RETURN TO THE EMPIRE
Written by:
Gökhan Tekir
The dissolution of the Soviet Empire prompted the emergence of 15 countries. Russian
Federation is the biggest country of these 15 countries and the successor of the Soviet Union.
Having deprived of its enormous army Russia used its energy card in formulating foreign
policy in various degrees depending on political circumstances of the country since its
establishment.
During Yeltsin’s years the rapid privatization and de-industrialization led to handing
over state institutions into businessmen under cheap prices. Energy companies were among
these institutions. Many oil and gas companies started to be controlled by oligarchs. Since
they had the control of the resources, they also engaged in formulating foreign policy-making
process. The policies formulated generally conformed with the West. Russia could not use its
energy card effectively in this period.
Putin’s presidential term marked a huge difference regarding energy policy. First years
of his presidential term he made an implicit consensus with oligarchs. It was not coincidence
that the war between Putin and oligarchs erupted because of disputes concerning the
ownership of energy.
In order to gain the hegemon and superpower status Russian elites considered energy
as the primary tool. Through energy Russia would emphasize its hegemon status in its region
and exert pressure on Europe and China. Thus, almost all energy companies were brought
under the state control. Putin appointed his trusted fellows to heads of gas and oil companies
so these companies were evolved into the state apparatus. The influence over the Central
Asian countries was intensified in order to cut the search of Europe to find alternative energy
routes.
1-ENERGY POLICY OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN YELTSIN ERA
Russian Federation was not able to exert influence over Central Asian and Caucasian
states, which recently gained their independence, in its early years of establishment. It had its
2
own internal clashes and privatization in the economy filled its agenda. During these years
former Soviet states established relations with Western oil companies without needing to get
approval of Russian Federation. The internal problems also compelled Russia. Russia had to
make concession to Chechnya in order to secure energy routes in 1992.
The importance of energy in gaining influence over Central Asian states was documented
in Russian National Security Concept in 1994. Using energy companies as foreign policy
actors in Central Asian countries was emphasized.
1
It was hoped that Russian energy
companies’ penetration to Central Asia would flourish economic re-integration of Central
Asian countries to Russia and ultimately political re-union would be provided. Since Russian
military forces were to serve as security forces to protect energy forces, the military presence
of Russia in Central Asia would be set. Victor Chernomyrdin has reiterated that economic
unity is a prelude to military and political union of the CIS countries. 2 The energy was used
to show Russia’s power over the former Soviet countries. For instance, Russia cut the oil
supply to Moldova just days before when Moldavian parliament would vote on the
membership of the CIS.
1. a. Deal of the Century
Having started to recover the turmoil of its early years of establishment, Russia stated its
intentions towards Central Asian and Caucasian states. In order get itself into game; Russia
took an active policy regarding energy deals of its ‘Near Abroad’ states.
On September 20 1994 several oil companies which merged into a consortium and
Azerbaijan signed an agreement which determined the blueprint of the extraction and
transportation of Azerbaijan oil. Russian state company LUKOIL was included in the
consortium by receiving 10% share without even paying one cent. Despite this generous
gesture of Western oil companies, the nationalist wing of Russian Federation objected this
1
Yasin Aslan, Hazar Petrolleri, Kafkas Kördüğümü ve Türkiye (Ankara: Berikan, 2005), 50.
Stephen Blank, Energy, Economics, and Security in Central Asia: Russia and Its Rivals (Carlisle: ,Strategic
Studies Institute, 1995), 5.
2
3
contract. Russian Foreign Minister Primakov stated that the ministry would not recognize this
deal.
3
The deal made between Western consortium and Azerbaijan was considered as an
intrusion to Russian sphere of influence. This contract also displayed the fragmented nature of
Yeltsin administration. Foreign Ministry was not even notified before the deal had been made.
Unfortunates did not leave Azerbaijan alone after signing the agreement. On September
21 four high-ranking prisoners, who were opposition members, escaped from custody. On
September 29 two top Azeri officials were assassinated.
4
A coup attempt, which aimed to
oust Aliyev, followed these unfortunate events. Aliyev managed to suppress coup attempt but
he changed his Western oriented course. While pursuing his balanced foreign policy, he gave
prefential treatment to Russia in his later years.
Despite the Deal of the Century, the problem of delivering Caspian oil and gas Europe
was not resolved completely. Russia’s ‘big brother’ status over Central Asian states was
increasingly felt by both the countries in the region and Western countries.
