ENVSEC Initiative
Environment and Security Initiative: Transforming
Risks into Co-operation
Central Asia
Ferghana – Osh – Khudjand Area
BACKGROUND PAPER
DISCLAIMER
This report was prepared for the purpose of providing background information,
by: Luigi De Martino, with contributions of Viktor Novikov, Diana Rizzolio,
Dominique del Pietro (UNEP). Additional comments and valuable inputs were
received from Gianluca Rampolla del Tindaro (OSCE), Inkar Kadyrzhanova
(UNDP), Nickolai Denisov, Otto Simonett (UNEP).
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect those of the UN or the OSCE. The designations employed
and the presentations do not imply the expression of any opinion on the part
of the three agencies concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city
or area of its authority, or delineation of its frontiers and boundaries.
2
Disclaimer ............................................................................................ ....................................2
1.1
Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 5
1.2
About the ‘Environment and Security’ Initiative ........................................................................ 5
1.3
About this paper ....................................................................................................................... 8
1.4
Understanding the links between environment and security .................................................... 8
2.
Regional Environment and Security Overview ....................................................................... 11
2.1
Political and Security Factors................................................................................................. 12
2.2
Economic Factors .................................................................................................................. 13
3.
The Ferghana Triangle: Issues and Hotspots ........................................................................ 15
3.1
Water ..................................................................................................................................... 16
3.1.1
Water Issues in the Ferghana Valley: what is the relevant level? .......................................... 19
3.1.2
Conclusions Water Cluster..................................................................................................... 26
3.2
Land ....................................................................................................................................... 27
3.2.1
Conclusions Land Cluster ...................................................................................................... 32
3.3
Industrial and Nuclear Wastes ............................................................................................... 33
3.3.1
Conclusions Industrial Wastes ............................................................................................... 38
3.4
Cross-Cutting Issues.............................................................................................................. 38
3.4.1
Natural Disasters.................................................................................................................... 38
3.4.2
Impact of Global Climate Change .......................................................................................... 40
3.4.3
Other Issues........................................................................................................................... 41
4.
The Ferghana Valley and the Prospect for Conflicts .............................................................. 42
3
MAPS and BOXES
Map – ENVSEC regions of concern.......................................................................................................... 7
Table- Security promoting vs. Insecurity Promoting Mechanisms............................................................ 8
Box - Livelihood Definition......................................................................................................................... 9
Box - Mobilizing young men .................................................................................................................... 11
BOX - The Ferghana Valley .................................................................................................................... 12
Box - Labour Migration............................................................................................................................ 15
Map - Areas of concern of the Ferghana Valley..................................................................................... 16
Box -The Water – Energy Nexus (World Bank, 2004)............................................................................ 17
Map - Water management in Central Asia (Source: UNEP/GRID).......................................................... 18
Box - Water Wars.................................................................................................................................... 20
Map – Water Cluster Locations............................................................................................................... 20
Table - Water – Logging, Raising groundwater...................................................................................... 21
Box - Irrigation in Central Asia ............................................................................................................... 22
Table – Water Availability and Access to Water...................................................................................... 23
Box - Agriculture in Uzbekistan ............................................................................................................... 24
Table – Water Quality and Water Pollution ............................................................................................. 25
Box - Batken ........................................................................................................................................... 28
Map - Ferghana Valley Population Density Map. Source: Reliefweb, October 2003 .............................. 28
Table: Land Cluster................................................................................................................................. 29
Map- Land Issues and Problem Areas .................................................................................................... 30
Box - Walnut-fruit forests......................................................................................................................... 31
Box – Protected Areas ............................................................................................................................ 32
Map - Radioactive, chemical and biological hazards in Central Asia (UNEP/GRID) .............................. 33
Table – Radioactive wastes hotspots...................................................................................................... 34
Table – Industrial Wastes Hotspots ........................................................................................................ 35
Map- Industrial Activity Problem Areas ................................................................................................... 36
Map – Oil and Gas Resources in the Ferghana Area ............................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
Map- Industrial Locations and Recurrence of Natural Disasters ............... Error! Bookmark not defined.
Box – Natural Disasters in the Ferghana Valley...................................................................................... 39
Map – Impact of Climate Change in the Central Asian Mountains .......................................................... 40
Box- Climate Change Scenarios for Central Asia ................................................................................... 41
Table – Summary Environment and Security Links ................................................................................ 42
Map - Ferghana valley: Environment and Security Hotspots, All Clusters ............................................. 44
4
1.1
Introduction
Central Asia, a region at the crossroad between Asia, Europe and the Middle East.
Osh, Kokand, Ferghana and Khudjand are names that bring to mind the ancient Silk
Road.
This paper focuses on the Ferghana valley, still the centre of Central Asia and
presently shared between three countries – Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan –
emerged as sovereign states after the breakdown of the Soviet Union.
From the different perspectives that one could use to look at the Ferghana valley, this
paper takes linking the environment and security. After presenting the “Environment
and Security” Initiative, a joint undertaking of three organisations: the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), we
will deal with the theory used for looking at the links between security and
environment. In the second chapter the paper will analyse the overall political and
economical framework in Central Asia, pointing out the main trends affecting the
situation in the Ferghana valley. The third chapter will be dedicated to the analysis of
the regional situation and to the discussion of the different clusters that compose the
environment and security dimension in the Ferghana valley.
The present document will be used as an input to stimulate the discussion for
activities in the Ferghana – Osh – Khudjand area during the next phase of the
“Environment and Security” initiative in Central Asia. In this sense, it would be
extremely interesting for the organisations at the origin of this paper to receive
feedback and reaction from its readers.
1.2
About the ‘Environment and Security’ Initiative
Acknowledging the multifaceted character of environmental sources of human
insecurity, three organizations with different mandates, expertise, and networks —
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP), and the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) — joined together to form the Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC).
Among the array of environment-security interactions, ENVSEC seeks to identify and
map those situations where environmental problems threaten to generate tensions –
among communities, countries or regions, where for example:
-
Water or air pollution in one community is a source of insecurity in another;
-
Allocation or use of land resources creates instability between neighbouring
regions;
-
Environment can be (perceived as) a means of control and persuasion of one
country over another (upstream – downstream relations)
At the same time, ENVSEC looks at situations where environmental cooperation may
help build common understanding on other more general issues. For example, joint
collection of data or management of a cross-border nature reserve will not
immediately reduce insecurity per se, but may help to build trust and strengthen
relations. Ultimately, it is believed that transboundary environmental cooperation can
contribute to peace building1.
1
Conca, K. and Dabelko, G. Environmental Peacemaking. Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2002.
5
By providing a framework for cooperation on local and cross-border environmental
issues, ENVSEC seeks to promote mutual confidence and peace. It builds on the
combined strengths and field presence of the lead organizations to perform three key
functions: assessing vulnerability and monitoring environment and security linkages;
building capacity and developing institutions; and developing, implementing, and
advocating integration of environmental and security concerns and priorities in
international and national policy-making.
Identification of environmental sources of human insecurity and of opportunities for
cooperation are the foci of ENVSEC assessment work. These assessments seek to
identify areas of priority for action by the partner organisations and affected
communities. ENVSEC uses a regional approach because many potential sources of
environmental conflict and threats to human security can only be approached from a
multilateral perspective.
The pilot phase of the initiative in 2003 assessed environmental threats in Central
Asia and South-Eastern Europe, two regions where environmental concerns have
clear security implications. (The Southern Caucasus joined later in 2004.) The work
began by identifying through consultation with national and regional stakeholders the
priority environment and security issues and situations. The subsequent stage moves
to the local level in the regions and countries, when specific hot spots will be
evaluated and inter-agency interventions designed for the following years.
The Environment and Security Initiative is governed by a Memorandum of
Understanding, signed in 2003. A Programme Management Unit located at UNEP in
Geneva coordinates all operations, fund-raising and reporting of the initiative.
NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division joined the Initiative as an associate in 2004. The
ENVSEC Management Board, consisting of senior members of the respective
organisations, approves strategic direction and fund allocation.
6
Map 1 – ENVSEC regions of concern
National Governments are strongly represented in the ENVSEC process through
partnerships with all three founding organisations. Ministries of Foreign Affairs and
Ministries of the Environment have given their firm endorsement to the ENVSEC
approach at the 5th Environment for Europe Conference in Kyiv, at the OSCE’s
Economic Forum in Prague, at the OSCE Maastricht Ministerial Council and at other
international and regional fora.
Everyday links with national Governments are maintained through UNDP’s and
OSCE’s networks of country missions as well as through National Focal Points
appointed by the Governments and typically representing Ministries of Foreign Affairs
and the Environment. During implementation of specific projects, national intersectoral working groups are established in host countries. ENVSEC activities are
also coordinated with ongoing policy processes, including the implementation of the
Environmental Strategy for Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia (EECCA)
launched in Kyiv in 20032.
The academic community and civil society organisations are involved in national and
regional scoping consultations, make part of country working groups and participate
in specific project activities. On the international level, ENVSEC maintains links with
research and policy organisations with relevant expertise.
2
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/49/30917886.pdf
7
1.3
About this paper
The present report has been prepared in order to provide background material on the
links between environment and security in a specific region of post-Soviet Central
Asia, the Ferghana – Osh – Khudjand area also identified as the Ferghana valley.
The paper draws from a number of different sources including:
Academic research;
Reports by international and local organisations working in Central Asia on
relevant issues;
News pieces published in different media (newspapers, Internet);
Data from the UNDP Preventive Development Program (Early Warning
component) and from the database of the early warning project developed by
Swisspeace / FAST;
Results of the discussions conducted by a joint OSCE, UNEP, UNDP mission in
Central Asia in September 2004, and feedback received from the countries on the
preliminary versions of this document;
Outcomes of ENVSEC regional consultations in Ashgabad in February 03 as well
as national consultations in all countries in the course of 2003 were used as well.
1.4
Understanding links between environment and security
The links between environment and security are an issue of debate in the academic
community. This report is based on a specific, conflict-oriented approach to the
concept of environmental security and focuses on identifying the linkages between
environmental degradation and violent conflict in a given region, in this case the
Ferghana triangle.
Modern conflicts are complex and multileveled. In a recent review of environmental
security entitled “State of the Art Review of Environmental Security and Cooperation”
(Dabelko and Alii, 2000), the authors highlight the multiple stresses the may cause
insecurity and the types of resilience that promote security for individuals and groups:
Table 1. Security promoting vs. Insecurity Promoting Mechanisms
System
Security-Promoting Mechanisms
Economic
Wealth
Welfare Policies
Political
Law
Legitimate force
Cultural
Social Identity
Justice
Demographic
Low Birth Rate
Urbanization
Ecological
Life Support
Raw Materials
3
Source: Dabelko et al., 2000. in Maltais et al., 2003
Insecurity-Promoting Mechanisms
Poverty
Inequity
Corruption
Unlawful Use of force
Discrimination
Injustice
High Birth Rate
Rapid Population Flows
Scarcity
Diseases
Although still very broad in its scope, the table above underlines the necessity to look
at what are the problems and issues that lower the resilience of groups and societies
and make them more vulnerable to threats, including to the threat of violent conflict.
3
Maltais Aaron, Dow Kirstin, Persson Asa, Integrating Perspectives in Environmental Security, Stockholm, SEI, January 2003
available at www.sei.se
8
Unfortunately, the relations and the causalities between the above-mentioned factors
promoting insecurity are still an issue of debate. Empirically, it has been difficult to
demonstrate that either poverty or environmental factors, in and by themselves, are
strong determinants of conflict. However, recent research (Ohlsson: 2000) points out
that it is the loss of livelihoods that is the common denominator for many of the
internal conflicts of the last decades.
Livelihood Definition
Ohlsson (2000) argues that “while poverty
A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets
may be a near-endemic condition in certain
(stores, resources, claims, and access) and
societies, loss of livelihoods marks a rapid
activities required for a means of living.
transition from a previous stable condition of
Source: Chambers and Conway, 1992
relative welfare into a condition of poverty or
destitution”. It is the rapid process of change
resulting in a sudden fall into poverty that creates the potential for livelihood conflicts.
Losses of livelihoods have many causes in the contemporary world though mostly
related to job scarcity, population increase, and environmental degradation of key
resources such as water and arable land. Failures to meet such challenges create an
opportunity for political forces to build on the grievances of the society and mobilize
popular support that may under certain conditions become violent.
The losses of livelihood resulting from environmental scarcities of arable land and
water form a special case of growing importance. Although roughly half the human
population now at the turn of the century are living in cities, agriculture is still by far
the largest single source of livelihoods and income.
The rapid negative changes associated with the losses of livelihoods by eroding the
resilience of societies, i.e. their capacities to absorb shocks, increase their
vulnerability to tensions and even violent conflict. On the other hand, not all tensions
and conflicts become violent.
The Swiss Environment and Conflicts Project, based at the Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology, Zürich and the Swiss Peace Foundation, analysed more than 40 cases
of conflict, about half of which crossed the threshold of violent outcomes (Baechler,
1998, 1999) and concluded that environmentally-induced conflicts result in violence
only if and when some of the following five key situations coincide:
• Inevitable environmental conditions. Group survival is dependent on degraded resources
for which no substitutes are apparent and eventually the group faces an inevitable and
therefore desperate environmental situation
• Scarcity of regulatory mechanisms and poor state performance. When a political system is
incapable of producing certain social and political conditions, goals, such as sustainable
resource use, become unattainable. The scarcity is either due to a lack of state outputs
regarding resource management and livelihood security or due to a disruption of social
institutions designed to regulate access to resources
• Institutionalising the environment. The environment is instrumentalised or manipulated by
dominating actors to pursue specific group interests so that environmental discrimination
becomes an (ideological) issue of group identity
• Opportunities to build organizations and find allies. Actors organize themselves in political
settings – often behind a strong leader – and gain allies either from groups affected by similar
problems, from certain (fraternizing) factions of the elite, or from foreign groups such as
I(N)Gos
• Spillover from a historic conflict. Environmental discrimination occurs within the context
of an existing (historic) conflict structure and, as a result, the conflict receives new impetus
Source: Baechler, 1999: 32-33 in Maltais et al., 2003
9
The ETHZ/Swisspeace research team also found that violent conflicts that are in part
caused by environmental degradation are more likely to occur in marginal vulnerable
areas, typically arid plains, mountain areas with highland - lowland interactions, and
trans-national river basins (Baechler, 1999). Moreover, environmentally induced
conflicts are more likely to happen at intra-state rather than inter-state level.
