
P over= 0,14bar; D=34m; Z=8,2
00,400
00,300
P over= 0,07bar; D = 56m; Z=13,6
00,200
00,100
00,000
10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58
WHY
WHAT
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
D [mt]
CONCLUSION
24/39
12
Mathematical comparison: HD 1.1
What is the difference?
What happen for internal distance?
QD~1/2
D min 20 meters; K=0.3; Q=4.444 kg
D min 20 meters; K=0.4; Q=2.500 kg
QD~1/3
D min 20 meters; K=2.4; Q= 580kg (Inter-Magazine Distance)
D min 20 meters; K=8; Q= 0 (Process Building Distance)
One order less! Could be that the cause for the prompt
sympathetic detonation effect
WHY
WHAT
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
CONCLUSION
25/39
Mathematical comparison
• Internal distance between some types of structures, laboratory,
the formulas TULPS (square root) is much shorter than the
distance obtained using “cubic root” formulas. Therefore, IATG
provides better safety, given the greater internal distance
between sites.
• External distance are much longer in the case of TULPS versus
the IATG. But don’t forget that for internal storage sites the
TULPS does not provide for the same safety, but distance is
shorter and Q is higher. So external distance is not real safety.
• In case of explosives belonging to Hazard Divisions 1.2 and 1.3,
the IATG envisages minimum internal distance, i.e. 60 and 40
meters. Below such distances, Q is zero.
• Hazard Divisions 1.4 follows the principles to calculate fire load
in infrastructures
WHY
WHAT
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
CONCLUSION
26/39
13
Qualitative vs Quantitative Risk Assessments
International Labour Organization (ILO) - safety in the
workplace
the “Consolidated Text on health and safety in the
workplace”, namely legislative decree no. 81 (XI) of 9
April 2008
 Qualitative method is
used:
 Quantitative method
Descriptive
should be used:
Measurable
or
Calculable
WHY
WHAT
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
CONCLUSION
27/39
CONCLUSION
28/39
Qualitative Risk Assessments
WHY
WHAT
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
14
Qualitative Risk Assessments
WHY
WHAT
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
CONCLUSION
29/39
CONCLUSION
30/39
Qualitative Risk Assessments
WHY
WHAT
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
15
Risk Management
Residual
Risk 1
1 – As Low As Reasonably Practicable
(ALARP)
WHY
WHAT
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
CONCLUSION
31/39
Risk Management
1.
Hazard
Identification
5. Risk
Tracking
2. Risk
Analysis
3. Risk
Control
Plan
4. Risk
Approval
is a continuous, sequential approach that applies a
consistent methodology to identify and minimize the risk.
WHY
WHAT
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
CONCLUSION
32/39
16
Quantitative Risk Assessments
Risk Communication
Risk Acceptance
Risk Reduction
Risk and ALARP
evaluation
“Risk
Assessment”
Hazard
Identification
Risk
Estimation
WHY
Risk
Management
Risk
Analysis
WHAT
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
CONCLUSION
33/39
Risk Estimation
Risk = Probability x Consequence
 Consequence analysis:
• The physical effects of such an explosion
• The number of casualties to be expected
• The levels of damage to be expected
WHY
WHAT
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
CONCLUSION
34/39
17
Risk and ALARP Evaluation
 Compare:
• Estimated effects of human fatalities
• Estimated effects of human injuries
• Financial costs
• Political impact
 Against what is tolerable in society
If tolerable and ALARP, further action may not be necessary
WHY
WHAT
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
CONCLUSION
35/39
Effect of Package
Be Attention
Effect of Package on Classification
• packaging may have a decisive effect on the
classification
• classification is determined for each
configuration in which are stored or transported
• a significant change in the packaging (e.g.
degradation) may affect the classification
WHY
WHAT
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
CONCLUSION
36/39
18
Effects of Containing
Be Attention
Containing item creates a more significant explosion!
Within the container: pressure increases, so temperature
increases, which results in an increase in pressure = a
reciprocal effect. ‘Contained’ explosion will usually be
significantly more powerful than an uncontained one
Caution should be exercised when fireworks contain
compositions with a metallic fuel and oxidizers such as per
chlorates, or when the storage building adds to
confinement. The worst cases are to be expected with large
quantities of loose compositions with these ingredients and
when under confinement, such as in ISO containers
WHY
WHAT
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
CONCLUSION
37/39
CONCLUSION
38/39
The levels of tolerable risk
WHY
WHAT
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
19
Conclusion
Norms in this sector should be
updated
to
smooth
out
shortcomings and discrepancies.
Directives should be issued to
apply risk management (quantity
process) to fireworks plants and
stacks, in view of just one result:
certify that all precautions have
been adopted to decrease risk as
much as possible. It should be
done a specific assessments case
by case basis because….
“An Event hasn’t happened yet, it
not mean that it will never
happen”
WHY
WHAT
HOW
CALL TO ACTION
CONCLUSION
39/39
QUESTIONS
?
If we exchange a coin will have both a
coin!
if we exchange an idea we'll both have
two ideas!!
Ten.Col. ing. s. SM Dario PORFIDIA
Direzione Armamenti Terrestri
[email protected]
Tel. +39 06469133159
20