1. b. Status of Caspian Sea
Status of Caspian Sea whether it is a sea or lake is one of the most controversial issues in
energy politics. The distribution of mineral resources, fishing rights and geopolitical
considerations are the factors that affect the positions of five littoral states.
The dissolution of Soviet Union and the emergence of different states fuelled the
discussions concerning the status of Caspian Sea. Russia, Iran and Turkmenistan held Caspian
Sea as a lake whereas Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan consider Caspian as sea. The early Russian
position siding with Iran proposed the equal share of the resources among five littoral states
because the international law of the sea cannot be applied to the status of Caspian ‘lake’. 1921
3
Roland Sinker, “The Management of a Transboundary Energy Resource: the Oil and Gas of the Caspian Sea,”
in The Politics of Caspian Oil, ed. Bülent Gökay (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 79.
4
Charles Fairbanks and Elkshan Alakbarov, “Azerbaijan and Ominous Rumblings,” Azerbaijan International,
last modified Winter 1994,
http://www.azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/24_folder/24articles/24_russia.html
4
and 1940 agreements signed between Iran and the Soviet Union were the legal basis of the
claims of these two countries.
The position of Russia changed constantly on Caspian status later. The change in Russian
policy about the status of Caspian reflected the struggle within the state structure. Ministry of
Oil and Fuel lobbied by oil companies and Foreign Ministry could not agree on this issue. Oil
companies urged Russian state to take a more conciliatory position. 5 Russian state used the
controversy concerning the status of Caspian Sea to prevent complete realization of the Deal
of the Century. Russia, then, softened its stance and sought bilateral agreements with littoral
states. Russia came to accept the sectorial division of Caspian Sea belt.6 This approach
divides the sea belt and surface. Iran protested Russia’s reversion. Iran proposed a joint
solution instead of bilateral agreements since it fears that Russia has the upper hand when
negotiating with countries in the region. The parties are still trying to find a solution, which
will satisfy all partners.
Russia’s stance on Caspian Base is geopolitical rather than the distribution of the
resources. Littoral states’ positions on Caspian Base determine their sovereignty areas. The
energy deals of these countries with other parties will be affected by their sovereignty issue.
As long as the status of Caspian Sea causes disputation, Russia will get opportunity to
interfere in the region.
1. c. First Chechen-Russian War
Chechnya is one of the autonomous republics in Russian Federation. Since its annexation
by Russian Empire in the 19th century, the disturbances and conflicts always existed between
Chechens and Russian state. The religious difference with Russian population was the main
reason for the ongoing conflict. After Second World War most of Chechen and Ingush people
5
Kamyar Mehdiyoun, “Ownership of Oil and Gas Resources in the Caspian Sea,” American Journal of
International Law 94, no. 1 (2000): 185.
6
Ibid., 187.
5
were expelled from their territories. That act of the Soviet state increased bitter feelings of
Chechens against Russians.
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union Chechens also wanted to set their own national
state so Chechnya declared its independence in 1991 under the Dzokhar Dudayev’s
leadership, who was a Major-General in the Soviet Army. This declaration was not accepted
by Russian Federation but the state was so weak that it could not send troops, either.
Energy politics is important in evaluating Chechnya’s position in Russia. Chechnya has
considerable oil resources and the Northern Baku-Novorossiysk route passes through over
153 km of Chechen territory.
7
In the case of Chechnya’s independence, an alternative route
which would connect Europe with Caspian oil would emerge. Therefore, Russia decided not
to tolerate a secessionist movement in Chechnya and launched a war in 1994 when the
nationalist wing in the government gained strength within the government. Yeltsin had to
support the war due to the fact that he felt that he needed a victory before the presidential
elections.
The result of the war was shocking to the world and to Russia. Small and unequipped
Chechen forces defeated Russian army. Russia had to withdraw from Chechnya and accept
de-facto Chechen independence. Russia treated Chechnya as a separate state in making energy
agreements by giving generous shares to Chechnya government in these agreements.
Chechnya was a huge failure for Russian honor because while asserting its leadership position
over Central Asian states, it could not restore its sovereignty within its territories.