After looking at the conditions that make violent, environmentally-induced conflict
possible, and at which regions are structurally more vulnerable to conflict, one should
look at what are the patterns of causation behind violent conflict.
Research carried out in Switzerland and in Canada (a research team at Toronto
University, led by Homer-Dixon, 1999, see Peace and Conflict Studies Program,
2003) highlighted the following processes:
•
The typical causal pathway to conflict involves dependency on natural capital and
discriminatory practices, in terms of unequal access to natural resources, causing
marginalization of a group, which in turn stimulates population movement (Baechler, 1998, 1999).
Environmental discrimination is the key mechanism and it is often related to a
modernization and development process with uneven distributive implications (Baechler,
1998, 1999).
•
According to the Canadian team, environmental scarcity arises when the quality and
quantity of renewable resources decreases (supply-induced scarcity), population grows
(demand-induced scarcity) and/or resource access becomes more unequal (structural
scarcity).
Degradation of renewable resources and population growth that cause unequal access to
resources may lead to a situation of ‘resource capture’ in which elites gain control over
scarce resources.
“Ecological marginalization” occurs when unequal resource access and population growth
combine to drive further degradation of renewable resources. Environmental scarcity, in turn,
can produce five types of social effects: constrained agricultural productivity; constrained
economic productivity; migration of the affected people; greater segmentation of society,
usually along existing ethnic cleavages; and disruption of institutions, especially the state. (in
Marais et al., 2003: 14).
10
Box - Mobilizing young men
“It is a common feature of livelihood conflicts that the
rank and file of most atrocious militias around the world
are filled by large cohorts of young men, who have been
subjected to a rapid devaluation of their expectations as a
result of loss of family livelihoods, and forced to accept a
much more lowly situation in society than they had been
led to believe they were entitled to, in their position as
men.
In such situations, and if they are unable to find
alternative livelihoods, in the cities, or in other sectors
than agriculture, young men are extremely easy to
mobilize in one or another movement, or even militia particularly if they are promised land, livelihoods, or
even just looting.
(…) The mobilization of young men, by scrupulous
leaders - or warlords - who of course have agendas of
their own, is regularly undertaken along ethnic lines”.
Source: Leif Ohlsson (2000a) text of the oral presentation
presented at the workshop "Poverty & Environment", the
UNDP/Sida conference on poverty reduction, Stockholm 20-21
November 2000, available at:
http://www.edcnews.se/Reviews/Ohlsson2000.html
When looking at the processes behind
conflict, one should identify the actors
with an incentive for violence. These
need to access resources that facilitate
mobilization and expansion of violence.
What is critical is not whether people
actually have reason to commit
violence, but what enables them to
carry it out in particular circumstances.
In their research, Collier and Hoeffler
(2001) argue that conflict may be
explained either by grievance or by
greed. They conclude that if we want to
understand the causes of
contemporary civil wars we should
focus less on explanations based on
grievances and look instead at the
greed of those who have an interest in
using violence to achieve their goals.
At the same time, societies are not
powerless when confronted with
conflict and have capacities to deal with it. Institutions, particularly political
institutions, can work to defuse conflict situations or they can fuel discontent through
repression, poor governance, corruption, and inefficiency. Finally, regional and global
factors can increase or decrease the possibility of conflict. When a variety of these
factors are in play, there will be windows of vulnerability, moments when events such
as elections, or even natural disasters, can trigger the outbreak of full-scale violence
2.
REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND SECURITY OVERVIEW
The situation of the Ferghana area can be understood only within the broader
context of the three countries whose regions constitute the valley, i.e. Kyrgyzstan,
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. In this chapter we will look at some of the overall trends
characterizing Central Asia after the end of the Soviet Union.
11
2.1
Political and Security Factors
BOX - The Ferghana Valley
With the breakdown of the Soviet
The Ferghana Valley is an intermountain depression in
Union and the accession to
Central Asia, between the mountain systems of the Tien-Shan
independence, the creation of an
in the north and the Gissar-Alai in the south. The Valley is
approximately 300 km long and up to 170 km wide and has
identity as a national state is one
an area of 22,000 sq km.”4 The location of the Ferghana
of the major challenges for Central
Valley makes it a separate geographic zone.
Asia. Already the Soviet Union
If geographically this zone is a single and non-separated area,
had promoted a sense of national
politically the Ferghana Valley presently subsumes three
identity and national
provinces of Kyrgyzstan – Osh and Jalal-Abad, and the
distinctiveness, at independence
recently created Batken, three provinces of Uzbekistan –
Andijan, Ferghana and Namangan in the center, and the Sogd
nationalism has been further
(formerly Leninabad) Province in Tajikistan, the southdeveloped so that the defence of
western end of the Valley.
perceived national interest
When the Ferghana Valley became part of the Russian
becomes the first reflex when
Empire in 1874, it continued to be treated as a single large
dealing with issues of regional
administrative unit and remained territorially much the way it
relevance. As a consequence, the
had under the Kokand Khanate (Ethnic divisions were not the
primary means of demarcation.
Central Asian states have so far
The 1917 revolution and the subsequent creation of the USSR
given in principle preference to
led to great changes in Central Asia. Beginning in 1924, the
bilateral, case-by-case solutions.
region was divided according to new administrative borders,
This has exacerbated competition
creating "national" republics that contained large
among regional actors and
populations of non-titular nationalities: Uzbeks in
Kyrgyzstan, Tajik in Uzbekistan, and so forth. If these
diminishes the impact of regional
populations existed in large enough numbers outside their
cooperation institutions and
own "national" republic, they won some level of autonomy.5
initiatives. On the other hand, so
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, these largely
far case-by-case mechanisms
administrative dividing lines became international borders.
have been able to prevent
interstate crises to escalating to open conflict.
Independence has also meant the necessity to determine and stabilise the complex
national borders inherited from tsarist and Soviet administrations. The presence of
seven enclaves located in the Ferghana valley increases the complexity of the border
question. If on the one hand the states have solved the main questions linked to the
border delimitation with China and Russia, on the other hand several unsolved
questions related to border delimitation and demarcation processes are straining the
relations between the Central Asian states.
Armed incursions from opposition groups harboured in neighbouring countries, the
penetration of trans-national organised crime networks (drugs, arms, human being
trafficking), the alleged success of radical Islamic organisations such as the Hizb-utTahrir mostly in the areas of the Ferghana valley have contributed to strengthening
the perception of insecurity of the Central Asian regimes. Hence stability and security
is on the top of the political agenda. The Central Asian states as well as their main
neighbours and the USA share a similar interest in security. This interest has been
reinforced by the “war on terrorism” after the US-led intervention in Afghanistan.
The states of Central Asia have used multilateral regional organisations such as the
CAEU6, the CIS Security Treaty and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in order
to strengthen their cooperation in fighting terrorism, extremism and trans-border
organised crime. At the same time, the legitimate need to establish state control over
the new national territory combined with the above security agenda have pushed the
4
Central Asia Monitor, Issue 1,1992, Washington USA, p.57
Douglas Goudie, “An overview of the Ferghana Valley,” Perspectives on Central Asia, Volume 1, Number 1 January 1996,
Published by the Eisenhower Institute's Center for Political and Strategic Studies
6
The CAEU has been created in 1994 under the name of Central Asian Economic Community or CAEC by Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Tajikistan joined the organisation in 1998
5
12
states of the region to pursue unilateral policies supporting an increased militarization
of border areas such as the one in the Ferghana area.
Central Asian states are multicultural countries each of them with own minorities in
other states (including in China as well as presence of Chinese minorities –Uighurs7in Central Asia). Minorities’ management is not only an issue of concern within the
states but also between the states. The post-independence international borders
between sovereign states not only make the ordinary flows of goods and people
more problematic, but the boundaries are also contributing to creating or at least
reinforcing ethnic identities. Language and alphabet policies and changes not only
affect the relations of minorities with the titular state, but also contribute to the
fragmentation process marking present-day Central Asia.
The question of political transition and change is an issue of concern. All five Central
Asian countries are still governed by Soviet – era elites, that have a common
background and socialisation. This has plaid a positive role in averting crisis and
overcome tensions. At the same time, highly personalised and centralised politics
make inter-state relations dependent on the personal relations between the five
presidents and make the question of political change a very sensitive political issue.
2.2
Economic Factors
As the rationale of the common Soviet market and economic system has
disappeared, the Central Asian states have to find their own position in the global
market without the support of the redistributive role of the Soviet economy. Their
geographical position, landlocked between two economic “giants” such as China and
Russia, makes this task difficult especially for poor countries such as Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan. The five countries are differently endowed in terms of natural resources,
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan profiting mostly from their large energy resources (oil
and gas). The control of such reserves and of their transport ways are a key factor of
the interest of neighbouring states such as Russia and China as well as of global
players such as the USA.
Even though there is nominal support to economic reform policies the implementation
of such policies has varied in practice from one country to another, and even within
each country they differ from one region to another. The same situation has occurred
for issues such as land privatisation. This phenomenon has contributed to increase
the fragmentation of a region formerly characterised by an important integration in a
larger market, a unitary set of laws and regulations (the Soviet one) and benefiting
from the redistributive function of the Soviet economy.
Central Asia is a region producing raw materials that need to be transported over
long distances to reach markets as local ones are limited in size and purchasing
power. The creation of national borders and customs makes trade and transport
expensive and difficult. Restrictive border management policies and practices,
combined with legal and illegal levies and duties have a negative impact over trade
and living conditions in areas such as the Ferghana valley. Such practices favour
harassment, corruption and smuggling8 and strain relations between the population
and the border forces. Inter-state customs agreements have so far been ineffective.
All three economies are predominantly agricultural. Agriculture employs 67% of
7
The Uighur question is sensitive issue for the relations between China and Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
For example, the border closure has fuelled an important illegal economy between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan (smuggling of
fuel and cotton from Uzbekistan).
8
13
Tajikistan’s, 53% of Kyrgyzstan’s, and 45% of Uzbekistan’s labour force.9 They all
rely on primary exports (gold, aluminum, cotton), which exposes them to fluctuating
world prices, while the heavy reliance on cotton production and other kinds of crops
makes the economies extremely dependent on weather conditions and availability of
water for irrigation and arable land.
GDP growth doesn’t necessarily reduce poverty and
inequality10
In recent years, Central Asia has experienced the highest
growth rates in CIS countries.
After growing by 4.1% in 2002,11 Uzbekistan officially
expects 5.3% increment in GDP, although the EBRD has
lower expectations (2.5%).12
Kyrgyzstan’s growth has experienced a slump in 2002
(-0.5%).13 Growth is expected to pick up in 2003-4 (3%)
thanks to a surge in gold prices, but hampered by stalled
structural reform.14
Tajikistan had strong real GDP growth of 9.1% in 2002
and is expected to continue to record growth rates.
However, this is mainly because of the severity of its
post-independence decline. Growth is expected to fall to
6% in 2003-4, owing to sluggish or slow implementation
of structural reforms in both the agricultural and
industrial sectors and low capital investment.15
Despite its outstanding aggregate growth rates the region
suffers from serious poverty and inequality. Up to 60%
of the whole population of the Valley is defined as poor.16
The post-independence period has
seen a sharp decline of the output of
the Central Asian economies and a
subsequent fall in living conditions.
Poverty is widespread, especially in
rural areas. Many regions have
experienced breakdown of communal
services17. Just as an example, several
areas in the Ferghana valley, including
cities such as Andijan and Ferghana
experience regular power and gas cutoffs, which contributes to strained
relations between the population and
the local authorities becoming more
and more the target of local protest.
Only recently some of the countries
have shown signs of an improving
economic situation however high GDP
growth rates have not helped reducing
poverty and social inequalities.
The post-independence economic crisis has reinforced the economic disparities
between urban and rural areas and between regions, thus contributing to reinforcing
the horizontal inequality among population groups and regions. This process of
marginalisation of a number of sub-state regions bears the risk for these to become
“incubators of conflict” (ICG 2001).
Unemployment rate is high in all three countries especially among younger people
and in marginalised regions. OCHA estimates that unemployment is likely to be
around 10-20% for the Kyrgyz Republic, 30% in Tajikistan and 30-40% in
Uzbekistan. The steadily growing lack of jobs combined with the fact that in all three
countries almost half of the population is under 17 years old and will be entering the
workforce soon, driving up unemployment figures drastically18, produces a situation
where social unrest becomes a possible scenario
9
Data for Kyrgyzstan: EIU, Country Profile 2002: Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, p. 28. 2001 figures; provided by the Kyrgyz
National Statistical Committee. Data for Tajikistan: IMF, Republic of Tajikistan-Statistical Appendix, May 2001. For Uzbekistan:
EIU, Uzbekistan, Country Profile 2003, p.47
10
SOURCE OCHA, Ferghana
Valley, Early – Warning Analysis, September 2003, draft document, p.6
11
Oxford Analytica, Uzbekistan: IMF programme may speed liberalisation, 21 February 2003
EBRD Transition Report 2002
13
Data released by the Kyrgyz National Statistical Committee, quoted by EIU viewswire, Kyrgyz Republic: Economy: News
analysis, 14 Jul 2003
14
EIU ViewsWire: Kyrgyzstan, Country outlook, 25 Jun 2003
15
EIU ViewsWire, Tajikistan: Economy: News analysis, 21 May 2003
16
FEWER (2001): Early Warning Report on the Ferghana Valley, October 2001, p.15
17
The states of the region have been unable (or unwilling as in Turkmenistan) to maintain the previous levels of investment in the
social sector, especially in the education and health sectors.
18
Data as reported in OCHA (2004): Official statistics in the Kyrgyz Republic suggest an unemployment rate of 3% for 2001,
while the EIU suggests figures around 7-10%, multilateral agencies even 20%. EIU, Country Profile 2002, Kyrgyz Republic,
Tajikistan, p. 13. UNICEF reports an unemployment rate of 24.8% among age 15-24. UNICEF (2003), Year-end figures. At the
same time, 41% of the Kyrgyzstan’s population is under 17 and will soon be entering the workforce (source: ibidem)..
Unemployment in Tajikistan is officially reported at 2.3% in 2001 (source: ibid.) while ICG estimates unemployment to be over
12
14
Box - Labor Migration
In Kyrgyzstan an estimated 500’000 persons migrate
annually to Russia and Kazakhstan for work (10% of total
population; 25% of working population). Urban population
is the most likely to emigrate and account for more than
60% of total emigrants.
Thanks to the recent improved situation in the agricultural
sector, Osh and Jalal-Abad cotton sector is attracting more
and more unskilled daily labour from Uzbekistan despite
the difficulties in crossing the borders. Uzbeks are also
regularly moving to South Kazakhstan in search of
employment in the agricultural sector.
In Tajikistan, every year, an estimated 900’000 persons
(one third of the working population) migrate to Russia and
Kazakhstan for work.
Widespread poverty and
unemployment has triggered
important flows of internal migrations
from marginalised rural areas to
urban (especially to capitals).
A second coping mechanism has
been the important labour migration
to Russia of large numbers of
persons (mostly men). This has been
a major safety valve for the region,
especially for Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan
and more recently Uzbekistan.
If we now look at the mechanisms fostering insecurity discussed in chapter 1.4
above, one can see that not surprisingly the current situation in post-independence
Central Asia presents all the factors supporting insecurity.
The period after the accession to independence has seen a
rapid decline of the living conditions of large segments of the
population, a dramatic increase in poverty and inequality, the
breakdown of communal and social services, the emigration of
key minorities, the development of labour migration as survival
mechanism for entire regions. At the same time this process
has been accompanied by high birth rates, increased
economical and/or political marginalisation of groups (ethnic
minorities) and regions. Central Asian economies continue to
depend on raw materials extraction and agriculture.
3.
Mechanisms Fostering
Insecurity
Poverty
Inequality
Corruption
Unlawful Use of force
Discrimination
Injustice
High Birth Rate
Rapid Population Flows
Scarcity
Diseases
Ferghana – Osh – Khudjand: Issues and Problem Spots
The research of available sources of information, previous publications on the subject
and ENVSEC consultations have so far identified three main clusters of issues as
relevant for the environment and security dimensions in the Ferghana triangle:
access to and quality of water resources, access to and degradation of land, and
pollution from industrial facilities.
In the next pages the report will analyse these clusters and, making use of the
theoretical inputs presented above, will try to identify and prioritize specific locations
and issues that can be considered as “problem areas” or “hotspots” from and
environment and violent conflict perspective.
In the analysis particular attention will be given to the sub-national level and
especially to marginal vulnerable lands such as arid plains, mountain areas with
highland - lowland interactions and trans-national river basins. On the topographical
map below, the main areas of concern become clear. In blue the areas related to the
Syr-Darya basin and in red the hilly / mountain areas that represent the physical
30% (ICG (2003), Tajikistan: A Roadmap For Development, ICG Asia Report No. 51, 24 April 2003). 36.5% of persons age 1524 are registered unemployed (UNICEF (2003), ibid.. Year-end figures). Almost half (48.9%) of the population is under 17
years of age and will be looking for jobs soon (ibid.). In Uzbekistan as little as 0.4% of the workforce is registered as
unemployed, but 57.9% of age 15-24 have no job according to UNICEF. The Institute for Regional Studies in Bishkek reports
that in the Uzbek part of the Ferghana Valley as many as 35% of all able-bodied people under 25 were unemployed in 1999
(FEWER (2001): Early Warning Report on the Ferghana Valley, October 2001). Here too, 44.3% of the population is younger
than 17 years and will enter the labor force soon and drive unemployment figures up.
15
border of the Valley. These areas are interesting for their relations with the irrigated
plains of the Ferghana valley.
Transboundary
water basin
Border regions with
low-lands vs. high
lands relations
Map 2 - Areas of concern of the Ferghana Valley19
3.1
Water
For Central Asia, agriculture represents a mainstay of the economy and in the
economic crisis of the post-independence period it has gained even greater
importance. With agriculture almost entirely dependent on irrigation access to water
is of strategic importance.
The Syr Darya, formed by the confluence of two major tributaries - Naryn and KaraDarya - both originating in the Kyrgyz Republic, is one of the two major rivers serving
the Aral Sea basin and is the key water resource for the whole Ferghana Valley. With
a length of 2200 km it originates in the Tien Shan mountain of the Kyrgyz Republic,
passes through Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and South Kazakhstan and falls into the Aral.
In principle, the mountains of Central Asia are rich in water. Taking into account that
a country is considered a highly water-scarce country when annual water supplies
drop below 1,000 cubic meters per person, the situation in Central Asia is very
different between down- and upstream countries. In 1998 it has been evaluated that
annual water supplies were of 704 cubic meters per person for Uzbekistan and 232
for Turkmenistan. The situation in this case is quite critical. On the other hand, the
figures were of 4,484 for Kazakhstan, 11,171 for Tajikistan and 10,394 for
Kyrgyzstan (World Resources Institute, 1998: 305).
The water crisis in Central Asia is so far20 not a crisis of quantity but of distribution.
Although Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are the most upstream countries in
19
Source: Reliefweb, October 2003. Areas of concern highlighted by author.
20
In the future this situation may change when looking i.a. at the local impact of global climate change.
16
the Aral Sea basin, water withdrawals for these three countries totals 17%. The
picture for downstream states (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) is exactly
the opposite. Uzbekistan withdraws 52% of the total water, followed by Turkmenistan
(20%) and Kazakhstan (10%).
Water abstraction versus flow generation in Central Asia
The chart shows that there is a clear imbalance in water consumption. While
irrigation was practiced for over 2000 years in the river basin, it was only in the period
of Soviet rule, water was diverted from the river on a large scale through an
extensive irrigation infrastructure such as diversion dams, storage dams, canals,
distributaries and pumping stations to enable the irrigated cultivation of cotton,
fodder, wheat, fruits and vegetables.
Box -The Water – Energy Nexus (World Bank, 200421)
By the 1960s the diversion of water for irrigation from the Syr Darya river was so extensive (around 30
BCM) that in the dry years with lower flows, the irrigation needs were greater than the total flow in the
river. This necessitated the construction of the multi-year storage reservoir in the Kyrgyz Republic on
the Naryn river, the main tributary of Syr Darya, for the purpose of storing water in wet years and
releasing such stored water during the dry years for facilitating down stream irrigated cultivation both
during normal and dry years. This reservoir was also provided with hydroelectric generating sets for
producing electricity when water was being released. Four more reservoirs with limited pondage were
constructed down stream in the same Naryn river to produce electricity using the waters released from
Toktogul.
Under Protocol No.413 of 1984 of the Soviet government, in a normal year 75% of the annual
discharge from the reservoir was to be made in summer (April-September) and discharges in winter
(October-March) at 180 m3/second should not exceed the remaining 25%. Surplus electricity generated
in summer was fed into the Central Asian Power System for use by Uzbek and south Kazakh regions.
Since Kyrgyz region lacked any significant resources of fossil fuels, they were transferred from Uzbek
and Kazakh regions to enable Kyrgyz region to meet its winter demand for electricity and heat.
Once these regions became independent states, the above arrangement came under a great strain. Fossil
fuel prices rose quickly to world price levels and payments were often demanded in hard currency.
Customers quickly switched from expensive fossil fuel fired heating to electric heating, increasing
winter electricity demand. The Kyrgyz Republic could not afford to import fossil fuels and started to
increase winter discharges of water to meet its winter power demand and reduce summer releases to
store water for the following winter. During 1990-2000, the summer releases declined to 45% and
winter releases increased to 55% of the annual discharges.
21
WORLD BANK, Water Energy Nexus, Improving Regional Cooperation in the Syr Darya Basin, Washington, January 2004
17
To solve this problem of the competing (and now international) claims on the water, the Central Asian
States entered into an agreement in February 1992 to maintain and adhere to the Soviet era
arrangements. This, as well as other agreements22 for the release of water and exchange of electricity
and fossil fuels proved ineffective and could not arrest the increasing power orientation of the Toktogul
operation. The issue of compensating Kyrgyzstan for for water storage services remained open.
Moreover, even when agreed summer discharges were made, supply of fossil fuels fell short of agreed
quantities, forcing the Kyrgyz Republic to increase winter discharges. In wet years downstream states
did not need the agreed volumes of summer discharges and this affected the export of electricity and
the compensating quantities of fossil fuel transfers to the Kyrgyz Republic. The latter was thus exposed
to a serious risk in terms of timing for meeting its winter demand for heat and power.
Map 3 - Water management in Central Asia
The problems related to the water – energy nexus along the Syr- Darya have already
been a caused a number of incidents since independence. In 1993, in 1998, in 2001,
and in 2004 Kyrgyzstan was blamed for releasing too much water from the Toktogul
dam during winter and not enough during summer. Farmers in Uzbekistan and south
Kazakhstan faced irrigation water shortages in summer and the frozen waterways
and canals being unable to handle the larger volume of water in winter resulting in
either flooding of small towns and arable lands or diverting them wastefully into a
series of depressions which formed the artificial lake called Aydarkul, with adverse
environmental consequences.
22
Annual agreements as well as the Long Term Framework Agreement in March 1998,
18
Looking at the water vs. energy equation, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have so far
been able to hammer out agreements with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to swap fossil
fuels for water. However the terms of trade in water for fuel swaps is problematic and
crises are recurrent over the payment for water or fuel. The question of who pays for
the management and maintenance of those parts of the system that benefit more
than one republic has also become a major political issue.
Several inter-state bodies have been created since 1992 in order to deal with the
issue of water management at regional level however, disputes over water
allocations show that inter-state bodies are still not able to solve critical issues since
they often lack the necessary political commitment from the highest spheres of the
concerned governments (see e.g. Gely and Mueller, 2002).
For example, even though the Aral Sea Basin Program (ASBP) is administered by a
council of deputy prime ministers and the International Fund for the Aral Sea (IFAS)
is governed by the President of the five Central Asian countries - a solution that
should assure a high level of political commitment – the issue of water management
is left largely up to the states. In Central Asia, the ASBP and IFAS would provide a
basis for joint approaches and actions. At the national level, different ministries
should be able to integrate the actions of the inter-states bodies into national policies,
strategies and programs. However, the real capacities of these ministries in fulfilling
this task are often overestimated. At provincial level, the participation of local
governments, the private sector, civil society organizations and institutions would be
needed to translate these policies and programs into action and provide feedback.
Civil society is often an important mechanism for parties directly concerned by water
issues, to express their views. This aspect of participation is de facto often ignored in
practical decision-making despite attempts of some inter-state bodies such as IFAS
or ISDC to create public advisory bodies made of NGOs.
The World Bank is currently facilitating a high-level discussion and negotiation with
the Central Asian states on the issue of the Water – Energy Nexus in the region. The
signals are so far very encouraging and if the venture is successful, the water and
energy concerns of the states would finally be integrated into a single regional policy
and operational framework.
A basic productive resource for agriculture, water and competition for scarce water
resources has been portrayed as a source of international conflict. Nations, however,
and the international system have learnt to manage this threat.
Previous research (Klötzli, 1994) identified three main Central Asian regions where
there are regularly incidents over water use: the Amu Darya delta, the Zeravshan
valley, and the Ferghana valley. However, in the case of the Zeravshan and
Ferghana valley, despite the very local character of the conflicts, the presence on
now international borders and / or the implication of communities of another ethnic
group, have “loaded” the conflict with ethnic and / or trans-border dimension.
3.1.1
Water Issues in the Ferghana Valley
As we have seen previously, the tensions related to the management of the water
flow from the Toktogul reservoir have strained the relations between Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to the point that Kyrgyz troops were deployed in summer
2000 and 2001 (drought years) in order to protect the reservoir and the water release
operations. On the other hand, the constant involvement of interstate bodies,
multilateral organisation, international financial organisations and key regional actors
is a guarantee that enough pressure and resources are dedicated to find peaceful
solutions among the five Central Asian states.
19
In general, there is now a growing
consensus that water scarcity will not
create wars between nations - but there is
also a growing conviction that water
scarcity may work in a direction to
exacerbate the basic conditions that fuel
livelihood conflicts, particularly as countries
go through the crucial transition period
between dependence on agriculture and a
modern society, based on economic
growth in cities.
Box - Water Wars
Some research into the prospect of “water wars”
shows that no war over water has ever been fought,
and only a handful of minor water “skirmishes” can
be identified for the past century, while during this
period 145 water related treaties have been signed.
However, it is noted “there is ample evidence that
the lack of clean freshwater has led to occasionally
intense political instability and that, on a small
scale, acute violence can result.”