1. d. The privatization of energy companies
The privatization of the state enterprises was the main objective of Yeltsin. Firstly,
voucher privatization was implemented in which vouchers which were equivalent of 10000
rubles were distributed among Russian population. Deprived of meeting their basic needs,
7
Syed Adnan Ali Shah, “The Genesis of Chechen Conflict,” The Institute of Strategic Studies, accessed April 5,
2012, http://www.issi.org.pk/old-site/ss_Detail.php?dataId=225
6
most of Russian citizens traded their vouchers with money. Thus, the vouchers were
accumulated into the hands of bureaucrats or people who had capital.
In 1995, loans for shares program was introduced with the recommendation of an oligarch
Vladimir Potanin. In this program, the assets of the state were held as leverage to the loans
lent by banks to the government. The program was implemented in a collusive course. The
managers of the state enterprises were bribed to take loans, which they don’t plan to pay back,
from the banks, owned by the oligarchs. Thus, the oligarchs became the owners of many state
companies under their normal value of the market. Among these state enterprises the energy
companies existed. Mikhail Khodorkovsky owned YUKOS, Boris Berezovsky and Roman
Abramovich owned Sibneft.
The oligarchs gained considerable influence over foreign policy via their ownership of
energy companies. The most controversial involvement of the oligarchs in Russian policy was
their role in Chechnya issue. The importance of Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline drove the
oligarchs to collaborate with Chechnya government during first and second Chechnya-Russia
war. It was rumored that the oligarchs financed Chechnya government against Russia.
Berezovsky was associated with Shamil Basaev, notorious war lord who was responsible for
the hostage crisis in Beslan.
8
The oligarchs, therefore, put their business interests above the
interests of the interests of Russian state. Putin, later, did not forgive Berezovsky for his past
dealings with Chechens.
The oil companies run by oligarchs clashed with Russian foreign ministry in the deals
with Central Asian countries in the mid-1990s. These clashes resulted mostly with the victory
of energy sector over nationalist wing. Berezovsky had risen to the executive secretary of the
CIS. His arbitrary involvement in the affairs of other states and usurpation of his authority
8
Peter Duncan, “’Oligarchs’, Business and Russian Foreign Policy: From Yeltsin to Putin” (Economics Working
Paper, London, 2007), 6.
7
upset even Yeltsin. He was sacked in 1999.
9
The role of oligarchs in both domestic and
foreign level created hatred among nationalist wing within the government. Russian
population also blamed the oligarchs for accumulation of wealth and power in the hands of
small group of businessmen. Old and weak president Yeltsin could not hold on power and
tendered his resignation in the last day of 1999. New prime minister and future president of
Russian Federation would change the course of Russian politics.
2. ENERGY POLITICS IN PUTIN’S PRESIDENCY
Putin attempted to restore the strength of Russian state. The energy politics is important
element for Russia to assert its superpower status. In Putin’s term, Russia tries to counter the
infiltration of NATO and the EU into its Near Abroad. Alexander Ghaleb, who is a national
security expert and U.S. Army captain, claims that Russia cannot confront NATO and
Western alliance through military means. Thus, oil and gas politics are the vital instruments
for Russia to formulate its grand strategic objectives. 10 Putin himself stated that the energy
resources are instruments to implement domestic and foreign policy; the role of country on
energy markets determines its geopolitical influence. 11
In addition to its importance of foreign policy, the rise in oil prices helped Russian
economy to develop in 2000s considerably after the economic collapse in 1990s. In 1997, the
price of crude oil per barrel saw the deepest level with $18,97 and deprived Russia of an
important source of revenue. Since 2000s oil prices have risen. In 2012, price per barrel of oil
is 101,83.
12
Strong economy enabled Russia to impose aid programs to its Near Abroad to
increase its influence. The weak position against the Western world disappeared due to weak
economy and Russia gained confidence in implementing its foreign policy.
9
Ibid., 8.
Alexander Ghaleb, Natural Gas as An Instrument of Russian State Power (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute,
2011), 43.
11
Roman Kupchinsky, “Russia’s New Energy Blackmail Tool, “ The Jamestown Foundation, last modified
April 22, 2009, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34888
12
“Oil price history, Research and Analysis System,” accessed 9 April 2012,
http://www.worldoils.com/oilprice.php
10
8
In order to establish oil and gas companies as the extensions of the state apparatus, the
energy companies that were handed over to the oligarchs were brought the state friendly
capitalists. This policy of Putin caused conflict between the administration and the oligarchs,
resulting the end of influence of oligarchs as the policy-making class in Russian politics.