Source: Wolf, 1998.
These findings apply also in the case of Central Asia where, as we have seen, states
have been able to find pragmatic solutions to the disputes related to water. The
situation is more preoccupying when looking at the sub-state level.
Map 4 - Water Cluster Locations
According to the results of the analysis carried out within the frame of the present
study, the water question in the Ferghana area seems to turn around three main
clusters of issues: water availability/ access to water; water quality; and the issue of
raising groundwater / water-logging.
20
The next table summarizes the results concerning the question of water-logging:
Table 2. Water-Logging, Raising groundwater problems
LOCATIONS
TAJ - Spitamen district
KYR - Sai-Aksu, Leilek district
KYR - Toktogul reservoir
ISSUES
flooding by waters
released in KYR
ROOT CAUSE
agriculture and water
use between KYR-TAJ
flooding in UZB and KAZ, energy vs. agriculture
high water discharges,
needs
water allocations
TAJ - Isfara and KYR loss of arable land
raising water table due
Batken border regions; Isfara
to increased water
Canal (TAJ)
levels in Kyrgyz
reservoirs, infrastructure
degradation
KYR - Kampyr-Ravat
loss of arable land,
raising water table
reservoir; Kara-Su and Uzgen destruction of homes
districts
UZB Kurgan-Tepe district
KYR - Kara-Bak village,
loss of arable land,
raising water table,
Batken region
destruction of homes
irrigation infrastructure
degradation
TAJ- Kairakkum Reservoir migration of Tajiks
raising water table
Arka / Kistakuz villages
towards Kyrgyz lands
KYR - Kadamdzhai district
raising water levels
expansion of Burgundy
KYR - Rishtan district
channel
TAJ-UZB Farhod Reservoir
raising water levels
water levels,
infrastructure
degradation
KYR – Kara Darya, Yassy,
rise of water level in the
reservoir and river
Kurshab rivers
Kyrgyz rivers
sedimentation
KYR – Osh province
KYR – Osh province
KYR – Uzgen district
KYR – Toktogul reservoir
risk of dam failure of the
Papan reservoir (built in
th
the 19 century)
water-logging from the
Uzbek controlled Andijan
and Papan reservoirs
water-logging from the
Uzbek controlled Uzgen
reservoir (KYR)
water-logging in Andijan
(UZB) and Uzgen (KYR)
SECURITY ASPECT
local tensions
flooding of lands
local tensions
health problems,
flooding of lands
flooding of lands
local tensions and
clashes
loss of lands
flooding of lands
status of the
infrastructure
protests due to
damage to
agricultural lands
risk of downstream
flooding
raising water levels in
the reservoirs
health problems,
loss of lands
raising water levels in
the reservoir
health problems,
loss of lands
higher levels of water
stored for hydropower
production
flooding of lands;
loss of arable soils,
water deficit
Raising groundwater table levels is a problem in the regions around water reservoirs,
especially around the Kampyr-Ravat reservoir in South Kyrgyzstan. In the Kara-Su
and Uzgen districts of Kyrgyzstan, as well as the neighbouring villages of KurganTepe district across the border in Uzbekistan, estimates that 250 houses have been
severely damaged and of up to 1,000 ha of arable land have been lost, reflective of
the cross-border nature of the problem23. A similar situation exists around the
Andijan, Uzgen and Papan reservoirs, with an additional inter-state dimension as
these reservoirs are Uzbek controlled.
23
Source: IRIN available at http://www.edcnews.se/Cases/KyrgyzGroundwater.html
21
Always according to IRIN, local officials and scientists estimate that in the Osh region
more than 185 settlements within the affected area were being impacted. The
phenomenon resulted in the destruction of topsoil, as well as extinction of flora and
agricultural crops once found in the area, decreasing health situation of the
population of the affected villages.
Increasing levels of the water table
around the Kairakkum lake in
Tajikistan is also a source of
concern. In the border areas of
Arka and Kistakuz, the
phenomenon is pushing Tajiks to
resettle to higher Kyrgyz lands.
Land acquisitions by Tajiks have
been declared illegal by local
Kyrgyz authorities that may want to
expel the Tajiks by force.
In the same area, i.e. Arka and
Kistakuz, tensions already existed
between Kyrgyz and Tajiks due to
the use of irrigation without proper
drainage by the firsts and the
subsequent water logging of Tajik
agricultural lands. In Kara-Bak
village of neighbouring Batken
Province, some 300 ha of land are
no longer usable due to water
saturation25. In Spitamen district of
Sogd region in Tajikistan, arable
land is regularly flooded by the
release of water from the rice fields
located on higher grounds in SayAksu district in Kyrgyzstan.
Box - Irrigation in Central Asia 24
In the Soviet era, extensive irrigation infrastructure has been
developed along the Syr Darya (and Amu Darya) basin. The
period between 1950 and 1985 saw the construction of
reservoirs, irrigation canals, pumping stations and field canals,
resulting in most of the water flowing in the rivers being
diverted for irrigation. The irrigation infrastructure supported
the cultivation of cotton, wheat, fodder, fruits, vegetables and
rice in the arid steppe areas. It enabled the expansion of
irrigated areas during this period by 150% in Amu Darya basin
and 130% in Syr Darya basin.
Large populations moved to the area to work in agricultural
farms. Thus by 1999, agriculture contributed 11% of GDP in
Kazakhstan, 29% in Tajikistan, 27% in Turkmenistan, 33% in
Uzbekistan, and 38% in the Kyrgyz Republic. Cotton accounts
for nearly 20-40% of the exports. Central Asia is the third
largest producer of cotton in the world.
The total agricultural area in the Syr Darya basin amounted to
3.4 million hectares, 56% of which was in Uzbekistan, and
24% in south Kazakhstan. In 2000, about 35% of the irrigated
areas was under cotton cultivation, 30% under wheat, 12%
under fruits and vegetables, 9% under fodder, 5% under rice
and 9% under other minor crops. Cotton, fodder fruits and
vegetables are the economically viable crops. Wheat areas are
increasing on account of the food self-sufficiency concerns of
the republics.
Irrigation is inefficient. Water use is as high as 12,900 cubic
meters / hectare and only 21% of this is effectively used. The
remaining 79% is lost, most of it on the unlined on-farm and
inter farm canals. This compares with the loss level of about
60% in developing countries.
Several factors are related to such
situations. First of all the construction of the huge Soviet irrigation schemes instead
of improving irrigation conditions and agricultural performance, led to soil erosion,
rising groundwater levels and water-logging, secondary salinization, increased water
use and lowered yields (Micklin, 2000: 33). A second factor is that building brigades
and contractors had failed to properly forecast the implications of constructing such
huge irrigation channels and artificial reservoirs. Moreover, Soviet construction
brigades often neglected the necessity to install drainage facilities in the drive to
maximise the area of new irrigation (Micklin, 2000: 33), and environmental impact
assessments have rarely or never been carried out.
In the period since independence, lack of funds and lack of clarity concerning the
responsibilities for the maintenance of the system led to the progressive degradation
of the existing irrigation and drainage infrastructure. The result is further degradation
of the soil and loss of top quality arable land.
Finally, in the post-independence period, under the pressure of population growth,
new lands have been put into production. These newly developed lands are often in
24
World Bank, Water Energy Nexus in Central Asia, Improving Regional Cooperation, Washington, January 2004:
3
25
Source: IRIN available at http://www.edcnews.se/Cases/KyrgyzGroundwater.html
22
marginal regions, e.g. on the slopes of the Kyrgyz border regions (Batken, Osh, JalalAbad). Irrigated without proper drainage systems, often sown with water-consuming
rice, these cultures contribute to exacerbating the raising groundwater levels of the
lower lands. As these lands are usually in another state, Tajikistan or Uzbekistan,
these issues become quickly a trans-boundary and “ethnic” problem.
The same factors are linked to the issue of water availability and access to water.
Table 3. Water availability and access to water
Table – Water Availability and Access to Water
LOCATIONS
ISSUES
ROOT CAUSE
KYR - Jar-Kyshtak in Leilek
water allocation
disputes water allocation
districts, Batken region
/ access to water
KYR – UZB Koprovadskoe
unresolved demarcation demarcation of borders
and Kirki-Dong reservoirs
of UZB-KYR border
UZB - Uzbek part of the
Water allocation for
legislation / government
Ferghana Valley
private farmers /Access
cotton and wheat quota
to water
UZB - Dostyk Canal
water allocations
conflicting interests for
water use
KYR - Enclaves, Batken
water allocations
dependency from
region
neighbours for
accessing resources
KYR – Tortkul reservoir
water allocations
water allocation between
disputes between Batken KYR and TAJ
(KYR) and Sogd (TAJ)
Taj - Mastchoh District, Sogd
water availability
lack of infrastructure
region
KYR - Batken region
water availability/lack of
lack of infrastructure
drinking water
KYR - Aravan, Uzgen districts, water availability for
infrastructure
Osh region
irrigation
degradation
KYR - Leilek, Batken,
water availability for
water allocation between
Kadamdzhai districts, Batken
irrigation
KYR UZB TAJ villages
region
KYR - Nooken district, Jalalwater availability for
water allocation between
Abad region
irrigation
KYR UZB villages
KYR- Ala Buka district, Jalalwater availability for
water allocation between
Abad region
irrigation
KYR villages
KYR – Ak-su district, Jalalwater availability for
water allocation,
Abad region
irrigation and drinking
infrastructure
degradation
KYR - Ak-Say, Ak-Tatyr and
water availability/access water and land allocation
Samarkandek villages in
to water, land allocations between KYR and TAJ
Batken region; Kyrgyz-Tajik
communities
border area
SECURITY ASPECT
local clashes
interstate
negotiations
local tensions
inter-regional
disputes
local tensions and
clashes
local tensions
local tensions
local tensions
local clashes on
water
local clashes on
water
local clashes on
water
local clashes on
water
local clashes on
water
local tensions and
clashes
The border regions between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan (including the enclaves) are especially problematic areas as the irrigation
infrastructure has been built when the borders were only administrative separations,
with independence these have become state border.26 As border demarcation
between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan is not yet completed, the border concerning the
Kirki Dong and Koprovadskoe reservoirs is still unresolved. Irrigation channels go
26
The presence of seven enclaves located in the Ferghana valley increases the complexity of the border question. Several
unsolved questions related to the border delimitation and demarcation processes are straining the relations between the Central
Asian states. The situation has become even more difficult with the increased militarization of the borders in the Ferghana after
the 1999 and 2000 military incursions of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).
23
now through the territory of two or even three states, so disputes over water
availability become easily trans-boundary matters.
Water allocation disputes also gain easily an ethnic dimension. The countries sharing
the Ferghana valley are multi-ethnic states. In Kyrgyzstan, the Uzbek population is
concentrated mostly in the South, in Osh, Jalal-Abad, and in the Kara-Su, Aravan,
and Susak districts, the Sogd region in Tajikistan harbours an important Uzbek
minority. In such a situation, disputes over water or land may quickly mobilize
communities through ethnic solidarity networks.
Aravan, Uzgen and Osh districts in Kyrgyzstan are regularly theatre of disputes over
water allocations. The same happens in Batken region, specifically in Samarkandek,
Ak-Say and Ak-Tatyr villages (tensions between Tajik and Kyrgyz communities) and
in the Leilek, Batken and Kadamdhzai districts (tensions between Kyrgyz, Uzbek and
Tajik villages).
The demarcation and enforcement of state borders and the distribution of ethnically
diverse communities along these borders (and the presence of seven enclaves) are
factors that rapidly load local disputes over water with an ethnic and trans-border
dimension. A situation that increases the risk of escalating local disputes in more
important violent clashes. Local and regional authorities have a major role to play in
de-escalating tensed situations and find peaceful solutions.
Tensions over water availability or water allocations are frequent also in mono-ethnic
and non-border districts such as in the Ala Buka district in Jalal-Abad (Kyrgyzstan) or
in Mastchoh district, in Sogd (Tajikistan) where tensions are mostly between local
communities and district and regional authorities.
The issue of water allocations has an additional dimension. The emergence of
numerous small private plots after independence has significant implication for water
use as it becomes very difficult to calculate water allotments to collectivities as
irrigation and drainage systems were not designed to serve small-scale farms. In
general it seems that water allocated for private plots is clearly inadequate, with the
results that households compete for water with individuals and groups diverting water
to their own plots. (O’Hara, 2002) Water allocation has also an “elite” dimension, as
local elites that have access to land manage also to get a better access to water than
small farmers.
The question of water quota allocations is
an especially sensitive issue in
Uzbekistan, where the available water is
not distributed equally among the users.
Not only upstream provinces allegedly
taking more water than the downstream
ones but also the Uzbek legislation still
gives a priority access to water for the
large collective farms (private farmers,
who are “secondary users” depend on the
collective farms for accessing water).
Box - Agriculture in Uzbekistan
“In Uzbekistan, agriculture accounts for 33% of
GDP, 60% of foreign exchange receipts and 45% of
the employment. The government follows the
objectives of stabilizing cotton export revenues,
achieving wheat self-sufficiency, and keeping food
prices low. In pursuit of these the government
controls production, planting, procurement and
pricing of the produce. Farmers get low prices.
Government monopolies handle input supply and
marketing. It bans exports of products like cereals
and livestock and imports through state monopolies
products like sugar and vegetable oils. About 20% of
the farm areas have been privatized, but are still
subject control of production and pricing and
procurement. Prices of livestock, fruits and
vegetables have been liberalized. While agricultural
production has been stabilized, incentives for
efficiency improvement remain low”.
At the same time, in Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan where the number of individual
farmers is higher, water ministries have
lost their previous counterparts, the
collective farms. The multiplication of
(Cited from World Bank, 2004:3)
interlocutors makes the authorities’ task
almost impossible. This is the reason why local water authorities favour the creation
of Water Users’ Associations. Moreover, the issue of water access is exacerbated by
24
the government’s preference to cash crops and its quota system for cotton and
wheat. At the same time, government prices for such crops tend to be much lower
than their open market value, impacting on the viability of independent farming.
Therefore, the problem of water scarcity in parts of Uzbekistan can be understood
only taking into consideration these local and national political and economical
factors and can’t be exclusively blamed on Kyrgyzstan’s policy of releasing less
water in summer months or on drought as in 1999-2001.
The question of water quality and water pollution is the third aspect related to the
water cluster.
Table 4. Water quality and water pollution
Table – Water Quality and Water Pollution
LOCATIONS
ISSUES
ROOT CAUSE
UZB – Reservoirs
water pollution by untreated breakdown of
along the Syr Darya
municipal waste from Osh
infrastructure
and Kara-Suu (KYR)
TAJ - Kanibadam,
water quality
salinization of drinking
Sogd region
water (canal)
TAJ - Gantchi, Jabbor water quality
canal water pollution by
Gafurov district, Sogd
domestic waste in KYR
TAJ - Kairakkum
water quality
pollution by agriculture /
Reservoir and Syr
mineralization of water
Darya near Khudjand
TAJ – UZB Syr Darya water quality
pollution by agriculture
and Isfarinka canal
UZB - Ferghana
water quality /
chlorination system
region
contamination of drinking
dysfunctional
water
SECURITY ASPECT
health problems
health problems
local tensions
water quality /
health
health problems
health problems
Kanibadam in Sogd province in Tajikistan– a town along one of the main irrigation
channels - as well as the Kairakkum lake are affected by the problem of water
salinization and consequent decreasing of drinking water quality.
This problem is not new. With the expansion of the irrigation systems and the
construction of large dams along the Syr Darya (and Amu Darya) during the period of
1965 to 1985, the Soviet “government devoted more attention to installing collectordrainage networks to cope with the growing problems of rising groundwater levels,
water logging and secondary salinization. However, this increased return drainage
flows into rivers, substantially worsening their quality” (Micklin, 2000: 34). The
widespread use of mineral fertilizers and pesticides also contributed to the pollution
of water resources by return flows from irrigated fields.
Soil contamination linked to irrigated agriculture (contamination by pesticides, nitrates
and strontium) is an issue in the whole central part of the Ferghana valley where
maximum soil salinity is observed.
The situation has not dramatically changed from the Soviet period and the problems
of secondary salinization and agriculture-related pollution remain the same though
they have gained a gained a trans-boundary dimension especially between Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan, for both the Syr Darya and Zeravshan rivers. (UNDP, 2003).
A related problem is the issue of the pollution of drinking water resources by organic
waste, a problem usually linked to the breakdown of local drinking water
infrastructure as in the case of Osh city and in towns of the Uzbek Ferghana region
or lacking infrastructure as in the case of Gantchi in Sogd, Tajikistan, where the
water used by the downstream Tajik settlement is polluted by the waste of upstream
Kyrgyz communities. These cases of pollution often results in increased health
25
problems for the local populations (such as in the recent typhoid fever epidemic or
malaria outbreak in the Batken region or the hepatitis epidemic in the Osh region)
and / or increased upstream-downstream tensions among communities where
ethnicity can quickly be mobilized as a dividing line.
3.1.2
Conclusions Water Cluster
For the Ferghana Valley, agriculture represents a mainstay of the economy and in
the economic crisis of the post-independence period it has gained even greater
importance. With agriculture almost entirely dependent on irrigation access to water
is of strategic importance.
The states of the region have inherited huge irrigation and power-generation infrastructure
build during the Soviet Union and managed, at that time, centrally. With independence, the
Soviet water management arrangements came under great strain. As upstream countries
needed more electricity generation capacities whereas the downstream ones need the
water for agriculture, the water – energy nexus along the Syr-Darya has been the source
of several incidents between the Central Asian countries, some of them had the potential
to escalate to military actions. On the other hand, the Central Asian states – also thanks to
the constant international pressure and attention – have found pragmatic solutions that
have so far averted the use of force.
The situation is more worrying at the sub-state level where the Zeravshan and the
Ferghana valleys have been the theatre of local conflicts which, due to the presence
of now international borders and / or the presence of communities of another ethnic
group, have gained an “ethnic” and / or trans-border dimension.
In the Ferghana valley, three main issues are source of concern: water availability / access
to water; water quality and the issue of raising groundwater levels and water-logging.
Raising groundwater levels is a problem in the regions around water reservoirs (such
as Kairakkum, Kampyr-Ravat and the Uzbek managed reservoirs near Osh),
resulting in loss of arable land, destruction of homes, decreasing health situation and
population movement towards higher grounds. Lack of or degrading drainage
infrastructure contributes to exacerbate these problems along irrigation channels,
especially in the border areas of the Ferghana.
Water-logging downstream of large reservoirs like Toktogul is becoming a growing
inter-state problem as the Uzbek authorities are building intermediate reservoirs and
canals to capture and divert excess flow.
The development of new more marginal lands - often on the slopes in border areas
and without the construction of appropriate drainage systems thus resulting in raising
water levels in the plains– has created tensions between higher –lands communities
and lower-lands ones.
The establishment of international borders have made the issue of accessing water
and of maintaining water infrastructure an extremely complex question. Tensions and
even local violent clashes along the borders of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan
are recurrent. At the same time, tensions over access to water are frequent also in
mono-ethnic and non-border communities, where disputes involve mostly local
communities and district / regional authorities.
The issue of water allocation is a particularly sensitive question in Uzbekistan,
specifically between upstream and downstream provinces and between collective
farms and private farmers.
The salinization of water resources and the pollution of rivers by return flows from
irrigated fields is a recurrent problem inherited with the construction of the Soviet
irrigation systems. After independence, the situation has gained a trans-boundary
dimension, especially between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan (Kairakkum lake).
26
The demarcation and enforcement of state borders and the distribution of ethnic
divers communities along these borders (and the presence of seven enclaves) are
factors that rapidly load local disputes over water with an ethnic and trans-border
dimension. A situation that increases the risk of escalating local disputes in more
important violent clashes. Local and regional authorities have a major role to play in
de-escalating tensed situations and find peaceful solutions.
3.2
Land
Given the importance of agriculture for the whole Ferghana basin, land like water has
been historically among the most important factors in terms of political and security
relevance.
One of the first questions when dealing with land in the Ferghana basin is the issue
of land availability. Because of geographic and historical conditions, the Central
Asian capitals, the Ferghana valley, the irrigated areas of Khatlon and Sogd (South
and North Tajikistan), the areas along the Zeravshan river (Samarkand and Bukhara)
in Uzbekistan show very high population densities.
The Ferghana Valley is the most populous area in Central Asia, holding about 20% of
Central Asia’s population. It is estimated to be home to 10.5 million people. The
Ferghana territories hold 50% of Kyrgyzstan’s population, 31% of Tajikistan’s
population and 27% of Uzbekistan’s inhabitants (even though the Uzbek territory is
only 4.3% of the Ferghana Valley territories). In absolute terms, about 6.6m Uzbek,
2.4m Kyrgyz, and 1.5m Tajik populate the Valley.
Population density is extremely high in the Uzbek part of the valley (277 people/km2)
compared to the Tajik (69) or Kyrgyz parts (18). High population densities increase
the risk of depletion of natural resources and thus of competition and even conflict for
their control. This situation is reinforced by the fact that all Central Asian countries
(with the exception of Kazakhstan) show an important population growth. OCHA cites
a population growth rate of 1.5%.27 Between 1959 and 1989 the population of the
basin states has increased by 140 per cent and is expected to increase by a third
again by 2020 (O’Hara, 2002).
Table 5 - Population and population density.28
Administrative Unit
% of state's
territory
Tajikistan
Sogd Province
Kyrgyzstan
Osh Province
Jalal-Abad Province
Uzbekistan
Andijan Province
Ferghana Province
Namangan Province
Total Ferghana
27
100
18.2
100
42.2
23.1
100
0.1
0.2
0.2
Area,
square km
% of state's
population
143,100
26,044
198,500
83,767
45,854
447,400
4,474
8,948
8,948
154,557
100
31.4
100
32
18.2
100
8.7
10.6
7.6
30.9
Population,
millions
5.9
1.8
4.7
1.5
0.9
23
2.0
2.4
1.7
10.4
Density
(pop./sqkm)
70.7
41
23.5
33
23
53.4
504
367
236
UNICEF data in OCHA, 2004: 14
28
Source: http://www.ferghana.elcat.kg/1en.htm. 1999. N.B. The newly created Batken province in Kyrgyzstan is not
yet represented by these figures.
27
Agrarian overpopulation and an increasingly young population put the whole region
under demographic pressure. This situation is aggravated by the lack of jobs and
economic opportunities in general but especially in marginalised areas.
Migration is one coping mechanism to look
for better economic perspectives.
Kyrgyzstan faces a process of internal
migration from least developed areas,
especially from rural areas and small towns
where Soviet enterprises provided the
viability of these towns. Interestingly, the
share of rural population grew to 65.2% in
1999. This phenomenon is further
contributing to a de-urbanisation process
where only the main urban areas and
marginalised areas show an important
population growth (Batken, 1,7%, Osh:
2.1%, Bishkek: 3.7% in 1998 UNDP 2001).
Box - Batken
Batken is a region of special concern
(established in 1999 after the incursions of the
IMU). It is the poorest region of Kyrgyzstan
(ADB estimates that more than 80% of the
population lives in poverty), combining the
highest ratio of unemployment and one of the
highest birth rate (1.7%). It has a complex
political geography with numerous border
crossings. Three big enclaves are located in
Batken, Sokh (Uzb.), Voruh (Taj.), Shahimardan
(Uzb.). Transport of goods and persons depends
on the political climate and relations at the border.
Because of such characteristics, the ICG in 2001
was defining the Batken region as an “incubator of
conflict”.
Osh and Jalal-Abad regions are important centres for cotton and cotton-processing
industries, hydro-electrical power production, extraction of oil and gas. Jalal-Abad is
becoming an important industrial centre, whereas Osh is facing deindustrialization
though remaining a key knot on the transport routes from the Ferghana, to Tajikistan
and China. Thanks to the recent improved situation in the agricultural sector in
Kyrgyzstan, Osh and Jalal-Abad cotton sector is attracting more and more unskilled
daily labour from Uzbekistan.
Map 5 - Ferghana Valley Population Density Map. Source: Reliefweb, October 2003
28
The results of the next table have to be read in the light of the factors discussed
above, e.g high demographic pressures in the Ferghana – especially in the Uzbek
areas - lack of jobs and lack of economic perspectives – especially in marginalised
areas but increasingly in irrigated areas of Uzbekistan (due to the problems linked to
the Uzbek cotton sector). These factors trigger population movements internationally
(international labour migration), internally (migration to main urban centres and
capitals) and cross-border (for example Uzbek labourers on Kyrgyz fields).
At the same time, local migration (both internal and cross-border) is also targeted
towards less populated rural areas in the region. The regions of Osh and Jalal-Abad
as well as the hills and mountain areas around these cities are poles of local
migration. The mountain slopes of the Batken province are attracting population from
border areas in Tajikistan.
This situation is changing the relations between lower and higher lands. Higher lands
are usually marginal areas with limited capacities to support a large population living
from agriculture. Moreover, local migration towards these areas is destabilising the
local situation, increasing pressure on limited resources and hence fostering tensions
and conflicts for their control. In this sense, local migration towards higher grounds
represents a short-term solution to the problem of lack of economic perspectives for
large segments of the population in the Ferghana region.
Table 6 - Land Cluster issues
LOCATIONS
KYR - Enclaves,
Batken region
ISSUES
border and land
disputes
ROOT CAUSE
dependency from
neighbours for accessing
resources
SECURITY ASPECT
local tensions and
clashes
TAJ – Border region
around Isfara
border and land
disputes
unclear attribution of lands
local tensions and
clashes
TAJ - Gantchi, Jabbor
Gafurov district, Sogd
region
deforestation
population pressure / lack
of energy
degradation of
environment
KYR - Ferghana and
Chatkal mountain
ranges, Jalal-Abad
region
deforestation, overuse
of walnut forests
population pressure,
migration from lowlands
local tensions
KYR- TAJ Border
areas
deforestation
cutting of juniper forests
leads to erosion
local tensions
KYR - Kerben, Aksy
district, Jalal-Abad
region and Mamai
village (UZB)
dispute of pasture use
unclear use of border
pastures
local tensions
TAJ - Border regions
Tajikistan - Kyrgyzstan
and Kyrgyzstan -UZB
dispute over use of
KYR pastures by TAJ
and UZB cattle
population pressure on
limited land; pastures
previously managed jointly.
local tensions
KYR - Aksy district,
Jalal-Abad region
land availability
population pressure on
limited land
competition for land,
clashes
KYR - Susak district,
Jalal-Abad region
land allocations
unclear attribution of lands
between KYR, UZB
local tensions
KYR - Nooken,
Alabuka districts, JalalAbad region
land availability
population pressure on
limited land
illegal purchase of
land, clashes
TAJ - Isfara, Tajikistan,
Voruch enclave (in
KYR, Batken region)
land availability /
deforestation
population pressure on
limited land
local tensions
KYR - Kok-Tash,
Batken region - Chorku
Isfara (TAJ)
seizure of lands by
Tajiks
unclear attribution of lands
local tensions and
clashes
29
From the table it seems clear that enclaves and border areas are zones of concern
with regard to tensions related to land. The complex and problematic demarcation of
borders between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan contributes to foster lack of clarity in
terms of attribution of land. The border region around Isfara in Tajikistan and the
region of Susak district in Kyrgyzstan are an example of such a situation. In Isfara
(more precisely in Kok-Tash – Batken region- and Chorku, near Isfara), the situation
has escalated to open conflict between Kyrgyz and Tajiks. A similar situation has
happened in the region of Arka and Kistakuz (see chapter on water), where Tajiks
have acquired lands in Kyrgyzstan after their lands have been flooded by raising
water levels. In general, Kyrgyz officials have regularly raised concern that the fact
that parts of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan bordering on Kyrgyzstan are overpopulated
put pressure on Kyrgyzstan, and it fears that its neighbours will seize hundreds of
hectares of land, string barbed wire and lay mines.29 A reference often done in
relation of the situation around the Kairakkum reservoir.