2. a. Clash of the oligarchs
In August 1999, Sergei Stephashin resigned from his premiership post. Yeltsin brought
Vladimir Putin, who was First Deputy Prime Minister at that time, to the premiership. The
oligarchs, notably Boris Berezovsky backed Yeltsin’s decision to appoint Putin. Berzevosky
thought that Putin could not fight with big capital and would be another puppet prime
minister.13 The premiership and first years of his presidential term Putin had warm
relationship with the oligarchs. The oligarchs financed Putin’s presidential race.
The honeymoon lasted very shortly. The Second Chechen War, which started in 1999,
marked the first fracture in the policies of Putin administration and the oligarchs.
Berezovsky’s connections with Chechen war lords and his role in the Chechen attack on
Dagestan created suspicion and controversy in the circles of the Russian state.
Putin made it clear that he would not share state power with the oligarchs. Putin and the
oligarchs came to a consensus in which Putin allowed them to retain their property in return
for non-interference of the oligarchs into the state affairs. However, the question concerning
the ownership of energy companies was the biggest obstacle to the maintenance of the
consensus because energy companies controlled by the oligarchs could not be used effectively
by the Russian state as reliable foreign policy instruments.
The strategy pursued in the ownership of energy companies had two dimensions. The first
one is the direct state control over the shares of the energy sector. The second one is to make
the state-friendly businessmen and bureaucrats in charge of the administration of the energy
13
Sinan Oğan, “Politics and Oligarchs in Russia” TÜRKSAM, last modified October 5, 2004, accessed April 12,
2012, http:// www.turksam.org.tr/a113
9
companies. Putin stated that he did not oppose capitalism per se on the condition that private
investment could only be possible under state control.
14
The oligarchs were forced to sell
their shares to the state. Some of bureaucrats who turned into businessmen are listed below.
Name
Official Post
Business Post
Date
Appointment
Dmitry Medvedev
Head, Presidential
Administration
Chairman
June 2002
Administration
Deputy head,
Presidential Admin
Chairman,
Igor Sechin
Deputy head,
Presidential Admin
Chairman, Rosneft
Yevgeny Shkolov
Former
aide
Medvedev
Arkady Dvorkovich
Head, Presidential
Experts’ Directorate
Board of directors, August 2004
Transneft
“
“
Board of directors,
Sukhoy
September 2004
Sergei Vyazalov
Deputy head,
Presidential Foreign
Policy Directorate
Board of directors,
RZhD
24 October 2003
“
“
Board of directors,
Svyazinvest
September 2003
Igor Shuvalov
Aide to the President
Board of directors, July 2004
RZhD
Vladislav Surkov
Gazprom
of
August 2004
Transnefteprodukt
27 July 2004
to Board of directors, August 2004
Transneft
14
Michael Fredholm, The Russian Energy Strategy & Energy Policy: Pipeline Diplomacy or Mutual
Dependence (Watchfield: Defence Academy of United Kingdom, 2005), 15.
10
Viktor Ivanov
Aide to the President
Chairman, Aeroflot
23 October 2004
Sergei Prikhodko
Aide to the President
Chairman, TRV
April 2003
“
“
Board of directors,
Sukhoy
September 2003
“
“
Chairman, TVEL
23 October 2004
Mikhail Lesin
Advisor
President
Aleksei Gromov
Press-secretary to
the President
Board of directors, 30 June 2004
Aleksandr Anoshkin
Aide to Medvedev
Board of directors, September 2001
Svyazinvest
Aleksei Miller
Friend of Putin from
St Petersburg
President, Gazprom
Igor Yusufov
President’s Special
Representative
Board of Directors, June 2005
Gazprom
to
the Board of directors, 30 June 2004
Channel One
Channel One
May 2001
15
Apparatchik system in the Soviet era was implemented in order to control energy and
media sector which have a big influence on policy-making process in foreign policy of
Russia. Ghaleb classifies new system in Russian economy as ‘post-Soviet Russian style
laissez-faire capitalism.’16 The notable oligarchs such as Boris Berezovsky, Vladimir
15
Ibid., 16.
Alexander Ghaleb, Natural Gas as An Instrument of Russian State Power (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute,
2011), 53.
16
11
Gusinksy fled the country. Those who stayed were expected to be loyal to the Russian
administration in order to avoid the consequences.