Map 6 - Land Issues and Problem Areas
29
EIU ViewsWire, Kyrgyz Republic: Riot-torn region hopes for stability, 26 May 2003
30
Box - Walnut-fruit forests.30
Another set of issues outlined by the table
above is the question of deforestation and use
of pastures. One of the main areas affected by
these problems is the area of Jalal-Abad where
the main walnut-fruit forests are located.
Sources cited by IRIN31 mention that in the
region there are some 10,000 households in the
area already, with that number increasing each
year. “Villages located in forest territories are
overpopulated. Not having any land - or means
to get by - people take out of the forest
everything they can," a local expert cited by
IRIN explained, adding that livestock trampled
down young plants in the area, while some local farmers turned forests into ploughed
fields. Moreover, with winters in the area notoriously long and cold, there has been a
marked rise in the number of people cutting down trees in the area for fuel.”
These important forests -- highlighted in
WWF’s Global 200 biodiversity assessment - represent remnants of the Tertiary
subtropical forests which exist only in the
Central Asian region The walnut-fruit forests
are found primarily on the northern slopes of
the Ferghana and Chatkal ranges of the Tien
Shan, and on the southern slopes of the
Gissar and Darvaz ranges in the southeast.
The forests are a remarkable combination of
walnut (Juglans regia) - reaching 20 m in
height -- and wild fruit trees such as wild
apple (Malus) and prune (Prunus).
Forests are getting under pressure also in the border areas around Isfara, in the
Voruch enclave (Tajik enclave in Batken region, Kyrgyzstan) and in Gantchi, in Sogd
Tajikistan. Once more these border areas are some of the main hotspots in terms of
environmentally related local tensions. And once more these tensions get an “ethnic”
dimension as the disputes usually involve groups from different ethnic communities.
Pastures in the mountain areas of Kerben (Jalal-Abad region, Kyrgyzstan) are also
affected by similar problems. Disputes caused by unclear regulations concerning the
use of pastures in border regions or simply by competition between different groups
living in these areas are frequent along the borders between Kyrgyzstan (where the
majority of pastures are located), Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.
These two types of regions, e.g. forest areas (especially the walnut forests) and
pastures areas, seem to have many of the characteristics necessary for
environmentally - induced conflicts to result in violence: the inhabitants of those
regions depend to a large extent upon the resources put under pressure by the
increasing numbers of persons arriving in the region, their livelihoods are directly,
negatively and rapidly affected by the consequences of local overpopulation such as
lower per capita availability of productive agricultural land and further impoverishment
of upland areas. In this context, environmental disputes can be easily
instrumentalised using ethnic identities as a marker and a divider, this manipulation is
facilitated by the fact that the incoming population is most probably Tajik or Uzbek
and it is reinforced by other identity markers such as “plain – mountain” identities.
Moreover, the regulatory mechanisms are usually deficient and the state has limited
capacities to protect the resources; at the same time local authorities – in this case
the Kyrgyz ones are openly dominated by Kyrgyz nationals (even in the South).32
30
Source: Krever V., Pereladova O., Williams M., Jungius H., Biodiversity Conservation in Central Asia, Washington, 1998
IRIN, Kyrgyzstan: Focus on Deforestation in the South, available at http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=36809
32
Even though after the events in Aksy, when local police fired on demonstrators killing six persons, local authorities have
usually shown restrain when dealing with situations having the potential to trigger popular protest.
31
31
Limited land availability has another impact:
because of population pressure and scarce
resources all available lands are utilized for
agricultural purposes also those areas rich
in endemic and endangered species.
Moreover, pipelines, roads, electricity lines
in the areas of fragile biodiversity, intensive
use of recreational resources (including
hunting and alpinism), mining and
processing industries are all factors
contributing to the loss of biodiversity in the
region.
Box – Protected Areas
Protected areas, established in representative and
unique ecosystems, formerly proved to be very
effective tools for biodiversity conservation and
monitoring. Recently, however, formerly integrated
protected network has become separated into
fragmented patches, its effectiveness dropped
significantly and political borders turn out to be
constraining factors for natural habitats. Some
protected areas were devastated by the armed
conflicts (Romit, etc) and other failed to conserve
biodiversity because of increasing ecosystems
fragmentation and barriers for migration.
Finally, since independence, Central Asian states have introduced a number of
agricultural and land reforms aimed at improving outputs and diversify the agricultural
base. If in general, the overall trend has been towards the transfer of land to the
private sector, in practice the different reform programs mean also different legal
regimes for accessing land and regulating the management of water at the local level
in the three basin states. This situation increases the complexity of the problems at
the sub-state level
3.2.1
Conclusions on Land Cluster
In the Ferghana valley, where the agricultural sector is of strategic importance, the
questions linked to access to land, land availability and land quality are vital for large
segments of the population.
As we have seen in the previous chapter on water, soil contamination and overall
land degradation from agricultural practices increase environmental pressure
especially in remote, mountainous areas, such as the Batken region (UNEP, 2003).
High demographic pressures in the Ferghana – especially in the Uzbek areas -, lack
of jobs and lack of economic perspectives – especially in marginalised areas but
increasingly in irrigated areas of Uzbekistan (due to the problems linked to the Uzbek
cotton sector) are factors triggering population movements, internationally
(international labour migration), internally (migration to main urban centres and
capitals) and cross-border (for example Uzbek labourers on Kyrgyz fields). At the
same time, local migration (both internal and cross-border) is also targeted towards
less populated rural areas in the region. The regions of Osh and Jalal-Abad as well
as the hills and mountain areas around these cities are poles of local migration. The
mountain slopes of the Batken province are attracting population from border areas
in Tajikistan.
The rapid influx of new population lowers the per capita availability of productive
agricultural land in upland areas. Forests and pastures are resources increasingly put
under severe pressure. Disputes caused by unclear regulations concerning the use
of pastures in border regions or simply by competition between different groups living
in these areas are frequent along the borders between Kyrgyzstan (where the
majority of pastures are located), Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Once more enclaves
and border areas around Isfara are some of the main hotspots in terms of
environmentally related local tensions.
These two types of regions, e.g. forest areas (especially the walnut forests) and
pastures areas, seem to have many of the characteristics necessary for
environmentally - induced conflicts to result in violence. These regions should be
among priorities for the ENVSEC initiative in terms of monitoring.
This situation is changing the relations between lower and higher lands. Local
migration towards these areas is destabilising the local situation, increasing pressure
32
on limited resources and hence fostering tensions and conflicts for their control. In
this sense, local migration towards higher grounds represents a short-term solution to
the problem of lack of economic perspectives for large segments of the population in
the Ferghana region.
3.3
Industrial Activities and Waste
The Soviet model of development for Central Asia was based on one hand on the
development of large-scale irrigation schemes that would allow the region to become
a major cotton producer and on the other hand on the development of heavy industry
(mining, oil and gas industry, chemical industry, textile). Major industrial sites have
been built together with the towns and cities to accommodate technicians and
workers. With independence and the end of economic rationality that unified the
Soviet market, the majority of these plants had to compete on the international
market without necessary experience or capital. The majority of them had to
drastically reduce their operations. Moreover, many of the trained technical staff left
for Russia. Over the years industrial and mining towns have lost large parts of their
population.
Although not much data is available, it seems that the operations of the industries in
the region were carried out with limited environmental or public health concern and
resulted in the accumulation of pollutants in the local environment. The Ferghana
valley has been used by the Soviet Union as one of the main source of uranium ores,
some 50 deposits were explored in this region.
Map 7 - Radioactive, chemical and biological hazards in Central Asia
33
Table 7 – Radioactive wastes hotspots
LOCATIONS
KYR – Mayluu Suu,
Jalalbad region
KYR – Shekaftar
uranium mine
UZB Uygursai
uranium mine
UZB – Charkesar
uranium mine
TAJ – Gafurov town,
Chkalovsk, Taboshar,
Adrasman and on the
Mogol-Tay slopes
ISSUES
radioactive spills
ROOT CAUSE
unprotected deposit
toxic wastes, uranium
tailings
toxic wastes, uranium
tailings
toxic wastes, uranium
tailings
uranium tailing deposits;
high radiation levels
radioactive storage facility
radioactive storage facility
radioactive storage facility
uranium mining; open
radioactive storage facility
SECURITY ASPECT
contamination of Syr
Darya
health problems;
river pollution
health problems;
river pollution
health problems;
river pollution
contamination of
land and water
The tailing dams at Mayluu Suu (Kyrgyzstan), Shefaktar and Sumsar (Kyrgyzstan), at
the Charkesar mine (in Uzbekistan), and in the complex in around Khudjand
(Chkalovsk, Adrasman and Taboshar) in Sogd province of Tajikistan are sites of
special concern. Many tailing dumps, as well as mud storage, were built directly on
river flood-plains33. There were cases where protection dams were washed away and
radionuclides entered the rivers and reservoirs such as the Kairakkum reservoir34.
Landslides threaten to push the contents of the dumps into the rivers. In Adrasman
and Chkalovsk open tailing dumps are exposed to wind and water erosion, as well as
to floods and landslides.
Because of their vulnerability to natural hazards, previous history of accidents35 and
their position along water courses and in the vicinity of towns and cities, these tailing
dumps represent a severe risk for the human security of the whole region. At the
same time, despite the clear trans-boundary nature of the risks of contamination,
these dumps have not been considered as a major issue by the Central Asian states.
So far the notable exception is the one of the Kyrgyz government who has been very
active in raising the attention of the international community over the problems of
Mayluu Suu and has been able to raise World Bank funding to carry out feasibility
studies and some melioration work on site36. Only recently Tajikistan started to
approach international organisations on the issue of radioactive waste deposits.
Uzbekistan has so far adopted a lower profile in raising international attention to this
issue. Uzbekistan has a joint commission with Kyrgyzstan that primarily deals with
Mayluu Suu, and the Uzbek state of the environment report from 200137 confirms the
concern over the question of nuclear waste.
33
UNEP / GRID-ARENDAL, Thirteen Environmental Stories from Central Asia, Arendal, May 2003
Meeting with the Academy of Science Dushanbe, Septermber 2004.
In the mentioned GRID-ARENDAL publication, one author reports that in 1958 the tailing dump nr 7 broke, releasing about
600’000 m3 of radioactive materials in the river. The radioactive mudflow caused widespread destruction and contamination of
huge areas. Additional information can be found in the Virtual media tour, http://www.grida.no/enrin/mediatour2003/
36
On the other hand, with respect to Myluu Suu a recent TACIS-financed study suggested that the cost of intervention is too
high given the level of risk. Complete clean-up seems not to be possible. (meeting with TACIS in Tashkent)
37
Republic of Uzbekistan, State of the Environment report, 2001, pp 106-107
34
35
34
Table 8 – Industrial Wastes Hotspots
LOCATIONS
KYR - Kadamdzhai
district, Chadak gold
deposit
KYR – Haidarken
district, Batken region
KYR – Jalal-Abad
region
ISSUES
toxic wastes, soil
contamination
ROOT CAUSE
pollution by Kadamdzhai
Combinat
SECURITY ASPECT
health problems; soil
contamination
theft of mercury from
industrial plant
possible toxic spills
security problem
KYR – Haidarken
district, Batken
KYR – Jalal-Abad,
Batken regions
toxic spills
KYR – Kadamdzhai
district, Batken
KYR – Kadamdzhai
district, Batken
KYR – Kadamdzhai
district, Batken,
transport of toxic
substances to storage
toxic spills
KYR – Kyzyl-Kyya
(KYR), Ferghana and
Kuvasai (UZB)
KYR – Mayluu Suu,
Jalalbad region
KYR – Sulukta Kysil
Kya districts, Batken
KYR – Sumsar valley,
Sumsar river; Lead
Treatment Plant
TAJ – Isfara
pollution by power plants
(coal)
local circumstances at
Haidarken Mercury plant
Kyrgyzneftegas JSC,
Kyrgyz Petroleum C;
Maili Suu Electric Bulb
Plant
industrial pollution
mercury mining
infrastructure
degradation, lack of
funding
Introduction of 300$ tax
by Uzb authorities
industrial pollution
antimony processing
Industrial pollution by
Kadamdzhai antimony
Factory
coal with sulphurous
content
energy needs KYR
pollution
industrial pollution, coal
mining
metallurgical production
health problems
industrial pollution
pollution / health
problems
pollution / health
problems
pollution / health
problems
TAJ – Kanibadam,
Sogd region
UZB – Bekabad
UZB- Almylyk Plant,
Pishkent district
UZB – Ferghana city
UZB – Minbulak oil
field
UZB – Ferghana and
Andijan oil processing
plants
UZB – Settlements of
Mugul and Kerauchi of
the Piskent district,
Tashkent region
municipal waste disposal
not functioning
soil and water
contamination
oil exploration, drilling,
production
toxic spills
toxic wastes, soil
contamination
pollution by industrial
plants
chemical wastes deposit
pollution by chemical
substances
trans-boundary industrial
pollution
pollution by metallurgic
(aluminium) and cement
plants
pollution by industrial
plant
pollution by industrial
plants
oil exploration, drilling,
production
Pollution by industrial
plant
trans-boundary industrial
pollution
Trans-boundary industrial
pollution
energy needs UZB
Trans-boundary industrial
pollution
pollution by Almalyk
mining & smelting
industrial pollution
health problems
local tensions
difficulties for
storage wastes
health problems
health problems;
river & soil pollution
health problems
health problems;
river & soil pollution
pollution / health
problems
pollution / health
problems
pollution Syr Darya
river
river & soil pollution
pollution
As we can see from the table above, the region has several locations that can qualify
as “hotspot” in terms of industrial activity with negative impact on the environment
and public health, mostly linked to mining and metallurgic operations, but also to oil
and gas extraction.
35
Map 8 - Industrial Activity Problem Areas
In Kyrgyzstan three main locations are source of concern. The plants of Kadamdzhai
and Haidarken (metallurgic plant, producing antimony and mercury) or the lead plant
in the Sumsar Valley in Kyrgyzstan present problems of soils contamination with
heavy metals and other toxic substances. The Kadamdzhai mercury plant is
perceived as a trans-boundary problem also by the Uzbek authorities.
Moreover, in its database FAST records several thefts of mercury for a total of about
than 150 kg from the plants of Haidarken and Kadmdzhai. This highly poisonous
metal seems to find a market in the region.
In Tajikistan the industries around Isfara, and the chemical wastes deposit of
Kanibadam are the identified hotspots in the Sogd province. The Kanibadam toxic
wastes deposit (for obsolete pesticides) potentially present a similar situation as the
radioactive tailing dumps described before, e.g. unprotected deposit, vulnerable to
natural hazards, located in the vicinity of the border, of a water-way and of a town. As
36
in the case of the nuclear tailings, the Kanibadam deposit is not perceived as a
security risk by the authorities at the regional level38.
In Uzbekistan, the Bekabad metallurgic plant, the industry in Ferghana city and the
Almalyk metallurgic plant in the Piskent district39 have been identified as key problem
areas. In particular the Bekabad plant is perceived as a trans-boundary problem by
Tajikistan. At the same time Tajikistan prefers to adopt a low profile on this plant in
order not to give the Uzbek authorities the occasion to criticize Tajikistan because of
the pollution caused by the Tajikistan Aluminium smelter in Turzunzade. Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan have agreements on issues of pollution from the Tajik Aluminium
Plant and the Uzbek Bekabad’s metallurgic and cement plants, an indicator that the
two countries take seriously the connection between environmental stress and
security.40
As for the oil and gas operations, contamination by oil products is present in soils
near oil deposits such as in the Minbulak oil field in Uzbekistan, at the oil production
plants in Andijan and Ferghana cities in Uzbekistan or at the oil refinery in JalalAbad. However, also in these cases, the environmental pollution is mostly not
perceived as a security problem even though past accidents have created tensions
between the countries of the region41.
Only in very few cases national and regional authorities perceive pollution caused by
industrial activity as a major security threat. The fact that these environmentally
problematic operations in many cases still represent important economic activities,
which are of crucial importance for the economies of regions such as Batken,
certainly contributes to the fact that countries usually keep a low profile on issues
related to industrial pollution. At the same time, these questions are a recurrent
problem that contributes to strain relations between neighbouring countries ( as in the
case of Tursunzade vs. Bekabad- Almalyk),
Another factor to be considered is that many of the industrial plants and of the
radioactive tailings deposits are exposed to natural hazards. Moreover, they are often
located near rivers and / or main irrigation channels, in the vicinity of town and cities.
Accidents and natural disasters would thus affect a population far more important
than only the one living in the immediate vicinity of a plant or deposit.
Incidents have been reported where flooding has washed off tailing dams at the
Uranium Treatment Plant in Mayluu Suu in Kyrgyzstan or the wastes storage at the
Lead Treatment Plant in Sumsar.
Major disastrous events affecting the plants listed above would have dramatic
consequences the livelihoods of large regions. In addition to the immediate
destructions such an event could trigger the displacement of large groups of persons
also affecting the livelihoods of the receiving regions.
Even though natural disasters are usually occasions for solidarity and cooperation
among states, the security dimension can’t be ruled out as such an event would also
trigger the displacement of large numbers of persons within the affected country and
/or to a neighbouring region.
38
Whereas the Tajik authorities are aware of the risks linked to the Kanibadam deposit.
The Almalyk plant is actually in the Tashkent region, however the pollution coming from this operation is a source of concern
also in Tajikistan.
40
UNEP, UNDP, OSCE, Addressing Environmental Risks in Central Asia, Bratislava, 2003, p. 19
41
In 1992, Tajikistan evaluated the damage from an oil spill in Uzbekistan as 600,000 roubles. There was formal communication
between the two countries. Moreover, possible pollution from oil production was mentioned as a concern by environmental
authorities in Dushanbe (meetings, September 2004).
39
37
3.3.1
Conclusions Industrial Wastes
The present report has identified a number of locations that represent a risk for the
Ferghana Valley from the environmental and public health perspective.
The radioactive tailing dams at Mayluu Suu (Kyrgyzstan), Shefaktar and Sumsar
(Kyrgyzstan), at the Charkesar mine (in Uzbekistan), and the complex in around
Khudjand (Chkalovsk, Adrasman and Taboshar) in Sogd province of Tajikistan are
sites of special concern. Because of their vulnerability to natural hazards, previous
history of accidents42 and their position along water courses and in the vicinity of
towns and cities, these tailing dumps represent a severe risk for the human security
of the whole region. A similar situation exists with industrial locations that that can
qualify as environmental “hotspot”. Only in very few cases (Bekabad, Turzunzade,
Almalyk) national and regional authorities perceive pollution caused by industrial
activity as a major security threat. The fact that these environmentally problematic
operations in many cases still represent important economic activities, which are of
crucial importance for the economies of regions such as Batken, certainly contributes
to the fact that countries usually keep a low profile on issues related to industrial
pollution. At the same time, these questions are a recurrent problem that contributes
to strain relations between neighbouring countries (as in the case of Tursunzade vs.
Bekabad- Almalyk).
An additional problem is linked to the fact that many of the industrial plants and of
the radioactive tailings deposits are exposed to natural hazards. Moreover, they are
often located near rivers and / or main irrigation channels, in the vicinity of town and
cities. Major disastrous events affecting the plants listed above would have dramatic
consequences for the livelihoods of large regions. In addition to the immediate
destructions such an event could trigger the displacement of large groups of persons
also affecting the livelihoods of the receiving regions. On the other hand, the
prospect of a disaster can be used as an occasion for developing cooperation among
regions and states potentially affected by an accident or disaster.
3.4
Cross-Cutting Issues
3.4.1
Natural Disasters
Central Asia is a disaster prone area, exposed to a number of natural processes
such as floods, droughts, avalanches, rockslides, or earthquakes. The region is also
vulnerable to man-induced disasters due to industrial activities and the nuclear /
chemical dumps inherited from the Soviet period.
Several factors such as population density in disaster prone areas, the general
important population growth, poverty, land and water use, non-application of building
codes as well as global climate change make the region vulnerable to natural as well
as man-made disasters hazards.
Natural disasters have killed about 2,500 people and affected some 5.5 million
(nearly 10 percent of the total population) in Central Asia over the past decade. The
incidence of natural disasters involving casualties among inhabitants settled in risk
areas has been on the increase over the recent years due to increased occurrence of
extreme weather events and inadequate preparedness.
42
In the above mentioned GRID-ARENDAL publication, one author reports that in 1958 the tailing dump nr 7 broke, releasing
about 600’000 m3 of radioactive materials in the river. The radioactive mudflow caused widespread destruction and
contamination of huge areas.
38
Box – Natural Disasters in the Ferghana Valley
The most destructive natural disasters of the past 10
years include: torrential rain and an earthquake in
Osh and Jalal-Abad in 1992 destroyed 51,000
hectares of agricultural lands and affected 20,000
people (direct damage US$ 31 million), heavy
rainfalls in 1993 (economic losses US$ 21 million),
large-scale landslides and mudflows in 1994 and
2004 in the Osh and Jalal-Abad killed over 200
people and made over 30,000 homeless, a glacial
lake outburst flood in 1998 (Shohimardon) killed
over 100 people and caused damage to Kyrgyzstan
and Uzbekistan, widespread floods in Jalal-Abad in
1998, caused by torrential rains, damaged an
estimated 1,200 houses and public buildings (direct
damage US$ 240 million), in the Tajik part of the
Ferghana Valley, floods and mudflows in 1999,
2002 and 2004 led to widespread damage
(compiled from nat. reports and UNECE).
In the Ferghana Valley alone, between
1994 and 2004, the cumulative damage
from natural disasters estimated at over
300$ US millions, with more than 500
people killed and tens of thousands
affected. 43 The regions most frequently
affected by natural disasters in the
Ferghana Valley are the Jalal-Abad and
Osh regions (Kyrgyzstan), the Sogd region
(Tajikistan) and the Ferghana region
(Uzbekistan). On average, approximately
80 per cent of all the disasters (mostly
hydrometeorological hazards) occur
between April and August.
Many disasters, such as GLOFs44,
earthquakes45 and floods46 are transboundary in nature. They can affect
security and livelihoods directly and indirectly. One of the examples is the 1998
Shohimardon flood, when a high mountain glacial lake in the Alai Mountains of
Kyrgyzstan released huge volume of water sweeping away homes, bridges, roads
and other infrastructure in the Ferghana Valley and severely affecting both Kyrgyz
and Uzbek territories (IRCF, UNECE).
The poor, who constitute majority of the Ferghana Valley population, are largely
affected by the natural disasters. Most of the rural poor are dependent on river flows
for agriculture and domestic water supply, and therefore live close to the riverbanks.
The floods directly affect their security status through impacts on settlements and
livelihood.
As we have previously seen (ch. 3.3.) natural disasters are a threat also for sensitive
industrial plants and waste deposits. If their direct security relevance in terms of
conflicts is relatively limited, disasters (and the risk thereof) are an opportunity for
43 Sources: ECHO and national reports
44
There are many glaciers and glacial lakes in the high altitude areas. A recent study shows that in the mountains surrounding the
Ferghana Valley there are over 100 glacial lakes featuring potential outburst risk (GLOFs), and other dangerous situations, such
as landslide dam outburst floods (LDOFs). The catastrophic phenomenon happened in July 1998 in the Shohimardon valley
(Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan transboundary territory), when a stone-mud-ice flood killed nearly 100 people and destroyed many
households. In 1999, the Asht Valley of Northern Tajikistan was hit by LDOF when 19 people killed, over 1,000 houses and
infrastructure destroyed or damaged
45
The mountain areas of Central Asia, including the Ferghana Valley, are seismically active. National Seismological Networks
record some 3,000-5,000 local and regional events a year. Over 500 earthquakes of magnitude M>5 were recorded during the
period 1900-2000 only in the Kyrgyzstan, mostly in the Ferghana Valley and its mountains. Destructive earthquakes took place in
Namanghan, Andijan, Ferghana, Jalal-Abad, Isfara areas. Maximum seismic activity has been observed in the Chatkal, Alai, and
Ferghana Mountains, where 8-9 M events are possible (nat. reports).
Most territory of the Ferghana valley and adjacent mountains are vulnerable to earthquakes with many small and large settlements located in
the epicenter zones of the potentially devastating earthquakes (Isfara, Jalal-Abad, Osh, Kara-balta, etc). Some 30 settlements are threatened
by both strong earthquakes and resultant risks (mudslides, unstable grounds, etc). The earthquakes (M>7) that struck the Ferghana
Valley and adjacent mountain territory from 1911 caused few thousands casualties and millions of dollars in economic loss (nat.
reports).
46
Mudflows and floods are sometimes considered as the most destructive natural events in the Ferghana Valley. High density of
river network, steep slopes and degraded soil cover increase mudflow risk, especially in piedmont parts of the Ferghana Valley.
Mudflows are formed due to interaction of hydro-meteorological and geological factors: cloudbursts, rapid snow melting, slope steepness,
easily washed grounds, etc. Almost all the piedmont territory of the Ferghana Valley is vulnerable to mudflows, including radioactive waste
sites. Over 1,000 river basins are estimated to hold from moderate to high mudflow risk. In spring 1998, in Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan, torrential rains caused severe flooding with over 20,000 people affected and many infrastructure and buildings
destroyed. The years 2003 and 2004 also featured flooding events in many areas, including the Syr Darya delta. Winter ice and a
failure to observe regional water use agreements trigged floods along the Syr Darya River in Kyzylorda, Southern Kazakhstan in
early 2004 (nat. reports).
39
cooperation among relevant authorities such as the Ministries of Emergency
Situations of the three countries. Such interest for cooperation could be enhanced
especially in the case of industrial locations or radioactive waste deposits with an
important danger of trans-boundary pollution by involving local authorities, disaster
response institutions and communities of the areas at risk.
3.4.2
Impact of Global Climate Change
One factor to consider while looking at the region in terms of the links between
environment and security is the impact of the global climate change on Central Asia
in general and on the Ferghana basin in particular. By modifying the livelihoods of
people, climate change may have an important security dimension especially in
conjunction with other aggravating factors.
Map 9 – Impacts of Climate Change in the Central Asian Mountains
In the Ferghana valley the water and agriculture sectors are likely to be most
sensitive to climate change-induced impacts in Asia. Even though regional climate
scenarios are still uncertain, they can provide elements for assessing the potential
impacts of climate change and considering appropriate policies and measures.