The consequences for not being loyal to the regime proved to be severe as we saw in
Khodorkovsky case. Once he was a small cafe owner in perestroika, he became the wealthiest
man in Russia. Mikhail Khodorkovsky became the owner of oil company Yukos during the
privatization in Yeltsin’s presidential term. Khodorkovsky’s clamorous opposition to Putin
administration and his search new foreign partners to his oil companies ended his success
story. He was in touch with Exxonmobile for Yukos and Chinese oil companies for
Yuganskneftegas to convince them to buy larger shares in Yukos because he was searching
allies against Kremlin for his political ambitions. On December 19, 2004 the Russian
government auctioned off Yuganskneftegas. The state owned company Rosneft bought
Yuganskneftegas, ultimately. On May 31, 2004 Khodorkovsky was sentenced to nine years
imprisonment. Putin addressed this conviction as the victory over corruption. 17 Kremlin
underscored three important headlines for the oligarchs that would influence their relations
with the state. The first rule was the state would no longer tolerate the interference and
opposition of the oligarchs. The second rule was the state would not allow the ownership of
the shares of the foreign companies in strategically important sectors. The final rule was if the
oligarchs do not follow first and second rule, they might face ‘corruption’ charges for their
misconducts in Yeltsin era.
2. b. Ukraine- Russia gas crisis
In 2005, Victor Yushchenko, who had pro-Western stance became president after the
fraudulent elections were renewed. Ukraine is a bridge which links the Russian gas to
European countries. The loss of this bridge was unacceptable to Russia. Putin signaled the gas
wars in 2004, when Yushchenko was elected in 2004: “Ukraine should think twice about any
17
Elizabeth Wishnick, “Russia and The CIS in 2005: Promoting East Asian Oil Diplomacy, Containing Change
in Central Asia, “ Asian Survey 46, no.1 (2006): 69.
12
such embrace of the West.”
18
It was clear that Russian administration would not maintain to
supply gas to Ukraine on low prices. Ukraine was paying $ 50 per thousand cubic meters of
gas; Russia was looking for $ 230 before talks halted.19 The privilege of paying low prices for
gas was kept for the states under Russian sphere of influence. Russia cut off gas to Ukraine
led to the crisis in 2006.
Europe was much affected by the crisis between Ukraine and Russia because Ukraine kept
gas which was supposed to be delivered to Europe. With European pressure Ukraine and
Russia reached an agreement. The overall price Ukraine will pay will be $ 95 per 1000 cubic
meters. It will also get paid 47% more for transporting Russian gas to Europe. 20
Gazprom acted as a department of foreign ministry during the crisis. Russia indicated that
it would not tolerate and finance pro-Western regimes in its sphere of influence. The crisis
also showed the European dependency on Russian energy supply. Thus, the EU accelerated
its endeavors to diversify the Caspian energy sources.
3. NABUCCO PROJECT
European countries sought South Caucasus and Turkey route as an alternative to bring
Caspian oil and gas to Europe to reduce the dependence on Russia. The negotiation began in
2002 and concluded in 2009 with an agreement signed in 2009 among Turkey, Romania,
Hungary, and Austria. The energy sources in Central Asia was planned to be delivered via
Turkey to Romania and distributed to Europe. The project was advertised as the project of the
century which would secure energy supply to Europe. However, the biggest challenge to the
project was the uncertainty of the cooperation of the energy supplier countries in Central
18
Alexander Ghaleb, Natural Gas as An Instrument of Russian State Power (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute,
2011), 90.
19
“Putin’s Kremlin Flexes Its Muscles With Gazprom,” forbes.com, last modified January 2, 2006,
http://www.forbes.com/2006/01/02/putin-gazprom-ukraine-cx_po_0102autofacescan02.html
20
“Ukraine and Russia reach gas deal, “ bbc.co.uk, last modified January 4, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4579648.stm
13
Asia. Despite the statements which indicated the willingness to join to Nabucco project, no
country in Central Asia dared to defy Russia openly.
The control over the ‘Near Abroad’ countries was tightened. Russia tried to make new
energy deals with Central Asian counties to prevent independent actions of those states by
exercising its tutelary position over them. Russia developed an alternative route by
convincing Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to sell their gas to Russia firstly. Then, the gas is to
be delivered through Russian soil to Europe. Thus, the supply side of Nabucco project was
weakened.
After 2008 war with Georgia Russia asserted dominant position over South Caucasus. The
energy route of South Caucasus was secured by Russian ‘peacekeeping’ forces in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia. This event was another blow to Nabucco project. On the other hand, the
situation in Iran, which was supposed to be another supplier to the project, is getting more
unstable day by day. The European countries were forced to cut off their oil supplies from
Iran almost completely with the insistence of the USA for the embargos. Therefore, the
European countries became more dependent on Russian supply.
Russia countered this project by setting new projects through which it will be able to
maintain its monopoly on the delivery of Caspian energy resources to Europe. South Stream
and Nord Stream are the projects which enable Russia to make bilateral agreements with
European states.
South Stream project aims at connecting Russia and South Eastern Europe via pipeline
system which would be constructed under the Black Sea. This project is seen as rival project
despite Russian officials’ denial. Considering the costs of building pipeline South Stream
seems to be more a strategic than a cost-efficient option to Russian gas to Europe. Gas
14
transportation to Europe will be contacted with Gazprom even if it originally stems from a
Central Asian country.21
Nord Stream is a project which links Germany and Russia with the pipeline under Baltic
Sea. It created too much controversy in the EU because this project eliminates the leverage of
transit countries in Eastern Europe against Russia for delivering Russian energy supply to
Europe. Europe appears to have different strategic considerations concerning energy security.
Russia takes advantage of this lack of disagreement between Old Europe and New Europe and
defines the rule of the game.22 Again, strategic considerations are taken into account instead
of economic considerations for Nord Stream project. Russia’s undersea Nord Stream pipeline
will cost three times more than a pipeline system which would pass through the territories of
Lithuania and Poland.23 With this project Russia not only prevents alternative energy route
that would undermine its energy-power status but also it is able to create division among EU
member states concerning the energy politics of Europe.
All these attempts of Russia to prevent Nabucco project from turning into reality show
that Russia perceive its energy card over Europe as an important foreign policy tool. It
developed several energy deals with both European countries and Central Asian countries to
maintain its energy supplier status for Europe.
4. CONCLUSION
According to Putin, the dissolution of the Soviet Union was the biggest geopolitical
catastrophe in the 20th century. The withdrawal of Soviet forces from former-Soviet territories
created vacuum in that area. Nonetheless, Russia did not give up its privilege interests over its
21
Caroline Dieckhöner, “Simulating security of supply effects of the Nabucco and South Stream projects for the
European natural gas market, “Institute of Energy Economics (2010): 6.
22
Alexander Ghaleb, Natural Gas as An Instrument of Russian State Power (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute,
2011),111.
23
Zeyno Baran, “ EU Energy Security: Time to End Russian Leverage,” The Washington Quaterly Autumn
(2007): 135.
15
‘Near Abroad’. Energy politics has been vital tool of Russia to counter Western influence on
its sphere of influence.
Due to fractured structure of the Russian politics in 1990s Russia could not use this
power effectively. Privatization of energy companies during Yeltsin’s presidential term
prevented Russian state from utilizing energy card. The oligarchs who controlled the energy
sector preferred to be in conformity with the Western powers.
Putin’s presidential term brought energy companies under state friendly businessmen
and former Kremlin bureaucrats. Thus, energy companies evolved into foreign policy agents
of the state. The rise in energy prices also helped Russian economy to develop. This
development in the economy enabled Russia to act more independently in terms of foreign
policy. Russia used energy card as the sword of Damocles over Europe
After experiences gas crisis with Russia, Europe sought new ways to bring Caspian
energy sources to the continent. Nabucco project aims at realizing that purpose. Nevertheless,
it was understood that no country would be supplier at the expense of Russia. In addition to
this blow, Russia developed two projects which eliminated Nabucco project: South Stream
and Nord Stream. These two projects raised questions concerning the coherency within the
EU concerning energy politics. Russia appears to maintain its dominant position over Central
Asia and European countries are forced to acknowledge Russia’s privileged position in this
area.
16
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Blank, Stephen. Energy, Economics, and Security in Central Asia: Russia and Its Rivals.
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17
Wishnick, Elizabeth “Russia and The CIS in 2005: Promoting East Asian Oil Diplomacy,
Containing Change in Central Asia. “ Asian Survey 46, no.1 (2006): 69-79.
“Ukraine and Russia reach gas deal. “ bbc.co.uk. Last modified January 4, 2006.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4579648.stm
18