The major impact of climate change in arid and semi-arid Asia is likely to be a
significant shortage of water resources associated with significant increases in
surface air temperature (IPCC, 2001). Growing populations and high concentration of
population in fertile areas, such as the Ferghana valley, will exert increasing
pressures on water availability and water quality. The agricultural sector and thus the
backbone of the regional economy would be affected by negative changes of water
availability.
Most climatic projections suggest in the long run (by 2050) high temperature increase
in the Syr Darya Basin ranging from 2°C to 3-5°C (moderate scenario), and over 56°C (worst case scenario) by the end of this century (assessments by
Uzbekhydromet and Tajikhydromet). This would have additional detrimental effects
40
on the populations’ health by possibly favoring increases in vector-borne and
waterborne diseases. Decreases in water availability and food production, leading to
poor nutrition and increased susceptibility to diseases, would indirectly affect the
health of the population.
Box- Climate Change Scenarios for Central Asia
On the basis of the magnitude and severity of the projected climate
change impacts it is possible to elaborate scenarios (2030-2060s) of
regional environmental security in Central Asia.
Most unfavorable would be the “hot and dry” scenario, when
extreme temperatures, severe droughts, initially increased water
flow and subsequent severe water deficit, rapid expansion of
deserts in lowlands and middle mountains and major decline in
natural grassland productivity would lead to diminished ecosystem
services, increased susceptibility to extreme events, erosion, direct
impacts on economic sectors and human health. Food and
agricultural production would be highly endangered. Valuable
alpine ecosystems, including piedmont mountain pastures, genetic
resources and many endangered species, could be lost. Heat,
malnutrition and diseases may affect thousands. The massive
degradation of mountain glaciers poses essential constraints on the
further development of Central Asia. Inequalities, tensions and
conflicts will be likely consequences of resource scarcity,
environmental deterioration and migration imposed by severe
climatic changes. As problems become prevalent, the regional
disputes over scarce and important resources increase.
Mildly damaging would be the “warm and wet” scenario, under
which temperatures grow moderately, precipitation increases
evenly, and year-to-year weather variability does not reach some
critical levels. Water resources continue to decline but, on a general
level, water supply to the population and economy is not
threatened. Alpine ecosystems may benefit from new climatic
conditions and CO2 enrichment, whereas low-mountain pastures
may be adversely affected. Natural disaster consequences increase
affecting vulnerable communities, especially the rural poor, and
some regions at levels higher than at the present climatic
conditions. Food production and agriculture do not experience
significant alterations, although overall decline would predominate.
Existing disputes over natural resources are unlikely to be reduced
under this scenario.
Depending
on
scenario
selected, climate change will
have from minor to severe
impacts on the Syr Darya basin
in general, and the Ferghana
Valley area in particular.
In general, water shortages and
water quality problems, already
issues in the Ferghana Valley,
are unlikely to be improve, and
will possibly be exacerbated by
climate changes. Land
conditions may worsen and
desert areas expand. Potential
decreases in food production
(rice, cereals) would lead to
indirect impacts on human
health. Heat stress and possible
spread in vector-borne and
infectious diseases are likely to
increase and affect vulnerable
population groups, primarily the
poor, elderly and children.
More worrying is the fact that
globally the occurrence and
intensity of extreme weather
events and the impacts of
natural disasters tends to
amplify, affecting even more the
livelihoods of the populations of
the concerned regions.
Moreover, the absence of effective policies and institutions to address the impacts of
global warming would increase the vulnerability to climate change – the states of the
region being unprepared to such changes – which in turn could affect the region’s
susceptibility to conflicts.
3.4.3
Other Issues
As mentioned in the chapter dedicated to the water cluster, outbreaks of diseases
related to water (typhoid fever, malaria and hepatitis) have been recently registered
in the Kyrgyz part of the Ferghana valley. Two elements should be noted. These
outbreaks are not easily constrained by state borders. Such events are the witness of
the declining living conditions of the affected populations and of the degradation of
their livelihoods. In this sense they can be considered as an indicator of an increased
vulnerability of these regions.
A final note should be made concerning the issue of direct military action and terrorist
acts directed against strategic objects such as dams (specifically Papan in the Osh
region, Toktogul reservoir but also Lake Sarez in Tajikistan). Clearly a successful
attack against this type of object would have disastrous consequences for the
41
Ferghana valley and Central Asia. On the other hand, operations against large dams
would need means and capacities that seem well beyond those of the insurgency
groups operating in the region. More worrying is the prospect of actions against
sensitive industrial sites, the recurrent thefts of quicksilver from the Haidarken
mercury plant prove that security is very easy to avoid.
4.
Outlook: The Ferghana Area and the Prospect for Conflicts
The present report is dealing with the links between environment and security in the
Ferghana areas (Ferghana – Osh – Khudjand). In chapter 1.4 above we have tried to
propose an approach that would help clarifying these links. The arguments used can
be summarised in the following table:
Table 9 – Summary Environment and Security Links
Necessary conditions
Vulnerable Locations
Causal Pathways
Mechanisms
Fostering Insecurity
Scarcity of regulatory
mechanisms and poor
state performance.
Marginal vulnerable areas,
at intra-state level.
Areas directly impacted by
environment degradation
(pollution, water logging)
Densely populated areas
where access to key
resources becomes an issue
of survival
Arid plains,
Mountain areas with
highland - lowland
interactions,
Trans-national river basins
Densely populated areas
where access to key
resources becomes an issue
of survival
- Dependency on natural
capital
- Unequal access to natural
resources,
- Consequent
marginalization of a group
- Population movements
Poverty
“Ecological
marginalization” (unequal
resource access
+population growth).
Corruption
Unlawful Use of force
Environmental scarcity can
produce:
Constrained agricultural
productivity;
Constrained economic
productivity;
Migration of the affected
people;
Greater segmentation of
society, usually along
existing ethnic cleavages;
Disruption of institutions,
especially the state.
Discrimination
Injustice
High Birth Rate
Rapid Population
Flows
Dependency from
scarce natural
resources
Institutionalising the
environment.
Opportunities to build
organizations and find
allies.
Spillover from a
historic conflict
Inequality
Scarcity
Diseases
If we look at post-independence Central Asia through the “lenses” proposed in the
table above, we can say that the exception of the civil conflict in Tajikistan, Central
Asia has been in general stable. The Ferghana valley, for the last ten years predicted
to be on the verge of an explosion, has not experienced major conflicts (with the
exception of the IMU incursions in 1999 and 2000).
The overall stability of the region can probably be linked to an underestimation of the
restraint factors. Analysis seems to have underestimated the persistence of Central
Asian pre-Russian, pre-modern conservatism, especially concerning the vision of
power. In the hierarchical societies of Central Asia, only a strong – and thus
pervasive - state is a legitimate state. The capacities of the population to endure
protracted economic crisis have been grossly underestimated. Islam is not only used
42
by radical neo-fundamentalist organisations to create a conflict environment but is
also a strong element of stability and restrain. The Central Asian ruling elites share a
common background and socialisation, making easier to find ad-hoc solutions in
case of crises. Elites and authorities have been so far able not only to avoid major
interstate crises but also to control crisis situations at local level. Finally, social
institutions such as the salience of informal social networks (« clans ») and the family
have been a powerful instrument of social control and restraint factor.
However, thirteen years have past since independence and during this time several
insecurity-fostering factors have become more important:
•
The fragmentation of Central Asia as a region from the political and
economical point o f view;
•
The progressive demarcation of the state borders in the Ferghana valley and
the reinforcement of the security regime at the border with the parallel
introduction of more restrictive visa regimes;
•
Decreasing living conditions for the majority of the population in the Ferghana
region, the post-independence period profiting only a fraction of the
population contribute to widespread perceptions of social inequalities and
injustice;
•
The different speeds of economic development processes between states but
especially within states have strengthened horizontal inequalities at the subregion level;
•
High population densities in the irrigated lowlands of Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan, combined with a birth rate decrease the capacities of these
regions to absorb excess labour;
•
Constrained economic productivity in the Ferghana areas and high levels of
unemployment especially among the youth, contribute to increase the pool of
people with grievances. So far migration (rural – rural, rural - urban or to other
CIS countries) has been a major safety valve;
•
To a strongly networked society corresponds a weak state where corruption is
widespread. State performances in delivering services have in general
decreased since independence;
•
Repeated abuses by state security forces contribute developing grievances
against the state structures and to radicalize oppositions;
•
Infrastructure degradation (especially the irrigation infrastructure of key
importance for the agricultural sector), combined with resource scarcity
contributes to accelerating existing political and social crises.
The increased importance of these risk factors combined with a constant erosion of
certain restraint factors, seem to make Central Asia more vulnerable to conflict. If at
the interstate level the prospects of conflict are low47 as restrain factors are still
strong, t is at the sub-state level and in already marginalized areas that tensions are
the strongest.
If we look more specifically at the role of environmental factors in influencing the
region’s vulnerability to tensions and violent conflict, the results of the analysis
presented by this report can be visualised in the following map (see next page):
47
Interstate violence may occur in case of unilateral military operations on the territory of a neighbouring state in response to
localised conflicts over access to natural resources or in case of state breakdown and subsequent intervention by a neighbouring
state to control strategic economic objects (dams such as Toktogul lake, industrial plant such as Turzunsade aluminium smelter).
43
Map 10 - Ferghana valley: Environment and Security Hotspots, All Clusters
Confronted with decreasing living conditions, degrading livelihoods, an increasing
shortage of land due to high demographic pressure and with the bleak economic
prospects in the Ferghana valley, large segments of the population decide to migrate
in order to look for a better future. Local migration, e.g. migration within the region, is
a phenomenon of key importance. Not only people are migrating to regional centres
such as Osh and Jalal-Abad in South Kyrgyzstan but there is also an important
migration48 from the low lands towards the hills and mountain regions surrounding the
Ferghana valley. The pressure put on natural resources by the rapid inflow of
population in these already marginal lands is changing the relations between lowand highlands. More importantly the competition for scarce local resources between
“established” populations and “newcomers” can easily and rapidly escalate into
violent conflict. Threatened by ecological marginalization, the mobilisation of the
populations living in these regions would most probably happen along ethnic lines.
In the irrigated plains, enclaves and border regions are areas of concern. Not only
the reinforcement of the borders (and especially of the Uzbek border) is disrupting
legal trade flows and economic activities (but fostering smuggling), the new state
48
Though reliable statistical data are not available, a range of anectodical information confirm this trend.
44
borders load with a trans-border dimension local disputes and make the search for
solutions more complex.
The establishment of international borders has made the issue of accessing water
and of maintaining water infrastructure an extremely complex question. Tensions and
even local violent clashes over access to water are recurrent along the borders of
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. At the same time, tensions over access to
water are frequent also in mono-ethnic and non-border communities, where disputes
have often an elite dimension and involve mostly local communities and district /
regional authorities. The issue of water allocation is a particularly sensitive question
in Uzbekistan. Disputes and tensions between collective farms and private farmers
will become more frequent.
Radioactive tailing dumps and several industrial locations are environmental
“hotspots”. In a few cases (Bekabad, Turzunzade, Almalyk) do national and regional
authorities perceive pollution as a major issue and as a security threat. The fact that
these environmentally problematic operations in many cases still represent important
economic activities certainly contributes to the fact that countries usually keep a low
profile on issues related to industrial pollution. At the same time, these questions are
a recurrent problem that contributes to strain relations between neighbouring
countries (as in the case of Tursunzadeh vs. Bekabad- Almalyk).
Tailing dumps and industries are exposed to natural hazards. Moreover, they are
often located near rivers and / or main irrigation channels, in the vicinity of town and
cities. Major disastrous events affecting the plants listed above would have dramatic
consequences the livelihoods of large regions. In addition to the immediate
destructions such an event could trigger the displacement of large groups of persons
also affecting the livelihoods of the receiving regions. At the same time, the prospect
of a disaster can be used as an occasion for developing cooperation among regions
and states potentially affected by an accident or disaster.
Climate change is likely to be a pressing and complex environmental issue for the
mountain areas of Central Asia in the coming 30-50 years (especially if severe
climate warming scenarios hypothesized in several studies indeed occur). A situation
made more difficult by the absence of effective policies and institutions to address
the impacts of global warming would increase the vulnerability to climate change –
the states of the region being unprepared to such changes – which in turn could
affect the region’s susceptibility to conflicts.
Finally, strategic infrastructure such as dams (specifically Papan in the Osh region,
Toktogul reservoir but also Lake Sarez in Tajikistan) could be at risk of terrorist
attacks. Fortunately, operations against large dams would need means and
capacities that seem well beyond those of the insurgency groups operating in the
region. More worrying is the prospect of actions against sensitive industrial sites,
since various incidents prove that security is very easy to avoid.
4.1
The Road Ahead
One of the final conclusions of the report could be that the vulnerability to
environmentally – related conflicts at sub-state levels has increased during the last
thirteen years. Especially at risk are mountain / forest areas as well as enclaves and
border regions. Issues pertaining to water (especially to the allocation of water) and
land (availability and quality) are clearly risk-increasing factors as these resources
are already scarce in the Ferghana region.
At the same time, states are not without means of action. By strengthening key
institutions, developing policies favouring cooperation and a sustainable and more
equal economic development, the Central Asian states would probably be able to
45
counter many of the negative effects of the phenomena described in this report, and
by doing this would decrease their vulnerability to violent conflict.
The Environment and Security initiative would like to support the states of the region
in this policy development work. Priority areas such as water, land and industrial
waste should be given specific attention therefore the initiative foresees to undertake
concrete projects in identified problem areas. Moreover, the initiative plans to support
the monitoring of environmentally related conflicts especially in mountain / forest
areas as well as enclaves and border regions.
46
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